Achieving excellence in engineering
education: theingredients of
successful change
March 2012
ii
Achieving excellence in engineering education: the ingredients of successful change
© The Royal Academy of Engineering, 2012
ISBN 1-903496-83-7
March 2012
Published by The Royal Academy of Engineering
3 Carlton House Terrace, London SW1Y 5DG
Tel: 020 7766 0600 Fax: 020 7930 1549
www.raeng.org.uk
Registered Charity Number: 293074
A copy of this report is available online at www.raeng.org.uk/change
Author
Dr Ruth Graham
Grateful thanks
The time given by those interviewed and by the sta at the institutions described in the case studies
isgratefully acknowledged.
The author thanks Professor Helen Atkinson FREng, Professor Edward Crawley FREng,
Professor Peter Goodhew FREng and Professor David Nethercot FREng for their technical advice,
guidance and oversight and Kristina Edström and Karl Smith for their help with proof reading
the drafts.
This report was jointly funded by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) and
The Royal Academy of Engineering.
Achieving excellence in engineering
education: theingredients of
successful change
March 2012
1
No profession unleashes the spirit of innovation like engineering. From research to real-world applications,
engineers constantly discover how to improve our lives by creating bold new solutions that connect
science to life in unexpected, forward-thinking ways. Few professions turn so many ideas into so many
realities. Fewhave such a direct and positive eect on people’s everyday lives. We are counting on
engineers and their imaginations to help us meet the needs of the 21st century.
Changing the conversation – messages for improving public understanding of engineering,
NationalAcademy of Engineering, 2008
Engineering is vital to successful, sustainable civilisation. So much rests on the shoulders of future generations
of engineers that we must give them the best possible foundation to their professional lives.
This means ensuring that engineering graduates can apply theoretical knowledge to industrial problems as
well as exhibit theoretical understanding, creativity and innovation, team-working, technical breadth and
business skills. To do this, engineering degree programmes must keep pace with the changing requirements
of industry, with much more interaction between departments and industry.
We call this experience led engineering education and The Royal Academy has dened this in a series of reports
going back to 2006. This latest report goes beyond asking what to change or why and asks how successful
and sustainable change has been achieved by engineering faculty around the world. It is essential reading for
everyone responsible for the education of the next generation of engineers.
Professor Edward Crawley FREng
President
The Skolkovo Institute of Science and Technology
Dr David Grant FREng
Vice Chancellor
Cardi University
Foreword
2
Achieving excellence in engineering education: the ingredients of successful change
A series of reports from The Royal Academy of Engineering
(The Royal Academy of Engineering, 2006, 2007, 2010) has
demonstrated that change in undergraduate engineering
education is urgently needed to ensure graduates remain
equipped for the new and complex challenges of the 21st
century. However, the necessary transformation in the
structure and delivery of undergraduate provision has yet to
take place across the sector. There is a growing appreciation
that the slow pace of change reects the diculties of
catalysing and sustaining educational reform within
engineering departments and schools. The case for reform is
recognised; the challenge is to make it happen. The pressing
issue for engineering education is not whether but how
to change.
The report turns the spotlight on this issue. It examines how
positive change can be achieved across the engineering
curriculum, looking specically at how reform can be initiated,
implemented and sustained within engineering departments
and schools.
The report draws on the experiences of those involved in
major programmes of engineering education reform across
the world with the aim of distilling the common features
of success and failure. A two stage study was conducted
between January and October 2011. Firstly, interviews were
conducted with 70 international experts from 15 countries,
each with rst-hand experience of curriculum change in
engineering. The interviews provided insight into a wide
range of examples of curricular reform from across the world,
oering a high-level view of the features associated with
successful and unsuccessful reform. Secondly, six examples
were selected from those identied through the expert
interviews to investigate in detail how signicant educational
reform can be achieved. The six case studies are all highly-
regarded, selected to provide a spectrum of drivers for reform,
change strategies, levels of ambition, geographical locations
and stages in the change process. A further 117 individuals
were consulted for these case studies.
The study identies four common features of successful,
widespread change that appear to be largely independent
of geography or institution type. These are discussed in
turn below.
Firstly, successful systemic change is often initiated in
response to a common set of circumstances. In contrast to
course-level (in the UK, module level) changes, which are
often driven by persuasive pedagogical evidence or national
calls for a new ‘breed’ of engineer, successful widespread
changes are usually triggered by signicant threats to the
market position of the department/school. The issues faced
are strongly apparent to faculty and, in some cases, university
management have stipulated that a fundamental change
is necessary for the long-term survival of the programme
and/or department. Typical issues include problems with
recruitment, retention and employability. The urgent and
fundamental nature of these problems creates both a
widespread acknowledgement that educational change
is unavoidable, and a collegiality and common purpose
amongst faculty in achieving the curriculum-wide reform.
These conditions appear to vastly increase the chances of
systemic reform being both successfully implemented and
sustained. Anumber of other common contextual factors
are shared by successful change programmes. For example,
they are much more likely to involve faculty with industry
experience and/or newly-hired faculty, often replacing those
retiring. Also, in a surprising number of cases, the leaders of
successful curriculum-wide change have experienced failure
in prior attempts to make isolated changes at the course level,
from which they concluded that “change needed to be radical
and widespread for it to stick”.
Secondly, a number of common features are apparent
in the educational design of successful programmes of
change. Success appears to be associated with the extent
to which the change is embedded into a coherent and
interconnected curriculum structure. The study identied
numerous examples of ambitious reform that had ultimately
failed due to their curricular isolation and reliance on
one or two faculty members. Almost without exception,
successful and sustainable change starts with a fundamental
assessment of the curriculum-wide goals and involves a
high-level re-alignment of the entire curriculum structure in
which a cross section of faculty are involved. This successful
approach to educational design appears to be independent
of the scale of change undertaken. Indeed, most successful
‘curriculum-wide’ changes typically only involve the
creation of a relatively small number of new courses –
usually less than 20% of the curriculum. What distinguishes
them, however, is the extent to which the changes are
interconnected within a re-designed coherent curriculum
structure with multiple horizontal and vertical dependencies.
The vast majority of successful change programmes
considered in this study have also sought to create a new
‘brand’ for their educational approach, and one that aspires
to set a benchmark for national or international engineering
education practice. This status, as a potential world-leader, is
one that supports continued faculty engagement with the
reform process.
Thirdly, the department appears to be the engine of
change, with the sustained commitment of the Department
Head being a critical factor in its success. Regardless of the
scale of the planned change (from a school-wide eort to
a small cluster of courses), the successful changes were
consistently identied as those that had taken a department-
wide approach to the reform. For example, amongst the
school-wide reforms considered in this study, long-term
successful curricular changes are conned to individual
departments, with very limited diusion of good practice
outside their boundaries. The pivotal role played by the Head
of Department in successful change is also a major nding
of the study. Almost without exception, successful changes
are energetically supported by the Department Head, who
invariably is also the leader or co-leader of the change. This
individual is typically internally appointed and very highly
regarded in both their research and teaching activities. Along-
standing trust in the Department Head amongst a core of
faculty often leads to a widespread belief that their eorts
in the educational change would be valued and a belief
that this individual would “ght our case” during promotions
procedures.
Executive summary
3
Finally, the study highlights signicant challenges
associated with sustaining change, with the majority of
reform endeavours reverting to the status quo ante in the
years following implementation. Indeed, even amongst
those changes that are successfully maintained, many have
encountered signicant problems around 5–10 years after the
graduation of their rst cohort of students. Most experience
a gradual course-by-course ‘drift’ back to a more traditional
curriculum. These issues often stem from a growing sense
amongst faculty that the new curriculum is no longer ‘cutting-
edge’ and/or an inux of newly-appointed faculty who did
not experience the threat that precipitated the reforms. The
critical test of the sustainability of an educational reform is
whether it continues beyond a university restructuring or
changes to senior management. The change programmes
that appear to be most resilient in these conditions are those
that involve: a cross-section of faculty in the delivery of the
reformed courses, a well-disseminated impact evaluation of
the change and an on-going focus on educational innovation
and reinvention.
The study highlights the signicant eort that has been
devoted to engineering curriculum reform across the world.
It also underlines the diculties experienced by the ‘lone
champions’ who are currently driving reform in engineering
schools and departments across the world, where changes
often prove limited and short-term. The evidence points
instead to the importance of departmental leadership and
widespread faculty engagement in a process of reform
which is informed, coherent and ambitious. Distilling the
strategies employed in successful change endeavours, the
study oers some recommendations for the consideration
of engineering schools and departments wishing to embark
on curriculum reform. It closes with three recommendations
for the engineering education community, to help to ensure
that curriculum reforms stand the best possible chance of
achieving a positive and sustainable change.
4
Achieving excellence in engineering education: the ingredients of successful change
This report was undertaken with nancial support from the Royal Academy of Engineering and Massachusetts
Institute of Technology. The study was guided and supported by a steering group of Fellows from the Royal
Academy of Engineering.
I am particularly grateful to the engineering faculty, university managers, industry partners, education
professionals and engineering students from across the world who contributed so generously to the study by
givingtheir time and sharing their experiences, knowledge and expertise.
Dr Ruth Graham
Acknowledgements
5
1 Introduction ...........................................................................................................................................................................6
1.1 Background .........................................................................................................................................................................6
1.2 Focus ...................................................................................................................................................................................6
1.3 Approach .............................................................................................................................................................................6
2 Summary literature review ................................................................................................................................................8
2.1 Origins and focus of research in the eld .............................................................................................................................. 8
2.2 Critique of current change activities .....................................................................................................................................8
2.3 Models and strategies for change ........................................................................................................................................9
2.4 Drivers for change ..............................................................................................................................................................10
2.5 Critical features of success and failure ................................................................................................................................10
2.6 Culture and rewards procedures ........................................................................................................................................11
2.7 Measuring the impact of change .......................................................................................................................................12
2.8 Is further evidence on change in engineering education needed? .....................................................................................12
3 Evidence from interviews with educational change experts and past reform leaders ...................................14
3.1 The interview study. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
3.2 Prospects for change across the world ...............................................................................................................................15
3.3 Examples of highly-regarded change .................................................................................................................................16
3.4 The conditions that trigger change ....................................................................................................................................16
3.5 Managing the change process ...........................................................................................................................................20
3.6 Sustaining and evaluating change .....................................................................................................................................23
4 Evidence from the case study investigations ..............................................................................................................26
4.1 Case study 1: Department of Civil, Environmental & Geomatic Engineering,
Faculty of Engineering Sciences, UCL, UK
...........................................................................................................................27
4.2 Case study 2: School of Engineering, The Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, Hong Kong ..........................33
4.3 Case study 3: iFoundry, College of Engineering, University of Illinois, US .............................................................................38
4.4 Case study 4: Department of Chemical Engineering, University of Queensland, Australia ...................................................41
4.5 Case study 5: Faculty of Engineering and Computing, Coventry University, UK ...................................................................48
4.6 Case study 6: Learning Factory, College of Engineering, Penn State University, US ..............................................................53
5 Concluding comments ......................................................................................................................................................60
5.1 Overall observations on educational change in engineering ..............................................................................................60
5.2 Common features of programmes of successful change ....................................................................................................60
5.3 What does NOT appear to be associated with successful change .......................................................................................63
5.4 Common features of unsuccessful change .........................................................................................................................64
5.5 Recommendations .............................................................................................................................................................64
Appendix A ....................................................................................................................................List of those interviewed 66
Appendix B ............................................................................................................................................................References 68
Contents
6
Achieving excellence in engineering education: the ingredients of successful change
1.1 Background
“Engineering today is characterised by both a rapidly
increasing diversity of the demands made on engineers in
their professional lives and the ubiquity of the products and
services they provide. Yet there is a growing concern that
in the UK the education system responsible for producing
new generations of engineers is failing to keep pace… The
structure and content of engineering courses [programmes]
has changed relatively little over the past 20 years”.
(The Royal Academy of Engineering, 2007)
A series of reports from The Royal Academy of Engineering
(The Royal Academy of Engineering, 2006, 2007, 2010)
demonstrates that change in undergraduate engineering
education is urgently needed to ensure graduates remain
equipped for the new and complex challenges of the 21st
century. However, the necessary transformation in the
structure and delivery of undergraduate provision has yet to
take place across the Higher Education sector. The engineering
curriculum in most institutions has proved resistant to change
and this problem is not conned to the UK:
From the US – “…we are sobered by two realities: rst, that
scattered interventions across engineering education over
the past decade or so have not resulted in systemic change,
but rather only in isolated instances of success in individual
programs, on individual campuses; and second, that the
disconnect between the system of engineering education
and the practice of engineering appears to be accelerating.”
(National Academy of Engineering, 2004)
From Australia – “… the engineering curriculum has been
slow to respond and while there has been some reform over
the past 15 years, the educational model we use is still not
much dierent from that of 30 years ago, and while the
pace of change in the world has increased signicantly, the
pace of change in engineering education has been far too
slow”. (Institution of Engineers, Australia, 1996)
There is a growing appreciation that the slow pace of change
reects the diculties of catalysing and sustaining systemic
educational reform within engineering departments and
Schools. The case for change is recognised; the challenge lies
in making it happen. In other words, the pressing issue for
engineering education is not whether to change but how
to change.
1.2 Focus
This study focuses on the conditions and mechanisms
for achieving positive and sustainable change in the core
undergraduate engineering curriculum. Educational design
is clearly a critical element of successful change; what
changes should be made are therefore of fundamental
importance. However, this report is primarily concerned with
how successful change can be initiated, implemented and
maintained.
In most engineering departments, innovative approaches to
teaching and learning are typically only found at the margins
of the undergraduate curriculum, with their development and
continuation resting on a few highly committed individuals.
In contrast, this study looks at strategic, systemic changes,
within a Department or School of Engineering, that aect
the mainstream education of a large proportion of the
student cohort and the factors that optimise the success and
sustainability of such a reform. It seeks to identify successful
change strategies that have produced long-term positive
outcomes as well as highlight common pit-falls that can sink
programmes of curricular reform.
The study draws on international knowledge about
educational change in engineering, supported by interviews
with international experts and additional evidence-gathering
from selected case studies. Evidence has been gathered
through consultations with 187 individuals from across the
world, of which 123 were formal one-to-one interviews.
Although international in its view, the study focuses
particularly on the US and UK.
The study builds on three pivotal reports published by the
Royal Academy of Engineering – Educating Engineers for the
21st Century (Spinks et al 2006, RAEng 2007) and Engineering
Graduates for Industry (RAEng 2010) that called for major
changes to the engineering curriculum.
1.3 Approach
The report is informed by three sources of information,
gathered between January and October 2011:
Phase 1: snap-shot review of the literature on
educational change in engineering. A summary is
provided in Chapter 2.
Phase 2: interviews with international experts and
practitioners. Expert evidence was captured from
70 individuals from 15 countries across the world
1
,
drawing on their perceptions, experiences and future
forecasts for educational change in undergraduate
engineering education. The interviews focused on the
current climate for educational change at a national
level, key barriers to establishing and implementing
reform eorts and the critical ingredients for
successful and sustainable reform. The interviews
targeted: (i) research experts in the eld, (ii) those
with experience of leading educational change in
engineering, (iii) those with a national or international
policy view of engineering education, and (iv)
observers to academic reform eorts, such as industry
advisors. A summary of insights from the interviews is
presented in Chapter 3.
Phase 3: case studies investigations. Six programmes
of educational reform in engineering were identied
from the expert interviews, and a diagnostic undertaken
of the critical conditions and catalysts for change in
each case. The selected case studies are from the US, UK,
Australia and Hong Kong. A total of 128 individuals were
consulted for the case study investigations, of which
1 Introduction
1 It should be noted that 11 individuals contributed both to the
interviews in Phase 2 and the case studies in Phase 3
7
64 were formal one-to-one interviews, typically one
hour in duration. Each case study investigation drew
on interviews with between 8–17 individuals who led,
participated in, managed, observed or were aected
by the change, to undertake an analysis of the factors
critical to the programme’s success. These six case
studies are presented in Chapter 4.
Chapter 5 provides a summary of the study outcomes,
presenting an overview of the critical common elements
in successful programmes of educational change
in engineering.
Unless directly quoting from interviewees in the study, all
terminology used in this report is based on US convention,
where, for example, faculty refers to departmental academic
sta and course refers to a discrete credit-bearing unit within a
degree programme.
8
Achieving excellence in engineering education: the ingredients of successful change
This chapter provides a summary review of the literature in
educational change in engineering. The review looks in turn
at the development of research on change in engineering
education (2.1), how curriculum change is typically
approached in practice (2.2), alternative change strategies
(2.3), the drivers for making a change (2.4), the critical features
of success and failure (2.5), the role of academic culture and
existing rewards procedures (2.6) and how the impact of
change is measured (2.7).
The key messages are (i) the dearth of research on strategies
for successful, systemic change in engineering education, (ii)
the dominance of the ‘diusion of innovation’ educational
change model in the literature, despite some concerns about
its applicability to curriculum reform, and (iii) the lack of
high quality evidence to evaluate the impact of engineering
curriculum change.
2.1 Origins and focus of research in the eld
Educational change in engineering is a relatively new eld of
research. It has its origins in the 1980s, in the drive to increase
student numbers and/or diversity in the Science, Technology,
Engineering and Mathematics (STEM) undergraduate body
(Godfrey, 2009 and Seymour, 2001). This eld of research was
later shaped by a desire to increase the talent pool in the
engineering education pipeline and the need to prepare
engineering graduates to meet the complex industrial and
societal challenges of the 21st Century (King, 2008, Jamieson
and Lohmann, 2009, Spalter-Roth et al., 2007).
The majority – probably 80–90% – of the research in
engineering education change has been undertaken in the
US. This is largely a product of the US approach to funding
educational innovation in the sciences in recent decades,
through the National Science Foundation (NSF). During
the 1990s and early 2000s, the NSF invested over $200m
in the Engineering Education Coalitions Program, targeted
at 8 university coalitions, to “foster broad-based, rapid,
synergistic, and collaborative change”
(Coward et al., 2000).
Although the coalitions resulted in local improvements at
the host institutions, they “did not lead to the comprehensive
and systematic new models for engineering reform that were
expected” (National Science Board, 2007). For many, the failure
of coalitions to catalyse wider change across the sector
was a consequence of the model of change on which the
Coalition Program was based. Drawing on Rogers’ diusion
of innovation model (Rogers, 2003), it was assumed that “if
a group of institutions developed, implemented, assessed, and
institutionalized a set of innovations with extensive funding,
then these innovations would be rapidly adapted and adopted
across a broad spectrum of institutions without signicant
funding” (Borrego et al., 2007). In other words, the focus of
eort was directed on developing and proving the ecacy of
the innovation, because, it was assumed, the wider adoption
will take care of itself, once the results are disseminated. It is a
criticism levelled at many of the change strategies proposed
in the engineering education literature, which are similarly
based on the assumption that the “demonstrated superior
ecacy of an alternative learning environment will motivate
faculty to change” (Froyd et al., 2000). As more recent research
notes, evidence of the ecacy of an educational innovation
is “necessary but not sucient” to trigger the wider adoption of
such approaches (Borrego et al., 2010, Dancy and Henderson,
2010, Seymour, 2001, Froyd et al., 2006). Indeed, Kezar
(2009) notes that, although diusions of innovation models
“sometimes work with individual change agents...[they]… do not
translate well into larger scale change eorts”.
The fact that the prestigious Coalition Program was based
on a diusion of innovation model appears to have heavily
inuenced wider research on engineering education change
in the US. Much of the scholarship, itself often funded
directly or indirectly via the NSF, has focused on the extent
to which proven educational innovations in engineering
are adopted by faculty members beyond the developer’s
course, department or institution (Spalter-Roth et al., 2007,
Borrego et al., 2010, Dancy and Henderson, 2010). This
model of educational change – where innovations naturally
‘diuse’ between faculty members – has left unchallenged
the assumption that inuencing the beliefs, priorities and
behaviours of the individual faculty member holds the key
to successful and sustainable educational reform. Such an
assumption is at odds with the wider literature on change in
higher educational more generally, where the department as
a whole is seen as the critical unit for change (Trowler et al.,
2003, Weiman et al., 2010).
Outside the US, research on engineering education reform
follows a much less coherent direction. However, three key
distinct areas are commonly considered: (i) evaluation of
change eorts at particular institutions (e.g. Pundak and
Rozner, 2008, Wilson-Medhurst et al., 2008, Molyneaux et al.,
2010), (ii) successful strategies for the adoption of problem-
based learning (PBL) within elements of the curriculum (van
Barneveld and Strobel, 2009, de Graaf and Kolmos, 2007),
and (iii) the consideration of the organisational culture in
engineering and its impact on the change process (Godfrey
and Parker, 2010, Merton et al., 2004).
2.2 Critique of current change activities
Critical examinations of current approaches to educational
reform in engineering appear to be limited. Outlined below
is a summary of available evidence, looking in turn at the
scale, nature and extent of changes that have occurred in
recent decades.
Firstly, the literature makes clear that current models of
innovation and curricular change are typically small-scale,
‘stand-alone’ and do not impact wider departmental,
institutional or national practice (Heywood, 2006). In
consequence, these innovations are typically lost when the
faculty member initiating the change moves on (Fisher et
al., 2003), because their colleagues are unwilling “to invest
the time to teach the course in the new manner in part because
the time commitment was greater than for traditional lectures”
(Fairweather, 2008). This model of change is seen to reect the
autonomy traditionally enjoyed by faculty, enabling them to
institute change in their own programme. Thus, change “arises
from the dissatisfaction of an individual faculty member with an
element of student performance or participation” with little or no
2 Summary literature review
9
scientic rigor in its development or impact assessment (Froyd
et al., 2000, Jamieson and Lohmann, 2009). Those examples
of ambitious department- or School-wide innovation most
commonly cited in the literature – such as Olin College of
Engineering in the US (Somerville et al., 2005) or Aalborg
University in Denmark (Kolmos et al., 2004) – tend to have
been designed from a blank slate rather being the product
of an educational transformation from a more traditional
curriculum. As such, they do not oer insights into the change
process at the systemic level.
Secondly, there is a small literature focused on the particular
topics/areas that have been the focus of past or recent
change eorts. Again, the vast majority of this research is US-
based. For example, a 2001 study analysed the changes in
engineering education over the preceding decade, as viewed
by 27 senior gures in US engineering industry, academia and
professional bodies (Bjorklund and Colbeck 2001). The authors
identied ve key areas where change has occurred: “the
incorporation of design throughout the curricula; an emphasis
on eective teaching; the inux of computer technology in
the classroom and beyond; the need for a more broad-based
curricula; and a new interest in assessment due in large part to
ABET 2000 accreditation criteria”. A more recent survey of 197
US engineering department chairs looked at the levels of
both awareness and adoption of established engineering
education innovations such as artefact dissection or summer
bridge programs (Borrego et al., 2010). The study identied high
levels of awareness (82%) of the innovations by the Heads
of Department, but relatively low levels (47%) of adoption
within their departments. These results closely mirror the
output from similar US-based studies on innovation in physics
undergraduate education (Dancy and Henderson, 2010,
Henderson and Dancy 2009).
Thirdly, the literature review points to the dearth of research
focused on the extent to which widespread change has
already occurred across the engineering education sector.
One exception is the Engineering Change study (Lattuca
et al., 2006), which studied the impact of the ABET EC2000
outcomes-based accreditation standards on US engineering
education practice between 1994 and 2004. Over this 10-
year period, the study pointed to an improvement in US
engineering graduates’ “understanding of societal and global
issues, their ability to apply engineering skills, group skills, and
understanding of ethics and professional issues”.
There appears to be limited evidence on national dierences
in approach to educational change. However, an international,
cross-disciplinary study of educational excellence in research-
intensive universities concluded that “no systematic dierences
[were] found between departments in universities in the UK and
Australia, Europe and North America. Their research-intensiveness
was their dominant characteristic, not their national context.”
(Gibbs et al., 2009)
2.3 Models and strategies for change
A critique of models of curricular change has been the topic
of debate in the engineering education literature (Froyd et
al., 2000, Smith et al., 2004, Fisher et al., 2003, Clark et al., 2004,
Walkington, 2002). Seymour (2001) provides a well-regarded
categorisation of change theories typically used within
STEM educational reform. She also comments that “in reform
eorts, the theory or theories that underwrite the chosen forms
of actions often remain unstated”. Probably the most highly-
regarded analysis of the change theories adopted within
higher education is provided by Kezar (2001), who draws a
clear distinction between systems change (typically externally-
driven and occurring across the sector, such as accreditation
changes) and organisational change (occurring within a single
institution).
The evidence in the engineering education literature suggests
that successful educational reform is often associated with a
combination of ‘top-down and bottom up’ change (Seymour
et al., 2011, de Gra and Kolmos, 2007, Walkington, 2002,
Heywood, 2006). At the broader higher education level, Elton
(2002) identies the combination of top-down and bottom-up
pressures as the “most important feature of successful change in
universities…with the top down being facilitative and the bottom
up innovative”. He also adds “even if the innovation comes
originally from the top, it may be wise to keep that secret”.
More recent literature on educational change in engineering
has often drawn on the model for change developed by
Kotter (1996), where the process of reform is viewed as a series
of 8 discrete stages. A summary of the Kotter change model is
provided in Figure 1, with the particular context for reform in
engineering education provided in the right-hand column for
each stage, as proposed by Froyd et al. (2000).
Although some feel that Kotter’s approach is too prescriptive,
the strong emphasis on establishing both urgency and
constituency buy-in is seen to be a critical, and often
overlooked, element of change in engineering education (de
Gra and Kolmos, 2007). For some, Kotter’s approach provides
a particularly robust model for curriculum change within
engineering departments because it “focuses on a process of
building a coalition around a recognised need rather than eorts
of individual faculty and/or the suciency of research data”
(Froyd et al. 2000).
There is also some debate in the engineering education
literature about which stakeholder groups, in particular, should
be engaged in order to most successfully eect change. Most
existing educational interventions and reform strategies in
engineering typically engage those faculty who are already
committed to improving and developing their educational
provision. In contrast, Fairweather (2008) argues that the
greatest positive change in STEM education will be produced
by focusing eorts on those faculty members whose only
current educational approach is lecturing to “use any form
of active or collaborative instruction”, rather than continuing
to support existing innovators. Others argue that successful
educational change should begin with aecting a shift in
the attitudes and behaviours of the students rather than
the faculty (Korte and Goldberg, 2010). For some, however,
systemic and sustainable change in engineering education
can only be possible – and will only be greater than the sum
of each individual faculty member’s contributions – if a culture
of collective responsibility can be developed across all faculty
(Fisher et al., 2003).
10
Achieving excellence in engineering education: the ingredients of successful change
2.4 Drivers for change
The vast majority of the literature describes the drivers for
change to engineering education either at the level of the
global/national need (Jamieson and Lohmann, 2009, King,
2008, Duderstadt, 2008) or on the motivations of the individual
faculty member (Cady et al., 2009, Dancy and Henderson,
2010). The drivers for strategic change across a department or
School are less often discussed in the engineering education
literature.
In their evaluation of change eorts to PBL in engineering
education, van Barneveld and Strobel (2009) assert that,
where the drive for change in medical education appears to
be bottom-up, relating to student and faculty dissatisfaction,
those in engineering and business tend to be top-down,
stemming from dissatisfaction among employers groups. They
also contend that drivers for educational change appear to
be grounded in issues that are “profession-specic rather than
being geography-specic”. Evidence from the wider literature
on change in higher education (Gibbs et al., 2009) found
that “experiencing a signicant problem or challenge (such
as a negative external review or even the threat of removal of
professional accreditation) was found to be virtually essential if
a process of change was to be adopted”. It is interesting to note
that this relationship between a strong external trigger and
planned systemic change is also evident at the primary and
secondary education levels. A recent report looking at the
most improved schools from across the world (Mourshed et
al., 2010) found that “the impetus required to start school system
reforms – what we call ignition – resulted from one of three
things: the outcome of a political or economic crisis, the impact
of a high-prole, critical report on the system’s performance,
or the energy and input of a new political or strategic leader”.
Forsome, however, “the strongest motivation for an engineering
faculty member at a research university to be interested in STEM
innovation is the prospect of saving time for research” (Porter el
al., 2006).
2.5 Critical features of success and failure
The key features of successful change emerging from the
literature are outlined below.
Leadership, communication and vision. The
importance of strong leadership with a clear and
well communicated educational vision is repeatedly
emphasised in the literature (Gibbs et al., 2009,
Walkington, 2002). Indeed, “one of the main reasons that
changes do not occur is that people fundamentally do not
understand the proposed change and need to undergo a
learning process in order to successfully enact the change”
(Kezar, 2009). Seymour et al. (2011) point to what they
term “radicalised seniors” as key champions of reform
within universities or engineering Schools “in publicly
promoting educational improvements, legitimating their
uptake, protecting younger faculty reformers from negative
consequences of their work, and using their power and
inuence to leverage change at the national, institutional,
departmental, and disciplinary levels”.
Faculty development. Participation in faculty
development programmes appears to inuence an
individual’s openness to implementing new teaching
and learning approaches in the classroom (Henderson,
2008). For example, a recent study of engineering faculty
identied that “those who had some formal preparation
in teaching were signicantly more likely to report using
active learning techniques and activity-based assessments”
(Lattuca, 2011). Such experiences, however, appear to
be much more eective when they are delivered within
the engineering context, rather than from a cross-
disciplinary university centre (Felder et al., 2011).
Faculty engagement. Developing a strong sense of
faculty ownership of the reforms is identied as critical
for successful change (Elizondo-Montemayor et al.,
1. Establish a sense of urgency 1. Establish need and energy for a curricular change
2. Form a powerful guiding coalition 2. Gather a leadership team to design and promote the curricular change
3. Create a vision 3. Dene and agree upon new learning objectives and a new learning
environment
4. Communicate the vision 4. Discuss the new objectives and environment with the college and
revise based on feedback
5. Empower others to act on the vision 5. Implement new curriculum using a pilot, if necessary
6. Plan for and create short-term wins 6. Conduct a formative evaluation of the program, investigating
strengths and weaknesses of the current implementation, and
indicators of short-term gains
7. Consolidate improvements and
sustain the momentum for change
7. Decide how the new approach may be used for the entire college
and prepare an implementation plan
8. Institutionalise the new approaches 8. Prepare faculty and sta for the new implementation, implement,
and follow up with improvements
Figure 1. Kotter’s change model (left) set in the context of engineering education reform by Froyd et al. (right)
11
2008). In particular, the development of a “collegial
commitment to student learning” (Ramsden et al., 2007)
is seen to be an important element in developing an
eective and coherent educational programme (Fisher
et al., 2003). The development of such communities,
however, can often come at the cost of faculty
autonomy and independence (Newton, 2003). For
some, the key to successful and sustainable reform
lies in breaking the direct responsibility between an
individual faculty member and any new or innovative
courses. As Gladding (2001) comments, it is essential to
share both the “pain and gain” of these developments
and reduce the reliance on “teaching heroes” who are
liable to becoming burnt-out. One strategy proposed for
distributing the burden of developing and maintaining
innovative approaches is the implementation of
‘teaching teams’ (Hadgraft, 2005, Crosthwaite et al.,
2001).
Resources and time. Insucient resourcing and/or
time are seen to be a key barrier to successful change
(Henderson and Dancy, 2007). Indeed, a study of
the barriers to change among science faculty found
that resources, time and turf conicts were the most
commonly cited problems at course level, as identied
by 60% of those consulted (Sunal et al., 2000). Carl
Weiman and his colleagues (Weiman et al., 2010) assert
that “more eective teaching need not take additional
time or money, although the process of change requires
additional resources”. The costs associated with change
are estimated by the authors to be around 5% of the
departmental annual budget, over a period of ve years.
External networks. The literature stresses the
importance of faculty teaching and learning networks
(Fairweather, 2008) and external disciplinary societies
(Kezar, 2009) in encouraging dialogue, exchange of
educational ideas and engagement with reform eorts.
In particular, communication across networks appears to
be most eective when the membership is conned to
discipline-specic faculty (Borrego et al., 2010).
Culture and rewards procedures. Considerable
attention is given in the engineering education
literature to the issues of organisational culture and
rewards procedures, and the role they play in supporting,
or hindering, change. Due to the volume of information
in this eld, a summary of the literature is presented in a
separate section (Section 2.6).
Sustaining the change. The issue of sustainability
of educational change is rarely touched upon in the
engineering educational literature. When considering
the management of change to PBL in engineering, de
Graaf and Kolmos (2007) refer to the work on sustaining
change at primary and secondary school level from
Fullan (2005). This work advocates the creation of
“recurrent energizers to pass from a phase of change to
continuous improvement”. In addition to these ‘energisers’,
the broader literature on educational change across all
STEM disciplines (Kezar, 2009) points to the need for
on-going funding and operational support, if changes
are to be insitutionalised and sustained – “Many changes
have come and gone because they never had enough
structural support, so they were the rst to be removed in
times of scal scarcity… For changes to be sustainable,
they need to become part of the institutional structure,
budgeting and priorities”. Evidence on sustaining change
from the literature spanning all higher education
disciplines points to the importance of the innovation
being ‘home grown’ (Trowler et al., 2003) and the need
for reforms to “become valued – and practiced – by a larger
group than the original innovators” (Colbeck, 2002).
2.6 Culture and rewards procedures
Within the literature on engineering education reform,
the issues of organisational culture and academic rewards
procedures are topics of considerable discussion (Godfrey
and Parker, 2010, Merton et al., 2004, Bjorklund and Colbeck,
2001, Fairweather, 2008, Institution of Engineers, Australia,
1996). Indeed, a recent US forum on educational change in
engineering identied university reward systems as “the main
structural deterrent to faculty who are otherwise disposed to
revise their teaching” (Seymour et al., 2011). However, although
“changing the culture” is a phrase used in many recent reports
on engineering education, the prevailing culture is rarely
dened and suggested strategies for cultural change are
limited. One exception is the work by Godfrey and Parker
(2010), who analyse in some detail the organisational culture
within the School of Engineering at the University of Auckland.
For many, “…without changing incentives or making appeals
to intrinsic motivators, faculty members inevitably focus on
the activities visibly rewarded by their institutions and peers”
(Fisher et al., 2003). Indeed, some see academic cultures in
engineering becoming more research-driven with time, as
new generations of faculty have been “hired and promoted at
many of our research intensive institutions primarily because of
their strengths in research and ‘grantsmanship’” (Splitt, 2002).
This observation is supported by the ndings of a study of
US STEM faculty, which demonstrated that average faculty
teaching hours correlates negatively with salary levels
(Fairweather, 2005).
Merton et al. (2004) highlight the impact of organisational
culture, by contrasting two reform eorts in engineering
education at Rose-Hulman Institute of Technology. They
argue that the success of one eort, and failure of the other,
was due to the extent to which the reforms were adapted to
the organisation culture. This nding, that alignment to the
institution’s culture is essential if a programme of educational
reform is to be successful, is supported by evidence on
educational change across higher education (Kezar and
Eckle, 2002). Fisher et al. (2003) argue that the development
of a culture of collective responsibility among faculty is a
critical element of systemic and sustainable reform. They
argue that the autonomous nature of the academic role
creates a tension between the “perspective of a curriculum
as a unied whole that is intended to shape the characteristics
of its graduates and the perspective of the curriculum as a
collection of individual courses for which individual faculty
members accept responsibility”.
12
Achieving excellence in engineering education: the ingredients of successful change
Research evidence from the US suggests that the perceived
priority given to teaching in engineering rewards procedures
has changed little, or even, for some, declined, in recent years
(Lattuca, 2011). The study also suggested that more senior
sta were more likely than faculty to perceive a greater value
being placed on teaching during promotions procedures.
This outcome is mirrored in the ndings of a recent UK study,
looking at the reward and recognition for teaching and
learning (Cashmore and Ramsden, 2009).
2.7 Measuring the impact of change
The review revealed limited evidence on the impact of reform
eorts in engineering education and what exists to be of
largely poor quality. This observation is echoed by ndings
from an analysis of the literature on educational change across
STEM disciplines (Henderson et al., 2011). This study concluded
that “although most articles claim success of the change strategy
studied, the evidence presented to support these claims is typically
not strong”. At a recent gathering of US-based experts in
educational change in engineering, one theme emerging was
the lack of rigorous measures to evaluate the impact of reform
eorts (Seymour et al., 2011).
The weakness of evidence in this area may be also a symptom
of a wider problem in measuring and evaluating good
teaching practice. Three programmes of reforms appear
to have used a rigorous approach to evaluation and were
recommended during the interview process for this study:
Gallos et al. (2005), Gillan-Daniel (2008) and Stelzer et al.
(2009). A summary of alternative approaches to evaluating the
quality of an engineering education programme is provided
by Molyneaux et al. (2010), as part of their eorts to evaluate
the impact of educational reforms in the School of Civil,
Environmental and Chemical Engineering at RMIT in Australia.
2.8 Is further evidence on change in engineering
education needed?
This chapter has highlighted a dearth of information of how
to achieve successful, widespread change to the engineering
curriculum. One nal task of the literature review was to
establish whether, indeed, a study looking at educational
change in the specic discipline of engineering was necessary,
or whether the change strategies proven to be successful
in other higher education disciplines should hold equally
well for engineering departments. The evidence suggests
that, although many lessons can be learnt from looking
at educational change across higher education, there was
considerable merit in considering change within engineering
specically:
Perceived relevance of the study outcomes: The rst
issue is simply one of maximising the credibility and
acceptability of the study outcomes among the target
audience – within any academic discipline community,
the outcomes of research in undergraduate education
are most eective when they are grounded within that
discipline (Cousin et al., 2003, Borrego et al., 2010). As
Huber and Morreale (2002) noted “For good or ill, scholars
of teaching and learning must address eld-specic issues if
they are going to be heard in their own disciplines, and they
must speak in language that their colleagues understand”.
Dierences in attitudes, approaches and expectations
in engineering Schools/departments. The second
issue relates to inherent disciplinary dierences that
shape the context for educational change – signicant
dierences are apparent in both attitudes and
approaches to teaching and learning among both
engineering students and faculty, as compared to
those in other disciplines (Lattucca and Stark, 1994,
Litzinger et al., 2011). Indeed, some evidence even
points to dierences existing between engineering
disciplines in both awareness and adoption of
educational innovations (Borrego et al., 2010) and
limited cross-fertilisation of eective practice between
discipline boundaries (Wankat, 2011). A recent study
on educational excellence in research-led institutions
concluded that “academic discipline was found to have a
profound aect on the form of leadership of teaching and
the form of educational change associated with excellence
in teaching... Any advice about leadership of teaching
should take into account these disciplinary characteristics
and cultures or it is likely to risk being not just irrelevant but
wrong” (Gibbs et al., 2009).
Against this background, a study was undertaken to evaluate
the key features of successful and unsuccessful change
strategies in engineering education. The ndings of this study
are reported in the chapters that follow.
13
14
Achieving excellence in engineering education: the ingredients of successful change
This chapter distils the insights of international experts and
practitioners in engineering education into the process
of educational change. One-to-one interviews were
undertaken between January and October 2011. Drawing
on their knowledge and experience, the chapter describes
the conditions and mechanisms for achieving successful
and sustainable change in engineering undergraduate
education.
Section 3.1 describes the interview approach. Subsequent
sections (3.2 to 3.6) then describe what they revealed. Section
3.2 synthesises views on the current prospects for educational
change in engineering from countries across the world. The
most highly-regarded examples of educational change in
engineering are summarised in Section 3.3, as identied by
interviewees. Section 3.4 discusses the circumstances under
which widespread changes are typically triggered. Strategies
commonly employed for managing change are presented in
Section 3.5, along with the approaches often associated with
success and failure. Finally, Section 3.6 presents interviewee
feedback on how curriculum changes are both evaluated
and sustained.
3.1 The interview study
One-to-one interviews were held with 70 individuals from
15 countries. The broad geographic mix of interviewees
is illustrated in Figure 2. A list of those consulted for this
section of study is provided in Appendix B. A small number
of these individuals (11 in total) also contributed to the
case study investigations (as presented in Chapter 4 of
thisreport).
A snowballing method was used to identify potential
interviewees. An initial list of 15 individuals was compiled,
drawing in equal numbers from the following four groups:
(i) those with a national view on engineering education
practice (policy-makers, leaders of national engineering
education organisations, accreditation agencies etc.), (ii)
researchers in educational change within engineering or
STEM disciplines, (iii) those who have observed educational
changes, such as faculty from peer competitor universities
or industry employers and (iv) those who have led
programmes of educational change within engineering
Schools or departments. Further interviewees were identied
by recommendation, with a predominant focus on those
who have led educational reforms, both successful and
unsuccessful. Figure 3 illustrates the overall mix of those
interviewed for this phase of the study, presenting, in each
case, the primary reason for their selection. In total, 89
individuals were invited to participate in the study interviews,
with 19 of those unwilling or unable to contribute.
Interview questions were designed to evaluate the process
of educational change in engineering rather than the goals,
pedagogy or curricular design of a reform eort. They focused
principally on: (i) the circumstances under which a systemic
reform is triggered, (ii) the potential barriers to change and
the critical success factors, (iii) impact evaluation, and (iv)
why and how change is sustained. Given that roughly 60% of
the interviewees had themselves led an educational reform
3 Evidence from interviews with
educational change experts and
past reform leaders
Other
4%
Asia
20%
Australia
20%
Europe
38%
North America
28%
Figure 2. Continent of residence of interviewees
Reform leaders
59%
National view
14%
Observers
of reform
13%
Research
experts
14%
Figure 3. Primary reason for selection of individual
for interview
15
eort, they were disproportionately more likely to believe
that some fundamental change was necessary to current
educational practice. In this respect, the attitudes of this
group are unlikely to be representative of engineering faculty
as a whole.
During this chapter, reference is made to ‘successful’ and
‘eective’ change. For the purposes of this chapter of the
study, the success or otherwise of reform eorts were self-
reported by those leading, participating in or observing the
change. No independent evaluations were conducted to
validate their ecacy.
3.2 Prospects for change across the world
Interviewees were asked to comment on the current climate
for educational change within their countries of residence.
The responses to this question varied considerably, with
some expressing great uncertainty about the potential
for curriculum reform over the coming decade and others
talking much more optimistically about shifting attitudes and
increasing resources for change.
At a very broad level, a number of interviewees talked about
national cultural dierences that continue to play a signicant
role in the capability of an engineering School or department
to make an educational change. For example, some felt that,
“change is dicult in countries where the professor has the power,
such as Germany, and particularly the US”. In contrast, countries
where the management or administration have greater
control over the curriculum and the direct link between
faculty member and course is less apparent, such as Denmark
or Australia, are seen to have much greater potential for
change.
The majority of the feedback, however, centred on recent
shifts in the climate for undertaking an educational change,
and focused on three factors seen as critical to initiating and
facilitating curriculum reform: (i) the support available at a
national level, (ii) the resource available at an institutional
(departmental or School) level, and (iii) the balance between
teaching and research. Each is discussed below.
National support: The rst factor concerned the changing
national climate for supporting educational change in
engineering. Many interviewees spoke about a growing
national engagement with engineering education over the
past decade, often catalysed by agship national reports
and communities of support – “the past 10 years has been
fantastic. With these new networks, a critical mass has developed
to talk about and push forward new [educational] innovations”.
However, in more recent years, the funding streams
supporting such centralised activities have been severely cut in
a number of countries. The picture across dierent countries is
highly variable. While some countries, such as South Korea or
Germany, point to the establishment of new national support
centres in engineering education, others see such centres
being dismantled or down-sized. For example, the UK-based
support centre for undergraduate engineering education
was closed in July 2011. The Engineering Subject Centre
was seen as a key catalyst in developing a UK community of
support in engineering education, and there is great concern
over the impact of its closure – “the Subject Centre legitimises
what many people are trying to do in education in their own
institutions. Without it, they may feel that they do not have any
visibility and no opportunities to network. There is a very strong
level of uncertainty about what will happen with this closure”.
International engineering education communities, such as
the CDIO
2
network, appear to play a particularly strong role
in supporting change in those countries where no national
centre exists. Many interviewees, however, found attending
networking events and conferences in engineering education
very challenging, as there were no national funding streams
available and departments were often unwilling or unable to
resource such activities.
Institutional resourcing: The second critical factor concerned
the extent of resource availability for change at departmental
or School level, and how this has changed in recent years.
Again, considerable variation exists between countries in
this area. In particular, it is interesting to note that many of
those countries who have been particularly active in the
international dialogue on education reform in engineering
over the past 20 years (such as the US, UK and Australia)
appear to be currently experiencing a period of considerable
retrenchment and resource constraint, linked to government-
led restructuring or funding changes. Some interviewees from
these regions pointed to a highly pressurised educational
system that, currently, does not have the capacity for change.
For example, as one US-based interviewee commented, “so
many people are just overwhelmed by the budget cuts at the
moment. We can’t even get people to sta the classes, so we are
not even going to start to do something creative”. Indeed, for
some, university-wide nancial pressures were impacting
on all engineering education activities outside the core
curriculum. As noted by one UK-based interviewee, “every bit of
expenditure is back on the table for scrutiny, including engineering
education projects that had been previously given the go-ahead”.
In contrast, many of those countries that have become
engaged in the international engineering education dialogue
in more recent years (such as perhaps Hong Kong, Singapore
or Malaysia) reported increasing resource availability for
educational innovation and change.
Research/teaching balance: The nal issue concerned the
perceived balance between research and teaching within
engineering School/departments. A recurrent theme in the
interviews was the perception of a shift in priorities towards
research and away from teaching over the past 5 years. The
sentiments of this interviewee were typical of many – “going
back 15 years, and comparing that with the situation 5 years ago,
education had become more important. I can see now, though,
there is more tendency for the priority to move back to research
and focus on paper publication”. This increasing emphasis
did not appear to be conned to any particular country or
university type. A number of interviewees spoke about these
changes being driven by the increasing inuence of university
ranking systems. Many pointed to specic national-level
triggers, including recent changes to the system of national
university research rankings (such as the introduction of
2 CDIO (Conceive, Design, Implement, Operate) initiative
(www.cdio.org)
16
Achieving excellence in engineering education: the ingredients of successful change
Excellence in Research Australia in Australia) or a change in
priorities of national research funding bodies (such as that
recently implemented by the Natural Sciences and Engineering
Research Council in Canada). As one interviewee noted, “over
the last three or four years, the pressure for research output has
increased a lot. We have a real obsession with rankings, and they
only want to measure the research”. For some interviewees,
these changes “are creating a culture of fear amongst faculty.
They are worried about getting their research funding and they
are becoming concerned about the time they spend on teaching”.
An additional consequence of this increased pressure on
research output appears to have been a reduction in the
number of faculty with “real industry experience”. For a number
of interviewees, such faculty members tend to be less tied to
“the way we do things around here” and bring a stronger drive
to incorporate authentic engineering experiences into the
curriculum. Indeed, the successful change eorts described
by interviewees disproportionately involved faculty with
signicant levels of industry experience.
A surprising number of interviewees also spoke with concern
about the impact of a changing research/teaching balance
on younger faculty. Despite what was described as a “natural
tendency to be more interested in creative ways of teaching”, the
culture into which younger faculty have been appointed and
the increasing pressures on them to meet ambitious research
targets is seen to have signicantly reduced their engagement
with engineering education generally and educational reform
specically. The observation of this interviewee was typical
of many – “those of us who are established now in engineering
education will probably stick with it. We have accepted that our
career progression will be retarded but we will continue. The threat
is really to the early career academics, who are just getting into
their career. The demands now being put on the research domain
are intense. The risk is that when we retire, there will be a lack of
succession … The dollar hitting the university will be the real thing
that sets the agenda. Unfortunately, the funding change is in the
wrong direction for engineering education at the moment”.
3.3 Examples of highly-regarded change
All interviewees were asked to identify national and
international examples of planned, signicant change in
engineering education, which, from their perspective, have
been eective. Figure 4 records all of those reform eorts
that were identied by 5 or more interviewees. It should
also be noted that most interviewees identied examples
predominantly from within their country of residence, which
has skewed the results towards to UK and US. It is interesting
to note that the majority of reform programmes listed in
Figure 4 centre on the implementation of problem-based
or project-based learning approach within an authentic,
professional engineering context.
A small number of interviewees did not feel qualied/able
to identify examples of ‘successful’ change and talked about
the diculty in judging the quality of a reform eort as an
external observer. In particular, some commented that there
was often a lack of honesty about the true scale and nature of
reform eorts, where, on further inspection, impressive claims
of radical, widespread reform “turn out to be little more than
smoke and mirrors”. The narratives presented at engineering
education conferences was seen, by some, to be in stark
contrast to the real changes happening on the ground in
the host institution. As one interviewee commented “Making
change is dirty work and it adversely aects your career. It is so
much easier to travel around the world and talk about the fantasy
version of your changes, … than it is to stay at home and deal
with the realities of actually making it happen”.
National and international engineering education
communities clearly play an important role in supporting
many change eorts. Probably the most successful example
is the CDIO
2
initiative, which appears to have been eective
in raising awareness of new approaches to engineering
education, but also in triggering systemic and eective
change at many of the participating universities. In addition
to the “well thought-through educational structure” and
international community of support, the success of CDIO was
credited by some to the endorsement and leadership of the
initiative by MIT. As one of the interviewees commented
“…[the involvement of MIT] has brought a lot more people in and
reassured people that this is not about ‘dumbing down’... I am not
sure whether [CDIO] would have been as eective without MIT
at the front”. Other interviewees also discussed similar “lead
institution eects”, where the involvement of a highly-regarded,
research-led, institution in a educational change eort would
trigger the involvement of international partners.
3.4 The conditions that trigger change
3.4.1 Drivers for embarking on change
Interviewees were asked to identify the key drivers for
educational change in engineering. The factors that they
identied as driving change at course level were in sharp
contrast to those triggering systemic or curriculum-wide
change, as discussed below.
When implemented by an individual faculty member or small
groups of individuals, change was seen to be triggered by
persuasive evidence of the ecacy of new pedagogies and/
or broader national/international drivers such as the changing
needs of industry or the role of engineering in solving the
‘grand challenges’. The evidence from the interviews indicated
that such educational changes are usually implemented
at the periphery of the curriculum, typically within a single
curricular course, an extra-curricular programme or an
optional/specialist class. These changes appear unlikely both
to be sustained beyond the tenure of the champion/s or
promulgated more widely within the curriculum – “you usually
have one or two enthusiasts in a department who do something
[innovative]. When they leave, everyone breathes a sigh of relief
and reverts to the status quo”.
In contrast, the national-level needs and/or pedagogical
evidence do not appear to play a major role in triggering
successful School/department-wide change or strategic
reforms across a signicant proportion of the curriculum.
Thispoint was particularly evident in the interviews with
leaders of systemic reform eects viewed to be both
successfully implemented and eectively sustained. The
vast majority described the triggers for change either in
17
terms of a very signicant threat that required urgent action
or an externally-imposed requirement for fundamental
structural change. Specically, most changes are driven by
a critical problem with their “position in the market-place”,
often declining student intake quality/quantity, increasingly
erce competition or very poor student satisfaction scores,
resulting in signicant pressure to change from the university
senior management. In a surprising number of these cases,
departments were given the option of either reforming
their education or being closed down. These pressures were
seen to focus the minds of the faculty – “we had a gun to our
heads…This was still there even after we made the changes. The
looming storm was always on our minds”. Amongst successful
reform eorts, this enforced need for fundamental change
also appears to engage faculty in the collective challenge of
the endeavour. This reaction was described by interviewees
in many dierent terms, from “enjoying the ght”, to “engaging
faculty’s intrinsic motivation for change” to simply the sense that
“if we were going to have to do something, it may as well be good”.
Although exceptions clearly exist, as a general rule,
unsuccessful or unsustained systemic changes appear much
more likely to be driven by factors that were not seen as
urgent or externally imposed – typically a desire to “improve
an already relatively successful” undergraduate education and/
or in response to pedagogical evidence on the ecacy of
a particular pedagogy. There appear, however, to be two
circumstances under which this general observation does not
hold true:
1. change within departments/Schools where a strong
collegial, entrepreneurial culture of educational risk-
taking and innovation already exists. In such cases,
the existing feeling of collective responsibility for
the undergraduate programme creates widespread
engagement with the educational goals and minimises
resistance. Faculty also hold a strong belief that their
eorts in improving the curriculum will be both
recognised and rewarded. The outcomes of the
interview phase of this study suggest that around
5–10% of successful programmes of change could be
placed in this category. One example of such a change
is the Department of Chemical Engineering at the
University of Queensland, detailed as a case study in
Chapter 4.
2. change that has benetted from very signicant
injection of funding sourced from outside of the
Aalborg University (all engineering programmes), Denmark
Chalmers (all engineering programmes), Sweden
Coventry University (Faculty of Engineering and Computing), UK
Georgia Tech (International Plan), US
Harvey Mudd (Engineering Clinic), US
Olin College (all engineering programmes), US
Penn State (Learning Factory), US
Purdue University (both GEARE and EPICS), US
RMIT (School of Civil Environmental and Chemical Engineering), Australia
Singapore Polytechnic (all engineering programmes), Singapore
Technical University of Denmark (rst year engineering programme), Denmark
The Hong Kong University of Science and Technology (School of Engineering), Hong Kong
TU Delft (Faculties of Industrial Design Engineering and Aerospace Engineering), Netherlands
UCL (Department of Civil, Environmental & Geomatic Engineering), UK
University of Colorado at Boulder (Integrated Teaching and Learning Laboratory), US
University of Illinois (iFoundry), US
University of Liverpool (School of Engineering), UK
University of Queensland (Chemical Engineering), Australia
University of Sydney (all engineering programmes), Australia
University of Technology Malaysia (all engineering programmes), Malaysia
Figure 4. Programmes of educational change in engineering, endorsed by 5 or more interviewees
18
Achieving excellence in engineering education: the ingredients of successful change
university. In these cases, almost exclusively US-based,
the external resources will typically bring signicant
prestige, benecial long-term partnerships and often
new educational facilities and learning spaces. More
importantly, however, the funding will buy out most, if
not all, of the faculty time required to make the change.
The resulting reform, therefore, rarely calls for the
engagement of any unwilling faculty and is an activity
that does not need to compete with existing resources.
As such, these changes encounter very little faculty
resistance in their implementation. Around 5–10% of the
programmes of change investigated could be placed
in this category. One example from this study is the
Learning Factory from Penn State (see case study from
Chapter 4).
3.4.2 Barriers to embarking on change
Interviewees were asked what they saw as the key barriers to
embarking on systemic educational change. A summary of
those barriers most commonly identied is provided below.
Widespread satisfaction with the status quo: This issue
appears to be the most prevalent barrier to change,
particularly within research-led institutions. For many,
“if sta are happy and you are getting good students, why
change?”.
Diculties in measuring success: The issue that “no-one
knows how to measure good teaching on a wide scale” has
been a major deterrent to some. As one interviewee
commented, “when people don’t really know what impact
their teaching is having [now], how can they contemplate
doing things dierently?… The risks associated with
change appears to be greater than the risks associated with
doing nothing”.
‘Overstued’ curriculum: Given that many changes,
historically, have resulted in an increased number of
student contact hours, many feel that their curriculum
is now operating at its maximum capacity and further
change is not an option –“there is vey little space in the
curriculum. Unless you overhaul it completely, there is little
room to manoeuvre”.
Structural constraints: Although sympathetic to
the need for change, some faculty would point to
institutional structural constraints as signicant barriers.
These would include insucient departmental budgets,
inadequate teaching spaces and/or a rigid curriculum
structure that (for example) could not support
immersive project experiences.
Legacy of failure: A surprising number of interviewees
talked about the long-term impact of failed reforms
and how their legacy can “stie any attempts at change
to the curriculum, beyond individual courses, for a decade
or more”. Unsuccessful reforms (or those viewed to be
unsuccessful) appear to hold an inuence beyond their
own department or institution. For example, a number
of UK-based interviewees referred to one particular
reform eort to implement problem-based learning
within the engineering curriculum at a major UK
research-led university. Each noted how the widespread
perception of the failure of this ambitious change was
leveraged by many faculty as a reason not to engage in
educational change – “the plans were quite radical. The
rest of us were watching and waiting to see whether they
were able to pull it o. As so many of the changes did not
survive … it is now used as proof by many of the resistant
academics that these sorts of teaching approaches will not
be supported and are not sustainable”.
Strategic priorities of the institution: The priority given
to research activities at many universities was seen to
be a signicant disincentive for departments to become
involved with educational change. This issue is discussed
in more detail in Section 3.4.4.
3.4.3 Impact of engineering accreditation or national
evaluations
Interviewees working within an engineering School or
department were asked about the extent to which their
accreditation system (or national equivalent) supported
positive curricular change. The responses varied considerably.
Indeed, even the views held by interviewees within some
countries (most notably the UK) were highly polarised on
this issue. For those who felt able to comment, the responses
broadly fell into three groups, as outlined below.
1. Accreditation as a deterrent for positive change:
Almost a quarter of respondents believed that
accreditation had fostered a risk-adverse attitude
amongst faculty, where “maintaining the status-quo is the
safest option”. The individuals expressing this view were
almost exclusively experienced reform leaders, based in
countries that have been engaged in the international
engineering education debate for many decades
(principally the UK, US and Scandinavia). Some reported
that the fear of non-compliance with accreditation
criteria deters many faculty from investing signicant
time in educational change or in implementing new
educational approaches – “although the problem may be
reducing, many academics will err on the side of caution,
and do not wish to take the risk that any proposed change
would jeopardise the department’s accreditation status”.
Such concerns, when expressed within departmental
curriculum planning meetings, were reported to “block”
any proposed curricular changes. Most interviewees,
however, still noted that it would be very unusual
for any programme, however radical, not be granted
accreditation. The fault, for many, is with the visiting
accreditation panels, and the impression they leave on
faculty, rather than with the standards themselves.
2. Accreditation as a driver for slow positive change:
Almost two thirds of respondents felt that accreditation
has had a positive, albeit slow, impact on educational
quality. In particular, the widespread move to outcomes-
based accreditation is seen to have raised the baseline
quality of engineering education across the sector. They
viewed these new accreditation frameworks as holding
departments to account for what they are delivering –
“there was a lot more space to hide poor teaching in the
19
old system, as well as make unsubstantiated claims about
what you were doing”. The reported positive impacts
of the introduction of outcomes-based accreditation
included: (i) a broader engagement amongst faculty
with ”what the students need to learn, rather than what do
we want to teach”, and (ii) an increased engagement by
faculty with the broader aims of the degree programme
and curriculum structure as a whole.
3. Accreditation as a driver for signicant positive
change: A smaller number (around 10%) of respondents
believed that either the act of seeking accreditation
with a new agency or the shift of their existing
accreditation framework to an outcomes based
system had triggered a signicant improvement in
national engineering education practice. For example,
in Chile, erce competition for students has resulted
in a number of engineering programmes seeking
international accreditation status, principally through
ABET, in addition to the national standards, in order to
“improve their credibility, status and international ranking”.
Within a number of Chilean engineering Schools and
departments, achieving accreditation with multiple
agencies has resulted in a fundamental reassessment of
their educational approach and positive reform of the
curriculum.
3.4.4 Impact of academic rewards procedures
A recurrent theme in the interviews was the importance of the
“prevailing culture in engineering departments” and, in particular,
the emphasis placed on research in the appointment and
promotion process. There was a consensus that the priority
given to research acted as a major deterrent to faculty
engaging with or supporting any programme of educational
change. Opinion, however, was divided on its implications for
supporting change across the sector, as summarised below.
Some interviewees believed that positive, systemic and
sustainable change to engineering education would
not be possible without a fundamental re-alignment
of the academic rewards procedures. They argued that
the present system disproportionately rewards quality
and impact of research output at an individual faculty
level, and provides little incentive to devote signicant
eort to education, let alone educational change. As
one interviewee noted, “at the moment we are relying
on those people who just want to do it, for us [engineering
departments] to make any changes at all. But these people
will never get promoted. They are like lepers. No one wants
to catch what they have”.
Other interviewees, however, believed that change to
the rewards structure was not a realistic option, and
the energy currently devoted to this “futile exercise” has
been at the expense of activities that were more likely
to improve educational practice. As one interviewee
commented, “I think [talking about the need to change
the rewards system] gets people o the hook too easily –
it’s so easy to complain about it, but then it stops people
from doing anything”. For some, the key to change was
to build the intrinsic motivation of faculty – “in most
departments, you can get out of teaching by doing a really
bad job. Rather than worrying about the rewards system,
[we should] make teaching an enjoyable experience, and
people will be motivated to do a good job”.
Most respondents were agreed, however, that creating a
culture that supports educational change “all boils down to
people” and whether faculty believe that senior management
will consider educational contributions “when they are sitting in
a room, deciding who gets promoted”.
3.4.5 The context for reform eorts
It was clear from the interviews that there were common
features in the institutional contexts of successful reform
programmes. In almost every case, at least two of the factors
below were present; in some, all factors were noted.
Faculty experience: an unusually high proportion of
faculty have industry experience or a non-traditional
academic background;
Eective departmental leadership: a well-regarded,
internally-appointed Head of Department with a very
strong internal reputation for educational commitment
and delivery and a strong national/international
reputation for their research activities. The individual has
typically been in post for a number of years before the
change is initiated;
Externally-imposed re-structuring: an upcoming
sector-wide educational restructuring – typically
national changes across the higher education sector, a
move to an outcomes-based accreditation system or a
move to Bologna compliance;
Recent sta changes: the recent appointment of a
signicant number of new, and often younger, faculty
members and/or signicant changes to senior university
management;
Personal experience of failure: the involvement of
some of the change leaders in a prior ‘failed’ course-level
reform, typically at a dierent institution, from which
they concluded that “change needed to be radical and
widespread for it to stick”;
New infrastructure: the recent award for funding of
a new building or signicant number of new learning
spaces. As one interviewee commented, “if the university
is already investing money in infrastructure, it is more likely
to support a parallel change to the curriculum”.
Many interviewees described the coming together of a
number of these factors in terms of “a degree of serendipity” and
“being in the right place at the right time”. In this context, some
reform leaders saw their greatest contribution to the reform
eort as “watching a number of events come together and
knowing when to make the move”.
It is also interesting to note that prior engagement with
curriculum-wide educational innovations and/or pedagogical
evidence does not appear to be more prevalent in the
successful examples of change than in those deemed to have
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Achieving excellence in engineering education: the ingredients of successful change
been unsuccessful. In a small number of cases, pedagogical
evidence played an important role in awareness-raising, but
was rarely the trigger to embark on change at a systemic
level. As one interviewee commented – “The data [pedagogical
evidence] get’s people’s attention, it does not translate into action.
A lot of things will raise awareness, but they do not do anything
until someone’s house is on re”. A number of interviewees,
particularly those from research-led institutions, spoke with
some frustration about how ineective they have found
pedagogical evidence to be in triggering change – “I presented
good data on the ecacy of an approach in terms of learning.
[Faculty] accepted that. That is not the issue. Some yahoo will
always get up and say “I tried it and it didn’t work”. Anecdotal
experience of one faculty tends to trump evidence every time, even
though the research methodology is accepted”.
3.5 Managing the change process
The previous section (3.4) discussed the conditions and
drivers often present before a department/School embarks
on a programme of educational reform. This section discusses
the strategies actively employed by departments/School in
managing the process of change itself.
3.5.1 The agents of change
Interviewees were asked to identify who they saw as the
critical players in achieving a successful and sustainable
educational change.
There was a broad consensus that successful, systemic
educational change was usually the product of a “balance of
top-down and bottom-up pressure”. Indeed, for some, achieving
this balance was the key to successful change – “a Head of
Department or Dean with a mandate and a strong vision who
give the faculty time and space to do something with it that
they can own. This is the real trick to pull o”. Within this broad
picture, interviewees also spoke about the role played by
particular groups or individuals in the change process. These
observations are summarised below.
Senior School and university management: Almost all of
the successful, systemic change programmes described
by interviewees had the explicit support of the Dean or
key members of university senior management. Many
interviewees talked about the critical importance of this
support in galvanising faculty engagement. In particular,
faculty must “trust the system” and feel condent that their
eorts will be recognised (if not explicitly rewarded) by the
institution during promotions procedures. One interviewee
spoke about a widespread curriculum change in engineering
that was “completely de-railed and, ultimately, abandoned”
when the university Rector delivered a public address
underlining the centrality of research to the strategic mission
of the institution.
Head of Department: One particularly striking outcome of
the study was the extent to which the Head of Department
was identied as central to change. Regardless of the scale
of reform, the enthusiastic support of a credible and well-
respected Head of Department appeared to be the single
greatest predictor of its success and sustainability. Asone
interviewee commented “Having a supportive Dean is
important, but the Head of Department in critical… Ultimately,
the Head of Department has the power on the resources and the
culture”. On the same theme, another noted “There is a close tie
between the department head and hiring… If they communicate
to the new hires that teaching is important, there will be a big
impact. It is very important for whatever direction you take”.
Change leaders: In most cases of successful change, the
leader or co-leader was the Head of Department. In many
cases, the endeavour was led by two key individuals, one,
typically the Department Head, providing the direction and
energy, and the other producing a “coherent backbone to the
changes” and mapping the vision into a logical curriculum
structure. Many leaders of successful changes also reected on
their own roles during the early stages of the change – “You
need to have people who are a little crazy and willing to invest
their life in something that is totally dierent” and “We really had
no idea what we were taking on. Without that naivety we would
probably never have done it, though”.
Faculty: When interviewees were asked for their advice for
others embarking on reform, it was engaging faculty that
was most frequently noted (“bring them with you”). When
discussing engagement strategies, many pointed to three
distinct faculty groupings, each of roughly equal size:
group 1 – faculty who do not support the proposed
change and are actively resistant to any shift away from
the existing curriculum;
group 2 – faculty who are highly focused on other
activities, principally their research, and “do not care either
way” whether the changes are implemented;
group 3 – faculty who support the change.
Many interviewees advised that group 1 are unlikely to ever
be supportive of educational reform, and any attempts to
force or coerce them into changing their educational practice
would be counter-productive. The advice was therefore to
“work around them” and allow “these people to carry on with their
existing teaching as they were before [and] do not force them to
become involved”. Indeed, many successful changes have left
one ‘ring-fenced’ section of the curriculum, where the content
and delivery remains largely unchanged in which this group of
faculty can operate.
Much of the advice therefore focused on faculty within
groups 2 and 3, and “put[ting] your energies into supporting
the third that support change and into converting the third
that don’t care”. In particular, the advice for engaging group
2 centred on highlighting the underlying drivers for change
and the benets that reform will bring – “these people tend
to be committed to the students, but are busy and focused on
their research. They need to be convinced that there is a real need
for such a signicant disruption”. Within large departments,
with fragmented and siloed research groups, reaching such
faculty is often very challenging. The results of benchmarking
exercises with world-leading research universities were seen
to be of particular interest to this group, particularly where the
messages were delivered by those with “intellectual authority
21
within their [engineering] discipline”. Many felt that this group
would not be convinced by pedagogical evidence, particularly
where it is presented by non-engineers. In contrast, evidence
of pedagogical ecacy was seen to resonate strongly with
those within group 3 and provide them with both the
condence and tools to improve student learning.
Students: A number of highly-experienced reform leaders
spoke with some disappointment about the minimal
inuence students have had on the progress of curriculum
change to date. As one commented “it was a fantasy of
mine for years and years – if I created courses that students
really responded to, they would go o from this experience and
advocate for that in other courses. This just did not happen”.
Another observed “I used to feel that students would vote with
their feet, but they only tend to make small deviations. At the end
of the day, employers will recruit from the top ranked universities,
and students will continue to [seek employment from them] – the
student is not the end consumer, the employer is, so students
are very adverse to changing the formula”. These observations
appear to be well founded. No instances were identied in
this study where positive student engagement was a primary
driver for curriculum change. The student voice only appears
to play a prominent role in progressing change where levels of
dissatisfaction impact on the reputation and/or operation of
the undergraduate programmes. It should be noted, however,
that student input is often used, to great eect, to inform
the educational design and approach of curricular changes.
However, the likelihood and ease with which these changes
are implemented, on the other hand, does not appear to be
improved by positive student engagement.
3.5.2 Common strategies in successful change
Interviewees who had been involved with or observed
programmes of educational change were asked to describe
the strategies adopted. Two particularly strong themes were
apparent in the successful change programmes described,
focusing on activities which built: (i) faculty engagement
in the underlying need for the change, and (ii) a collegiality
across the faculty and a sense of collective responsibility for
the curriculum as a whole. In addition, a number of common
stages were apparent across many of the successful change
strategies. These are outlined below, sub-divided into three
phases of activity: preparation, planning and implementation.
As can be seen, the two themes of engaging faculty in the
need for change and creating a collective responsibility for the
undergraduate programmes are woven into many of the
stages described.
Phase 1: Preparatory work
Local evidence gathering: Building a strong evidence base for
the need for change has been a highly eective strategy for
engaging faculty and university management in the reform
process. Such evidence appears to have the greatest impact
when focused in the following areas: (i) data quantifying the
critical drivers for change, such as student intake numbers or
retention rates, as compared to peer competitor institutions,
and (ii) feedback from engineering graduate employers on
employability, comparing their own graduates to that of
competitor institutions.
Benchmarking of educational approach: Most successful
change programmes conducted a brief benchmarking
process to inform their curriculum design process. As a general
rule, it appears that benchmarking both against a premier
research-led institution, principally Stanford or MIT (“…if these
universities are doing similar things – faculty think that you are
on the right track”) and peer, competitor, universities tends to
engage faculty most positively with the change process. It is
interesting to note that faculty resistance sometimes appears
to increase if change leaders point to highly innovative
institutions, such as Olin College in the US and Aalborg
University in Denmark, when proposing educational reforms
– “…they have such dierent students and so much more money
available, and a completely dierent structure… Telling [faculty]
that we are going to try to do something similar is really not going
down well”.
Presenting the early vision to senior management: In a
number of cases, the broad vision for change was presented
to university senior management before discussions were
held with faculty. Although somewhat of a risk, these early
consultations can provide some signicant advantages. In
particular, they can allow: (i) reform decisions to be made
on the basis of known institutional constraints, (ii) where
structural conicts exists, the exploration of options for
moulding or changing existing university regulations to
accommodate the proposed changes, and (ii) reform leaders
to demonstrate to faculty “from the outset” that the endeavour
is supported at a university level.
Presenting the need for change to faculty: Many
interviewees noted that the initial meeting with faculty to
introduce the idea of educational change is a “make or break”
point in the process. As one interviewee commented “this is
all about faculty time, and winning them over is a combination
of convincing them that the change eort is suciently benecial
that it requires their attention and reassuring them that the
endeavour will not signicantly eat into their time”. During this
initial meeting, many of the leaders of successful changes
focused discussions solely on the underlying drivers for
change – “do not present the solution before anyone has had
time to think about the problem. People then just look at the
implications it has on their own teaching and never really engage
with the problem”.
Phase 2: Planning for the change
Selecting the new educational model: Once the decision
had been made to embark on a programme of systemic
change, the selection of the underpinning educational
approach is often “a relatively quick and painless decision”
based on a brief international benchmarking exercise or
the “classroom experience” of those leading the change. One
striking feature of the interviews was the similarity between
the educational goals of the reform eorts described,
regardless of geography or institution type. A signicant
majority of successful change programmes “develop[ed] our
own unique approach, that blends problem-based learning with
professional engineering practice”. In almost all cases, a clear
emphasis is apparent on the unique and bespoke nature of
the educational approach adopted.
22
Achieving excellence in engineering education: the ingredients of successful change
Curriculum design: Many interviewees talked about the
importance of engaging the majority of, if not all, faculty in
the process of designing the new curriculum. This process
was seen to be critical in both optimising support for the
change eort and ensuring that the reformed programmes
would be sustainable. This process was most eective when
faculty were able to take a step back and think fundamentally
about the curriculum from a blank slate, rather than “tinkering
at the edges” of the existing curriculum. In many cases, the
widely acknowledged urgency of change supported this
fundamental re-assessment. Some interviewees, particularly
from Scandinavian countries, spoke about the value of faculty
development workshops and their role in informing the
curriculum design process.
Careful planning by a small management team: Many
change leaders spoke about the importance of careful and
methodical planning, undertaken by a “safe pair of hands who
knows the department inside out”. Building on an intimate
knowledge of the faculty, learning spaces, resource availability,
these individual/s would develop plans for the transition to
and on-going operation of the new curriculum.
Resourcing: The injection of new funding into a change
eort is relatively rare, and does not appear to be a particular
characteristic of successful programmes of change. However,
almost all successful changes ‘bought-out’ a small portion of
the time of at least two carefully-selected individuals. Typically,
this funding is sourced internally, usually at the departmental/
School level. A very clear divide was apparent between the
US and all other countries considered in this regard. In sharp
contrast to non-US interviewees, those individuals consulted
from the US were signicantly more likely to consider external
funding as an essential factor in successful change.
External perspectives. As noted in Section 3.4.5, many
programmes of change appear to be initiated at School/
departments with signicant numbers of newly appointed
faculty or high numbers of faculty with industry experience.
Where these factors did not apply, leaders of successful
change talked about the importance of bringing in a “fresh
pairs of eyes” to the planning process, typically employed on
a temporary part-time basis. The types of individual selected
vary by institutional culture and geography, but most have a
background in either engineering industry or education.
Phase 3: Implementing the new approach
Establish an implementation team: Interviewee feedback
on implementation focused on who should be making
the changes and how they should be supported by their
department or School. To avoid “burn-out” of those charged
with implementing the changes, many interviewees
recommended ensuring that other departmental duties be
formally removed from these individuals during the period of
reform. Caution was also advised in the selection of the early
adopters of the new approach – “they must not just be the ‘usual
suspects’ of mavericks that people have become accustomed to
ignoring”.
Demonstrate the benets of the change: In the months
following initial implementation of a reform, many
interviewees reported a period of “exhaustion”, where some
faculty “question whether it is all worth it”. Some interviewees
noted the value of “demonstrat[ing] the benets of what we
were doing – Show that academics are accepting it. Show that
someone has been promoted as a result of it. Show that it was
starting to have a positive eect on students”. Such activities are
seen to maintain the momentum of the change during a “very
intensive and time-consuming period”.
Implementation speed and phasing: There did not appear
to be a common pattern amongst the successful reform
endeavours with respect to piloting the reform; some piloted
and rened their approach extensively over a period of 2–3
years before rolling out widespread change, while others
trialled the new approach in a single course and started full
implementation within a year. However, what was common
across successful change eorts was the manner in which
they moved from the pilot/conceptual phase through to
roll-out. Sustainable, widespread change was very rarely
associated with a gradual expansion, where courses were
slowly reformed one at a time over an extended period.
Although exceptions clearly exist, most successful, systemic
changes were implemented in a single concentrated
and focused eort over a 2–4 year period, and called for
considerable faculty-wide attention during that period.
One reform leader described this as “taking the band-aid o
quickly”. It should be noted, however, that the overall reform
process (from initial planning to impact analysis following
implementation) rarely took less than ve years and typically
took much longer. As one interviewee noted, “be prepared for a
long term endeavour. Whatever people say, this will not just take
two years!”.
3.5.3 Common features of unsuccessful change
As with any other process of change, the majority of reform
eorts in engineering education fail. Many interviewees
described their own personal experiences with failed reform
eorts, both as the instigator of change and as an observer.
On the basis of the interviewee responses, there appear to
be three critical stages when failure is most likely to occur, as
outlined below.
Point 1: immediately following the announcement to
faculty of the intent to change;
Point 2: very early in the implementation process;
Point 3: 5–10 years following full implementation.
The types of failure commonly reported at each of these three
stages are summarised below.
Point 1: The key cause of early failure appears to be where
the champions for change are “unable to articulate the benets
that it will bring” and faculty are left unclear as to “what is
happening and why”. Some interviewees spoke about a
“disastrous” early meeting with faculty, where the concept
of educational change was rst introduced, after which “the
academics revolted before they even started to implement this”.
One interviewee recounted the aftermath of such a meeting,
where a senior faculty member “made it very clear to the Head
of Department, that, if this change went ahead, all of his best
23
academics would leave. This risk was just too great” and the
reform was abandoned. In particular, if faculty view the reform
as “dumbing down” the engineering fundamentals within the
curriculum or as not aligning with the strategic priorities of
the School or university senior management, “it will be rejected
instantly”.
Point 2: A common point of failure appears to be early in the
implementation process. The majority of issues appear to
relate to a lack of resources. For those who benetted from
external funding to support the change, some noted that
“the money runs out before anything has been truly integrated”
and the activity is not sustainable. Many of these examples
continue to “look successful from the outside”, although very
little real change has been made. For others, only minimal
resource was ever devoted to the change. The planning and
early implementation stages were completed through the
“good will and hard work” of a small number of dedicated
faculty, but they were unable to devote this level of eort
(in addition to their existing duties) for a sustained period.
One interviewee spoke about the impact of such under-
resourcing, “This is okay for the rst year or so, until they get burnt
out by years 2 and 3, usually just as you are starting to roll the
changes out into the curriculum. We had this problem, and we
had a lot of people become ill in this period”. Without the steady
drum beat of someone saying “let’s do this, let’s do this, let’s do
this..”, momentum is lost, with the result that that changes
“never really got to the heart of the curriculum and then just
faded away without anyone really noticing”.
Point 3: The third point at which failure appears more
common is in the years following full implementation of the
change. This issue is discussed further in Section 3.6.1.
3.6 Sustaining and evaluating change
3.6.1 Sustaining change
A high proportion of educational reforms that have been
successfully implemented appear to encounter signicant
problems in sustaining the change. Indeed, of the curriculum
reforms investigated that had been operational for more
than 10 years, almost all had encountered a signicant, and
in some cases almost catastrophic, problem that threatened
their sustainability. Many interviewees recounted similar
experiences in this regard. The common triggers for the
non-continuation of reforms were stang/organisational
changes such as the appointment of a new Head of
Department, retirement of the original change leader or
a School-wide restructure. Following these disruptions, it
appears that those changes that have been implemented
into the core curriculum are much more likely to “survive”. I n
other words, at these points, sustaining newly-implemented
extra-curricular, optional or pilot courses have a much lower
success rate. Rather than an abrupt abandonment of reforms,
interviewees tended to describe a cumulative dilution of
the changes, leading to a lack of coherence to the approach
and a “drift” back to something closely resembling the
prior curriculum.
The underlying issues seen to undermine the sustainability of
reform were:
the changes continuing to be ‘owned’ by one individual;
the changes remaining isolated within the curriculum;
faculty and senior management becoming focused on
other activities (“took their eye o the ball”)
a lack of meaningful evaluation data;
a lack of informal positive feedback;
the new curriculum never becoming formally
recognised as the ‘standard’ approach.
Each of these issues is discussed below.
Faculty ownership: In many cases, the underlying cause for
failure appeared to be that the change was predominantly
‘owned’ by one individual, or small group of individuals, and
its long-term success continued to rest on their shoulders.
Typically, this individual would deliver many of the agship
courses in the reformed curriculum and devote very
signicant time and eort to their teaching activities. As such,
they would be widely seen to have jeopardised their research
prole, and thus career progression, in order to deliver the
new curriculum. One interviewee commented that “we need
to set the bar lower for what innovative engineering education
looks like. The more you build up the ‘ideal’ instructor, the less
likely you are to build capacity… People need to know that you
don’t have to kill yourself [to deliver non-traditional educational
approaches]”. For some, the answer lay in the development
of a team teaching approach across all non-traditional
courses, with regular rotation of faculty involved, particularly
amongst new faculty. By widening the net of individuals who
could deliver the reformed courses, the sense of individual
ownership would be reduced, as would the expectation that
faculty would need to devote unrealistic time and energy
to the activity. Many interviewees talked about the positive,
but subtle, changes that occurred within their departments
following the introduction of team teaching – “teams of three
worked closely together, and started to share tips and take an
interest in each other’s teaching. The conversations suddenly
started to change in the coee room, as people actually started
to talk about their teaching”.
Isolation within the curriculum: Where the original reform
was not part of a strategic analysis and re-design of the
curriculum, the resulting changes are often isolated with few,
if any, meaningful linkages to ‘core’ courses. As such, most
faculty are often not aware of the changes made or the impact
that they may have on student learning. However substantial
or successful the changes themselves, such reforms are highly
vulnerable to university re-structuring (having not generated
a wide support base to champion their continuation) and
faculty turnover (with few faculty willing or able to pick up the
delivery of the courses).
Maintaining a focus on education: A number of
interviewees who have been involved in department-level
reforms commented that the sustainability of larger-scale
reform was contingent on a culture of continuous change
and improvement – “after the rst cohort of students graduate
from your new programme, the tendency for sta is to ‘hangup
24
Achieving excellence in engineering education: the ingredients of successful change
their boots’ and settle back to a focus on their research. This
can be very damaging, as elements will start to drift back to
the old curriculum, and others will just stagnate. You need to
ensure that a core of the sta are really engaged in continuous
change and development”. Some also spoke about how
newly-appointed faculty often do not appreciate the
importance of maintaining the changes – “the new faculty
were not there when we were about to be shut down and never
felt that pressure”. A number of dierent mechanisms were
suggested for stimulating this process of continuous change.
For some, particularly US-based interviewees, this was only
possible through the injection of ring-fenced funding for
innovation and research in engineering education. Other
mechanisms which were found to maintain engagement
included the establishment of internal research groups in
engineering education.
Informal positive feedback: Maintaining change is clearly
much more problematic where faculty do not see or feel the
positive benets of the reforms. Without individual faculty
members hearing direct and positive feedback, motivation
levels for sustaining a reform often diminishes, particularly
where overall workloads have increased as a result of the
change. Amongst those change programmes that have
been successfully sustained, two features are often apparent,
either singly or in combination. Firstly, faculty across the
department/School are aware of a signicant increase in
student motivation and intake quality which they directly
attribute to the reform, whether or not they were originally
supportive of the changes. Secondly, the existing or newly-
established Industry Advisory Board takes an active role in
supporting and overseeing the undergraduate curriculum,
providing positive feedback on the reforms that is “heard” by
individual faculty.
Impact of the changes: Well-designed impact evaluation
plays an important role in sustaining change, as discussed
in Section 3.6.2. Impact evaluations appear to be particularly
valuable in protecting a new curriculum during periods of
re-structuring and sta change – “If the new management does
not like it, especially if you can’t provide evidence of its success,
people will revert to the status quo.”
Formal acknowledgement: Finally, a number of interviewees
commented that curriculum changes often “become diluted”
where they are not formally acknowledged as standard
School/departmental practice, and remain operating with
“the status of a long-term pilot innovation”. Some noted that
an explicit, and formalised, signal that an educational change
was now part of the permanent curriculum was “the key to
long-term success”. Examples oered included the inclusion of
the new course/experience in the student handbook or the
activity becoming a “line in the departmental budget”.
3.6.2 Impact evaluation
The study has focused on identifying the common features
of programmes of positive and long-term educational
change in engineering. Amongst those reform endeavours
considered, it was apparent that formal impact evaluation
was more common amongst changes that had been
sustained. In particular, where signicant problems had
been encountered in sustaining change, impact evaluations
appeared to play a crucial role in overcoming them. Despite
these apparent benets, however, systematic impact
evaluations of systemic educational changes are relatively
rare. Where evaluations had been undertaken, most tended
to be hastily conducted and incomplete, and almost all
required a bespoke assessment model to be developed
in-house. These observations were supported by many
of the researchers in educational change consulted –
“There is a very low bar when it comes to evidence. It is very
anecdotal. People tend to present quotes from a small number
of programme supporters as evidence. Other evidence was not
really meaningful, such as a [student] exit survey”. Indeed, few
interviewees could identify any impact evaluations from
educational change programmes that they felt were well-
designed and rigorous. Two of the exceptions were the
evaluations of the programme-wide reforms in the School
of Civil, Environmental & Chemical Engineering at RMIT in
Australia and the reforms of the introductory physics course
in the Department of Physics at the University of Illinois in
the US, which were both recommended by a number of
interviewees.
There appear to be a number of reasons why rigorous
impact evaluations are so rarely conducted. These issues are
outlined below.
No clarity about what to measure: The diculty in
measuring the impact of educational change was
a common theme in the interviews, as was the lack
of commonly accepted models for such impact
assessments. Another issue highlighted was the lack of
clarity about the underlying goals of the reform, which
made impact assessment almost impossible – “for many
people, the success criteria they talk about are much more
grand that it will ever be possible to evaluate, and they can
ever attribute solely to the change they are making”.
Measurements starting too late. Many Schools/
departments do not start to consider impact assessment
until well after the process of implanting change has
commenced – “People often develop new metrics at the
2nd or 3rd year of the change implementation, which is
too late.” By this stage, it is almost impossible to collect
‘base-line’ data to capture curricular impacts before the
change, and therefore draw any rm conclusions about
the long-term impact of the reform. One exception in
this regard, is Aston University in the UK, which is just
embarking on a 7-year longitudinal study of the impact
of an upcoming change to the engineering curriculum.
Responsibility falls on one individual. The
responsibility for impact studies is typically taken by
one individual, often the person who has carried much
of the burden of the change eort itself. As this task is
undertaken in addition to many other duties, the data
collection is often rather “haphazard” and stored in a
manner that makes it dicult for others to retrieve or
interpret. Some interviewees estimated that, for impact
data to be meaningful, it must be collected over the
course of at least 10 years, from before the change
is implemented through to the point where the rst
25
graduating classes are operating in the workplace.
When relying on one, typically over-stretched,
individual, ensuring continuity over such a long period
is very dicult. In practice, the individual will often
retire, run out of the original project funding or feel
that they must “get on with their day job” at a relatively
early stage, and data collection essentially stops at
this point.
26
Achieving excellence in engineering education: the ingredients of successful change
This chapter investigates the process of educational change
in six Schools or departments of engineering from across the
world. Reecting the focus of this report, these investigations
centre on how change has been achieved, rather than what
changes were made and/or the ecacy of the underlying
educational approach adopted.
The case studies were identied through the interview phase of
the study, as outlined in Chapter 3. All those interviewed were
asked to identify examples of engineering education reform
that they have been impressed by or considered to have been
particularly successful. The 6 case studies were selected from
this set of examples (as listed in Figure 4), as a mechanism to
improve the likelihood that they described change that was
both genuine and eective. They were also selected to provide
a spectrum of drivers for reform, change strategies, levels of
ambition, geographical locations and stages in the change
process. The case studies all involved planned, systemic change
that impacted (or had the potential to impact) a signicant
proportion of the core engineering curriculum.
The case studies selected for investigation are listed below.
1. The Department of Civil, Environmental & Geomatic
Engineering, Faculty of Engineering Sciences, UCL, UK
2. School of Engineering, Hong Kong University of Science
and Technology (HKUST), Hong Kong
3. iFoundry, University of Illinois, US
4. Department of Chemical Engineering, University of
Queensland, Australia
5. Faculty of Engineering and Computing, Coventry
University, UK
6. Learning Factory, Penn State, US
Figure 5 illustrates the broad timelines over which these
reforms have been implemented, with the date of the case
study investigation process (April–September 2011) indicated
with a dashed red line. As can been seen from the gure, three
case studies presented have completed the change process
and three are still on-going.
A total of 128 individuals were consulted for the case
study investigations, including 64 one-to-one interviews.
For each case study, formal interviews were held with
between 8 and 17 stakeholders and observers to the
educational programmes. Interviews were typically 1-hour
in length and conducted either face-to-face or remotely,
via Skype or telephone. Interviews were complimented
by additional evidence gathering through informal
feedback sessions and focus groups. In addition, classroom
observations were undertaken for all but two of the
case studies – the University of Queensland, where the
author had observed the reformed curriculum on a prior
occasion, and the HKUST where the educational change
is yet to be implemented. All case study evaluations were
approved by the host university concerned before their
inclusion in this report.
The six case studies are presented in the sections
that follow.
4 Evidence from the case study
investigations
1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014
Penn State
Queensland
UCL
Illinois
Coventry
HKUST
Pre/post reform changes
Planning and piloting phase
Education cycles of rst cohort under new (core curricular) programme
Figure 5. Time lines for change of the 6 case studies investigated. The time of investigation is indicated with a red
dashedline.
27
4.1.1 Context and drivers for change
Context: UCL is a London-based university with very strong
international research reputation. It is seen to be an institution
that encourages “mould-breaking and rapid” change, a
vision supported at a senior university level. For some, the
UCL operating model is more akin to a corporation than a
university, resulting in more decisive change, with strategic
decisions often made by individuals rather than committees.
Departmental structures are strong, with limited exchange
between departments on educational ideas and approaches.
The Department of Civil, Environmental & Geomatic
Engineering (CEGE) is one of nine departments in the School,
and is home to around 40 faculty with a current undergraduate
intake of around 70 students each year. The current Head of
Department has been in post since 2003. Prior to the reform
eort, CEGE was seen to be a “fairly typical research-intensive
engineering department... with very few changes made to the
undergraduate programmes in over 30 years”. Indeed, one
described the department’s educational approach as “as
traditional as they come – very old school”. Although some
non-traditional teaching and learning approaches had been
employed prior to reform, these were largely conned to design
teaching and not typical of the wider departmental practice.
The demographic in the department was strongly male, with
many faculty close to retirement.
Drivers: The principal drivers for the change to the
undergraduate education in CEGE were problems with
recruitment and student engagement – “the poor quality of
students coming in [to the department] and the problem of them
becoming very demotivated by the second year”. These issues
were highlighted in an external examiners’ review of the
degree programmes, which pointed to a low ‘value-added’
between student entry and exit.
A number of other issues were also apparent. Within the
department, there was a feeling amongst a number of the
faculty that the undergraduate programme was no longer
‘t for purpose’ and did not adequately respond to the
societal, environmental and political challenges of the 21st
century. Indeed very few changes had been made to the
core curriculum in more than two decades. The department’s
research prole was also not aligned to subject areas taught at
undergraduate level, resulting in a very uneven teaching load
across the faculty.
In response to these problems, the new Head of Department
was appointed in 2003 with an explicit mandate to ‘turn
around’ the undergraduate programme. Other stang
changes followed. The new Head of Department undertook
a rapid recruitment programme, appointing 10 new faculty
to replace those close to retirement. A high proportion of the
new faculty were young and female. With these appointments
came a signicant shift in the department’s age and gender
demographic, and an accompanying change in departmental
outlook and culture.
4.1.2 The educational vision and changes implemented
The incoming Head of Department instituted a fundamental
review of the undergraduate programmes to develop a new
vision of “what we are really trying to achieve”. To articulate
their vision and goals, the review considered both inputs
(student prole at the point of admission) and outputs
(skills, knowledge and outlook at the point of graduation).
The review therefore evaluated the desired demographics,
aspirations and attitudes of both incoming and graduating
students. It was informed by consultations with both
schools and engineering industry. Only very limited external
benchmarking of alternative educational approaches was
conducted and no reference was made to existing research on
eective pedagogies in engineering.
The consultations with schools identied a number
of important markets that were being ‘missed’ by the
department’s current undergraduate recruitment – principally
4.1 Case study 1: Department of Civil, Environmental & Geomatic Engineering, Faculty of
Engineering Sciences, UCL, UK
Overview: This UK-based case study describes a
department-wide reform involving a signicant re-
design of the rst two years of the curriculum and
a controversial change to entry requirements. Initial
discussions on the reform eort started in 2003 and
the rst cohort graduated from the new BEng (3 year)
curriculum in July 2009.
Reasons for selection as a case study: (i) this
department-wide change was undertaken within
a premier research-led institution, (ii) despite a
controversial broadening of the entry requirements to
the degree programme, accreditation was granted, (ii)
the model for change is to be rolled-out across a number
of other departments within the School
3
.
Who was interviewed: 21 individuals were consulted
for the case study investigation. Informal discussions
were held with 11 current departmental undergraduates
(selected at random from the 1st, 2nd and 4th years of
study) and formal interviews were held with 10 other
stakeholders to the undergraduate programme (including
the current Head of Department, current and former
Director of Studies, faculty from both the Department
of Civil, Environmental Geomatic Engineering and other
departments in the School, the Vice Dean (Education)
for the School, the university Vice-Provost, the Director of
Membership and the Institution of Civil Engineers, and a
member of the department’s industry advisory panel).
3 For consistency across all case studies, ‘School’ in this
case will refer to the Faculty of Engineering Sciences
28
Achieving excellence in engineering education: the ingredients of successful change
highly gifted and academically able individuals who would
be engaged by the challenge of an engineering education,
but were not necessarily motivated to become engineers.
This group were seen to be driven by a desire to “x the world
and make it a better place to live in” and typically would not be
studying Mathematics and Physics at A level (which would
usually be mandatory for an entry to a UK engineering degree
programme). A key message emerging from the consultations
with industry was the particular need for strong engineering
leaders and problem-solvers, with a broader educational base.
Reecting the focus on inputs and outputs, the major changes
related to recruitment and educational approach:
Recruitment: The admissions criteria were broadened,
to accept prospective students studying any A-level or
equivalent on entry to the programme, provided that
they achieve at least ‘straight A-grades’. Interviews for
entry to the programme were replaced by a team-based
PBL (problem-based learning) scenario. The marketing
of the programme was refocused around the themes of
leadership and engineering for social responsibility.
Educational approach: The rst two years of the
curriculum has been redesigned and now operates in 5
week cycles. The rst four weeks of each cycle is delivered
in a largely traditional manner, but is structured around
four equally-weighted ‘clusters’ – context, mechanisms,
tools and change – rather than the traditional engineering
discipline-based topics. Given that only two of the
‘clusters’ (mechanisms and tools) stem from engineering
science, the traditional engineering curriculum content
has been signicantly reduced. A greatly increased
emphasis has been given to topics such as design and
conceptualisation. The nal week of the cycle is a full-time
intensive, team-based problem-based learning ‘scenario’,
where the problem posed draws on the learning from the
preceding four weeks.
The reforms also delivered three major operational benets:
(i) 50% reduction in contact hours, thus allowing faculty
time for planning, delivery and assessment of the PBL-style
scenarios without increasing the average teaching loads, (ii)
a more equitable distribution of the teaching load across all
faculty, regardless of their area of research specialism, and
(iii) a reduction in the number of degree programmes from
12 to 2 – the Civil Engineering and Environmental Engineering
programmes.
4.1.3 Achieving change
As noted above, change was initiated by the appointment
of new Head of Department in 2003, followed quickly by the
recruitment of new faculty and a root-and-branch review
of current provision in order to develop a new vision of the
undergraduate programme. Key elements of the vision were
to provide a broader, more engaging curriculum, based
around problem-solving, that attracted bright, creative and
socially-responsible individuals who could rise to leadership
positions both within and outside the engineering profession.
Following agreement on this educational vision, two
attempts were made to design a new curriculum capable of
deliveringit. The rst ‘bottom-up’ approach to the educational
reform did not succeed (Oct. 2003 – Oct. 2004). The second
attempt, which combined a ‘top-down and bottom up’
approach, was successfully designed and implemented (Oct
2004. – Sept. 2006). The full change process, including both of
these attempts, is outlined below.
Initial discussions among departmental senior
management on the ‘bottom up’ approach began
in summer 2003. In October 2003, a working group,
comprising faculty with an interest in educational change,
was established to review the existing curriculum and to
re-design the educational provision in the rst two years
of the undergraduate degree. In July 2004, the working
group presented their proposals for education reform to all
departmental faculty, with a curriculum structure that was
largely based around the traditional engineering science
disciplines. The proposed reforms met with signicant
opposition, both from those who saw them as “dumbing
down” the engineering science elements of the education,
and those who viewed the change to be “too conservative
and too close to what we already had”. At this point, it was
recognised that a new approach to the change process was
needed – “the bottom-up approach was too meandering. We
actually needed to be forced to think about the education in
a completely dierent way. So Nick [the Head of Department]
swung in with an edict”.
A new approach to the change process was adopted in
October 2004, when the Head of Department fundamentally
redesigned the curriculum structure and then asked all faculty
to engage in the new curriculum design. One of the most
signicant changes made by the Head of Department was to
move the curriculum away from the traditional engineering
disciplines and reshape it around four ‘clusters’ and project
‘scenarios’. Working groups were established for each of the
four cluster themes; all departmental faculty were allocated
to a working group and tasked with designing that element
of the curriculum. In January 2005, the educational vision
and curriculum template were presented to senior university
management and given provisional approval to proceed.
The educational approach, including the plans to broaden
the entry criteria for incoming students, was also informally
discussed with the key Civil Engineering accreditation agency
at this stage, to a very positive reception. Following further
development of the approach and curriculum design by
the four working groups, a ‘dry run’ of one of the scenarios
was held in July 2006. Two months later, in September 2006,
the rst cohort of rst-year students entered the reformed
programmes.
4.1.4 Critical factors in successful change
Four elements appear to have been critical to the success of
the change process:
1. Strong and committed leadership;
2. A clear vision for the educational changes, which
was well communicated to faculty, senior university
management, industry advisors and the accreditation
agencies at an early stage of the reform process;
3. A clarity amongst faculty that signicant change was
29
going to happen – “we knew that this was not going to go
away, so we really needed to engage with it”;
4. A curriculum that was designed by all faculty, but
through a process that required them to think outside
their discipline areas.
Each of these elements is discussed in turn below.
Strong and committed leadership. This was provided by a
well-respected and dynamic Head of Department with strong
backing from senior colleagues in the department and the
university. The Head of Department has a strong international
research reputation (“his research record speaks for itself”);
he also has a personal commitment to the undergraduate
experience and devotes signicant time to teaching. Both
those within and outside the department pointed to a step-
change that occurred when the Head of Department took up
his post, of which the reforms to the education were one part.
In the atmosphere of a changed faculty demographic and
a new energy from the top, a cultural shift was seen to take
place, with a new openness to discuss educational change. It
is also clear that, while the Head of Department provided the
vision and leadership for the reform, its implementation was
managed by two key faculty members, one of whom was the
Director of Studies at the time. For many, this combination
of strong and passionate leadership, on the one hand, and
systematic and careful curricular implementation, on the
other, provided the conditions in which successful change
could be achieved.
A clear vision for change (“the intellectual case was superb”).
All stakeholders, both within and outside the department,
were able to articulate the educational vision, and used
similar terms to describe it. It was acknowledged to be a
fundamental, but carefully considered, reform, presented
(by the Head of Department) with passion, precision and
complete condence in its success. The messages resonated
well at all levels, with clarity both about the goals and targets
for change. For example, the drive for leadership and social
global responsibility embody elements of the university’s
wider vision for undergraduate education. A number of the
proposed changes – such as the broadening of the entry
criteria – were controversial, but the articulation of a strong
narrative for change helped to secure support for them.
The vision was also seen to be addressing a number of
fundamental concerns about UK engineering education, such
as how to widen participation in engineering, particularly
amongst girls, and how to improve the leadership position
of UK engineers in an increasingly globalised industry. For
some, the radical and fundamental nature of the change
also held strong appeal – as the Head of Department in
CEGE commented “the big advantage of [the change in] our
department is the image was associated with ‘making the world
better’. That marriage – what they are trying to do being bigger
than the subject – may be more dicult in other disciplines”.
Change is inevitable. From the beginning of the change
process, the Head of Department was clear that a signicant
change was coming and that reform would be rapid and
fundamental – “You can’t do this by tinkering at the edges.
Ididn’t give them any options. There needed to be a fundamental
change, and it needed to be a quick hit”. The early discussions
with the university senior management, the Vice Provost of
UCL, and the key accreditation agency for the programmes,
the Institution of Civil Engineering, also appear to have been
very signicant. The radical nature of the proposed changes
always carried a danger of being dismissed by faculty as
unworkable or unlikely to be supported by the university
or accreditation agency. Securing support at such an early
stage from both the university and the accreditation body
“caught many of the sta o-guard”, helping to diuse much
of the early resistance to reform as well as demonstrating
the seriousness of intent to push forward with change. As
one faculty member commented “Once Nick [the Head of
Department] had sold the vision of what we were trying to do, we
had support right up the chain of the university, the Vice-Dean,
the Dean, the Provost and even the ICE [the key accreditation
agency]. After this, it was quite hard for people to pretend that this
was not happening”.
An inclusive process of change. All faculty were given a voice
in the design of the new curriculum, through their assigned
‘cluster’ working group. However, although the curriculum
was developed by departmental faculty, they were not able
to operate within their traditional engineering disciplines.
Instead, because each working group theme cut across
disciplines, faculty were “forced to think about the curriculum
from a blank sheet, rather than just ghting for their own subjects
to continue”. The early stages of the change process uncovered
divisions among faculty about the magnitude of change
that they were willing to support; some were pushing for a
wholesale problem-based learning (PBL) approach across the
curriculum while others believed that the curriculum should
remain entirely unchanged. In many ways, the creation of the
5-week cycles “made everyone feel that they were getting what
they wanted – the PBL group had their focused intensive periods
and the traditional group could just operate in the 4 out of the 5
weeks where they could deliver the courses in any way they chose”.
4.1.5 Challenges in the change process
A number of challenges were encountered during the design,
implementation and continuation of the educational changes
in CEGE. An early practical challenge was running the old
and new curriculum concurrently for 2 years. But the major
challenges for the management of the change process appear
to relate to faculty attitudes and values.
The most controversial element of the reforms was the
removal for the requirement for entrants to have studied
Mathematics and Physics during their previous two years
of school (A-levels or equivalent); as one faculty member
commented “convincing the sta to accept this was this was
the biggest challenge for the department”. These changes are
now broadly accepted by departmental faculty, primarily
because the concerns that fuelled opposition to the changes
have proven to be unfounded. The rst concern was that
such changes would lead to non-compliance of university/
accreditation regulations; to address this concern the
widening of the intake was discussed, and explained, at an
early stage with university senior management and the critical
accreditation body, leading to strong support in principle
in both cases. The second concern was that there would
be a reduction in the quality and mathematical abilities of
30
Achieving excellence in engineering education: the ingredients of successful change
the student entry. Instead, the changes resulted in dramatic
increase in the overall quality of student intake, and the non-
traditional intake, in particular, were outperforming their peers
in the mathematically-based subjects.
A second challenge concerned a dierence of view on the
goals of the undergraduate programme. A number of faculty
expressed concern about the shift away from educating future
engineers and towards developing leaders who can operate
across dierent professions. In most cases, these concerns do
not appear to have been allayed, with a number of individuals
still strongly believing that the change was mis-guided;
in their view, the education and training of professional
engineers should remain the primary goal.
Finally, although a large part of the curriculum design was
undertaken and ‘owned’ by departmental faculty, it also clear
that much of the change process was mandated at Head of
Department level, and, in that sense, had a strong ‘top-down’
element. This has clearly caused some problems, leaving a
number of faculty with the feeling that they “did not get a fair
hearing” when expressing their ideas or concerns. During the
process of change, the Head of Department was not seen
to engage with those more resistant to change. Although
this does not appear to have altered the course of reform,
for some, this has left some “simmering issues” within the
department that “may come back to bite us once the Head of
Department is replaced”.
4.1.6 Impact of the changes
There is compelling evidence of improvements in intake
quality, retention rates and student performance following
completion of the reform programme.
Student intake. Over the past 10 years, the department has
seen a dramatic improvement in the academic standard
of incoming students, with A level entry grades rising from
CCC in 2003 to AAA in 2011. Although other departments in
the School have also seen increases in intake quality during
this period, the rises in Civil, Environmental and Geomatic
Engineering have been much more signicant. During the
early years of the reform, the department experienced a
decline in the application numbers from overseas students,
which was presumed to stem from the shift away from a
traditional education in the engineering fundamentals.
However, over the past 2 years, the numbers of applications
from overseas students, particularly those in China, have
increased signicantly. This shift is seen to be due, in part,
to the reputation of the reformed education, but also due a
broader improvement in the international prole of UCL and
the wider engagement, particularly in China, with the need
to integrate personal and professional development into
engineering education.
Student Performance. The curricular changes appear to
have triggered a signicant improvement in the end of year
scores achieved by students. For example, Figure 6 illustrates
the increase in the percentage of high-achieving students
following reform and Figure 7 illustrates the decrease
in percentage of students with low performance scores
following reform. These gures were created from attainment
score data spanning 2002–2010.
Most telling, perhaps, are the improvements in achievement
level apparent in the third year of study, where both the
curriculum and assessment approach have remained
unchanged. The numbers of third year students achieving the
two highest attainment classications rose from 43% (prior to
the reforms, from 2001 to 2008) to 60% (following the reforms,
since 2008). In addition, the numbers of students achieving
the three lowest attainment classications during their third
year decreased from 23% (prior to reform, from 2001 to 2008)
to 8% (following the reform, since 2008).
Widening participation. The number of students entering
the programmes by the non-traditional route (i.e. those not
studying Mathematics and/or Physics pre-university) has been
relatively modest – less than 10% of the cohort each year.
However, almost all of those consulted within the department,
faculty and students, commented on the disproportionate
impact that this group has on the cohort as a whole, acting
as a catalyst for improved creativity, enquiry and ambition –
“they ask more questions about the background and context of
problems. They are particularly hard-working, as they feel they
have to make up ground in maths and physics, and this eort is
infectious”.
The student experience. Informal discussions with
undergraduates as part of this case study revealed strongly
positive attitudes to the new educational approaches,
particularly the ‘scenarios’, which were seen to be intensive,
challenging but highly benecial. The comments of one
second year student were very typical – “we live from one
scenario to the next…. They are really ‘full-on’. You know those
weeks are going to be really exhausting, but you are so aware
of how much you are learning. They [the scenarios] are really
important”. The key concern amongst the students centred
on the operation of the scenarios rather than the model itself.
They pointed to a lack of consistency in approach to each
scenario, apparently stemming from poor communication
between faculty members, and, in a number of cases, a lack
of timely and informative feedback following the scenarios.
Itwas also interesting to note that only those undergraduates
with non-traditional entry into the department were
aware of its radical educational approach in advance of the
departmental open day or even entering the rst year. In
other words, the department does not appear to be actively
marketing itself as eectively as hoped. This issue was also
highlighted by a member of the department’s industrial
advisory committee – “there is no clear indication, externally,
that the course is dierent. They are really underplaying the virtue
of what they have”.
Faculty experience. Faculty feedback on the impact of
the reforms is also broadly very positive. In particular, the
increase in student quality and engagement has been a
major motivation for faculty. A number highlighted the
dierences they see in recent cohorts of graduates, with
enthusiastic feedback from employers and an increase in
external prizes and awards in national student competitions.
Some continuing concerns exist amongst a small number of
faculty over the reductions seen to the traditional engineering
science content in the curriculum. However, these concerns
are not widespread and appear to be diminishing with time.
31
There were mixed views about the impact of the reforms on
overall faculty workload. Some faculty pointed to an increase
in the overall ‘teaching load’ resulting from the reforms, which
were not seen likely to reduce, even when ‘steady-state’ was
reached. Others experienced a reduction in contact hours,
which allowed for improved preparation and creativity in their
educational approach.
4.1.7 Sustainability of the change
This programme of reform is widely seen to be well
embedded and likely to be sustained for the foreseeable
future. Any reversion back to the ‘old education’ appears
unlikely, particularly given the very strong endorsement
from senior university management, who view the reformed
programme as a model for good practice within UCL,
and positive response from the student body. For most,
however, the real key to the sustainability of the reform
is the improvement in the quality of students. Almost all
faculty members, even those still unconvinced by the nature
and scale of the reforms undertaken, commented on this
positive outcome of the change process. As one faculty
member commented “we like teaching bright, engaged
No. of students
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
First year
Second year Third year
n Prior to reform
n Following reform
Figure 6. Percentage of students achieving the two highest attainment classications (1st and 2:1), comparing average
scores before and since reform was implemented in that year of study. Data taken from attainment score from 2002–2010.
% of students
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
First year Second year Third year
n Prior to reform
n Following reform
Figure 7. Percentage of students achieving the three lowest attainment classications (3rd, ordinary pass and fail),
comparing average scores before and since reform was implemented in that year of study. Data taken from attainment
score from 2002–2010.
32
Achieving excellence in engineering education: the ingredients of successful change
students, nomatter whether we agreed [with the change] or not.
Whatwould kill it [the changes], though, would be if our student
numbers or quality fell”.
The vision and drive for change is clearly very closely
associated with the current Head of Department. For
some, continuing with such a radical approach across
the curriculum may be dicult to maintain if a new
Head of Department were to take post. Some concern
was expressed that faculty with reservations about the
approach may take this opportunity to revert back to the
old curriculum within their own courses. This view, however,
does not appear to be widespread. Many simply feel that
“we all are too exhausted to make any more changes for quite
some time!”.
As a result of the perceived success of the changes in CEGE,
the School, with strong support from the university senior
management, is planning to roll-out similar educational
reforms across all engineering departments. In contrast to the
CEGE reforms, change will be driven by senior management
at School and university level. It is not yet clear whether
this dierent approach to change will be equally successful;
however, important elements of success, including a strong
educational vision and senior university management
committed to radical change, remain in place.
33
4.2.1 Context and drivers for change
Context: The Hong Kong University of Science and
Technology (HKUST) was established in 1991 and has already
built an international reputation for excellence in research,
recently ranked as Asia’s premier institution in the QS Asian
University Rankings. Across Hong Kong, HKUST is seen to be
a young, dynamic institution that is open to change and
encourages new ideas from sta at all levels.
The School of Engineering houses six departments, with a
total undergraduate body of around 2000 – about 40% of
the University’s student population. The existing educational
approach is seen to be broadly traditional and ‘teacher-
centred’, with the vast majority of contact time devoted to
lecture-based instruction. Since the University’s inception, the
School of Engineering has established and maintained strong
industry partnerships. For many, these links have helped to
ensure that the undergraduate education is both responsive
to and informed by current practice.
In 2005, the Hong Kong government announced far-reaching
changes to secondary and tertiary education, which were
designed to “eectively prepare our next generation to cope with
the challenges of the 21st Century and the demands of our rapidly
developing knowledge-based society”. The fundamental changes
will both impact the city’s educational structure (moving
from a British to a US system, with secondary education
being reduced by 1 year and tertiary education extended by
1year) and educational approach (broadening the curriculum
and a focus on ‘whole person development’ and ‘lifelong
learning’). The rst cohort of students entered this New
Academic Structure (NAS) at senior secondary school level
in September 2009, and will move into the higher education
system in September 2012. During the 2012/13 academic
year, universities will have to accommodate a ‘double cohort’
of students, with the rst intake under the NAS and the nal
intake under the old educational system entering higher
education at the same time. In addition to the NAS, the Hong
Kong government is also moving towards an outcomes-based
education at undergraduate level. In line with this move, the
Hong Kong engineering accreditation agency (Hong Kong
Institution of Engineers) will require all engineering programmes
to adopt an outcomes-based approach starting in 2012.
Drivers: Within the School of Engineering at HKUST, the
government-imposed structural changes were seen as a “rare
opportunity for the School to examine critically its educational
mission, objectives, and delivery… this was a disruptive rather
than incremental change, and rarely would we have such
an opportunity”. The School of Engineering has therefore
embarked on an additional programme of reform across all
of their undergraduate educational programmes. Although
triggered by the system-wide reforms, the decision to
embark on this ‘self-initiated’ element of the change was
driven by what was described as a “conuence of events”.
Twodrivers appear to have been particularly central.
Firstly, the School was aware of the growing demand for
engineering leaders with a global perspective, and sought
to ensure that their graduates were better positioned in this
marketplace. Secondly, there were concerns about student
recruitment and the decline in popularity of engineering in
Hong Kong in favour of subjects such as business – “after a
10 year decline, we want to make engineering attractive again
to our brightest minds”. As a result of these two drivers, the
School saw the opportunity to shift from a ‘teacher-centred’
to a ‘learner-centred’ paradigm.
4.2.2 The educational vision and changes planned
The School-wide reforms, currently in the planning phases,
can be considered in two distinct categories: (i) those
changes mandated by the NAS, engineering accreditation
requirements and HKUST, and (ii) those self-initiated changes
4.2 Case study 2: School of Engineering, The Hong Kong University of Science and
Technology, Hong Kong
Overview: The Hong Kong education system is
currently undergoing a radical, government-led change,
impacting all secondary and tertiary educational
institutions. The School of Engineering at HKUST has
taken this opportunity to drive through an additional,
and signicant, reform to the educational structure
and approach of their undergraduate programmes.
Planning for the changes commenced within the School
of Engineering in 2007 and the rst student cohort
will be welcomed to the reformed four-year degree
programmes in September 2012.
Reasons for selection as a case study: (i) this School-
wide educational reform, within a premier research-led
institution, was triggered by a ‘top-down’ mandated
change across the sector, (ii) the design and assessment
of the reform is informed by a new in-house engineering
education innovation centre with a growing international
prole, and (iii) evidence gathered on the impact of
the changes is likely to inform the use of innovative
educational approaches more widely in engineering
Schools across Asia.
Who was interviewed: interviews were held with
8 individuals, including those driving the wider
educational changes across Hong Kong (the Deputy
Secretary of the Hong Kong Education Bureau and the
Director of Qualications of the Hong Kong Institution
of Engineers) and stakeholders in the undergraduate
programmes in the School of Engineering at HKUST
(faculty members, the Associate Dean for Undergraduate
Studies and Student Aairs, departmental coordinators
for the educational reform, Director of the Center for
Engineering Education Innovation (E
2
I), an external
educational advisor to the School and a recent graduate
from the existing programmes).
34
Achieving excellence in engineering education: the ingredients of successful change
that have been devised and driven through, in parallel, by the
School of Engineering. Each is discussed in turn below, with an
overview of their implications for education within the School.
Mandatory changes aecting the School of Engineering
from 2012. Three sets of changes have been ‘imposed’ on the
School.
Firstly, the system-wide move to the NAS will involve a number
of fundamental changes to the city’s higher education system:
(i) students will enter university a year earlier, with a two-fold
increase in student intake numbers in 2012, the ‘double cohort’
year, (ii) the duration of degree programmes will increase from
3 to 4 years, and (iii) the curriculum will become broader and
more exible, with discipline specialisation occurring in the
second-year rather than rst-year of study.
Secondly, to coincide with the NAS, HKUST will be introducing
some university-wide changes from 2012: (i) all degree
courses must incorporate a set of ‘common core courses’, and
(ii) students will be oered a much greater level of exibility
to shape and ‘individualise’ their educational experience,
including the ability to select many options of study (e.g.,
double major, minor).
Finally, fundamental changes to the engineering accreditation
system are planned for gradual implementation from 2012,
where all engineering degree programmes will be expected
to: (i) be outcomes-based, with the demonstration of a
rigorous approach to meeting a selection of the programme’s
learning outcomes, and (ii) oer a “better balance between the
core engineering education and wider learning”.
Additional reform eort initiated by the School of
Engineering. In 2007, in light of the system-wide changes
already in the pipeline, a decision was taken by Dean and
Heads of Department to undertake a root-and-branch review
of the School’s educational approach and embark on a more
ambitious programme of educational reform. Through this
new vision, the School is seeking to produce graduates who
can “operate across traditional boundaries and take on roles
that demand not only technical knowledge but a range of other
skills, including communication, leadership and management
capabilities”. For the majority of those interviewed, these
‘self-initiated’ reforms are the primary focus of their attention
– “the only mandatory change, really, was to the duration of
the education, from 3 to 4 years. What we are doing, though, is
much more radical”. The changes driven at the School-level are
focused in 3 areas:
Curricular changes. Although the nature and extent
will vary between departments, changes are planned
to the curriculum structure, delivery and assessment.
These changes include: (i) reducing the number of
required technical courses, (ii) establishing a context
for engineering learning with engaging hands-on
project experiences, particularly during the early years,
(iii) providing students with ‘multiple exposures’ to
critical engineering concepts and ideas at key stages
throughout their studies, (iv) increasing the focus on
personal and professional skill development, particularly
the themes of leadership, innovation and global
awareness, and (v) aligning assessment procedures with
the new educational approaches.
Non-curricular changes. The School is seeking to oer
students greater exibility within the curriculum, such
that they have more opportunities to engage in co-
curricular and extra-curricular activities. Non-curricular
activities will be coordinated by the Associate Dean,
and will involve opportunities within engineering, such
as industry internships, as well as outside engineering,
such as community service projects.
Cross-School educational support and information.
A key element of the reform involves building cross-
School capacity in engineering education, improving
both educational delivery (through, for example,
encouraging an active faculty dialogue on teaching and
leaning, oering instructional development to faculty
and supporting ‘research informed’ teaching practices)
and providing formal programmes of student support
(through, for example, mentoring programmes and
rst-year advisory services). Many of these activities are
planned to be delivered through the newly established
Center for Engineering Education Innovation (E
2
I).
4.2.3 Achieving change
Within the School of Engineering, planning for the change
eort started in earnest in 2007. Early work focused on
international benchmarking and consultation. Much of the
eort was focused on a review of the engineering curricula
at a number of premier US-based engineering Schools
and hosting presentations from national and international
educational experts. Although the establishment of E
2
I in 2010
has subsequently made engineering education scholarship
an explicit part of the School’s educational reform strategy,
the new educational vision and approach was not informed
by existing research evidence at the early phase of the reform.
As the current Associate Dean comments “Personally, I was not
aware of any of the research… the key mechanism [for designing
the reform] is faculty drawing from their own experience and
sharing their ideas and outcomes with others”.
Although the change is driven at School-level, authority for
the design, planning and implementation of curriculum
reforms has been devolved to each individual department,
who each will decide how (and the extent to which) any
changes are made. As the Associate Dean commented
“…we cannot force change and must respect the autonomy of
individual departments and faculty… otherwise we would create
a lot of resistance”. The only curricular change that has been
mandated at School-level is the requirement to implement
an engaging hands-on introductory course at the start of
the rst year. Otherwise, each department has been asked
to design and manage a programme of curricular reform
that is tailored to their own needs, but that follows the
School’s overall educational vision and the need for increased
curricular exibility.
In 2009, curricular change committees were established
within all departments, each comprising a cross-section of
faculty from all subject areas, who meet every two weeks. Each
departmental committee feeds into a central cross-School
35
curriculum change committee, chaired by the Associate Dean,
that also meets twice a month. The committees provide a
formal mechanism for the exchange of ideas and concerns,
as well as reporting on progress in the reform eort, which
appears to be highly eective.
The rst department to embark on a programme of
fundamental curriculum change was the Department of
Electronic and Computer Engineering (ECE), in early 2008.
This change eort was led by both the Head and Associate
Head of Department, who were both well respected and
strongly committed to educational reform. The resulting
departmental changes involved a fundamental restructuring
of the curriculum around four ‘layers’, each of increasing
subject depth. In 2009, the Head of ECE was appointed as
Dean of the School, shortly followed by the appointment of
the Associate Head of ECE to a new role of Associate Dean
for Undergraduate Studies and Student Aairs. Although
the reform eort had always enjoyed high levels of support
from senior management, to many, these appointments
were highly signicant and marked a new, and invigorated,
direction for the School-wide educational change eort.
Overall, although a clear commitment exists to “respect
departmental autonomy”, the School has employed a number
of strategies to encourage and support the educational
change eort, as outlined below.
Creating a cross-faculty dialogue and engagement
in education. At the heart of the School’s change
strategy has been the building of a dialogue and sense
of community in engineering teaching and learning
amongst faculty. This theme was discussed repeatedly
by almost all interviewees. Following the city-wide
announcement of the NAS, formal and informal channels
of dialogue have opened up between universities and
across subject areas, which has clearly helped to establish
“a new openness [amongst faculty] to talking and thinking
about their teaching”. Within the School, a major focus
of the various reform committees is the discussion and
exchange of educational ideas, which is supported by
external invited speakers and faculty workshops.
Freeing up time in the curriculum. A key barrier to
change was the perception amongst many faculty that
the “curriculum was already full and there was no time
for anything new”. An explicit early task in the reform,
therefore, was to encourage departments to reduce
the existing curriculum content to allow space for the
development of new courses and student experiences.
As the Associate Dean commented “rather than forcing
faculty to make the changes that we would like, we have
freed up time in the curriculum and given them much more
exibility”. So, for example, the School has signicantly
reduced the number of ‘technical’ courses required in
the departmental curriculum. Although some described
this process of cutting back the curriculum content
as “a real ght”, it is clear that this process has been
successfully completed in most departments.
Targeting enthusiasts to pilot innovations. Particular
attention has been focused on the existing champions
of change within the departments, on the basis that,
once innovations are established, “further change across
the department can grow from there”. The School has
therefore sought to empower these enthusiasts, by
providing them with the “time, room and recognition
they need” to implement course-level changes, on a
pilot basis, within their departments. Funding is made
available at both School and university level for these
innovations, and they are championed within the
various reform committees.
Establishment of a mechanism for continuous
educational improvement and support. In 2010 the
Center for Engineering Education Innovation (E
2
I) was
established, to inform and support the School’s new
educational approach. The centre performs multiple
functions, including to: (i) undertake research in
engineering education which actively informs practice
within the School, (ii) provide faculty with engineering
instructional development as well as opportunities
for exchange, dialogue and community-building in
education, (iii) provide direct support for students in
making their educational choices (for example through
peer-mentoring schemes), (iv) inform, support and
evaluate the current educational reform eort, and (v)
act as a ‘hub’ for engineering education research within
Asia. Further details on the role of the centre in the
reform eort are given below.
Taking inspiration from a recent ASEE report (Jamieson and
Lohmann, 2009), E
2
I is seeking to both implement and sustain
a world-class educational approach through a “virtuous cycle of
research-informed practice”. Early benchmarking exercises and
literature reviews, however, identied two critical limitations
of the current evidence base in engineering education –
rstly, that it has largely been gathered in ‘western’ countries
and its ecacy on Asian cohorts is largely untested, and,
secondly, that the trend in recent engineering education
research towards theoretical scholarship provides limited
outputs to inform classroom practice. For this reason, the
School established E
2
I , to act as a bridge between research
and practice and establish an Asian hub for research in
engineering education. A key focus of activity in this regard
has been the development of tools for the assessment of
teamwork and lifelong learning skills. In addition to this
applied scholarship, the centre is also designed to provide a
much more hands-on role in supporting faculty and students.
To date, the centre has been operating for less than a year,
but already appears to be making a signicant contribution
to the change process. Its role and priorities also appear to
be responsive to the changing needs of the faculty. As one
faculty member commented “we give them all the problems
that the rest of us cannot solve”. Although the centre performs
a great many functions, its role in catalysing dialogue and
engagement in teaching and learning amongst faculty
appears to be critical to the change eort.
4.2.4 Critical factors in successful change
At this stage, 14 months from implementation, it is not
possible to assess whether the reforms will be successful.
36
Achieving excellence in engineering education: the ingredients of successful change
However, four factors place the School in a particularly strong
position during this on-going change process:
Strong faculty engagement: Almost all faculty have
accepted and broadly support the need for change,
with very little apparent resistance. This acceptance
appears to stem from the fact that the NAS changes
were externally imposed and have been known
about for some time – “because of the structural need
and OBE [outcomes-based education], it has been easier
than expected to push forward with the idea”. Faculty
engagement appears to have been further supported
by the positive outcomes of early pilots and, in
particular, the increased motivation seen amongst the
participating students – “even the more reluctant [faculty]
see the dierence in the students and the higher levels of
motivation”. A strong and vocal minority, estimated to
be around 20–30% of faculty, are highly committed
to the change eort, and are dedicating signicant
amounts of time to designing and implementing the
new curriculum at department level. As one interviewee
commented “every department in the School now has
more than just a few people actively involved in the change.
There is a real sense of commitment there”. Comments
from external observers to the change process also
point to signicant levels of engagement – “…they have
taken the change to outcomes-based [education] seriously
and the level of change is impressive”.
Strong support for change from School senior
management: There is a clear sense amongst faculty
that the School senior management is actively
committed to the new educational vision. Although
curriculum reform was acknowledged by a number
of interviewees as being a time-consuming process,
the clear support from the Dean made them feel that
“this is not wasted eort and it is being recognised”. The
cross-School reform committee also provides a formal
mechanism to both monitor departmental progress
and allow for feedback, ideas and concerns to be
communicated with senior management.
Cross-faculty exchange and dialogue: Perhaps the
most impressive aspect of the reform eort is the extent
to which this process has engaged the faculty with the
teaching and learning agenda. For some, the magnitude
of the change has acted to bring faculty together to
look fundamentally at their educational priorities and
approaches – “as engineers, the scale of the problem has
got them interested. If people see change as incremental,
the cynics would say “why bother”, but this is a signicant
change and has allowed them to critically examine what
they are trying to achieve”. This faculty dialogue has been
supported by the recent establishment of E
2
I, which
holds regular seminars and workshops on engineering
education. As the Director of E
2
I commented “it is so rare
for so many people [faculty] to come together to talk about
education… There is a really strong level of engagement.
This demonstrates that, deep down, people are genuinely
interested in teaching and learning. They just needed the
opportunity to engage”.
On-going educational practice informed by in-
house research: The plans to inform faculty teaching
practice by research evidence, gathered in-house or
synthesised from the international literature, holds great
potential. The research undertaken within E
2
I is likely to
result in some international recognition of the School-
wide reform eort, which, in turn, is also likely to have
a positive inuence on how the reforms are viewed
internally. The impact assessments will also support the
sustainability of the changes, allowing the School to
be responsive to any issues identied and supporting
an on-going focus on educational excellence and
improvement, even after steady-state is reached.
4.2.5 Challenges in the change process
The most prominent practical challenge of the reform,
and one faced by any department/School undergoing a
signicant educational change, will be the operation of both
the ‘new’ and ‘old’ curricula during the period of transition - in
this case, from 2012 to 2015. The School of Engineering at
HKUST, however, will be dealing with a number of additional
layers of complexity, as the reform (i) is taking place within
an educational system that is also in a state of considerable
change, (ii) will be introduced alongside signicant changes
to the engineering accreditation system, (iii) will be rst
implemented to a ‘double cohort’ of students, and (iv) will
need to cater for incoming students with very dierent
aptitudes, expectations and aspirations than held by previous
generations. Under such circumstances, there is clearly a
danger that the School will focus all available eorts on this
3-year transition, rather than considering their longer-term
‘steady-state’ educational provision beyond 2015.
Early faculty concerns surrounded the reduction of ‘core’
technical courses and a “diluting of the engineering science”
in the curriculum. However, many of these fears appear to
have been allayed by the results of benchmarking exercises,
comparing the balance of “technical and non-technical content”
in the curriculum at premier US-based engineering Schools,
such as Stanford and MIT, with the new educational approach
within the School.
A strong theme amongst most interviewees was the levels of
uncertainty surrounding the intake to the 2012 programmes
– in particular, their academic attainment levels, abilities
and expectations. Such concerns are certainly not unique
to HKUST, and appear to be echoed across the education
system in Hong Kong. Within the School of Engineering at
HKUST, faculty concerns centre, in particular, around the levels
of mathematical and scientic skills of the new incoming
cohorts. The key to overcoming such concerns is clear
communication with faculty, which the School appears to be
handling well.
There appear to be two strong, but competing, views on the
change eort within the School of Engineering. For some
(around 20–30%), the Hong Kong-wide structural changes
provide a “not-to-be-missed” opportunity to rethink and
redesign the educational approach. These individuals are
actively pressing forward with reform activities. For others, the
upcoming city-wide changes will “already be highly disruptive,
37
so further change will be too much to deal with”. This group only
devote the minimum time to the reform activities and “allow
others to carry the burden”. It is a major advantage to the School
of Engineering that many of its senior managers appear to be
in the former group.
Devolving most reform decisions to the departments has
resulted in diering levels of progress towards the reform
goals. Some departments, such as ECE, have already made
signicant changes to their educational approach, while
others are still in the planning stages. Such departmental
dierences appear to be related to the levels of engagement
of the Head of Department. As one faculty member
commented “The Dean or Provost is not going to tell individual
faculty what to do in terms of classroom activity. This goes down
the chain of command. The success will come down to the extent
to which the Head of Department can mobilise their faculty”. The
departments that have been most successful in the change
eort appear most likely to view the changes as department-
led rather than School-led. As one faculty member from
ECE commented “although this was School-driven, this is our
change and we made it our own”. One considerable challenge
for the School will be to ensure that the resulting educational
oering, across all departments, is coherent and unied.
4.2.6 Impact of the changes
The School of Engineering is taking a rigorous approach to
measuring the impact of the reform, which is informed by the
existing international research evidence. Such an approach
is highly unusual, particularly for a reform eort at this scale.
Impact assessments, the results of which will be shared with
individual departments to inform further improvement, will be
made on two aspects of the educational change:
The programme-level impact. An assessment will be
made of the ‘value for money’ of the reform eort on the
educational programmes as a whole. Evidence will be
captured from employers (surveys and interviews to be
conducted in 2012/13 and 2017/18), students (through
entrance and exit surveys and focus groups of cohorts
in the new and old curriculum) and faculty (through
surveys and interviews in 2012 and 2016). Following
early assessments of existing approaches to capturing
employer feedback, the School is currently engaged
with developing a bespoke set of evaluation tools.
The outcomes-level impact. Based on the newly-
dened School-wide learning outcomes, an assessment
will be made of “whether the students are learning
what we want them to” at the point of graduation. For
example, a snap-shot of student attributes will be taken
each year during the nal-year capstone project, to
assess changes in the personal and professional skills
of each graduating cohort. These assessments will be
conducted using new instruments, developed in-house,
which will focus in particular on teamwork and lifelong
learning skills.
It should be noted that impact assessment will be
complicated by the system-wide educational change in
Hong Kong. As the Director of E
2
I commented “…the students
joining us from 2012 will have been receiving a very dierent
education from the age of 15. It will therefore be very dicult to
get ‘clean’ data on the impact of the changes we are making”.
Despite these practical constraints, however, it is clear that
the results from these impact studies have the potential to be
highly inuential. The scholarly approach to the assessment
will provide both important data on the overall benets of
educational change at a School-level and valuable insight into
the impact of non-traditional educational approaches (such
as engaging pedagogies and holistic learning experiences) on
large cohorts of Asian students.
38
Achieving excellence in engineering education: the ingredients of successful change
4.3.1 Context and drivers for change
Context: The University of Illinois is a high-ranking institution
with a strong research reputation in engineering. The College
of Engineering
4
, comprising 12 departments, has the highest
number of National Science Foundation research grants of any
institution in the US. The School attracts high-calibre students
and is unusual in the US in enrolling them directly into specic
engineering disciplines on entry to the university. The School
is seen to enjoy a strong reputation for rigor in the education
of the engineering sciences, and there is a widespread feeling
that this should not be compromised – as the Associate Dean
for Undergraduate Education commented “[the University of]
Illinois has done a good job at traditional engineering education
– our graduates know their stu technically. We need not to lose
that”. Aside from the establishment of a faculty development
programme around 15 year ago, there has been little
history of formal School-wide engagement with innovation
in engineering education. For example, when the call for
proposals for the US Engineering Coalitions was issued in
the 1990s, no discussions were held within the School about
tendering an application.
The School has a very strong departmental structure, which
some describe as “siloed”. The core curriculum within the
departments is seen to be heavily focused towards “math and
physics”, with opportunities for contextualising knowledge and
developing students’ personal and professional skills typically
oered through optional courses, extra-curricular activities or
liberal arts electives. Opportunities for innovation or change
to the departmental curriculum during the rst two years are
described as “very tightly controlled”.
Drivers: iFoundry was established by a small group of faculty
who believed that a fundamental shift was necessary in the
approach to US engineering education. In particular, iFoundry
sought to sustain the international leadership position of the
US in engineering through undergraduate education reform,
where “excellence in scientic education and analytical skills is
complimented by a broader curriculum that inspires creativity
and innovation and includes training in professionalism and
leadership traits”. Rather than a programme of change in itself,
iFoundry is designed as a catalyst to promote and enable
reform, at a course-by-course level, across the School. The
iFoundry approach was driven by the need to combat the
perceived barriers to educational change in engineering –
principally organisational resistance within departments.
4.3.2 The educational vision and changes implemented
(to date)
Educational vision. Considerable time and thought have
been invested in the educational ideas that underpin iFoundry.
Three key themes are most prominent: (i) the incorporation of
key critical and creative thinking skills (described as the seven
‘missing basics’
5
) into the curriculum, (ii) the development of
a strong community of peer support amongst engineering
undergraduates from the earliest stage in their studies,
and (iii) a strong focus on students’ intrinsic motivation for
their development as engineers, professionals and life-long
learners. iFoundry is also working closely with Olin College
of Engineering to see how the innovative educational ideas
implemented at this ‘boutique’ university can be scaled-up for
application to larger cohort sizes, with lower resourcing levels.
The iFoundry approach was based around two perceived
barriers to educational reform:
The ‘catch-22’ problem that an innovation is unlikely
to be approved for curricular implementation without
evidence of its ecacy in that environment, but such
ecacy cannot be demonstrated without the changes
rst being implemented;
4 For consistency across all case studies, the term ‘School’ will
be used here to describe the College of Engineering.
5 These ‘missing basics’ are identied as (i) asking questions,
(ii) labeling technology and design challenges, (iii) modeling
problems qualitatively, (iv) decomposing design problems, (v)
gathering data, (vi) visualizing solutions and generating ideas,
and (vii) communicating solutions in written and oral form.
4.3 Case study 3: iFoundry, College of Engineering, University of Illinois, US
Overview: iFoundry (The Illinois Foundry for Innovation
in Engineering Education) is a grassroots initiative that
seeks to nurture, develop and evaluate student-centred
courses in pilot form before supporting their wider roll-
out into the curriculum. Since its inception in 2007, the
educational changes resulting from iFoundry have been
focused on liberal arts electives and a cross-School rst
year experience. The rst pilot to operate alongside a
core departmental course will be implemented in the
2011/12 academic year.
Reasons for selection as a case study: (i) The iFoundry
approach is designed to combat perceived barriers
to educational change – principally organisational
resistance within departments – by creating a
supportive environment outside the formal curriculum
for innovation, (ii) iFoundry is working closely with Olin
College of Engineering, to see how the creative small-
group experiences delivered at this boutique, privately-
funded College can be adapted for application to much
larger cohorts, and (iii) the drive for change was ‘bottom-
up’, led by a group of faculty.
Who was interviewed: 19 individuals were consulted
for this case study investigation. Informal discussions
were held with 6 undergraduate students and 4 faculty
members, and formal interviews were held with 9
stakeholders to the School’s education (including the
Dean, Assistant Dean, iFoundry leadership, teaching
assistants and faculty members across the School).
39
Proposed curricular changes, although often broadly
accepted by faculty, are often voted out during the
approval process by individuals who are fearful that
the changes will adversely aect their current teaching
activities or encroach on the curricular time devoted to
their specialised subject.
iFoundry is therefore designed to provide a creative and safe
environment outside of the formal departmental curriculum
where new educational approaches can be piloted, tested
and championed by volunteer faculty and students. Using
the Dean’s signatory authority, all students participating in
iFoundry pilots would be credited appropriately within their
home department. Such pilots would be designed to run in
parallel to an existing, more traditional course, thus requiring
positive impacts on student experiences and outcomes to
be demonstrated before departmental approval is sought for
their full implementation. The intention is that, as the faculty
involvement in such pilots increases, their openness to wider
curricular change will also increase.
Changes implemented (to date). Outlined below is a
summary of educational changes made (up to academic
year 2011/12) through iFoundry over the four years since its
inception.
Illinois Engineering First-year Experience (iEFX):
The major iFoundry activity to date has been the
development of a School-wide freshman experience,
which is designed to build students’ intrinsic
motivation, within a mutually supportive engineering
undergraduate community. The rst pilot version of
this experience was delivered to 75 volunteer students
in the fall of 2009, operating in parallel to the existing
mandatory ENG 100 experience that catered for the
full cohort of 1500. The second pilot, in the fall of
2010, delivered the course to 300 students. A slightly
amended version of the course will be rolled out for the
full School-wide cohort in 2011/12, and will replace the
existing ENG 100 course.
Liberal arts electives: Over the past 2 years, a suite of
‘iFoundry’ pilot courses have been oered to engineering
undergraduates, as liberal arts electives. These include
two pilots developed from existing courses oered at
Olin College of Engineering – User-Oriented Collaborative
Design/Innovation Design 8 (UOCD/ID8) and Foundations
of Business and Entrepreneurship. These ‘Olin’ pilots are in
their second year of implementation. At present, student
numbers in these courses are relatively low. For example,
a total of 12 students have taken the UOCD/ID8 course
over the past 2 years.
Intrinsic Motivation Conversion course. During the
2011/12 academic year, a new pilot departmental
course will be implemented in the Department of
Electrical and Computer Engineering – the ECE 290 core
course with multiple pilot Intrinsic Motivation Conversion
sections. Students are invited to participate in this
iFoundry pilot, as an alternative to the existing course,
where they will be oered “a unique classroom experience
that relies on their intrinsic motivation”.
4.3.3 Achieving change
iFoundry has its origins in a desire amongst a core group of 6
faculty members to “just get on with” curriculum change, rather
than continue to discuss and discount various models of reform.
The original iFoundry group was formed in 2007 as a grassroots
activity. Formal approval for iFoundry was granted by the Dean
of the School in 2008. This support was based on the potential
of iFoundry to improve: (i) student learning across the School,
and (ii) rates of retention during the rst two years of study. With
the Dean’s support also came approval to establish new pilot
courses across the School. Since 2008, a School-wide iFoundry
committee has been in operation, as a vehicle to champion
change, with representatives from every department meeting
on a monthly basis.
The early iFoundry activities were focused on “selling
the educational vision within the College and building up
expectations that change was coming”, particularly through
web-sites and social networking channels. Considerable time
has also been devoted to disseminating the iFoundry ideas
and model at a national level, including the organisation of
two conferences (Engineer of the Future). In the Spring of 2009,
a memorandum of understanding was signed by all Heads of
Department to allow students to enroll in the pilot ENG 100
experience (iEFX).
The iFoundry team described the change strategy as both
‘organic’ and ‘entrepreneurial’. In essence, the reform eort
is focusing on change at a course-by-course level, with
three broad phases envisaged in each case: (i) testing and
rening curricular changes through the establishment of pilot
courses, (ii) if successful, championing their inclusion in the
core departmental curriculum, and (iii) allowing this good
practice to permeate out into the departments. As the Dean
commented “it is very dicult to mandate change – it is best
to lead by example”. iFoundry seeks to empower students to
better understand what they need from their education, and
demand it of their departments.
As can be seen from Section 4.3.2, changes have yet to be
made to the core curriculum in any department within the
School. Activity to date, however, would be seen within
iFoundry as critical in both establishing the credibility of the
reform eort and validating the concept of operating pilot
activities alongside existing courses. As commented by one
the iFoundry co-Directors, “we rst piloted an incubator, and
now we can incubate pilots”. Planning has started for the rst
pilot course within a core departmental curriculum, the IM
Conversion, with an anticipated start-date of September 2011.
iFoundry operates on relatively low resources, with two
salaried sta – one full-time Associate Director and one
part-time Program Coordinator – and a number of faculty and
students engaged on a voluntary basis.
4.3.4 Challenges and success factors
It is clear that the iFoundry programme has enjoyed strong
support and the enthusiastic involvement of many highly-
committed faculty and students. As iFoundry membership
is entirely voluntary, there is little evident hostility amongst
faculty towards this reform eort, although there appears to
be a view amongst some faculty in the School that they have
40
Achieving excellence in engineering education: the ingredients of successful change
“yet to see any real impact from iFoundry”. The incremental and
voluntary nature of the reform will inevitably lead to a slower
rate of change than that seen across the other case studies
included in this report. In this regard, the good levels of
support for iFoundry amongst the School senior management
– which is currently viewed to be “central” to their long-term
educational strategy – will be essential if the momentum for
this eort is to be maintained.
The majority of activity to date has been led by a relatively
small group of faculty members who form the core of the
iFoundry management team and, to date, has focused almost
exclusively on liberal arts electives and the cross-School
freshman experience. As such, it has yet to impact the core
curricular activity within the engineering departments or
diuse to wider faculty groups. The coming year appears to
be a critical period in the evolution of iFoundry, with three
signicant challenges being faced:
In 2011/12, IEFX will be rolled out to the full cohort of
1500 students across the School. This will represent a
ve-fold increase in student numbers from the 2010/11
pilot and a move away from catering only to volunteer
students. Given that the success of the pilot version of
this course appeared to be based on the close student/
sta interaction and ability to build student community,
the School-wide roll-out across such large cohort sizes is
likely to be a signicant challenge. In addition, for many
faculty across the School, the success of this roll-out will
be inextricably linked with their perception of iFoundry
and the success of this initiative as a whole.
Internally and externally, iFoundry is strongly associated
with the co-founder and current co-director, who
retired in January 2011. The vision and educational
underpinnings of the initiative are closely aligned with
his own educational ideas and many view his passion
and commitment to educational change as central to
the successful establishment of the initiative. Although
this change in leadership will undoubtedly bring some
change in the direction of iFoundry, it yet remains
unclear what impact it will have on its capacity to
catalyse wider curricular change.
In some senses, the true test of the iFoundry model
begins in 2011/12, when the rst pilot of a core
departmental course will be implemented. As one
interviewee commented “So far, the changes have only
been at the margins of the education, not at the core…
iFoundry is now on the threshold to a next step after its
honeymoon period”. For many, it is too early to determine
how this pilot course will be received within the host
department, and therefore whether approval will be
granted for its implementation into the core curriculum.
4.3.5 Impact of the changes (to date)
Two broad areas of impact of iFoundry were identied by
those interviewed for the case study, relating to faculty and
students respectively.
With respect to faculty, many of those interviewed for the
iFoundry case study talked about its impact on the attitudes
towards teaching and learning amongst the faculty involved
– “The biggest achievement of iFoundry has been a shift in culture
to one where we think more entrepreneurially with a greater
openness to experiment”. From the School perspective, the
“depth and quality of thinking” is one of the greatest benets
of iFoundry, and it enjoys good levels of support from senior
School management. The Dean is very clear about the success
criteria for iFoundry. In order to determine whether the
initiative has been successful, he would “want to see 50% of
faculty involved with iFoundry and engineering retention rates
increased to 80% by the fourth year”.
With respect to students, informal feedback from faculty on
the IEFX pilot suggests that student attitudes to the Freshman
experience fall into three equally sized groups: (i) those who
“loved” the experience, which they viewed as “life changing”
and one which fundamentally shifted their attitudes to their
education and future careers, (ii) those who did not view the
course as signicantly dierent to the rest of their educational
experience, and (iii) those who were very resistant to the
course, and disengaged from the non-compulsory and
‘community-building’ elements at an early stage. Many of
those students within the former group, who were highly
engaged by the experience, are now actively involved in
iFoundry in a voluntary capacity.
The School has also instituted formal mechanisms to capture
the student experience. Since 2008/09, it has undertaken a
bi-annual ‘climate survey’ to record the expectations, attitudes
and experiences of all its undergraduates. The survey data for
2008/9–2010/11 will provide a ‘baseline’ from which to track
the impact of IEFX from pilot to roll-out phase, and enabling
comparison of students on iFoundry courses with their non-
participating peers. A formal analysis of the iEFX student
experience is also nearing completion.
41
4.4.1 Context and drivers for change
Context. The University of Queensland is a research-led,
publically-funded university, founded in 1910. It is a founding
member of the Group of Eight coalition of research-
led universities in Australia. The Faculty of Engineering,
Architecture and Information Technology (referred to here
as the School
6
) caters to around 3500 (FTE) engineering
undergraduate students, of which 16% are international.
Degree courses are four years in duration, with a common
School-wide rst year and discipline specialisation from the
second year of study – at which point, around 15–20% of
engineering students select Chemical Engineering.
The Dean of School, who was in post before the reform, had
been instrumental in the publication of a pivotal report on
the future of Australian engineering education (IEAust, 1996),
which recommended radical and widespread changes to
existing educational practice across the country. In response
to this report, in 1996, the Australian criteria for engineering
education accreditation changed to an outcomes-based
system, which necessitated signicant changes in national
approaches to engineering education. In the same year,
the newly-appointed Vice Chancellor of the University of
Queensland announced plans for widespread change in
the educational delivery structure across the university, with
a standard unit course size across all departments. For the
Department of Chemical Engineering, this ‘unitisation’ called
for a dramatic reduction (by around 50%) in the number of
courses per semester and an increase in the size and content
of each of these new courses.
Prior to reform, the Department of Chemical Engineering
housed around 14 faculty, with around 70 undergraduates
in each year group. The department was research-led and
enjoyed a very strong national and international reputation for
research excellence. Although the department’s educational
approach was seen to be unremarkable – “a traditional blend of
lectures and tutorials” – the departmental culture and outlook
were seen to be highly distinctive. This theme emerged very
strongly from almost every interview conducted. For example,
many interviewees pointed to the “long-standing culture of risk-
taking and innovation, with a real spirit of embracing change”.
There was a strong collegial feeling amongst the majority
of faculty that led to a “low sense of ownership of individual
courses”, and a widespread sense of collective responsibility
for the educational programmes. The department’s relatively
small size clearly played a part in creating this distinctive
and mutually respectful atmosphere. Another factor was
the strength of leadership – “the department had a history
of spectacular leadership – they were entrepreneurial, ahead
of the game…[and]… created a culture that encouraged
innovative thinking”. Many of the faculty also had signicant
industry experience, with a number of recent appointments
immediately before the period of reform.
Although not necessarily reected in the curriculum prior to
the reform eort, the department had a history of educational
innovation. For example, during the 10 years that preceded
the reform, emphasis had been placed on ‘resource-based
education’, where students were encouraged to think and
work independently and were able to access a range of
dierent resources for their learning, such as site visits or
video presentations. These changes, however, were seen to
be only “partially successful”. Students felt overburdened by
the new courses and the resulting educational oering was
“not coordinated and not having the impact we wanted”. Some
interviewees described how this experience convinced them
that a change eort can only eective when it is “placed at
the heart of the curriculum”. During the decade prior to the
reform, the department had also built up a highly eective
relationship with the university’s Teaching and Educational
Development Institute (TEDI). Through this partnership,
4.4 Case study 4: Department of Chemical Engineering, University of Queensland, Australia
Overview: The case study describes a department-
wide educational reform, where the curriculum was
re-designed around a core set of project-based learning
experiences that simulated professional engineering
practice, termed a ‘Project-Centred Curriculum’.
Planning for change started in 1996 and the rst
cohort of students graduated from the reformed 4-year
programme in 2001.
Reasons for selection as a case study: (i) the early stages
of the change were ‘bottom-up’, with strong support
from a majority of the faculty within the department,
(ii) the reform programme is well regarded nationally
and internationally and has been used as a benchmark
for change at a number of other institutions, (iii) during
the 10 years since completion of the reform, the
department has encountered, and overcome, a number
of challenges in sustaining the quality and impact of the
new curriculum.
Who was interviewed: 12 individuals were interviewed,
including stakeholders in the educational provision
at the time of the reform (including faculty members,
a student, the Head of Department, Dean of School
and those instigating and managing the change) and
stakeholders in the current undergraduate education
in the department (including a current student, faculty
members, the head of the departmental Teaching and
Learning committee and faculty observers from outside
both the department and the university). Aremote
Q&A was also completed by the current Head of
Department.
6 For consistency across all case studies, ‘School’ in this case will
refer to the Faculty of Engineering, Architecture & Information
Technology, and ‘department’ will refer to the Department of
Chemical Engineering as it was in 1996, and School of Chemical
Engineering, as it is now.
42
Achieving excellence in engineering education: the ingredients of successful change
asignicant number of the faculty were ‘bought out’ from
teaching for a semester and given support to redesign
a course. Many of the younger faculty had enrolled in a
graduate certicate in education through TEDI, and “came
back to the department with their eyes opened and a desire to do
things dierently”.
Drivers. There does not appear to be a single signicant driver
for reform, but rather a “combination of factors and some degree
of serendipity”. A signicant proportion of faculty held strong
personal convictions that a radical change to engineering
education was necessary both at national and local levels
– “this group was really agitating for change. There was a real
feeling that not only was change necessary, but it would be fun
and would put us on the map”. There was also a widespread
awareness that two upcoming external policy changes would
necessitate a signicant reform to the educational structure
in the department – the national move to outcomes-
based accreditation in engineering and the university-wide
‘unitisation’ restructuring. For many, these externally-imposed
requirements were an opportunity to fundamentally re-
examine their whole educational approach. The nal factor
driving the change was student satisfaction with the existing
programmes. During the early to mid 1990s, the department
began to receive poor feedback from students and national
student satisfaction surveys, which was seen to indicate some
deep-rooted problems with the educational approach. The
Chemical Engineering programme was seen to be a “killer
degree” by students, with a curriculum “packed with technical
content and very high student workloads”. Internally collected
data on poor student experience was very persuasive in the
nal decision to change amongst those faculty who had
previously been “on the fence”.
4.4.2 The educational vision and changes implemented
The design of the Project-Centred Curriculum (PCC)
responded to a desire to “develop the full range of engineering
graduate attributes needed for professional practice”. The
existing curriculum was seen to provide students with a good
theoretical framework, but not one which was grounded in
professional experience and practice – “so many academics
are now really applied scientists – there was a real need to bring
authenticity to the teaching”.
The curriculum was completely re-designed around “a
backbone of project work that is supported by and integrated
with all core teaching and learning activities”. As illustrated in
Figure 8, around one quarter of the curriculum is devoted
to team-based, project-centred courses, which are designed
as a “structured sequence of professional practice simulations”.
A further half of the curriculum is dedicated to relatively
traditional “chemical engineering science” courses, and electives
make up the nal quarter, providing both breadth and depth.
Particular thought and care have been given to the sequence
of each course, ensuring the “cumulative development over
four years of both discipline specic and transferable generic
graduate attributes”. A team-teaching approach was also
adopted, both within the spine of project courses and also
across each semester, to ensure the coherent development
of the graduate attributes throughout the 4-year curriculum
and provide “improved communications between sta, better
collective ownership of the programme overall, and therefore
smoother running of individual courses and the overall
program”. The curricular inclusion of communication, team
work, and independent learning was also supported by
exible and open learning spaces, used for both timetabled
classes and informal, unscheduled group discussions. The
degree programme also incorporates a number of broader,
non-curricular, experiences such as opportunities for
undergraduates to tutor group projects in lower years.
4.4.3 Achieving change
The decision to embark on a programme of change was made
in 1996, following a strategic departmental planning retreat.
The drive for change came from a committed group of around
a third of the faculty body, with active support from the Dean
of the School. During the early stages, extensive external
benchmarking and consultation were conducted, looking
at both existing non-traditional approaches to engineering
education (such as that witnessed at Aalborg University,
Denmark and McMaster University, Canada) and the teaching
and learning theories underpinning such innovations. Given
that the drive for change initiated from grassroots faculty,
this group felt that it was imperative that they were “well
informed and super cautious” in ensuring that the changes
were grounded in established educational research. The
group worked closely together over a six month period
to identify the fundamental priorities of the department’s
undergraduate education and develop a new educational
structure that emphasised the development of professional
engineering skills and attitudes. A very conscious decision
was taken to design this new curriculum from the “top down”,
starting with the desired graduate attributes. The idea of
the project-centred curriculum (PCC) emerged very quickly,
which was seen to be a blend of problem-based learning with
professional practice simulations.
Attention was then focused on the remaining faculty within
the department and “getting them on board with the proposals”.
The diversity of backgrounds and personalities amongst the
original group of faculty champions was clearly a major asset
when engaging with the range of dierent perspectives
and concerns regarding the reforms amongst the wider
department. For example, two of the key instigators for
change were research leaders within the department, and
their backing helped to build its credibility amongst research-
focused faculty. Throughout this period, there was also “a lot
of open discussions in the department, both formal presentations
and informal exchanges, about what we were trying to do”.
Soon after, a new Head of Department was appointed from
within this group of supporters and he moved quickly to raise
expectation for and visibility of the changes, both internally
and externally.
The next phase of the change processes was the detailed
curriculum design – “…all of the elements were pulled together
– the university’s unitisation requirements, the outcomes-based
accreditation criteria, the outcomes from the benchmarking, a
review of the current education – to put together a framework
for change”. A ‘change committee’ was formed amongst the
original group of champions, who met regularly during this
period. The strong collegiality amongst this group supported
Process Control &
Synthesis
Environment Risk
Management
Investigation &
Analysis
Semester
Common
First Year
1
&
Chemical
Engineering
Specialisation
Begins
3
4
5
6
7
8
TEAM PROJECTS ELECTIVES
Minors, Coherent Streams & Dual Degrees
CHEMICAL ENGINEERING SCIENCES
Introduction to
Engineering
Chemistry
Chemistry
Molecular
Biotechnology
Calculus &
Linear Algebra
Engineering
Chemistry
Fluid & Particle
Mechanics
Process Thermo
Dynamics
Heat & Mass
Transfer
Analysis of
Engineering Data
Maths
ELECTIVE
ELECTIVE
ADVANCED
ELECTIVE
ADVANCED
ELECTIVE
ELECTIVE
ADVANCED
ELECTIVE
ADVANCED
ELECTIVE
ELECTIVE ELECTIVE
Reaction
Engineering
Unit
Operations
Process Modelling
& Dynamics
Maths
Thermo
Dynamics
Transport
Phenomena
Process Systems
Analysis
Process Principles
PROCESS ENGINEERING DESIGN PROJECT
(integration and application of all prior learning and skills development)
Depth or Breadth
43
Process Control &
Synthesis
Environment Risk
Management
Investigation &
Analysis
Semester
Common
First Year
1
&
Chemical
Engineering
Specialisation
Begins
3
4
5
6
7
8
TEAM PROJECTS ELECTIVES
Minors, Coherent Streams & Dual Degrees
CHEMICAL ENGINEERING SCIENCES
Introduction to
Engineering
Chemistry
Chemistry
Molecular
Biotechnology
Calculus &
Linear Algebra
Engineering
Chemistry
Fluid & Particle
Mechanics
Process Thermo
Dynamics
Heat & Mass
Transfer
Analysis of
Engineering Data
Maths
ELECTIVE
ELECTIVE
ADVANCED
ELECTIVE
ADVANCED
ELECTIVE
ELECTIVE
ADVANCED
ELECTIVE
ADVANCED
ELECTIVE
ELECTIVE ELECTIVE
Reaction
Engineering
Unit
Operations
Process Modelling
& Dynamics
Maths
Thermo
Dynamics
Transport
Phenomena
Process Systems
Analysis
Process Principles
PROCESS ENGINEERING DESIGN PROJECT
(integration and application of all prior learning and skills development)
Depth or Breadth
Figure 8. Structure of the Project-Centred Curriculum.
44
Achieving excellence in engineering education: the ingredients of successful change
the development of a common vision for the curriculum
design – “we all operated as a team. People had bright ideas and
brought them along. You would have been pressed to nd a more
friendly group who were more passionate about teaching. There
was no real resistance”. Two well-regarded individuals took a
particular lead in the detailed design and implementation
of the PCC reforms – one newly-appointed faculty member
whose research focus was the impact assessment of the
change programme and one long-standing senior faculty
member with a strong research reputation. Although very
little additional resource was allocated, the time dedicated to
the change eort by these two individuals appears to have
been critical.
The new curriculum was implemented between 1998 and
2001, alongside newly-formed faculty teaching teams at
the course and semester level. Those faculty who were less
supportive of the PCC approach (approximately one third
of the department) were allocated to conventionally-taught
courses, outside of the project ‘spine’, and were not pressurised
to engage or become signicantly involved in the process of
curriculum change. All project-centred courses were allocated
to those within the PCC change committee. Throughout
the implementation of the PCC, consultations were taken
from all departmental faculty, students and TEDI. Particular
attention was paid to the feedback from the rst cohort of
students experiencing the new curriculum, and a number of
adjustments were made to the curriculum “on the y” during
roll-out.
4.4.4 Critical factors in successful change
Overall, four factors appear to have been critical to the success
of the change eort, as outlined below.
Shared purpose amongst faculty: Perhaps the most
signicant factor in the success of the reform was the
shared commitment to the change amongst a high
proportion of the faculty, supported by an existing
collegial culture of innovation in the department.
This sense of common purpose appears to have
been critical in both designing and implementing
the PCC. As one interviewee commented “I have seen
other departments handle this so badly, where change
was imposed from on high, and the academics just
revolted. This was very dierent. We all felt as though we
were in it together”. There also appears to have been a
widespread feeling amongst the faculty that “spending
the time to make the change would help my career in
the university”. Many interviewees also noted that the
reform eort, indeed, was personally benecial for
most of those actively involved – “There was a strong
message from the middle-layers of the university at that
time… [that they were] strongly supportive of educational
change, and we believed that [the PCC reform] would help
our careers… It was naive, perhaps, but it worked out well
for almost everyone”.
Strong and well-respected leadership: Soon after the
decision was made to embark on the reform, a new
Head of Department took post, who was appointed
internally from amongst the group of original “agitators
for change”. This Head of Department appears to be
a critical gure, giving senior support to the eort
and ensuring it was given strong visibility across the
university. As one interviewee commented “he took
up the champion role from a position of power and
inuence”. In addition, the two key individuals managing
the change process were both well-informed and
highly-regarded – “they are both listened to at high
levels, externally and internally” – and have clearly been
inuential in maintaining a continued focus on the PCC
reforms through the 15 years since its rst inception.
Simple and eective educational design. The PCC
curricular approach is simple and “driven by good
curriculum design principles”, with faculty teams taking
responsibility for creating curricular coherence across
semesters as well as within courses. The majority
of students appear to understand the curriculum
structure and how “all of the subjects and courses are
interconnected”. The logical curriculum design has both
helped to ensure clarity and ecacy of approach,
internally, but also a highly transferable model,
externally. Perhaps for this reason, together with the
well disseminated impact evaluation, the PCC has
been used as a benchmark for a number of education
reforms around the world. Such external recognition has
certainly helped to support the on-going focus on the
PCC approach internally – “we have developed a strong
reputation, which kept the focus on what we were doing
– it is less easy to sweep problems under the carpet when
others were watching”.
Carefully-planned impact assessment: A well-
designed impact evaluation process was undertaken,
starting with base-line data collected before the
PCC was rst implemented (see Section 4.4.6). The
evidence from this impact evaluation appears to have
played a vital role throughout the reform eort, in a
number of respects: (i) to highlight the poor student
learning outcomes prior to reform, and thereby
support the drive for change, (ii) to demonstrate
the early impact of the PCC reforms, maintaining
momentum and engagement with the change
eort, (iii) identifying problems/issues with the PCC
implementation at an early stage, to both ensure
remedial action was taken and “keep us honest about
what was really happening, and (iv) demonstrate
the success of the reform eort externally, to both
maintain engagement and attract future resources
and support to the department.
4.4.5 Challenges in the change process
Unusually, the change eort does not appear to have
contended with any signicant challenges or “political
agitation against reform” during the design and planning of
the PCC. Although the reform eort was not supported by
around 30–40% of faculty, who held reservations about the
move away from a traditional educational model, this group
were “not obstructing what we were trying to do”. Around
a half of these non-supporting faculty have since left the
department. It should be noted that, of those who remain,
45
their opinions of the PCC remain largely unchanged, even 10
years after the new curriculum was implemented. This group
still holds concerns about a lack of emphasis on independent
study, particularly in the early years, and a lack of rigor in the
engineering fundamentals.
The key issue encountered during the implementation of
the PCC related to the burden carried by the rst cohort of
students entering the new curriculum – “..the group that we
experimented on were very patient. We asked a lot of them”.
The detailed curriculum design was managed by semester,
but the communication between groups was sometimes
inadequate. For this reason, problems encountered during
one year of the curriculum were not fed through eectively to
the team managing the subsequent years – “[during the PCC
reform meetings] we talked in general terms about the problems
associated with individual courses, but others did not know the
details and we did not explicitly pass on advice or warnings”. So,
for example, although student complaints about excessive
workload were soon rectied during one academic year,
when the cohort moved into the next year, they encountered
identical problems, which was a source of some frustration
amongst this student cohort.
Although the reform eort appears to have encountered very
few problems during its design and implementation, it has
been the sustainability of the change that has provided the
greatest challenge. Further detail on these issues is provided in
Section 4.4.7.
4.4.6 Impact of the changes
Interview feedback on the impact of the PCC reforms was
overwhelmingly positive, by those viewing the changes
from both an internal and external perspective. For example,
an engineering faculty member from a peer Australian
university commented that “they were real visionaries…
Because the department and [the University of Queensland]
had a good reputation, they were a good role model for change
that worked. Their C-E-Q [score] sky-rocketed after the change,
which was a really important factor [in building their national
prole]”. Departmental faculty point to a signicant shift in the
students’ outlook and professional skills, following the reforms,
along with a dramatic rise in national students prizes awarded
and strong, positive feedback from graduate employers.
It is interesting to note that most students do not appear to be
aware of the PCC before entering the department. However,
soon after they enter, it soon becomes apparent that the
educational approach is “dierent to the other departments” and
they view the project-centred approach as one where they
are more likely to “retain the underpinning concepts, because
we practice it, not just get told it”. The student common room
also appears to play a signicant role in supporting student
learning and building a strong community of peer-support
between and across year groups.
The positive impacts of the PCC reforms were illustrated very
clearly through the nationwide Course Experience Questionnaire
(CEQ), which captures feedback each year from all Australian
university graduates. Figure 9 presents CEQ data from
1998–2010, comparing graduate feedback for the Chemical
Engineering department at the University of Queensland with
the national average perceptions of teaching quality (the
Good Teaching Scale). The data from 1998–2003
7
indicate a
dramatic increase in perceived teaching quality and student
satisfaction following the curriculum reform.
The department also undertook ‘exit surveys’ of those
graduating from the programmes before, during and
after the changes. These surveys focused on the graduate
learning outcomes, and indicated signicant benets from
the introduction of the PCC. For example, the proportion
of students who felt “condent of their ability to use skills and
knowledge to tackle new, previously unseen situations” rose from
45% in 1999 to 83% in 2004. In 1999, two thirds of students
“reported a perception that sta did not take an interest in their
progress”. By 2004, 80% of the students “felt part of a group of
students and sta committed to learning”.
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
-5
-10
-15
n UQ
n National
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Figure 9. Selected results from the Australian Course Experience Questionnaire, 1998–2010, comparing the Good Teaching
Scale score for the Department of Chemical Engineering at the University of Queensland with the national average
7 Data from 2000 is not included because of the very low
response rate.
46
Achieving excellence in engineering education: the ingredients of successful change
4.4.7 Sustainability of the change
For 5 years after implementation, the PCC continued to
produce exceptional student outcomes and the reform
attracted considerable international attention. Many aspects
of the new curriculum were, and continue to be, “hard-wired
into the department”. Even for those less engaged faculty who
saw the PCC as an overly time-consuming activity, there was
a widespread feeling that “it would take greater eort to change
[the PCC curriculum] than to teach it, so there has never been any
rumblings to replace the PCC”.
However, in 2006, following a very impressive rise in the
department’s CEQ rating, this score started to drop, relative
to the national average gure (see Figure 9, 2006–08). These
declining student satisfaction scores pointed to a “failure of
a number of the project-centred courses to deliver the intended
outcomes”. In addition, there was seen to be signicant
“drift” from the original PCC framework and approach, and
increasing student concerns about a lack of coherence in
the curriculum and poor outcomes in some courses. These
problems were caused by a number of factors, both internally
and externally imposed, that all combined to undermine
the integrity of the department’s educational approach, as
outlined below.
Changing management structures: The most
signicant factor was the change in the School
management structure. The department was merged
into a larger School of Engineering in 2001. This move
brought a “loss of identity within a bigger organisation, loss
of nancial control and a feeling that we had lost control
over our destiny”. As another faculty member commented
“the academics suddenly felt far removed from the decision
making and lost any ownership over the PCC”. This loss of
control and direction led to “a “reduced focused on our
teaching in general, but on the PCC in particular” across
many of the faculty, with minimal priority given to these
activities by the discipline leadership at the time.
PCC designers leaving the department: Between 2004–
2006, many of the key individuals who had inspired and
led the PCC reforms moved out of the department or
were focused on projects outside the university. The
newly-appointed faculty members “were not part of the
change and did not understand what it was all about.
They just saw a successful curriculum that just needed to
be delivered”. As one leaders of the change commented
“it all happened so quickly, we forgot to infect the next
generation”.
Changing size and strategic priorities of department:
There had been a signicant increase in the student
intake to Chemical Engineering, from 60–80 in the mid-
1990s to around 120 by 2008. The larger cohort sizes
clearly placed a strain on the project-centred model,
just at the point where the PCC was being “handed over
from the people who had developed it to a new generation”.
Faculty numbers were also increasing, with new
appointees primarily recruited for their research prole
and potential, in preparation for the upcoming national
research assessment exercise, Excellence in Research
Australia. The department head at the time was also
strongly focused on research outputs, and sent a clear
signal to faculty in this direction.
Collection scrutiny and analysis of the impact data
“fell by the wayside”: Impact data relating to the reform
was collected until 2008. However, after 2004, close
attention was no longer paid to the analysis of this data
– “the new curriculum had been highly successful, people
had moved on and the pressure was o”. For some, this
meant that the department “stopped really hearing the
feedback from the students” and were not alerted at an
early stage to the problems that were developing.
Following the early success of the PCC, there was some
sense that the department had “taken our eye o the ball”
and not anticipated the coming problems. The dropping of
the CEQ scores in 2006 “helped to focus minds” back onto the
undergraduate programmes.
To date, the department has clearly come a long way to reverse
these problems, although, as some acknowledge, “we have quite
a lot more to do”. Student engagement levels have increased
signicantly, with an improved “cooperative/collaborative culture
within the student body”. This on-going turn-around is reected
in the recent CEQ scores (see Figure 9, 2009–2010) and has
been achieved through a number of mechanisms:
Regaining departmental autonomy: In 2008, the
disciplines of Metallurgy and Chemical Engineering
joined to form one department within the larger
engineering School. Through this ‘demerger’, Chemical
Engineering was once again allocated with its own
budget and a departmental teaching and learning
committee. This regained autonomy had a signicant
impact on the faculty culture, creating “a feeling […]
that Chemical Engineering can move forward with the
entrepreneurial spirit that has always characterised the
place” and regaining the collective ownership and
pride in their undergraduate education. Signicantly,
the department was also able to establish its own,
independent, teaching and learning committee, and
the new chair of this committee has clearly provided
a strong sense of direction and commitment to
the curriculum.
Strong leadership: In 2009, a new Head of Department
was appointed, who is strongly committed to
undergraduate education generally, and the PCC
specically. From early in this new post, he sent out
a clear message to faculty that the PCC curriculum
had “seriously regressed over the proceeding years”
and that remedial action was a strategic priority of
the department.
Re-focusing on the original PCC goals: After the
CEQ data indicated emerging problems, the original
developers of the PCC “went back into the department to
explain why and how the new curriculum was designed”.
The newly appointed Head of Department also instituted
a number of measures, including “actively assign[ing]
my ‘best teachers’ to the core PCC courses, and ensur[ing]
that we resourced those courses properly”. He also focused
47
particular attention to the junior faculty, who “had no idea
about the history of the [PCC] program, nor the basis of its
design”. Anew series of workshops has been established
to discuss the goals, approach and impact of the PCC.
Faculty attendance at these workshops is very high.
Improved review and planning approaches: A number
of departmental procedures have now been amended,
including (i) the creation of 5-year plans for teaching
teams, to ensure that all less experienced faculty can
be linked with a mentor and only those committed
faculty members are allocated to the project-centred
courses, (ii) the incorporation of student feedback
data is now included within the annual review of each
faculty member.
The PCC has been an inuential benchmark for
educational change at a national and international level,
and many of the original leaders of the reform programme
are now prominent gures in the engineering education
community. The rapid improvement in CEQ scores appears
to be a key factor in the high regard in which this reform
programme is held within the engineering education
community.
48
Achieving excellence in engineering education: the ingredients of successful change
4.5.1 Context and drivers for change
Context: Coventry University is a UK-based institution, rst
established in 1843 as the Coventry College of Design. It was
one of 35 former-polytechnics in the UK that were granted
university status in 1992 and has a reputation for industry-
informed education, particularly in the automotive sector.
During the recent shake up of UK higher education funding,
Coventry has, almost uniquely, opted to set discipline-specic
tuition fees, rather than adopt a standard university-wide
fee level. This approach is seen to oer the students both
transparency and value-for-money.
The Faculty of Engineering and Computing (referred to here
as the School
8
) was formed in 2005, following the merger
of the School of Engineering, the School of Mathematics
and Information Sciences and the Department of the Built
Environment. This new structure brought a new, externally-
appointed Dean and four Associate Deans, appointed
internally from across a range of disciplines within the School.
Overall, the School caters to around 3100 (FTE) undergraduate
students, of which 35% are international.
Prior to reform, the educational approach across the School
was described as “a mixed bag, but overall pretty similar to our
competitors”. Although there were “pockets of poor teaching”,
there were also examples of excellence and innovation, such
as the project-based learning experiences oered within the
Motor Sport programmes. During the early 1990s, an attempt
was made at grassroots faculty level to encourage a broader
adoption of project-based learning into the engineering
curriculum. A number of individuals who now hold leadership
positions within the School, including one of the Associate
Deans, participated in this eort. The failure of this reform
eort to take hold was attributed by many to its lack of senior-
level support and alignment with the strategic priorities of
the School.
Faculty point to their genuine commitment to and close
relationship with the students as a particularly strength of
the School. Stakeholder interviews indicate that the School
caters to a very diverse student cohort, in their demographic
prole as well as their academic ability and motivation levels.
Providing coherent educational programmes across this
wide student spectrum is clearly a challenge, which has been
compounded by a recent rise in intake of highly motivated
and bright students from Eastern Europe.
Drivers. The change eort was guided by a number of internal
and external factors. The senior management of the newly-
formed School were seeking to bring “stability and coherence”
to the educational provision across a range of disciplines. The
University’s decision to resource a new School-wide building
demanded strategic thinking about future learning space
requirements and thereby the long-term educational models
to be used across all departments. The critical drivers for the
change, however, appear to be centred on a need to improve
the School’s reputation and improve student engagement. In
particular, it responded to concerns about: (i) the quality and
quantity of the student intake, (ii) low student engagement
and retention, particularly during the rst 2 years of study,
and (iii) graduate employability. At a national level, there were
also signals of a likely, and substantial, increase to student
tuition fees. In such a climate, where the market for student
places would be increasingly competitive, the School viewed
a shift towards ‘student centred’ learning and employability
as a means to “dierentiate us in an ever changing competitive
market”.
4.5.2 The educational vision and changes implemented
The educational changes across the School have centred on
the adoption of Activity-Led Learning (ALL), a learner-centred
approach which integrates “student-led discovery, complex
problem solving activities and work-based learning” where
“involvement in the activity guides the learning”. A conscious
decision was taken to develop a new, bespoke, educational
approach that both responded to the need for improved
students recruitment, retention and employability, but that
would also build a national and international reputation for the
School as a “leader and innovator in undergraduate education”.
Much of the early eort has been focused on the
establishment of a new, intensive ALL experience for all
4.5 Case study 5: Faculty of Engineering and Computing, Coventry University, UK
Overview: The case study describes an on-going
adoption of ‘Activity-Led Learning’ across all ve
departments in the Faculty of Engineering and
Computing in this UK-based university. Planning for the
change started in 2007 and the rst pilot activity was
launched in 2009, followed by a staged School-wide roll-
out from 2010.
Reasons for selection as a case study: (i) the vision
and energy for change originated from the School
senior management, (ii) the changes will be supported
by a suite of innovative learning spaces, housed in a
new School building currently under construction,
designed to support both traditional and active
learning approaches, (iii) this School-wide reform is
being implemented across a range of engineering and
non-engineering disciplines.
Who was interviewed: 19 individuals were consulted for
this case study investigation. Focus groups and informal
discussions were held with 11 students (in their rst and
second year of study from across the School) and formal
interviews were held with 8 stakeholders to the School’s
undergraduate education (including the Dean, two
Associate Deans, a teaching development fellow, a former
Head of Department and faculty from across the School).
8 For the purposes of this case study, ‘School’ will refer to the
Faculty of Engineering and Computing.
49
students entering the School, during their rst year of study
– “this sets the tone, from the outset, for what we expect from
the students, building a sense of hard work and creating a work
ethic”. In most departments, this early ALL activity has been
in the form of a full-time, six week project-based experience.
For example, in the Aerospace Systems degree programme,
students work through a sequence of scenarios based around
an air-crash investigation. Following the implementation
of the six-week experiences in 2010, departments are now
starting to integrate ALL experiences into later years of the
curriculum and will oer a minimum number of ALL-based
courses within each year of study by September 2012. The
School is also building its strategic links with engineering
industry to set an authentic professional context for the ALL
learning. It has recently bid for signicant external funding to
further develop these partnerships, which will be designed
to inform the undergraduateexperience from the point of
application to the programmes, such that “relevance and
vocational educational is driven from the outset”.
In addition to the move towards ALL, the School-wide
programme of change involves three new and complimentary
elements:
Cross-School student support centre. The School has
recently established the Student Experience Enhancement
Unit, to provide peer-support services for students.
Around 50 undergraduates are currently employed as
‘advocates’ within the Unit, and their activities involve:
(i) providing front-line services to the School, such as
running departmental reception desks, (ii) engaging
in educational research, supporting existing faculty-
led projects, and (iii) providing one-to-one advocacy
services to support individual students to overcome any
academic and non-academic problems.
New learning spaces: A new cross-School building is
due to open in September 2012. The vast majority of the
learning spaces will be designed around active learning
principles and they will incorporate key features of some
of the most well-regarded engineering learning spaces
from across the world.
Educational research. Integral to the School’s
educational vision is a stronger international prole
in STEM research that would enable it to develop a
network of strategic national and international alliances.
The School has established an educational research
group, chaired by a former Head of Department, to
promote a rigorous approach to developing and
evaluating educational initiatives – “We want to be known
as a place that takes teaching and learning seriously. In
order to move forward with integrity and credibility, we
must expose what we are doing to rigorous peer review”.
4.5.3 Achieving change
The decision to undertake a major programme of educational
change was taken by the School senior management in 2007,
although the content of the new approaches was deliberately
left open at this stage. Shortly after, the university allocated
funds of around £55m for a new building for the School, to
house a signicant proportion of its learning spaces, research
facilities and faculty oces. As part of the scoping for this
new building, the four Associate Deans visited around 15
national and international universities to evaluate some of the
most innovative engineering learning spaces from across the
world. Many of these spaces were exible, carefully designed
and built to accommodate student-centred engineering
learning, through pedagogies such as problem-based
learning. Witnessing these dierent educational approaches,
in the context of the new building design, “forced us [senior
management] to think about how we actually would be
teaching the students over the next 40–50 years” and triggered
a more fundamental analysis of the School-wide educational
approach. The problem-based learning (PBL) approaches
witnessed at Aalborg University in Denmark appear to have
been particularly inuential – “this was the rst line in the sand
that gave us a condence that we could really do something new”.
The benchmarking exercise also helped to shape the ultimate
educational vision adopted at Coventry – “they saw examples of
PBL in action, and became increasingly convinced that the [School]
needed something broader than that… something that took the
principles of PBL… [but that was also] reective of professional
practice and helped to prepare students for roles in industry”.
Shortly after returning from these international visits, the
Dean and Associate Deans made a series of presentations to
the university senior management – including the ndings
from the benchmarking process and their vision for both the
School’s educational approach and the learning spaces within
the new building. These presentations appear to have been
a critical factor in securing strong university support for the
educational reform. This support provided the School with the
ability to “quite heavily inuence the design of the new building”.
In addition, it helped to allay faculty concerns that the reform
would not be supported at an institutional level; a concern
fuelled by the perception that research was the university’s
over-riding strategic priority.
In November 2007, an away-day was held with the College
senior management and representatives from each
department. This meeting both sought to signal the coming
educational change, and to “thrash out” a more detailed
denition of ALL. Over the next 6 months, the School senior
management further rened their denition of ALL and
started to focus, in particular, on how such an educational
approach could be implemented during the rst 6 weeks
of study, following entry to the degree programme. During
this period, the Associate Deans also attended a number
of departmental sta meetings, to discuss the rationale of
the ALL approach and how it might be implemented into
the curriculum.
In July 2008, the School held a compulsory away-day for all
faculty, senior management and professional sta to discuss
the School’s future educational approach. Discussions were
focused on the teaching space requirements in the new
building and types of activity that might be suitable for
implementation in the rst 6 weeks. Two months later, the rst
pilot ‘6 week experience’ was implemented in Mechanical and
Automotive Engineering. Student surveys during and after
this experience indicated signicant improvements in student
satisfaction and performance.
50
Achieving excellence in engineering education: the ingredients of successful change
In January 2009, the Dean and Associate Deans asked all
Heads of Department to implement a compulsory six-week
ALL experience at the beginning of the rst year of the
curriculum in the following academic year. Although the
overall structure and approach of this course were prescribed
at School level, “departments were given completely exibility
about how this should be achieved”. To support this change, 30
new Teaching Assistants were employed across the School.
These individuals were “young enthusiastic and very bright”, and
appear to have carried some of the burden for implementing
this rst wave of ALL experiences. In September 2009, all
departments implemented their 6-week experience and
these models were further rened and developed for the
2010 student intake. Some departments have also taken this
opportunity to restructure other elements of the curriculum
around ALL. To date, outside the mandatory 6-week
experience, levels of ALL implementation vary considerable
between departments.
From September 2011, all departments were required to
implement a minimum number of course credits that are
based on the ALL approach in each year of study – amounting
to 25% of course credits in the rst and second year and over
40% in the third year. Again, decisions on how and where such
changes are implemented have been left the departments. A
further 30 Teaching Assistants are currently being appointed
to support these additional changes.
Many view September 2011 as the point when “ALL will be
handed over from the School to the departments”. However,
the on-going departmental changes will continue to be
supported at the School level by: (i) the former Head of
Department of the Built Environment, whose new role is
to support change within the departments, develop the
School’s educational research capacity and to improve its
external educational prole, (ii) a cross-School teaching
fellow, who is leading the evaluations of the reform
programme, (iii) a new Learning, Teaching and Assessment
group, to disseminate eective educational practice across
the School, and (iv) annual teaching and learning away-days
for all faculty and senior management. The new building will
open in 2012, and the majority of on-campus courses within
the School will be delivered in this space. The School will be
hosting a number of national and international engineering
education conferences within this space during 2012
and 2013.
4.5.4 Critical factors in successful change
The process of reform across the School is still on-going,
and there is clearly some signicant variation between
departments in the extent and impact of the changes.
However, there are clear and strong indicators of successful
change. Three factors appear to have been critical:
A strong commitment amongst faculty to the
underlying goals of the reform;
A very strong commitment and direction to the
programme of reform from the School’s senior
management, and a recognition amongst faculty that
this is driven by a genuine commitment to educational
improvement;
A widespread “feeling of optimism” in the new
educational brand that is seen to place the School in a
more secure position for the future.
Each of these elements is discussed in turn below.
Faculty support for the underling reform goals. It is clear
that there is overwhelming support amongst faculty for the
central goals of the ALL developments – to improve student
satisfaction, retention and employability. The vast majority
accept that some form of systemic educational change was
necessary and that the ALL design was responding to many
of the critical issues. Although not all faculty members believe
that the ALL model is the most appropriate solution, the
strong support for its underlining drivers appears to have
softened the resistance to change and played a critical role in
unifying most departments behind the reform.
Commitment of School senior management: The change
process has been triggered and led by a senior management
team who hold a deep-seated and genuine commitment
to educational improvement. This team have taken a very
hands-on approach to the change, to which they have
dedicated very signicant amounts of time over the past
5 years – benchmarking, developing the new educational
approach, communicating with Heads of Department,
faculty and students, coordinating and evaluating the
change eort and disseminating the outcomes at a national
and international level. The early stages of the process
were driven, in particular, by the Associate Deans, whose
partnership strengthened their vision and common resolve
for radical change – “this was an extraordinary process. The
four of us came together from quite dierent places, but became
quite close. There was a real coming together of minds”. This
genuine commitment has clearly been recognised by
faculty, and with it an appreciation that there was no “hidden
agenda” in the change eort, but also that the mandate for
change was unlikely to diminish. The Associate Deans were
also well-known across the School - each originating from
dierent departments – with a long-standing reputation for
“teaching commitment”. It is also widely understood that both
the Dean and Associate Deans see this educational approach
as the USP of the School and one which will dierentiate it
from its competitors as the UK tuition fees increase in 2012.
The reform eort also enjoys a strong level of support from
university senior management.
The new brand: A widespread feeling of optimism is apparent
amongst many of the faculty that “quality of our teaching is not
currently reected in the league tables” and the ALL reforms are
likely raise the national and international prole of the School,
particularly once students start to graduate from the reformed
programmes. Even amongst those who hold reservations
about the ALL approach, there appears to be a recognition
that “ALL is likely to change our reputation in a positive direction”.
In the context of the upcoming increase in UK tuition fees,
many see the ALL reforms as placing the School in a much
stronger, and safer, position as competition increases for
university places. The anticipated impact of the new building
was also raised repeatedly by interviewees, and many view
the opening of this new space as a potential trigger for the
establishment of a stronger educational community across
51
the School and an opportunity for wider prole-raising at a
national and international level.
4.5.5 Challenges in the change process
The original vision and energy for the ALL reforms came
from the School senior management. The most signicant
challenge in the change process is translating this
engagement into the strategic priorities of each of the
departments. As the Dean comments, “You can strategise all
you like, but, in the end, it means nothing if the academics do
not believe in it… We always have to keep our focus on the sta
who are delivering ALL and the students”. A critical rst stage
was “getting the Head of Department on board”. Although all
Heads of Department made a commitment to implement
the ALL changes, there was not universal support for the
approach. In particular, those subject areas not allied with
the engineering disciplines, particularly mathematics, held
signicant reservation about the universal applicability of the
ALL approach – “teaching maths is fundamentally dierent from
teaching engineering or computer science. Most students chosing
maths at degree level do so because they want to learn maths
in the same manner that they were taught at [high] school, and
therefore do not respond at all well to ALL”. In addition, a number
of faculty hold concerns over the responses of international
and/or academically weaker students to the ALL environment.
From an early stage, School senior management sent a clear
message that the incorporation of ALL into the curriculum was
necessary, but that departments would be given freedom over
how this was to be achieved. Faculty reactions to this position
tended to fall into one of two groups. For some, the challenge
and exibility were seen as “a real opportunity to do something
interesting ourselves” and has resulted in some signicant
changes, over and above the mandatory elements. However,
others viewed this position as a ‘dictat’ and were frustrated by
the lack of clarity on how such experiences might be designed
and implemented in practice. This issue appears to be most
acute in non-engineering subjects, particularly mathematics.
There also appears to be some discomfort over the fact that
the benchmarking exercises were not conducted using direct
UK-based competitor universities, but rather with international
institutions with very dierent educational structures, student
intake and resourcing levels – “We don’t know what our
competitors are doing - the real analysis has not been done. The
Associate Deans were looking at what was happening around the
world and everything has been based on what they have found.
They only visited Australia and the US, and have assumed that
the model is transferrable”. Particular concerns were raised by
some faculty about the applicability of educational models
developed at institutions such as Aalborg University to the
School. Internally, messages describing ALL as a “unique”
approach and one which “will put Coventry on the map” appear
to be much more eective in galvernising faculty support
than those suggesting that ALL derives from eective practice
adopted elsewhere.
Across the School, during the early stages of the
implementation of the ‘6-week experiences’, faculty concerns
centred on the practicalities of the ALL operation – such as
the availability of appropriate spaces for ALL delivery, how to
integrate late-starting students into the ‘6-week experience’
and how to deliver ALL to large cohort numbers. Although
some faculty feel that School senior management were
slow to respond to these issues, each appears to have been
resolved, with “compromises made on both sides”.
A number of interviewees commented on an apparent
conict between the institutional priority given to research
and the School-level push for educational change. Many
would like to see a formalised role for promotion in teaching
innovation/excellence – “80% of our income is from teaching,
but so few people are promoted for teaching excellence. This is a
major weakness of [the School’s] focus on teaching. Things would
really change if we saw more promotions. The university is asking
everyone to bring in research money, but educational research
does not pay”. Perhaps for this reason, much of the burden
for implementing the ALL reforms has fallen to a relatively
small group of people, estimated to be around 10% of the
faculty. Many of these individuals described the experience
as “exhausting” and there is some apprehension over who,
in each department, will be taking on the next wave of ALL
implementation in the 2011/12 academic year.
The opening of the new building will clearly be a signicant
determinant of the overall success of the reform eort. To
date, most of the ALL-based courses have been implemented
within inappropriate and inexible spaces. Although new
building should rectify these problems, there is some
apprehension amongst faculty over the appropriateness
of the new teaching spaces and whether, indeed, they will
cater to the range of educational delivery modes currently
employed across the School.
4.5.6 Impact of the change
A dominant theme in the feedback from both faculty and
students was the scale of the educational change undertaken
across the School, with representatives from almost every
department reporting signicant and coherent reform to their
rst year programs. In the UK context, it is very unusual to nd
such genuine and widespread change in a School of this size.
Given the magnitude of educational change undertaken, what
is striking is the positive assessment of the ALL strategy by the
faculty. Overall, it is estimated that around 40–50% of faculty
are broadly supportive of the widespread implementation
of the ALL approach, although there clearly are pockets of
much lower levels of support in particular departments.
Levels of support appear to be increasing, as “people start to
see the improvement in the students [resulting from the on-going
change]”. For those faculty who were less enthusiastic about
their experience with ALL, most still saw positive benets in
terms of student engagement, community-building and the
development of personal and professional skills – “…socially, it
is brilliant. It gets them working from day one and sets the tone for
what we expect from them for the rest of the course”. In general,
those departments or semi-autonomous sub-departmental
groups whose leadership is strongly supportive of the ALL
model report much more positive impacts from the changes
implemented to date.
Informal student feedback was also gathered about the
newly-implemented rst-year ALL courses. The feedback was
generally very positive, and almost all students appear to
52
Achieving excellence in engineering education: the ingredients of successful change
have a coherent understanding of the structure and intended
benets of the learner-centred approach. Most also spoke
about high engagement and motivation levels amongst the
student body during these activities.
Although it is too soon to determine whether the ALL
reforms will be successful, early evaluations of the six-week
experiences demonstrate strong student support for the ALL
approach. For example, 74% of students who participated in
the ALL courses reported that they “would like to see more of
this approach” across the rest of the curriculum.
4.5.7 Sustainability of the change
Probably the most signicant challenge in sustaining the
ALL changes will be maintaining the momentum and
coherence of the reforms over such a large and diverse School.
Departmental faculty and senior management from around
50% of the School now see ALL as “part of the culture”, where
there is “no going back” from the signicant changes already
implemented. For those departments less engaged with the
ALL approach, particularly those outside the engineering
subjects, it appears likely that only those mandatory changes
will be implemented and sustained within the curriculum.
There is a strong sense that the “proof of the pudding” of the
educational changes will come when the new building opens
in September 2012 – “the building will make a huge dierence –
providing the learning spaces for the ALL experiences, invigorating
and unifying the [School], but also raising the prole of what we
are trying to achieve”.
The ALL reforms have been implemented during a period
of signicant change and great uncertainty in UK higher
education. In particular, there is an apprehension that the
upcoming increase in tuition fees will result in a signicant
fall in student enrollments within the School in 2012/13
and possibly in subsequent academic years. In line with
many universities across the UK, the attention of senior
management has been focused on the potential nancial
impact of the new funding regime. Although this may have
caused some delay in the implementation of the educational
reforms, the changing market in higher education appears to
have strengthened the resolve to ensure that the School is
providing a distinctive and high-quality education –
“…[the increase in] tuition fees will be a dicult time and
student numbers are going to go down signicantly. But we have
something that is well-designed and unique and a brand new
world-class facility, and are now well placed for the future”.
53
4.6.1 Context and drivers for change
Context: Penn State is a large public ‘land grant’ university
with a reputation as a “student-centred research university”.
Many interviewees described it as having a “blue collar”
history with a hands-on approach to both its research and
teaching activities. Penn State is seen to be “less silo-ed than
many other universities… [with] … departments that are
willing to work together”. The student population is described
as being very diverse, both in their academic ability and
their career aspirations – “we take our responsibility to educate
students from across the State very seriously, so we take on a
huge mix”.
Within the College of Engineering (referred to here as the
School
9
), a long-standing culture of “valuing engineering
education” is apparent. Indeed, four past presidents of the
American Society for Engineering Education (ASEE) have
been based within the School, including the current Dean
and Associate Dean for Academic Aairs. The ethos has
been further reinforced by the Dean, who has sent out a
clear message across the School that educational quality
is a strategic priority and is one that will be recognised. As
one Head of Department commented “the Dean is key [to the
culture of promoting education]. You know he takes teaching
seriously. When I talk to him, it is a very balanced discussion
between teaching and research… we don’t just take teaching for
granted in promotions and tenure”. The School also has a long-
standing history of working in partnership with engineering
industry. For example, during the mid-1980s, the Department
of Industrial and Manufacturing Engineering secured funding
through the Ben Franklin Technology Partnership to establish
strategic research partnerships with local manufacturing
industries. The partnership created over 50 new projects,
providing opportunities for faculty and graduate students to
“work on real-world, practical engineering problems”. During this
period, however, despite considerable industry connections in
its research activities, the School’s undergraduate curriculum
had remained predominantly theoretically-based, “mostly in a
lecture recitation format”.
During the 5 years prior to the establishment of the Learning
Factory, a number of high-prole engineering education
initiatives had been established within the School. In 1990,
Penn State was part of a consortium of seven universities that
secured one of the rst National Science Foundation (NSF)
Engineering Education Coalition grants, to establish the ECSEL
Coalition. The award enhanced the status of engineering
education among faculty as an activity that could attract
signicant and prestigious external funding – “the ECSEL
Coalition broke the ground that education innovations were
important and would be supported by the federal government”.
In the years following the receipt of this award, the School
established two further externally-funded initiatives, the
Leonhard Centre for the Enhancement of Engineering Education
and the Engineering Design Program, both seeking to advance
knowledge in engineering education and improve the
student learning experience.
Drivers: The principal driver for the establishment of the
Learning Factory was the availability of signicant external
funding. In 1993, the Advanced Research Projects Administration
(ARPA) in partnership with the NSF launched the Technology
Reinvestment Program, oering funding support for
“manufacturing education and training”. In response to this
announcement, the Learning Factory founders formed a
coalition with three partner institutions
10
, and successfully bid
4.6 Case study 6: Learning Factory, College of Engineering, Penn State University, US
Overview: The Learning Factory, rst established in 1995,
oers hands-on, professional engineering experiences.
The central Learning Factory activity is the ‘capstone’
design project – a nal-year, semester-long team-based
activity, where students are tasked with solving real
engineering problems, as assigned by industry mentors,
and develop their solutions within a purpose-built
on-campus workshop space. The capstone design
programme is the focus of this case study.
Reasons for selection as a case study: (i) this highly-
regarded initiative was established following the receipt
of a signicant external award, (ii) despite a number
of challenges, it has continued to expand over its 16
year history and now caters to around half of the nal-
year students within the College of Engineering, and
(iii) the initiative is driven by a network of eective
industry partnerships.
Who was interviewed: 49 individuals were consulted
for the case study investigation. Formal interviews were
held with 17 individuals, including the Learning Factory
founders (the initial Director and senior management
supporting the original application for external funding)
and current stakeholders to the Learning Factory
(including both the current Learning Factory Director
and Workshop Manager, Dean of School, Associate Dean
for Academic Aairs of School, corporate and alumni
relations managers at School and university levels, the
university Vice President and Dean for Undergraduate
Education, Heads of Department and faculty members
within the School and the Director of the Leonhard
Centre for the Enhancement of Engineering Education).
Informal discussions and focus group sessions were
held with a selection of those participating in Fall 2011
Learning Factory projects, including 8 undergraduates,
6faculty members and 18 industry sponsors.
9 For the purposes of this case study, for consistency across the
report, ‘School’ will refer to the College of Engineering.
10 The Manufacturing Engineering Education Partnership
(MEEP) members were Penn State University, The University of
Puerto Rico, The University of Washington and Sandia National
Laboratories.
54
Achieving excellence in engineering education: the ingredients of successful change
for around $2.75m. A signicant proportion of this funding
was matched by the School and industry partners.
Although interviewees for this study were clear that the
Learning Factory concept was developed in direct response
to the recently-established funding stream, its design and
approach were informed by other factors. The ESCEL Coalition
had successfully worked to introduce design experiences
into the early years of the curriculum. However, the later
years of study (junior and senior years) remained largely
unchanged, and, for some, had become “rather stale, leaving
students unengaged and retention rates low”. By the early 1990s,
there was also a growing acknowledgement that a divide
existed between the skills, experiences and attitudes held
by graduating engineers, and those desired by engineering
industry. In this regard, the founding Learning Factory team
were particularly inuenced by the list of “desired attributes
of an engineer”, produced by Boeing in 1993
11
, and sought
to provide students with authentic hands-on engineering
experiences that “inject[ed] some life into the curriculum”.
4.6.2 The educational vision and changes implemented
The Learning Factory is described as an “industry-university
partnership to produce world-class engineers by integrating
design, manufacturing and business realities into the engineering
curriculum”. It seeks to expose students to engineering
challenges involving “a real client and a real problem”, where
they work alongside professional engineers and gain hands-
on experience developing physical prototypes of their ideas.
The Learning Factory oers a dedicated on-campus workshop
space, which students can access until 10pm each weekday.
Its central activity is the ‘capstone’ design project, a nal-year
semester-long team-based activity.
At the beginning of each semester, a network of industry
partners are each invited to identify an on-going problem from
within their core business, to be oered as a single capstone
project for a team of 4–5 students. For each project, the
company also provides a mentor to oversee and support the
team’s activities, and a small donation towards the project and
overhead costs. Students, faculty and company sponsors attend
a ‘kick o’ meeting, where all of the projects are presented, and
students are given the opportunity to discuss the proposals in
more detail with the sponsoring company. Students then vote
on their preferred project and are assigned into teams based
on their preferences and the disciplinary needs of the project.
During their 14-week project, each team member will typically
devote 10–15 hours per week to the activity. In addition to the
project and prototype development, teams will meet with their
faculty supervisors on a weekly basis and will typically arrange
face-to-face or remote communications with their company
mentor every two weeks. At the close of the semester, student
teams present their completed project at a ‘showcase’ event, to
which all industry partners attend.
4.6.3 Achieving change
The catalyst for the establishment of the Learning Factory
was securing external funding from ARPA of $2.75m, from
11 Desired Attributes of an Engineer, Boeing (see http://www.
boeing.com/educationrelations/attributes.html)
1994–97. This award instantly established a highly-visible
prole for the Learning Factory, both internally and nationally.
As the Head of the Industrial and Manufacturing Engineering
at the time commented, “this was the biggest grant that my
department had ever had – it gave us real credibility”. For some,
the funding also played an invaluable role in allowing faculty
to “take a step back” and reassess the existing undergraduate
provision – “we were already well known. There were not a lot
of motivations for change… the money provided incentives for
faculty to be involved”.
Some early benchmarking was conducted of existing
approaches to hands-on, industry-informed, education.
Institutions investigated were all US-based and included
the University of New Mexico, Worcester Polytechnic and
Harvey Mudd. Although the founding team did not consult
pedagogical evidence – “it just felt right. You don’t need
research to tell you that” – they had become interested in
the discussions on active learning emerging within the
engineering education community. Interactions with their
partner institutions
12
was also clearly an energising force
during the early stages of the Learning Factory establishment
– “collaborating with those Schools helped everyone, as we were
able to see the commonality in engineering education. We saw
that the Learning Factory had applicability to everyone”.
Established in 1995, the early development of the Learning
Factory was led by two highly-committed and well-regarded
champions from two departments: an Assistant Professor from
Mechanical Engineering, who provided the “vision and energy”
for the initiative, and the Head of Industrial and Manufacturing
Engineering, who “kept people’s feet to the re”.
The original ARPA/NSF grant was designed to infuse every year
of the curriculum with “practice-based” teaching and learning
activities. However, because “there was a lot of faculty resistance
to active learning”, it “never made in-roads into the curriculum”.
Instead the founders of the Learning Factory focused their
attention on the “big impact classes”, principally the capstone
design project. Although some other Learning Factory courses
continue (such as the required School-wide Introduction to
Engineering Design or the optional Product Realization Minor),
to almost all of those interviewed, the Learning Factory is
synonymous with the capstone design programme.
The capstone projects rested on a network of industry
partners. The Head of Department of Industrial and
Manufacturing Engineering took the lead on developing this
network, and it was clearly advantageous that the individual
who brokered the initial partnerships was “someone with real
clout who could also really speak for what we were trying to do”.
Alongside the network of partners, an Industry Advisory Board
was established. Mainly comprising Penn State alumni, this has
been a critical driving force behind the direction and energy
of the Learning Factory. During the rst year of operation, in
1995/96, the Learning Factory oered 6 capstone projects.
From this point, and over the next 10 years, the Learning
Factory steadily grew within its two host departments of
12 After the ARPA/NSF funding ceased in 1998/99, the Learning
Factories at the three partner institutions soon folded, with
“novestige” now remaining of the initiative on these campuses.
55
Mechanical Engineering and Industrial and Manufacturing
Engineering. Signicant on-going eort was devoted by the
Learning Factory supporters and in particular its Director, to
securing a “constant stream of industry projects”.
The Learning Factory is currently managed by a team of three
(a part-time Learning Factory Director, a full-time Workshop
Manager and a Sta Assistant) together with undergraduate
Teaching Assistants. Its operation relies on signicant and
on-going external funding, amounting to $50–100k each
year. Company donations for each team project (currently
$3k, increasing to $3.5k where a condentiality agreement
is required) cover many of the basic operational costs, such
as events and the team materials and supplies. Additional
external funding has been used to develop and maintain the
Learning Factory workshop space.
4.6.4 Critical factors in successful change
There are a variety of factors that have contributed to the
successful establishment and continuation of the Learning
Factory. The School as a whole has a non-typical culture of
both prioritising undergraduate education and supporting
hands-on approaches to engineering. The current Dean,
Associate Dean and a number of Heads of Department have
each played critical roles in both championing and protecting
the Learning Factory during various stages of its development,
as well as securing signicant funding for the activity. Indeed,
a number of interviewees noted that “there has been a Dean at
all of the Learning Factory events, every year. This sends out a clear
message”. The two Learning Factory Directors, both of whom
are existing faculty members, have been highly eective; the
rst establishing the new activity and the second broadening
the model across the School.
Perhaps the most striking outcomes of the interviews
and observations, however, were the levels of genuine
enthusiasm for and commitment to the Learning Factory
by all parties involved. Almost all interviewees characterised
the initiative as a “win-win for everyone involved” – students
broaden their engineering capabilities and gain access to
potential employers; faculty are able to provide engaging and
benecial capstone projects without a signicant time and
cost commitment; the School gains the prestige of hosting
an innovative educational endeavor and further cultivates
its industry partnerships; company sponsors improve their
prole amongst Penn State graduates and benet from
fresh new thinking on some of their on-going issues. Not
only do all stakeholders feel that they are benetting from
their participation, most see the Learning Factory as the best
avenue available to achieve these outcomes.
Underpinning this positive assessment of the Learning Factory
are four factors which have been critical to its success:
1. On-going and signicant external funding;
2. Its curricular position and approach;
3. The level of student engagement generated;
4. A network of highly committed industry partners.
External funding: The Learning Factory was established
following a very signicant injection of external funding.
With this funding came considerable prestige, a national
prole, and a sense that “we were being watched and we
really couldn’t fail”. More importantly, the funding ensured
that existing School and departmental resources were not
compromised by the development of the Learning Factory:
the funding enabled it to operate ‘in addition to’ rather than
‘instead of’ other School priorities, and it therefore “did not
tread on any toes”. As a “faculty independent intervention”, it met
relatively little active resistance. All interviewees were clear
that the Learning Factory could not have been established
without the initial award. However, its ongoing operation has
been contingent on annual company donations and other
donations and prizes, such as the Gordon Prize received in
2006. In order to continue to receive such external resources,
the Learning Factory must continue to provide an educational
approach that is “ahead of the game” and a model valued by
US engineering industry. The ability of the Learning Factory to
adapt to the changing needs of both students and industry,
particularly in recent years, has been a key strength and one
that has ensured its continuation.
Curricular position and approach: The Learning Factory’s
curricular position and approach also minimised active
resistance from faculty. It was established shortly before a
new accreditation system was implemented across the US,
which required engineering programmes to oer a capstone
team-based design project and cross-disciplinary experiences.
Even amongst those faculty who are not fully supportive of
the concept, therefore, “the Learning Factory is an easy way to
check o that [ABET] box” which would otherwise have had
to be created elsewhere in the curriculum. In addition, the
Learning Factory holds a relatively autonomous position in the
curriculum, as a “terminal course with very few dependencies”,
and therefore does not impact signicantly on other teaching
activities within the departments. Involvement with Learning
Factory is also not “forced” on any unwilling faculty, and
operates with relatively small faculty numbers – the Fall 2011
activity involves 13 faculty from across 9 departments whereas
Spring 2011 involved 18 faculty across 11 departments.
Student engagement and development: The activity is
clearly highly engaging and benecial for the participating
students. For many, the Learning Factory has resulted in
“a major change in the quality of our graduates – a quantum
jump”. There is a strong sense of student autonomy in driving
forward their projects, to which they devote considerable time
and thought. This is certainly enhanced by the open-access
nature of the workshop spaces, where teams are able to work
independently. The increased engagement amongst students
participating in the Learning Factory is widely acknowledged
by faculty across the School. As one interviewee commented,
“the public displays are impressive and hard to deny. When
students go out on interviews, they talk about the Learning
Factory…. Even faculty who are not involved can see that
students get jobs because of this experience”.
Industry partnerships: Perhaps most importantly, the
Learning Factory has established an impressive web of highly-
eective company partnerships. For many of the interviewees,
this factor has been the key to its on-going success. One
particularly striking element of the discussions with the
industry partners was their level of genuine enthusiasm for
56
Achieving excellence in engineering education: the ingredients of successful change
and personal commitment to the Learning Factory. Indeed,
many of the most engaged partners are alumni of Penn
State. In this respect, the sheer size of the School is a great
advantage to the endeavor – company partners gain access to
a signicant number of students and a large number of Penn
State alumni hold posts in major US engineering companies.
At the centre of these relationships is the Learning Factory
Industry Advisory Board – “the Industry Advisory Board roll up
their sleeves and work shoulder to shoulder with us. These are
eective and collegial working relationships… They can see that
they make a dierence”. Internally, the Learning Factory is also
viewed as one element of a larger university-wide strategy to
develop and strengthen its industry links. Very considerable
amounts of time are spent by the Learning Factory team,
corporate and alumni relations managers (at School and
university levels), School management, Heads of Department
and faculty in securing this engagement.
4.6.5 Challenges in the change process
As noted in the previous section, the Learning Factory did not
contend with signicant faculty resistance during its start-up
phase. For most faculty, the Learning Factory brought clear
benets to the School without any signicant compromises.
Two faculty concerns were apparent, however.
The rst centred on a “loss of control over the projects”. Potential
faculty supervisors were required to pass the responsibility
for sourcing their capstone projects to a third party, which
brought a signicant level of risk – “what if the project was
a dud?”. It took 3–4 years for the Learning Factory team
to establish their credibility in selecting the projects and
managing the industry relationships – “they said that they could
get the projects, but until they consistently delivered, people were
still nervous about getting involved”.
The second faculty concern related to the diculties in
supervising these real-world, complex projects – “we have
had considerable success in bringing people in from industry.
Butnding faculty is dicult… Many [faculty] don’t feel that they
can handle it. It is not in their domain. They don’t feel like their
experience and expertise has prepared them for it”. Supervising
Learning Factory projects was also seen to be a highly
time consuming activity and not one which many faculty,
particularly those on tenure track, could commit to. As a
result, securing the required numbers of faculty supervisors
for Learning Factory projects was, and continues to be, a
challenge.
Perhaps the greatest challenge for sustaining the Learning
Factory, however, came in the mid-2000s. Further details on
these issues are provided in Section 4.6.7.
4.6.6 Impact of the change
All interview feedback suggested that the impact of the
Learning Factory has been overwhelmingly positive. School
senior management, participating students, faculty and
industry partners all pointed to the signicant benets of the
initiative, as summarised below.
Student perspective: Since 1995, the number of student
participants has steadily increased, with now a half of
the 1500 School graduates participating in the Learning
Factory each year. Overall, 20% of student participants
in Learning Factory projects have been subsequently
oered employment by their industry sponsor. Most
student participants are aware of the potential of the
Learning Factory for securing graduate employment
and “think quite strategically about which corporate
sponsor they are selecting”. The students consulted for this
study understood the underlying goals of the Learning
Factory and its potential benets for their development
as professional engineers.
Industry perspective: High levels of enthusiasm were
apparent amongst the industry partners, although
motives for participation clearly vary. For larger
companies, the primary motivator is exposure to
bright, motivated and well-educated engineering
students. Smaller companies tend to be driven by
nding solutions to the projects themselves, and the
contributions made by the student teams to their “back
burner” challenges. The economic downturn appears
to have increased interest amongst both communities:
where companies are employing fewer graduates, their
focus on the quality of selection has increased, and
where funding for R&D has decreased, companies are
looking for alternative, low-cost ways of developing and
improving their operations. The nal ‘showcase’ event is
clearly a signicant experience for the industry partners,
and many commented on the extent to which their
mentees had changed through their capstone project,
displaying “maturity, professionalism and ideas that blew
us out of the water”. Some also spoke about company
cost savings derived from Learning Factory projects
running into the hundreds of thousands of dollars.
School and university perspective: Both the School and
university derived multiple benets from the Learning
Factory, including “external recognition, contribution to
the stature of the university, as well as public interest in
what the university is doing”. One particularly benecial
outcome has been the industry partnerships. As a
university Corporate Relations Manager commented
“the Learning Factory has changed the relationship of
Penn State with some of these engineering companies.
Other universities are charging $50k per project for similar
programs but the low entry point [of the Learning Factory]
means that they can dip their feet in the water to see
what the university is all about, and things can grow from
there. It is a great way to get corporations on campus”. In
2010, Penn State was placed at the top of a Wall Street
Journal survey for employable graduates. Many of those
interviewed, at a School and university level, credited
the Learning Factory as an important factor in the
development of this reputation.
4.6.7 Sustainability of the change
During the rst 10 years, the Learning Factory continued
to expand within its host departments of Mechanical
Engineering and Industrial and Manufacturing Engineering
and enjoyed enthusiastic support from its industry partners
and student participants. However, by the mid-2000s,
anumber of challenges emerged, threatening the long-
57
term viability of the initiative and forcing a fundamental
rethink of its approach. As outlined below, four issues were
particularly apparent.
Isolation within the School. In the early 2000s,
the Department of Industrial and Manufacturing
Engineering embarked on a major curriculum reform,
integrating inter-disciplinary design experiences
into the capstone project. As the existing Learning
Factory model did not oer a “truly interdisciplinary”
experience, the department started to source their
capstone projects from elsewhere. By 2005/06, the
Learning Factory had developed an “image of being just a
Mechanical Engineering activity”. At this point, there was
“a real danger that the Learning Factory would just become
dispersed, with each department having their own version,
but no real coherence”.
Diculties in securing projects: Securing the
required number of industry projects was becoming
increasingly challenging. With each department working
independently to establish potential partners for their
own capstone projects, “companies did not know what
their point of entry was to the School”. Not only was this a
cause of some frustration to industry partners, it meant
that only projects that “t neatly” into the boundaries
of a specic engineering discipline were likely to be
taken forward.
Limited incentives for internal participation: It was
apparent that non-participating departments within the
School felt that the Learning Factory “was not serving
the needs of the School as a whole ... [with] … a sense
that it was competing with what the other departments
wanted to do”. The funding model for the initiative was
also seen to be a disincentive for other departments
to participate. At the time, the company donation
received for each project was divided equally between
the Learning Factory operation and the team budget
for their prototype development. The host departments
themselves did not receive a portion of this funding.
The approach was no longer cutting-edge: In 1995,
the experiences oered by the Learning Factory were
almost unique within the US. However, by the mid-
2000s, the Learning Factory had “become stale. It was
no longer cutting edge – this was something that many
other universities were starting to do”. Many felt that the
initiative needed to adapt, and, in particular, start to
provide students with meaningful multi-disciplinary and
global experiences.
In 2006, in response to these issues, the School made a
number of strategic decisions. With a new Director in post,
the Learning Factory was re-established as a cross-School
activity, serving all departments. This move has clearly been
critical – “[in the past] there was a danger that [the Learning
Factory’s] success would be dependent on each department’s
relationship with Mechanical Engineering at any one time.
If Mechanical Engineering falls on hard times, the Learning
Factory cannot now be ‘cut out”. The newly-appointed
Learning Factory Director visited each department in
the School and met with key sta, including the Head of
Department and undergraduate and project coordinators
in each case, to better understand their perceptions of the
initiative and the barriers to participation. Following this
review, four signicant changes were made to the Learning
Factory operational model.
School-wide access point for external partners:
TheLearning Factory now takes a School-wide
approach to establishing external partnerships, holding
collaborative discussions between potential partners
and representatives from all departments. Asthe
Learning Factory Director commented, “You can lose
out on a lot of synergies when you are only dealing with
one department… Now, we bring people from each
department to meetings with potential sponsors. This
pulls out a lot more opportunities for multi-disciplinary
projects… The more we can do this, the more we can mimic
real engineering, where things don’t come in boxes”. With
these changes, the Learning Factory team “no longer
worry about not getting enough projects. In fact, we now
have more projects than student [teams]”.
Bringing new departments into the initiative:
Signicant eort has been devoted to broadening the
internal participation. With a new cross-School approach
and a greater number of multi-disciplinary projects –
“itis becoming easier and easier to bring new departments
into the Learning Factory and make them self-sucient in
terms of company sponsors”.
New funding model: The income received for each
project was re-distributed. From the basic $3000
donation, $1000 is now allocated to the team (for
materials, supplies, etc.), $500 to the Learning Factory
operation (for kick o and showcase events) and $1500
to the host department (for faculty time, labs, etc.). The
departments provide the faculty to teach the courses,
and the School funds the salary costs for the Learning
Factory team (Director and two sta ).
Continuous development of the educational goals:
Greater emphasis has been given to ensuring that the
Learning Factory experience reects the changing needs
of both engineering industry and the School as a whole –
“students are changing and the path that they take after they
leave us is changing. We have learnt to be really attentive
to that”. For example, the experience has now become
multi-disciplinary, with the majority of teams now
incorporating students from across dierent departments
and some also involving students from outside the
School. More recently, the focus has shifted towards
integrating cross-cultural experiences. Learning Factory
teams bring together students from universities in Korea,
Singapore and China, working remotely with students
from Penn State. Around 10% of the Penn State students
currently participating in the Learning Factory have been
involved with such a “global project”. The ultimate goal is to
extend this experience to 80–90% of the student teams.
These changes have clearly re-invigorated the Learning
Factory approach and a strong sense of optimism for the
58
Achieving excellence in engineering education: the ingredients of successful change
future is apparent. It is also acknowledged that the Learning
Factory has “started to pervade the pedagogical experience
for capstone design. The connection between faculty and
companies had a real impact on people’s attitudes, and faculty
started to really appreciate what industry was looking for... This
was an unexpected outcome. Faculty now hear things personally
from industry. This has infected the culture of the School”.
Over the coming ve years, the Learning Factory will need to
address two particular issues: (i) expanding and upgrading its
workshop spaces, which are no longer sucient for the large
number of participating students, and (ii) broaden the pool of
faculty supervisors for Learning Factory projects. However, the
key to the long-term success of the Learning Factory will be its
ability to adapt to the needs of US engineering industry and
remain at the cutting-edge of engineering education, thus
securing the necessary funding and industry support for its
continued operation.
59
60
Achieving excellence in engineering education: the ingredients of successful change
5.1 Overall observations on educational change
in engineering
The study sought to capture the experiences of those who
have led, participated in, observed and supported signicant
programmes of educational change in engineering from
across the world, and thereby identify the common features
of success and failure. It drew on two primary evidence
gathering phases: (i) interviews with 70 international experts
and practitioners from 15 countries, and (ii) 6 case study
investigations from the UK, US, Australia and Hong Kong,
during which a further 117 individuals were consulted. The
interview phase of the study provided an overview of current
activity and a high level view of the features and strategies
associated with successful and unsuccessful change. The case
study phase added depth to the picture, looking in detail
at the context and strategies for eective change and the
impact of each stage in the reform process on each of the
major stakeholders.
One area of particular interest was the extent to which
geographic dierences played a role in the context and
strategies for successful change. A number of key dierences
emerged, mainly connected to the broader climate for
supporting educational change at a national level.
All interviewees were asked about the current climate for
making an educational change within their countries, and
the extent to which engineering education reform was
encouraged, supported and resourced at both institutional
and national levels. Some interesting international dierences
were apparent in the interviewee responses. In particular,
dierences were apparent between interviewees from
countries, predominantly in the West, that have been engaged
in signicant national debates on the future of engineering
education during the last 15–20 years (such as the US, UK and
Australia) and those from countries, mainly in Asia, where the
national engagement with engineering education is more
recent. These included Hong Kong, Singapore and South
Korea, and, outside Asia, Chile.
The former group spoke about growing national support for
educational change in engineering and an increasing level
of engagement amongst engineering faculty in the need
for curricular reform. Many had anticipated that this building
momentum would likely trigger widespread and positive
educational reform over the coming decade. However, recent
government-led cuts to national engineering education
support activities as well as to the higher education sector
more broadly has led to considerable retrenchment over
the past 2–3 years. Many interviewees within the US, UK and
Australia spoke with some concern about the potential for
positive educational change within the current climate and
real uncertainty for what future directions might be taken.
In contrast, many interviewees from the countries that
had become more recently engaged at a national level in
improving engineering education spoke much more positively
about the climate for educational change. Many reported
an increase, albeit small, in funding available at a national
and institutional level and an increased engagement across
the board in the need for change. Interviewees from these
countries were also much more likely to cite accreditation,
and in particular the move to an outcomes-based system, as a
major driver for systemic change. Additional drivers for reform
that were particularly noted amongst interviewees from these
regions included: (i) increasingly erce competition between
universities for students, (ii) signicant demographic shifts
amongst incoming students, and (iii) changing knowledge-
base and expectations of incoming students from “the internet
generation”.
One issue emerged strongly across almost all interviews and
appeared to be independent of geography or institution
type: that of the teaching/research balance. Over a half of
the individuals consulted reported a perceptible shift in their
institutions’ priorities towards research outputs, and away
from undergraduate education, in the past 5 years. For many,
these changes were triggered by an increasing emphasis on
national and global university ranking systems. In addition
to reducing the institution’s focus on educational change,
interviewees pointed to two further negative eects of this
increased pressure for faculty to hold an unbroken research
record. Firstly, the proportion of faculty with signicant
industry experience has been reducing. These individuals
appear to be signicantly more likely to support and drive
educational change. Secondly, younger faculty are being
appointed into a culture that does not reward time and
energy invested in educational innovation or change.
Anumber of interviewees who have devoted many years to
educational change at their institutions spoke with concern
about a “lack of succession” to continue the momentum for
curriculum reform.
5.2 Common features of programmes of
successful change
The study identied a number of common features between
programmes of successful, systemic change in engineering
education. The features typically associated with success
are summarised in Figure 10 and discussed further in the
following sections.
5.2.1 Common features of success: context for change
In almost all cases of successful change, there was a clear
sense of common purpose amongst faculty, grounded in a
widespread acknowledgement that educational reform is
unavoidable and/or necessary. This imperative for change is
typically triggered by one of the following scenarios:
The department/School is suering from a critical
problem with their “position in the marketplace” –
typically declining student intake quality/quantity,
increasingly erce competition or poor graduate
employment rates – often resulting in signicant
pressure to change from university senior management.
This enforced need for fundamental change is strongly
apparent to faculty, who engage in the collective
challenge of the endeavour. Changes triggered under
these circumstances appear to be the most likely to
produce successful outcomes. The vast majority (around
70–80%) of the change eorts evaluated in this study fall
into this category.
Concluding comments
61
In a smaller number of cases (around 10%), the reform
is responding to mandatory and externally-imposed
changes at a national or university level. Typically, these
changes involve a signicant university re-structuring
or a sector-wide shift, and this opportunity is taken to
implement a wider educational change.
More rarely, in around 5–10% of cases, change occurs
within Schools/departments where a collegial culture
of innovation and risk-taking already exists. Ahigh
proportion of faculty hold a sense of collective
responsibility and a shared vision for the undergraduate
programmes, as well as a belief that their eorts in
improving the curriculum will be recognised at senior
levels. Surprisingly, such circumstances appear to
be amongst the few where existing innovation or a
research background in engineering education is a
signicant positive inuence in the change process.
There appears to be one set of circumstances, almost
exclusively US-based, under which successful systemic
change is not associated with widespread engagement by
faculty on the necessity for change: where the change eort
had benetted from signicant external funding. When
well supported and managed, such change eorts typically
encounter low levels of faculty resistance, because: (i) faculty
participation is typically voluntary and their time devoted to
the activity is usually ‘bought out’, (ii) the award of funding
brings prestige and external visibility to the change, with
an associated pressure for the endeavour to be seen to be
successful, and (iii) the activity typically does not draw on
signicant internal resourcing and therefore does not require
cut-backs or compromises to be made elsewhere. The
sustainability of such changes, however, is often problematic
and usually contingent on an on-going external funding
stream and a prominent external prole.
Successful change programmes share a number of other
common contextual factors. Firstly, they are much more likely
to involve faculty with industry experience and/or newly-
hired faculty, often replacing those retiring. Both sets of
demographics appear to produce an academic culture that is
more open to change and more willing to devote additional
time to educational activities. Secondly, the decision to
Common features in successful change
The context for
change
Most faculty agree that change is unavoidable/necessary, and the primary driver for reform is
typically a critical ‘market’ problem with the existing educational programmes
The decision to change is often made in the context of an upcoming institutional/sector-wide
restructuring and /or accreditation changes
An unusually high proportion of faculty have industry experience and/or have been recently
appointed
Leadership
and faculty
engagement
The Head of Department is fully committed to the reform and is often leading the endeavour
University senior management have made their support for the reform both explicit and public
Many faculty who are participating in the change process believe that their eorts will be
recognised by senior management, although not necessarily rewarded in promotions procedures
Educational
design and
implementation
The vision for reform is clearly communicated to faculty with an emphasis on the underlying drivers
for change. A signicant proportion of faculty are committed to the goals of the reform
Regardless of the scale of change, the fundamental priorities and approach of the entire degree
programme will be re-assessed, such that all changes are a core and integrated element of a
coherent curriculum structure
A ‘unique’ educational approach is adopted that seeks to set a benchmark for national/international
practice
A high proportion of faculty are involved in the curriculum design process
A small number of carefully-chosen individuals are tasked with the detailed design, planning and
management of the reform, and their time is formally released for this activity
No pressure is placed on reluctant faculty to change their preferred delivery style, and a proportion
of the curriculum is left largely unchanged where this group can continue to operate
Team teaching, or some form of shared teaching responsibility, is adopted across the ag-ship
courses
Sustaining
change
Long-term impact evaluations are conducted, where outcomes (including early successes) are well
disseminated
A signicant improvement in student intake quality and motivation is apparent following reform
Faculty are engaged in some form of on-going educational change/improvement
Figure 10. Common features of successful programmes of educational change, as identied during this study
62
Achieving excellence in engineering education: the ingredients of successful change
embark on educational reform is frequently made in the
context of upcoming changes to the national system of
accreditation and/or the recent award for funding of a new
building. Thirdly, the leaders of successful changes have often
experienced failure in prior attempts to make isolated changes
at the course level, from which they concluded that “change
needed to be radical and widespread for it to stick”.
5.5.2 Common features of success: leadership and faculty
engagement
Successful change programmes appear to deliver a balance of
“top-down and bottom-up pressures”, where a strong vision and
direction from senior management is supported by ‘ownership’
of the changes by the majority of the faculty. Almost without
exception, successful changes are energetically supported by
the Head of Department, who invariably is also the leader or
co-leader of the change. This individual is typically internally
appointed, very highly regarded in both their research and
teaching activities, and is seen as an individual who “walks the
talk”. The pivotal role played by the Head of Department in
successful change is a major nding of the study. Regardless
of the scale of the change (from a small cluster of courses
to a School-wide eort), the commitment and leadership of
individual Department Heads appears to be a critical factor in
its long-term success.
Successful changes are also often supported by the university
senior management, from the very early stages of the
development of the reform proposals. As a result of this
support, university regulations have been waived or moulded
to accommodate some of the more unconventional aspects
of the reforms. Reecting engineering departments/Schools in
general, successful programmes of change do not appear to
be associated with any formal changes to promotions/rewards
procedures. However, in many of the cases of successful
change, there is a clear understanding that involvement in
the reform process (and the resulting withdrawal from other
activities) would, at the very least, not count against a faculty
member in promotions procedures. In many cases, there
is also a strong perception that, although the promotions
criteria had not changed, the manner in which they would be
applied would be dierent, and educational innovation and/or
participation in a programme of educational change would be
valued to a greater extent. This widespread believe amongst
faculty is often based on a long-standing trust in the Head of
Department and a belief that this individual would “ght our
case” during promotions procedures.
5.2.3 Common features of success: educational design
and implementation
For most of the successful programmes of change included
in the study, faculty clearly understand both the drivers for
change and the broad strategy to be adopted from an early
stage in the process. In particular, the underlying need for
educational reform is well-articulated by the change leaders
and often supported by evidence. Following these early
discussions, a large proportion of faculty are agreed that
educational change is necessary and therefore are more likely
to support the full change eort.
One clear distinguishing feature of successful changes is the
extent to which they have taken a ‘step back’ and thought
fundamentally about what their educational programme is
trying to achieve. Such high-level evaluation and re-alignment
of the curriculum appears to be a critical success factor, even
where the changes only impact a relatively small number
of courses. A particularly striking element of the interviews
with leaders of successful change is the extent to which they
tried to shift faculty thinking towards a more fundamental
consideration of educational goals, a shift achieved by
encouraging them to look outside of their own specialism
to the curriculum as a whole. The radical nature of many of
the resulting changes are often seen to engage faculty as a
challenge that they can “get their teeth into, rather than tinkering
at the edges of the curriculum”. In addition to its coherent
design, the resulting curriculum is also often “leaner” with a
reduced number of contact hours.
The vast majority of successful change programmes
considered in this study have sought to create a unique
brand for their educational approach, and one that aspires
to set a benchmark for national or international engineering
education practice. It is interesting to note that most
involve a blend of problem-based learning with professional
engineering experiences. Successful change programmes also
tend to involve a high proportion, if not all, faculty members
in the detailed design of the reformed programmes. Typically,
they have managed and sustained change on relatively little
additional resource. What appears to be crucial, however,
is the formal release of time for a small number of carefully
chosen faculty to manage the design and implementation
of the reform. Typically, these individuals would have some
teaching or administration tasks removed by the Department
Head. Changes without release of faculty time tend to
result in a signicant dilution of the planned reform, on
implementation, or an early “burn-out” of those tasked with
implementing the change.
Despite widespread faculty involvement in curriculum design,
almost all successful changes do not force reluctant faculty
to change their preferred educational delivery style. In other
words, a portion of the curriculum is ring-fenced, typically for
lecture-based delivery of traditional content. As one Head of
Department commented “you bring the enthusiasts with you,
convert the middle ground, but leave the resisters where they
are”. These ‘resisters’ may be asked to make one change to
their activities (teaching a dierent topic, ensuring that the
material delivered feeds coherently into the brief for a future
PBL project etc.), but the key components of their day-to-day
educational activities will not change.
Finally, more successful change programmes appear to have
broken or loosened the direct connection between each faculty
member and a particular course, creating a greater sense of
shared ownership of the curriculum as a whole. In many cases,
this appears to be achieved through a combination of team-
teaching and the eects of the whole faculty body having been
involved in the curriculum design process.
5.2.4 Common features of success: sustaining change
The principal test of the sustainability of an educational
reform appears to be whether it continues beyond a
63
university restructuring or changes to senior management.
Reform programmes that appeared to be most resilient
in these conditions typically involved at least two of the
following features.
1. Changes are embedded into the core departmental
business: Lack of sustainability of a change is often
linked to the extent to which it is isolated within
the curriculum and reliant on a small number of
‘enthusiasts’ to deliver the agship courses. Without
a strongly interconnected and coherent curriculum,
the importance and impact of the reforms may not be
apparent to most faculty, or indeed most students, and
they are unlikely to champion for their continuation.
Without a wide pool of faculty willing and able to
deliver the reformed courses, any sta changes amongst
existing course leaders can be catastrophic. Team
teaching appears to be a valuable tool in this regard,
particularly where the teams are regularly rotated.
2. A marked improvement in student engagement is
apparent: In a high number of cases, the sustainability
of change appears to be linked to a signicant
improvement in student engagement and intake quality
resulting from the reform. Even for those faculty who
continue to hold reservations about the vision and
approach of the reform eort, the improved satisfaction
from educating “bright and motivated” students brings a
wider acceptance of the changes.
3. Long-term impact evaluations have been conducted:
Where conducted, impact evaluations appear to play
an important, positive role in supporting change and
protecting newly-implemented reforms from the
eects of institutional restructures or sta changes.
The resulting evidence is often used, to great eect,
to both maintain the momentum during the early
implementation stages as well as to support the
long-term continuation of the reformed curriculum.
In practice, however, rigorous impact evaluations are
rarely undertaken. One key barrier to their adoption is
the lack of commonly accepted success measures and
evaluation tools.
4. An ongoing focus on educational innovation and/or
research is apparent: Engagement with a continuous
process of educational change in some form, following
the formal period of change, is also a common thread
amongst those reforms that have been successfully
sustained. For some, this took the form of establishing
programmes of research in engineering education;
for others, it involved a constant cycle of evaluation
and improvement to each course. A culture for such
continuous improvement appears to be particularly
important at the point where new leadership
takespost.
5.3 What does NOT appear to be associated with
successful change
The interviews and case studies challenged some widely held
assumptions about the critical components of successful
change. Some key beliefs were not supported by the evidence
from this study, as summarised below.
Systemic, successful change is not typically
triggered by pedagogical evidence: Very few
programmes of successful systemic change considered
in this study were informed by the educational research
literature before either deciding to make a change
or when selecting the desired curricular approach. In
other words, pedagogical evidence did not appear to
play a signicant role in triggering curriculum-wide
reform or in shaping its overall educational design.
These decisions are almost always made on the basis
of “personal experience in the classroom” and, in some
cases, witnessing a dierent educational approach
elsewhere. The outcomes of this study suggest that
evidence of market position are much more critical than
pedagogical evidence in triggering systemic change.
Indeed, some of the feedback suggested that discussion
of pedagogical evidence disengages some faculty from
the process; they feel that the original ‘test’ environment
is too dierent from their own and weakens their sense
of ownership of the approach. However, in contrast to
curriculum-wide changes, decisions made to embark
on reforms at course level, by individual faculty or small
teams, are often heavily inuenced by the pedagogical
evidence.
Positive student engagement with the change
process does not improve its chances of success:
Although successful programmes of reform invariably
produce a curriculum that enhances student
engagement, they do appear to be more likely to
have benetted from positive student input during
the process of change itself. For example, a number of
change programmes have been based on a “build it and
they will come” model: that if students experience a new,
benecial educational approach in one course, they
will demand it elsewhere and force change. In other
words change strategies that actively engage students
as champions for new approaches to teaching and
learning do not appear to have a higher success record
than those that do not. In contrast, signicant student
unhappiness does appear to trigger change in some
instances. It should be noted, however, that although
positive student engagement does not typically impact
the change process (e.g., how likely it is to be initiated
or sustained), it does appear to improve the quality of
resulting educational programmes. So, for example, a
robust student consultation process during the design
of new curricula is likely to lead to improved learning
outcomes for the reformed programme.
Existing innovation and/or educational expertise
are not critical building blocks for systemic reform:
Existing strong levels of engagement in educational
research or a history of educational innovation do
not appear to be more common amongst successful
curriculum-wide changes. Indeed, in some cases, the
presence of a signicant minority of existing innovators
and/or experts in educational research can create an
64
Achieving excellence in engineering education: the ingredients of successful change
“usand them” division within the faculty during the
change process that can have catastrophic impacts.
The only instances where existing educational research
expertise appeared to be particularly benecial are
where the department is small, collegial and there is a
high proportion of faculty supporting change.
Good practice does not typically dissipate from
existing faculty champions. The change strategy
adopted in many programmes of reform is to identify
existing innovators, empower them to implement
change in their courses, and then encourage this ‘good
practice’ to dissipate out to the rest of the curriculum.
Such models appear to have good early success within
the target courses, but, ultimately, these innovations
do not dissipate and are not themselves sustained over
the long-term, unless supported by strong leadership
and an overarching strategic vision. All of the evidence
from the study points to change only being successfully
implemented when a high proportion of the faculty
are engaged in the educational design/approach and
sustained only when the changes are part of a critical
examination and re-shaping of the whole curriculum.
5.4 Common features of unsuccessful change
The study points to 3 stages where in the change process
where failure is most likely to occur:
The pre-planning stage: following the presentation of
the new educational vision for change to the faculty,
before any detailed planning for the reform has taken
place. On learning about the broad plans for reform, a
high proportion of the faculty “revolt”, and the change
eort is abandoned. The key concerns of faculty
typically centre on one or more of the following: (i)
that the changes will result in a “dumbing down” of
the curriculum, (ii) that they, fundamentally, do not
agree with the underlying need for change, (iii) they
do not believe that the proposed changes align with
the strategic priorities of the university, and/or (iv) that
they are fearful that the changes will adversely aect
their day-to-day jobs. Failure at this early stage tends to
be associated with a lack of eective communication
across the faculty about the planned changes (and, in
particular, why change is necessary and what benets
it will bring to the individual faculty member) and/
or the low credibility of the individual/s proposing
the changes.
The pre-roll out stage: at a late stage in the planning
process or early stage in the roll-out of the reform.
Where there is over-reliance on a small number of
individuals, poor planning and/or insucient resourcing
for the reform-eort, those charged with leading the
change “burn-out” and are unable to deliver the planned
reforms. In some cases, the change eort is abandoned
soon after, but, more frequently, the momentum behind
the reforms slows down, resulting in a much diluted
change that is not well supported and therefore proves
to be unsustainable.
The post-implementation stage: in the 5–10 years
following the implementation of the reform. Following
roll-out, change eorts appear not to be sustained for
a number of reasons: (i) the allocated resources are
insucient to sustain the reforms in their steady-state,
(ii) the new courses/programmes are over-reliant on
one or two individuals, who either “burn out” or move
on, (iii) strong student or faculty dissatisfaction, and (iv)
most commonly, senior management do not continue
to monitor the impact and operation of the new
curriculum and faculty start to revert, unnoticed, to the
previous curriculum within their courses.
5.5 Recommendations
5.5.1 For the engineering education community
The study has highlighted a number of barriers and facilitators
of systemic educational change in engineering Schools and
departments across the world. On the basis of the study
ndings, the prevalence and success-rate of curriculum reform
would be signicantly improved by:
1. The development of a set of simple tools to measure
eective teaching and learning in engineering. Such
tools would serve two very important purposes: (i) to
support the process of promotion and reward of faculty
based on their educational contribution, and (ii) to
provide an accepted template by which departments/
School could monitor the impact of curriculum
reforms without the need to develop their own
bespoke models.
2. The ready availability of evidence on the impact of
educational reform on programme performance.
Given that the majority of successful reform eorts
are triggered by a critical, largely market-driven,
problem, evidence of the long-term impact of change
endeavours in improving their market position
would be of great benet to others considering
change. Such evidence could be in the form of a
longitudinal study of a successful reform eort from a
well-regarded institution, charting the impact of the
change on factors such as recruitment, retention and
employability, and comparing these with competitor
institutions.
3. Funding to support educational change should be
allocated, where possible, to whole departments
with the explicit involvement of the Department
Head, rather than to individuals or groups. Receipt of
funding should also be contingent on a long-term
impact analysis.
5.5.2 For engineering Schools and departments
The study has identied a number of strategies and features
associated with successful and sustainable change. On the
basis of these ndings, a number of specic recommendations
have been made to support engineering Schools and
departments wishing to embark on widespread educational
change. These are summarised in Figure 11.
65
PREPARATION
Collect evidence: gather quantitative evidence of the performance of your programme, as compared to competitor
institutions, with a focus on key areas of concern to your current or future market position.
Engage the Head of Department: devote as much energy as possible to ensuring that the Department Head is actively
supporting, and preferably leading, the change. If their support is limited, be aware that your chances of long-term
success will be severely diminished.
Consult senior university management: open informal discussions with university management about plans for
change. Identify potential conicts and gauge levels of support.
PLANNING
Communicate need for reform to department-wide faculty: focus on the critical need for change, supported by the
evidence gathered, and the potential impact of reform on faculty day-to-day activities. Avoid specifying details of
what the change should look like. Underline university support for change, if this is in place.
Faculty-wide curriculum design: engage most, if not all, faculty in a department-wide educational design process.
Encourage them to think outside their discipline, identify the fundamental educational priorities and design a
coherent curriculum and where all new elements are carefully interlinked with existing courses. The new educational
approach should be distinct and something that will put your institution ‘on the map’. At least one portion of the
curriculum should remain unchanged.
Consult external perspectives: ensure that some external voices are heard. Possibilities include an Industrial Advisory
Board with real ‘teeth’, sending faculty to visit peer institutions that have implemented positive changes and/or
appointing an educational/industrial advisor. Such activities are particularly important where there has been little
recent faculty turn-over and/or few faculty have industry experience.
Appoint a management team and release their time: carefully select a management team of 2–3 individuals who are
well-respected and understand the detailed operation of the undergraduate programmes. Formally release a portion
of their time to devote to detailed planning and implementation.
Establish impact evaluation: select a method by which you can collect impact data throughout and beyond the
change process and collect ‘base-line’ data relating to the period prior to reform.
IMPLEMENTATION
Select implementers of reform: those implementing the rst pilot phases of reform should not necessarily be the
‘usual suspects’ of existing innovators in the department. Do not attempt to force highly reluctant faculty to deliver
any of the new courses at any point in the process.
Loosen direct link between faculty and individual courses: where possible, establish team teaching for all new
courses, with regular rotation of faculty. Provide a dedicated forum for teams to meet.
Maintain momentum: ensure regular dialogue between faculty and change leaders. Ensure that the change is publicly
noted as a priority by senior departmental and university management. Disseminate early successes internally
andexternally.
SUSTAINING THE CHANGE
Closely monitor impact data: continue to collect and monitor impact data for a sustained period. Continue to ag
results, positive and negative, internally. Disseminate successes externally.
Make new faculty aware of the reform: ensure that all new faculty are fully aware of why the reforms were undertaken
and the impact of the changes made. Assign new faculty to experienced teaching teams.
Establish an on-going focus on education: ensure that the new curriculum is not stagnant. Engage in continuous
development that keeps the curriculum at the cutting edge. Establish activities that are likely to engage a range
of faculty. These will vary by context, but might include an engineering education research group, membership of
international communities and/or faculty development workshops.
Be aware of potential issues: during university re-structuring and/or changes to senior management place particular
emphasis on above 3 tasks and communicate the drivers for and impact of the reforms to all faculty.
Figure 11. Recommendations for departments/School wishing to embark on systemic change, based on the study
outcomes
66
Achieving excellence in engineering education: the ingredients of successful change
List of those interviewed
Listed below are the 70 individuals consulted during the second phase of this study, as outlined in Chapter 3. It should be
noted that the additional 53 interviewees consulted for the case study investigations (as presented in Chapter 4) are not
included in this list.
Esat Alpay Senior Lecturer in Engineering Education, Faculty of Engineering, Imperial College London
Helen Atkinson Head of Mechanics of Materials, Department of Engineering, University of Leicester
Angela van Barneveld PhD Candidate, LearningDesign and Technology, Purdue University
Maura Borrego Associate Professor, Department of Engineering Education, Virginia Tech
Mike Bramhall Head of Teaching, Learning and Assessment, Faculty of Arts, Computing Engineering and
Sciences, Sheeld Hallam University
Lori Breslow Director, Teaching and Learning Laboratory, MIT
Doris Brodeur Lecturer and Director of Learning Assessment, Department of Aeronautics and Astronautics,
MIT
James Buseld Reader in Materials, School of Engineering and Materials Science, Queen Mary, University of
London
Ian Cameron Senior Fellow, Australian Learning & Teaching Council and Professor, Chemical Engineering,
University of Queensland
Duncan Campbell Alternate Head of School, School of Engineering Systems, Queensland University of
Technology
Malcolm Carr-West Engineering Education Consultant, MCW Consulting
Jianzhong Cha Chair on Cooperation between Higher Engineering Education and Industries, Department of
Mechanical Engineering, Beijing Jiaotong University
Albert Chow Director of Qualications, Hong Kong Institution of Engineers
Robin Clark Head of Learning and Teaching Research, CLIPP, Aston University
Ed Crawley Ford Professor of Engineering, Professor of Aeronautics and Astronautics and Engineering
Systems and Director, Bernard M. Gordon – MIT Engineering Leadership Program, MIT
Caroline Crosthwaite Director of Studies and Associate Dean, Faculty of Engineering, Physical Sciences &
Architecture, University of Queensland
John Dickens Former-Director, Higher Education Academy Engineering Subject Centre and Engineering
Centre for Excellence in Teaching and Learning, University of Loughborough
Kristina Edström School of Education and Communication in Engineering Sciences, KTH Royal Institute of
Technology
Ng Eng Hong Director, School of Mechanical and Aeronautical Engineering, Singapore Polytechnic
Charles Engel Visiting Professor, University of Manchester
Marco Federighi Faculty Tutor and Sub-Dean of Engineering Sciences, University College London
Norman Fortenberry Executive Director, American Society for Engineering Education
Duncan Fraser Professor, Department of Chemical Engineering, University of Cape Town
Gary Gladding Professor and Associate Head for Undergraduate Programs, Department of Physics, University
of Illinois
Svante Gunnarsson Professor, Division of Automatic Control, Department of Electrical Engineering, Linköping
University
David Goldberg Change consultant, ThreeJoy Associates and former- Jerry S. Dobrovolny Distinguished
Professor in Entrepreneurial Engineering and co-director, iFoundry, University of Illinois
David Good Lecturer, Department of Social and Developmental Psychology, University of Cambridge
Peter Goodhew Director of the UK Centre for Materials Education, Department of Engineering, University of
Liverpool
Roger Hadgraft Director, Engineering Learning Unit, Melbourne School of Engineering
Charles Henderson Associate Professor, Mallinson Institute for Science Education, Western Michigan University
Ron Hugo Head, Department of Mechanical & Manufacturing Engineering, University of Calgary
Brent Jesiek Assistant Professor of Engineering Education, Department of Engineering Education, Purdue
University
Margaret Jollands Discipline Head, Civil, Environmental & Chemical Engineering, RMIT University
Ashraf Kassim Vice-Dean, Faculty of Engineering, National University of Singapore
Appendix A
67
Edmond Ko Director, Center for Engineering Education Innovation and Adjunct Professor, Chemical
Engineering, Hong Kong University of Science and Technology
Anette Kolmos Professor in Engineering Education and PBL and Chairholder, UNESCO Chair in Problem
Based Learning in Engineering Education, Aalborg University
Russell Korte Assistant Professor, Department of Human Resource Education, University of Illinois
Peter Kutnick Professor, Chair of Psychology and Education, Associate Dean of Research, Faculty of
Education, University of Hong Kong
Helene Leong Deputy Director, Department of Educational Development, Singapore Polytechnic
Fiona Lamb Associate Director, Engineering Centre for Excellence in Teaching and Learning,
Loughborough University
Tom Litzinger Director, Leonhard Center for the Enhancement of Engineering Education, Penn State
University
Johan Malmqvist Professor, Department of Product and Production Development, Chalmers University of
Technology
Fred Maillardet Chairman, Engineering Professors Council and Former Dean of the Faculty of Science and
Engineering, University of Brighton
Fiona Martland Director, Engineering Professors Council
Ivan Moore Director, Centre for Promoting Learner Autonomy, Sheeld Hallam University
Angelica Natera Senior Program Development Ocer, LASPAU, Harvard University
David Nethercot Head, Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering and Deputy Principal (Teaching),
Engineering Faculty, Imperial College London
Karoli Njau Nelson Mandela Institute of Science and Technology, Tanzania
Carolyn Percield Director of Strategic Planning and Assessment, College of Engineering, Purdue University
John Pritchard Assistant Director (Institutions), The Higher Education Academy (UK)
David Radclie Kamyar Haghighi Head, Department Of Engineering Education, Purdue University
Teri Reed-Rhoads Assistant Dean of Engineering for Undergraduate Education, Associate Professor of
Engineering Education, Purdue University
Carl Reidsema Associate Professor and Director of Teaching and Learning, School of Mechanical and Mining
Engineering, University of Queensland
Tom Ridgman Director, External Education, Institute for Manufacturing, University of Cambridge
Jose Manuel Robles Dean, Faculty of Engineering, Universidad Del Desarrollo
Lim Seh Chun Deputy Dean, Faculty of Engineering, National University of Singapore
Richard Shearman Deputy CEO, Engineering Council UK
Cheah Sin Moh Deputy Director, School of Chemical and Life Sciences, Singapore Polytechnic
Karl Smith Cooperative Learning Professor of Engineering Education, School of Engineering Education
(Part Time), Purdue University and Morse-Alumni Distinguished Teaching Professor, University
of Minnesota
Deborah Sneddon Deputy Director of Formation. Engineering Council UK
Diane Soderholm Education Director, Gordon-MIT Engineering Leadership Program, MIT
Simon Steiner Discipline Lead – Engineering, Higher Education Academy
Johannes Strobel Assistant Professor, Engineering Education & Educational Technology, Purdue University
Pee Suat Hoon Director, Department of Educational Development, Singapore Polytechnic
Bland Tomkinson University Adviser on Pedagogic Development, University of Manchester
Uranchimeg Tudevdagva Professor, Power Engineering School, Mongolian University of Science and Technology
Faith Wainwright Dean, Arup University, Arup
Jae Youn Director, Global Education Center for Engineers and Professor, Materials Science and
Engineering, Seoul National University
Ng Weng Lam Director, School of Electronics and Electrical Engineering, Singapore Polytechnic
Khairiyah Mohd Yusof Associate Professor/Head of Department of Chemical Engineering, Universiti Teknologi
Malaysia
68
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