Historical Case Studies of Converging Cross-Domain
Fires in Large-Scale Combat Operations
Edited by Thomas G. Bradbeer
LARGE-SCALE COMBAT
OPERATIONS SERIES
Army University Press
Cover image: Soldiers from the 4th Infantry Division’s 2nd Battalion, 77th
Field Artillery Regiment, re a test round downrange from a newly arrived
M777A2 howitzer at Kandahar Aireld, Afghanistan. US Army photo by
Specialist Ariel Solomon.
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University Press
This book is part of The US Army Large-Scale
Combat Operations Series, which includes:
Weaving the Tangled Web: Military Deception
in Large-Scale Combat Operations
Bringing Order to Chaos: Historical Case Studies
of Combined Arms Maneuver in Large-Scale
Combat Operations
Lethal and Non-Lethal Fires: Historical Case
Studies of Converging Cross-Domain Fires
in Large-Scale Combat Operations
The Long Haul: Historical Case Studies
of Sustainment in Large-Scale Combat Operations
Deep Maneuver: Historical Case Studies
of Maneuver in Large-Scale Combat Operations
Into the Breach: Historical Case Studies of Mobility
Operations in Large-Scale Combat Operations
Perceptions Are Reality: Historical Case Studies
of Information Operations
in Large-Scale Combat Operations
Lethal and Non-Lethal Fires
Edited by
Thomas G. Bradbeer
Army University Press
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
Historical Case Studies of
Converging Cross-Domain
Fires in Large-Scale
Combat Operations
iv
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Names: Bradbeer, Thomas G., 1957- editor. | Army University Press
(U.S.), issuing body.
Title: Lethal and Non-Lethal Fires: Historical Case Studies of Converg-
ing Cross-Domain Fires in Large-Scale Combat Operations / edited by
Thomas G. Bradbeer.
Other titles: Historical Case Studies of Converging Cross-Domain Fires
in Large-Scale Combat Operations.
Description: First edition. | Fort Leavenworth, Kansas : Army University
Press, 2018. | Series: US Army Large-Scale Combat Operations Series
Identiers: LCCN 2018033942 (print) | LCCN 2018035484 (ebook) |
ISBN 9781940804484 (ebook) ISBN 1940804485.
Subjects: LCSH: United States. Army--Artillery--Drill and tactics--Case
studies. | Tactics--Case studies. | Military planning--United States--De-
cision making--Case studies. | Military doctrine--United States--Case
studies. | Unied operations (Military science).
Classication: LCC UF160 (ebook) | LCC UF160 .L47 2018 (print) |
DDC 355.4/22--dc23 | SUDOC D 110.20:3.
LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2018033942.
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2018
Editors
Diane R. Walker and Lynne M. Chandler Garcia
v
Foreword
Since the Soviet Union’s fall in 1989, the specter of large-scale ground
combat against a peer adversary was remote. During the years following,
the US Army found itself increasingly called upon to lead multinational op
-
erations in the lower to middle tiers of the range of military operations and
conict continuum. The events of 11 September 2001 led to more than 15
years of intense focus on counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, and stability
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. An entire generation of Army leaders
and Soldiers were culturally imprinted by this experience. We emerged as
an Army more capable in limited contingency operations than at any time
in our nation’s history, but the geopolitical landscape continues to shift and
the risk of great power conict is no longer a remote possibility.
While our Army focused on limited contingency operations in the
Middle East and Southwest Asia, other regional and peer adversaries scru-
tinized US military processes and methods and adapted their own accord-
ingly. As technology has proliferated and become accessible in even the
most remote corners of the world, the US military’s competitive advantage
is being challenged across all of the warghting domains. In the last de-
cade, we have witnessed an emergent China, a revanchist and aggressive
Russia, a menacing North Korea, and a cavalier Iranian regime. Each of
these adversaries seeks to change the world order in their favor and contest
US strategic interests abroad. The chance for war against a peer or region-
al near-peer adversary has increased exponentially, and we must rapidly
shift our focus to successfully compete in all domains and across the full
range of military operations.
Over the last two years, the US Army has rapidly shifted the focus of
its doctrine, training, education, and leader development to increase read-
iness and capabilities to prevail in large-scale ground combat operations
against peer and near-peer threats. Our new doctrine, Field Manual (FM)
3-0, Operations, dictates that the Army provide the joint force four unique
strategic roles: shaping the security environment, preventing conict, pre-
vailing in large-scale combat operations, and consolidating gains to make
temporary success permanent.
To enable this shift of focus, the Army is now attempting to change
its culture shaped by over 15 years of persistent limited-contingency op-
erations. Leaders must recognize that the hard-won wisdom of the Iraq
and Afghanistan wars is important to retain but does not fully square with
the exponential lethality, hyperactive chaos, and accelerated tempo of the
multi-domain battleeld when facing a peer or near-peer adversary.
To emphasize the importance of the Army’s continued preparation for
large-scale combat operations, the US Army Combined Arms Center has
published these volumes of The US Army Large-Scale Combat Operations
Series book set. The intent is to expand the knowledge and understand-
ing of the contemporary issues the US Army faces by tapping our orga-
nizational memory to illuminate the future. The reader should reect on
these case studies to analyze each situation, identify the doctrines at play,
evaluate leaders’ actions, and determine what dierentiated success from
failure. Use them as a mechanism for discussion, debate, and intellectual
examination of lessons of the past and their application to today’s doctrine,
organization, and training to best prepare the Army for large-scale combat.
Relevant answers and tangible reminders of what makes us the world’s
greatest land power await in the stories of these volumes.
Prepared for War!
Michael D. Lundy
Lieutenant General, US Army
Commanding General
US Army Combined Arms Center
vi
vii
Contents
Foreword ................................................................................................... v
Introduction .............................................................................................. xi
Chapter 1
—
“In This Thing With Both Feet”: Eisenhower and
Operation Overlord’s Airpower
by Joe R. Bailey ........................................................................................ 1
Chapter 2
—
Gunners at Cambrai, 1917: How the Royal Artillery
Set the Conditions for the Successful Armored Assault
by Lieutenant Colonel (Retired) Thomas G. Bradbeer ........................... 21
Chapter 3—The Inuence of Electronic Warfare on Operational Maneuver
by Major David M. Rodriguez ...................................................................45
Chapter 4
—
Firepower and Breakthrough in the Meuse-Argonne:
1 November 1918
by Lieutenant Colonel (USAF-Retired) Mark E. Grotelueschen ............ 67
Chapter 5
—
The Division Artillery: Linking Strategy to Tactics
in Operations Desert Shield/Storm
by Major Lincoln R. Ward ...................................................................... 91
Chapter 6
—
The Kasserine Pass Battles: Learning to Employ Artillery
Eectively in Large-Scale Combat Operations
by Major Jerey S. Wright .................................................................... 107
Chapter 7
—
Operational Artillery in the Korean War
by Major G. Kirk Alexander ..................................................................119
Chapter 8
—
US Army Artillery in the Vietnam War
by Boyd L. Dastrup ............................................................................... 143
Chapter 9—Close Air Support and Bombardment Theory: Operation Cobra
by Mark T. Calhoun .................................................................................. 163
Chapter 10
—
Fires and Combined Arms Maneuver:
The Battle of Vimy Ridge, 9 April 1917
by David Thuell and Thomas G. Bradbeer ........................................... 183
Chapter 11
—
The Future of Fires: Dominating in Large-Scale
Combat Operations
by Major General Wilson A. Shoner and Colonel Christopher D.
Compton ............................................................................................ 203
About the Authors ..................................................................................211
ix
Illustrations
Figure 1.1. General Dwight D. Eisenhower and key leaders ................... 7
Figure 1.2. Map of Operation Overlord ...................................................11
Figure 1.3 US Air Force B-17s in support of Operation Overlord ......... 15
Figure 2.1. British Mark IV tank moving through Arras, 1917 .............. 23
Figure 2.2. The Royal Artillery re-plan for the Battle of Cambrai ....... 27
Figure 2.3. Royal Artillery (RFA) 18-pounders in action ....................... 35
Figure 2.4. Royal Field Artillery (RFA) 18-pounder .............................. 39
Figure 4.1. Map of the Meuse-Argonne Oensive ................................. 69
Figure 4.2. Major General Charles P. Summerall ................................... 70
Figure 4.3. US Army 108th Field Artillery in action .............................. 77
Figure 5.1 Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm .................................. 93
Figure 5.2. 1st Battalion, 9th Field Artillery conducting re mission .... 97
Figure 5.3. US Field Artillery Multiple Launch Rocket System .......... 100
Figure 6.1. Kasserine Pass Battles .........................................................111
Figure 6.2. A 105-mm howitzer during the Battle of Kasserine Pass ....114
Figure 7.1. Gun crew res howitzer on North Korean troops .............. 121
Figure 7.2. United Nations operations, July–December 1950 .............. 123
Figure 7.3. US Army 105-mm howitzer in action ................................ 133
Figure 8.1. US Army CH-47 delivers ammunition ............................... 145
Figure 8.2. M107 175-mm gun ring during the Vietnam War ............ 149
Figure 9.1. Major General Elwood R. “Pete” Quesada ........................ 169
Figure 9.2. “The Bocage Country” in Normandy, France, June 1944 . . 171
Figure 9.3. General Lesley J. McNair ................................................... 176
Figure 10.1. “The Taking of Vimy Ridge, Easter Monday 1917” ........ 187
Figure 10.2. Lieutenant General Sir Julian Byng ................................. 189
Figure 10.3. Canadian MK V 8-inch howitzers in action, April 1917 . . 193
xi
Introduction
Thomas G. Bradbeer
The Russian rocket attack on Ukrainian forces at Zelenopillya
on 11 July 2014 was the rst example of Russia’s contemporary
reconnaissance-strike model on display. The strike targeted a
large Ukrainian assembly area where Ukrainian forces were
preparing to uncoil and conduct an oensive. At approximate-
ly 0400 on 11 July, drones were heard overhead; at around the
same time, Ukrainian forces lost the ability to communicate over
their tactical radio network. A few minutes later a bevy of rock-
ets and artillery fell on the assembly area. The result was car-
nage—upwards of 30 Ukrainian soldiers were killed and dozens
were severely wounded, while more than two battalions’ worth of
combat power was destroyed.
1
—Majors Amos C. Fox and Andrew J. Rossow
According to Army doctrine, the word Fires describes the use of
weapon systems to create a specic lethal or nonlethal eect on a target.
2
Similarly, the Fires Warghting function, which evolved from the Fire
Support Battleeld Operating System less than a decade ago, specically
deals with the related tasks and systems that collectively provide coor-
dinated use of Army indirect res, air and missile defense (AMD), and
joint res through the targeting process. Army res systems are tasked to
deliver res in support of oensive and defensive operations to create spe-
cic lethal and non-lethal eects. To accomplish this, the res warghting
function must accomplish three critical tasks: 1) deliver res; 2) integrate
all forms of Army, joint, and multinational res; and 3) conduct target-
ing.
3
Furthermore, res assists operational forces in “seizing, retaining,
and exploiting the initiative . . . and enhanc[ing] freedom of action and the
movement and maneuver of ground forces.”
4
From the evolution of artillery systems such as the catapult and ballista
used by the Roman Legions to present-day cannons, missiles, and rockets,
the purpose of res has remained constant: to be the maneuver command-
er’s most responsive combat arm and by doing so assist the other arms
in accomplishing their battleeld missions. As the Army prepares for the
possibility of conducting large-scale ground combat operations (LSCO)
against a peer or near-peer threat, it must confront the likelihood that US
Army and joint res—especially cannon, rocket, and missile artillery—
will be vastly outnumbered and outranged. Additionally, for the rst time
xii
in nearly 70 years, US and Allied air and naval forces may not have air
superiority—let alone air supremacy—during the opening engagements
and battles of the war. To ensure US and Allied forces do not suer the
same fate experienced by the Ukrainian army in July 2014, we must take
advantage of our intellectual capital throughout the Army and our military
to make up for our potential technological disadvantages in weapons sys-
tems if we are to be successful on tomorrow’s battleelds.
Precision and near-precision munitions with stand-o capability are
at risk of losing eectiveness against adversaries that contest our hege-
mony in the space domain, across the electromagnetic spectrum (EMS),
and through anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) capability.
5
Our ability to
provide exible response and deterrent options to combatant commanders
rests in the aggregated eorts of the greater res community across the
land, air, and maritime components—with varying levels of buy-in from
host nation, regional, and Allied partners.
This volume is a collection of historical case studies involving lethal
and non-lethal res from the period 1917 through 1991 with lessons for
military professionals who will be engaged in future large-scale combat
operations. Though the chapters range from the First World War through
Desert Shield/Desert Storm, they are not organized chronologically. This
will allow the reader with time constraints to read and analyze those spe-
cic battles and operations that strike a specic interest or need. The con-
cluding chapter written by the Commanding General, Fires Center of Ex-
cellence, reviews the future of res and the requirements and expectations
for lethal and non-lethal res to accomplish the numerous and complex
missions the warghting function will be expected to successfully execute
during the conduct of multi-domain operations.
The authors were asked to provide a concise overview of an engage-
ment, battle, or campaign that would be the centerpiece of their case study.
They were to present the doctrine the organizations were using or attempt
-
ing to use, the challenges the leaders encountered with the doctrine and
the operational environment, as well as their actions and decisions during
the conduct of the operation. Most importantly, they were to address the
lessons learned by the leaders in these large-scale combat operations and
how they were applied or ignored. Lastly, they were to identify how these
lessons learned are applicable to US Army leaders today and in the future.
Chapter 1 by Joe R. Bailey, the Assistant Command Historian for the
US Army Combined Arms Center and Fort Leavenworth, examines the
use of airpower during the planning and execution of Operation Over
-
xiii
lord. The focus is on how General Eisenhower overcame parochial and
competing interests between the dierent services and nations to ensure
that airpower eectively supported the seaborne and ground assault. In
Chapter 2, Lieutenant Colonel (Retired) Thomas G. Bradbeer, the Major
General Fox Conner Chair of Leadership Studies for the US Army Com
-
mand and General Sta College at Fort Leavenworth, provides a chapter
on the November 1917 British oensive operation against Cambrai. He
will argue that by using the latest scientic and technological advance
-
ments in gunnery, the British Royal Artillery was able to overwhelm the
German defenders along the Hindenburg Line, enabling the successful
armored assault which followed.
General David M. Rodriguez’ 1989 School of Advanced Military
Studies (SAMS) monograph in Chapter 3 analyzes two mid-east wars—
the Sinai Campaign in 1973 and the Bekaa Valley Campaign in 1982—
to illustrate the impact of electronic warfare on operational maneuver. In
Chapter 4, Lieutenant Colonel (Retired-USAF) Mark E. Grotelueschen,
a professor in the US Air Force Academy’s Department of Military and
Strategic Studies, discusses the US Army’s major oensive in 1918 into
the Meuse-Argonne and examines how signicant changes made at the
army, corps, and division levels aected the way repower was planned
and employed during the battle, resulting in the most successful attack for
the American Expeditionary Forces (AEF) during the war. Major Lincoln
R. Ward, Joint Plans Ocer, Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Afri-
ca, describes how the division artillery can achieve the Army Chiefs of
Sta objective of readiness using Operations Desert Shield and Storm as a
case study to analyze preparations for deployment and the use of artillery
during oensive operations against a near-peer threat in Chapter 5.
In Chapter 6, Major Jerey S. Wright, an instructor in the Department
of Military Instruction, US Military Academy at West Point, analyzes
the February 1943 Battle of Kasserine Pass, the rst major engagement
between American and Axis forces in Africa during the Second World
War. He examines how both the maneuver and eld artillery commanders
learned from their initial mistakes and were able to set the conditions to
mass, demonstrate exibility, and eectively synchronize res to defeat
follow-on Axis attacks. Lieutenant Colonel G. Kirk Alexander is the bat-
talion commander for 1st Battalion, 31st Field Artillery, Basic Combat
Training at Fort Sill, Oklahoma. Using the Korean War as a case study in
Chapter 7, he examines the principles of re support in the defense: mass,
unity of command, and security. He argues that operational success in the
Korean War largely depended upon the US Army’s ability to provide ar-
xiv
tillery support at the decisive place and time to defeat the North Korean
and Chinese oensive operations. He also discusses whether our current
doctrine and organizations can execute these principles against a near-peer
threat in large-scale combat operations.
In Chapter 8, Boyd L. Dastrup, the US Army Field Artillery School
Branch Historian, analyzes the performance of the US Army Field Artil-
lery during the Vietnam War. First and foremost, he argues that the eld
artillery demonstrated adaptability and exibility, most especially with its
shift to incorporate airmobile operations in support of maneuver forces.
He also identies that the Army became too reliant on repower to ac-
complish its missions and that this was not always the most eective way
to conduct operations. In Chapter 9, Lieutenant Colonel (Retired) Mark T.
Calhoun, an Associate Professor at the US Army School of Advanced Mil-
itary Studies, examines the use of strategic bombers in close support of US
ground troops using the Normandy campaign, and specically Operation
Cobra, as a case study. His chapter contrasts well with Bailey’s Chapter 1,
ensuring that multiple perspectives are provided on the role and use of US
and British airpower during the invasion of France in 1944.
David Thuell, a graduate student at the Norwich University, and
Lieutenant Colonel (Retired) Thomas G. Bradbeer analyze how the Cana
-
dian Corps applied new doctrine in the employment of res and maneuver
to successfully capture the German-held Vimy Ridge during the Battle
of Arras in April 1917 in Chapter 10. Five of the six tenets of today’s
Unied Land Operations—exibility, integration, lethality, adaptability,
and synchronization—were displayed by the leaders and Soldiers of the
Canadian Corps during the assault on Vimy Ridge. The concluding chap-
ter by Major General Wilson A. Shoner, Commanding General, Fires
Center of Excellence and Fort Sill, Oklahoma, presents his vision of the
future of lethal and non-lethal res and the critical role they will serve in
ensuring that the combined arms team will win the rst battle of the next
conict against a near-peer opponent.
The volume provides three chapters focusing on battles from the First
World War; three on battles and campaigns from the Second World War;
and one each on the Korean War, Arab-Israeli Wars, and First Gulf War.
The work analyzes the use of lethal and non-lethal res conducted by US,
British, Canadian, and Israeli forces from 1917 to 1991. The coverage is
comprehensive and focuses heavily on the successful use of res in large-
scale combat operations against near-peer threats.
xv
This work would not have been possible without the voluntary time
and work of the authors; they are the experts. The authors are a mix of
active (four) as well as retired ocers and civilian scholars (seven). Sev-
eral authors are current or past Army historians with a signicant depth
of expertise. Some are scholars who have devoted a lifetime of study to
master the sources, understand the context, analyze the breadth and depth
of the subject, and develop a skill for presenting each case study in a com-
prehensible format.
I owe special thanks to the sta of Army University Press for putting
this volume into physical and electronic form as part of The US Army
Large-Scale Combat Operations Series. Special thanks to Colonel Paul E.
Berg, book series general editor; Donald P. Wright for production; Robin
D. Kern for graphics; and Diane R. Walker and Lynne M. Chandler Garcia
for copy editing and layout. Russell P. “Rusty” Raerty, Chief, Classied
Services, Ike Skelton Combined Arms Research Library, as well as Ken
A. Turner and Lieutenant Colonel David M. Ward, Field Artillery—two
instructors from the Department of Command and Leadership, US Army
Command and General Sta School—deserve special praise for their will-
ingness to locate photographs to support each of the chapters, as well as
their cogent advice and recommendations. They have made this volume
better for their contributions. As the general editor of this volume, I am
responsible for any errors, omissions, or limitations of this work.
xvi
Notes
1. Amos C. Fox and Andrew J. Rossow, “Making Sense of Russian Hybrid
Warfare: A Brief Assessment of the Russo-Ukrainian War,” Association of the
United States Army Institute of Land Warfare, Land Warfare Paper No. 112,
March 2017, 10.
2. Department of the Army, Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP)
3-09, Fires (Washington DC: 31 August 2012), 1-1.
3. Department of the Army, ADRP 3-09, 1-1 and 1-2.
4. Department of the Army, Army Techniques Publication (ATP) 3-09.90,
Division Artillery Operations and Fire Support for the Division (Washington
DC: 12 October 2017), vii.
5. Headquarters, Combined Arms Center, CALL Handbook No. 18-28, Op-
erating in a Denied, Degraded, and Disrupted Space Operational Environment,
(Fort Leavenworth, KS: Headquarters, Combined Arms Center, June 2018), 6.
1
Chapter 1
“In This Thing With Both Feet”: Eisenhower and
Operation Overlord’s Airpower
Joe R. Bailey
Multi-Domain Battle requires the ability to maneuver and deliver
eects across all domains in order to develop and exploit battle-
eld opportunities across a much larger operational framework.
It must include whole-of-government approaches and solutions to
military problems and address the use of multinational partner
capabilities and capacities.
1
—General David Perkins, Commanding General
US Army Training and Doctrine Command
In January 1944, General Dwight Eisenhower assumed his new post
as Supreme Commander of the Allied Expeditionary Force in Europe,
the headquarters responsible for the cross-channel invasion of continen
-
tal Europe, also known as Operation Overlord. Among the many prob-
lems Eisenhower encountered was the necessity of making airpower an
asset for the coming invasion. This consumed enormous amounts of his
time, particularly his eort to gain operational control of American and
British strategic bombers.
As the Army implements multi-domain operations into its doctrine,
leaders should look to the ways in which Eisenhower skillfully maneu-
vered these choppy winds and made airpower a viable cross-domain re
that directly supported the cross-channel invasion. To achieve this, the
new Supreme Commander fought to establish eective command arrange-
ments and organization for the use of airpower. He not only overcame
parochial and competing interests between dierent services but did so
while establishing a complex, multi-national command. Eisenhower also
negotiated a complex web of organizational, political, and ethical prob-
lems as the air support plan unfolded.
Eisenhower knew that airpower would be a decisive component in the
coming invasion. The rst step in making it eective meant ensuring unity
of command and bringing all air forces under his strategic and operational
direction. In keeping with his background as an infantry ocer, Eisenhow
-
er had concluded that Germany would ultimately have to be defeated on
the ground. Thus, he argued that strategic bombers should directly support
Overlord’s ground forces for a limited period before and after the invasion.
He disagreed with strategic bombing advocates who argued the primary
2
mission of airpower was to destroy Germany’s economic centers and de-
feat the military capacity of Germany to ght. He also disagreed that their
use of strategic bombing would render an invasion of Europe unnecessary.
2
Eisenhower clearly saw the joint nature of airpower. Although he be-
lieved that the rst mission of airpower was support of ground troops, he
never opposed the strategic bombing of Germany. To his thinking, strate-
gic airpower could weaken Germany and achieve air superiority for his
Allied ground forces. Time and again, however, Eisenhower called on
strategic bombers for operational missions that diverted them from bomb-
ing Germany. In giving strategic bombers operational missions directly
supporting the invasion, Eisenhower established that support of ground
forces took precedence over the strategic bombing of Germany.
After the war, Eisenhower explained his belief in the dual role of air-
power. He noted,
Many ground soldiers belittled the potentialities of the airplane
against ground formations. Curiously enough, quite a number
of Air Force ocers were also antagonistic to the idea, thinking
they saw an attempt to shackle the air to the ground and therefore
a failure to realize the full capabilities of air attack. It was pa
-
tiently explained over and over again that, on the contrary, the re-
sults of coordination would constantly advance the air bases and
would articulate strategic bombing eects with ground strategy,
so that as the air constantly assisted the advance of the ground
forces its long-range work would not only be facilitated but de-
struction of its selected targets would contribute more eectively
and directly to Nazi defeat.
3
Eisenhower and the Challenges of Unity of Command
Eisenhower’s problems with airpower organization and command
structures that threatened unity of command began even before he as-
sumed his position as Supreme Commander of the Allied Expeditionary
Force. In 1943, British planners for Overlord urged the Combined Chiefs
of Sta to decide the organization of tactical airpower for the invasion.
In a message to Army Chief of Sta George C. Marshall on 31 Decem-
ber 1943, Eisenhower bitterly complained about those arrangements. He
pleaded with Marshall, “I most earnestly request that you throw your full
weight into opposing the tendency to organize in advance the sub-echelons
of the Overlord operation in such a way as to tie the hands of the command
and Allied sta.” Eisenhower also noted that he and many of his sta had
learned the dangers of such arrangements during his tenure as Allied com-
3
mander during Operation Torch in North Africa, and he urged the Army
Chief of Sta to let him apply that experience to Overlord’s organization.
4
As he became familiar with the organization of the command he was
about to assume, Eisenhower also found that Air Chief Marshal Arthur
Tedder, a Royal Air Force ocer with vast experience in the Mediterra-
nean, had been assigned as his Deputy Supreme Commander, although
this ocer came “without portfolio [without denite responsibilities].”
On the other hand, Air Chief Marshal Traord Leigh-Mallory was given
command of the tactical air forces although he styled himself as com-
mander of all air forces for Overlord. These arrangements and divided au-
thority troubled the Supreme Commander deeply. Eisenhower’s Chief of
Sta, General Walter B. Smith, told him, “I personally believe that Tedder
should be the real air commander and your advisor on air matters, which
Mallory now considers himself. I don’t think there is a place for both of
them.” Before assuming command in England, Eisenhower took a short
leave back to the United States. After a few days of travel with his wife,
Eisenhower arrived in Washington to meet with Marshall and Chief of
Sta for the Army Air Forces, General Henry “Hap” Arnold. Eisenhower
continued his protest of the air arrangements proposed by the Combined
Chiefs of Sta and also voiced his displeasure at the controversy over
Leigh-Mallory and Tedder.
5
At the same meeting the new Supreme Commander argued that both
American and British strategic bombing commands should come under
his operational control for the invasion. Commanders of both strate-
gic bombing forces, Air Chief Marshal Arthur Harris and General Carl
Spaatz, however, wanted to continue their strategic bombing of Germany,
insisting that this more eectively employed the bombers. Eisenhower
referred to their opinions as “dangerous nonsense” and insisted that the
most eective use of strategic air forces was to directly support Overlord.
6
Eisenhower left Washington for his new command without a satisfactory
solution to his airpower problems. The topic received much attention and
debate over the next several months.
One of the many insights that Eisenhower gleaned from his time as the
Allied commander in the Mediterranean regarding airpower came from the
landing at Salerno. This bloody aair, where Allied forces landed on the
Italian Peninsula and established a beachhead, cemented within the Su
-
preme Commander’s mind that Soldiers on the ground needed responsive
airpower at critical times. This experience shaped his future view of air
-
power organization for Overlord. Eisenhower later stated, “My insistence
upon commanding these air forces at the time was further inuenced by the
4
lesson so conclusively demonstrated at Salerno: when a battle needs the
last ounce of available force, the commander must not be in the position of
depending upon request and negotiation to get it.” He added, “It was vital
that the entire sum of our assault power, including the two Strategic Air
Forces, be available for use during the critical stages of the attack.”
7
Very early, Eisenhower attempted to achieve some consensus on the
consolidation of airpower for Overlord. In fact, the Supreme Commander
began this implementation before he left Washington to take his new com-
mand. Trying to bring the American and British strategic bomber com-
mands under his operational control consumed much of his time. On 5
January 1944, he sent a message to Smith anticipating diculty in making
the necessary arrangements to integrate the tactical and strategic air forces
according to his plan. He told Smith that Tedder should be sent to consult
with Spaatz, head of US Strategic Air Forces, to begin planning for this in-
tegration. Eisenhower was already directing Tedder, his deputy command-
er without portfolio, in matters concerning airpower.
8
On the same day, Lieutenant General Thomas Handy, the Army’s
Chief of Sta for Operations, sent a message to Spaatz telling him that the
Supreme Commander saw his strategic bombers and those of Air Chief
Marshal Harris, his British counterpart, as the “big guns” for Overlord.
Through Handy, Eisenhower asked Spaatz to operate in conjunction with
Harris and his British Bomber Command. Eisenhower had also noted,
“While the above conception has not been ocially approved by all con-
cerned, it oers the only chance of success, and therefore I am condent
will be accepted by everyone shortly.”
9
Nothing, however, could have been
further from the truth. Argument through diplomatic and military channels
over airpower concerns continued for several months. This proved to be
only the rst in a long series of debates that emerged about the use and
control of airpower in support of Overlord.
The Supreme Commander, while uncompromising in his requirements
for Overlord’s airpower needs, was willing to negotiate in order to achieve
acceptance of his plan by the Americans and the British. In a message to
Arnold, Eisenhower stated, “To get what I want, I am perfectly willing to
avoid terms and language that may startle anyone. But there can be no eva-
sion of the certainty that when the time comes, the Overlord Command-
er must have the full power to determine missions and priorities for all
forces.” Eisenhower anticipated little trouble from British Prime Minister
Winston Churchill but was prepared to present his case to the Combined
Chiefs of Sta, if necessary.
10
5
The Air Plan to Support Overlord
Eisenhower directed his sta, under the leadership of Tedder, to begin
a plan that could be presented to the Combined Chiefs of Sta. On 9 Feb-
ruary 1944, Eisenhower told Marshall that the air plan would be complet-
ed in the next few days. He stated, “This plan will not only lay out exactly
what we have to do, with our priorities, but will also x our recommended
dates for the passage of command over Strategical Air Forces to this Head-
quarters. Before I present it to the Combined Chiefs of Sta, I am going to
have a Commanders-in-Chief meeting on it so that thereafter it becomes
‘doctrine’ so far as this Headquarters is concerned.”
11
Eisenhower’s desire to bring American and British strategic bomber
forces under his operational control during Overlord brought many objec-
tions from, not only the British government, but also from the strategic
commanders Spaatz and Harris. One objection that British and American
air commanders had was the appointment of Leigh-Mallory as the Com-
mander in Chief for Air of the Allied Expeditionary Force. Both Spaatz and
Harris remained reluctant to take orders from Leigh-Mallory, a commander
whose experience was with tactical air forces and not strategic bombers.
Eisenhower also experienced objections from Prime Minister Churchill.
12
During this debate, Eisenhower told Marshall, “The Prime Minister was
quite violent in his objections to considering Leigh-Mallory as the overall
Air Commander-in Chief, although this was his denite assignment.”
13
In order to gain Churchill’s approval and that of the Combined Chiefs
of Sta, Eisenhower was willing to negotiate on parts of the air plan, but
stood fast and refused to consent to losing operational control of the Allied
strategic bomber commands. On 29 February 1944, Eisenhower told Ted-
der about Churchill’s objections to Leigh-Mallory’s command of the stra-
tegic bombers and urged Tedder to nd solutions with Spaatz and Harris. If
a solution could not be found, he warned, “the P.M. [Prime Minister] will
be in this thing with both feet.” He explained his conceptual basis for oper-
ational control and told Tedder, “I’m quite prepared, if necessary, to issue
an order saying I will exert direct supervision of all air forces—through
you—and authorizing you to use headquarters facilities now existing to
make your control eective. L.M.’s [Leigh-Mallory’s] position would not
be changed so far as assigned forces are concerned but those attached for
denite periods or denite jobs would not come under his command.”
14
On 9 March 1944, Eisenhower solved some of these problems with
airpower organization. A new directive gave Tedder overall command
of the air forces for the invasion. Eisenhower would exercise control
6
of these air forces through Tedder; Leigh-Mallory would command the
tactical air forces that consisted of the US Ninth Air Force and the British
Second Tactical Air Force. General Spaatz and Air Chief Marshal Harris
directed their respective strategic bombing units under Tedder’s super
-
vision. The turnover of Spaatz’s and Harris’s bombers to Eisenhower’s
operational control would take place after the Supreme Commander and
British Air Chief of Sta, Air Chief Marshal Charles Portal, agreed on
an overall air plan for their use in Overlord. Eisenhower sent a message
to Marshall telling him, “This morning it appears to me the air problems
are at last in good order and will be presented ocially to the Combined
Chiefs of Sta quickly. All air forces here will be under Tedder’s super
-
vision as my agent, and this prospect is particularly pleasing to Spaatz.”
The Supreme Commander also messaged Arnold, “I think we have our
Air Forces pretty well straightened out. As you can well imagine it has
not been simple because of the independent status that so many of these
Air Forces have heretofore enjoyed.”
15
Feeling condent that his plans were moving forward, Eisenhower
was surprised a week later when the British raised objections to the word-
ing in the agreement with the Combined Chiefs of Sta regarding his con-
trol of the strategic bombing forces. Eisenhower’s frustration was evident
when he observed that, “the air problem has been one requiring a great
deal of patience and negotiation.” He recorded in his diary:
In the messages coming back and forth from Washington, a sud-
den argument developed over the use of the word “command.”
The whole matter I had considered settled a week ago, after many
weeks of argument. This did not seem important at the time the
drafts were rst drawn up, but as long as the question was raised
I have recommended to General Marshall that a word be adopt-
ed that leaves no doubt in anybody’s mind of my authority and
responsibility for controlling air operations of all three of these
forces during the critical period of Overlord.
16
The Supreme Commander made it clear that he would have the ability
to give strategic bombers tactical missions in support of Overlord, or he
would quit. Eisenhower was insuring that all military assets under his com-
mand would work to further the objectives of the all-important invasion.
Eisenhower Threatens to Resign
Growing increasingly frustrated by the constant bickering of those
objecting to his airpower plan, Eisenhower determined to wrestle control
of the strategic bombers or to go home. He noted that he would have one
7
more meeting with his air commanders to attempt implementation of his
plan and wrote, “If a satisfactory answer is not reached, I am going to
take drastic action and inform the Combined Chiefs of Sta that unless
the matter is settled at once I will request relief from this command.” On
6 March 1944, General George Patton walked into Eisenhower’s oce in
the middle of a telephone conversation between Tedder and the Supreme
Commander. Patton arrived in time to hear Eisenhower say, “Now, listen,
Arthur, I am tired of dealing with a lot of prima donnas. By God, you tell
that bunch that if they can’t get together and stop quarreling like children,
I will tell the Prime Minister to get someone else to run this damn war.
I’ll quit.” Eisenhower also told Churchill that if he did not receive a total
commitment of the bombers that he would “simply have to go home.”
17
Evidently Eisenhower’s threats to resign did not fall on deaf ears. Chur-
chill, eventually, agreed to the Supreme Commander’s arrangement to ex-
ercise operational control of the strategic bombers. After being informed of
wording problems associated with his “command” of the strategic bombers
and noting that he would resign short of a satisfactory solution, later that
Figure 1.1. General Dwight D. Eisenhower and his key leaders meet to discuss
planning for Operation Overlord. Front row (left to right): Air Chief Marshal
Sir Arthur Tedder, Eisenhower, General Sir Bernard Montgomery; back row:
Lieutenant General Omar N. Bradley, Admiral Sir Bertram Ramsay, Air Chief
Marshal Sir Traord Leigh-Mallory, Lieutenant General Walter Bedell Smith.
Photo courtesy of Imperial War Museum, CH12110.
8
day Eisenhower added a postscript to his diary stating that the chiefs-of-
sta found the word “direction” acceptable, and he expressed relief.
18
Although Eisenhower won operational control of the strategic bomb-
ing commands under Spaatz and Harris, the Supreme Commander still
experienced trouble attempting to perfect the new organization. Many
British and American authorities remained confused about who would ac-
tually give the strategic bombers their instructions. They also remained
confused about when Eisenhower’s direction of the bombers would begin.
On 12 April 1944, he wrote Marshall telling him, “For the past two weeks
all air operations have been under my general direction and although it
takes a little time to get new operational lines completely sorted out where
there have been so many independent voices and authorities, everything in
that particular eld is working satisfactorily.”
19
The problems associated with organizing his air plan remained on Ei-
senhower’s mind for several months. On 22 May 1944, he mentioned these
problems in his diary. He complained, “One of our most dicult problems
here has been the setting up of a completely satisfactory air organization.
This comes about because of the widely scattered interest of the air forces
and the great strength of units that have been acting in almost an indepen-
dent way. However, somewhere about 10 April, a special arrangement was
worked out that gives the supreme commander all the authority necessary
to secure full support from all the air forces in England.”
20
While ghting to gain operational control of the strategic bombers,
the Supreme Commander faced a concurrent argument about how to best
employ strategic airpower to support the invasion once the bombers were
under his direction. Initially, Eisenhower believed that the invasion’s suc
-
cess hinged on Allied air superiority. In his postwar report as Supreme
Commander of the Allied Expeditionary Force, Eisenhower declared, “The
Strategic Air Forces also would be given denite tactical responsibilities
during critical periods [in preparing for the invasion], although their prin
-
cipal mission would be to continue their attacks on the industrial potential
of Germany, with emphasis now placed on the facilities for aircraft produc-
tion. They had also denite tactical responsibilities at critical periods of the
battles.”
21
Eisenhower told Marshall that the Strategic Air Forces of Spaatz
were taking every opportunity to “force the Luftwae to ght, and noted that
Spaatz’s operations were “taking a big toll of the enemy.”
22
To Eisenhower, Allied air superiority was vital to Overlord’s success.
Air superiority allowed freedom of action that enabled the stockpiling of
men and equipment in England essential to the invasion. Secondly, estab-
9
lishing a rm beachhead in France necessitated the Luftwae be weakened
to the point that they could not oppose the Allied landings. The Supreme
Commander recalled, “Quite apart from the direct assistance these attacks
lent to the success of our landings, they were essential also as a prelim-
inary to the intensive bombing of German industry.” Eisenhower once
again exhibited that he supported strategic missions so far as they assisted
in the conduct of Overlord, but one could not mistake that the invasion was
his priority for the use of strategic airpower.
23
The Transportation Plan
Having largely achieved air superiority during Big Week, when the
strategic air forces forced the Luftwae to ght and incur damaging losses
in planes and pilots, Eisenhower focused on ways to more eectively em-
ploy airpower as part of the invasion. In his postwar report on operations
of the Allied Expeditionary Force, the Supreme Commander conveyed his
intent. He recalled, “Until January 1944, the view had been held that the
heavy bombers of the Strategic Air Forces could make sucient direct
contribution to the assault in a period of about a fortnight before D-day.
Further consideration, however, indicated the need to employ them for a
much longer period—about three months—and a plan was nally adopted
which aimed at the crippling of the French and Belgian railway systems
and the consequent restriction of the enemy’s mobility.” This plan became
known as the Transportation Plan, and it called for a large role to be played
by both the tactical and strategic air forces.
24
The Transportation Plan intended to deprive the Germans of the ability
to concentrate troops rapidly in the invasion area. To do this, the Transporta
-
tion Plan called for attacks by the tactical air forces against railroads, bridg-
es, and communications centers beginning two months before the invasion.
The Supreme Commander ultimately hoped that the plan would “hinder his
[German] eorts to maintain an adequate ow of reinforcements and sup-
plies, forcing him to move by road with resultant delay, increased wastage
in road transport and fuel, and increased vulnerability to air attack.” In order
to conceal the actual place of the invasion, however, Eisenhower’s planners
had to avoid concentrating all of their attacks on the invasion area. Instead,
they attacked targets in a wide area and, shortly before D-Day, they began
concentrating their attacks on areas vital to Overlord.
25
The Transportation Plan enjoyed support from Tedder, Leigh-Mallory,
and most of the ground commanders. Like much of his entire air plan, how
-
ever, Eisenhower’s Transportation Plan encountered resistance. Among
those objecting to the plan were the commanders of the American and Brit-
10
ish strategic bombing forces, Prime Minister Winston Churchill, and the
British War Cabinet. Allied predictions of the Transportation Plan noted
that it would kill 10,000 to 15,000 French citizens if implemented. Chur-
chill and the War Cabinet, considering the possible political ramication
for postwar France, balked at this idea and urged Eisenhower to devel-
op another plan. Churchill recommended that the air forces should engage
“bases, troop concentrations, and dumps.” On 29 April 1944, Eisenhower
told Marshall that Churchill’s recommendations were simply not practical.
He noted, “The fact is that any large dumps are obviously located near mar-
shalling yards while troop concentrations are by battalion in little villages.
Any immediate attempt to bomb the German troop units throughout France
would probably kill four Frenchmen for every German.” The Supreme
Commander also noted that there was simply no other way the Allied Air
Forces could help him in the period before Overlord commenced. Eisen
-
hower argued for the necessity of the Transportation Plan.
26
Eisenhower had previously told Churchill something very similar on
5 April. He remarked, “After long study by our transportation experts
as well as by our senor airmen, it was decided that the only preparatory
eld in which our air force could be protably employed, other than its
normal task of destroying the hostile air force, was against the enemy’s
transportation system.” The Supreme Commander also told Churchill that
he simply did not see any other way of eectively using airpower to aid
Overlord, and noted that he thought the estimates of French casualties
were “grossly exaggerated.”
27
Eisenhower continued this discussion with Churchill on 2 May 1944.
He told the Prime Minister that he had taken steps to reduce French civil-
ian casualties during the conduct of the Transportation Plan. These steps
included issuing warnings to the population before attacks occurred and
waiting to attack large rail centers in close proximity to large civilian pop-
ulations at the latest possible date. Eisenhower did, however, indicate that
civilian casualties were inevitable in any operation using airpower and
once again noted that the estimates of French lives that would be lost were
likely overstated. On the other hand, Eisenhower argued that the bomb-
ing of rail centers would inict very heavy casualties upon French rail-
road personnel. Finally, Eisenhower told Churchill that he had consulted
with his sta and found no alternative to implementing the Transportation
Plan, writing that he appreciated “the gravity of the issues raised,” but stat-
ed, “The ‘Overlord’ concept was based on the assumption that our over-
whelming air power would be able to prepare the way for the assault. If its
hands are to be tied, the perils of an already hazardous undertaking will be
11
greatly enhanced.”
28
He explained to the Prime Minister in no uncertain
terms that he understood the political ramications in a postwar world
between France and the Allies if bombing killed large numbers of French
civilians. Eisenhower argued, however, that the Transportation Plan was a
vital component to the success of Overlord and must proceed regardless of
the casualties it inicted on French civilians.
While the British War Cabinet and Prime Minister opposed the Trans-
portation Plan because of the projected casualties to French civilians and
116
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Operation Overlord
6 June 1944
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Widely Dispersed Armored Formation
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KESSELRING
Figure 1.2. Map of Operation Overlord. Map courtesy of US Military Academy,
West Point.
12
the fear of resulting political ramications, the Allied strategic air force
commanders opposed the plan for other reasons. They thought that the stra-
tegic bombing campaign against Germany was of vital importance, and
that it should not be discontinued for the more tactical role of preparing the
French coastal areas for the invasion. Most strategic bombing advocates ar
-
gued that the continuation of Operation Pointblank, the strategic air assault
against Germany, would render the invasion of Normandy unnecessary.
In early February 1944, General Carl Spaatz, commanding American
strategic forces in Europe, and Air Chief Marshal Arthur Harris of Royal
Air Force (RAF) Bomber Command objected to the Transportation Plan.
Spaatz believed that targets under the Transportation Plan were of little
value and jeopardized achieving air superiority before the invasion. Harris
wanted to continue the area bombing of German cities. General James
Doolittle, commanding the Eighth Air Force later noted that he thought
“the Strategic Air Forces could render more eective aid to the war ef-
fort by denying the enemy the facilities he required than by giving direct
support to our ground forces.” In other words, Doolittle thought that the
continued strategic bombing of Germany was more eective than using
strategic bombers as part of Eisenhower’s Transportation Plan.
29
Eisenhower consistently attempted to convince strategic bombing
advocates that he did not want to discontinue Operation Pointblank. The
Supreme Commander had viewed the continued strategic bombing opera-
tions as a way of gaining air superiority by forcing the Luftwae to ght.
Now that Eisenhower had gained the desired control of the air, he argued
that strategic bombers would be most useful in helping achieve the goals
of the Transportation Plan although he never wished to completely aban-
don Pointblank. During his ght to secure control of the strategic bomb-
ers, he told Tedder, “It is equally important that the plan recognize the
tremendous advantages accruing to Overlord through current Pointblank
operations and therefore be so developed that from the very beginning the
air operations of Pointblank and Overlord are completely integrated.”
30
Nevertheless, the objections by Spaatz and Harris continued. Before
D-Day, Harris warned Eisenhower that a temporary stop of the strategic
bombing to assist the invasion would allow Germany, within ve months,
to fully restore its war production.
31
Although Eisenhower made the de-
cision to use strategic bombers as part of the Transportation Plan, he
demonstrated again that he recognized the signicance of Pointblank. In
May 1944, he wrote Harris noting, “I have of course been familiar with
the over-all strategic eort against Germany from the air, but since you
showed me last night the photographs and charts portraying the extensive
13
damage inicted upon the enemy within the boundaries of his own coun-
try, I am more impressed than ever.”
32
After the invasion gained a foothold,
Harris reminded the Supreme Commander of his warning and urged that
the Allies return to the strategic bombing of Germany as soon as possible.
Eisenhower told the British air commander, “I hope I have never left any
doubt as to my desire to return all the Strategic Air Forces to the bombing
of Germany to the greatest extent at the earliest possible moment. I have
been quite pleased, lately, to note the extent which Bomber Command and
the Eighth and Fifteenth Air Forces have been hitting the centers of Ger-
man production. Of course we always have the emergencies of the battle
front, and, most of all, the necessity for beating down Crossbow.”
33
Counter to the Transportation Plan: The Oil Plan
In March 1944, General Spaatz briefed a plan he thought was more
eective than the Transportation Plan. Spaatz’s alternative became
known as the Oil Plan because it called for the destruction of Germany’s
oil production facilities and redened Pointblank operational priorities.
Spaatz argued that the Transportation Plan was not viable. In short, he
believed that the plan included too many targets, and it would take too
long to see any noticeable eects. The Oil Plan, however, would only re
-
quire 15 days of visual bombing for the 8th Air Force and 10 by the 15th
Air Force to reduce the German oil production to 80 percent. Advocates
of the Transportation Plan, however, argued that the eects of the Oil
Plan would not be timely enough to support the invasion. Tedder wrote
after the war, “It was considered that, since the enemy would almost
certainly be holding ample stocks of oil in France to meet the immediate
emergency, attack on the oil industry was not likely to give the imme-
diate assistance which the assault required. It was therefore decided that
the primary target system for the Allied strategic bomber forces should
be the transportation system upon which the movements of enemy rein-
forcements would depend.”
34
After protracted debate, Eisenhower settled
on the Transportation Plan. Now, with his airpower plan complete, the
strategic bombers came under his operational control and Ike settled his
command arrangements with his air commanders.
Airpower over Normandy
On 6 June 1944, Operation Overlord commenced, and both strategic
and tactical air forces saw large-scale use. On that day alone, 8th Air Force
and RAF Bomber Command ew 5,309 sorties and dropped 10,395 tons
of bombs. The tactical air forces ew 5,276 sorties. Targets on D-Day re-
14
mained largely conned to enemy troop concentrations, defensive works,
gun positions, and communications centers.
35
Eisenhower and his sta continued contemplating the role of airpower
after a lodgment was established. On 3 June 1944, Eisenhower wrote that
he envisioned oensive operations moving forward in two distinct zones
of advance, one British and the other American. At that time, he planned
the establishment of a second army group commanded by General Omar
Bradley, which would pursue this strategy. The Supreme Commander
wanted each one of the groups to be supported by its own contingent of
ghters and ghter-bombers. Eisenhower stated, “At that time a certain
portion of the so-called ‘tactical’ air force, that is, medium bombers and
possibly some of the long-range ghters, will remain under the command-
er in chief, AEF (Allied Expeditionary Force). This portion of the tactical
air force will be available to assist either army group.”
36
Eisenhower’s vision for a second army group came to fruition after
the invasion gained a stable beachhead. In addition to the tactical air forc
-
es that supported each army group, Eisenhower continued using strategic
bombers to support the ground campaign. Eisenhower wrote, “In addi
-
tion to the strategic bombing of oil, aircraft, and communications targets,
we were, during the campaign, to call upon the Strategic Air Forces for
tactical support. At the time of the breakthrough in Normandy . . . strate-
gic bombers were employed in strength to attack enemy positions, sup-
ply bases immediately supporting the enemy front, and strongpoints and
communication centers within the battle area. In these instances of tacti
-
cal assistance, the Strategic Air Forces aided immeasurably in turning the
decision of battle in our favor.”
37
One of Eisenhower’s more eective uses of airpower after the land-
ings was its use in breaking up enemy troop concentrations. Before the in-
vasion, he noted in a memorandum, “Because the enemy in great strength
is occupying a country that is interlaced with a ne communication sys-
tem, our attack can be looked upon as reasonable only if our tremendous
air force is able to impede his concentrations against us and to help destroy
the eectiveness of any of his counterattacks.” Five days later, after Allied
troops had landed on the Normandy beaches, Eisenhower noted that the
situation was uid and that added to the diculty of assigning targets to
air assets. He was, however “condent that if weather permits our air will
intervene eectively in any attempted counter attacks by the enemy.”
38
Although tactical aircraft engaged enemy troops, equipment, and trans-
portation, the Allied strategic bombers did not receive another substantial
15
mission until the commencement of Operation Goodwood, an oensive
operation planned in the British sector of Normandy. On 18 July 1944, ap
-
proximately 1,700 bombers from RAF Bomber Command and the 8th Air
Force, in addition to other bombers belonging to the 9th Air Force, dropped
8,000 tons of bombs in advance of ground operations. In this operation,
commanders learned from previous experience and avoided cratering the
ground that ground forces would need to cross by only using ghter bomb-
ers in attack lanes established for armored divisions. They also ordered
ground units to “attack immediately after the air strike in order to capitalize
on the paralyzing eect of the bombardment on the Germans.”
39
Operation Cobra, a breakout attempt in the American sector, includ-
ed plans for massive air support preceding the oensive. The planners
arranged target areas and bombing durations for the various types of par-
ticipating bombers, timetables for the withdrawal of American Soldiers to
a zone of safety, and made arrangements to mark the target areas for the
aircraft. Tragically, despite the elaborate planning, the situation went awry
almost immediately. On 24 July, the day the attack was to commence, Air
Figure 1.3 US Air Force B-17s attack marshalling yards in support of Operation
Overlord, 29 May 1944. Photo courtesy of Imperial War Museum, FRE11844.
16
Chief Marshal Leigh-Mallory was on the ground to observe it. Realizing
that the sky was too overcast for the planned air support, Leigh-Mallo-
ry attempted to call the bombardment o but could not reach all of his
aircraft. Some bombers reached their targets and subsequent accidents
and miscalculations resulted in dropping bombs on positions occupied by
American infantrymen.
40
Commanders halted the operation until the next day. Another bom-
bardment commenced on 25 July 1944. Formations of heavy, medium, and
ghter bombers dropped more than 4,150 tons of bombs in support of Op
-
eration Cobra. Despite further planning to prevent such occurrences, again,
poor weather conditions and human error resulted in short drops that killed
111 American Soldiers and wounded another 490. Among the dead was
Lieutenant General Lesley McNair, commander of Army Ground Forces.
Eisenhower subsequently told Bradley that he would never again use heavy
bombers in support of ground forces, but later changed his mind.
41
Referring later to Goodwood, Eisenhower remarked, “Although only
temporary in eect, the results of the bombing were decisive so far as the
initial ground attack was concerned. Actual casualties to the enemy, in his
foxholes, were comparatively few, but he was stunned by the weight of
the bombing and a degree of confusion was caused which rendered the
opposition to our advance negligible for some hours.” He also noted, “At
the same time, the spectacle of our mighty air eets roaring in over their
heads to attack had a most heartening eect upon our own men.” The Su-
preme Commander said similar things about airpower in support of Cobra.
While the bombardments did not inict large numbers of German casual-
ties, “the bewilderment of the enemy was such that some men unwittingly
ran toward our lines and four uninjured tanks put up white ags before
any ground attack was launched.” The Supreme Commander also lauded
the success of airpower in other ways. He stated, “The closeness of the air
support given in this operation, thanks to our recent experiences, was such
as we should never have dared to attempt a year before. We had indeed
made enormous strides forward in this respect.” He added that “from the
two Caen operations we had learned the need for a quicker ground fol-
low-up on the conclusion of the bombing, for the avoidance of cratering,
and for attacks upon a wider range of targets to the rear and on the anks
of the main bombardment area.” Despite the setbacks, airpower proved
valuable in these operations.
42
17
Conclusion
Eisenhower faced similar challenges in organizing and coordinating
airpower on the eve of the Normandy invasion in 1944. As today’s com-
manders work to implement cross-domain res, they would do well to
study Eisenhower’s airpower accomplishments in support of Overlord.
Airpower served as a valuable, albeit imperfect, cross-domain re in
the period before, during, and after Overlord. Although critical to the in-
vasion, the eectiveness and success of airpower in Normandy was not
inevitable. On the contrary, Eisenhower, in his role as Supreme Command
-
er, engineered the attainment of eective airpower. Through the force of
his personality and experience, Eisenhower achieved unity of command
for airpower operations supporting Overlord and created an organization
ensuring that all components worked toward the same goal. Additionally,
Eisenhower overcame inner- and inter-service rivalries, diering interna
-
tional priorities, and political challenges while deftly and diplomatically
orchestrating his own version of multi-domain battle. Today’s commanders
face similar challenges while establishing cross-domain res, in addition to
establishing multi-domain organizational frameworks. For example, Field
Manual (FM) 3-0, Operations, refers to the responsibilities of a theater
army commander, noting, “These forces are either allocated or assigned to
the combatant commander, who establishes command and support relation
-
ships with the theater army as required.” FM 3-0 also addresses the role of
coordinating cross-domain res. According to the manual, “Commanders
ensure the coordinated use of indirect res, AMD, and joint res to cre-
ate window of opportunity for maneuver and put the enemy in a position
of disadvantage. This is accomplished through the operations process, re
support planning, and targeting. . . . Commanders use long-rang res (rock
-
et, naval, surface re support, and rotary and xed-wing air support) to en-
gage the enemy throughout the depth of their AO [Area of Operations].”
43
18
Notes
1. US Army Capabilities Integration Center, “Multi-Domain Battle: Evolu-
tion of Combined Arms for the 21st Century, 2025–2040,” December 2017.
2. Stephen Ambrose, Eisenhower: Soldier and President (New York, NY:
Simon and Schuster, 1990), 121. Lieutenant Colonel Michael J. Finnegan has
also addressed Eisenhower’s eort to achieve unity of command in “General Ei-
senhower’s Battle for Control of the Strategic Bombers in Support of Operation
Overlord: A Case Study in Unity of Command,” (US Army War College, 1999).
3. Dwight Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe (New York: Doubleday and
Company, 1955), 47.
4. Eisenhower to General George Marshall, December 31, 1943, ed. Alfred
D. Chandler, The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower, The War Years 3 (Balti-
more: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1970), 1648–49.
5. Walter Bedell Smith to Eisenhower. 30 December 1943. The Eisenhower
Papers, 1648, n. 1.
6. Ambrose, Eisenhower: Soldier and President, 121.
7. Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, 221–22.
8. Eisenhower to Smith, 5 January 1944. The Eisenhower Papers, 1651.
9. General Thomas T. Handy to General Carl Spaatz, 5 January 1944, The
Eisenhower Papers, 1654.
10. Eisenhower to Henry Arnold.23 January 1944, The Eisenhower Papers,
1677.
11. Eisenhower to Marshall, 9 February 1944, The Eisenhower Papers,
1715.
12. Eisenhower to Tedder, 29 February 1944, The Eisenhower Papers,
1755–56; Arthur Tedder, With Prejudice (Boston: Little, Brown and Company,
1966), 508–12; The Eisenhower Papers, 1756, n. 1.
13. Eisenhower to Marshall, 3 March 1944, The Eisenhower Papers, 1758.
14. Eisenhower to Tedder, 29 February 1944, The Eisenhower Papers,
1755–56.
15. Dwight Eisenhower, Report of the Supreme Commander To The Com-
bined Chiefs of Sta On the Operations In Europe of the Allied Expeditionary
Force 6 June 1944–8 May 1945 (Washington, DC: Center of Military Histo-
ry, 1994), 9–10; Eisenhower Memorandum, 22 March 1944, The Eisenhower
Papers, 1784; Eisenhower to Marshall, 10 March 1944, The Eisenhower Papers,
1766–67; Eisenhower to Arnold, 15 March 1944, The Eisenhower Papers, 1768.
16. Eisenhower Memorandum, 22 March 1944, The Eisenhower Papers,
1784–85.
17. Eisenhower Memorandum, 1785; Ambrose, Eisenhower: Soldier and
President, 126
18. Eisenhower Memorandum, 22 March 1944, The Eisenhower Papers,
1784, 1786, n. 9.
19. Eisenhower to Marshall, 12 April 1944, The Eisenhower Papers, 1817.
19
20. Memorandum for Diary, 22 May 1944, The Eisenhower Papers,
1880–81.
21. Eisenhower, Report of the Supreme Commander, 9–10.
22. Eisenhower to Marshall, 12 April 1944, The Eisenhower Papers, 1817.
23. Eisenhower, Report of the Supreme Commander, 9–10.
24. Eisenhower, 10.
25. Eisenhower, 9–10.
26. Eisenhower to Marshall, 29 April 1944, The Eisenhower Papers, 1838; Ei-
senhower to Churchill, 2 May 1944, The Eisenhower Papers, 1842–43, 1844, n. 1.
27. Eisenhower to Churchill, 5 April 1944, The Eisenhower Papers, 1808.
28. Eisenhower to Churchill, 2 May 1944, The Eisenhower Papers, 1842–43.
29. Wesley F. Craven and James L. Cates, eds. “Europe: Argument to V-E.
Day,” The Army Air Forces in World War II, (Washington, DC: Oce of Air
Force History, 1983), 74–75; James. H. Doolittle, I Could Never Be So Lucky
Again, (New York: Bantam Books, 1991), 387–88.
30. The Eisenhower Papers, 22 March 1944, 1784; Eisenhower to Tedder, 9
March 1944, The Eisenhower Papers, 1765–66.
31. The Eisenhower Papers, 2033, n. 1.
32. Eisenhower to Harris, 25 May 1944, The Eisenhower Papers, 1888.
33. Eisenhower to Harris, 27 July 1944, The Eisenhower Papers, 2033;
Operation Crossbow was the Allied attacks against German long-range weapons
facilities.
34. Craven, “Europe: Argument to V-E. Day,” 76–77; Richard Davis, Carl
A. Spaatz and the Air War in Europe, (Washington, DC: Center for Air Force
History, 1993), 345–46; Arthur Tedder, Air Power in War, (London: Hodder and
Stoughton, 1947), 108. See also Richard Davis, Bombing the European Axis
Powers: A Historical Digest of the Combined Bomber Oensive, 1939–1945,
(Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University Press, 2006).
35. Eisenhower, Report of the Supreme Commander, 19–20.
36. Eisenhower Memorandum, 3 June 1944, The Eisenhower Papers,
1905–06.
37. Eisenhower, Report of the Supreme Commander, 16.
38. Eisenhower Memorandum, 3 June 1944, The Eisenhower Papers, 1905;
Eisenhower to the Combined Chiefs of Sta, 8 June 1944, The Eisenhower
Papers, 1916.
39. Martin Blumenson, Breakout and Pursuit, The United States Army in
World War II: The European Theater of Operations, (Washington, DC: Center of
Military History, 1984), 188–91.
40. Blumenson, 221–22, 228–29.
41. Blumenson, 233–36; Omar N. Bradley, A Soldier’s Story, 349.
42. Eisenhower, Report of the Supreme Commander, 35–37
43. Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 3-0, Operations (Washing-
ton, DC: October 2017), 2-3, 2-45.
21
Chapter 2
Gunners at Cambrai, 1917: How the Royal Artillery Set the
Conditions for the Successful Armored Assault
Lieutenant Colonel (Retired) Thomas G. Bradbeer
At 0620 hours on 20 November 1917, 1,003 medium and heavy guns
of the Royal Artillery opened re on the German trenches southwest of
the French town of Cambrai. This was the signal for 476 Mark IV tanks to
begin the crossing of no-man’s land.
1
Six infantry divisions supported by
nearly 300 aircraft of the Royal Flying Corps (RFC) were directly behind
the tanks. Their objective: penetrate the Hindenburg Line (identied as the
SiegfriedStellung or Siegfried Line by the Germans) and secure the high
ground that was the Bourlon Ridge to the north and crossing over the St
Quentin Canal in the south.
2
If the British could achieve their objective,
they would capture Cambrai, a critical logistics and communications base,
secure “the passages over the Sensee River, and cut o the troops holding
the German front line.”
3
Foregoing the days or weeks long artillery barrage that had signaled
the start of all previous oensive operations, the British artillery barrage
was synchronized to begin when the tanks and infantry began to cross no-
man’s land. The Germans, dug-in behind the Hindenburg Line, were tak-
en by surprise and stunned by the overwhelming intensity of the barrage
re. The combined arms assault of artillery, tanks, infantry, and aircraft
achieved greater results in one day than any previous British Army oen-
sive operation on the Western Front in over three years of warfare.
The artillery re pinned the German defenders in their dugouts, al-
lowing the tanks to crush the immense barbed-wire obstacles that had
earned the Hindenburg Line its impregnable reputation, and to overrun
the enemy trenches and strongpoints. The British captured numerous for-
tied villages and made an initial crossing over the St Quentin canal. In
less than four hours of the rst day, the British had “smashed” through the
outpost line and two heavily fortied German trench systems, breeching
the Hindenburg Line on a front of six miles to a depth of four miles. The
British Third Army captured more than 4,200 prisoners and 100 artillery
pieces at the cost of 4,000 casualties.
4
The German Supreme Command
was so shocked by the British advance that they seriously considered or
-
dering a withdrawal from the entire Hindenburg Line. If the British could
exploit their gains achieved on the rst day of the battle, it might signal
the beginning of the end of the war.
5
22
When the news of the successful attack reached London on 21 No-
vember, church bells rang out all over the country to signal a major victory
on the Western Front. It was the rst time the bells had rung since the start
of the war in August 1914.
6
Signicance of Battle of Cambrai to Unied Land Operations
Today, military professionals remember the Battle of Cambrai as the
rst battle in which tanks were used en masse in an attempt to break the
deadlock of trench warfare. More importantly, by synchronizing advances
in military technology as well as organizations and doctrine to achieve
combined arms maneuver in oensive operations, Cambrai initiated a
revolution in military aairs (RMA) in 20th Century warfare.
7
More im-
portantly, is the critical inuence that artillery had on shaping the initial
success of the armored breakthrough. Using new techniques and tactics,
in concert with detailed planning, coordination and synchronization, as
well as the re support provided by the Royal Artillery can be found in the
re support doctrine of today’s US Army contained in Field Manual 3-0,
Operations as well as Field Manual 3-09, Artillery Operations.
The use of indirect res, such as that displayed at Cambrai, was the
beginning of what would later be identied as a major component of the
“modern style of warfare” or as noted artillery expert and historian Jon-
athan Bailey has stated, “the advent of three-dimensional conict.”
8
The
doctrine employed by the Royal Artillery at Cambrai would be used for
the remainder of the war and during oensive operations of the British
Army during the Second World War. Many of the tactics, techniques, and
procedures rst used at Cambrai remain an integral part of most artillery
formations in the 21st Century.
9
The Tank’s Baptism of Fire
The British rst used tanks in September 1916 during the attack on
Flers-Corcelette during the Battle of the Somme. Field Marshall Sir Doug
-
las Haig, commander of the British Expeditionary Force (BEF), had re-
quested 150 tanks be shipped to France in time for the start of the Battle
of the Somme in July with the hopes that the new weapon would assist his
force in achieving a breakthrough of the German positions. Only 60 Mark 1
tanks arrived by early September under very tight security. When the attack
commenced on 15 September, only 30 tanks were operational, and owing to
insucient doctrine, were used in small groups to support the infantry as-
sault.
10
The debut of the tank had mixed results. Several tanks did very well
leading the infantry over the German trenches and capturing strongpoints
23
to include the village of Flers. They also managed to induce panic amongst
several German units, which resulted in surrender or pell-mell retreat.
11
In the after-action review detailing the tanks performance in com-
bat, Haig admitted that the tanks had not achieved his expectations but
“had saved many lives and justied their existence.”
12
He then request-
ed delivery of an additional 100 Mark 1 tanks and placed an order for
1,000 more tanks that were to be modied based on the lessons learned at
Flers-Courcelette.
13
Tanks were used throughout the remainder of the Battle of the Somme
and again during the Battle of Arras (April 1917) and the Battle of Mess-
ines (June 1917). In each battle, the tanks provided valuable support to
the infantry. Also in June 1917, Haig approved the creation of the Tank
Corps with its own commander and sta. Lieutenant Colonel Hugh Elles,
an engineer, was selected to be the commander and Major John Frederick
Charles Fuller, an infantryman, was to be his chief of sta.
It was during the Third Battle of Ypres (July–November 1917), fought
on the ooded plains of Flanders, where the Tank Corps suered its high-
est casualty rate and a major blow to its reputation. More than 200 tanks
served in the ve-month campaign and at the end of the ghting with the
Figure 2.1. British Mark IV tank moving through Arras, 1917. Photo courtesy of
Imperial War Museum Q6418.
24
British capture of Passchendaele ridge, the majority of the tanks had been
destroyed by German artillery in the direct re mode when they became
bogged down in the mud forming a “tank graveyard” along the Menin
Road.
14
The Tank Corps received criticism and blame for the lack of its
success in supporting the infantry and the subsequent heavy casualties the
British infantry suered. There were even rumors amongst the British se-
nior leadership of dissolving the Tank Corps.
Salvation and a chance at redemption came from the BEF commander.
Haig, more than most, knew the diculties that the Tank Corps had faced
in the trying conditions around the Ypres salient. In his ocial dispatch
after the battle he provided both a rationale for their performance as well
as a tribute to their eorts:
Although throughout the major part of the Ypres battle, and es-
pecially in its later stages, the condition of the ground made the
use of tanks dicult or impossible, yet whenever circumstances
were in any way favourable, and even when they were not, very
gallant and valuable work has been accomplished by tank com-
manders and crews on a great number of occasions. Long before
the conclusion of the Flanders oensive these new instruments
had proved their worth, and amply justied the labour, material
and personnel diverted to their construction and development.
15
A Tank “Raid” or Surprise Attack?
A month into the Battle of Third Ypres, Elles and Fuller began to ana-
lyze the terrain along the Western Front in an attempt to nd a location that
could best support the capabilities of the new Mark IV tanks. They identi-
ed two critical factors required to support the cross-country capability of
the tank. The rst was an area that had seen little to no serious ghting and
thus was not heavily cratered by near-constant artillery re. This would
allow better tracability for the tanks, as well as the infantry and artillery.
Second, the area must not have a low water table and must be absent of
swampy or muddy ground.
Both Haig and his sta had considered the possibilities for oensive
action against the German positions west of Cambrai. For more than a
year, both the British and the Germans had used the Cambrai sector as a
location to allow their corps and divisions to rest and rebuild their strength
after the intense ghting on the Somme, Arras, and Ypres during 1916 and
1917. Cambrai was considered a quiet sector experiencing little ghting in
the rst three years of the war.
25
After a detailed analysis, Elles and Fuller identied the ground just
west of Cambrai as ideal for the use of tanks. The British Third Army,
commanded by General Sir Julian Byng, was responsible for the Cambrai
sector. Byng had commanded the Canadian Corps when it had captured
the key terrain that was Vimy Ridge during the Battle of Arras in April
1917, and he was considered a rising star for future high command.
In early August 1917, Elles and Fuller submitted a plan to Third Army
headquarters outlining a “tank raid” using 200 tanks whose objective was
to destroy the German artillery behind the Hindenburg Line near Cambrai.
The plan called for a “hit and run” attack that would last no more than 48
hours. Nearly simultaneously, another plan for an attack on Cambrai ar-
rived at Third Army headquarters that called for a “surprise attack” in the
IV Corps sector, a subordinate unit of Third Army.
Though much of the historiography of the Battle of Cambrai gives
Elles and Fuller credit for identifying the Cambrai sector as the location
to conduct an oensive operation with tanks en masse, as well as devising
the operational plan for the attack, it was in fact an artillery ocer, Brig-
adier General Henry Hugh Tudor, the commander of the 9th (Scottish)
Division’s artillery and a leading artillery tactician, who provided the crit-
ical elements of for what would become the operational plan for the attack
against Cambrai in November 1917.
16
Tudor’s divisional artillery supported the Third Army’s IV Corps. He
proposed a surprise attack in which the artillery would not open re until
the tanks and infantry left their positions and began to cross no-man’s
land. This was a new concept for the use of artillery in supporting a ground
attack. In all previous oensive operations, British, French, and German
artillery had conducted days or weeks long preparatory artillery barrages
to destroy the enemy’s trenches and artillery while preventing reinforcing
units from moving into the battle zone. These lengthy barrages prevented
all eorts at surprising the enemy, and in fact did just the opposite, alerting
the defenders to the impending assault.
Tudor’s plan called for the tanks to be in the lead to cut lanes through
the massive wire obstacles of the Hindenburg Line, some of which were
hundreds of yards deep, while the artillery neutralized enemy artillery and
forced the infantry to remain underground until the tanks were on top of
their positions. The most critical factor of Tudor’s plan however, called
for the artillery to forgo registration on enemy artillery batteries and other
important targets and thus eliminate the requirement for a days or weeks
26
long artillery bombardment. Instead they would use “silent registration”
and “predicted re” to achieve surprise.
It was only because of the many technological and scientic advance-
ments within the Royal Artillery between 1915–1917 that allowed Tudor
to be so condent that a surprise attack against Cambrai was both feasible
and realistic. He rmly believed that by applying the latest gunnery tech-
niques and procedures, of which silent registration was but one new tech-
nique, the artillery would re fewer shells but with greater precision and
thus be far more eective than in previous oensive operations. Achieving
precision and surprise would be the two most critical components of the
Cambrai oensive.
General Byng approved “The Tudor Plan” as it was known, on 13 Oc-
tober. Byng and his sta briefed the plan to Field Marshall Haig three days
later. Recommendations from Elles and Fuller’s plan were also included.
Realizing that the ghting in Flanders was turning into another battle of
attrition, Haig approved the plan for an attack on Cambrai and directed
that the Cavalry Corps with its ve divisions be included into the order of
battle with the intent of exploiting any breakthrough of the Hindenburg
Line. When Byng briefed the plan to his corps and division commanders
on 26 October, he stressed the importance of secrecy for the operation to
achieve complete surprise.
The preparation for the battle was immense. Six infantry and ve cav-
alry divisions, along with three tank brigades consisting of three tank bat-
talions each, had to be assembled and organized for what was to become
one of the war’s rst combined arms battles. Additionally, 14 squadrons
from the Royal Flying Corps would observe and direct artillery re as
well as provide close support to the attacking armor and infantry units. A
detailed training plan was developed that ensured every infantry battalion
had at least two days to train with the tanks that would support them. One
thousand and three artillery pieces were allocated to support the attack
with many having to be transferred from the Ypres sector. More than 150
new battery positions had to be prepared and massive amounts of ammu-
nition, of a variety of calibers, had to be moved by train, truck, and mule
to these new battery positions.
17
In short, the logistics for the battle were
herculean and all of it had to be done without providing any telltale signs
to the Germans that an attack in the Cambrai sector was imminent.
As training between the infantry and tanks took place from late Octo-
ber through mid-November, the artillery units began to occupy their po-
27
sitions during the hours of darkness. Haig provided additional guidance
to Byng and the nal plan code-named “Operation GY” was issued on 13
November. In his brieng to his corps and division commanders, Byng
identied three phases with multiple objectives within each phase:
Havrincourt
Wood
+
+
Fire-plan for Battle of Cambrai
20–23 November 1917
0 1 2 Miles
France
Fontaine
Line achieved at the
end of 20 Nov
III Corps
Couilly
Wood
Marcoing
Copse
Lateau
Wood
Bourlon
Wood
La Folle
Les Valióes
Cambrai
Rumilly
Noyelles
Crèvecoeuer
Lesdain
Les Rues
des Vignes
Les Rues
Vertes
Masnieres
Ribécourt
Trescault
Beaucamp
Villers
Plouich
Havrincourt
Flesquires
Cantaing
Graincourt
Anneux
Vaucelles
Banteux
Gonnelieu
Gouzeaucourt
Metz
VIII Corps
IV Corps
52nd Div
51st Div
6th Div
20th Div
55th Div
12th Div
36th Div
56th Div
Exploitation
Position
16th Bde RHA
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
21 Nov
22 Nov
22 Nov
23 Nov
Exploitation
Position
17th Bde RHA
Marcoing
La Vacouerie
Demicourt
Doignies
Boursies
Hermies
Beaumetz
La Pave
Farm
Pam
Farm
Bonavis
Farm
BANTEUX RAVINE
WELSH RDE
Moeuvres
Bourlon
Le Quennet
Farm
Bantaouzelle
+
+
Exploitation
Position
15th Bde RHA
SPOIL
77th Bde RHA
Advance Positions
5th Bde RHIA
Advance Position
16th Bde RHA
First Advance
Position
+
Attacks on 20 November
Attacks after 20 November
German Positions and Trenches
Railroad
Road
Smoke
60-pounder gun
6-inch howitzer
+
N
Louveral
Figure 2.2. The Royal Artillery re-plan for the Battle of Cambrai, 20 November
1917. Map recreated by Army University Press; reproduced by kind permission
of the Royal Artillery Institution.
28
1). The breakthrough of the Hindenburg Position; the seizing of the
canal crossings at Masnieres and Marcoing; and the capture of the Mas-
nieres-Beaurevoir line (the German Second Position) beyond.
2). The advance of the cavalry, through the gap made, to isolate
Cambrai and seize the crossings of the Sensee river; and the capture of
Bourlon Wood.
3) The capture of Cambrai and the quadrilateral dened by Haig and
the defeat of the German forces cut o.
18
Haig realized that the attack required detailed synchronization among
the tanks, infantry, cavalry, and the squadrons of the Royal Flying Corps.
He also informed his subordinate commanders that he would call o the
attack after 48 hours if the attack failed to attain the seven objectives iden-
tied in the plan. Haig believed that if a breakthrough did not occur in the
rst 48 hours, the Germans would have the necessary reinforcements in
place to blunt any further advance in the Cambrai sector.
19
For the combined arms attack against Cambrai to succeed, much
depended on the ability of the British artillery to destroy, neutralize, or
suppress critical targets while providing supporting res to the advancing
tanks and infantry as they crossed no-man’s land. It is therefore important
to review the organization, capabilities, and doctrine of the Royal Artillery
from the start of the war through November 1917.
The Royal Artillery: Organization, Capabilities, and Doctrine
When the war started the Royal Artillery consisted of three branches:
the Royal Horse Artillery (RHA), the Royal Field Artillery (RFA) and the
Royal Garrison Artillery (RGA). The RHA provided artillery support for
cavalry units and was considered the corps d’elite within the Royal Artil-
lery.
20
The RFA provided support to infantry divisions. The RHA and RFA
were equipped with the horse-drawn 18-pounder Quick Firing gun Mark
I, the 13-pounder Quick Firing gun Mark I, and the 4.5-inch (114mm)
Quick Firing howitzer.
21
A well-trained crew could re 20 rounds a minute
to a maximum range of between 6,600 yards to 7,800 yards depending on
which weapon they were equipped with. Divisional heavy batteries were
equipped with the 60-pounder gun Mark I which had a maximum range of
10,300 yards. The RGA Heavy artillery consisted of the obsolete 6-inch
30-cwt howitzer with a maximum range of 5,200 yards. These would be
replaced with the more improved 12-inch and 15-inch guns.
22
The RGA
was organized for use in coastal forts against enemy ships but also provid-
ed the army with mountain batteries of light guns and howitzers. As the
war progressed the RGA attached a heavy battery to each infantry division
29
within the BEF. By the start of the Cambrai oensive, the most numerous
artillery pieces in the Royal Artillery were the 6 and 8-inch howitzers, the
18-pounder gun, the 60-pounder gun, and the 9.2-inch siege howitzer.
23
At its lowest level, the organization of the Royal Artillery was the
battery. By 1917 each RHA and RFA battery was equipped with six
18-pounder eld guns and all howitzer batteries had six 4.5-inch howit-
zers. A major commanded a battery with an additional four ocers and
about 200 men.
24
The next echelon within the Royal Artillery was the ar-
tillery brigade, which was the equivalent of an artillery battalion in the
US Army today and was commanded by a lieutenant colonel. Two RHA
Brigades were attached to a cavalry division with each brigade having two
batteries. By 1917 the divisional artilleries were reduced to two brigades
but contained four batteries, with three 18-pounder eld gun batteries and
one 4.5-inch howitzer battery. Army eld brigades were formed and were
used by the army commander to provide reinforcing res to artillery bri-
gades supporting major oensive operations.
25
The Royal Artillery did not have a corps artillery organization in its
force structure when the war started. Within the corps headquarters the se
-
nior gunner was the Brigadier-General, Royal Artillery (BGRA). He was an
advisor to the corps commander and not a commander. By the time of Cam
-
brai, however, the BGRA was recognized as the corps artillery commander
(GOCRA) though the position continued to be lled by brigadier generals.
At the divisional level, a Commander, Royal Artillery (CRA), also a
brigadier general, commanded the artillery. The CRA was assigned a Bri-
gade-Major Royal Artillery (BMRA) to assist with the coordination and
synchronization of all artillery matters. Each of these positions was creat-
ed shortly before the start of the war and had evolved from lessons learned
from the British Army’s experiences in the Anglo-Boer War (1898–1902).
The major lesson learned from the Russo-Japanese War (1904–1905)
by the Royal Artillery (as well as the artillery formations of the Europe-
an nations and the United States) was the signicant impact indirect re
had on the outcome of the land battle. At the Battle of Sha-ho (Septem-
ber 1904), the Japanese positioned their artillery on reverse slopes where
the Russian artillery or their observers could not see them. From their
concealed positions, they neutralized the Russian guns and devastated the
Russian infantry. They also massed res by controlling their artillery bat-
teries using wireless telephones.
26
Though the Royal Artillery revised its doctrine in 1906 to incorporate
the lessons learned from the war in South Africa and the Russo-Japanese
30
War, stressing the importance of indirect re as the primary form of artil-
lery re, the RHA and RFA spent most of its time in the inter-war period
training to conduct direct re. Both branches of the Royal Artillery learned
painful lessons in the opening battles of the First World War. Using di-
rect re tactics against the advancing German Army during the ghting
at Mons and Le Cateau in August 1914, both the RHA and RFA suered
severe losses to their battery leadership and gun crews.
27
The high casualty
rate convinced senior British artillery commanders they had to incorporate
indirect re as the primary means of engaging the enemy.
With the evolution of artillery as a major weapon system on the bat-
tleeld in the late 19th Century, the increasing incorporation of scientic
advancements and methodologies on artillery systems and procedures was
not fully accepted within at least two of the three branches of the Royal Ar-
tillery. The RFA had earned a reputation of being resistant to change, most
especially with the advancements that science was having on gunnery in
the decade before the start of the First World War. The majority of leaders
within the artillery branch thought that the use of artillery had more to do
with art than science. It was believed that intuition and judgment were two
critical attributes that were more important than scientic advancements
in gunnery for artillery to be eective on the future battleeld.
28
“The RFA did not practice temperature corrections, map shooting was
unknown, and communications were by visual signal, sometimes by short
telephone line, but more usually by megaphone.”
29
The RGA, however,
embraced the scientic advancements. When the war began it was using
indirect re as its primary method of engagement, using instruments to
ensure all of its guns and howitzers were ring in a common direction and
using calculated data to account for weather and maps to attain a more
accurate ring solution. The RGA also incorporated techniques to include
camouage as a means to improve battery survivability.
30
The Artillery-Aviation Team
After trench warfare set in along the Western Front in the Fall of 1914,
the Royal Artillery as a whole recognized that it had to transition to use
indirect re as its primary modus operandi if it was to be of value in future
oensive operations. As part of this learning curve, infantry and artillery
commanders also began to recognize the valuable role aircraft could play
to augment and enhance their own capabilities.
Within the rst few days and weeks of the war in France and Belgium,
the senior leadership of the British Army came to recognize that aircraft
could be a force multiplier. On 22–23 August 1914, the RFC conducted
31
almost continuous reconnaissance missions during daylight and identied
that the advancing German Army was attempting to envelop the two Brit-
ish Corps near Mons Belgium. With these observation reports from the
RFC, Sir John French, the BEF commander realized the danger to both
of his anks and ordered a retirement that would save the British Army.
31
In September, reports provided by RFC aircrew, identied that the
German commander, Field Marshal von Kluck, had left his right ank
exposed. In what became known later as the “Miracle on the Marne,” the
French were able to conduct a counter-attack that forced the Germans to
retreat 40 miles to the River Aisne and dig-in. During the Allied counter-
attack on the Marne, the commander of the BEF, Field Marshal Sir John
French, notied the Prime Minister and the War Cabinet:
I wish particularly to bring to your Lordship’s notice the admira-
ble work done by the Royal Flying Corps under Sir David Hen-
derson. Their skill, energy, and perseverance have been beyond
all praise. They have furnished me with the most complete and
accurate information, which has been of incalculable value in the
conduct of operations. Fired at constantly both by friend and foe,
and not hesitating to y in every kind of weather, they have re-
mained undaunted throughout.
32
During the subsequent Battle of Aisne and the First Battle of Ypres, the
evolution of aircraft continued as a weapon of war in support of the ground
commander. The RFC began to experiment with aerial photography focus-
ing on enemy dispositions and artillery emplacements. The end result was
that by 1916, hundreds of thousands of photographs were taken along the
entire Western Front, and in coordination with Field Survey Companies
from the Royal Engineers, produced accurate and detailed maps that high-
lighted enemy trenches, unit locations and artillery emplacements. These
maps enabled British artillery commanders to accurately x the location
of each of their batteries as well as the locations for enemy targets. Battery
commanders were provided with a specially prepared map known as a
“plotting table” or “Artillery Board.” From these maps, gunners in the Fire
Direction Center applied mathematical calculations to determine the angle
and elevation for their batteries.
33
The RFC in coordination with the Royal Artillery also began to exper-
iment with directing artillery re from the air using wireless. By the Battle
of Cambrai, the techniques for the conduct of aerial reconnaissance, aerial
photography, and directing artillery re had become established doctrine
within both the RFC and the RA.
34
32
Advancements in weapon systems and gunnery techniques
As the war entered its third year, advancements by the Royal Artillery
greatly increased both the range and lethality of its guns and howitzers. In
tandem with better artillery systems, there was a corresponding increase
in the complexity of the ammunition red by the guns. Shrapnel was used
almost exclusively from 1914 through 1916 with good eect against per-
sonnel and barbed wire obstacles but the use of high explosive (HE) shells
was often less eective due to the fact that the fuse often delayed deto-
nation until after the shell buried itself in the ground, and the force of the
explosion was primarily upward.
35
By 1917 this problem was solved with
the introduction of the No. 106 fuse, which enabled a HE shell to detonate
before it hit the ground. The blast went horizontal rather than vertical and
proved to be more eective than shrapnel at cutting barbed wire. Even
better, by exploding above the ground the shell did not create deep craters
that would impede the advance of infantry and tanks.
36
A smoke shell was
also developed to be red by the 18-pounder.
This combination of improved weapon systems and ammunition, the
18-pounder and 4.5-inch howitzer and smoke shell specically, and the
No. 106 fuse, with a plentiful supply of HE ammunition, made the artil-
leryman’s contribution to oensive operations much more eective than in
the rst three years of the war.
37
Other scientic techniques used by the Royal Artillery to improve
its lethality and eectiveness included “ash-spotting” and “sound-rang
-
ing” of enemy artillery batteries. The German artillery used these same
techniques, but the British were much more committed in their develop
-
ment and application. Commanders such as Brigadier General Hugh Tu-
dor stressed the importance of using new and experimental methodolo-
gies to locate and neutralize German artillery batteries and to ensure that
these eorts were coordinated from brigade through army headquarters.
Much of these eorts would be codied in evolving doctrine directed
by the War Oce when it issued a pamphlet titled “Artillery Notes No.
4-Artillery in Oensive Operations.”
38
By November 1917, the Royal Artillery had proven itself to be supe-
rior to its German counterpart, both tactically and technically.
39
The use
of sound-ranging and ash-spotting were so eective that the Germans
feared them.
40
The data produced from these two processes could deter-
mine a German artillery piece’s location to within 15 yards as well as ac-
curately locate the fall of shot from British guns. By using these methods
and by working with the RFC, the counter-battery units within each corps
33
were able to win the artillery duels that took place during the battles of
Arras (April 1917) and Messines (June 1917). The end result was that the
RA now focused more heavily on neutralizing the German artillery and
less on bombarding enemy tranches.
41
Having started the war with a 19th Century mindset, the RA had made
signicant and lasting advancements in the development of its weapon
systems and tactics. Under the visionary leadership of men like Major
General Sir Herbert Uniacke, MGRA Fifth Army, Lieutenant General Sir
Noel Birch, MGRA Fourth Army and Brigadier General Hugh Tudor,
CGRA 9th Division Artillery, the RA had by the nal planning stages for
the Battle of Cambrai proved it was more than ready to assume a greater
and more signicant role in the coming combined arms battle.
Silent Registration
The nal piece of the puzzle to convince the ground commanders (as
well as some of the non-believing artillery commanders) that a surprise
attack was feasible by not conducting the traditional days and or weeks
long preparatory artillery barrage, was the introduction of a new method
for calibrating artillery pieces. The proven technique had been to calibrate
guns while conducting registration re on enemy targets as part of the ini-
tial bombardment but this eliminated any chance of surprise.
Instead, Tudor proposed that every gun and howitzer involved in the
Cambrai oensive be sent to ranges in the rear area before moving into
the line prior to the start of the battle. At the range, crews would ascer-
tain their piece’s muzzle velocity by conducting calibration of the gun
or howitzer tube; this eliminated the requirement to calibrate the gun or
howitzer by conducting live-re and was termed “silent registration.”
Once the guns occupied their positions behind the trenches, critical in-
formation for a target was taken from a map and then a gunnery solution
was developed and recorded to be used when the barrage started. By
doing this, Tudor argued, the element of surprise would be maintained up
until the start of the attack.
42
The Battle of Cambrai
With the mission of neutralizing enemy artillery batteries west of
Cambrai in the opening attack, General Byng had 36 artillery brigades
(battalions by modern standards) plus an additional 16 batteries of General
Headquarters artillery units and 11 batteries from Third Army bringing the
total to 1,003 guns and howitzers to support his six attacking divisions.
Third Army Intelligence identied that the Germans had only nine bat-
34
teries, totaling 34 guns supporting the 20th Landwehr Division, the 9th
Reserve Division and the 54th Division deployed between Havrincourt
and La Vacquerie. The 54th had spent July and August ghting at Ypres
and was in the process of reconstitution due to its heavy losses.
43
The Ger-
man artillery was thus the rst priority on the high priority target list. The
re-plan directed all 60-pounders to re gas on the German artillery units
and then switch to known reserve assembly areas in the villages behind
the front lines. The 6-inch guns were to continue the bombardment of the
German artillery positions until directed otherwise.
44
To prevent German observation of the attack, a smoke screen was to
be red and maintained by the British artillery on the Havrincourt-Flesqui-
eres Ridge throughout the rst two hours of the attack, weather permitting.
The re-plan also reminded all artillery commanders that there would be
no pre-registration on targets and that all RA batteries would use a “lift-
ing barrage,” from one objective to the next at timed intervals, instead
of a “creeping barrage” that had been introduced during the Battle of the
Somme the previous year. The 13- and 18-pounders were to re one-third
shrapnel, one-third high explosive and one-third smoke. Of the 1,003 ar-
tillery pieces providing re support to the attacking tanks and infantry, the
most predominant system was the 18-pounder of which there were 498
at the start of the battle.
45
The operations order also provided detailed in-
structions on the routes and timings to be followed for those artillery units
who were to move forward as the battle progressed.
46
Additionally, for
the rst time in the war, the British also developed a detailed air defense
plan to support the attack. Twenty-eight anti-aircraft guns were deployed
throughout the sector with most of them well forward to provide coverage
up to 4,000 yards ahead of the British front-line trenches.
47
The last batteries moved into their ring positions on the night of
17–18th November. Haig and Byng were condent that the detailed plan
to use tanks, infantry, artillery, cavalry, and aircraft as a combined arms
force would rupture the Hindenburg Line east of Cambrai. The two com
-
manders agreed that with limited reinforcements available to sustain the
attack they had 48 hours to achieve their objectives. After that time, they
realized the German commander at Cambrai would receive reinforce-
ments and these units would most likely determine the ultimate success
or failure of Operation GY.
A thick mist appeared over the impending battleeld on the morning
of 20 November, limiting visibility to less than 200 yards. At 0610 the
tanks, the rst echelon of the 476 that would take part in the battle, with
infantry units behind them, moved forward along a front of 6 miles.
48
Ten
35
minutes later, at zero hour the British artillery opened re, their shells
landing 200 yards in front of the advancing tanks and lifting forward to the
German trenches per the re-plan.
49
“The synchronization was excellent and it was a most impressive sight
to see the hillsides burst into a perfect sheet of ame.” Major E.F. Nor-
ton, commanding D Battery, RHA stated.
50
The British tanks and infantry
crossed no-man’s land with their own artillery re bursting all along the
front with an accuracy that surprised both the infantry and the artillery
commanders. The concept of “Predicted Fire” that Brigadier General Tu-
dor had argued so hard for was vindicated in the rst minutes of the assault.
Haig and Byng had feared for weeks that if the element of secrecy was
lost and the Germans learned of the impending attack against Cambrai, the
advancing infantry would suer heavy losses. In fact, all along the Hin-
denburg Line, the Germans were taken by surprise as the British tanks, in
platoon and company formations, crushed the massive wire obstacles and
breeched the German rst line trenches within the rst hour of the attack.
Field Marshal Paul von Hindenburg, German Army Chief of the Gen-
eral Sta, conrmed that at all levels, the German leadership had been
caught by surprise with the attack against Cambrai. More importantly, he
recognized that the British had changed their strategy by using a combined
arms approach in an attempt to break-through what had been considered
an impregnable defensive position.
On November 20 we were suddenly surprised by the [British] near
Cambrai. The attack at this point was against a portion of the Siegfried
Figure 2.3. Royal Artillery (RFA) 18-pounders in action. Photo courtesy of Imperial
War Museum Q2017.
36
Line which was certainly very strong. . . . With the help of their tanks,
the enemy broke through our series of obstacles and positions which had
been [previously] entirely undamaged. . . . With the Battle of Cambrai the
[British] High Command had departed from what I might call the routine
methods which hitherto they had always followed.
51
Though directed to neutralize the German artillery, the Royal Artillery
destroyed many of the German batteries west of Cambrai. The accuracy
of the massed British guns might have surprised the British command-
ers but shocked the German leadership who later would question how the
Royal Artillery was able to achieve such eects without conducting their
usual barrage to register their guns.
52
The answer lay primarily with the
“Flash-Spotting” and “Sound Ranging” units of the Royal Engineers and
the herculean work the sappers had done to survey every British gun and
howitzer location prior to the start of the battle. The RA was able to achieve
a 90 percent accuracy rate in locating the German artillery positions.
53
It
was a combination of each of these three techniques that convinced Tudor
that predicted re based on “silent registration” was not only feasible but
would ensure that a surprise attack against Cambrai would catch the Ger-
mans unawares and set the conditions for a success unlike anything the
British had experienced on the Western Front up to that time.
A few of the German guns attempted to conduct counter-battery re
against the British batteries but the overall eort was negligible, and in turn,
they were destroyed or neutralized by returning British artillery or by RFC
aircraft searching for the German batteries to bomb or to call for re on
these high priority targets. A single example is noteworthy of the eort of
the RFC that day. In poor weather with heavy fog, four DeHavilland ve
aircraft located and attacked German battery positions on the reverse slope
of Flesquieres Ridge, which was at the extreme range of the British guns.
Flying at less than 200 feet, the four pilots dropped their bombs and then
strafed each gun position. An hour later a reconnaissance aircraft conrmed
the German guns were neutralized with their crews dead around their guns.
54
By mid-day it was evident that the British had achieved a major breech
in the Hindenburg Line. Tanks and infantry were advancing on Graincourt
and Bourlon Wood in the west, toward the villages of Marcoing and Mas-
nieres in the center, and the St. Quentin Canal Crossing in the east while
the massed batteries of the RFA and RHA continued to lay down res on
high priority targets west of Cambrai as part of the scheduled re-plan.
Assigned batteries began to move forward to better provide supporting
res as British units advanced closer to Cambrai.
37
The lone German success on the rst day of the battle occurred in the
center in the fortied village of Flesquieres, which sat atop the Flesquieres
Ridge and so looked down upon the advancing British tanks and infantry.
Two battalions of German infantry, along with several batteries of artil-
lery, which were dug-in on the reverse slope of the ridge, managed to put
up a resolute defense, withstanding several intense artillery bombardments
as well as numerous bombing and strang attacks from RFC aircraft. Most
signicantly on the long-term outcome of the battle, the German units
in Flesquieres successfully halted two British tank battalions, knocking
out dozens of the slow-moving vehicles with 77-mm eld guns in the di-
rect-re mode at close range as the tanks crossed over the ridgeline. Of
concern to the British commanders was the fact that 179 tanks out of the
378 tanks assigned a combat mission had been put out of action in the rst
day of the battle; a 47-percent attrition rate. More than 100 were lost due to
mechanical failures or ditching in trenches with 65 having been destroyed
by German artillery.
55
The loss of these tanks would be a major reason for
the subsequent loss of momentum the British experienced in the subse-
quent days of the battle.
Notwithstanding the German defense of Flesquieres, by the end of the
rst day of the attack the British III and IV Corps had advanced to a depth
of 9,000 yards, captured numerous villages, crossed the St Quentin Canal,
and taken more than 4,000 prisoners and 100 artillery pieces. British casu-
alties had been light in comparison, soldier morale was extremely high, and
a breakthrough of the Hindenburg Line seemed likely the following day.
None of this would have been possible if it were not for the stalwart
leadership of Brigadier General Tudor and the skill demonstrated by the
ocers and men of the Royal Artillery, the Royal Engineers, and the air
-
crew of the RFC. Tudor’s concept for the overall plan of attack against
Cambrai and his insistence on using predicted res to achieve the element
of surprise, as well as the precision and accuracy of the guns and how-
itzers of the Royal Artillery, proved to be the critical factors that set the
conditions for the success the tanks and infantry achieved on the rst day
of the attack at Cambrai.
56
Conclusion
The British continued the attack toward Cambrai on 21–22 November
believing that they had weakened the German forces to the point that a
breakthrough into open country could be achieved with one more com-
bined attack by the tanks and infantry. Then it would be the turn of the ve
38
cavalry divisions to exploit the breech. Unfortunately, for Field Marshal
Haig and General Byng’s Third Army, the Germans proved once again that
they might bend but they would not break.
After consulting Byng, Haig made the decision to continue the attack
beyond the agreed upon 48 hours, with the aim of capturing the villag-
es of Fontaine and Bourlon, two German strongpoints northwest of Cam-
brai. These attacks failed primarily due to a lack of reinforcements and
exhaustion on the part of the attacking brigades. On 27 November, Haig
was forced to use several of his cavalry divisions as dismounted infantry
to repulse local German counter-attacks. Unknown to Haig and Byng and
their stas, German reinforcements had begun to arrive in the Cambrai
area as the battle started, much sooner than the British commanders had
anticipated. With casualties mounting by the day to unsustainable levels,
Haig made the decision to consolidate the gains achieved and prepare the
Flesquieres Ridge for defense. On 30 November, the Germans launched a
counter-attack across the entire Cambrai sector, and in the course of a week
recovered most of the ground they had lost on the rst day of the battle.
By the time the battle ended, the ghting at Cambrai had involved nearly
20 British divisions, a quarter of the British forces on the Western Front.
57
Within the military revolution that occurred during the First World
War, Cambrai is considered to have been the genesis of a combined arms
revolution in military aairs. More importantly from a res perspective
were the lessons learned that would become doctrine within the Royal
Artillery and the British Army to ensure a complementary relationship be-
tween res and maneuver through the conduct of detailed planning and
synchronization for the integration of res. The development of eld ar-
tillery operations, as well as the organizational force structure required to
ensure the maneuver force was adequately supported by res, was also a
major lesson learned from Cambrai that the Royal Artillery analyzed and
assessed for application in future large-scale ground combat operations.
In the rst week of the battle the British had achieved a tactical suc-
cess but they could not overcome the resilience of the German Army and
its response, which prevented the British from achieving an operation
-
al victory. Not until August 1918, during the Second Battle of Amiens,
were the British able to eectively apply the lessons learned from Cam
-
brai and defeat the German Army in France and Belgium four months
later. A signicant factor which contributed to the nal victory was the
role of the artillery whose relationship with the maneuver forces had not
changed but was redened. No longer was the artillery’s primary purpose
the destruction of enemy obstacles or machine guns; instead it was to
39
destroy or neutralize enemy artillery. It could also focus more eort to
the conduct of the deep battle.
58
The use of predicted res to neutralize, suppress, or destroy, what
today is identied as high-payo and high-value targets, as the attack
begins ensures the element of surprise and that the initiative remains with
the attacking maneuver force. The predicted re technique developed by
Tudor would become doctrine within the British, French, German, and
American artilleries before the war ended. It survives today in artillery
doctrine around the globe.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly to the conduct of present and
future eld artillery operations in large-scale combat operations, are the
ve requirements for accurate re: 1) accurate target location and size;
2) accurate ring unit location; 3) accurate weapons and munitions infor-
mation; 4) accurate meteorological information; and 5) accurate compu-
tational (gunnery) procedures, all of which were developed and put into
practice by the Royal Artillery during the Battle of Cambrai.
59
The tasks and systems that are the foundation of the res warghting
function in today’s US Army, specically the delivery of res, the integra-
tion of Army, joint and multinational res, and the conduct of targeting can
be traced to the lessons learned by the Royal Artillery during the Battle of
Cambrai over 100 years ago. The doctrinal concepts of preparatory res,
counter-re, suppression res for gaining and maintaining re superiority,
as well as the inclusion of xed wing air support as identied in Army
Figure 2.4. Royal Field Artillery (RFA) 18-pounder setting up in new position,
1917. Photo courtesy of Imperial War Museum, Q5171.
40
Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 3-09, Fires, and Field Manual
(FM) 3-0, Operations, also evolved from the techniques and tactics used
by the British artillery at Cambrai.
60
The lessons learned from a battle
fought over 100 years ago provide many valuable lessons for today’s com-
bined arms leaders as the Army prepares for large-scale combat operations
in today’s operational environment.
41
Notes
1. Bryn Hammond, Cambrai 1917: The Myth of the First Great Tank Battle
(London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2008), 68–69. See also Gary Sheeld,
Forgotten Victory: The First World War—Myths and Realities (Headline Book
Publishing, 2001), 181.
2. Jack Sheldon, The German Army at Cambrai (London: Pen & Sword
Books, Ltd. 2009), 1.
3. Alexander Turner, Cambrai 1917: The Birth of Armoured Warfare (Ox-
ford: Osprey Publishing Company, 2007), 10.
4. Hammond, Cambrai 1917, 193. See also Wilfrid Miles, History of the
Great War: Military Operations France and Belgium: The Battle of Cambrai
(1948; repr., Nashville, TN: The Imperial War Museum and The Battery Press,
1991), 88.
5. Bryan Cooper, The Battle of Cambrai (New York: Stein and Day Publish-
ers, 1968), 14.
6. J.H. Johnson, Stalemate: The Real Story of Trench Warfare (London:
Rigel Publications, 1995), 182.
7. Drew Middleton, Cross-Roads of Modern Warfare: Sixteen Twenti-
eth-century Battles that Shaped Contemporary History (New York: Doubleday
& Company Inc., 1983), 51. On the debate between Military Revolutions and
Revolutions in Military Aairs see Scott Stephenson, “The Revolution in Mil-
itary Aairs: 12 Observations on an Out-of-Fashion Idea,” Military Review 90,
no. 3, May–June 2010, 38–46; Michael J. Thompson, “Military Revolutions and
Revolutions in Military Aairs: Accurate Descriptions of Change or Intellectual
Constructs?” University of Ottawa, accessed 2 May 2018, http://artsites.uottawa.
ca/strata/doc/strata3_082-108.pdf; MacGregor Knox and Williamson Murray,
eds., The Dynamics of Military Revolution, 1300–2050 (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2001); and Jonathan A. Bailey, “The First World War and the
Birth of the Modern Style of Warfare” in the Dynamics of Military Revolution,
eds. Knox and Murray (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 132–53.
8. Bailey, “The First World War and the Birth of the Modern Style of War-
fare,” 132.
9. General Sir Martin Farndale, History of the Royal Regiment of Artillery,
Western Front 1914–1918 (Dorchester, England: The Dorset Press, 1986), 258.
Specically, the ve requirements for accurate re identied by the US Army
Field Artillery can be traced back to the Royal Artillery’s considerations of the
use of artillery on the Western Front, 1914–1918: 1) Accurate target location
and size; 2) Accurate ring unit location; 3) Accurate weapons and munitions
information; 4) Accurate meteorological information; and 5) Accurate computa-
tional procedures. See Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 3-09, Field
Artillery Operations (Washington, DC: 4 April 2014), 1-41.
10. J.P. Harris, Men, Ideas and Tanks: British Military Thought and Ar-
moured Forces, 1903–1939 (Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press,
1995), 62–67.
42
11. Kenneth Macksey, Tank versus Tank: The Illustrated Story of Armored
Battleeld Conict in the Twentieth Century (New York: Crescent Books,
1991), 16.
12. Harris, Men, Ideas and Tanks, 67.
13. Harris, 66–67. See also Gary Sheeld and John Bourne, eds., Douglas
Haig: War Diaries and Letters 1914–1918 (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson,
2005), 229–31.
14. Bryan Cooper, The Ironclads of Cambrai (New York: Stein and Day
Publishers, 1968), 58.
15. Cooper, 60.
16. The most prominent exceptions include: Farndale, History of the Royal
Regiment, 216; Harris, Men, Ideas and Tanks, 108; Turner, Cambrai 1917; Ham-
mond, Cambrai 1917.
17. Hammond, Cambrai 1917, 66.
18. Hammond, 78.
19. Hammond, 78.
20. Dale Clarke, British Artillery 1914–19 (Oxford: Osprey Publishing,
2004), 3–4.
21. The principle of Quick-Firing or QF meant that the artillery piece had
a hydrostatic buer and recuperator system that absorbed the recoil after the
weapon red. The piece returned to its original ring position while the carriage
remained stationary and the gun remained aligned on its target. Just as import-
ant, Quick-Firing also enabled an increased rate of aimed re because of the
gun’s stability. The rst artillery piece to possess this system was the French
75-mm eld gun introduced in 1897 that became the mainstay artillery weapon
of the French Army in the First World War.
22. Farndale, History of the Royal Regiment, 1.
23. In the Royal Artillery, guns were identied by the weight of their projec-
tile e.g. 18-pounder. Howitzers were identied by the diameter of their projectile
in inches (4.5-inch).
24. Clarke, British Artillery 1914–19, 8–9.
25. Clarke, British Artillery 1914–19, 9–10.
26. Shelford Bidwell and Dominick Graham, Fire Power: British Army
Weapons and Theories of War 1904-1945 (London: George Allen & Unwin
Publishers Ltd., 1982), 10. See also Boyd L. Dastrup, King of Battle: A Branch
History of the US Army’s Field Artillery (Fort Monroe, VA: United States Army
Training and Doctrine Command, 1993), 148.
27. Hammond, Cambrai 1917, 30. At Le Cateau the RHA and RFA had 38
guns captured and most of these gun crews were killed, wounded, or captured.
Noted Royal Artillery historian, General Sir Martin Farndale would state that
“Le Cateau was an artillery battle fought with 20th Century weapons by men
used to 19th Century methods.”
28. Paddy Grith, ed., British Fighting Methods in the Great War (London:
Frank Cass, 1996), 24.
29. Grith, 24.
43
30. Grith, 24.
31. Air Historical Branch, The Royal Air Force in the Great War (1936,
Reprint, London: Department of Printed Books, The Imperial War Museum,
1996), 25.
32. Air Historical Branch, 26
33. Hammond, Cambrai 1917, 34.
34. The BEF General Sta produced numerous pamphlets during the war
that incorporated lessons learned from each battle. In December 1916, a month
after the end of the Battle of the Somme, the General Sta issued “Co-Opera-
tion of Aircraft with Artillery.” The pamphlet addressed command and control
issues as well as best practices for directing artillery from the air. The principles
identied evolved into accepted doctrine by both the RFC and the RA for the
remainder of the war.
35. Paddy Grith, Battle Tactics of the Western Front: The British Army’s
Art of Attack 1916–1918 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994), 139–40.
36. Grith, 139–40.
37. In 1915, the Royal Artillery suered a major shortage of ammunition,
which resulted in the “Shell Scandal” that nearly brought down the British gov-
ernment.
38. Farndale, History of the Royal Regiment, 158.
39. Grith, ed., British Fighting Methods, 35. See also Bidwell and Gra-
ham, Fire Power, 110.
40. Bidwell and Graham, Fire Power, 110.
41. Bidwell and Graham, 110.
42. Hammond, Cambrai 1917, 67–68.
43. Hammond, 105. See also Farndale, History of the Royal Regiment, 218.
44. Farndale, History of the Royal Regiment, 219.
45. Turner, Cambrai 1917, 29.
46. Hammond, Cambrai 1917, 216–21.
47. Farndale, History of the Royal Regiment, 219.
48. Of the 476 Mark IV tanks involved in the Battle of Cambrai, 378 were
considered Fighting Tanks organized in nine battalions of 42 tanks each. Fif-
ty-four tanks were to serve as supply tanks towing sledges with additional fuel
and ammunition to resupply the ghting tanks. Thirty-two were given the mission
of pulling the barbed-wire obstacles away after the lead echelon of tanks crushed
the obstacle belts. An additional nine tanks were assigned as wireless communi-
cation vehicles to assist with command and control (one per tank battalion), and
the remaining tank was assigned the task of carrying telephone cable from Third
Army Headquarters to assist in keeping the higher headquarters informed of what
was occurring on the front lines of the attack. Wilfrid Miles, The Ocial History
of Military Operations in France and Belgium, 1917, Volume 3: The Battle of
Cambrai (London, His Majesty’s Stationery Oce, 1948), 28.
49. Anthony Livesey, Great Battles of World War I (New York: MacMillan
Publishing Company, 1989), 149.
50. Farndale, History of the Royal Regiment, 222.
44
51. Field Marshal von Hindenburg, The Great War, Charles Messenger, ed.
(London: Greenhill Book, 2006), 156. See also Sheldon, The German Army at
Cambrai, 303. Crown Prince Rupprecht, commander of Bavaria’s Army Group
in the Cambrai sector stated “The [British] oensive achieved complete surprise.
. . . Our forces discounted the imminence of a major oensive because there had
not been any increase in artillery re. . . . Without a heavy artillery bombard-
ment it seemed that an attack could be ruled out completely.”
52. Sheldon, The German Army at Cambrai, 312.
53. Farndale, History of the Royal Regiment, 222.
54. Hammond, Cambrai 1917, 124–25.
55. Cooper, The Ironclads of Cambrai, 135.
56. John Pimlott, ed. The Hutchinson Atlas of Battle Plans: Before and After
(Oxford: Helicon Publishing, 1998), 56–57.
57. Pimlott, ed., 62.
58. Jonathan A. Bailey, “British Artillery in the Great War,” in British Fight-
ing Methods in the Great War, 37–38.
59. Department of the Army, FM 3-09, 1-41–1-44.
60. Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 3-0, Operations (Washing-
ton DC: October 2017), 2-45–2-47.
45
Chapter 3
The Inuence of Electronic Warfare on Operational Maneuver
*
Major David M. Rodriguez
Editor’s Introduction: Field Manual (FM) 3-0, Operations (2017),
is the capstone doctrine on unied land operations describing how Army
forces—as part of a joint team—will shape operational environments, pre-
vent conict, conduct large-scale ground combat, and consolidate gains
against a peer threat. Though then-Major Rodriguez wrote this monograph
on the inuence of electronic warfare on operational maneuver nearly 30
years ago, the information is still relevant today and will be in the future
as well. Technology and its applications for the conduct of warghting is
changing at an ever-expanding rate. The challenge that military profes-
sionals face for adapting to and incorporating emerging technologies has
and will be dicult. Rodriguez’ analysis of how technological advance-
ments in the area of electronic warfare inuenced military operations in the
1973 and 1982 mid-east wars between Israel and several near peer threats,
provides us a historical case study on a critical topic for Army leaders to
study and learn from. When the next conict starts, the US Army may be at
a disadvantage in the area of electronic warfare. Our adversaries will use
cyberspace and electronic warfare to support their military operations. To
mitigate this threat, the US Army will rely on both cyberspace and elec
-
tronic warfare counter-measures as well as the best means to use our own
oensive capabilities to assist in the defeat of a peer or near-peer threat.
Electronic warfare is a eld where technology improves
capabilities
rapidly.
Warfare in the electromagnetic spectrum began in World War I
with rudimentary
communication interceptions.
It has progressed with
such speed from then to now, that an argument can be made that
the ef
-
fect may be decisive.
Chris Bellamy emphasizes that the 1982 Opera
-
tion Peace for Galilee, “was not the rst war in which electronic war-
fare featured prominently, but it demonstrated how electronic weaponry
has become pivotal on the modern battleeld.”
1
The dramatic increase
in technological capability to inuence war creates the current dynamic
environment of electronic warfare.
The inuence of electronic warfare is felt through the three levels of
war: strategic, operational, and tactical. This chapter limits the analysis to
the operational level of war, specically, the inuence of electronic war-
fare on operational maneuver. The purpose of the chapter is to determine
46
how exploitation of electronic warfare capabilities support operational
maneuver by ground forces to the operational depth of an opposing force.
The importance of the operational level of war in our doctrine was
reintroduced in the 1982 Field Manual (FM) 100-5, Operations, and re-
armed in the 1986 version. Operational maneuver is a major part of the
operational level of war.
Its purpose is
to seek a decisive impact on the
campaign by gaining advantage of position to exploit tactical success to
achieve theater objectives.
2
The Sinai Campaign in 1973 and the Bekaa Valley Campaign in 1982
are historical experiences analyzed to illustrate the impact of electronic
warfare technology on operational maneuver. These experiences in the
Middle East indicate that electronic warfare signicantly enhances the
ability to execute operational maneuver. However, it is evident that the
risk of conducting an operational deep attack with maneuver forces is con-
sidered high because of survivability and sustainability issues.
After evaluating these historical examples, this paper will analyze fu-
ture operational concepts designed to win control of the electromagnetic
spectrum. The impact these concepts have on the ability to execute deep
maneuver will be examined. The increasing relevance of electronic war-
fare on future operations is included.
The Theory of Operational Maneuver and Its Relation
to Current Doctrine
The theory and importance of operational maneuver can be traced to
the military theorist, Antione-Henry Jomini. He denes two types of de-
cisive points: geographical objective points and objective points of ma-
neuver. Both points, if attained, can lead to operational results. Objective
points of maneuver are the basis for operational maneuver.
3
The geographic objective point may be dened as: “an important for-
tress, the line of a river, a front of operations which aords good lines of
defense or good points of support for ulterior enterprises.”
4
Jomini further
states that during oensive action, the geographical objective point is ter-
rain which, if possessed by the attacker, will compel the enemy to make
peace.
5
Compelling the enemy to make peace is one eect that can be
attained by operational maneuver.
The other objective point is the objective point of maneuver. “Objec-
tive points of maneuver, in contradistinction to geographical points of ma-
neuver, derive their importance from, and their positions depend upon, the
47
situation of the hostile masses.”
6
Jomini goes on to discuss the objective
points of maneuver as points which relate to the destruction of the enemy
army.
7
Thus, destruction of the enemy army is also an eect attained by
operational maneuver.
The operational eects can therefore be dened as those that have a
decisive impact on major operations or a campaign.
According to Jomi-
ni, the two methods of
attaining this are seizure of a piece of terrain that
compels the enemy to make peace and destruction of the enemy army.
The results therefore correspond to a given
time and location relative to
the enemy in terms of ability to force him to make peace due to positional
disadvantage or loss of a major portion of its army.
Tracing Jomini’s concepts to FM 100-5 (1986 edition) will illustrate
his inuence on current and future doctrine. FM 100-5 states: “Operational
maneuver seeks a decisive impact on the conduct of a campaign.
It attempts
to gain advantage of
position before battle and to exploit tactical successes
to achieve operational results.”
8
The decisive impact and operational re
-
sults equate with Jomini’s discussion relating to operational eects.
Another example of the operational eect of maneuver is the actual
defeat of an enemy. Eective maneuver “continually poses new problems
for the enemy, renders his reaction ineective, and eventually leads to his
defeat.”
9
This technique also illustrates a means of producing an opera-
tional eect. The ability to conduct operational maneuver on the modern
battleeld demands tremendous coordination of eort. “
Leaders com-
bine maneuver, repower, and
protection capabilities available to them in
countless combinations appropriate to the situation.”
10
As situations become more complex due to the rapidly changing en-
vironment of modern war, the commander’s ability to conduct operation
maneuver is critical. The importance of repower to operational maneu-
ver is clearly stated in FM 100-5. Firepower supports friendly operational
maneuver by damaging key enemy forces or facilities, creating delays in
enemy movement, complicating the enemy’s command and control, and
degrading his artillery, air defense, and air support. At the operational lev-
el, repower can also disrupt the movement, re support, command and
control, and sustainment of enemy forces.
11
Oensive electronic warfare enhances the repower eect by disrupt-
ing movement, re support, command and control, and sustainment of
enemy forces.
12
Electronic warfare used in conjunction with repower is
a large contributor to the tremendous eects all repower can have while
•
48
supporting operational maneuver.
Electronic warfare support
to the re-
power dynamic is increasing in importance on the modern battleeld and
will continue to increase in the future.
13
Protection is another dynamic of combat power that is integral to op-
erational maneuver. FM 100-5 explains: “They (operational commanders)
protect the force from operational level maneuver and concentrated air
support. Air superiority operations, theater wide air defense systems and
protection of air bases are important activities associated with maximizing
combat power.”
14
Electronic warfare is a major player in each of these areas. The in-
creasing role of ground based missiles in air defense roles is becoming
a technological battle for control of the electromagnetic spectrum. The
rapidly changing technological capabilities of electronic warfare systems
make this battle for protection of the maneuver force a question of who
possesses the latest technology and
can eectively employ it.
The import-
ant role electronic warfare has in support of operational maneuver will be
the framework for the remainder of the paper.
Electronic Warfare Doctrine
FM 100-5 clearly species the purpose of electronic warfare: “Elec-
tronic warfare uses the electronic spectrum to deceive the enemy, locate
his units and facilities, intercept his communications, and disrupts his
command, control, and target acquisition systems at critical moments.”
15
FM 100-6 goes somewhat further by establishing the electromagnetic
spectrum, “electronic warfare is military action to determine, exploit, re-
duce, or prevent hostile use of the electromagnetic spectrum.”
16
The sta responsibility for the conduct of electronic warfare is as-
signed to the operations ocer and the communications ocer. FM 100-
5 declares: “The G-3 or S-3 has the overall responsibility for electronic
warfare, but focuses his primary eort on oensive electronic warfare.
The G-2 or S-2 develops targets for interception jamming or destruction.
The communications electronics ocer manages defensive electronic
warfare.”
17
This methodology divides responsibility between oensive
and defensive missions among dierent sta sections. Electronic warfare
directly supports the commander’s concept of the operation.
FM 100-5
states electronic
warfare assets should be integrated by the command-
er into his concept of operation.
FM 100-5 emphasizes:
“Commanders
should treat electronic warfare assets much as he treats artillery assets.
Electronic warfare is conducted concurrently at both the operational and
tactical levels, and these eorts must be synchronized with each other and
49
with other activities—maneuver, re, and air support to obtain maximum
benet.”
18
Thus our doctrine places a heavy emphasis on electronic war-
fare as one of the elements of combat power.
The defensive application of electronic warfare includes electronic
counter-countermeasures (ECCM) and electronic warfare countermea-
sures (ECM). ECCM are passive measures to protect command, control,
and communications
(C3) systems against enemy activities.
ECM can be
used to transmit through enemy jamming or jam enemy signal intelligence
systems to screen and prevent enemy intercept.
19
The oensive components of electronic warfare are electronic sup-
port measures (ESM) and active electronic
countermeasures CECM).
ESM provides information for jamming, deception, targeting, and tactical
employment of
combat forces.
ECM is a nonlethal attack of the enemy’s
command, control, and communication systems.
20
Electronic warfare is an important player in deception activities:
“Careful integration of electronic deception with visual, sonic, and olfac-
tory actions is critical to the successful projection of a deception story.”
21
Electronic deception uses either manipulative electronic
deception (MED)
or imitative electronic deception.
MED is the passing of false data among
friendly forces to deceive
enemy signal intelligence capabilities.
Imitative
electronic deception is the imitation of the enemy’s own electromagnetic
radiation to deceive or confuse them.
22
Due to the distinctive mission, scarce equipment resources and train-
ing problems, an integrated concept for electronic warfare employment
is dicult to implement. FM 100-5 puts electronic warfare concepts in
the current perspective: “plans should reect the relative scarcity of elec-
tronic warfare weapons, their limitations, and the transient nature of their
eects.”
23
This transient nature of eects may or may not be true when
considered in an integrated concept.
The transient eects can be turned
into permanent eects when combined with maneuver, repower, protec-
tion, and intelligence. Control of the electromagnetic spectrum is a new
mission. The services are like any large organization when it comes to
assimilating changes, so the changes come slowly. The scarce equipment
resources make it dicult to train and learn the dicult art of coordinating
the eects of electronic warfare systems.
Lessons from the 1973 Mideast War
The origins of the 1973 war can be traced to the 1967 war.
The defeat
of Egypt and subsequent occupation of the
Sinai by Israel were unaccept-
50
able to the Egyptians.
Egypt
prepared to regain the lost territory as soon
as possible.
During the time between the 1967 and 1973 wars, Egypt had to nd
an answer to the superiority of the Israeli Air Force.
Contrastingly, the
Israelis believed that: “
Having learned the lessons of the 1967 war, the
Egyptians would not embark upon a new war until they felt capable of
striking at Israeli airelds and neutral using the Israeli air force.”
24
However, assistance came from the Soviet Union in the form of mod-
ernized equipment. Modernization of Egyptian equipment began in 1970
to oset the Israeli Air Force’s air superiority.
The new equipment in
-
cluded more air
superiority aircraft and, more importantly, surface to air
missiles and electronic equipment:
Through February and March (1970), in great secrecy their (Sovi-
et) men and equipment began to arrive: 80 MIG-21 interceptors;
27 battalions of surface to air missiles (SAMS); banks of electron-
ic equipment to counter that carried aboard the enemy intruders
(Israeli); four MIG-25 high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft and
the crews to man them.
25
This is the rst time that air superiority was countered by anything but
more aircraft. The Israeli Air Force was to be dealt with by the creation
of one of the densest missile “walls” in the world, composed of a mixture
of various types of Soviet ground to air missiles SAM-3, and SAM-6,
in addition to conventional anti-aircraft weapons, which would provide
an eective umbrella over the planned area of operations along the Suez
Canal. This would to a very considerable degree neutralize the eects of
Israeli air superiority over the immediate eld of battle.
26
The Egyptian
ability to neutralize the Israeli Air Force was the goal for acquiring new
equipment from 1970–1973.
Due to the equipment and the primary coverage area of the ADA um-
brella, the Egyptian air defense system was defensively oriented:
For static defense they might prove adequate (though we still did
not have SAM batteries to protect every target), but they could
provide no air cover for an oensive operation especially over the
open landscape of the Sinai.
27
The Egyptians understood the defensive orientation but were limited in
what they could resource.
The important thing
was to establish an area
in which they possessed the freedom to move equipment, arms and men.
This enabled them
to concentrate forces prior to the battle with little to
51
no interference by the Israelis.
This also allowed them to
achieve surprise
when the attack commenced.
The ability to concentrate undetected enhances the ability of a force to
execute operational maneuver.
Though
the Egyptians did not conduct an
operational deep attack, they did establish a relatively safe area to mass:
We had guessed that they (Israelis) would try to knock out our
SAM radars, which were set back some ten miles west of the canal
by using strike air to ground missiles . . . we had devised electron-
ic means of countering strike and were quite keen to test them . .
. the missiles fell hopelessly short. Clearly we were beginning to
establish a cordon sanitaire east of the canal too.
28
This cordon sanitaire became a safe area in which to move, mass, and
support major maneuver forces.
Engagements which subsequently occurred between the Egyptian air
defense systems and the Israeli Air Force point out the eectiveness of
modern electronic warfare. After the initial engagements it was becom-
ing clear “that victory in any such conict would go to whoever happened
to have the more sophisticated electronic detection, jamming, and count
-
er-jamming devices.”
29
The level of sophistication and the new employment
methods enabled the Egyptians to gain surprise and the early advantage.
The Israelis were basically caught unprepared the rst day of the war:
Poor electronic intelligence before the war left the Israeli Air
Force unprepared and it sustained heavy losses in the rst few
days. However, it then quickly managed to develop countermea-
sures to suppress the radar, which controlled most of the air de-
fense systems.
30
It was in the interim between the Israeli’s initial surprise and their count-
er-reaction that Egypt was able to tactically maneuver forces successfully.
The Egyptians, through the use of a missile umbrella supported with
heavy electronic warfare assets, had established a limited zone of con
-
trol where they could maneuver. Later, when the Egyptians attempted to
maneuver outside of this zone, the Israeli Air Force and armored forces
enjoyed success. “That they (Egyptians) had been justied in limiting
themselves to the area covered by the missile umbrella was proved to
them when the Israeli Air Force twice destroyed their advancing forces
pushing southwards along the Gulf of Suez.”
31
This example illustrates
a strong link between air superiority
operations and ability to maneuver.
52
The Israeli Air Force was not the only beneciary of the turning tide in
the air and missile war:
On the west bank of the Suez Canal, an unusual example of mu-
tual coordination emerged between the advance of ground-forces
and the Israeli Air Force. As the armored forces on the west bank
of the canal destroyed one surface-to-air missile battery after an-
other, the Israeli Air Force gained a freer hand and became a major
factor in supporting the advancing Israeli forces.
32
In this example, which came after some initial successes by the Israeli Air
Force that weakened the air defense umbrella, the ground forces directly
supported then air superiority ght.
The relationship of air superiority to operational maneuver of heavy
conventional forces is one of dependency.
This was initially brought to
light by Erwin Rommel
from his experience against the Allies in North
Africa. Rommel stated:
During the day, practically our entire trac—on roads, tracks,
and in open country—is pinned down by powerful ghter-bomber
and bomber formations, with the result that the movement of our
troops on the battleeld is almost completely paralyzed, while the
enemy can maneuver freely.
33
Future developments in equipment and doctrine are continuing to sup-
port this premise.
With the arrival of
the missile age, the battle for air su-
periority became a totally joint air-ground eort as illustrated in the 1973
war.
The electronic warfare impact on intelligence,
protection, repower,
and leadership were enormous during the 1973 Mideast War.
The impact
was particularly important
for Egyptian intelligence, due to the large in-
ux of modern equipment:
The Soviets had reorganized the Egyptian intelligence system
and had provided it with modern, sophisticated equipment for all
forms of electronic warfare. Radio interception, electronic sur-
veillance and locating equipment were all introduced and attained
a satisfactory standard of operation . . . the Arabs also beneted
from Soviet surveillance over Israel by means of electronic intel-
ligence and satellites.
34
This new equipment was instrumental in gaining an advantage over the
Israelis.
As the Egyptians trained and learned
with this new equipment,
they also improved their own doctrine.
53
As the capabilities of this equipment became understood, the Egyp-
tians knew they would have to adjust their own doctrine to improve and
better protect their force. Examples of this include employment of radar
and variety of air defense systems employment ·techniques: “to prevent the
Israelis acquiring the locations and number of air defense radars by elec
-
tronic intelligence (ELINT), the radars deployed forward to cover the ini-
tial assault over the Suez Canal were kept silent until the assault began.”
35
Examples of the air defense systems employment techniques includ-
ed: use of dierent frequency bands which changed rapidly to minimize
the eect of jamming; pulse; continuous wave and infrared homing radar
to increase the diculty of defeating both; and changes in radar positions
to minimize the extent of Israeli ELINT.
36
“Some of the radar tracking
systems also had the ability to track optically so that operations could con-
tinue even in a high ECM environment.”
37
The electro-optics option was a
simple x to the technological battle of electronic warfare. Unfortunately,
there are limitations such as visibility and shorter ranges of electro-optics
that decrease its eectiveness.
The impact of electronic warfare on the repower dynamic of com-
bat power during the 1973 war was also dramatic. The preponderance of
SAMS was the most important. “Each of these weapons (SAMS) pos-
sessed dierent electronic guidance characteristics, which complicated
the application of electronic countermeasures.”
38
This electronic warfare
advancement was specically used to enhance the Egyptian air defense
umbrella while degrading the Israeli air support. This led directly to the
Israeli Air Force’s inability to support maneuver initially. The Egyptians
capitalized on this and supported their initial attack by sound employment
of SAMS.
The Egyptian intent from the start was to cover
their front line
“in such a way that Israeli air intervention would have little or no eect
on the initial stages of the attack, and would allow the Arab preponder-
ance in artillery, troops, and armor to be concentrated fully at the point of
attack.”
39
This is a direct application of electronic enhanced repower to
support maneuver that was successful.
The impact on command and control was a race to integrate new tech-
nology. Lieutenant General Saad El Shazly, Egyptian Chief of Sta de-
clared: “Our major innovations lay in training, technique, and determina-
tion; I was nevertheless constantly looking for any device that might help
us.”
40
The increased role of new technology as well as the development of
training and techniques to improve combat capabilities is clearly evident
from this example.
54
The major lessons learned with respect to electronic warfare in the
1973 war were numerous. These include: the importance of missiles, the
synergism between air defense and air superiority, the role electronic war-
fare plays in concentrating major forces, and the air-ground coordination
required to win the air-superiority ght.
Electronic guidance systems and the tremendous number of SAMS
the Egyptians were able to employ ushered in the
complete arrival of the
missile age.
The importance of this will have eects on all future conicts
in air,
land, and sea operations.
This also points out the technological bat-
tle between opposing forces as each attempts to counter the eectiveness
of their opponent’s weapons systems. The ranges of the missiles also in-
creased signicantly. The stando capabilities of air, land, or sea based
missiles increases the dependence on electronic means to provide early
warning and tracking for destruction of these munitions prior to impact.
The link between air superiority and air defense was developed fur-
ther. Ground based air defense systems are now more capable of directly
inuencing the air superiority battle than was ever imagined prior to this
time.
“The bulk of the Israeli losses (aircraft) were
caused by missiles and
conventional anti-aircraft re, with honours roughly even between the two,
particularly during close support missions.”
41
This increasing eect of air
defense systems requires a relook at the eect of air power in the future.
The ability to gain air
superiority will be degraded by the air defense sys
-
tems and the pursuit of local air superiority will become more important.
The role electronic warfare plays in the ability to concentrate forces
is extremely vital.
The Egyptian plan
to provide an electronic and air de-
fense umbrella along its front lines is an excellent example.
This umbrella
helped
them to move and to concentrate major forces while denying the
Israelis the ability to observe.
This provided the
Egyptians with an oppor-
tunity to surprise the Israelis. The ability to protect concentrating forces at
the point of attack is a key aspect of operational maneuver. The Egyptian
success, though not used to launch a deep attack, is directly applicable to
operational maneuver.
Air-ground cooperation to win the air superiority ght
was also im-
portant.
The Egyptians enjoyed success in the initial stages of the war be-
cause the umbrella was a
combined air-ground eort.
The Israeli response
of
aircraft was unsuccessful.
After the Israelis recovered by upgrading
their electronic countermeasures and coordinating closer with maneuver
forces, the tide turned. The resultant air-ground coordination was eective
55
against
the Egyptian forces.
Ground forces greatly assisted the ght for air
superiority and the air forces assisted the maneuver of the ground forces.
Lessons from the 1982 Mideast War
The Bekaa Valley campaign in 1982 had a profound impact on the fu-
ture of electronic warfare to support operational
maneuver.
The inuence
of air superiority and synchronized maneuver on the battle is important.
The analysis will center on one day, 9 June 1982, during which electronic
warfare played a prominent role. A general description of the events of
that day follows:
Just an hour after the attack started, the defenders (Syria) knew
they were in big trouble. It was June 1982, and Lebanon’s Bekaa
Valley was a hornets nest of Soviet supplied surface-to-air mis-
siles. They could, their Syrian operators thought, hurl up a lethal
wall of repower against any attacking aircraft. Instead, they hard-
ly got o a shot. Radar seeking missiles honed in on 29 suppos-
edly secret sites, blowing them away while gleeful Israeli ocers
sitting in situation rooms across the border watched the action on
television. A masterstroke of warfare had left the skies controlled
by the attackers, and Israel’s friends and enemies alike wondered
how they’d done it.
42
The results provided Israeli ground forces the freedom to maneuver to
drive the Syrians out of the Bekaa Valley.
The Israeli preparations for the Bekaa Valley Campaign are key to
understanding the results. Armed with the lessons of the 1973 war, the
Israelis prepared for the next war.
Their essential preparations included ac-
quisition of
new high technology equipment, extensive intelligence prepa-
ration of the battleeld, and the integration of battleeld requirements to
win control of the electromagnetic spectrum.
Acquisition of new equipment kept Israel at the forward edge of tech-
nological development from 1973–1982.
This new
equipment included
remote piloted vehicles (RPVs) that were used in surveillance, target des-
ignation, jamming, and monitoring roles.
43
Another major acquisition was the EC-707 aircraft which can be con-
gured for communications intelligence, electronic intelligence, and jam-
ming roles.
44
Anti-radiation and TV guided munitions both air and ground
launched were particularly eective at attacking radar.
45
Another important
equipment upgrade was the state of the art electronic warfare equipment
carried on Israeli aircraft. These include jammers, cha/are dispensers
56
and threat warning systems.
46
As shown, the Israelis were not going to be
upstaged by not keeping abreast with technological advancements, espe-
cially in the realm of electronic warfare.
The Israeli intelligence preparation of the battleeld was a key to the
successful operation. “They spent 12 months studying Syrian air defenses
in the Bekaa Valley and along the Syrian/Lebanese border.”
47
Information
gained included electronic intelligence on SAM guidance radars, frequen-
cies, and accurate locations of the majority of radar.
48
This extensive eort
was protable for two reasons: Israeli technology and Syrian ineptness in
employing the SAMS.
The Israeli emphasis on winning control of the electromagnetic spec-
trum was exceptional. This thorough preparation paid dividends on the
afternoon of 9 June. The control and sequence of the operation indicates
a tremendously synchronized operation that was executed
awlessly.
The
scale and coordination of eort for the
raid were unparalleled in modern
warfare.
“The Bekaa missile raid was a textbook example of modern day
electronic: warfare.”
49
The Syrian preparation for the Bekaa Valley Campaign was a story of
problems.
The biggest problem, as with
Egyptian use in the 1973 war, was
the immobile layout of SAMS.
“The Syrians used mobile missiles in a
xed
conguration; they put the radars in the valley instead of the hills.”
50
This enabled the Israelis to pinpoint their locations prior to the attack.
The
poor operational
security of the Syrians made them susceptible to the vast
Israeli collection eorts, most of which was electronic intelligence.
The Israeli operational plan to win the electronic warfare battle was
an integrated concept from start to nish.
First, RPVs were own over the
battleeld to
stimulate the SAM radar sites.
Following this, both RPVs
and the EC-707 gathered information about the radars as they tracked the
RPVs. Jamming began to blind the radars as well as the command and
control nets.
A coordinated attack
occurred from air and ground launched
anti-radiation missiles along with conventional artillery res.
Target
as-
sessment was accomplished by RPVs to include the rst phase.
51
The second phase followed as the Syrian Air Force began their defen-
sive counter air operation.
The Israelis jammed
Syrian ground control ra-
dar and communications nets, preventing any coordinated attacks against
the Israeli planes. The result was a loss of 24 aircraft on the Syrian side
with no losses to the Israelis.
Aerial dog ghts
continued the next day
with similar results.
52
57
Technology had enabled commanders to centralize control of the bat-
tle. As stated earlier, Israeli operations ocers watched the Bekaa Valley
raid on TV monitors. Though not much is written about the command and
control of the operation, it is clear that it was a very high headquarters that
provided the detailed plan and very centralized command:
The control and direction of such an operation, and the orches-
tration required for all elements involved, is highly complex, and
thus despite the very sophistication of the equipment, the human
element still remains a dominant one.
53
The eect on operational maneuver by the electronic warfare dom-
inated air battle was tremendous. “This new development (victory over
the missiles) now enabled the Israeli forces to take advantage of Israel
air power and to dominate the battle-eld,”
54
The Israeli Armored Forces
were now able to maneuver under protection of the Israeli Air Force.
Ben-
Gal’s corps broke through and was able to
advance up the Bekaa Valley.
The corps penetrated to the operational depth of the Syrian forces who
committed their operational reserve, the Syrian 3rd Armored Division.
The 3rd Armored Division was interdicted and became engaged directly
by Ben-Gal’s corps on 11 June, when the Syrians agreed to a cease re.
55
The Israelis had maneuvered to a position that had aorded them the op-
portunity to destroy the Syrian force. In Jomini’s terms, they had reached
the operational point of maneuver that motivated the Syrians to quit the
eld in the eastern area of operations.
The importance of the ght for air superiority and its relationship to
operational maneuver were lessons learned from the 1973 war. The Israe-
lis knew that they could concentrate forces under an air umbrella augment-
ed by electronics.
They also realized that the ability to
maneuver large
armored forces even in dicult terrain was dependent on air superiority.
This knowledge was applied in the Bekaa Valley in 1982 to eectively
conduct operational maneuver.
Electronic warfare had a marked impact on the 1982 war. The Israelis
were able to gain real-time intelligence. Smart munitions and anti-radia-
tion munitions contributed to repower.
Control of the air was
coordinated
by an advanced electronic warfare supported operation. This allowed ar-
mored forces to move freely and also protected them from Syrian maneu-
ver. The exploitation of oensive electronic warfare paralyzed the Syrian
command structure resulting in a loss of control and unresponsive actions
to counter Israeli maneuver.
58
The use of drones gave Israeli commanders access to near real-
time intelligence:
The eld commanders beneted from almost instant intelligence,
which facilitated their task of reaching immediate decisions. It
is clear that the very eective development of reconnaissance
drones, produced over recent years by Israeli industry, has played
an important part in the success of battleeld intelligence.
56
The use of electronic intelligence was important during both the intelli-
gence preparation of the battleeld and
during the Bekaa Valley operation.
In both situations the Israelis gained such a relative advantage over the
Syrians, that this played a signicant role in their success.
The use of smart munitions and anti-radiation
munitions enhanced the
eect of repower, as
the batteries “were probably attacked with sophis-
ticated
air-launched ‘smart’ weapons.
Such weapons are highly accurate
and some can be launched from well beyond the reach of SAMS.”
57
As
noted in a July 1982 New Republic article:
These weapons are quite eective, but can be countered in part by
turning o the radar. What the Israelis reportedly did was modify
the guidance systems of these missiles so that even if the target
radars are turned o, the missile will continue straight to the last
source of radar pulses.
58
The exploitation of the electromagnetic spectrum was eective in enhanc-
ing repower as exemplied by the devastating eect of these munitions.
The protection required when moving heavy units around today’s lethal
battleeld is an important requirement to support operational maneuver.
Protection from opposing
force maneuver is key and the Israeli Air Force
accomplished this during the oensive maneuvers in the Bekaa Valley:
The Israeli Air Force was successful in interdicting and in pre-
venting reinforcements from reaching the battleeld, as when a
brigade of the Syrian 3rd Armored Division was caught in a nar-
row dele and badly mauled.
59
The electronic warfare assets assisted in detecting this force and were the
main reason air superiority over the Bekaa Valley could be maintained.
The employment of oensive electronic warfare to disrupt Syrian
command and control was highly successful: “Prior to and during the at-
tack, the Syrians claim that their entire radar net was both decoyed and
reconnoitered by RPVs and subject to extensive jamming generated by
airborne Boeing 707 stand-o platforms, ground stations, and dedicated
•
59
A-4 Skyhawk aircraft.”
60
This paralyzed the Syrian command structure,
which could oer no adequate response.
Another related eect on command and control was the result the
Bekaa Valley attack had on the Syrian high command:
The destruction of this doctrinal theory, knocked the Syrian com-
mand o balance, as it was clear, as they threw air units desper-
ately into battle, thus incurring additional heavy air losses that
they were urgently seeking a reply to a situation for which they
had not planned.
61
The Syrian command lost the initiative midday on 9 June, and they were
unable to recover it throughout the war. The shock that sent the Syrians
reeling was reminiscent of the eect the blitzkrieg had on Germany’s Sec-
ond World War opponents in 1939-1940.
Lessons learned in the 1982 Bekaa Valley Campaign are applicable
to a wide range of electronic warfare, air superiority, and operational ma-
neuver issues. The technological impact of electronic warfare is quickly
changing employment concepts.
The ght for the Bekaa Valley “was one
between the complex technological systems, including the most modern
and highly sophisticated air control and electronic communication equip-
ment.”
62
Acquiring new electronic warfare equipment and more impor-
tantly integrating improved operational concepts throughout the force oc-
cupies a critical role in the preparations for the next war.
Electronic warfare, when integrated with other warghting systems,
can be the decisive factor in enabling one to maneuver operationally. The
success of the ght to defeat the SAMS and gain air superiority over the
valley
was the rst step.
After this, a combined air-ground operation actu-
ally carried out the maneuver, “the rst move was to strike with heavy air
attacks, the only major air action in nine days combined with artillery and
armor.”
63
This type of operation forced the Syrians to ght defensively and
withdraw before they were destroyed.
The operational commander’s concept of operation must integrate elec-
tronic warfare. The entire operation on 9 June was dominated by the battle
for the electromagnetic spectrum. This will not always be the most import
-
ant factor in the future, but its potential eect cannot be downplayed. It
seems evident from the 1982 war that if electronic warfare is not integrated
into the concept of operation, the operational commander is inviting trouble.
The potential of unmanned vehicles in the future is limitless.
The RPV’s
capacity to be used as a platform for
a wide range of capabilities is inviting.
60
In addition
to communications, intelligence, jamming, and radar decoy, the
Israelis also used them as a weapons platform. “At least one SAM-8 was
destroyed by a RPV congured with an ammunition payload.”
64
The only
limiting factor to employing RPVs seems to be lack of imagination.
The speed and lethality of modern combat was
graphically illustrated
over the Bekaa Valley.
In less than an hour, the SAMS were destroyed.
The ght for air superiority lasted less than two days. In 16 days the Is-
raelis moved the Syrians to the northern entrance of the Bekaa Valley and
destroyed signicant aircraft, air defense systems and Syrian forces. The
eect of this operational maneuver compelled the Syrians to make peace.
Conclusions: The Future Direction of Electronic Warfare
to Enhance Operational Maneuver
Several conclusions that are critical to future large-scale combat oper-
ations can be drawn from experience in the mid-east wars. First, the battle
for control of the electromagnetic spectrum must be won to eectively
conduct operational maneuver. Second, military doctrine must keep pace
with improving technologies. Third, near real-time intelligence increases
the speed of the commander’s decision-making cycle. Technology is in-
creasing the diculty of eectively employing electronic warfare capabil-
ities, and the risk of being caught short in electronic warfare capabilities
can be decisive in future operations.
Coordination of the ght for control of the electromagnetic spectrum,
air superiority, and operational maneuver are inseparable in the missile
age. This has made air-ground cooperation an even more crucial link than
in the past. Control of the electromagnetic spectrum which includes denial
of the enemy’s free use of it, is critical to war now. Without control, our
ability to gain air superiority for even limited periods of time is question-
able.
The side that wins the electronic warfare
battle will possess advan-
tages in the air superiority ght that will be nearly impossible to overcome.
Gaining air superiority is critical to maintaining the ability to execute
operational maneuver. The ability to concentrate forces, maneuver forces
freely, and adequately protect the force must be accomplished for suc-
cessful operational maneuver to occur.
Because air superiority
depends
on the ability to control the electromagnetic spectrum, these capabilities
are interdependent.
The eectiveness of operational repower depends in many ways on
electronic warfare capabilities. Without eective oensive and defensive
capabilities, the air force will be hard pressed to deliver operational res.
61
The increased dependence on electronically guided missiles also makes
forces vulnerable.
If these guided missiles are
electronically defeated, nu-
merous air, sea and ground launched long range missiles will contribute
little to operational res.
Protection of forces depends heavily on electronic warfare capabil-
ities.The Egyptian umbrella in the 1973 war and the destruction of the
Syrian umbrella in 1982 are perfect examples of the protection dynamic in
war. The Egyptian defensive umbrella provided protection for their forces.
As the umbrella was degraded, air support became the means of protec-
tion. In 1982, the Syrian air defense umbrella was quickly destroyed and
Israeli air superiority again became the means of protection.
Operational leadership is becoming more and more dependent on
intricate communications systems. Destruction of these means even for
short periods of time could be critical. The eect one hour had on the Syr-
ian high command on 9 June exemplies this well. From this day forward,
they were in a reactive mode and could not recover.
Despite a fairly good
showing at the tactical level, the Syrians could not regain the initiative
operationally.
Military doctrine and operational concepts must keep pace with im-
proving technologies. The risk of not doing this could be operational
surprise.The emphasis in this area by the Russians can be seen in the
following passage:
Hundreds of Russian experts and advisors rushed to Syria within
days of the air battles, because once again as in 1969, in Egypt
in the war of attrition, the system defending the Soviet empire
had been tested by the Israeli Air Force and found wanting. The
Soviets will inevitably provide a reply to Israel’s technological
solutions, but the results of the air battles in the Bekaa Valley have
given them much cause for concern.
65
NATO, and the United States in particular, is as interested as the Russians.
In future large-scale combat operations the cost of being upstaged by new
technologies will be great. But it is not only the technology that provides
input into the equation. Research and development cycles, and more im-
portantly, training and preparation for employing new concepts are time
consuming processes.
The impact of near real-time intelligence provided by electronic war
-
fare has decreased the decision cycle in modern combat. This can have a
dramatic eect on the speed of modern combat.
Major General Doyle E.
Larson in
discussing one role of electronic warfare intelligence states: “The
62
sensor information needed for C3CM [Command, Control, and Communi-
cations Countermeasures] execution must be available at the lowest level
within 15 seconds of collection. This is a tough goal for us to reach, but one
which is within our technological capability.
”66
The technological impact is increasing the diculty of eectively us-
ing electronic warfare capabilities. The cost of elding this type of equip-
ment is almost prohibitive. Budgetary constraints complicate the problem.
The focus on physical destruction or “hard kill” weapons normally in-
creases while “soft kill” electronic weapons take a back seat.
67
The expertise necessary to operate and maintain new electronic war-
fare weapons is increasing.
The impact on
operational maneuver is tremen-
dous. We must exploit the increasing capabilities of electronic warfare to
successfully execute operational maneuver. The decisive eect of opera
-
tional maneuver is within our grasp. A synchronized air-ground ght for
control of the electromagnetic spectrum will be a major factor in the future.
Implications
Education of operational commanders is becoming more dicult due
to the increasing complexity of electronic weaponry. Battle for control of
the electronic spectrum has no service boundaries. It is truly a joint ght.
The capabilities of each service must be understood to develop a coherent
concept of operation or campaign plan. The many new electronic warfare
capabilities in each service make attaining the required technical knowl-
edge increasingly dicult.
The problem of developing new operational concepts for integrating
electronic warfare into future doctrine is twofold.
General William E.
Depuy, with respect to the US
Army, stated:
[They are] not yet comfortable with Electronic Warfare. The se-
nior leaders have little rsthand experience and thus little con-
dence or skill in its use and tend to leave it, unintegrated, in
the hands of specialists. The specialists, in turn, are faced with
a tradition and structure of secrecy and compartmentalization—a
hangover in part from the days of ULTRA.
68
The ability to implement innovative uses of the technology is seen as lim-
ited to the “specialists” who are kept abreast of technological improve-
ments.
This is a dangerous
situation that must be overcome.
Another implication related to electronic warfare is
the mission com-
mand warghting function enabling a commander to balance the art of
command and the science of control in order to integrate the other war-
63
ghter functions.
“There are real-time television monitors at division,
corps, and territorial headquarters, which may indicate an inclination in
the Israeli Army to centralize command at higher levels.”
69
This could be
critical to operational
leadership in the future. Mission commands
tends
to lead initiative at lower levels of command. On the other hand, limited
electronic warfare assets diculty in employing them on the scale of the
Israelis in the Bekaa Valley requires centralization.
The ability of mission command must be closely analyzed as future
technological developments occur. The mission command issue and sus-
ceptibility to electronic
warfare problem go hand in hand.
Continual de-
pendence on technology that increases centralization of command and
control without regard to protective countermeasures would
be disastrous.
The balance is tenuous at best, and the opportunity for miscalculations is
high, as history has so eectively demonstrated.
Electronic warfare is changing the environment of
modern war.
We
must be prepared to adapt quickly as new
technologies are developed.
The electromagnetic spectrum is now as important as the air, land, and
sea dimensions of
battle.
Control of this spectrum is essential to conduct
eective operational maneuver. These case study examples of electronic
warfare and the ever changing environment require further studies of our
past to enable our large-scale combat operations in the future.
64
Notes
* Major David M. Rodriguez, “The Inuence of Electronic Warfare on
Operational Maneuver,” School of Advanced Military Studies Monograph, US
Army Command and General Sta College, 22 May 1989.
1.
Chris Bellamy, The Future of Land Warfare (New York: Croom Helm,
1987), 31.
2.
Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 3-0, Operations (Wash-
ington, DC: 2017), 12.
3.
Baron De Jomini, The Art of War (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers,
1977), 88
–
89.
4.
Jomini,
89.
5..
Jomini,
88.
6.
Jomini,
88.
7.
Jomini,
89.
8.
Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 100-5, Operations
(Washington, DC: 1982),
12.
9. Department of the Army,
FM 100-5, 12.
10.
FM 100-5, 11.
11.
FM 100-5, 13.
12.
Department of the Army
, Field Manual (FM) 34-1, Intelligence and
Electronic Warfare Operations (Washington DC: 1987), 1-3.
13. David Bolton, editor, “The Challenge of Electronic
Warfare.” Whitehall
Paper No.1 (London: Her Majesty’s Stationary Oce, 1986), 10.
14. Bolton, 13.
15. Bolton,
54.
16.
Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 100-6, Large Unit
Operations (Washington, DC: 1987), 3-12.
17. Department of the Army,
FM 100-5, 54.
18.
FM 100-5, 54.
19.. Department of the Army,
FM 34-1, 1-3.
20.
FM 34-1,
1-4.
21.
Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 90-2, Tactical Decep-
tion (Washington, DC: 1978), 2-16.
22.
FM 90-2, 2-16
–
2-17.
23. Department of the Army,
FM 100-5, 54.
24.
Chaim Herzog, The Arab-Israeli Wars (New York: Random House,
1984), 227.
25.
Lieutenant General Saad el Shazly, The Crossing of the Suez (San
Francisco, CA: American Mideast Research, 1980), 13.
26.
Herzog, The Arab-Israeli Wars, 227.
27.
Shazly, The Crossing of the Suez, 21
–
22.
28.
Shazly, 81.
29.
Shazly,
15.
30.
Bolton, The Whitehall Paper No. 1, 11.
65
31.
Herzog, The Arab-Israeli War, 310.
32.
Chaim Herzog, The War of Atonement (New York: Little Brown &
Company, 1975), 274.
33.
B.H. Liddell Hart, editor, The Rommel Papers (New York: Harcourt
& Brace, 1953), 476
–
477.
34.
Herzog, The War of Attonement, 274.
35.
Bellamy, The Future of Land Warfare, 222
–
223.
36.
Bellamy, 222
–
223.
37.
Bellamy, 223.
38.
Herzog, The Arab-Israeli Wars, 307.
39.
Herzog, 307.
40.
Shazly, The Crossing of the Suez, 76.
41.
Herzog, The Arab-Israeli Wars, 311.
42.
Jim Schefter, “Stealthy Robot Planes,” Popular Science, October
1987, 64.
43.
Martin Streetly, “The Israeli Experience: A Lesson in Electronic Air
Combat,” Jane’s Defense Weekly, August 1985, 319.
44.
Streetly, 316.
45.
Streetly, 317.
46.
Streetly, 317.
47.
Bolton, Whitehall Paper No. 1, 11.
48.
Bolton, 11.
49.
Richard A. Gabriel, Operation Peace for Galilee (New York: Hill &
Wang Publishers, 1984), 98.
50.
Marshall Lee Miller, “The Soviet Air Force View of the Bekaa Val-
ley Debacle,” Armed Forces Journal International, June 1987, 54.
51.
Bolton, Whitehall Paper No. 1, 11.
52.
Gabriel, Operation Peace for Galilee, 99.
53.
Herzog, The Arab-Israeli Wars, 366.
54.
Herzog, 348.
55.
Herzog, 349.
56.
Herzog, 364
–
365.
57.
W. Seth Carus and Stephen P. Glick, “The Battle of Lebanon: The
Aerial Assault,” The New Republic, July 1982, 16.
58.
Carus and Glick, 16.
59.
Herzog, The Arab-Israeli Wars, 366.
60. Streetly, “The Israeli Experience: A Lesson in Electronic Air Combat,” 317.
61.
Herzog, The Arab-Israeli Wars, 365.
62.
Herzog, 366.
63.
Gabriel, Operation Peace for Galilee, 109.
64.
Gabriel, 99.
65.
Gabriel, 366.
66. Doyle E. Larson, “Controlling the Electromagnetic Spectrum,” The
Marine Corps Gazette, October 1983, 49.
67. Bolton, Whitehall Paper No. 1, 35–36.
66
68..
Bellamy, The Future of Land Warfare, 240.
69.
Gabriel, Operations for Galilee, 195.
67
Chapter 4
Firepower and Breakthrough in the Meuse-Argonne:
1 November 1918
Lieutenant Colonel (USAF-Retired) Mark E. Grotelueschen
If we are to be economical with our men, we must be prodigal with
guns and ammunition.
1
—Major General Charles P. Summerall
Commanding General, V Corps
The rst phase of the Meuse-Argonne campaign, which began on 26
September 1918, was a demonstration of the modest initial success that
could be achieved in a prepared large-scale assault. However, that oen-
sive also clearly showed the problems and loss in eciency that the attack-
ing units experienced during subsequent assaults. Considering the tremen-
dous strength of the German positions opposing his army, General John J.
Pershing’s plans for his initial attack in the rst phase of the oensive were
exceptionally optimistic. The attack orders directed his forces to advance
some 16 kilometers within two days and break through the enemy’s main
line of resistance, the Kriemhilde Stellung of the Hindenburg line, at the
far end of the deep two-day advance. While the attack on 26 September
began well along much of the front, with the leading units of many di-
visions pushing forward as far as 7 kilometers on the rst day, once the
infantrymen advanced beyond the range of their supporting artillery the
progress slowed, then stopped, and the casualties rose. In a few instances,
most notably in the sector of the green 35th Division, over-extended and
disorganized infantry battalions were unable to hold their advanced po-
sitions, and were thrown back by German counterattacks.
2
In every case,
the attacking divisions soon proved unable to advance despite suering
serious losses in their eorts. Three divisions in the center of the line—
the 35th, 37th, and 79th—each had to be replaced after less than a week
of ghting, but even then, the new divisions, including such experienced
units as the 1st, 32nd, and 3rd, found progress slow, and the price high.
3
Finally, on 14 October, after weeks of painfully slow, forward progress,
the Army reached the initial objectives it had set for 27 September.
4
While
determined and skillful German resistance in terrically challenging ter-
rain explains much of the First Army’s diculty, weaknesses with its own
re support eort also contributed.
The rst phase of the First Army’s oensive in the Meuse-Argonne suf-
fered from three major problems in its employment of artillery. First, plans
68
called for the infantry to continue its initial attack all the way to distant ob-
jectives that were surely going to be beyond the range of the supporting ar-
tillery.
5
Pershing and his sta were clearly counting on their infantry being
able to successfully carry those distant objectives with little or no artillery
support. Second, the attacking corps and divisions attempted to make such
a quick, deep penetration without using one of the most tactically decisive
weapons of the German Army’s spring oensives—gas. Smothering the
defending forces with tons of gases of all types was an integral part of
each one of Germany’s spring oensives in 1918.
6
Pershing also included
a massive gas bombardment in his initial plan for the 26 September attack.
Unfortunately, the American Expeditionary Forces (AEF) could not secure
all the gas shells that it needed to fully carry out the plan. Additionally, the
decision as to when, where, and how to use the gas that was available was
left to the corps and division commanders. However, due to unfamiliarity
with the weapon, these commanders had an almost inexplicable fear of
enemy retaliation with gas—inexplicable because the commanders surely
knew that the massive use of gas had become standard practice by the Ger-
man Army in 1918. That fear, coupled in some inexperienced units with an
inated expectation of what the infantry could accomplish on its own, led
many unit commanders to disregard Pershing’s ideas for employing gas.
7
A third problem was that the army and corps artillery groups were not used
to maximum eect in either counter-battery against the German guns, or in
directly supporting the infantry advance with an additional rolling barrage.
Due to the expectations of many high-ranking AEF ocers that aggressive
infantrymen would be able to make successful attacks without the support
of heavy artillery, and the fear that the use of heavy guns in an infantry
support role would lead to a rash of friendly re incidents, the corps and
army guns were prohibited from ring on positions close enough to the
advancing infantry to be of any practical use to them.
8
The Reorganization of First Army
However, from mid-October until the end of the month, the Ameri-
can First Army focused on preparing for its next massive assault, to take
place on 1 November—an attack that would prove to be its nal major
oensive of the war.
Lieutenant General Hunter Liggett, who replaced Pershing as com-
mander of the First Army on 16 October, made changes tailored to solve
the problems that had plagued the rst two phases of the oensive. He
also ensured that experienced units served to spearhead the attack, most
notably, the 2nd Division, which had recently completed one of the most
impressive oensive feats of the year when it seized Blanc Mont Ridge
69
in early October while part of the French Fourth Army. By late October it
was moving towards the front lines in the Meuse-Argonne, where it would
join the 89th Division to form the V Corps.
Meanwhile, the 2nd Field Artillery (FA) Brigade, which had been sup-
porting the 36th Division along the Aisne River, was nally recalled to re-
join the 2nd Division on 28 October, and it took up ring positions behind
Belgium
Germany
Luxembourg
Flize
Meuse River
Carignan
Remily
Sur-Meuse
Peuvillers
Martincourt
Jametz
Clergas
Danvillers
Grandpre
Vouziers
Pont Magis
Chemery
Chatillon-
Sur-Bar
Les Petities-Armoises
Fosse
Avocourt
Cumieres
Vacherouville
Brioulles
Souilly
Troyon-Sur-Meuse
Moranville
St. Menehould
Boureuilles
Esnes
Sedan
Verdun
N
(Feints)
Rupt
En-Woevre
Ippecourt
Beaumont
Luxembourg
Point-A-Mousson
Metz
Grimoucourt En-Woevre
Rioville
Jonville
Mars la Tour
Preny
St. Mihiel
Thionville
Briny
Chambley
Mammey
Parois
Cervisy
Mouzon
Dan-Sur-
Meuse
Barricourt
25 Sep
XXXX
FOURTH
GOURAUD
FR.
XXX
III
3 Nov
3 Oct
1 Nov
26 Sep
3 Oct
FR.
XXX
VXVII
XXX
V
XXX
I
XXXX
FIRST
PERSING
LIGGETT
(12 Oct)
U.S.
XXXXX
CROWN PRINCE
XXXXX
GALLWITZ
XXXXX
ALBRECHT
11 Nov
FR.
XXX
XXX
IV
XXX
VI
XXXXX
A E F
PERSHING
XXXX
SECOND
BULLARD
(Est. 12 Oct)
U.S.
Inor
Moulins
Armistice
Line
River
France
The Meuse-Argonne Offensive
September–November 1918
0 5 10 15 20 Miles
International Boundary
Elevation 200m
Elevation 300m
Elevation over 300m
Figure 4.1. Map of the Meuse-Argonne Oensive. Created by Army Univer-
sity Press.
70
its infantry brigades in the Meuse-Argonne sector two days later. By then
plans for the attack on 1 November were almost nalized. Brigadier Gen-
eral Albert J. Bowley, the 2nd FA Brigade commander, left Colonel Joseph
R. Davis from the 15th Field Artillery (FA) in command of the artillery
brigade which was still with the 36th Division north of Blanc Mont, and
had joined General Lejeune to aid him in the last stages of the planning
eort.
9
As early as 25 October, the division had produced a “Tentative Plan
of Attack,” and the infantry brigade, regimental, and battalion command-
ers were able to study the plan and reconnoiter the ground.
10
General Liggett assigned the 2nd Division to Major General Charles
P. Summerall’s V Corps which held the lines in the center of the American
First Army. Unlike the previous attacks in this campaign, the plan of attack
for 1 November did not call for all divisions in line to make as deep a pen-
etration as possible. The V Corps was directed to make a 9-kilometer-deep
penetration to seize the heights of Barricourt Ridge, while the other two
corps, the I Corps on the left and the III Corps on the right, were to make
supporting attacks only. The 2nd
Division was to advance through two
intermediate objectives, each followed by a-30 minute rest, before taking
the nal “First Day” objective. Subsequent attacks on following days by
all three corps were to drive the enemy north of the Meuse River.
11
These plans, and
the supporting artil-
lery re-plans, were
developed in a series
of conferences held at
V Corps Headquarters
which were attended
by the corps and di-
vision commanders,
their chiefs of sta,
all chiefs of artillery,
and the division ma-
chine-gun ocers.
12
While previous attacks
often counted on the
infantrymen to ght
their way forward,
this attack, more than
any other large-scale
Figure 4.2. Major General Charles P. Summerall.
Photo courtesy of US Army Center of Military History.
71
AEF or 2nd Division attack of the war, put its faith in massive amounts of
well-coordinated repower.
This was especially true in V Corps, where Summerall, an artillery-
man and former artillery brigade commander, ordered that “re superiori-
ty, rather than sheer man power be the driving force of the attack.”
13
With
the full support of General Liggett, army and corps planners addressed
each of the three major artillery problems that had plagued the earlier
phases of the campaign. First, the plans called for the supporting artillery
to fully cover the attacking troops all the way through the rst day’s nal
objectives. Of equal importance was the fact that all of the main lines of
enemy resistance scheduled to be assaulted on the rst day were within
a few kilometers of the jump-o positions and were therefore well with-
in range of all the supporting artillery.
14
Second, unlike previous attacks,
AEF artillery was to subject the enemy to a very heavy gas bombardment,
in some places beginning as much as two days before the actual assault.
The plan called for the use of gas, specically persistent mustard gas, to
systematically neutralize the large German artillery groups on each ank,
so as to protect the main thrust of the V Corps from the crushing re that
had previously come from the enemy guns in those positions.
15
Last, the heavy guns of the army and corps batteries were to be ex-
tensively involved in providing accompanying re for the infantry. In
previous attacks the use of heavy guns in the infantry support role had
been conned to ring concentrations on known or “suspected” enemy
positions, and always well ahead of the infantry they were supposed to
be supporting. For the 1 November attack, Liggett removed this restric-
tion and directed the “complete use of artillery.”
16
His First Army planners
therefore programmed the use of army and corps guns in an infantry sup-
port role, allowing them to re their concentrations on a rolling barrage
schedule that kept the re always within 1,000 meters of the attacking
infantry throughout their advance.
17
The V Corps Fire Support Plan
In V Corps, Summerall divided the re support plan into four periods:
the time preceding the preliminary bombardment, the preliminary bom
-
bardment itself, the covering re for the infantry’s initial assault, and the
support of the infantry during “subsequent stages of the advance.” The
rst period covered several days and included the ring of gas, shrapnel,
and high explosive shells by all calibers on “all enemy organizations,
batteries, and routes of communication.” During this time, American gun-
ners would re short but intense artillery barrages from all guns two or
72
three times a day, so that the defending German troops, who fully expect-
ed a continuation of the oensive, would not be sure when the real assault
was starting and would be “trained” to respond more slowly when it did
come. Additionally, AEF artillerymen would use this period to carry out
a carefully scheduled and concealed registration of those artillery pieces
already in their positions.
18
The re-plan called for the actual preliminary bombardment to last
only two hours, but it was to be accomplished at the maximum rate of re
for each gun. According to the corps commander, the very short prepara-
tion was driven by the amount of available ammunition, “as ammunition
could not be procured for a maximum rate of re during a longer period,”
and Summerall believed it “better to deliver re at a maximum rate than to
employ slow re over a longer period.”
19
This line of reasoning was right
in step with much of the most current and eective artillery practices of
war, such as the short German bombardments of the spring oensives and
the “hurricane bombardments” of the British Expeditionary Force (BEF).
As for targeting, batteries of 75-mm howitzers were to hit the enemy front
lines and specically identied German units. The 155s were to hit cer-
tain towns, woods, and all known and suspected machine-gun nests. Other
corps and army guns were to neutralize enemy batteries.
20
To add to the
maelstrom, 255 machine guns would re coordinated barrages into the
German positions opposite the 2nd Division.
21
One important innovation was made to this preparation. Some infan-
try attacks in previous phases of the oensive had been met immediate-
ly by heavy enemy machine-gun re. Often this delayed the infantry’s
advance so much that it caused them to lose contact with their rolling
barrage. Research into the problem showed that German machine gunners
had been noting the short limit of the artillery re during the prepara-
tion and then moved into shell holes far enough into “No Man’s Land”
to avoid the incoming shells. These troops were ready and waiting with
their machine guns when the infantry assault nally came. To catch these
forward machine gunners, prior to the initial infantry assault of 1 Novem-
ber, the gunners supporting the 2nd Division spent the last ten minutes
of the preparatory bombardment ring a heavy standing barrage that was
drawn back 200 yards from the previous short limit. During this barrage,
the leading assault troops moved up as close to the standing barrage as
possible, so that they could hit the rst enemy positions within moments
of the barrage’s rst lift forward.
22
After the start of the infantry attack the focus of nearly all the re-
power in the corps was on covering the infantry attack. The rate of ad-
73
vance of the rolling barrage was tailored to match the type of terrain facing
the infantry: 100 meters every four minutes on open ground, 100 meters
every six minutes up steep slopes, and 100 meters every eight minutes
through woods. Two batteries in each light battalion (75mm) were to shoot
high explosive shells, and the third was to superimpose shrapnel re on the
whole battalion sector, ring 200 meters ahead of the batteries shooting the
high explosive. Other guns were dedicated to re smoke shells throughout
the barrage. The 155s were directed to re “a series of standing barrages,
lifting as the infantry advances so as to fall at least 500 meters beyond the
rolling barrage.”
23
Following each infantry objective the rolling barrage
was to halt, and the 155s were to shoot “heavy concentrations” on “all
enemy organizations” within 2 kilometers of the new front line. Batteries
of eight-inch howitzers were designated to further intensify this accompa-
nying re by adding another layer to the barrage, 500 meters ahead of the
155s, when the barrage rolled through certain strong points and wooded
areas. The order made it clear that those army and corps guns not assigned
specic counter-battery missions were to continue supporting the infantry
advance all the way through the third and nal objective of the rst day.
24
To accomplish this massive re-plan, the 2nd Division received more
artillery augmentation than in any previous attack. In addition to its own
guns, it would have the support of two other divisional artillery brigades,
the 1st FA Brigade of the 1st Division and the 67th FA Brigade of the 42nd
Division (a total addition of four 75-mm regiments and two 155-mm regi-
ments). The 2nd Division also received the dedicated support of 2 batteries
of 8-inch howitzers and 3 batteries of 105-mm guns, and would share with
the 82nd Division to their right some 17 batteries of 155-mm howitzers
and 21 batteries of 155-mm guns from the corps and army artillery groups.
All told, the infantrymen of the 2nd Division would be supported by more
than 300 guns and howitzers.
25
Command of the three brigades of divisional artillery was given to the
ranking artillery commander, General George G. Gatley from the 67th FA
Brigade. However, more than with any other attack by the 2nd Division,
the plans issued by the Corps Chief of Artillery, in this case Brigadier Gen-
eral Dwight E. Aultman, had carefully scripted all artillery actions, even
to the point of detailing exactly when each divisional artillery battalion
would displace forward and to what position it was to move. Two hours
after the infantry began their attack, the 2nd FA Brigade was to begin its
movement forward by echelon, one battalion advancing at a time. The for-
ward batteries were then to pick up the barrage, or otherwise support the
infantry attack, after the rst objective was reached. While exact forward
74
positions were listed in the plan, the guiding principal was that “batteries
were to be pushed as far forward as the tactical situation permits.” The
plan also directed that “previous to ‘D’ day,” the 67th FA Brigade was to
take up positions “as far advanced as compatible with conservation of the
material and replenishment of ammunition,” so that it would be sure to
have the capability of ring the entire barrage without advancing.
26
In fact,
General Gatley procured enough of the long distance 1917 Model “D”
shell to enable both the 67th and 1st FA Brigades to re the barrage all the
way through the nal objective without having to advance their batteries.
27
The divisional plan also had an additional measure of exibility in its
rolling barrage, which was inserted to limit the damage that would result
from one of the more common problems in previous American attacks.
The attack order stated that “should the infantry at any time be unable to
keep up with the barrage, the barrage may be recalled to some well estab-
lished line, to rest there until the infantry lines are adjusted.”
28
This was, of
course, easier to write into an attack order than to accomplish in the midst
of an attack that was, by denition, not going well, but it does represent an
important attempt to solve an all too common problem.
As at the AEF’s previous oensive at St. Mihiel, the corps instructions
called for accompanying guns to be used in the attack. Aultman directed
that “batteries or single guns will be detailed, after consultation with Di-
vision and Infantry Brigade Commanders, to accompany the advance of
the infantry, for the purpose of ring on Machine Gun nests.”
29
In this
regard, the divisional plan specied that one battalion each from the 12th
and 15th FA Regiments were “to be prepared to move forward for close
support of the infantry as soon as the advance of the infantry warranted
it.”
30
However, just as at St. Mihiel, the leadership of the 2nd Division
had no intention of breaking up these battalions and assigning the pieces
directly to individual infantry battalions. While still subject to requests
for re from any infantry unit, these battalions were to remain assigned to
and under the control of their respective artillery battalion, regimental and
brigade commanders.
31
All told, it was the most comprehensive repower employment plan
that the 2nd Division, or any other AEF division, had ever seen. Every-
thing was in place well in advance of the jump-o time, which was set
for 0530 on 1 November. During the artillery preparation, which began
promptly at 0330, all the guns assigned to the corps opened up on their
German targets, namely batteries and those infantry positions that were
able to deliver re upon American infantry at their starting positions.
Eighty gas projectors also red lethal chemicals on known machine-gun
75
nests, observation posts, and suspected enemy machine-gun positions in
no-man’s land. Ten minutes before H hour (the designated time to start),
the standing barrage was put down in front of the German forward posi-
tions, as was a thick smoke screen to hide the American infantry moving
up to the barrage. At 0530 the barrage rolled forward, and the attacking
infantry battalions of the 2nd Division began their advance, assisted by
one company of 15 tanks.
32
The Attack
Three regiments moved forward simultaneously, with the leading bat-
talions of the 6th Marine, 5th Marine, and 23rd Infantry Regiments cover-
ing the 4-kilometer-wide divisional front. The 9th Regiment advanced in
support. Reports from across the front agree that the rst German positions
“did not oer a great deal of resistance.” On the right, the 23rd Regiment
“followed the barrage closely,” cleared out the enemy strong points in the
Bois de Hazois, and reached the rst objective at the scheduled time.
33
At
this point the divisional front narrowed, and the 23rd Regiment moved
to the left and took a support position behind the two Marine regiments.
After the 30 minute rest at the rst objective, the Marines continued the
advance, meeting only slight enemy resistance, and taking “one objective
after another on scheduled time.” At the third and nal objective the Ma-
rines consolidated their positions and sent patrols forward to the “exploita-
tion line.”
34
The 9th and 23rd Regiments dug in behind them for the night.
The rst day’s attack was an unequivocal success; the division had
broken through the enemy’s main line of resistance, advanced 9 kilome-
ters, and had suered light casualties.
35
It was another well-executed set-
piece attack, like the 1st Division’s assault of Cantigny in May, the 2nd
Division’s seizure of Vaux in July, and the initial phase of the First Army’s
attack on the St. Mihiel salient in September. On 1 November, the 2nd
Division took all of its assigned objectives without any serious diculties.
Strategically, the division had achieved one of the main objectives of the
campaign, as the German Army’s critically important Metz-Sedan railroad
line had been brought within range of heavy artillery re. Regarding the
one-day advance of his division, Lejeune proudly claimed that it funda-
mentally changed the remainder of the oensive. For the Germans, the
attack changed their defensive plan from one of “stubborn resistance, in
a prepared position, to one of a series of holding engagements.”
36
For the
Americans, the operation changed “from that of a prepared attack, with
a dened objective, to one of exploitation of a success already gained.”
37
76
For the second time in less than a month, the artillery had proven
itself more than equal to the tasks assigned it in the initial attack. The
infantry was even more impressed with the artillery support of the 1 No-
vember assault than they were for the support of the rst attack at Blanc
Mont. The acting commander of the 3rd Brigade, Colonel Robert O. Van
Horn, claimed that the preliminary preparation “was the most intense and
best executed of any preceding any attack of the brigade [sic].”
38
Briga-
dier General Wendell C. Neville, commanding the 4th Brigade, credited
the “thorough” preparation with causing the withdrawal of a portion of
the German forces.
39
The counter-battery eort also appears to have been
successful, as some reports stated that the German artillery response was
“weak” or “light,” and others did not even deem it worthy of mention.
40
As for the artillery re accompanying the assault, a commander in the
3rd Brigade claimed that the “resistance of the enemy was shattered by the
intensity and rapidity of the barrage re” and that it was “most eective.”
Colonel Stone of the 23rd Infantry Regiment reported that “the initial at-
tack was marked by a brilliant coordination of arms, the artillery laying
down an absolutely smothering barrage which the infantry followed close-
ly. . . . Attention must again be called to the wonderful work of our artil-
lery in the rst ghting. Our troops have never advanced behind a more
perfect barrage.”
41
These reports are conrmed by the commander of the
tank company that accompanied the initial assault. Captain C. H. Barnard
reported that when his tanks advanced at “H” hour, they found that “the
artillery work had been so thorough that there was very little wire to be cut
and practically no machine gun resistance except for an isolated gun here
and there which they destroyed.”
42
The 2nd FA Brigade also appears to have been very successful in mov-
ing forward during the initial attack. As early as 0745, General Bowley
reported to the corps headquarters that his rst batteries were moving for-
ward “as per the schedule.”
43
By 1230, the advance battalions were in
forward positions ring the rolling barrage, and the other light battalions
had been in motion for hours. The rst battalion of 155s was on the road
forward at 1000, and the other two were advancing before 1700. Every
gun in the brigade was therefore in a forward position in time to guard
the day’s gains throughout the rst night. While the 1st FA Brigade also
moved forward that evening, the 2nd Division did lose the support of the
67th FA Brigade, as that brigade was returned to its parent division.
44
This
meant that by the beginning of the rst night of the oensive, the division
had already lost one third of its divisional artillery strength.
77
On the night of 1 November, V Corps ordered the 2nd Division to pre-
pare to change directions and advance due west, in order to make a ank
attack on the German forces opposing the American division on its left.
However, early the next morning the corps changed its mind and directed
the division to continue advancing to the north. Due to these changes in or-
ders, the division made no advance until that night.
45
After passing through
the 4th Brigade, the 3rd Brigade formed its regiments in one long column
of twos, with advance and ank guards, and made a bold advance under
cover of darkness and rain some 3 kilometers to the “exploitation line”
given in the rst day’s orders. The night march took the regiments through
the Bois de Folie, which was still laced with German soldiers performing
a rear-guard mission. By 0600, 3 November, the brigade was on its objec-
tive and was ready to continue the attack. Six hours later it had advanced
another 4 kilometers, and found itself facing a German defensive position
that was supported by artillery and Minenwerfers (trench mortars), at the
south edge of the Bois de Belval.
46
Although the supporting batteries from Colonel Davis’s 15th FA had
just moved to more advanced positions that day, the 3rd Brigade had no
trouble arranging for re to be brought on the German positions. Colonel
Van Horn reported that the supporting guns from the 15th FA “shot up the
resistance with good eectiveness.”
47
After blasting the edge of the woods,
the artillery red a rolling barrage of sorts that advanced along a road
Figure 4.3. US Army 108th Field Artillery in action during the Meuse-Argonne
campaign, October–November 1918. Photo courtesy of US Army Center of
Military History.
78
through the woods, concentrating its re to cover just 200 yards on each
side of the road. That evening the 9th and 23rd Regiments again formed
into columns of two and followed an advance guard through the woods,
advancing some 6 kilometers that night. By midnight on 3 November,
the leading elements of the division were some 8 kilometers ahead of the
divisions on their anks. The success of the night march also proved the
disorganization rampant in the forward German units at that time. Whole
groups of German ocers and soldiers were captured while sitting in well-
lit farm houses, or while asleep in the woods, all totally unaware of the
depth of the American advance.
48
Finally, on the morning of 4 November, the Germans were able to
piece together a strong line of resistance with well-organized machine-gun
nests, 2 kilometers south of the town of Beaumont. When Colonel James
C. Rhea, the new commander of the 3rd Brigade, realized his forces were
up against a formidable enemy position, on dicult ground, with both
anks exposed, he reported the situation to General Lejeune, who ordered
the brigade to continue the advance. Rhea claimed that he had just one bat-
talion from the 15th FA in position to support the attack. While the attack
succeeded in breaking the German line and in continuing the advance for
about a kilometer, Rhea said it was only accomplished “at the expense of
heavy casualties, the losses being in the neighborhood of 1,000 casualties,
with a high percentage killed.”
49
Why was there so little artillery support available for this particu-
lar attack? The division was in its fourth day of continuous operations,
during which it had by this time advanced more than 20 kilometers. The
division was straining its logistical elements to the limit, and the constant
rain made that strain much worse. Rhea stated that the roads in his sector
“were at rst almost impassable, and after November 3rd were entirely
impassable.”
50
The artillery, and all of its ammunition, had to make its
way forward either cross-country or by using the congested roads in other
divisional sectors. A divisional inspector reported that all roads in the 2nd
Division’s sector were “axle deep in mud,” and that he had personally wit-
nessed a team of “22 horses hitched to one gun and they could just move
it in the mud.”
51
A second factor contributing to the lack of artillery support was that
on 4 November the 4th Brigade moved out of its support role to advance
into the divisional sector not covered by the 3rd Brigade’s night marches.
Therefore, the Marine brigade was using the batteries of Lieutenant Col-
onel John A. Holabird’s 12th FA to support that movement.
52
The 1st FA
Brigade had been returned to its parent division that day as well, which
79
meant that while the leading infantry battalions for the 1 November attack
had the dedicated support of more than three whole artillery brigades, just
three days later the assaulting infantry units were reduced to scraping to-
gether as many guns as they could get from their one supporting regiment
of light guns and half of the 17th FA.
To make matters worse, division inspectors had reported to the Inspec-
tor General of the AEF, and through him to Major General Summerall, that
the 2nd Division did not properly employ “accompanying guns” during the
initial assault, as per the corps order. Pressured to rectify this irregularity,
General Lejeune ordered that as of 3 November, accompanying artillery
was to be detailed to the infantry, with two guns going to each battalion in
the front line.
53
Therefore, those guns were probably not available to the
regimental artillery commander at a time when he was called on to provide
the greatest possible concentration of re.
On 4 and 5 November, both infantry brigades pressed towards the
Meuse River, and the German forces opposing them fought rear-guard
actions to enable the greatest number of German troops and materiel to
get behind their new line of resistance across the river. From 6 to 10 No-
vember, the infantry brigades improved their positions on the west bank
of the Meuse, all the while being subjected to heavy German artillery re
from across the river. The artillery brigade also established gun positions
in preparation for supporting an eventual crossing of the river.
54
Finally, late on 9 November, General Lejeune complied with corps di-
rectives and ordered his troops to cross the Meuse in two places on the fol-
lowing night. General Neville was ordered to command a crossing force
composed of troops from two V Corps divisions, the 2nd and 89th Divi-
sions. Neville requested that the orders be changed to allow for a daytime
crossing at just one location, since he was convinced of the strength of the
German positions on the east bank and because he had “little artillery with
which to support even one crossing.” The requests were denied.
55
The 12th
FA and four batteries of the 17th FA were to support the northern crossing
near Mouzon, which was thought of as the main eort. The 15th FA, along
with the other two batteries of 155s, were assigned to the southern cross-
ing near Letanne. The crossings were attempted at 2130, preceded by an
hour-long artillery preparation. At Mouzon, the responding German re
was so strong that the engineers and infantrymen could not even get the
temporary bridges across. At Letanne, the German gunners were slower in
identifying the crossing point and three battalions from the two attacking
divisions were able to ght their way across the foot bridges and establish
positions east of the river. However, the casualties sustained in these “sur-
80
prise” attacks were heavy; General Summerall even called them “exces-
sive.”
56
Within hours of the crossing the armistice took eect, and the war
was over. The 2nd FA Brigade had red its last shell of the war.
57
The attack of the 2nd Division in the third phase of the Meuse-Argonne
campaign was viewed by many in the AEF as being the most successful
American attack of the entire war. In eleven days it advanced some 29 ki-
lometers, captured more than 1,700 prisoners and 105 artillery pieces, and
suered 3,299 casualties.
58
However, just as with the previous oensives,
an operational analysis demonstrates that the division, the V Corps, and
the First Army, showed both its strengths and its weaknesses at dierent
parts of the campaign.
There can be no doubt that the preliminary bombardment was eec-
tive, as noted above. The decision to pull back the barrage for the last
ten minutes of the preparation demonstrated an ability to adapt to the
changing tactics of the enemy, and may have been an important measure
of the success of the initial assault.
59
Another factor crucial to the success
of the attack was the use of massive quantities of gas in the preparato-
ry bombardment to neutralize both German batteries and infantry strong
points. Rexmond Cochrane, in his analysis on the American use of gas in
the Meuse-Argonne, asserted that “the gas plan for the nal assault [on 1
November] was the best that could have been devised, and it succeeded
exactly as planned.”
60
Despite these achievements, probably the most signicant innovation
made in the nal attack was the massive, overpowering rolling barrage that
incorporated both heavy and light artillery throughout its execution. While
the 2nd Division, and the AEF in general, had previously used heavy guns
to re in concentrations in advance of the 75-mm rolling barrage, the goal of
that re had always been to “soften-up” known or suspected obstacles that
the infantry was eventually going to meet. The attack on 1 November was
the rst to incorporate the heavy guns into a comprehensive infantry sup-
port re-plan that had as its goal the neutralization of “only those positions
from which re could be delivered upon our infantry at that moment.”
61
The
use of this “thick” barrage was the result of a victory by those in the AEF
who were convinced that, regardless of what General Pershing thought the
infantryman could accomplish with just his rie and bayonet, “the assault
battalions must be covered by artillery and machine gun re in all stages of
the advance.”
62
The results achieved by the 2nd Division and the entire V
Corps on 1 November attest to the eectiveness of that principle.
81
Of course, covering the infantry attack with re was much easier to
arrange on the rst day of the attack, and the 2nd Division proved the
necessity for overwhelming re-power again in the later stages of the at-
tack by demonstrating the costs of not being able to provide it. Just as at
Blanc Mont in early October, the number of guns assigned to the divi-
sion became smaller and smaller as the attack progressed. When situations
arose in which the attacking infantry needed strong, concentrated artillery
support, as occurred with the 3rd Brigade on 4 November and to the 4th
Marine Brigade in its attempt to cross the Meuse, the divisional artillery
brigade was often unable to provide adequate support on its own. This
insucient artillery support was not caused solely by a reduction in avail-
able repower, but also by the compression in the amount of time allowed
to properly prepare and coordinate the repower that was assigned. For the
Meuse crossings, senior ocers in the division attempted to secure the use
of allied aircraft to get updated photographs of the new German defenses
so that the re-plan for the attack would adequately suppress enemy re.
Colonel Dan Moore, who replaced Bowley as commander of the artillery
brigade, asserted that “if photos had been available for the preparation of
the attack for the crossing of the Meuse, a much more intelligent bom-
bardment of the enemy’s machine gun and battery positions might have
been undertaken, and the crossing probably would have been a success at
Mouzon.”
63
The lack of time and resources available to adequately support
infantry attacks in the “exploitation” phase were factors that caused the
2nd Division trouble throughout the war.
The use of “accompanying guns” was one innovative attempt to pro-
vide artillery support to the infantry attacking in the “exploitation” phase.
However, when General Aultman, the Chief of Artillery for V Corps, re-
ported that the 2nd Division could only make “little use” of its accompany-
ing guns and that “they were of no value to the artillery” during the period
they were parceled out to the infantry, it was an all too common description
of the use of accompanying guns by American units.
64
Clearly, Lejeune and
Bowley shared a dislike for accompanying guns and were convinced that
despite the problems of attempting to employ masses of artillery after the
initial assault, it was better to maintain a system that enabled the possibility
of concentrating a “more eective volume of re . . . on any point desired”
than to break up the guns and hope that they would be used to provide
some support at critical points in the attack.
65
Colonel Moore, Bowley’s re-
placement, closed his operations report for the Meuse-Argonne campaign
by asserting that attacking divisions get the “best results from artillery by
placing artillery support in the hands of the artillery regiment and battal-
82
ion commanders, who follow the advance closely and solve the problems
of enemy resistance through direct liaison with the infantry.”
66
However,
keeping all the guns “close” and the liaison “direct” was easier said than
done, and the division never fully met either challenge.
The infantry regiments of the 2nd Division made much better use of
a dierent innovation to reduce their susceptibility to enemy repower
in the “exploitation” phase of the attack. The night marches were clearly
an attempt by the attacking infantry to continue to make aggressive ad-
vances in the midst of the enemy, without having to measure their own
repower against that of the enemy. It was a brilliant and bold tactic, and
each maneuver surely saved many lives and much hard ghting. However,
it is also clear that such a tactic would have been suicidal just one month
earlier had it been tried at Blanc Mont, or just about anywhere else on the
Western Front. From 3 November on, the German forces in the Meuse-Ar-
gonne were disorganized and frantically attempting to withdraw to a posi-
tion east of the river, and that is what allowed the night marches to be such
a success.
67
It is important to realize that even though the German forces
were in the midst of a rather disorganized withdrawal, they still were able
on two occasions to confront the advancing forces of the 2nd Division and
inict heavy casualties on them.
Nevertheless, the German forces that were hurled back some 9 kilome-
ters during the initial assault on 1 November were, while tired and depleted,
neither disorganized nor seriously considering a withdrawal. Those forces
were resoundingly defeated by a 2nd Division force that proved, once again,
that it could deliver an extremely eective set-piece attack. It was only in
the later stages of the “exploitation” that the 2nd Division showed that it still
was battling the troubles caused by a doctrine that was ill-suited to its area
of expertise. Even at the end of the war, Pershing’s query from 8 August
was still very pertinent to AEF operations in the “exploitation” phase of
any attack--perhaps they were still “losing too many men,” and perhaps the
doctrine Pershing relied on deserved a share of the blame.
68
In its three nal attacks, at St. Mihiel, Blanc Mont, and the Meuse-Ar-
gonne, the 2nd Division positively demonstrated what it had given strong
hints of at Vaux and Soissons—that it could execute limited, set-piece at
-
tacks with great success. It succeeded against determined defenders who
were in strong defensive positions, and did so without suering excessive
casualties. It even proved capable of successfully executing these attacks
despite being given insucient time to prepare (e.g. at Blanc Mont) and
having the divisions on its anks make unimpressive supporting advances
83
(e.g. Blanc Mont and Meuse-Argonne). What also emerged, most notably
in the nal two oensives, was a desire on the part of the senior divisional
ocers to break from ocial AEF doctrine and ght for limited objectives
by maximizing the use of artillery. On the negative side, the division strug
-
gled to make successful attacks after the initial assault. Though the division
may have been inclined to hold its new lines and make preparations for ad
-
ditional artillery-centered, set-piece attacks, the French and American high
commands each compelled it to press ahead. These follow-on attacks near
-
ly always led to excessive casualties, while yielding unimpressive gains.
Conclusion
What are the lessons to be gained from this case-study of large-scale
combat operations waged a hundred years ago? First, combat doctrine, and
the operational plans based on it, must match the capabilities of the units
that will have to conduct the operations. Whether there are, as General
Pershing believed, unchanging “essential principles of war” or not, a mis-
match between unit capabilities and ocial doctrine can be disastrous.
69
However, when operational plans properly consider the actual capabili
-
ties of the combat units that are expected to carry out the attacks, even
relatively inexperienced units—and in the fall of 1918, nearly all AEF
units were relatively inexperienced by modern standards—can achieve
remarkable results. Second, unit commanders, at all levels, must be will-
ing to innovate and adapt in order to succeed on the modern battleeld,
even if that means choosing what works best over doctrinal orthodoxy.
Third, despite the desire to keep the pressure on the enemy and drive
forward until his forces collapse, sometimes it may be wiser to pause and
allow one’s own forces to regroup.
During his time as First Army commander, General Pershing attempt-
ed to push the enemy to the breaking point by conducting three weeks of
nearly non-stop attacks. By mid-October, his forces were bloodied, worn
out, disorganized, and unable to conduct large-scale combat operations
eciently. While the defending Germans were hard-pressed, the front-
line American forces lacked the power to conduct even attritional warfare
eectively, much less force a breakthrough. Lieutenant General Liggett
wisely chose to stop these inecient attacks and give his forces time to
ret and reorganize. The remarkable success of the First Army’s attack on
1 November shows that Liggett chose wisely, and that certain AEF units,
such as the 2nd Division and the V Corps, had learned how to succeed on
the modern battleeld.
84
Notes
1. Major General Charles P. Summerall, “Comments by the Corps Com-
mander upon the Operations of the Fifth Army Corps,” in V Corps Historical
File, Entry 1118, RG 120, NA.
2. This chapter includes excerpts from Mark E. Grotelueschen, Doctrine
Under Trial: American Artillery Employment in World War I (Westport, CT:
Greenwood Press, 2001). For a detailed study on the case of the 35th Division,
see Robert Ferrell, Collapse at Meuse-Argonne: The Failure of the Missou-
ri-Kansas Division (Columbia, MO: University of Missouri Press, 2004).
3. Of the initial nine divisions that attacked on 26 September, three had
to replaced within the rst week, and four lasted just eight days. Casualties
for these divisions were: 35th: 6,006 in six days; 91st: 4,768 in eight days,
37th: 3,060 in ve days, 79th: 3,529 in ve days. American Battle Monuments
Commission, American Armies and Battleelds in Europe (Washington, DC: US
GPO, 1992), 327–28.
4. David F. Trask, The AEF and Coalition Warmaking, (Lawrence, KS:
University Press of Kansas, 1993), 122–23, 149.
5. Allan R. Millett, The General (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1975),
399.
6. The German Army used gas extensively in the 1918 spring oensives to
neutralize both enemy infantry and artillery. In the Chemin des Dames oensive,
50 percent of the three million artillery rounds red on the rst day were gas
rounds. See David T. Zabecki, The German 1918 Oensives: A Case Study in
The Operational Level of War (Routledge, 2006).
7. “The failure to use gas in the Argonne and on the 5th Corps front in the
opening assault were therefore major blunders,” according to Rexmond Co-
chrane, The Use of Gas in the Meuse-Argonne Campaign, September-November
1918, Study #10, US Army Chemical Corps Historical Studies: Gas Warfare
in World War I (Army Chemical Center, Maryland, 1958), 90. While Cochrane
asserted that there was no sign of any shortage of gas shells for the First Army,
Colonel Conrad Lanza, the Chief of Operations for the First Army Artillery
during the campaign, claimed that plans to use great quantities of gas shell “had
to be abandoned due to the fact that nothing like the amount of gas shell asked
for could be had.” See Conrad H. Lanza, The Army Artillery, First Army (United
States, s.n., no date), ii. This undated typescript unit history was commissioned
by the War Department, and is held at the U.S. Army Military History Institute,
Carlisle Barracks, PA. The testimony of General Charles P. Summerall, a divi-
sion and corps commander in the campaign, supports Lanza’s claim. He stated
that “the Corps was at all times anxious to re large quantities of non-persistent
gas and the amount of gas so red was only limited by the supply that could be
obtained.” See Major General Charles P. Summerall, “Comments by the Corps
Commander upon the Operations of the Fifth Army Corps,” 4, V Corps Histori-
cal File, Entry 1118, RG 120 NA.
85
8. Conrad H. Lanza, “The Artillery Support of the Infantry in the A.E.F”
Field Artillery Journal (January–March, 1936): 70–71.
9. “Report of Operations During the Period Nov. 1st to Nov. 11th,” HQ 2nd
FA Brigade, 26 December 1918, Folder 15, 2nd Division les, G-3 Reports,
AEF/GHQ, Entry 270, RG 120, NA; Lieutenant William D. Bickham and Major
William Burr, “Second Field Artillery Brigade History,” 22, undated typescript,
2nd FA Brigade Historical File, Entry 1246-11.4, RG 120, NA.
10. The division received the rst drafts of the First Army and V Corps
plans on 24 October, Oliver Spaulding and John W. Wright, The Second Divi-
sion: American Expeditionary Force in France, 1917–1919 (New York: The
Hillman Press, 1937), 198; “Report of Operations, 3rd Brigade from October 17,
1918 to 2nd Nov, 1918,” Folder 50, 2nd Division les, G-3 Reports, AEF/GHQ,
Entry 270, RG 120, NA.
11. Field Orders No. 88, First Army, AEF, 27 October, 1918, in Department
of the Army, United States Army in the World War 9 (Washington, DC: GPO,
1948), 333–49 (hereafter USAWW).
12. Major General Charles P. Summerall lecture, “Recent Operations from
the Standpoint of Employment of Artillery with Particular Reference to Co-op-
eration between the Infantry and the Artillery,” 5, to the ACAS, on 16 December
1918, in Folder 14, ACAS Files, Entry 371, RG 120, NA.
13. Field Order No. 101, V Corps, 28 October, 1918, in US Army, 2nd Di-
vision, Records of the Second Division (Regular) 1 (Washington DC: Army War
College, 1924), (hereafter RSD).
14. The farthest main line of resistance (south of the Meuse) for the Germans
was the Freya Stellung, which was within 6 kilometers of the 2nd Division’s
jump-o position and as close as 4 kilometers to the 89th Division’s front lines.
15. Cochrane, The Use of Gas, 4.
16. Lanza, “Artillery Support,” 75.
17. Lanza, 75.
18. Major General Charles P. Summerall lecture, “Recent Operations from
the Standpoint of Employment of Artillery with Particular Reference to Co-oper-
ation between the Infantry and the Artillery,” 1-2, to the ACAS, on 16 December
1918, in Folder 14, ACAS Files, Entry 371, RG 120, NA.
19. See Summerall lecture, “Recent Operations from the Standpoint of
Employment of Artillery with Particular Reference to Co-operation between the
Infantry and the Artillery,” 1–2, to the ACAS, on 16 December 1918, in Folder
14, ACAS Files, Entry 371, RG 120, NA.
20. Operations Order No. 5, “Plan of Attack,” Artillery HQ, V Corps, 29
October, 1918, V Corps Historical File, Entry 1118, RG 120, NA.
21. This number comes from General Lejeune. How many machines guns
were involved throughout the whole of V Corps front is not known. John A. Le-
jeune, The Reminiscences of a Marine (Philadelphia, PA: Dorrance, 1930), 384.
22. Spaulding and Wright, The Second Division, 199–200.
23. Operations Order No. 5, “Plan of Attack,” Artillery HQ, V Corps, 29
October 1918, V Corps Historical File, Entry 1118, RG 120, NA.
86
24. Operations Order No. 5, “Plan of Attack,” Artillery HQ, V Corps, 29
October, 1918, V Corps Historical File, Entry 1118, RG 120, NA.
25. Summerall stated that the 2nd Division had 236 divisional guns, the
89th Division had 208 guns, and that they shared 152 corps guns, including the
dedicated army groups that were put under corps direction. This was spread on
an eight kilometer front, giving the corps an artillery density of one 75-mm gun
for each 29 meters, a 155-mm or 8 howitzer for every 39 meters, and a 105-mm
or 155-mm gun for every 69 meters of front. The division also had a battery (12)
of six-inch Newton Mortars, and a number of gas projectors. Memo, Summerall
to Deputy Chief of Sta, AEF, 5 January 1919, V Corps Historical File, Entry
1118, RG 120, NA; Operations Order No. 5, “Plan of Attack,” Artillery HQ, V
Corps, 29 October, 1918, V Corps Historical File, Entry 1118, RG 120, NA.
26. Operations Order No. 5, “Plan of Attack,” Artillery HQ, V Corps, 29
October, 1918, V Corps Historical File, Entry 1118, RG 120, NA.
27. Spaulding and Wright, The Second Division, 200.
28. Field Order No. 49, HQ the 2nd Division, 0700, 31 October 1918, 2nd
Division Historical File, Entry 1241-32.1, RG 120, NA.
29. Operations Order No. 5, “Plan of Attack,” Artillery HQ, V Corps, 29
October, 1918, V Corps Historical File, Entry 1118, RG 120, NA.
30. “Report of Operations, 2nd FA Brigade,” Folder 15, 2nd Division les,
G-3 Reports, AEF/GHQ, Entry 270, RG 120, NA.
31. “Report of Operations, 2nd FA Brigade,” Folder 15, 2nd Division les,
G-3 Reports, AEF/GHQ, Entry 270, RG 120, NA.
32. Each battery in the rst battalion of the 12th FA red 400 rounds at
enemy strong points and forward positions. “Report on advance of 1st Btn, 12
FA, Nov. 1,” Folder 9, 2nd Division les, G-3 Reports, AEF/GHQ, Entry 270,
RG 120, NA; Summerall lecture, “Recent Operations from the Standpoint of
Employment of Artillery with Particular Reference to Co-operation between the
Infantry and the Artillery,” 1–2, to the ACAS, on 16 December 1918, in Folder
14, ACAS Files, Entry 371, RG 120, NA; “Report of Operations from Sept. 26th
to Nov. 8th, 1918,” HQ V Corps-Artillery, 14 November, 1918, V Corps His-
torical File, Entry 1118, RG 120, NA; Memo, “Projected Use of Gas Troops,”
26 October 1918, 2d Battalion, First Gas Regiment, to V Corps Commander,
Folder 14, 2nd Division les, G-3 Reports, AEF/GHQ, Entry 270, RG 120, NA;
Spaulding and Wright, The Second Division, 200.
33. “Report of Operations, 3rd Brigade from 17 Oct. 1918 to 2 Nov. 1918,”
Folder 50, 2nd Division les, G-3 Reports, AEF/GHQ, Entry 270, RG 120, NA.
34. “Operations Report, 4th Brigade, Marines, 24 Oct.–11 Nov.,” Folder 87,
2nd Division les, G-3 Reports, AEF/GHQ, Entry 270, RG 120, NA.
35. General Neville, whose Marine battalions served as the assault troops for
all three rst day objectives, estimated that his brigade suered casualties of just
ve percent of the forces engaged on that day. Lejeune reported that “the prisoners
taken exceeded the losses sustained on that day.” “Operations Report, 4th Brigade,
Marines, 24 Oct.–11 Nov.,” Folder 87, 2nd Division les, G-3 Reports, AEF/
GHQ, Entry 270, RG 120, NA; “Report of Operations, 3rd Brigade from Oct. 17,
87
1918 to 2 Nov. 1918,” Folder 50, 2nd Division les, G-3 Reports, AEF/GHQ,
Entry 270, RG 120, NA; “Operations Report of the 2d Division,” RSD, vol. 1.
36. “Operations Report of the 2d Division.”
37. “Operations Report of the 2d Division.”
38. “Report of Operations, 3rd Brigade from Oct. 17, 1918 to 2 Nov. 1918,”
Folder 50, 2nd Division les, G-3 Reports, AEF/GHQ, Entry 270, RG 120, NA.
39. “Operations Report, 4th Brigade, Marines, 24 Oct.–11 Nov.,” Folder 87,
2nd Division les, G-3 Reports, AEF/GHQ, Entry 270, RG 120, NA.
40. No unit in the 3rd Brigade even mentioned German artillery re during
this attack. “Records of Telephone Messages Sent and Received, Nov. 1st to
Nov. 11th, inclusive,” V Corps Historical File, Entry 1118, RG 120, NA; “Oper-
ations Report, 4th Brigade, Marines, 24 Oct.–11 Nov,” Folder 87, 2nd Division
les, G-3 Reports, AEF/GHQ, Entry 270, RG 120, NA.
41. “Report of Operations,” 3rd Brigade, Nov. 2–11 and “Report of Opera-
tions, Nov. 1–11, 23d Infantry,” 27 November 1918, found in “Report of Units
of 2nd Division, Meuse-Argonne Oensive, No. 1-11, 1918,” Folder 15, 2nd
Division les, G-3 Reports, AEF/GHQ, Entry 270, RG 120, NA.
42. Of the 15 tanks that started with the 2nd Division, only six reached even
the rst objective. The rest either broke down, or were “hung up” in tank traps,
ditches, or deep shell holes. The 4th Brigade said they were “ably supported by
the tanks” while the 23rd Infantry claimed that the “tanks failed to keep up and
were of little assistance.” See “Report of Operations, 1st Provisional Tank Com-
pany, 1st Brigade Tanks,” 1 November 1918, in 2nd Division Historical Files,
Entry 1241-33.0, RG 120, NA; “Operations Report, 4th Brigade, Marines, 24
Oct.–11 Nov,” Folder 87, 2nd Division les, G-3 Reports, AEF/GHQ, Entry 270,
RG 120, NA; “Report of Operations, Nov. 1–11, 23d Infantry,” 27 November
1918, found in “Report of Units of 2nd Division, Meuse-Argonne Oensive, No.
1-11, 1918,” Folder 15, 2nd Division les, G-3 Reports, AEF/GHQ, Entry 270,
RG 120, NA.
43. “Records of Telephone Messages Sent and Received, Nov. 1st to Nov.
11th, inclusive,” V Corps Historical File, Entry 1118, RG 120, NA.
44. “Records of Telephone Messages Sent and Received, Nov. 1st to Nov. 11th
inclusive,” V Corps Historical File, Entry 1118, RG 120, NA; “Report of Opera-
tions during the Period Nov. 1st to Nov. 11th,” HQ 2d FA Brigade, Dec. 26, 1918,
Folder 15, 2nd Division les, G-3 Reports, AEF/GHQ, Entry 270, RG 120, NA.
45. “Operations Report,” 2nd Division, RSD, vol. 1.
46. “Report of Operations,” 3rd Brigade, Nov. 2–11, in “Report of Units
of 2nd Division, Meuse-Argonne Oensive, No. 1-11, 1918,” Folder 15, 2nd
Division les, G-3 Reports, AEF/GHQ, Entry 270, RG 120, NA; Spaulding and
Wright, The Second Division, 208, 210.
47. One battalion from the 17th FA had been assigned to the 15th FA for
advanced operations on this day and took part in the shelling of the German po-
sitions in the woods. “Report of Operations, Nov. 1–11, 9th Infantry Regiment,”
29 November 1918, Folder 15, 2nd Division les, G-3 Reports, AEF/GHQ,
Entry 270, RG 120, NA; Spaulding and Wright, The Second Division, 208–09.
88
48. “Report of Operations,” 3rd Brigade, Nov. 2–11, in “Report of Units
of 2nd Division, Meuse-Argonne Oensive, No. 1-11, 1918,” Folder 15, 2nd
Division les, G-3 Reports, AEF/GHQ, Entry 270, RG 120, NA; “Operations
Report,” 2d Division, RSD, vol. 1.
49. “Report of Operations,” 3rd Brigade, Nov. 2–11, in “Report of Units
of 2nd Division, Meuse-Argonne Oensive, No. 1-11, 1918,” Folder 15, 2nd
Division les, G-3 Reports, AEF/GHQ, Entry 270, RG 120, NA.
50. “Report of Operations,” 3rd Brigade, Nov. 2–11, in “Report of Units
of 2nd Division, Meuse-Argonne Oensive, No. 1-11, 1918,” Folder 15, 2nd
Division les, G-3 Reports, AEF/GHQ, Entry 270, RG 120, NA.
51. “Report of Operations,” 3rd Brigade, Nov. 2–11, in “Report of Units
of 2nd Division, Meuse-Argonne Oensive, No. 1-11, 1918,” Folder 15, 2nd
Division les, G-3 Reports, AEF/GHQ, Entry 270, RG 120, NA; Report of 14
November 1918, in Inspection Reports of Armies, Divisions and Corps, Entry
590, RG 120, NA.
52. “Operations Report, 4th Brigade, Marines, 24 Oct.–11 Nov,” Folder 87,
2nd Division les, G-3 Reports, AEF/GHQ, Entry 270, RG 120, NA.
53. “Report of Operations from Sept. 26th to Nov. 8th, 1918,” HQ V
Corps-Artillery, 14 November, 1918, V Corps Historical File, Entry 1118, RG
120, NA; Report of Colonel J. C. Johnson, Inspector General, “Operations and
Conditions, 2d and 89th Divisions, V Corps, 1–3 Nov. 1918,” and Memo, Major
General A. W. Brewster, AEF Inspector General to V Corps Commander, subject:
“Use of Artillery 2nd Division,” both in Artillery folder, Entry 590, RG 120, NA.
54. “Report of Operations during the Period Nov. 1st to Nov. 11th,” HQ 2d
FA Brigade, Dec. 26, 1918, Folder 15, 2nd Division les, G-3 Reports, AEF/
GHQ, Entry 270, RG 120, NA; “Report of Operations,” 3rd Brigade, Nov.
2–11, in “Report of Units of 2nd Division, Meuse-Argonne Oensive, No. 1-11,
1918,” Folder 15, 2nd Division les, G-3 Reports, AEF/GHQ, Entry 270, RG
120, NA; “Operations Report, 4th Brigade, Marines, 24 Oct.–11 Nov,” Folder
87, 2nd Division les, G-3 Reports, AEF/GHQ, Entry 270, RG 120, NA.
55. “Operations Report,” 2d Division, RSD, vol. 1; “Operations Report, 4th
Brigade, Marines, 24 Oct.–11 Nov,” Folder 87, 2nd Division les, G-3 Reports,
AEF/GHQ, Entry 270, RG 120, NA; Spaulding and Wright, The Second Divi-
sion, 219–20.
56. Memo, Summerall to Deputy Chief of Sta, AEF, 5 January 1919, 6, V
Corps Historical File, Entry 1118, RG 120, NA.
57. “Operations Report, 4th Brigade, Marines, 24 Oct. –11 Nov,” Folder 87,
2nd Division les, G-3 Reports, AEF/GHQ, Entry 270, RG 120, NA; Spaulding
and Wright, The Second Division, 219–20.
58. Again, the ABMC total for casualties is slightly lower, 3282; the gure
in the text is taken from the report of 2nd Division Commander (Major General
John A. Lejeune), to Assistant Chief of Sta, G-3, GHQ, AEF, Subject: “Opera-
tions Information,” 30 December 1918, in Reports and Other Records Regarding
the History of AEF Units, Divisional Skeleton Histories, Entry 443, RG 120, NA.
89
59. The US 80th Division, on the left ank of the 2nd Division on 1 No-
vember, was stopped immediately by machine guns that had slipped beyond the
artillery preparation and rolling barrage. The division inspector who investigated
the poor rst day showing of that division reported that they should have done
just what their neighbors to the right did. Memo for Inspector General, AEF,
titled “Observations with 1st and 5th Corps,” 8 November 1918, in “Inspection
Reports of Armies, Divisions, and Corps,” Entry 590, RG 120, NA.
60. Cochrane, The Use of Gas, 91.
61. Summerall, “Recent Operations from the Standpoint of Employment of
Artillery with Particular Reference to Co-operation between the Infantry and the
Artillery,” lecture to the ACAS on 16 December 1918 in Folder 14, ACAS Files,
Entry 371, RG 120, NA, 2–4.
62. Summerall, 2–4.
63. Colonel Moore replaced General Bowley on 3 November, as the latter
was promoted to be the Chief of Artillery for VI Corps; “Report of Operations
during the Period Nov. 1st to Nov. 11th,” HQ 2d FA Brigade, 26 December 1918,
Folder 15, 2nd Division les, G-3 Reports, AEF/GHQ, Entry 270, RG 120, NA.
64. General Lejeune said much the same thing when he asserted that “no
material advantage was gained” by his employment of accompanying guns. He
was convinced that “more satisfactory results are obtained when all of the artil-
lery remains under the control of the Artillery Commander and the 37mm. and
Stokes mortars are used to best advantage by the infantry.” Memo for Inspector
General (IG), AEF, 8 November 1918, subject: “Observations with First and
Fifth Corps with respect to Artillery in recent operations,” Entry 590, RG 120,
NA; “Report of Operations,” “Report of Operations from Sept. 26th to Nov.
8th, 1918,” HQ V Corps-Artillery, 14 November 1918, V Corps Historical File,
Entry 1118, RG 120, NA.
65. General Bowley told an Inspector General ocial that he “did not
believe in this use of accompanying guns.” Report of Colonel J. C. Johnson,
Inspector General, “Operations and Conditions, 2d and 89th Divisions, V Corps,
1–3 Nov. 1918,” and Memo, Major General A. W. Brewster, AEF Inspector
General to V Corps Commander, subject: “Use of Artillery 2nd Division,” both
in Artillery folder, Entry 590, RG 120, NA.
66. “Report of Operations during the Period Nov. 1st to Nov. 11th,” HQ
2d FA Brigade, 26 December 1918, Folder 15, 2nd Division les, G-3 Reports,
AEF/GHQ, Entry 270, RG 120, NA.
67. Spaulding and Wright, The Second Division, 210.
68. Pershing is quoted in James W. Rainey, “Ambivalent Warfare: The Tac-
tical Doctrine of the AEF in World War I,” Parameters, Journal of the US Army
War College, September 1983, 41.
69. Pershing issued ocial documents during the war stating that “the es-
sential principles of war have not changed,” and that “the fundamental principles
governing the conduct of re for eld artillery remain essentially unchanged.”
See USAWW, 3: 316–17, 326.
91
Chapter 5
The Division Artillery: Linking Strategy to Tactics in
Operations Desert Shield/Storm
Major Lincoln R. Ward
In 2016, with his initial message to the force, Chief of Sta of the
Army General Mark Milley established readiness as the top priority for
the US Army. Within the eld artillery branch, the implication was how
to achieve the highest level of readiness, while also preparing for ground
combat against a near peer competitor. Additionally, the deterioration of
the eld artillery in the 12 years of persistent low-intensity conict created
a sense of urgency within the Army that spawned the reestablishment of
the division artillery.
This chapter will identify how the division artillery can achieve the
Chief of Sta’s strategic guidance, specically the objective of readiness
“through the arrangement of tactical actions in time, space, and purpose.”
1
Operations Desert Shield and Storm, show the evolution of doctrine, or-
ganization, and employment of eld artillery against a near peer competi-
tor. The conduct of these operations demonstrated several of the tenets of
unied land operations, which “describes the Army’s approach to gener-
ating and applying combat power in campaigns and operations.”
2
Specif-
ically, the elements displayed were exibility, lethality, adaptability, and
synchronization. The division artillery acts as an operational artist, while
within modularity, there is no advocate for ensuring that subordinate eld
artillery units are getting the manning, training, and employment that pre-
pares them for future conict.
In April 2014, the Army re-established the division artillery, a brigade
level eld artillery headquarters. Its stated mission, not yet codied in doc
-
trine but outlined in a Fires Center of Excellence white paper, is to “ght
res for the division” and to “provide training certication standardization
of all eld artillery units in the division.”
3
This is further outlined in the US
Forces Command (FORSCOM) Division Artillery implementation order
addressing declining prociency levels, the ability to mass and synchronize
since the advent of modularity in 2003, and the decline of artillery skills as
a result of “in lieu of” missions in support of the Global War on Terror.
4
In
2015, the Army suspended the phased reestablishment of the division artil-
lery. This decision has caused uncertainty and confusion about the role of
the division artillery. Research ndings and historical context demonstrate
92
that the role of the division artillery will continue to be the link connecting
the Chief of Sta of the Army’s strategic guidance to tactical action.
5
Division Artillery’s Role in Large-Scale Combat Operations
In draft US Army doctrine, the role of the division artillery is to facil-
itate the training, manning, and equipping of eld artillery battalions, as
well as ensure the professional development of eld artillery Soldiers and
leaders.
6
In future conict, specically in large-scale combat operations
against a near peer adversary, the division artillery will be vital in synchro-
nizing and delivering accurate and timely res.
Historical case studies illustrate the role and eectiveness of division
artilleries in both large-scale combat operations and as a part of stability
operations. Operation Desert Shield and Operation Desert Storm provide
an invaluable case study in the train up, organization, and employment of
res in support of large-scale combat operations. An analysis of the Air-
Land Battle doctrine used during these two operations is also integrated
with the case study. This framework shows how the division artillery can
take the strategic guidance from the Chief of Sta of the Army and trans-
late the guidance to tactical action, improving readiness and eectively
preparing for future combat operations.
The historical case studies also demonstrate the evolution of doctrine,
organization, and employment of eld artillery against a near peer com-
petitor. This is the framework in which General Milley has framed his
strategic guidance to the Army to be prepared for ground combat with a
near peer competitor.
7
The Battles of Operation Desert Shield and Storm
demonstrated several of the tenets of unied land operations, which “de-
scribes the Army’s approach to generating and applying combat power
in campaigns and operations.”
8
Specically, the elements displayed were
exibility, lethality, adaptability, and synchronization. Flexibility is de-
ned as employment of a versatile mix of capabilities, formations, and
equipment for conducting operations.
9
The employment of eld artillery
in Operation Desert Storm displayed lethality, which in this context “is
the capacity for physical destruction, which is fundamental to all other
military capabilities.”
10
Adaptability in this case refers to “a willingness
to accept prudent risk in unfamiliar or rapidly changing situations, and an
ability to adjust based on continuous assessment.”
11
Finally, both opera-
tions displayed synchronization or “the arrangement of military actions in
time, space, and purpose to produce maximum relative combat power at a
decisive place and time.”
12
93
A review of current trends is necessary to tie the historical case study
to the current state of the eld artillery. Current refers to that time since the
beginning of operations in Afghanistan, the 2003 invasion of Iraq, and the
advent of the modular Brigade Combat Team in 2003.
13
The deterioration
of the eld artillery in the 12 years of persistent low intensity conict be-
tween 2004 and the present has created a sense of urgency within the Army
that spawned the reestablishment of the division artillery as a brigade level
headquarters. The conclusion and recommendations will demonstrate how
The Liberation of Kuwait
The Allied Ground Attack
24–28 February 1991
0 25 50 Miles
XX
24
US
XX
UK
1
XX
US
1
US
1 CAV
XX
XX
SY
9
III
US
3
XX
FR
6
XX
82
SA
XX
24
US
Y
TA
52
26
45
10
ME
ALF
ADN
Iran
Samawah
Basra
An Nasiriyah
Nisab
Kuwait
City
Hafar-al-Batin
Iraq
Saudi Arabia
Kuwait
XVIII
XXXX
VII
282000 FEB
260800 FEB
282000 FEB
282000 FEB
250800 FEB
G-Day 24 Feb
H-Hr 0400
As Salman
Tallil
Jalibah
Republic Guard Division
ADN Adnan
ALF Al Faw
HA Hammurabi
ME Medina
NEB Nebuchadnezzer
Average Republican Guard Division
Strength on G-Day: 68%
Iraqi Divisions in KTC: 41
USAF Assets
F-15 C/D 120
F-15E 48
F-16 249
F-117A 45
F-111 E/F 84
B-52G 80
A-10A 144
EF-111A 18
F-4G 48
RF-4C 18
E-8A 2
Tankers 302
USN/USMC Air
F-14 100
F/A-18 172
A-6E 115
A-7E 24
EA-6B 41
S-3 50
AV-8B 60
OV-10 24
Tankers 24
Major Allied Air Forces
Saudi Arabia 165
United Kingdom 82
France 66
Canada 29
COALITION Strength
620,000
37 Nations
COALITION Naval Forces
United States Greece
United Kingdom Italy
Argentina Kuwait
Australia Netherlands
Belgium Norway
Canada Poland
Denmark Portugal
France Spain
International Boundary
Road
Oilfield
Airfield
Al Jaber
101
XX
US
Y
AO EAGLE
FOB VIPER
FOB COBRA
XX
EG
NEB
HA
12
XX
US
3
XX
1
US
III
US
2
X
KU
XX
2
SA
XX
GCC
260800 FEB
XX
1
US
Marines
XX
2
US
X
2
SA
N
Figure 5.1 Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm. Map courtesy of US Military
Academy, West Point/created by Army University Press.
94
the division artillery will achieve the Chief of Sta’s strategic guidance,
specically the objective of readiness “through the arrangement of tactical
actions in time, space, and purpose.”
14
The division artillery is the opera-
tional artist, whereas within modularity, there is no advocate for ensuring
that subordinate eld artillery units are getting the manning, training, and
employment that prepares them for future conict.
15
Analysis of the role of artillery during Operations Desert Shield and
Desert Storm is separated into three sections. The analysis highlights
the preparation for deployment, the use of artillery in preparation for the
ground oensive, and nally for the attack of Iraq itself. Each phase is ex-
amined in terms of the elements of operational art, unied land operations,
and the AirLand Battle doctrine. Using this context demonstrates how the
division artillery headquarters conducted operational art. This case study
is being used for several reasons: to examine the successful employment
of eld artillery against a near peer competitor, to identify the factors that
enabled the linking of tactical actions to operational and strategic objec-
tives, and to pull forward best practices for how to best train, prepare, and
employ eld artillery in the future.
Training and Organizing for Desert Shield/Desert Storm
Operation Desert Shield, the preparation and buildup of forces in the
Saudi Arabian desert, followed by Operation Desert Storm, which began
with the oensive into Iraq, were the result of the August 1990 Iraqi inva-
sion of its southern neighbor Kuwait. At the time, Iraq had the fourth larg-
est military in the world, numbering over one million men. Its organization
and doctrine reected its ties to the British Empire as well as with its main
supplier of arms, Russia, and was formed into seven corps-sized elements,
with four of the corps oriented to the south, toward Saudi Arabia and in
Kuwait.
16
Each mechanized corps not only had a robust armored force, but
also contained a substantial indirect re capability. Each corps contained
a brigade of artillery, numbering between 70 and 140 medium artillery
pieces. The overall numerical artillery advantage was exacerbated by the
generally overall greater ranges possessed by the Iraqi artillery systems.
17
Overall strength of direct support artillery was some 3,300 pieces along
with some 300 more longer ranging multiple launch rocket systems. Com-
plicating matters was the capability for the Iraqi army to employ chemical
munitions with its artillery assets.
18
The threat of the use of chemical weapons and the large number of
Iraqi artillery drove training and emphasized the importance of US ar-
tillery. Across the deploying force, division artilleries led training of all
95
subordinate artillery battalions, which created a familiarity between the
subordinate units and facilitated interoperability within the units. Firing,
logistical, and communications operations were all standardized within the
subordinate artillery units within a given division artillery.
19
By standard-
izing operations, subordinate artillery units would later be able to provide
exible support to any of the maneuver units based on the enemy threat or
friendly mission. For maneuver commanders, the level of support could
be counted on, regardless of artillery unit. This, in eect, reduced some of
the fog and friction that Clausewitz famously points out happens in war.
20
One example to indicate commonality across the force stems from
the 3rd Armored Division Artillery, who would later help spearhead the
VII Corps attack into Iraq. By focusing on command post exercises with
its subordinate battalions, it was able to create a shared understanding of
the processes and procedures needed to provide accurate and timely res
in support of the division. The division artillery commander noted that
the “training exercises proved highly invaluable in getting all available
artillery assigned to the force eld artillery headquarters working together
prior to deployment.”
21
The common training and familiarity greatly aided
in employment the of the division artillery which was “responsible for
recommending the res organization for combat and positioning all units
organic to, assigned to, and supporting the maneuver force commander.”
22
This would prove fortuitous once operations began in facilitating exi-
bility, mass, and tempo that led to the overwhelming success of US forc-
es. This training can arguably be traced back to the way of thinking seen
in Brigadier General Leslie McNair as a division artillery commander in
1937, and guidance from McNair as Army Ground Forces commander in
1943. Almost 50 years later, the doctrine had become rmly ingrained.
The rst tenet of unied land operations that was met during the divi-
sion artillery training and preparation for deployment was exibility.
23
This
common understanding and familiarity enabled commanders at each level
to tailor their force, specically eld artillery units, to achieve the mission,
weight the main eort, and have the condence that they would receive
the lethal eects to face a severely reduced enemy. This exibility, which
could be translated to the AirLand Battle imperative of agility, was dened
as “the ability of friendly forces to act faster than the enemy, [which] is the
rst prerequisite for seizing and holding the initiative. Such greater quick-
ness permits the rapid concentration of friendly strength against enemy
vulnerabilities.”
24
Achieving the AirLand Battle imperatives would have
been considered critical considering the nature of the enemy that coalition
forces were preparing to face during Operation Desert Shield.
96
Preparations
As the overall war plans developed, the US Army portion of the coa-
lition would attack with two corps abreast, conducting a anking maneu-
ver on the Iraqi defenses into Iraq.
25
Additionally, a corps sized coalition
led by the First Marine Expeditionary Force (1MEF) was to attack into
Kuwait itself.
26
To reduce the Iraqi forces and mitigate some of the risk
of being overmatched by sheer numbers of armored forces and artillery,
the coalition waged an extensive air campaign. The air campaign was ex-
tremely eective at reducing and demoralizing Iraqi forces and engaging
strategically important targets deep within Iraq. Artillery, along with ro-
tary wing support, was used for setting the conditions for the close ght,
specically the initial breach of the Iraq border defensive belt. An eective
tactic used to prepare for the ground oensive was the artillery raid. Over-
all, the organization, training, and nally the execution would demonstrate
that the division artillery was the level of command that would link strat-
egy to tactical action.
Artillery raids were employed to reduce enemy artillery, mitigating
the threat of both conventional and chemical munitions. Each division
artillery demonstrated its prociency prior to the invasion by facilitating
the numerous artillery raid operations along the Iraq international border.
The artillery raid involved sending artillery units forward, into range of
their known targets and massing res. Prior to execution, the division
artillery facilitated these raids by deconicting airspace with Army avi
-
ation and other air assets. In order to prevent being engaged by enemy
artillery, US artillery would displace after every barrage was red. Di
-
vision artillery radar and dedicated ring units stood by, ready detect to
engage Iraqi artillery counter-re. These artillery raids had devastating
eects on the enemy, one report stating that 97 of 100 howitzers within
an Iraqi division had been destroyed by massed res.
27
On 13 Febru-
ary, the 1st Cavalry Division Artillery massed an entire attached multiple
launch rocket system battalion, destroying 24 Iraqi targets with more
than 300 rockets, all in less than ve minutes.
28
The tremendous eects of this tactic would not have been possible
without the organization of the artillery within the division artillery. As
outlined previously, the res force headquarters, doctrinally, had the re-
sponsibility for ensuring the training and readiness of all artillery organi-
zations as well as “recommending the res organization for combat and
positioning all units organic to, assigned to, and supporting the maneuver
force commander.”
29
The eectiveness of the artillery raid is also indica-
tive of extending operational reach prior to conducting the ground oen-
97
sive.”
30
To achieve the desired surprise with the artillery raid, a signi-
cant amount of synchronization was required. The division artillery set
the conditions for successful artillery raids through standardized training.
During planning and execution, the division artillery managed the move-
ment, observation, target observation and sustainment capabilities of the
subordinate battalions.
Additionally, by reducing the enemy forces prior to the invasion, the
tactical actions facilitated the attainment of an operational level decisive
point.
31
In this case, Army Central planners had “assumed that the proper
level of attrition was roughly 50 percent of the Iraqi armor and artillery,
including 90 percent of the tanks and guns at the breach sites.”
32
Thus,
the critical factor was the destruction of enemy forces prior to commenc-
ing the ground oensive. Prior to the invasion, the 3rd Army intelligence
cell assessed that 53 percent of Iraqi artillery and 42 percent of the Iraqi
armor had been lost.
33
Finally, the artillery raids demonstrated phasing and transitions. This
usually “involves a change of mission, task organization, or rules of en-
gagement. Phasing helps in planning and controlling and may be indicated
by time, distance, terrain or an event.”
34
In this case, artillery units dis-
Figure 5.2. 1st Battalion, 9th Field Artillery conducting re mission in Iraq, Febru-
ary 1991. Photo courtesy of Lieutenant Colonel Bill Pitts.
98
played their exibility as they transitioned between massing res on Iraqi
forces prior to the ground oensive to providing direct support to maneu-
ver units. The ability to organize quickly into a mobile artillery task force,
maneuver within range of enemy targets, synchronize massed artillery re
to destroy the enemy, and quickly return to the supported maneuver for-
mation is a testament to the collective training, communication, and stan-
dardization prior to deploying.
The artillery raids conducted by coalition forces prior to the ground
attack exemplify the AirLand Battle Doctrine during Operations Desert
Shield and Storm. Specically, when planning for or conducting oen-
sive operations “repower exploits maneuver by neutralizing the enemy’s
tactical forces and destroying his ability and will to ght. Firepower may
also be used independent of maneuver to destroy, delay, or disrupt uncom-
mitted enemy forces.”
35
Additionally, the artillery raids conducted prior to
the invasion exemplify the doctrinal imperative that “engagements must
be violent to shock, paralyze, and overwhelm the enemy force quickly.
They must be terminated rapidly to allow the force to disperse and avoid
eective enemy counterstrikes.”
36
The Attack
Actions once US forces crossed into the Iraqi defensive zone once
again demonstrated that the training, organization, and execution of the
division artillery was the tactical headquarters which could link strategy to
tactics. Once the attack into Iraq began early on the morning of 23 Febru-
ary 1991, eld artillery continued to play a signicant role in the success
of the US forces. Units displayed the skill they had gained in training and
continually demonstrated exibility as the oensive proceeded. The of-
fensive began as the 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment (2nd ACR) entered
Iraq as a covering force for the two corps which were the main eort.
As the spearhead for oensive into Iraq, the 2nd ACR depended heavily
on artillery to mitigate the superior numbers of Iraqi forces. Intelligence
reports indicated 2nd ACR would encounter the elite Republican Guard,
which possessed its most formidable weapon, the T-72 tank.
37
To mitigate
the risk of facing the Republican Guard, the regiment, in addition to con-
siderable air support, was augmented with an entire eld artillery brigade.
This exibility enabled the 2nd ACR to conduct 30 minutes of preparation
res with an entire brigade to “suppress or destroy Iraqi observation posts
located in several bunkers and observation towers.”
38
The 30-minute artil-
lery barrage on the Iraqi positions along the border crushed enemy morale.
99
Three separate division artilleries coordinated targeting of numer-
ous Iraqi command and control, artillery, and sustainment nodes in or-
der to eliminate the possibility of enemy forces disrupting the oensive.
The 3rd Army battle damage estimate reported that all 100 Iraqi artillery
pieces that 2nd ACR initially faced were indeed destroyed.
39
Through-
out the entire operation, the 30 minutes of artillery preparation involved
more than 350 artillery pieces. Three eld artillery brigades supported
breaching operations, ring more than 11,000 rounds and 414 rockets.
This massed re destroyed more than 50 Iraqi tanks, 139 other armored
vehicles, and 152 artillery pieces.
40
As the 2nd ACR maneuvered, its supporting division artillery tai-
lored artillery support based on the enemy situation template, which was
surprisingly accurate. After the initial breach of the Iraqi defense, 2nd
ACR received light contact throughout its 64-kilometer movement on the
rst day of the ground oensive. When the regiment did receive enemy
contact, it was quickly suppressed and neutralized by responsive eld
artillery support.
41
The support on the rst day of the oensive enabled
and exemplied the AirLand Battle dynamic of maneuver in that actions
demonstrated “the means of concentrating forces at the critical point to
achieve the surprise, psychological shock, physical momentum, and mor
-
al dominance which enable smaller forces to defeat larger ones.”
42
As
demonstrated with the artillery raids, the execution of the artillery units
in support of 2nd ACR also displayed the fundamentals of repower as
described in AirLand Battle, by facilitating “maneuver by suppressing the
enemy’s res and disrupting the movement of his forces. Firepower ex
-
ploits maneuver by neutralizing the enemy’s tactical forces and destroy-
ing his ability and will to ght.”
43
This was clear as enemy infantry, in
entrenched positions, were engaged with US artillery, resulting in “nu
-
merous enemy prisoners of war surrendering.”
44
Into the second day of the ground oensive, the weather took a turn for
the worse with poor visibility due to dust and haze, severely restricting the
employment of close air support. This made the role of the eld artillery
even more critical as 2nd ACR continued its movement toward the Iraqi
premier force, its Republican Guard. Again, the division artillery seamless
-
ly increased artillery support to lead elements is the regiment approached
the elite Iraqi unit. AirLand Battle prescribed that “priority of support
should change automatically when the commander shifts his main eort.”
45
This not only demonstrated exibility, but also the AirLand Battle im-
perative of depth. The doctrine stated, “through the use of depth, a com-
mander obtains the necessary space to maneuver eectively; the necessary
100
time to plan, arrange, and execute operations; and the necessary resources
to win.”
46
Despite the challenges presented with the poor weather and cor-
responding reduction in air support, once the Republican Guard was en-
gaged, eld artillery res had a devastating eect. According to the battle
damage assessments over a brigade’s worth of enemy armored vehicles
were destroyed. This is remarkable given the supposed maneuverability
of Iraqi armored forces, and the general inability for eld artillery to have
eects on moving targets.
47
While the 2nd ACR saw the majority of the action during the initial
48 hours of the invasion of Iraq, the remaining two corps followed and
prepared to become the main eort of the operation. Field artillery units
were continuing to demonstrate their agility as the corps maneuvered in
division columns. Artillery commanders continually reallocated forces to
weight the main eort within the division columns, in this case the ele-
ments most likely to make contact with enemy forces.
48
Despite minimal
enemy contact the agility prepared the divisions “for the rapid concentra-
tion of friendly strength against enemy vulnerabilities.”
49
Figure 5.3. US Field Artillery Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) conducting
re mission. Photo courtesy of Morris Swett Digital Collections & Archives, Fires
Center of Excellence, Fort Sill, Oklahoma.
101
Analysis and Conclusion
Intelligence reported that 43 Iraqi divisions prepared to defend along
its border, organized into four corps. Despite their overwhelming numer-
ical superiority, the Iraqi army was woefully overmatched and defeated
soundly in a little more than four days of ground combat. The coalition
force was prepared to face a much more determined enemy.
50
Specically,
the eld artillery exemplied the tenets and imperatives of the current doc-
trine, AirLand Battle. The eld artillery heeded “integrating re support
into operations, the most important considerations are adequacy, exibility,
and continuity.”
51
They carried out their doctrinal imperatives due to the
integrated training led by each division artillery, which had begun long
before being notied of deploying. Notication of the deployment focused
their training, creating a sense of urgency that enhanced unit cohesion.
52
Upon arriving in theater and preparing for ground combat, res fa-
cilitated by the division artillery displayed exibility by reducing enemy
defenses with numerous artillery raids. This satised the imperative that
“engagements must be violent to shock, paralyze, and overwhelm the en-
emy force quickly. They must be terminated rapidly to allow the force to
disperse and avoid eective enemy counterstrikes.”
53
The artillery raids
completely neutralized the threat of artillery delivered chemical munitions
during the initial attack into Iraq and vastly reduced the conventional artil-
lery threat. This undoubtedly had a huge psychological benet to the coa-
lition forces as one of had neutralized one of the enemy’s most dangerous
tools. Finally, the division artilleries continually adjusted the task organi-
zation of their subordinate units to provide the maximum available support
to maneuver elements in contact or probable contact with the enemy. The
AirLand Battle imperative which states “priority of support should change
automatically when the commander shifts his main eort,” though simply
stated, takes quite a bit of foresight, common training and understanding,
and eective communication.
54
This is exemplied as at one point on the
third day of the advance through Iraq, when the 3rd Armored Division Ar-
tillery massed res from three artillery battalions to destroy both an enemy
bunker system and the supporting artillery that was a part of the bunker’s
defense.
55
By the end of the ground oensive, American eld artillery had
red more than 58,000 rounds, helping to drive Iraq out of Kuwait.
56
Overall, the performance of the eld artillery was a testament to the
training, habitual relationships within each division artillery, their subordi-
nate units, and the comprehension and application of their current doctrine.
These units displayed their readiness as a key part of the coalition force
102
as it closed with, destroyed, and achieved a decisive victory over the Iraqi
forces. When looked at through the lens of operational art, the division ar-
tilleries which participated in Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm
were the organizations that ensured that artillery was the decisive arm,
“enabling the achievement of operational and strategic objectives through
tactical action in time space and purpose.”
57
This will become important to
remember as the US Army shifts its focus from counterinsurgency oper-
ations to multi-domain operations and an operational environment where
the US Army may be challenged by a near peer threat with superior tech-
nological capabilities. Using historical case studies as a guidepost, such as
Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm, the US Army Field Artillery must
be organized, equipped and trained to demonstrate exibility, adaptability,
synchronization, and lethality if it is to successfully accomplish cross-do-
main res in future large-scale ground combat operations.
103
Notes
1. Mark Milley, 39th Chief of Sta of the Army, “Initial Message to the
Army,” August 2015, accessed 7 July 2016, https://www.army.mil/e2/rv5_down-
loads/leaders/csa/Initial_Message_39th_CSA.pdf.
2. Milley.
3. US Army Fires Center of Excellence, DIVARTY White Paper, May 2014,
14.
4. US Army Forces Command, US Army Forces Command Division Artil-
lery Implementation Order, 9 April 2014, 2.
5. Historically known as “non-divisional units,” or what are now known
as Field Artillery Brigades, will not be discussed. They generally consist of
Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) battalions and High Mobility Artillery
Rocket System (HIMARS) battalions. Field Artillery Brigades generally support
a corps or eld army. The principal missions of non-divisional artillery were the
neutralization or destruction of hostile artillery (counterbattery re), destruction
of hostile defenses, long-range interdiction re, and reinforcement of division
artillery res. This mission has generally remained unchanged between World
War II and today.
6. Fires Center of Excellence, DIVARTY White Paper, 32.
7. Mark Milley, “Initial Message to the Army.”
8. Department of the Army, Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 3-0, Opera-
tions (Washington, DC: 2016), 7.
9. ADP 3-0, 8.
10. Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 3-0, Operations (Wash-
ington, DC: 2016), 1-11.
11. ADRP 3-0, 3-10.
12. ADRP 3-0, 3-15.
13. With the modular Brigade Combat Team came the reduction of several
brigade level headquarters historically associated with a US division, including
the division support command and the division artillery. The intent was to, as
the name implies, make brigades modular, self-contained organizations. While
the Brigade Combat Team performed well when conducting stability/counterin-
surgency operations, the unintended consequence of the deactivation of division
artilleries across the army resulted in the atrophy of skills and prociency of
artillerymen and artillery units to perform their military occupational skills and
mission essential tasks.
14. Department of the Army, ADRP 3-0, 2-1.
15. “Who we are” United States Army Field Artillery School,” accessed 16
October 2016, http://sill-www.army.mil/USAFAS/who-we-are.html. The Field
Artillery Branch and the Field Artillery School, headquartered at Fort Sill, Okla-
homa, have the shared responsibility for basic and mid-level training for Field
Artillery Soldiers. Within the scope of the division artillery, they also contribute
to generating and revising eld artillery doctrine and gather and disseminate
lessons learned from across the force.
104
16. Theresa Kraus and Frank Schubert, The Whirlwind War: The United
States Army in Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, (Washington, DC:
US Army Center of Military History, 1995), 133–34.
17. Kraus and Schubert, 135–36. Iraqi tube artillery consisted of at least
six dierent variants, ranging from 100-mm to 160-mm caliber rounds. For
context, artillery less than 100-mm is considered light, 100-mm to 210-mm
is medium-caliber, and greater than 210-mm is considered heavy artillery. A
common Iraqi artillery piece was the G5, with a range of 39 kilometers. This
range exceeded the 30-kilometer maximum range of the M109A2 self-propelled
“Paladin”, the most common howitzer within the US armored divisions.
18. Kraus and Schubert, The Whirlwind War, 135; Kevin M. Woods and
Michael R. Pease, The Mother of All Battles: Saddam Hussein’s Strategic Plan
for the Persian Gulf War (New York, NY: Naval Institute Press, 2008), 60.
19. US Army, Third Armored Division Artillery Historical Summary, 1991,
2.
20. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. Michael Howard and Peter Paret
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984), 101.
21. Third Armored Division Artillery, Historical Summary, 2.
22. Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 3-09, Field Artillery Oper-
ations and Fire Support (Washington, DC: 2014), 1-6; Fires Center of Excel-
lence, DIVARTY White Paper, 32.
23. Department of the Army, Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 3-0, Op-
erations, 7. Flexibility is “the ability to employ a versatile mix of capabilities,
formations, and equipment for conducting operations.”
24. Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 100-5, Operations (Wash-
ington, DC: 1986), 16.
25. Robert Scales, Certain Victory: The US Army in the Gulf War (Fort
Leavenworth, KS: US Army Command and General Sta College Press, 1994),
132.
26. Woods and Pease, The Mother of All Battles, 6.
27. Kraus and Schubert, The Whirlwind War, 165.
28. US Army Field Artillery School (USAFAS), “Redleg Update,” USAFAS
PAO, 2017, 22.
29. Department of the Army, FM 3-09, 1-6; Fires Center of Excellence,
DIVARTY White Paper, 32.
30. Department of the Army, Joint Publication (JP) 3-0, Operations, 4-5.
Operational reach is “the distance and duration across which a joint force can
successfully employ military capabilities.”
31. Department of the Army, ADRP 3-0, 4-4. Decisive point is “a geograph-
ic place, specic key event, critical factor, or function that, when acted upon,
allows commanders to gain a marked advantage over an adversary or contribute
materially to achieving success.”
32. Kraus and Schubert, The Whirlwind War, 167.
33. Richard M. Swain, Lucky War: Third Army in Desert Storm (Fort Leav-
enworth, KS: US Army Command and General Sta College Press, 1994), 204.
105
34. Department of the Army, ADRP 3-0, 4-7.
35. Department of the Army, FM 100-5, 12.
36. FM 100-5, 24.
37. Scales, Certain Victory, 223.
38. 210th Field Artillery Brigade, Summary of Signicant Events: Operation
Desert Storm (New York, NY: Department of the Army, March 1991), 2.
39. Scales, Certain Victory, 226.
40. USAFAS, “Redleg Update,” 22.
41. 210th Field Artillery Brigade, Summary of Signicant Events, 3.
42. Department of the Army, FM 100-5, 12.
43. FM 100-5, 12.
44. 210th Field Artillery Brigade, Summary of Signicant Events, 2.
45. Department of the Army, FM 100-5, 44.
46. FM 100-5, 16.
47. 210th Field Artillery Brigade, Summary of Signicant Events, 1-3.
48. Third Armored Division Artillery, Historical Summary, 10.
49. Department of the Army, FM 100-5, 16.
50. Kraus and Schubert, The Whirlwind War, 133–135.
51. Department of the Army, FM 100-5, 44.
52. Third Armored Division Artillery, Historical Summary, 2.
53. Department of the Army, FM 100-5, 24.
54. FM 100-5, 44.
55. Third Armored Division Artillery, Historical Summary, 13.
56. USAFAS, “Redleg Update,” 22.
57. Department of the Army, ADRP 3-0, 4-4.
107
Chapter 6
The Kasserine Pass Battles: Learning to Employ Artillery
Eectively in Large-Scale Combat Operations
Major Jerey S. Wright
The US Army and the eld artillery, following the conclusion of major
combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan in 2003, shifted focus to coun-
terinsurgency and stability operations. While the wisdom gained remains
important, leaders within the US Army acknowledge that it does not ad-
equately prepare units for peer and near-peer threats. Some leaders even
raised concerns that the artillery’s focus on non-standard missions created
an atrophy of traditional res core competencies, reducing the ability to
integrate with maneuver forces to meet future threats.
1
To combat this, the
US Army and eld artillery instituted several corrective actions, to include
focusing combat training center rotations on decisive action and the re-es-
tablishment of the division artillery (DIVARTY) concept.
2
While improv-
ing training concepts and organizational structures remain important, it is
critical that leaders reect on historical examples that highlight challenges
and successes in large-scale combat operations.
The Kasserine Pass battles in February 1943, the rst major engage-
ment between American and Axis forces in Africa during World War II,
provide an opportunity to assess the US Army and artillery’s ability to op-
erate in large-scale combat operations. During such operations, command-
ers “conduct decisive action to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative”
through multiple synchronized and simultaneous tasks.
3
Unable to seize
and retain the initiative during the initial Axis oensive, American and
Allied forces found success when they synchronized eorts “across the
breadth and depth of their assigned AOs.”
4
The successive defeats suered
in the initial battles resulted from fundamental aws in Allied disposi-
tions. These included artillery units—and the larger force as a whole—
isolated on djebels (hills), dispersed too widely to provide mutual sup-
port, and generally unprepared for an attack by Axis forces. The success
of the Allied defense in Kasserine Pass, in contrast, resulted from eective
leadership, the establishment of a combined arms defense in depth, and a
concentration of artillery linked by a re direction center (FDC) and en-
abled by forward observers to disrupt the attack with rapid, accurate, and
devastating massed res.
A synthesis of joint and US Army doctrine provides a way to analyze
the eld artillery’s eectiveness during the battles. These tools include
108
two Principles of Joint Operations and two tenets of Unied Land Op-
erations. Mass entails concentrating combat power eects “at the most
advantageous place and time to produce decisive results,” and requires
“maximum massed res when and where they are required.”
5
Maneuver
involves the “employment of forces in the operational area through move-
ment in combination with res to achieve a position of advantage,” and
requires artillery to “displace rapidly, keep pace with the supported force
. . . and position as needed to support future operations.”
6
Flexibility re-
quires leaders to “adapt to conditions as they change and employ forces in
a variety of ways” based on an accurate understanding of their operational
environment, equipment, and unit.
7
Finally, the synchronization of the ar-
tillery with the rest of the combined arms team in time, space, and purpose
allows “maximum relative combat power at a decisive place and time.”
8
The Road to the Kasserine Pass Battles
On 13 February 1943, the Allies in North Africa occupied dispersed
positions along the Eastern Dorsal of the Atlas Mountains in Central Tuni-
sia. Divided into three sections along a 250-mile front from the north Tu-
nisian coast to El Guettar, the British First Army under Lieutenant General
Sir Kenneth Anderson consisted of the British V Corps in the north, the
French XIX Corps in the center, and the American II Corps under Major
General Lloyd Fredendall in the south.
9
Allied Forces commander General
Dwight Eisenhower told Anderson and Fredendall the day before the Axis
oensive that he considered the Allied dispositions “as good as could be
made pending the development of an actual attack and in view of the great
value of holding the forward regions.”
10
Despite Eisenhower’s optimism,
the Allies had struggled since their successful North African arrival.
After landing successfully in North Africa in November 1942, the Al-
lies attempted to defeat Axis forces quickly in Tunisia and capture Tunis.
Unfortunately, Axis forces prevented this due to their greater concentration
of forces, better air cover, and shorter supply lines.
11
Failing to seize Tu-
nis quickly in late 1942, the original aim of trapping Field Marshall Erwin
Rommel’s Afrika Korps in northern Libya between the First Army and Gen
-
eral Sir Bernard Montgomery’s Eighth Army could not occur. With Gen-
eral Juergen von Arnim’s Fifth Panzer Army well positioned in northern
Tunisia, Allied leaders recognized that Montgomery would need to drive
Rommel west of Tripoli and into Tunisia.
12
Not content to remain idle in
Tunisia while Montgomery attacked, Eisenhower planned an attack by II
Corps against Rommel’s western ank to inict casualties on his forces,
keeping them o balance while ideally breaking the Axis line of commu
-
nication.
13
However, the scheduled date of attack (late January 1943) coin-
109
cided with Montgomery’s planned arrival in Tripoli, and fears of a German
counterattack against the Americans while the First Army xed the Fifth
Panzer Army led Eisenhower to cancel the operation.
14
Rommel and his
Afrika Korps, along with Fifth Panzer Army, seized the opportunity to strike
in central Tunisia as Montgomery slowly advanced and the Allies gradually
built up combat power.
15
Multiple operations described as struggles “for the advantages of posi-
tion and initiative” between Fifth Panzer Army and the Allies, specically
the possession of major passes in the Eastern Dorsal took place in January
1942.
16
Already in control of a corridor along the eastern Tunisian coast,
the Germans conducted operations to capture additional passes to block
future Allied advances and to threaten their lines of communication and
supply bases.
17
The Fifth Panzer Army attacked the French XIX Corps
successfully on three separate occasions, with poorly trained and equipped
French soldiers receiving little support from nearby forces.
18
Throughout
these operations, the Allies took several actions that set the stage for the
Kasserine Pass battles.
Beginning in late January, Eisenhower instructed Anderson to keep
the II Corps on the defensive and to hold the 1st Armored Division as a
concentrated, mobile reserve pending Montgomery’s arrival in Tunisia.
19
However, Eisenhower acquiesced to Fredendall’s plan to conduct several
raids with II Corps along the Allied southern ank.
20
Wanting to test newly
arrived units of the 1st Armored Division, Fredendall instructed the divi-
sion commander, Major General Orlando Ward, to establish three more
combat commands in addition to Combat Command B (CCB) to perform
various missions.
21
While a standard capability of the American triangular
division at the time, the formation of combat commands oered great ex-
ibility at the cost of increased complexity and reduced cohesion—signi-
cant risk during a division’s rst experience of combat. Ward soon found
his division widely dispersed, with CCB supporting the French XIX Corps
and Combat Commands A (CCA), C (CCC), and D (CCD) conducting
unsuccessful operations between 24–30 January to seize Maknassy Pass
and retain Faid Pass from Axis forces.
22
Instead of potentially controlling
two key passes, the Allies held neither. With the 1st Armored Division in-
structed to “hold as much as possible of the forward areas” in preparation
for a March oensive, II Corps found itself ill prepared to hold areas east
of the Western Dorsal should the Germans attack—a dangerous situation
with the arrival of Rommel’s Afrika Korps in Tunisia on 4 February.
23
As
Eisenhower received a brieng on 13 February, Brigadier General Paul
110
Robinett, commander of CCB, recommended that Eisenhower withdraw
these II Corps units to better defensive positions as soon as possible.
24
Artillery Integration at the Kasserine Pass Battles
As elements of the Fifth Panzer Army attacked Sidi Bou Zid in the
early morning of 14 February, they confronted dispersed and isolated II
Corps units. CCA, reinforced by the 168th Infantry Regiment of the 34th
Infantry Division, occupied positions in and around Sidi Bou Zid that pre-
vented artillery units from massing res. Two artillery battalions—the 91st
Field Artillery and 2nd Battalion, 17th Field Artillery—occupied exposed
positions in the open plain east of Sidi Bou Zid, with two batteries of the
91st isolated from its parent battalion.
25
As Von Arnim’s forces attacked
from the Faid and Maizila Passes, they encircled II Corps units on two iso-
lated hills and attempted to envelop Allied forces around Sidi Bou Zid.
26
While two of the three ring batteries of the 91st withdrew under pressure
in support of CCA, the third outlying battery failed to displace in time and
succumbed to German forces.
27
The 2nd Battalion, 17th Field Artillery
no longer existed as a functioning combat unit after the initial encounter,
losing every artillery piece in a German air attack after failing to displace
in time.
28
Any hope of II Corps stopping the Axis assault would require a
strong counterattack force.
The II Corps counterattack force sent to destroy the German attackers
near Sidi Bou Zid and aid in the withdrawal of CCA on 15 February did
not possess the artillery or maneuver strength to accomplish its mission.
The Allies counterattacked with a weaker force, made up of CCC and only
one armor battalion of CCB from the French XIX Corps sector.
29
Anderson
refused to release all of CCB to Ward because he still expected the Axis
main eort to attack farther to the north.
30
Only the understrength 68th
Field Artillery battalion supported the counterattack force. Although not
nearly enough artillery to support the operation, the 68th maneuvered and
remained exible by adapting to dierent forms of support well, providing
counterbattery res, close support res directed by observers against ene-
my tanks, and even direct re.
31
Despite valiant Allied eorts, Axis forces
defeated the counterattack and forced II Corps to withdraw under pressure
to the Western Dorsal.
32
With elements of the 5th Panzer Army seizing
Sbeitla and the Afrika Korps seizing Gafsa and Feriana by 17 February,
Axis forces positioned themselves for a nal attack through the Western
Dorsal passes and into the Allied rear areas of Central Tunisia.
33
As II Corps and the French XIX Corps withdrew and reconsolidated
along the Western Dorsal, Rommel received a directive to attack toward
111
Le Kef in the Allied rear areas.
34
To accomplish this task, Rommel sent
the 21st Panzer Division north of Sbeitla to penetrate the Allied line at
Sbiba as the Afrika Korps prepared to attempt a similar penetration via
the Kasserine Pass to the southwest. Rommel positioned the 10th Panzer
Division in a central position near Sbeitla to exploit success wherever the
opportunity appeared.
35
As the Axis forces prepared their operations on 19
February, the Allies hurriedly massed infantry and artillery to defend the
Sbiba and Kasserine Passes. Eight infantry battalions with three eld ar
-
tillery battalions in support prepared for the defensive operation in Sbiba
Thala
Kasserine
Gafsa
El Guettar
Aïn Bou Driès
Sbiba
N
18 Feb
Night
14‒15 Feb
Early 14 Feb
Night
17‒18 Feb
16 Feb
17 Feb
19 Feb
15‒16 Feb
17 Feb
16‒17 Feb
14 Feb
17 Feb
18 Feb
21 Feb
17 Feb
21‒22 Feb
21‒22 Feb
from Fondouk
20 Feb
20 Feb
1(-)
XX
(22 Feb)
9(-)
XX
III
E
1
X
C
1
X
B
1
XX
1
XX
X
Br.
1
X
A
1
X
B
XX
1(-)
XX
34(-)
III
Br.
X
1 GD
15 Feb
10(-)
XX
10(-)
XX
21(-)
XX
10(-)
XX
21(-)
XX
15 Feb
10(+)
XX
(Part)
XXXX
FIFTH
ARNIM
(Part)
XXXX
ROMMEL
AFRICA
Axis forces started with-
drawing through Kasserine
Pass 22 February, reaching
line Hadjeb El Aioun–Sbeitla‒
Feriana by 26 February.
Algeria
Tunisia
Tebessa
Youks les Bains
El Abiod
Ousseltia
Maktar
Fondouk
Pichon
Kairoun
Maknassy
Sened
Battle of Kasserine Pass
Operations, 14–22 February 1943
0 100 200 300 Miles
Thelepte
Ferlana
Fakl
Sidi Bou
Zid
III
168 RCT
(Part)
III
168 RCT
(Part)
1
X
C
Sbeitla
Hadjeb el Aïoun
19‒20 Feb
Dernlln
D.A.K.
TF BOWEN
TF WELVERT
28 Feb
DJ ABIOO
DJ TROZZA
DJ KSARA
DJ SSOUD
Figure 6.1. Kasserine Pass Battles. Map created by Army University Press.
112
Pass.
36
Concurrently, Colonel Alexander Stark situated his “Stark Force”
of an infantry battalion, an artillery battalion, and an engineer regiment in
defensive positions at the opening of the Kasserine Pass.
37
Success for the
Allies would depend on how long they could delay the Axis oensive and
how many units could arrive in time to serve as reinforcements.
As the 21st Panzer attacked Sbiba Pass, it confronted three well-pre-
pared artillery battalions with more than 100 pre-planned targets along
the likely attack route and multiple observers to adjust indirect res.
38
As
the attack on Sbiba failed to penetrate this defensive position of massed
and synchronized res, Rommel ordered the 10th Panzer to reinforce the
Afrika Korps as it attacked the much smaller Stark Force in the Kasserine
Pass.
39
As Stark’s defense of the Kasserine Pass went into a second day on
20 February, Rommel ordered the 10th Panzer and Afrika Korps to con-
duct a “side-by-side attack,” which nally enabled him to gain control of
the pass on the evening of 20 February.
40
Allied senior commanders antic-
ipated their inability to hold and repositioned units in defensive positions
on either side of the Bahiret Foussana Valley, west of Kasserine Pass, to
limit any Axis exploitation.
Anderson ordered the 16th Infantry Regiment and 7th Field Artillery
Battalion of the 1st Infantry Division to block the Axis attack vicinity Bou
Chebka on the northwest side of the valley.
41
Meanwhile, the British 26th
Armored Brigade established defenses along Highway 17 on the northeast
side of the valley while CCB established defensive positions at Djebel el
Hamra, covering the passes to the Allied rear areas of Tebessa and Haid-
ra.
42
The arrival of Allied reinforcements and commanders that knew how
to employ them as part of a combined arms defense—Robinett and 1st In-
fantry Division commander Major General Terry Allen—meant that Rom-
mel’s forces would face solid defenses on 21–22 February.
43
As Rommel’s forces moved into the Bahiret Foussana Valley, Allied
forces blocked their advance and prevented any attempt to exploit vic-
tory in the Kasserine Pass. Four artillery battalions supporting CCB and
elements of the 1st Infantry Division delivered massed res that contrib-
uted signicantly to the defeat of Axis attempts to penetrate at Djebel el
Hamra and Bou Chebka. Supporting CCB, the 27th Field Artillery alone
red over 2,000 rounds, while Colonel Clift Andrus—the 1st Infantry DI-
VARTY commander—synchronized counterattacks with res from the 7th
and 33rd Field Artillery battalions.
44
On the northeast side of the valley, the 10th Panzer advanced toward
Thala against the British 26th Armored Brigade. Possessing two batteries of
113
artillery, the brigade withdrew twice to subsequent defensive positions be-
fore taking nal defensive positions just south of Thala.
45
These retrograde
operations provided time for the 9th DIVARTY under Brigadier General S.
LeRoy Irwin to arrive, establish mutually supporting positions, and assist
the British in defeating the German attack. Bringing with him three artillery
battalions and two cannon companies, Irwin established a “three-mile arc”
to deliver massed res.
46
Rommel believed that the arrival of this additional
artillery portended an impending counterattack and ordered all Axis units to
withdraw from the Kasserine Pass on the night of 22 February.
47
Analyzing Field Artillery Employment
While American artillery failed to mass res eectively at the begin-
ning of the Kasserine Pass battles due to poor unit dispositions preventing
mutual support, II Corps weighted the main eort suciently with artil-
lery during the defensive battles at Sbiba, Djebel el Hamra, Bou Chebka,
and Thala. The failure to weight either the forces in vicinity of Sidi Bou
Zid or the counterattack force caused one senior leader to write, “the con-
centration of artillery re is a prerequisite of success.”
48
The ineective
combat command structure of the 1st Armored Division contributed to the
initial inability of supporting artillery to deliver massed res. Excessive-
ly dispersed artillery units could not provide mutual support, particularly
because the 1st Armored Division created two additional ad hoc combat
commands, CCC and CCD.
49
Artillery battalions had the tools to mass,
but senior leaders following the campaign recommended keeping the three
division artillery battalions in mutual support, to employ artillery “as a
battalion and not as separate batteries,” and to maintain centralized control
at the division-level in order to mass res at the decisive point.
50
Maneuverability can enable artillery to avoid counterbattery re, en-
hance survivability, and ensure guns stay in supporting range of ground
combat units. Senior artillery leaders participating in the battles stressed
at the conclusion of the Tunisian Campaign the need for artillery units to
improve survivability in order to support future combat operations eec-
tively. Topics of discussion included multiple avenues of displacement,
anti-tank operations, tube dispersion, and local security.
51
Some artillery
units, like the 91st and 2nd Battalion, 17th Artillery, failed in this regard
during the Battle of Sidi Bou Zid. Others, such as the 68th, eectively
supported their maneuver brethren while maintaining survivability due to
eective leadership and solid training.
52
The Allies initially failed to demonstrate exibility by refusing to
withdraw the First Army from the Eastern Dorsal to better defensive posi-
114
tions and await favorable weather and additional combat power. Flexible
and adaptive leaders must possess “comfort with ambiguity and uncertain-
ty,” and an “ability to rapidly adjust while continuously assessing the sit-
uation.”
53
Eisenhower acknowledged his unwillingness to change the plan
based on knowledge of the operational environment after the war, “had I
been willing at the end of November to admit temporary failure and pass
to the defensive, no attack against us could have achieved even temporary
success.”
54
Such a willingness to change could have prevented the posi-
tioning of dispersed artillery units in non-mutually supportive positions
before the Axis attack on 14 February. Only until successive defeats on
14–15 February did Anderson acknowledge the precariousness of the sit-
uation and order a withdrawal to the Western Dorsal. As the eld artillery
battalions reconsolidated and moved within mutual supporting distance,
senior artillery leaders recognized they could employ their units according
to doctrine to mass res through FDCs and observed res.
Finally, eective synchronization of artillery with other combat arms
did not take place until the battles of Sbiba, Djebel el Hamra, Bou Cheb-
Figure 6.2. A 105-mm howitzer and crew from B Battery, 33rd Field Artillery Bat-
talion, prepare to re at advancing German infantry during the Battle of Kasser-
ine Pass, February 1943. Photo courtesy of US Army Center of Military History.
115
ka, and Thala largely because senior leaders familiar with synchronizing
artillery with maneuver were not present to coordinate such actions. Two
weeks before the Axis attack on Sidi Bou Zid, the 1st Armored DIVARTY
commander took command of the improvised CCD, depriving the division
of a senior artillery commander and his sta to synchronize res eective
-
ly.
55
As senior artillery commanders (like Colonel Andrus of the 1st Infantry
DIVARTY and Brigadier General Irwin of the 9th DIVARTY) arrived to co-
ordinate artillery res with maneuver forces around Bou Chebka and Thala,
Allied forces exercised eective synchronization to defeat Axis attacks.
Conclusion
Initial employment of artillery in the Kasserine Pass battles suered
from the same problems as the larger Allied force. As Major General Er-
nest Harmon—the new 1st Armored Division commander following the
battles—summarized in his Tunisian Campaign report, the division “was
never employed as a unit except in the nal phase . . . the division had
arrived piecemeal and had been used piecemeal.”
56
As commanders and
leaders conduct decisive action during large-scale combat operations to
seize, retain, and exploit the initiative, res weight the decisive operation
or main eort to ensure mission success. This remains particularly import-
ant at the commencement of large-scale combat operations, as there is a
high probability that US Army forces will need to defend against an ene-
my with locally superior capabilities.
57
During future large-scale combat
operations, successful employment of American eld artillery requires an
array of forces that sets the conditions to mass, exibility by adapting to
conditions as they change in the operational environment, maneuverability
to gain an advantage, and synchronized action with maneuver forces to
achieve greater eects. The initial attacks by Axis forces during the Kas-
serine Pass battles caught the II Corps unprepared to employ its excellent
re support system developed from sound, practical doctrine and proce-
dures. As the operation progressed, II Corps learned from its mistakes and
employed artillery to enable Allied victory.
116
Notes
1. Sean MacFarland, Michael Shields, and Jerey Snow, “White Paper: The
King and I: The Impending Crisis in Field Artillery’s Ability to Provide Fire
Support to Maneuver Commander,” White Paper, United States Army, 2007, 1.
2. Dennis Steele, “Decisive-Action Training Rotations: ‘Old School Without
Going Back in Time,’” Army (February 2013): 28-32; Scott R. Gourley “Return of
Division Artillery Stokes the Fires,” Fires, November–December 2014, accessed
18 May 2018, http://sill-www.army.mil/resbulletin/current/06_Gourley.html.
3. Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 3-0, Operations (Washing-
ton, DC: 2017) 5-3.
4. FM 3-0, 5-5.
5. Joint Chiefs of Sta, Joint Publication (JP) 3-0, Joint Operations (Wash-
ington, DC: 2017) A-2; Department of the Army, Army Doctrine Reference
Publication (ADRP) 3-09, Fires (Washington, DC: 2012) 1–9
6. Joint Chiefs of Sta, JP 3-0, GL-12; Department of the Army, ADRP
3-09, 1–9.
7. Department of the Army, Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 3-0, Opera-
tions (Washington, DC: 2017) 10; Department of the Army, ADRP 3-09, 1–5.
8. Department of the Army, ADRP 3-09, 1–5.
9. Omar Bradley, A Soldier’s Story (New York: Henry Holt and Company,
1951), 24.
10. George F. Howe, Northwest Africa: Seizing the Initiative in the West,
United States Army in World War II: The Mediterranean Theater of Operations
(Washington, DC: Oce of the Chief of Military History, 1957), 405.
11. Carlo D’Este, World War II in the Mediterranean (Chapel Hill: Algonquin
Books of Chapel Hill, 1990), 7–10; Gerhard Weinberg, A World at Arms: A Global
History of World War II (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 435.
12. Howe, Northwest Africa, 347; D’Este, World War II in the Mediterra-
nean, 8, 12.
13. Howe, 349–50.
14. Howe, 353; US Military Academy, The War in North Africa, Part 2
(The Allied Invasion) (West Point: United States Military Academy AG Press,
1947), 24.
15. Weinberg, A World at Arms, 441–42, Howe, Northwest Africa, 349.
16. Howe, 386.
17. US Military Academy, The War in North Africa, Part 2, 23; Howe, 386;
Orr Kelly, Meeting the Fox (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 2002), 149.
18. Kelly, 154; US Military Academy, 25–26; Rick Atkinson, An Army at
Dawn (New York, NY: Henry Holt and Company, 2002), 308.
19. Howe, Northwest Africa, 384; Atkinson, An Army at Dawn, 305.
20. Atkinson, 305.
21. Kelly, Meeting the Fox, 155–56.
22. Atkinson, An Army at Dawn, 305–07, 310–12; Howe, Northwest Afri-
ca, 392.
117
23. Howe, Northwest Africa, 399; US Military Academy, The War in North
Africa, 27–28.
24. Kelly, Meeting the Fox, 175.
25. Howe, Northwest Africa, 411; George F. Howe, The Battle History of
the 1st Armored Division (Washington, DC: Combat Forces Press, 1954), 145;
Kelly, 176–77.
26. Atkinson, An Army at Dawn, 340, 342; Bradley, A Soldier’s Story, 25.
27. Howe, The Battle History of the 1st Armored Division, 146, 149.
28. Kelly, Meeting the Fox, 187–88; Atkinson, An Army at Dawn, 340;
Howe, Northwest Africa, 412.
29. Atkinson, An Army at Dawn, 349; Howe, Northwest Africa, 418–19.
30. Howe, 416; Atkinson, 349.
31. Howe, The Battle History of the 1st Armored Division, 155–63.
32. Atkinson, An Army at Dawn, 352–53; Howe, Northwest Africa, 423–24.
33. Howe, 426–27.
34. Howe, 440–41.
35. Atkinson, An Army at Dawn, 369.
36. Howe, Northwest Africa, 442–43.
37. Howe, 442–443; Atkinson, An Army at Dawn, 366–67.
38. Howe, 452–53; Kelly, Meeting the Fox, 234; Atkinson, 378.
39. Atkinson, 378; Howe, 459.
40. Howe, 459; Atkinson, 372.
41. “A Factual Summary of the Combat Operations of the 1st Infantry Di-
vision in North Africa and Sicily During World War II (Extract),” in Kasserine
Pass Battles: Readings I, Part 2, ed. Harold W. Nelson, Roger Cirillo (Washing-
ton, DC: US Army Center of Military History, 1993), 15–16.
42. Howe, Northwest Africa, 457–58.
43. Paul M. Robinett, “Combat Command B, 1st Armored Division, Opera-
tions Report, Bahiret Foussana Valley, 20–25 February 1943,” in Kasserine Pass
Battles: Readings I, Part 2, 2; Atkinson, An Army at Dawn, 379; Howe, North-
west Africa, 462–63.
44. Robinett, “Combat Command B,” 2; Terry Allen, “1st Infantry Divi-
sion, Summary of Activities, January–March 1943, and Division Commander’s
Notes,” in Kasserine Pass Battles: Readings I, Part 2, 3.
45. Howe, Northwest Africa, 464–66.
46. Robert C. Baldridge, “How Artillery Beat Rommel After Kasser-
ine,” Field Artillery, May–August 2002, 49–50; Atkinson, An Army at Dawn, 385.
47. Atkinson, 385–87.
48. Headquarters, Thirteenth Armored Regiment to Commanding General,
1st Armored Division, 8 July 1943, Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library,
US Army: Unit Records, 1917–1950, 1st Armored Division, 1940–1946, Box
16, 1st Armored Division Misc. Sta Section Battle Lessons 1943.
49. D’Este, World War II in the Mediterranean, 10, 18; Kelly, Meeting the
Fox, 155–56.
118
50. Headquarters, 27th Armored Field Artillery Battalion to Commanding
General, 1st Armored Division, 16 July 1943, Dwight D. Eisenhower Presi-
dential Library, US Army: Unit Records, 1917–1950, 1st Armored Division,
1940–1946, Box 16, 1st Armored Division Misc. Sta Section Battle Lessons
1943; Headquarters, 91st Armored Field Artillery Battalion to G3, 1st Armored
Division, 10 July 1943, Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library, US Army:
Unit Records, 1917–1950, 1st Armored Division, 1940–1946, Box 16, 1st
Armored Division Misc. Sta Section Battle Lessons 1943; “Lessons from Tu-
nisian Campaign, 1943,” in Kasserine Pass Battles: Readings II, Part 3, ed. Har-
old W. Nelson and Roger Cirillo (Washington, DC: US Army Center of Military
History, 1993), 28; Boyd L. Dastrup, King of Battle: A Branch History of the US
Army’s Field Artillery (Fort Monroe: United States Army Training and Doctrine
Command, Oce of the Command Historian, 1992), 210–11.
51. 27th Armored Field Artillery; Headquarters, 1st Infantry Division to
Commanding General, Allied Force Headquarters, 9 July 1943, Dwight D. Ei-
senhower Presidential Library, US Army: Unit Records, 1917–1950, 1st Infantry
Division, 1942–1945, Box 756, 1st Infantry Division Reports on Combat Expe-
rience and Battle Lessons for Training Purposes; Headquarters, 68th Armored
Field Artillery Battalion to Commanding General, 1st Armored Division, 10
July 1943, Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library, US Army: Unit Records,
1917–1950, 1st Armored Division, 1940–1946, Box 16, 1st Armored Division
Misc. Sta Section Battle Lessons 1943.
52. Howe, The Battle History of the 1st Armored Division, 162–65.
53. Department of the Army, Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP)
3-0, Operations (Washington, DC: 2017), 3–9.
54. Atkinson, An Army at Dawn, 391.
55. Atkinson, 347.
56. Headquarters, First Armored Division to Commanding General, Allied
Force Headquarters, 13 July 1943, Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library,
US Army: Unit Records, 1917–1950, 1st Armored Division, 1940–1946, Box
16, 1st Armored Division Misc. Sta Section Battle Lessons 1943.
57. Department of the Army, FM 3-0, 5-5.
119
Chapter 7
Operational Artillery in the Korean War
Major G. Kirk Alexander
Exhausted American Soldiers lined the Naktong River in a series of
observation posts to provide early warning and to direct and adjust artil-
lery re missions to disrupt the next enemy attack. Mindful of every noise,
no one could be sure where or when the North Koreans would attempt
another attack the fragile Pusan Perimeter, the nal eort to buy time to
allow the United Nations (UN) to build up forces in Korea. The summer
months and lack of rain had decreased the river depth to three feet in sev-
eral areas, almost negating the river as a defensive obstacle. The Naktong
River defenders were aware of these conditions and anticipated a large-
scale North Korean attack. As expected, incoming artillery rained in on the
men and broke the silence, a standard precursor to a North Korean attack.
According to plan, re support ocers executed designated artillery and
air targets on likely enemy crossing points to increase their responsive-
ness. The plan did not account for every aspect of the enemy’s attack.
Forward observers, observation battalions and observation aircraft
were all rening targets and adjusting calls for re to compensate for this
lack of predictability. Requests for indirect artillery support funneled into
the re support net monitored by the corps artillery headquarters. They
maintained centralized control of all artillery units not under the control of
the division to permit maximum integration of all available assets on the
targets. Meanwhile, the artillerymen were at work slamming rounds into
their howitzers and guns in an attempt to keep up with enemy oensive.
The harsh Korean terrain thwarted any attempt to reposition the howitzers.
Regardless, they delivered massive amounts of artillery at an alarming
rate, sometimes exceeding the howitzer’s physical capacity resulting in
damage to the tubes. North Korean soldiers struggled to maintain their
formations and crossing sites, immediately noting the accuracy and eec-
tiveness of the volleys. Additionally, the North Koreans found their own
artillery under intense bombardment, which limited their ability to contin-
ue to the attack. As the North Koreans began to disperse and retreat from
the Naktong, they presented the UN’s artillery forward observers with ad-
ditional targets of opportunity. Divisional artillery battalions and close air
support attempted to nish the rest of the enemy forces. Unfortunately,
just as the artillerymen were about to deliver another destructive volley,
their position was attacked by an inltration force that had slipped through
120
the line. Transitioning to direct re mode, the artillerymen attempted to
depress the tubes to engage dismounted enemy breaching the defensive
wire. As enemy armor, artillery, and machine gun re increased, the artil-
lerymen abandoned their howitzers to take up defensive positions in near-
by buildings. Ultimately, it was a lost cause. Forced to evacuate the ring
point, the artillerymen left the howitzers to the North Koreans.
1
This depiction is representative of a number of the conicts that took
place along the Pusan defensive line between 1 August 1950 and 1 Septem
-
ber 1950. Primarily, it describes the employment of artillery in the defense
against an enemy with seemingly limitless manpower. United States artil
-
lery in the Korean War was a mix of towed and self-propelled howitzers and
guns that delivered projectiles up to 15 miles away upon designated targets.
2
The ability to employ these weapons at the most basic level hinged on the
interaction of the three components of the artillery team: the observer that
locates the target, the re direction center that computes the data to engage
the target, and the actual howitzer or gun team that executes the mission.
Massed res were concentrating the eects of more than one howitzer or
gun on a single target. Artillery battalions of up to 18 howitzers could co
-
ordinate these eects on a single target internally. However, on a larger
scale, synchronizing multiple battalions in this way added another level
of complexity. These massed eects did not simply happen in the Korean
War; extensive target planning, adequate command and control structures
to coordinate eorts, and the exibility to engage targets of opportunity
with divisional and non-divisional artillery made them possible. Centralized
control at the battalion and corps levels permitted the controlling authority
to determine the most lucrative targets to engage with the full complement
of artillery and close air support.
3
Additionally, the survivability of artil-
lery battalions was critical to ensure the availability of all battalions at any
time. Security of artillery forces was lacking in the beginning of the conict.
During the Pusan defense, North Korean forces overran the UN’s artillery
positions several times, but UN forces fought to regain lost ground with the
infantry. By 1951, the artillery battalions corrected or mitigated the majority
of the security concerns.
4
Despite the security shortfalls of the artillery in
support of the Pusan Perimeter, operational artillery remained highly eec
-
tive at repelling the human wave attacks of North Korean forces.
5
The Korean War provides a unique window to examine the eective
use of artillery in large-scale combat operations because of the unprec-
edented amount of artillery rounds red per gun during the conict.
6
At
times, the US Army artillery red ve times the daily expenditure rates of
World War II.
7
This heavy rate of re was necessary because of a number
121
of factors. The nature of defensive res in protection of dispersed out-
posts, particularly against the sheer number of North Korean and Chinese
militants, forced the UN forces to make up for their lack of artillery units
through increased rates of re for long durations. Additionally, in order for
the UN’s counter-re to be eective against heavily fortied static North
Korean and Chinese artillery positions, it resorted to precision res that
used high volumes of artillery to destroy these positions.
8
Therefore, the
UN forces had to evaluate their current methods for providing eective
artillery support in response to these threats. During this process, leaders
drew upon lessons from World War II, recommendations during the inter-
war period, and adaptations during the Korean War conict. In 2013, as
the US Army reorganizes after ten years of counter insurgency warfare and
looks at conducting multi-domain operations, it is time to reevaluate our
current ability to provide massed artillery against a near peer threat during
large-scale combat operations.
The Korean War: A Brief Synopsis
On 25 June 1950, North Korea launched an invasion across the 38th
Parallel. US President Harry S. Truman almost immediately responded
Figure 7.1. Gun crew of B Battery, 61st Field Artillery Battalion, 1st Cavalry
Division re their 105-mm howitzer across the Naktong River on North Korean
troops, 7 August 1950. Photo courtesy of US Army Center of Military History.
122
with the commitment of air and naval forces to support the Republic of Ko-
rea’s defense. Two days later, the UN Security Council passed a resolution
to aid in the defense of South Korea and President Truman (without con-
sulting Congress) approved the deployment of two Army divisions from
Japan to Korea. He failed to get a congressional declaration of war though
Congress did little to stop the intervention. The North Korean assault con-
tinued and by 28 June, Kim Il Sung’s forces seized Seoul, the capital of
South Korea. General Douglas MacArthur, nominated as commander of
UN military forces in Korea, committed Task Force Smith, an unprepared
force of approximately 500 men to delay the North Koreans while a larger
force deployed to Pusan. In the ensuing battle with North Korean forces,
Task Force Smith lost half of its combat force and withdrew under pres-
sure. Fortunately, the UN’s air superiority provided a marked advantage
to delay the north, but it became clear that a larger ground force would be
required to stop the North Korean People’s Army. The UN committed ad-
ditional US divisions to reinforce the delaying action, but they were forced
east of the Naktong River into the Pusan defensive perimeter.
9
Holding rm within the Pusan Perimeter, UN forces under General
MacArthur initiated an amphibious landing at Inchon on 15 September
1950 to regain Seoul and cut the supply lines of the North Korean forces
in the south. This allowed the UN’s forces to launch an oensive that
eventually pushed North Korean forces back to the 38th Parallel. After
crossing the 38th Parallel and conducting amphibious landings in the
east, UN forces decimated remaining North Korean forces and reunited
the peninsula. This prompted Chinese intervention, which launched three
massive oensives against the UN forces and eventually recaptured Seoul
in early January 1951.
10
Over the next month, UN forces withdrew south of Wonju to Line D,
approximately the 37th Parallel. Able to hold this line, the UN conducted
several counteroensives and stopped the Chinese Fourth Oensive in
mid-February. Capitalizing on their momentum, the UN forces conduct
-
ed two more oensives that recaptured Seoul on 14 March 1951 and
re-established the UN front along the 38th Parallel. Two more oensive
operations allowed the UN forces to move 30 miles north of the 38th
Parallel to establish a defensive line along Phase Line Kansas to prepare
for another Chinese oensive.
11
The Chinese began their Fifth Oensive on 22 April 1951, resulting in
some of the most extreme ghting of the Korean War. The oensive forced
the UN forces back to No Name Line, but ultimately they held there. On
16 May 1951, the Battle of the Soyang River and other battles along the
123
U.S.S.R.
Korea
Bay
Tongchon
Sea of
Japan
Yellow
Sea
Korean Archipelago
Cheju-do
Tsushima
(Japan)
China
Japan
South
Korea
United Nations Operations
in Korea
June–December 1950
0 25 50 75 100 Miles
N
Mokpo
Yanji
Tumen
Musan
Chongjin
Aoji
Jian
Chosan
Kanggye
Rashin
Kilchu
Hyesan
Wonsan
Hagaru
Iwon
Hamhung
Hongwon
Hungnam
Chonson-up
Chongju
Tokchon
Sunchon
Songchon
Pyongyang
Kun-ri
Anju
Kansong
Yangyang
Yongdok
Pohang
Taejon
Kunsan
Sariwon
Kaesong
Pyonggang
Chunchon
Haeju
Nampo
Chongju
Chungju
Kwangju
Masan
Pusan
Yosu
Chonju
Taegu
Kyongju
Yongjam
Koje-do
26 Oct
24 Nov
14 Oct
7 Oct
26 Sep
Pusan Perimeter
15 Sep
US Forces from Japan
1 Jul–Sep
Unsan
Onsong
Vladivostok
North
Korea
Sukchon
Panmunjom
Munsan
Seoul
Suwon
Osan
Chonan
MacArthur & X Corps
15 Sep
Diversionary assaults
preceding the landing
at Inchon
Figure 7.2. United Nations operations, July–December 1950. Map recreated
by Army University Press, courtesy of the US Military Academy, West Point.
124
No Name Line forced the Chinese and North Korean forces to withdraw
to the 38th Parallel by mid-May 1951. UN forces began a nal summer
oensive that pushed the Chinese and North Koreans back to beyond the
Wyoming-Kansas Line where UN forces held on 22 June 1951. Negotia-
tions for an armistice began at Kaesong, but took two years to complete.
The nal armistice signaled the end of active hostilities on 27 July 1953.
12
The Fundamental Principles of using Artillery in the Defense
This section examines the factors of operational artillery during the
defense of the Pusan Perimeter, the defense along Soyang River in May
1951, and along the 38th Parallel during the negotiations up to the armi-
stice.
13
The lessons from the Second World War validated the importance
of artillery in modern conict and presented a number of recommenda-
tions for improving its eects on the battleeld. The structure of the force
and doctrine after World War II centered on the concept of unlimited war-
fare using overwhelming repower of nuclear weapons.
14
Artillery ocers
recommended increasing the number of artillery pieces in the organic divi-
sion artillery formations, reestablishing the corps artillery headquarters as
the command and control element for synchronizing res, and pushing for
more self-propelled artillery.
15
However, the drawdown of the US Army,
the lack of training associated with the drain of experienced leaders, and
overreliance on atomic weapons during the period before the Korean War
hampered the implementation of these lessons.
16
Additionally, equipment
and ammunition shortages compounded the problem. American military
forces became accustomed with trading repower for maneuver, prefer-
ring to remain static in the defense.
17
In some cases, the US Army would
have to relearn the lessons of World War II to take advantage of the Army
at hand. Operational leaders utilized artillery most eectively by mass-
ing divisional and non-divisional artillery forces to support the maneuver
battalions, establishing unity of command to facilitate massed res and
ensuring artillery survivability. The fundamental principles of defensive
artillery re support as employed by large unit commanders in the Korean
War were mass, unity of command, and security.
Using Artillery in the Defense: Mass
On 16 May 1951, amidst the North Korean and Chinese Second
Spring Oensive, the US X Corps along with two Republic of Korea
(ROK) Corps found themselves nose-to-nose along the Soyang River
with a numerically superior force consisting of two Chinese Army Groups
and two North Korean Corps.
18
The UN forces had just regained Seoul in
March and repelled a communist attack against the South Korean capi
-
125
tal in April. The X Corps occupied defensive positions along No Name
Line and communist forces focused their attacks against them with over
15 divisions. General James Van Fleet, then commander of the Eighth
Army, allocated an additional three battalions of corps artillery to Gener
-
al Ned Almond’s X Corps giving him ten divisional artillery battalions,
six battalions of corps artillery, and ve additional reinforcing artillery
battalions. Van Fleet increased the daily rate of re enabling some of the
battalions to re in excess of 10,000 rounds during a single engagement.
An excess of 1,000 sorties of close air support complemented these res,
all coordinated to maximize eects.
19
As thousands of Chinese troops
ooded the X Corps’ sector, a barrage of massed artillery res and close
air support stopped the oensive cold in its tracks.
During the Battle of the Soyang River, heavy concentrations of massed
res stopped a numerically superior enemy on the oensive. Commanders
were no longer limited to directed ammunition restrictions and could nal-
ly maximize the number of rounds that the artillery red.
20
The combina-
tion of more rounds to re and accurately concentrated artillery proved ex-
tremely lethal. At the time of the Korean War, the 1949 Army Field Manual
100-5, Operations codied the concept of mass as a recognized principle of
war. It dened mass as “the concentration of superior forces, on the ground,
at sea, and in the air, at the decisive place and time, and their employment
in a decisive direction” to create the conditions essential to victory.
21
Applied to artillery, the concentration of eects from multiple artillery
battalions as well as air support assets at the decisive place and time to
provide an advantage over the enemy equaled massed res. In order to
concentrate and synchronize the eects of artillery and air support required
detailed integrated re planning, overlapping observation platforms and
artillery mobility facilitated the defense. Behind the scenes of the UN’s re-
sponse was a honed artillery machine forged from their experiences from
the past year’s conict and grounded in tested World War II doctrine.
At the time of the Korean War, there was no doctrinal denition of
massed res, but the clarication of the term emerged throughout the doc-
trine of the period.
22
The 1953 War Department Field Manual (FM) 6-20,
Artillery Tactics and Technics described the use of artillery with respect
to mass as a principle of employment: “The proper tactical and techni-
cal employment of artillery re power exploits the principles of mass and
maneuver. Artillery weapons and units are not physically massed in the
manner implied for ground gaining arms; rather artillery is so employed as
to provide the maximum capability for massing its res when and where
required to support the action of the ground gaining arms.”
23
Essentially,
126
the artillery should concentrate as many artillery weapons as possible on
targets that are decisive to the maneuver element.
The relative lack of artillery in comparison to World War II led Army
leaders to increase the amount of artillery rounds red from each system.
Comparatively, hardly any other modern war had higher rates of re to
compensate for this shortfall.
24
These two elements of concentrated eects
and increased ring rates directly led to the successes of the defensive
battles of August and September 1950 of the Pusan Perimeter and later at
the Soyang River.
25
Fire planning in the Korean War was not much dierent from that used
in World War II. A re plan was “the tactical plan for using the weapons of
a unit so that their re missions will be coordinated.”
26
Doctrinally, coor-
dinating re missions were essential to concentrated res because it syn-
thesized the current targeting intelligence, prioritized the engagement of
these targets, forecasted the logistical requirements, and synchronized the
available artillery formations.
27
This process involved every member of
the artillery team. The observers within the maneuver battalions nominat-
ed and rened targets synchronized with maneuver for execution while the
unit artillery headquarters took these targets and determined the best way
to support their execution through positioning of unit formations, type of
missions required to achieve the desired eects, and the logistical support
plan. These plans occurred at all levels with the subordinate plans feeding
the higher operational picture.
One of the essential elements of re planning was prearranged res,
“planned re which is to be delivered at a specied time or for which
a need for rapid delivery can be anticipated and for which ring data
are prepared in advance and kept current.”
28
Essentially, these res were
pre-determined targets that were on call from the supported unit. To de
-
velop these targets, artilleryman analyzed aerial photos or actually ob-
served the terrain, determined the most likely enemy avenue of approach,
and pre-coordinated the targets with maneuver.
29
This pre- coordination
allowed for faster responsiveness and clearance of res. In the defense,
especially in Korea, prearranged res on likely enemy avenues of ap
-
proach delayed and reduced the eectiveness of enemy oensive opera-
tions against an established perimeter.
30
Ultimately, pre-planned artillery could not completely account for ev-
ery place that the artillery units planned to engage the enemy. Often artil-
lery targets emerged that were absent from the initial re plan and required
a certain amount of exibility to engage. Artillery planners attempted to
127
build this type of exibility into the re plan. Planners would designate
supporting artillery units to provide res specically for targets of oppor-
tunity while others would provide prearranged res.
31
Engaging targets of
opportunity required an extensive communication network that linked the
observers with the ring unit.
32
While these res were more dicult to
coordinate and less responsive, they provided the much needed exibility
to engage an ever-elusive target set.
Underpinning the execution of re planning was the ability to acquire
targets for both prearranged res and targets of opportunity. The integra-
tion of forward observers at the tactical level and the observation battal-
ions and observation aircraft at higher levels was essential to providing
integrated targeting and accurate target locations for execution. Each of
these elements played a unique role in synchronizing eective massed
re and providing accurate target data throughout the defenses in Korea.
During the Korean conict, forward observers were resident to the artil-
lery formations with a section in the divisional artillery for each maneuver
battalion.
33
Representing their maneuver elements, they rened and nom-
inated targets for preplanned artillery res and eectively integrated them
into the defensive plans. These observers were skilled in calling res for
targets of opportunity as well as directing close air support. They served as
a direct link between the maneuver battalions and the direct support artil-
lery headquarters. Whereas the observers were the link with direct support
artillery headquarters, the Observation Battalion was the link with non-di-
visional and corps artillery headquarters.
Observation battalions provided additional observation capabilities
beyond what the forward observers provided. During World War II, the
corps observation battalions provided limited coverage due to the wide
frontages and robust corps zones. Post-war organization increased the
number of observation batteries in the battalions from two to three as well
as provided a counter-mortar radar platoon to each battery to better meet
the requirements for wide front.
34
Observation battalions were responsi-
ble for six principle missions: Location of hostile artillery, registration
and adjustment of friendly artillery, collection of information, conduct
and coordination of corps artillery survey operations, comparative cal-
ibration of friendly artillery, and provision of ballistic meteorological
data for friendly artillery and for sound ranging.
35
Unfortunately, the First
Field Artillery Observation Battalion would be the only one available in
theater until 1953.
36
This left the forward observers and observation air-
craft to do most of the observation.
128
The Korean topography was not ideal for quickly moving artillery
units and supplies throughout the battleeld. The harsh landscape, inad-
equate improved roads, and extreme weather conditions restricted ma-
neuver and limited logistical support.
37
The ability to quickly mass res
and protect the artillery laid in the exibility of the artillery formations to
meet the challenges posed by the terrain. Tactical mobility was the abil-
ity of the artillery formations to keep up with maneuver and traverse the
terrain to maintain direct support artillery res for maneuver.
38
Strategic
mobility was the ability to quickly reposition artillery formations through-
out the theater of operations to support the decisive operation, as well
as providing the logistical train associated with drastically repositioning
forces.
39
Strategic and tactical mobility in the Korean War required a mix
of self-propelled and towed systems. Self-propelled artillery was a huge
advantage for tactical mobility in the Korean War because of its ability
to traverse rough terrain over the large fronts.
40
However, towed systems
were lighter, easier to emplace and conceal, and were generally perceived
as more strategically mobile.
41
The static nature of the defense in Korea
coupled with the rugged terrain led to relying on the tactical mobility of
the self-propelled systems that only existed in the non-divisional artillery
formations. This allowed the corps the exibility and mobility to quickly
reinforce and augment divisional massed res throughout the conict. The
mobility and range of self-propelled artillery made it possible to engage
targets from greater distances and then quickly withdraw before coming
into direct contact with the enemy.
42
Unfortunately, these systems were in
short supply during the Korean War.
Up to April 1951, ammunition shortages restricted the number of
rounds that artillery units could re daily. The Army lifted this restriction
just prior to the Battle of the Soyang River in May 1951 which enabled
the artillery to nally operate at full capacity. Artillery Fire Support O-
cers planned prearranged res for known concentrations of enemy forc-
es, likely avenues of approach, and bridges across the Soyang. Artillery
headquarters selected artillery units for execution of these res in accor-
dance with the plan. When the Chinese attacked on 12 May, the artillery
units targeted enemy groups of 200 to 500 men with concentrated res and
achieved tremendous eects.
During the preparation of the defense of the Soyang River, the vast
area between the main defensive line and the concentration of Chinese
forces during the defense required combat patrols to operate well ahead of
the defensive line to maintain contact with the enemy. The artillery battal-
ions established advanced positions outside of the defensive lines in order
129
to support these patrols. These positions necessitated the tactical mobility
of the battalions to occupy and withdraw quickly in support of the maneu-
ver formations. Ultimately, these conditions led to many lessons learned in
the employment of massed re.
43
The Battle of Soyang River reinforced the lessons of massed res
learned throughout the Korean War. One of the keys to the success of UN
forces in Korea was their ability to mass res on targets of opportunity.
The exibility of massing res on targets of opportunity provided the UN
forces with a marked advantage in this respect. While neither MacArthur
nor Ridgeway would ever receive all the artillery that they requested for the
theater, they would make the best use of what they had.
44
Artillery leaders
accomplished the eects of massed res through preplanned and synchro-
nized targeting at the divisional and non-divisional levels; the exibility to
mass res on targets of opportunity through accurate target locating and
mobility to position artillery forces to achieve those devastating eects.
Using Artillery in the Defense: Unity of Command
Non-divisional artillery battalions were in high demand throughout
the duration of the Korean conict because of the need to reinforce ex-
isting divisional artillery battalions and provide exibility for the corps.
45
As the Army scrambled to fulll this need, what became noticeable was
the lack of continuity in the command and control of the non-divisional
elements. In July 1950, the 92nd Armored Field Artillery Battalion left its
parent unit, the 2nd Armored Division, to deploy as a separate battalion of
the 5th Field Artillery Group, the only acting corps artillery headquarters
in Korea at the time. For the remainer of the year, the 92nd Field Artillery
Battalion participated in the Inchon amphibious assault, the Iwon amphib-
ious landing, and the X Corps’ defense in the northeastern sector of the
peninsula after the Chinese intervention. The battalion’s missions ranged
from serving under direct centralized control by the 5th Field Artillery
Group to an artillery reinforcement for the divisions under decentralized
control. The battalion never maintained a habitual relationship with one
command for longer than a month. This was the normal life of a non-divi-
sional artillery battalion in Korea.
46
During the Korean War, Field Manual 100-5 dened unity of command
as “that unity of eort which is essential to the decisive application of the
full combat power of the available forces.”
47
Additionally, “unity of eort
is furthered by full cooperation between the elements of command.”
48
The
rst denition linked the ability to mass res on the battleeld to the con-
trol of the artillery commander and the second with the ability of artillery
130
and maneuver commanders to synchronize these eects. Artillery in Korea
required an organizational command structure that allowed artillerymen to
synchronize eorts and mass res within their span of control while also
meeting the needs of maneuver. To support the maneuver requirements, ar-
tillery commanders assigned specic roles or missions to the artillery units
that explained the relationship of their support to the maneuver unit.
49
An-
other aspect of unity of command was the command relationships between
artillery commanders and their supported unit commanders.
50
Organiza-
tionally, the Army classied artillery battalions as divisional battalions and
non-divisional battalions. Divisional artillery battalions were “organic, as-
signed, or attached to the division.”
51
Non-divisional artillery units formed
a pool of battalions that the Army combined and centrally controlled by a
group or corps headquarters or decentrally controlled by assigning them
supporting roles within a division. This required non-divisional artillery
battalions to move throughout the Korean theater, being assigned to dif-
ferent corps or groups in direct support, general support and reinforcing
roles for all echelons from corps to battalion. These roles helped ensure a
mutual understanding of responsibility of artillery commanders and their
supporting relationship with the maneuver commanders. While this pro-
vided exibility for allocating artillery resources, what was missing was
a lasting relationship between non-divisional artillery battalions and their
higher headquarters as well as their supported maneuver headquarters.
52
Prior to the Korean War, artillery ocers recommended creating an
artillery division to organize non-divisional battalions that had their own
organic artillery divided into groups and regiments that allowed the corps
the exibility to reallocate groups without losing continuity. However,
when the Army implemented the reforms, they assigned organic artillery
battalions to the group, but only semi-permanently attached the group to
corps. The corps could then attach the group to a division in a supporting
role. Ultimately, the Army assigned non-divisional battalions permanently
for continuity and decreased uctuation, while retaining exibility within
the corps. This was the only change to the organization of non-divisional
artillery; the group remained the primary organizational method of em-
ploying non-divisional artillery.
53
Aside from organizational changes, a key part of unity of command
in the Korean War was the command responsibilities of the artillery com-
manders. Generally, in armies, corps, divisions, and task forces, the senior
artilleryman was the commander of the organically assigned artillery units
as well as the artillery ocer on the special sta of the supported unit to
advise the commander and sta on artillery matters and re support coor-
131
dination.
54
Doctrinally, artillery commanders only had command authority
over the battalions that were organic to their headquarters. With the new
group concept, this meant that corps artillery commanders did not have
direct command over the group artillery and the groups did not have direct
command over the divisional artillery.
55
This did not alleviate the artillery
commander’s responsibility to synchronize the eects of artillery within
their maneuver headquarters, regardless of the echelon. One of the major
developments during the interwar period to assist in this synchronization
was the re support coordination center.
Doctrine required army, corps, and division and task force artillery
commanders at each level to “establish and supervise the re support coor
-
dination center as re support coordinator for the command.”
56
Therefore,
during the Korean War, artilleryman established formal re support coordi
-
nation centers at all corps and division re direction centers, and subordi-
nate artilleryman carried the concept to the infantry regimental and battalion
levels.
57
In the re support coordination center, artilleryman planned and
synchronized air support, naval gunre and artillery, and responded to tar-
gets of opportunity with the available means. This allowed units to de-con-
ict close air support and artillery res and integrated the artillery observer
into the process of determining the best asset to engage a given target.
58
During the “Pusan Perimeter” defense, the only available artillery
units were divisional artillery units.
59
Even as non-divisional artillery bat-
talions entered the theater, they were attached as general support or rein-
forcing units for the divisions, only adding to the span of control for the
division artillery commander. Artillerymen could only mass res at the
division level due to the absence of a corps artillery headquarters and the
lack of non-divisional artillery battalions and often, due to the wide disper-
sion of units, this was dicult to accomplish. Each corps was authorized
an artillery ocer and small sta, but they had no command authority or
capability to adequately synchronize res across the corps.
60
Initially, the X Corps utilized the 5th Field Artillery Group as its corps
artillery headquarters due to the lack of a corps artillery sta. During the
initial phases of the Korean War, the 5th Field Artillery Group served as
the best example of employing and controlling non-divisional battalions.
They controlled their two organic battalions directly as well as synchro-
nized the artillery eorts within X Corps. During the push to the Chinese
border in October and November 1950, they decentralized artillery em-
ployment to the divisions in order to keep up with the oense. As the Chi-
nese launched oenses to push the X Corps back to the 38th Parallel, the
5th Field Artillery Group centralized the control of artillery to maximize
132
the eectiveness of the withdrawal.
61
I Corps Artillery was the rst ocial
corps artillery headquarters to arrive in theater in February 1951 and by
March, IX Corps Artillery arrived.
62
As more non-divisional battalions en-
tered the theater, corps artillery commanders and their stas could better
reallocate and control how the attached units would support the overall
corps re plans. As the nature of the war transitioned to more of a static
defense, artillery commanders placed even more emphasis on centrally co-
ordinating and allocating non-divisional artillery to best disrupt the com-
munist attacks.
63
Unity of command of artillery forces in Korea centered on the exi-
ble organizational structure of the groups, the command authorities and
responsibilities of the artillery commanders, and the mission roles of
the individual artillery battalions. Organizationally, the artillery group
concept worked because it provided some continuity in command to the
non-divisional artillery battalions while retaining the exibility to move
non-divisional units between corps and divisions. The concept still re-
quired a corps artillery headquarters to nest the non-divisional and di-
visional re plans within the maneuver re planning. Synchronization
of artillery forces across the theater of operations required re support
coordination centers at all levels to coordinate artillery and integrate air
support across a wide front. These centers served as the medium for more
eective command and control.
Using Artillery in the Defense: Security
By September 1950, the North Koreans had conned the UN forc-
es to the Pusan Perimeter and were pressing to disrupt the defense along
the Naktong River. The 35th Infantry Regiment of the 25th Infantry Divi-
sion was the division’s right ank and the division was responsible for the
southwestern portion of the Pusan Perimeter. On 3 September 1950, North
Korean Forces launched an attack against the 35th Infantry line. The 64th
Field Artillery Battalion was in direct support of the 35th Infantry and had
established localized defenses around each of the battery position areas
because they were keenly aware that they were responsible for their own
defenses given the likelihood of enemy inltration. Early that morning, the
rst sergeant of A Battery, 64th Field Artillery noticed a small element of
men moving toward their position.
Before he could identify the element, they opened machine gun re on
the American position. Additional res from all directions accompanied
the initial attack. Before the men of A Battery could respond, the enemy
killed ve men, wounded one and destroyed the battery communications
133
switchboard. At this point, A Battery’s howitzers stopped all re missions
as the machine gun re turned on their positions. By the time that A Bat-
tery returned machine gun re, they realized that it was too late; the North
Koreans had completely inltrated its position. Some of the howitzers re-
sponded with direct re against the inltrators, but to no avail. The howit-
zers were lost until recovered later that morning.
64
Figure 7.3. US Army 105-mm howitzer in action west of Yongsan, Korea, on
1 September 1950. Photo courtesy of US Army Center of Military History.
134
This example was not the rst time that the enemy overran an American
artillery formation in the war. The 63rd Field Artillery Battalion experi-
enced the same type of event in July 1950, south of the Kum River.
65
In
fact, artillery units were overrun close to a dozen times during the rst nine
months of the war.
66
With the limited amount of artillery deployed to theater,
this became an operational level problem. The impact of the linear nature of
World War II conditioned artillery units to rely on the safety of the contig
-
uous front. This left artillery units unprepared to defend against the threat
of North Koreans and Chinese inltration that required mutually supporting
defensive positions.
67
By the end of the Korean War, the US Army artillery
units learned valuable lessons in protecting their vulnerable formations.
At the beginning of the Korean War, doctrine developed during World
War II favored the oensive nature of warfare to annihilate the enemy.
This did not t well within the defensive nature of the limited war in Ko-
rea.
68
By 1953, artillery doctrine described the defense of an artillery po-
sition in terms of the batteries responsibility to protect their position. “All
units prepare their positions for defense against enemy ground attack with
particular attention to antitank defense. Units must be prepared to counter
airborne attacks, guerrilla action, and inltration.” Additionally, the manu-
al advocated training artillery units in infantry tactics and delivery of artil-
lery direct re in support of the battery defense, though it was only specic
to airborne operations.
69
Ultimately, the defense of the battery position was
the responsibility of the artillerymen. Artillery commanders understood
the need to develop mutually supporting battery positions and integrating
them with maneuver, but the lack of training in this respect during the in-
terwar period made this dicult to accomplish.
70
As the war progressed, North Korean and Chinese inltration tactics
exploited the weakness of artillery defenses and the breadth of the Amer-
ican’s defense.
71
“Inltrating enemy units frequently occupied positions
to the Americans’ rear, striking command posts, support units or artillery
positions.”
72
Later, the United States built more depth into their defens-
es and integrated the artillery position defense with maneuver forces. By
the end of the conict, the vulnerability of artillery formations was much
improved. The Army learned two major lessons: batteries must be able
to defend themselves, and the battalion must integrate a mutually sup-
porting defense plan with maneuver. General Almond expanded on these
areas adding, “Automatic weapons within artillery units must be ready
at all times to defend their positions whether on the move or in position.
Destruction of artillery units is a primary enemy objective. All units must
135
stress defense against inltration tactics, train for anti-guerrilla measures
and be prepared for all-around defense.”
73
Conclusion
The elements of mass, unity of eort and security characterized eec-
tive defensive operational artillery employment during the Korean War.
The ability to synchronize the eects of multiple divisional and non-divi-
sional artillery battalions within the corps, groups, and divisions required
a command and control relationship structure that facilitated a coordinated
artillery defense. Faced with an enemy that favored inltration tactics and
the overall nature of defensive operations, the American and UN com-
manders recognized the importance of adequately securing artillery po-
sitions. Today, applying these same characteristics to the Army’s current
ability to provide adequate re support in large-scale combat operations
provides key insight into its preparation for future wars.
The concept of massed res was not new to the Korean conict. How-
ever, technological advances in the interwar period contributed to im-
proved methods of target acquisition and communication between observ-
ers and the guns. The necessity to compensate for the lack of artillery units
with concentrated res honed the artillery system to prioritize prearrange-
ment of targets in the defense. Target acquisition improvements allowed
UN forces to engage targets of opportunity more readily. Additionally, the
need to reallocate and redistribute non-divisional artillery battalions re-
quired strategic and tactical mobility to respond to the Communist threat.
Ultimately, the UN’s advantage over North Korean and Chinese forces
was their ability to mass res on targets of opportunity.
Unity of command for artillery units during the Korean War reect-
ed the desire to combine the exibility of the group concept of World
War II while providing continuity for non-divisional battalions within the
groups. The corps centralized control during static defensive operations
and decentralized control to the divisions during oensive maneuver.
During the defensive, centralized control allowed commanders to better
synchronize the eects of massed res and allowed the corps exibility to
respond to the largest threats. These concepts will be essential to coordi
-
nating artillery units in the future especially without an artillery headquar-
ters above the brigade level.
Security of artillery units in the beginning of the Korean War was
woefully inadequate. In the beginning of the conict, artillerymen expect-
ed conict to be similar to the linear battle during World War II. However,
136
due to the enemy tactics of inltration, they quickly realized that the artil-
lery battalions had to defend themselves. Integrated battery defense plans
nested within the maneuver defense improved throughout the conict.
Ultimately, by the end of the conict, artillery battalions adjusted their
methods to respond to security challenges.
Today, artillery doctrine still addresses each of these critical areas. The
characterizations of mass are increased lethality, longer ranges, better target
acquisition technology, and precision munitions. It could be said that ad
-
vent of precision guiding munitions has somewhat changed the concept of
massed res by reducing the reliance on multiple artillery units to achieve
desired eects. Regardless, the army’s current artillery organization lacks
the ability to integrate multiple battalions at the division level and higher.
The fact that contemporary doctrine addresses the aspects of mass,
unity of command and security does not mean that the artillery units can
actually perform the concepts well. Much like during the start of the Ko-
rean War, the current US Army’s ability to execute all doctrinal artillery
tasks such as massed res is lacking. This is not necessarily for the same
reasons as during the Korean War. Sound written doctrine does not neces-
sarily mean that the army’s artillery units can actually execute it. The last
decade of counterinsurgency operations have certainly inuenced the ar-
tillery’s ability to mass res above the battalion level. Today, an argument
can be made that the artillery is unprepared to mass res against a near
peer army during large-scale combat operations. The degradation in the ar-
tillery’s ability to mass res and secure itself is due to the last ten years of
conict but adequate training can x it. The aspect of unity of command,
however, is a completely dierent problem.
Eective unity of command for artillery units must be able to accom-
plish a number of functions. Commanders must be able to control subor-
dinate artillery elements and the artillery must be organized to eectively
integrate with maneuver and synchronize the concentration of artillery
throughout the entire theater of operations. The major change in unity of
command since the Korean War for divisional artillery is the elimination
of the division artillery headquarters from the current army structure. In
fact, there is no command headquarters for artillery units above the bri-
gade level. The Army eliminated the division artillery and transferred the
role of synchronizing divisional artillery res to the Chief of Field Artil-
lery in the division headquarters and above. However, the Chief of Field
Artillery has no command authority over any artillery battalions.
137
The US Army Field Artillery made great contributions to the overall
success achieved by UN forces in the Korean War. The doctrinal concepts
of mass, unity of command, and security evolved during the three years
of conict, and these concepts will continue to evolve as the Army shifts
its focus to the conduct of large-scale combat operations against a near-
peer threat. Artillerymen must ask themselves if they are prepared to exe-
cute these functions in a similar situation such as Korea. Has the artillery
trained enough at massing res above the battalion level? Is the Army’s
current unity of command adequate to synchronize the artillery of multi-
ple divisions? And, do artillery battalions know how to adequately secure
their formations during the conduct of large-scale combat operations?
138
Notes
1. Bevin Alexander, Korea: The First War We Lost (New York: Hippocrene
Books, 1993), 135–36, 140–42; Roy E. Appleman, South to the Naktong, North
to the Yalu (Washington, DC: US Government Printing, 1961), 248, 282–83,
343.
2. Janice E. McKenney, Organizational History of Field Artillery 1775–
2003 (Washington, DC: United States Army Center of Military History, 2007),
201.
3. US Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 6-20, Artillery Tactics
and Techniques (Washington, DC: 1953), 35.
4. US Army, Conference on Battle Employment of Artillery in Korea (Fort
Sill, OK: Artillery Center, 11 February 1952), 9.
5. US Army, Conference on Battle Employment of Artillery in Korea, 9.
6. Stanford Research Institute, Operational Data for Selected Field Artil-
lery Units During World War II and The Korean War (Stanford, CA: Stanford
Research Institute, 1954), 1.
7.Peter J. Lane, “Steel for Bodies: Ammunition Readiness during the Kore-
an War” (Master’s thesis, Command and General Sta College, 2003), 27.
8. William Glenn Robertson, “The Korean War: The United Nations’ Re-
sponse to Heavy Bombardment,” in CSI Report No. 13: Tactical Responses to
Concentrated Artillery, by Combat Studies Institute (Fort Leavenworth, KS: US
Army Command and General Sta College, n.d.), 109–11.
9. Appleman, South to the Naktong, 241–249; George C. Herring, From
Colony to Superpower: US Foreign Relations since 1776 (New York, NY: Ox-
ford University Press, 2008), 639–641.
10. Allan R. Millett, The War for Korea, 1950–1951: They Came From
the North (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2010), 240; Walter G.
Hermes, Truce Tent and Fighting Front (Washington, DC: Oce of the Chief of
Military History, United States Army, 1966), 10–14.
11. Millett, 384–387, 390–403, 411–16; Herring, From Colony to Super-
power, 642.
12. Millett, 384–387, 390–403, 411–16; Herring, 642.
13. Operational artillery is the employment of non-divisional artillery assets
to support the arrangement of tactical actions in time, space and purpose to
achieve the operational or strategic objective.
14. Walter E. Kretchik, US Army Doctrine: From the American Revolution
to the War on Terror (Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas Press, 2011), 164.
15. Boyd L. Dastrup, The Field Artillery: History and Sourcebook (West-
port, CT: Greenwood Press, 1994), 243.
16. John D. Dill, Fire Support in the Pusan Perimeter (Fort Leavenworth,
KS: US Army Command and General Sta College, 2000), 3.
17. Robert A. Doughty, The Evolution of US Army Tactical Doctrine,
1946–76 (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, US Army Command
and General Sta College, 1979), 7–12.
139
18. A Chinese Army Group consisted of three divisions and approximately
30,000 soldiers. A North Korean Corps consisted of three to four understrength
divisions and approximately 17,000 soldiers.
19. Millett, The War for Korea, 443–445; Russell A. Gugeler, Army His-
torical Series: Combat Actions in Korea, (Washington DC: US Army Center of
Military History, 1987), 167; X Corps Artillery Report, “Battle of the Soyang
River: An Analysis of Artillery Support, X Corps Sector, 1 May–29 May 1951.”
20. Early ammunition restrictions were based on World War II expendi-
ture rates and modied to compensate for the lack of available ammunition in
theater. As more ammunition became available, UN forces were able to increase
these rates.
21. Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 100-5, Operations (Wash-
ington, DC: 1949), 22.
22. A doctrinal denition is a commonly understood and agreed upon de-
scription of a term or concept that appears in a military manual.
23. Although published in 1953 as doctrine, the technique of massed res
was in use throughout the Korean War; Department of the Army, Field Manual
(FM) 6-20, Artillery Tactics and Techniques (Washington, DC: 1953), 33.
24. Thomas S. Grodecki, “From Powder River to Soyang: The 300th Ar-
mored Field Artillery in Korea,” (Washington, DC: Center of Military History),
71.
25. D.M. Giangreco, Korean War Anthology: Artillery in Korea: Massing
Fires and Reinventing the Wheel (Fort Leavenworth, KS: US Government Print-
ing Oce, 2003), 7.
26. Department of the Army, FM 6-20, 136.
27. FM 6-20, 136.
28. FM 6-20, 138.
29. McKenney, Organizational History, 206.
30. US Army, Conference on the Battle Employment of the Artillery
1950–1951 (1952), 4.
31. Department of the Army, FM 6-20, 140–41.
32. Dastrup, The Field Artillery, 253.
33. McKenney, Organizational History, 190.
34. McKenney, 194.
35. Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 6-120, The Field Artillery
Observation Battalion and Batteries (Washington, DC: 1951), 1-3.
36. McKenney, Organizational History, 200.
37. James F. Schnabel, Policy and Direction: The First Year (Washington,
DC: US Government Printing Oce, 1973), 1.
38. A.C. Bole Jr., “Towed Versus Self-Propelled Artillery in the Period
Prior to 1955: An Historical Investigation of the Argument in the United States
Army,” (Fort Leavenworth: Command and General Sta College, 1966), 14.
39. While A.C. Bole uses the terms tactical and strategic mobility to dene
the characteristics of artillery mobility at the time, strategic mobility can also
be understood as operational maneuver today. A.C. Bole Jr., “Towed Versus
140
Self-Propelled Artillery in the Period Prior to 1955: An Historical Investigation
of the Argument in the United States Army,” 15.
40. Bole, “Towed Versus Self-Propelled,” 54–55.
41. Bole, 49.
42. Grodecki, “From Powder River to Soyang,” 67–68.
43. US Army, “Conference on the Battle Employment of the Artillery
1950–1951.” 1952, 2–3.
44. Robertson, “The Korean War,” 107–17.
45. Millett, The War for Korea, 153–54.
46. Millett, 153–154.
47. Department of the Army, FM 100-5, 22.
48. FM 100-5, 22.
49. “Direct support artillery has the mission of supporting a specic unit of
a command . . . is not attached to the supported unit, it remains under the com-
mand of the higher artillery commander, but its res are not taken away from
the supported unit except by the authority of the division or force commander. .
. . General support artillery has the mission of supporting the force as a whole.
Units with such a mission are held under the command of the artillery com-
mander thus making immediately available to the force commander a reserve
of re with which to inuence the action… A reinforcing mission requires the
reinforcing artillery unit to augment the res of the reinforced artillery unit on
call.” Department of the Army, FM 6-20, 37.
50. “When the artillery is assigned or attached to the force (supported unit),
the artillery ocer is both a subordinate command and a special sta ocer
of the force (supported unit) commander. When artillery is neither assigned
nor attached to the force but is supporting the force, the artillery commander’s
relationship to the force commander is both that of an advisor and that of an
independent commander obliged to render continuous eective re support in
accordance with his assigned mission.” Department of the Army, FM 6-20, 10.
51. Department of the Army, FM 6-20, 8.
52. Grodecki, “From Powder River to Soyang,” 72–74, 90.
53. McKenney, Organizational History, 195.
54. Department of the Army, FM 6-20, 10.
55. FM 6-20, 10.
56. FM 6-20, 13.
57. McKenney, Organizational History, 205.
58. Dastrup, The Field Artillery: History and Sourcebook, 259; Russell Wal-
lace Jr., “For Battleeld Teamwork: Fire Support Coordination Center,” Combat
Forces Journal, May 1953, 24–26; Carl W. Schaad, “Fire Support Coordina-
tion,” Combat Forces Journal, September 1952, 39–41; Eighth Army, “A Study
of the Employment and Eectiveness of the Artillery with the Eighth Army
during the period, October 1951–July 1953,” 1954, 7–8.
59. Russell A. Weathersby, “The Field Artillery Group in Support of the
Corps and Field Army, 1942–1953,” Thesis, US Army Command and General
141
Sta College, 1966, 126; McKenney, Organizational History, 196–97; Schnabel,
Policy and Direction, 90–92.
60. Russell A. Weathersby, “The Field Artillery Group in Support of the
Corps and Field Army, 1942–1953,” 126–127; Department of the Army, The
Artillery School, ”Report of the Artillery School Representative, AFF Observer
team No. 2 Concerning Korean Campaign, September to October 1950, Inclu-
sive, “27 November 1950, 134–41.
61. Russell A. Weathersby, “The Field Artillery Group in Support of the
Corps and Field Army, 1942–953,” 130.
62. Weathersby, 133.
63. Weathersby, 133–35.
64. Gugeler, Army Historical Series, 31–38.
65. Appleman, South to the Naktong, 126–28; Giangreco, Korean War
Anthology, 3–5.
66. Giangreco, Korean War Anthology, 1.
67. Giangreco, 1, 5; Dastrup, The Field Artillery, 228–29, 242–43, 247, 25;
Edward T. Klett Jr., “Solving the 6400-mil Nemesis,” Combat Forces Journal,
July 1951, 34.
68. Walter E. Kretchik, US Army Doctrine: From the American Revolution
to the War on Terror, (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2011), 158;
Scott R. McMeen, “Field Artillery Doctrine Development 1917–1945,” Com-
mand and General Sta College, 1991, 48.
69. Department of the Army, FM 6-20, 93.
70. Giangreco, Korean War Anthology, 5.
71. Dastrup, The Field Artillery, 255; Giangreco, Korean War Anthology, 3.
72. Doughty, The Evolution of US Army Tactical Doctrine, 7–8.
73. US Army, Conference on the Battle Employment of the Artillery
1950–1951, 1952, 9.
143
Chapter 8
US Army Artillery in the Vietnam War
Boyd L. Dastrup
After eight years of ghting to preserve its colonial empire, France
nally suered defeat at the hands of Ho Chi Minh, an ardent Vietnamese
nationalist and communist, when Dien Bien Phu fell in March 1954. This
along with communist rhetoric about picking up the banner of nationalism
by supporting wars of liberation inuenced the United States to consider
sending troops. Provisional agreements reached at Geneva, Switzerland,
prevented this, divided the country at the seventeenth parallel, and sched-
uled reunication to come through a general election in July 1956.
1
Fearing that the communists would eventually gain power, the
United States began pouring in economic and military aid to buttress
South Vietnam against subversion by the Viet Cong, a contraction of
Vietnamese Communists, and the threat of invasion by North Vietnam.
Although the Army had been sending advisors to Vietnam since the
early 1950s, President John F. Kennedy’s decision in the spring of 1961
to increase the American commitment greatly expanded the Army’s
advisory eort. As quickly as the Army could train advisory teams, it
dispatched them to South Vietnam. Each eld artillery advisory team
included an ocer, generally a captain, and a senior noncommissioned
ocer that was assigned to an artillery battalion in South Vietnamese
divisions and corps. While the ocer provided guidance to improve
overall unit eectiveness, the noncommissioned ocer assisted the
battalion operations ocer and operations noncommissioned ocer
in training ring batteries and gun sections. In the meantime, an Ameri
-
can artillery ocer, normally a major, was assigned to each corps and
division to counsel senior South Vietnamese commanders on artillery
matters and coordinated the eorts of the advisory teams in subordi
-
nate battalions. Although the Americans faced soldiers with a dierent
set of values, they produced a better led and trained South Vietnamese
artillery by 1965 than the one encountered in 1961.
2
In the meantime, North Vietnam built a military force to gain con-
trol of Vietnam. By the early 1960s North Vietnam had a formidable army
that had been organized, equipped, and trained along Chinese lines and
that relied upon stealth and foot mobility. North Vietnamese divisions had
around ten thousand lightly armed and equipped men with a ready reserve
of approximately 500,000 men. To compensate for the lack of repower
144
the North Vietnamese stressed rigorous discipline, tactical superiority, and
careful preparation. The Viet Cong gave the North Vietnamese another tool
to bring down the South Vietnamese government by inltrating South Viet-
nam and conducting sabotage, terrorist, and propaganda campaigns.
3
Encouraged by the deaths of Ngo Dinh Diem, the premier of South
Vietnam, and President Kennedy, North Vietnam intensied its political
and military oensive against South Vietnam in 1964.
4
To meet the ex-
ternal threat the Army abandoned its defensive strategy for aggressive
oensive actions.
5
After a series of limited oensives, General William
Westmoreland, Commander, US Military Assistance Command, Vietnam,
opened a campaign to counter North Vietnamese moves to cut South Viet-
nam in half. After an attack on a Special Forces camp at Plei Me in October
1965, he sent the 1st Air Cavalry Division (Airmobile) under Major Gen-
eral Harry W.O. Kinnard to destroy the retreating North Vietnamese units
responsible for the assault.
6
The Battle of the Ia Drang Valley
Late in October 1965, the 1st Cavalry Division moved into the
Ia
Drang
Valley. After several days of searching, the 1-9 Cavalry bumped
into the enemy on 1 November. As the ghting grew hotter, the 1st Cav
-
alry quickly concentrated by using the helicopter’s mobility, defeated the
North Vietnamese, and forced them to retreat. That same day, 1-9 Cav-
alry’s airborne scouts spotted a battalion-size enemy force advancing
towards the recent ght. The scouts red on the North Vietnamese.
Without any artillery support the 1-9 Cavalry along with reinforcements
airlifted into the battle area repeatedly repulsed enemy assaults. The
enemy’s proximity to American troops precluded aerial artillery from
being employed, while tube artillery was out of range. On 3 November
the 1-9 Cavalry squadron began conducting a reconnaissance-in-force
along the Cambodian border. After establishing a patrol base, it staked
out ambushes to catch North Vietnamese units eeing to safety. That
night the North Vietnamese ferociously hit the 1-9 Cavalry. Aerial ar
-
tillery and a dogged defense turned back many enemy attacks. Outside of
aerial artillery, the 1st Cavalry’s eld artillery provided minimal sup
-
port. The short, intense battles fought at distances beyond towed artil-
lery’s range simply precluded any help.
7
During the second week of November, both sides opened oensives
to gain control of the Ia Drang Valley. On 14 November, CH47 Chinook
helicopter airlifts placed two batteries at Landing Zone Falcon to support
the 1-7
Cavalry’s oensive at Landing Zone X-Ray. Gun crews concentrat-
145
ed their re around the landing zone. As tube artillery lifted its re, aerial
artillery blasted the area to allow the infantry to land. This action totally
disrupted North Vietnamese plans to attack Plei Me and put them on the
defensive. Even though they were surprised, the North Vietnamese slugged
the Americans viciously with small arms, rocket, and mortar re. To repel
the assaults the Americans airlifted in reinforcements throughout the day
under the cover of artillery re from landing Zone Falcon. These bom-
bardments along with small arms re broke up several attacks during the
day. Throughout the night the North Vietnamese continued their attempt to
defeat the Americans, but intensive re from the two batteries at Landing
Zone Falcon and aggressive ghting by the cavalry repulsed the charges.
8
The battle at X-Ray carried on over the next two days. On the f-
teenth the North Vietnamese repeatedly assaulted the Americans, Small
arms re became so intense that the forward observer from the most
hard-pressed American company was pinned down and could not call
in artillery re. Fortunately, the artillery ocer located back at 1-7’s
command post could see the ghting, adjusted artillery re, and direct
-
ed aerial artillery attacks and tactical air strikes. Despite eective air
Figure 8.1. US Army CH-47 delivers ammunition to a combined 105-mm and 155-
mm howitzer battery in Vietnam. Photo courtesy of The Center of Military History.
146
and artillery support, the enemy closed in on the perimeter and assailed
it from all directions. Using colored smoke rounds to identify the pre-
cise outline of his perimeter, Lieutenant Colonel Harold G. Moore,
the 1-7 Infantry battalion commander, called for additional artillery
support. Heavily armed helicopter gunships entered the fray, while the
two batteries at Landing Zone Falcon and two at Landing Zone Colum-
bus laid down a devastating shield of iron. This combination broke the
enemy’s attacks for the day. The following day, the North Vietnamese
renewed their assaults but ran into a curtain of artillery rounds. Using
this as protection, the Americans then pushed towards the North Viet
-
namese, who retreated.
9
On 17 November, the 2-7 Cavalry and the 2-5 Cavalry, which had
joined Moore’s command on the 15th at X-Ray, moved on a sweep
north to cut o North Vietnamese elements moving towards Columbus
and Falcon. The 2-5 Cavalry arrived at Columbus without contacting
the enemy, but the 2-7 Cavalry were ambushed en-route to Landing
Zone Albany by several North Vietnamese units. The engagement
quickly deteriorated into a wild melee. Unable to distinguish between
friend and foe, gun crews from Landing Zone Columbus and airmen
waited patiently four hours before they could respond. In mid-after
-
noon aerial and tube artillery and tactical air support joined the ght.
Although the enemy applied pressure into the evening, a continuous
ring of artillery shells and tactical air strikes prevented the Vietnamese
from further penetrations of the perimeters. Unable to take such pun-
ishment, the North Vietnamese nally abandoned their drive to destroy
the artillery that had been so destructive at X-Ray. The North Vietnam
-
ese hit Columbus with mortar and machine gun re on 18 November
and battled the Americans at several other locations, but the ghting at
Albany marked the last of major combat in the Ia Drang.
10
Lessons Learned from the Ia Drang
After the Battle of Ia Drang, General Kinnard had nothing but
praise for his eld artillery. “Using Chinooks, we had been able to position
tube artillery in the midst of a literally trackless jungle where it provided
close support to our infantry and gave them a vital measure of superiority,”
Kinnard wrote in
Army in 1967.
11
Besides lauding tube artillery, he boasted
that aerial artillery had matured in the Ia Drang by supplementing tube ar
-
tillery and in some cases providing the only repower. Taking his argument
even further, Kinnard insisted that the 1st Cavalry lured the enemy into
battle by teasing it with a “seemingly unprotected airmobile infantry bat
-
147
talion.”
12
Once the enemy struck, the 1st Cavalry hit it hard with “massive
artillery support.”
13
Simply stated, the battles of Ia Drang vindicated the
airmobile concept and showed the eld artillery’s capacity to provide close
support in dicult terrain.
14
Lieutenant Colonel Lloyd J. Picou of the 1st Cavalry’s artillery re-
sponded with the same enthusiasm. Writing in Artillery Trends in Au-
gust 1967, Picou explained that airmobile artillery proved its versatility
and mobility, its ability to displace quickly, and its mastery of airmobile
artillery techniques.
15
The following year, Picou explained in Military Re-
view, “From the division artillery viewpoint, the most signicant outcome
of this campaign [Ia Drang] was the use of aerial artillery.”
16
Aerial artil-
lery gunships ew to the scene and were able to locate and attack enemy
forces. Pilots contacted ground units and then adjusted tube artillery on
the fringes of the battleeld. As his article indicated, he believed that the
eld artillery had made a signicant breakthrough with aerial artillery
because it provided eective support to airmobile units.
17
The Army and 1st Cavalry Division drew two more conclusions. Both
pointed out that operations in the Ia Drang revealed the importance of hav
-
ing mutually supporting eld artillery positions. Towed 105-mm howitzers
could not be used in a direct re role on a landing zone surrounded by dense veg
-
etation without causing extensive casualties to the security force. To protect one
landing zone and its batteries, the eld artillery had to site at least two bat
-
teries within range of each other. Because of guerrilla warfare, commanders
simply could not position their eld artillery without adequate protection.
18
In their eorts to justify airmobile operations, Kinnard and other o-
cers overlooked an important weakness. During the short but intensive bat-
tles on 1–3 November between small forces, tube artillery failed to furnish
any support because it was out of range of the ghts whereas aerial artil
-
lery rushed quickly forward to hit enemy units. Even though it was trans-
ported by helicopter, tube artillery lacked sucient mobility to respond
to fast-moving situations. This meant that the infantry and cavalry would
have to ght alone on the enemy’s terms unless they were under a protec-
tive umbrella of re support. Likewise, repower succeeded only because
the North Vietnamese stood and fought. Although repower was a decisive
factor, it had limitations. Late in 1965, it could not be applied at will.
Because the Ia Drang acquainted the enemy with American repower
and inuenced it to avoid such encounters in the future, the Army had to
inaugurate search-and-destroy operations in 1965-66 to ferret out the en-
emy.
19
For example, covered by 105-mm and 155-mm howitzer batteries
148
positioned in the mountains bordering the Bong Son River, assaults by the
3rd Brigade, 1st Cavalry, landed south of the river on 28 January 1966 to
deceive the enemy, attacked northward over the river with the Vietnamese
Airborne Brigade, and destroyed two enemy battalions. On 6 February as a
battalion of Marines sealed o the north end of the An Loa Valley to pre-
vent the enemy from escaping, the division’s 2nd Brigade air assaulted into
An Lao Valley. As the 2nd Brigade opened a thrust south down the valley,
the rest of the division pushed rapidly southwest of Bong Son.
20
This rapid sweep taxed the 1st Cavalry’s artillery’s ability to support
the maneuver elements. Even though eld artillery ocers tried to minimize
displacements, the speed of the ground troops and the size of the area com-
pelled them to make over 160 displacements, which strained the division’s
air resources. When the pieces were moved by helicopter, eld artillerymen
generally transported ammunition and guns separately. To economize and
speed up displacements they devised a system of using one helicopter to
carry both. They suspended the ammunition and the howitzer beneath the
helicopter by means of a double-sling system to allow the transportation of
a complete ring section. By doing this, eld artillerymen reduced the time
required to occupy a position and dispelled fears about the eld artillery’s in-
ability to keep up with the other combat arms on a highly mobile battleeld.
21
Even though 1st Cavalry eld artillerymen could maneuver their
105-mm howitzers around, they wanted still more repower. Without
suitable roads 155-mm howitzers could not occupy positions within
range of the objective. To resolve that shortcoming eld artillerymen air-
lifted the howitzers. Using CH-54 Flying Cranes and CH-47 Chinook
helicopters and reducing the weight of the 155-mm howitzer by elimi
-
nating unnecessary equipment, the 1st Cavalry ew a four-gun battery a
distance of 15 miles in approximately two hours to provide re support
for the ground forces. This movement set an important precedent as it
indicated that medium guns could be air lifted and therefore possess the
same mobility as lighter pieces had.
22
During those early days of 1966, eld artillerymen in the 1st Cav-
alry also developed new tactics for aerial artillery. While tube artillery
was adjusted on a target, aerial artillery orbited as near as possible. If any
enemy tried to escape, aerial gunners red on them. Whenever possible
or appropriate, the pilots adjusted tube artillery to ush personnel into
the open and then attacked. The ability to airlift towed 105-mm and 155-
mm howitzers and the rapid response of aerial artillery signied important
changes in tactics. The 1st Cavalry had the capability to maneuver their
artillery aggressively on the battleeld to destroy the enemy and refused
149
to allow dicult terrain to hinder delivering huge amounts of repower
upon enemy positions.
23
The war concurrently forced the eld artillery to rene certain gun-
nery techniques. In past wars eld artillerymen could predict the enemy’s
moves because they were primarily conned to a sector and could be plot-
ted on a map with some degree of accuracy. Vietnam changed this. Be-
cause of the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong practice of hitting from any
direction at any time, gun crews had to respond quickly and deliver re
in a full circle.
24
Realizing that existing procedures were inadequate, gun
crews improvised their own to furnish re in a complete circle. This creat-
ed varying ways. To eliminate confusion, The Artillery and Missile School
devised a method to re in a complete circle in 1966 and disseminated it
throughout the Army.
25
Moreover, the school increased its instruction time
on ring in a complete circle (6400-mils) to prepare graduates better for
combat in Vietnam.
26
As important as technique was, suitable eld pieces facilitated ring
in a complete circle. The M108, Ml09, and M102 howitzers had the capa-
bility of traversing 360 degrees with ease, oset the limited traverses of
Figure 8.2. M107 175-mm gun ring during the Vietnam War. Photo courtesy of
The Center of Military History.
150
other eld guns, such as the 8-inch howitzer and 175-mm gun, and com-
plemented the revised 6400-mil ring chart.
27
Although search-and-destroy operations of late 1965 and early 1966
were successful, the Army still had diculties protecting the countryside.
To ensure that the maximum area was defended by available troops, the
Army assigned an area of operations to each unit from the highest to the
lowest. This dispersed the Army throughout the countryside. Because of
the size of the brigade’s area and range limitation, the division artillery
commander attached a battery to a particular battalion to provide the max-
imum coverage. Consequently, an artillery battalion no longer supported
an entire brigade as it had done in previous wars. This habitual association
decentralized re direction from the battalion to the battery and frequently
isolated the battery from the rest of its battalion. Addressing this devel-
opment, Brigadier General James G. Kalergis, Commander, I Field Force
Vietnam Artillery, explained in 1967 that eld artillery batteries normally
performed
as if they were battalions and that battalions acted as if they
were division artillery or group head quarters. This transferred the au-
thority to make key decisions from the battalion commander or higher
to the battery commander. For example, Operation Fitchburg of late
1966 and early 1967 in Tay Ninh Province gave the battery commander
“an excellent opportunity to exercise command and control indepen
-
dent of the artillery battalion” because one 105-mm. howitzer battery
was placed in direct support of each maneuver element.
28
Commanders permitted batteries to operate independently because
the war was basically a small unit conict and was being fought over a
large area. Although commanders preferred to keep re direction under
the battalion’s control, batteries had to be able to direct their own re
since they were often employed piecemeal into battle. In some cases,
batteries fragmented operations even more by assigning part of their
guns for base camp defense and the other for tactical employment.
29
Because of operations over vast areas, numerous displacements,
short, violent actions, and an undenable front and rear in 1965–66, the
eld artillery found the battery-battalion arrangement to be logical and to
provide fast, accurate re. As
a result, the enemy feared American eld
artillery and made batteries prime targets for inltration or full-scale at
-
tacks. Unable to perform their missions and protect themselves simulta-
neously, eld artillerymen created re support bases by positioning their
pieces with the command post of a maneuver battalion. From these posi
-
tions located so that any point in the area of operations could be reached
by at least one battery and usually two or more, the maneuver commander
151
conducted oensive operations, while eld artillery, ranging from 105-
mm howitzers to 175-mm guns, furnished re support and helped defend
other re bases as required. This arrangement guaranteed a rapid response
by the artillery when called upon, simplied furnishing re support in
guerrilla warfare, and saved lives. The base along with the availability of
naval gunre and tactical air gave the Army the capacity to rain deadly
re and reinforced the growing trend of relying upon repower rather
than maneuver for defeating the enemy.
30
Most commanders concluded that the overriding lesson of 1965
–
66 was the importance of repower. As the battles indicated, Amer-
ican ground forces were vulnerable when they lacked re support.
Because of that, many commanders reluctantly operated beyond their
artillery or tactical air support and refused to ght on equal terms with
the enemy.
31
Commenting on this, Brigadier General Willard Pearson,
Commander, 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division, wrote in December
1966 that his unit’s motto was “Save Lives, Not Ammunition.”
32
Given
this, he wrote in December 1966 that the ground forces’ main task in-
volved nding the enemy. Artillery and air power had the responsibil-
ity of defeating, routing, or destroying the enemy. In December 1966
he admitted, “Our airmobile operations and re support then become
the mainstay of our oensive.”
33
Along with other commanders, Pear-
son insisted that massive artillery and air re were the most eective
ways to crumble enemy resistance. Although some ocers opposed
such a tactic, most commanders valued repower because it preserved
lives. A memorandum for General Kalergis pointed out “There is not
[a] price tag in [on] the life of a US soldier; massive use of artillery, air
and naval support will save US
lives.”
34
The war in 1965
–
66, therefore, forced the eld artillery to mod-
ify tactics and organization. Without a front line gun crews did not
have the luxury of establishing positions in the rear areas, had to re
in a complete circle, had to defend themselves from inltrators, had to
airlift their pieces into remote areas, and had to decentralize their bat-
teries through habitual association to provide support in many cases.
Even though habitual association created erce loyalties between the
infantry and eld artillery, it made massing battalion and division re
dicult and elevated the importance of the battery re direction center.
Despite these adaptations during the heat of combat, the eld artillery
gave prompt, reliable support. Along with the pressure from public
opinion to preserve lives, by 1966 the Army made eld artillery, naval,
and air repower more important than maneuver since infantry, armor,
152
and cavalry units would not conduct operations unless they were under
the protective umbrella of re support.
Operations Cedar Falls and Junction City
Battles in 1967 and 1968 also reected this preoccupation with re-
power. Despite the success of the search-and-destroy operations in 1966,
hostile bastions still dotted South Vietnam. Carefully situated in hard-to-
reach areas-jungles, mountains, and swamps and provided with escape
routes, the bastions furnished the enemy excellent bases from which they
assaulted South Vietnam. Since the Iron Triangle was a formidable arrow
tip pointing straight at Saigon, the Army decided late in 1966 to destroy
that preserve even though previous attempts had failed. Early in Janu-
ary 1967, the 1st Infantry Division, the 25th Infantry Division, the 173rd
Airborne Brigade, the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, and separate bat
-
talions of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam opened Operation Cedar
Falls. The units moved into pre-arranged positions around the Triangle to
seal it o and attacked.
35
As expected, main force Viet Cong units dis-
persed as the Americans and South Vietnamese pushed into the bastion.
Although enemy resistance was light, the eld artillery red missions
from bases ringing the area of operations to seal o escape routes or re-
duce small points of resistance and ercely shelled landing zones. Nev-
ertheless, division artillery commanders had diculty locating moving
units and coordinating supporting res. Because of this, the 1st Division’s
artillery commander delegated re control to commanders of direct sup-
port battalions, who helped convert the Iron Triangle from a haven into a
no man’s land by the end of January.
36
Shortly thereafter, the Army launched another multi-division opera-
tion called Junction City. For years the insurgents had a major stronghold
along the Cambodian border from which they had hit the South Vietnam-
ese. Late in February, the Americans surrounded the area with 18 battal-
ions and 13 mutually supporting re bases and conducted search-and-de-
stroy operations over the next three weeks.
37
Junction City culminated with the battles of Ap Bau Bang II, Suoi Tre,
and Ap Gu. In each case Viet Cong forces attacked American re bases
with mortar rounds, rie grenades, rockets, and recoilless rie re. To ght
o the assaults the Americans employed small arms re, eld artillery, and
air strikes. According to Brigadier General David E. Ott, Commander, 25th
Division’s artillery, the most signicant artillery action occurred around
Fire Support Base Gold during the Battle of Suoi Tre. As infantry patrols
swept around the base on 21 March, they bumped into a Viet Cong force
153
that was preparing to assail the base. The accidental confrontation prema-
turely triggered a violent enemy attack. To defend themselves American
gun crews levelled their tubes and spewed beehive rounds (canister rounds
lled with hundreds of metal darts) into the Viet Cong. At point-blank
range round after round hit the assaulting force as batteries from other
bases threw up a continuous wall of shells around the perimeter and as air
strikes pounded the attackers. This demonstration of repower along with
small arms re compelled the Viet Cong to withdraw.
38
As Lieutenant General Bernard W. Rogers, who was the assistant di-
vision commander of the 1st Infantry Division in 1967, recalled in 1974,
Cedar Falls/Junction City operations conrmed the importance of eld
artillery and air power. They veried the need to get as much repower on
the enemy as quickly as possible and to use artillery and air strikes simul-
taneously. Equally important, these operations reemphasized the value of
105-mm howitzers because of their rapid re capabilities and strengthened
the requirement for mutually supporting bases.
39
In Summons of the Trumpet: US-Vietnam Perspective (1978),
David R. Palmer, an advisor to the Vietnamese Military Academy and
Vietnamese armor units during the Vietnam War, caught the essence of
the transformation-of Army tactics caused by the drive for re support.
By 1967 only a foolhardy or a desperate commander would ever engage
the enemy by any means other than repower. Early drifts towards this
mentality started in la Orang and culminated in 1967. Even though Army
doctrine still called for re and maneuver, practice in Vietnam diered
considerably. Commanders located the enemy with infantry and then at-
tacked with eld artillery and air strikes. After leaving Vietnam, General
Westmoreland criticized this routine vigorously when he admitted that ar-
tillery and air power had produced a rebase psychosis.
40
The Tet Oensive and the Vietnamization of the War
In 1968, the North Vietnamese abandoned their strategy of a protracted
war. Within 24 hours after the beginning of Tet, on 30 January 1968, Hanoi
launched a series of attacks from the demilitarized zone to the southern
tip of Vietnam. The Viet Cong and North Vietnamese struck six major
cities, 64 district capitals, and 50 hamlets and caught the Americans and
South Vietnamese o guard. In Saigon the Americans and South Vietnam-
ese repulsed the initial assaults and cleared the city within several days. A
similar pattern emerged in other places with the exception of Hue. After
three weeks of heavy bombing and intensive artillery re, the Americans
and South Vietnamese nally liberated the city.
41
154
Generally, post-Tet operations reected past counter-guerrilla opera-
tions. Enemy tactics compelled the resumption of small unit actions, rang-
ing from squad- to company-size. As the other combat arms scoured the
countryside, gun crews supplied close support by shelling enemy positions.
As
a means to extend oensive operations, the Army conducted artillery
raids from re bases into remote areas by displacing artillery to supplemen-
tary positions and quickly withdrawing. Normally, a raid included one 105-
mm howitzer battery, one understrength 155-mm howitzer battery (three
howitzers), one rie company for security, aerial observers from division
artillery, and air cavalry for target acquisition and damage assessment when
it was available. Equally important, American eld artillerymen created a
fourth ring battery in direct support battalions because of the clamor for
more repower and because of a surplus of guns and ammunition and in
-
creased the use of the Field Artillery Digital Automatic Computer (FAD-
AC) that had been introduced in Vietnam in 1966–67. In fact, FADAC had
become the primary means of computing ring data by 1969.
42
Although FADAC did not eliminate the need for manual computation
for backup capability, it greatly altered the eld artillery’s performance in
Vietnam. It reduced fatigue and the resulting errors of re direction center
personnel. By doing this FADAC greatly increased accuracy, decreased
response time, and allowed gun crews to re longer missions and hit more
targets with less ammunition. For the eld artillery these capabilities were
critical because the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong were elusive, used
hit-and-run tactics, and engaged the Americans and their allies at close
distance with the idea of negating their superiority in artillery, helicopter,
and tactical air support.
43
The war assumed a new dimension following Tet. Even though the
North Vietnamese did not achieve their objective, their ability to initiate
such an oensive stimulated a great debate in the United States. For many
Americans the oensive symbolized the senseless destruction of the war.
For the military Tet presented a golden opportunity to crush the Viet Cong
and North Vietnamese because they were weakened by that great eort.
Seeking to take advantage of the enemy’s condition, Westmoreland pro-
posed a two-sted oensive, a ground attack against sanctuaries in Laos
and Cambodia and an intensive bombing campaign. In contrast, Pentagon
civilians urged shifting from search-and destroy operations to population
security by deploying the bulk of the military forces along the demograph-
ic frontier, a line just north of the major population centers. From here
the military would defend against a major North Vietnamese thrust and
engage in limited oensive operations to keep the enemy o balance. Pen-
155
tagon civilians also wanted the South Vietnamese to assume more respon-
sibility for their own defense and hoped to end the war through negotiation
rather than a resounding military victory. Even though the military bitterly
denounced this position and warned that it would produce certain disaster,
President Lyndon B. Johnson’s administration accepted it in March 1968,
an election year. Because of his opposition to expanding the war, President
Johnson cut back bombing, informed the South Vietnamese that they had
to shoulder more of the burden for defending themselves, and launched a
peace initiative to create an independent, non-communist South Vietnam.
44
Although the Army continued ghting into 1973, Vietnamization
changed the eld artillery’s primary mission. Beginning early in 1969,
the Americans upgraded assistance programs to improve South Vietnam-
ese artillery operations, allowed the South Vietnamese to function inde-
pendently, and launched equipment modernization and training programs.
Despite these eorts and those that strengthened the South Vietnamese
army as a whole, South Vietnam nally collapsed in 1975 in the face of a
determined North Vietnamese onslaught.
45
Even though the Vietnam War demonstrated the Army’s exibility to
move from its preoccupation with nuclear war to unconventional war, it
also revealed the Army’s growing reliance upon repower. Exploiting im-
proved artillery systems coming o production lines, using FADAC to assist with
automated gunnery procedures and dusting o forgotten tactics and techniques,
eld artillerymen delivered unprecedented accurate re to shatter enemy
attacks and seal o the battleeld and showed their ability to furnish huge
quantities of re. Ironically, the Army’s past conditioned soldiers to see
repower-artillery, naval guns, and tactical air-as the preferable solution.
The Artillery Branch Study
Additionally, the Vietnam War highlighted the inherent shortcomings
of consolidating the eld and coast artillery. Following the closing of the
Seacoast Artillery School in 1950 and disbanding coast artillery units or
converting them to eld or antiaircraft artillery that same year, only eld
and antiaircraft artillery (called air defense artillery after 1957) existed as
part of the Army’s artillery. Because of the growing divergence of tech-
niques, tactics, doctrine, equipment, and materiel for the two artilleries,
the Continental Army Command outlined a plan in 1955 to develop basic
courses in eld artillery and antiaircraft artillery for new ocers. Integrat-
ed basic and advanced ocer courses, which had been initiated in 1947,
had failed to provide ocers with adequate preparation to serve eective-
ly in either artillery.
46
With support from the Army’s Assistant Chief of
156
Sta for Training, the Continental Army Command created basic courses
for the two artilleries in 1957 but reintegrated basic ocer training in 1958
through 1961 because of the lack of ocers and money.
47
In the meantime,
the Continental Army Command retained the integrated artillery advanced
course for ocers with ve to eight years of experience because of pres-
sure to maintain exibility in ocer assignments.
48
The pressure to end integrated training and form eld artillery and air
defense artillery as two distinct combat arms branches mounted. Based
upon the report of the Army Ocer Education and Review Board of 1958,
the Continental Army Command reintroduced separate basic ocer cours-
es in 1962 because of the need for specialized training for new ocers.
Because the Army wanted exibility to shift experienced artillery ocers
easily between eld and air defense artillery units, the command retained
the integrated advanced course. As a part of the advanced course, student
ocers received instruction at the Artillery and Guided Missile School
and the Air Defense School at Fort Bliss, Texas. In a student thesis at the
Army War College in 1963, Colonel William F. Brand pointed out that
integrated training provided an inadequate amount of time for detailed
instruction on all artillery weapons, which meant that ocers left the ad-
vanced course without mastering any of the weapons. As a result, Colonel
Brand urged separate training for eld artillery and air defense artillery. At
the direction of the Commanding General, Continental Army Command,
the Artillery and Guided Missile School and the Air Defense School ex-
plored the desirability of dividing the artillery into two branches. In 1963
the schools recommended separation because of the diculty of cross
training and the growing dierence between the two artilleries. In line
with this, the authors of “The Artillery Branch Study” of 1966 wrote that
integrated training ‘spawned mediocrity.’”
49
In 1965–1967 the demand for eld artillery ocers with highly pro-
fessional skills in the Vietnam War nally caused the Army and the Conti-
nental Army Command to reorganize the artillery. Because of the one-year
tour that left little time for on the-job training, combat in Vietnam required
the ocer to arrive as a procient eld artilleryman and not a hybrid eld
and air defense artilleryman. Army commanders in Vietnam simply did
not have the time to train an air defense artilleryman to be competent in
eld artillery and upgrade the skills of a eld artillery man, who had had
insucient training in the basic techniques.
50
Viewing the past years of
integration and its detrimental impact on eld and air defense artillery and
the need for qualied ocers in both artilleries, authors of “The Artillery
157
Branch Study’ urged ceasing the practice of cross training and forming two
separate branches of artillery.
51
The Army concurred with the recommendations and split the
eld artillery and air defense artillery into two distinct combat arms
with their own training programs in 1968. This freed eld artillery
-
men to concentrate on eld artillery subjects. Yet, separating the
two artilleries had little impact upon the Artillery and Guided Mis-
sile School, which was renamed the Field Artillery School, because
it was already focusing its energies on eld artillery.
Conclusion
The Vietnam War had a profound impact on the eld artillery. After
years of debate over the validity of consolidating eld and air defense ar-
tillery, the war prompted the Army to recognize the existence of two artil-
leries and to make them independent of each other. Also, the war compelled
the eld artillery to adapt to ght a small-unit war, but it never abandoned
its faith in massing re or being to ght large-scale combat operations
against a near peer threat. The operational environment imposed many
challenges on artilleryman that they had not trained for nor experienced
since conducting operations during the Pacic campaign in the Second
World War. In the end, US Army artillery proved once again that it could
provide re support to maneuver forces when and where it was needed.
More importantly, artilleryman demonstrated exibility, adaptability and
ingenuity in accomplishing whatever mission was assigned them. Lessons
learned from the Vietnam War would be put into practice 15 years later
in the deserts of Kuwait and Iraq during the First Iraq War, 1990 to 1991.
This time however, artilleryman found themselves operating in an oper-
ational environment they had trained for thanks in part to the many unit
rotations conducted at the National Training Center (NTC) and elsewhere.
Though methods of the employment of res, both lethal and non-le-
thal, have changed since the end of the Vietnam War, it is vitally im-
portant that Field Artillerymen today continue to focus on developing the
necessary skills and abilities to provide “collective and coordinated use
of Army indirect res . . . in support of oensive and defensive tasks to
create specic lethal and nonlethal eects” against a near-peer threat in
large-scale combat operations.
52
158
Notes
1.
Report on the War in Vietnam. Admiral U.S.G. Sharp, Commander in Chief
Pacic and General W.C. Westmoreland,
Commander, US Military Assistance
Command, Vietnam, 30 June 1968 (Morris Swett Library hereafter MSL), 98.
2. David E. Ott, Field Artillery: 1954–1973 (Washington DC: Department
of the Army, 1975), 22–37.
3.
George C. Herring. “
The 1st Cavalry and the Ia Drang Valley, 18 Octo-
ber–
24 November 1965,” in Charles E. Heller
and William A. Stot, eds., Amer-
ica’s First Battles, 1776–1965 (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas,
1986), 300–01; Allan R. Millet and Peter Maslowski, For the Common Defense,
(New York: The Free Press, 1984), 547.
4.
Report on the War in Vietnam. Admiral U.S.G. Sharp, Commander in Chief
Pacic: and General W.C. Westmoreland,
Commander, US Military Assistance
Command, Vietnam, 30 June 1968 (MSL), 98.
5. Artillery Trends, January 1967, 1; I.etter, HQ 2nd Battalion, 32nd Artillery,
to CG, US Army Artillery and Missile School, “Heavy Artillery in the Guerrilla
Warfare Environment,” 24 January 1966, in Correspondence Received from Viet-
nam File, MSL; Herring, “The 1st Cavalry and the Ia Drang Valley,” 306.
6. George C. Herring, America’s Longest War: The United States in Viet-
nam, 1950–1975 (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1979), 151;
George C.
Herring
. “The 1st Cavalry and the Ia Drang Valley, 303–304; Robert H. Scales,
“Firepower and Maneuver in the Second Indochina War,” Field Artillery Jour-
nal, September–October, 1986, 48; Harry W.O. Kinnard, “A Victory in the Ia
Drang: Triumph of a Concept,” Army, September 1967, 77.
7. Kinnard, “A Victory in the Ia Drang,” 78–83; After Action Report, 1st
Cavalry Division, 23 October–26 November 1965, 45, 51, 54, MSL.
8. Kinnard, “A Victory in the Ia Drang,” 84–86; Scales, “Firepower and Ma-
neuver in the Second Indochina War,” 49–50; After Action Report. 1st Cavalry
Division, 23 October–26 November 1965, 84; Report, CG, 1-7th Cavalry, 1st
Cavalry Division (Airmobile), “After Action Report, Ia Drang Valley Operation,
1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry,” 14–16 November 1965, 3–11.
9. After Action Report, 1st Cavalry Division, 23 October–26 November
1965, 87; Herring, “The 1st Cavalry and the Ia Drang Valley,” 319; Kinnard, “ A
Victory in the Ia Drang,”
86
–
87; Scales, “Firepower and Maneuver in the Second
Indochina War,” 50; Report, CO, 1-7th Cavalry, lst Cavalry
Division (Airmobile),
“After Action Report, Ia Drang Valley Operation, 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry,”
14–16 November 1965, 13–15.
10. After Action Report, 1st Cavalry, 23 October–26 November 1965,
93–94, MSL; Herring. “The 1st Cavalry and the Ia Drang
Valley, 18 October
–
24
November 1965,” 320; Kinnard, “A Victory in the Ia Drang,”
88–89; Ott, Field
Artillery, 94–95.
11. Kinnard, “A Victory in the Ia Drang,” 85.
12. Kinnard, 85.
159
13. After Action Report, 1st Cavalry, 23 October–26 November 1965, For-
ward, MSL.
14. After Action Report, 1st Cavalry, 23 October–26 November 1965, For-
ward, MSL.
15. Lloyd J. Picou, “Airmobile Artillery in Combat,” Artillery Trends, Au-
gust 1967, 20. Artillery Trends was a small journal published by the Artillery and
Guided Missile School during the late 1950s through early 1970s. During those
years the journal went by several dierent names: The Artillery Quarterly, Trends
in Artillery for Instruction, and The Field Artilleryman. Basically, the journal was
designed for in-house use by instructors at Fort Sill and for wide distribution.
16. Lloyd J. Picou, “Artillery Support for the Airmobile Division,” Artillery
Trends, October 1968, 7.
17. Picou, 7.
18. After Action Report, 1st Cavalry, 23 October–26 November 1965,
127; Report, US Army Vietnam, “Battleeld Report: A Summary of Lessons
Learned,” n.d., 52–55, MSL.
19. Report on the War in Vietnam, 30 June 1968, 114, MSL.
20. Lloyd J. Picou, “The Day the Artillery Sprouted Wings,” Army Infor-
mation Digest, November 1966, 24–25; Ott, Field Artillery, 100–101; Report,
1st Air Cavalry Artillery, “Operation Masher and White Wing (Eagle Claw),” 14
March 1966, 49; 1st Air Cavalry: Memoirs of the First team, Vietnam, August
1965–December 1966 (Tokyo: Dia Nippon Printing Company, Ltd, n.d.), 30–32.
21. Ott, Field Artillery, 105–106. After Action Report, 1st Air Cavalry Divi-
sion Artillery, 16 May 1966, 10, MSL.
22. Lloyd J. Picou, “Artillery Support for the Airmobile Division,” Military
Review, (October, 1968), 9–10.
23. Picou, “Artillery Support for the Airmobile Division,” 11; Report,
1st Air Cavalry Artillery, “Operation Masher/White Wing (Eagle Claw),” 14
March 1966, 5.
24. Picou, “Artillery Support for the Airmobile Division,” 11; Report, 1st
Air Cavalry Artillery, “Operation Masher/White Wing (Eagle Claw),” 14 March
1966, 5, MSL.
25. Letter, 3rd Battalion, 18th Field Artillery to US Army Artillery and
Missile School, “Artillery Employment,” 8 August 1966, in Lessons Learned,
18th Field Artillery File, Morris Swett Library; Report US Army, Vietnam, “A
Summary of Lessons Learned,” 30 August 1965, II-I, MSL; report, US Army,
Vietnam, “A Summary of Lessons Learned,” n.d., 55, MSL.
26. “Simple Solutions to 6400-mil Charts, Artillery Trends, January 1967, 11.
27. Report , Major General Charles P. Brown, Commandant, The Artillery
and Missile School, 11–24 September 1967, MSL; “Field Artillery Equipment,”
Artillery Trends, July 1966, 3–11
28. After Action Report, 196th Light Infantry Brigade, 25 November 1966–
68, April 1967, 3; Picou, “Airmobile Artillery in Combat,” 12–14; Memorandum
for Commanding General, I Field Force V Artillery, 5 December 1967, in letter,
160
HQ I Field Force V, to Brigadier General John J. Kenney, Assistant Comman-
dant, Artillery and Missile School, 4 January 1968, MSL.
29. Memorandum for Commanding General, I Field Force V Artillery, 5
December 1967; DF, “Observations of Artillery Operations in Vietnam,” 14 May
1968, TAB A, MSL.
30. Bruce R. Palmer, Jr., The 25 Year War: America’s Military Role in
Vietnam (Lexington, KY: The University Press of Kentucky, 1984), 158; Report
on the War in Vietnam, 30 June 1968, 120; Letter, Headquarters 3rd Battalion,
319th Field Artillery to Commandant, US Army Artillery and Missile School, 15
January 1966, in Correspondence Received from Vietnam File, MSL; Ott, Field
Artillery, 42–45; Piccou, “Airmobile Artillery in Combat,” 12–18; Captain F.H.
Hemphill Jr., “Defence of the Artillery Battery.” Artillery Trends, January 1967,
27–32; Colonel R.E. Cavazos, et al., Analysis of Fire and Maneuver in Vietnam,
June 1966–June 1968 (Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army War College, 1969),
II-16–25; Captain Gary J. Pieringer, “Counting the Sappers,” Field Artillery,
August 1988, 6; Ott, Field Artillery, 55–58, 238.
31. Robert A. Doughty, The Evolution of US Army Tactical Doctrine, 1946–
1976 (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, US Army Command and
General Sta College, 1976), 36–38.
32. Willard Pearson, “Find ’em, Fix ’em, Finish ’em,” Army Information
Digest, December 1966, 19.
33. Pearson, “Find ’em, Fix ’em, Finish ’em,” 19.
34. Memorandum for Commanding General, I Field Force V, 5 December
1967, MSL; Scales, “Firepower and Maneuver in the Second Indochina War,” 53.
35. Ott, Field Artillery, 110; David R. Palmer, Summons of the Trumpet:
US-Vietnam in Perspective (San Francisco, CA: Presidio Press, 1978), 134–137;
Bernard W. Rogers, Cedar Falls-Junction City: A Turning Point (Washington
DC: Department of the Army, 1974), 16–217.
36. After Action Report, 173rd Airborne Brigade, 25 February 1967, 3–4,
MSL; After Action Report, 1st Division, 13 March 1967, Annex F, MSL; Rog-
ers, 24–43, 75–76.
37. Rogers, Cedar Falls-Junction City, 83, 103, 107, 110.
38. Rogers, 129–140; Ott, Field Artillery, 113–118.
39. Rogers, 156.
40. Palmer, Summons of the Trumpet, 140–146.
41. Herring, America’s Longest War, 185–187.
42. Ott, Field Artillery, 157–169, 184–185; Major Robert E. Gilbert, “FAD-
AC,” Artillery Trends, May, 1968, 45; Major Martell D. Fritz, “Revised Pro-
grams for FADAC, Artillery Trends, April 1969, 36; Lieutenant General Richard
G. Stilwell, “Evolution in Tactics: The Vietnam Experience,” Army, February
1970, 21; Lieutenant General Frank T. Mildren, “From Mekong to DMZ: A
Fighting Year for the US Army’s Best,” Army, November 1968, 88.
43. Lieutenant Colonel Matthew J. Ringer and Major Martell D. Fritz, “FA-
DAC Computations versus Manual Computations,” Artillery Trends, April 1969,
40; Mildren, “From Mekong to DMZ,” 88.
161
44. Herring, America’s Longest War, 189–197, 204–205.
45. Herring, 189–197, 227–252.
46. Letter, Headquarters, Continental Army Command to Assistant Chief
of Sta, G3, 9 February 1955, The Artillery Center, Integration of the Artillery
Schools, MSL; “The Artillery Branch Study,” 35, 36, 41 MSL; Disposition of
Enclosures, “Integration of the Artillery,” n.d., The Artillery Center, “Consoli-
dation of the Artillery School;” “Army Reorganization,” Antiaircraft Journal,
July–August 1950, 27.
47. “The Artillery Branch Study,” 61.
48. “The Artillery Branch Study,” 41; Acting Assistant Chief of Sta, G3,
to Commanding General, Continental Army Command, “Training and Assign-
ment of Artillery Ocers,” 11 June 1955, The Artillery Center, Integration of the
Artillery School; Letter, de Shazo to Commanding General, Continental Army
Command, “Integration of the Artillery,” 16 May 1956, US Army Artillery Cen-
ter, Integration of the Artillery Schools, MSL.
49. “The Artillery Branch Study,” 45, 46, 93; William F. Brand, “A Re-ex-
amination of the Integration of the Artillerists,” Thesis, US Army War College,
1963, 31–32.
50. William F. Brand, “A Re-examination of the Integration of the Artiller-
ists,” Thesis, US Army War College, 1963, 118–119.
51. “Two Career Fields Formed for Artillery,” The Journal of the Armed
Forces, 15 June 1968, 29; “Air, Ground Artillery Split,” Army Times, 19 June
1968, 1; William F. Brand, “A Re-examination of the Integration of the Artiller-
ists,” 24; “The Artillery Branch Study,” 52–53.
52. Department of the Army, Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP
3-0), Operations (Washington, DC: 16 August 2017), 5-4.
163
Chapter 9
Close Air Support and Bombardment Theory: Operation Cobra
Mark T. Calhoun
After more than two decades of US Army involvement in counterin-
surgency, counterterrorism, and stability operations, today’s senior lead-
ers have expressed concern about the Army’s preparedness to engage in
large-scale combat operations (LSCO) against peer and near-peer threats.
1
While most of today’s Army personnel have participated in limited wars,
few have experienced LSCO. This begs the question how the Army should
prepare for multi-domain battle (MDB) in the anticipated future opera-
tional environment.
2
In On War, Carl von Clausewitz described practice through maneu-
vers that include elements of friction and physical exertion, like those ex-
perienced in combat, as the next-best thing to actual combat experience.
3
In addition to realistic maneuvers, Clausewitz advocated critical thinking,
a means of testing military theory through objective analysis of history, as
another way to prepare for war, arguing that “The inuence of theoretical
truths on practical life is always exerted more through critical analysis
than through doctrine.”
4
Operation Cobra, the American breakout from Normandy in late July,
1944 illustrates the validity of Clausewitz’s assertions. Cobra serves today
as a testament not only to the US Army’s maturation through the interwar
years, but also to the harmful eects of branch parochialism. This resulted
in both the most eective and the most tragic use of strategic bombers in
close support of US ground troops during World War II (WWII).
Theoretical debates plagued air-ground cooperation before and during
WWII, and have continued to do so ever since. In his study of Close Air
Support (CAS) doctrine and capability, US Air Force Major Russell Fette
described this pattern as an “ebb and ow” of American air-ground coop-
eration.
5
Fette argued that CAS competency requires good relationships
between the air and ground arms, which enables the cooperation needed to
develop sound doctrine, tactics, and training. He found that over the past
century, the US military’s air-ground relationship has atrophied during
peacetime as services competed for higher budgets and new equipment.
The relationship tends to recover in combat, when a common enemy mo-
tivates land and air forces to rebuild relationships that enable development
of eective CAS tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP), but this takes
place slowly, resulting in poor CAS in the early phases of conict that
164
gradually improves over time.
6
In the interwar years, branch parochial-
ism outweighed critical analysis as strategic bombardment theory came
to dominate Army Air Corps (AAC) doctrine, education, training, and air-
craft development.
The Development of a Strategic Bombing Theory
The airpower debate began in earnest soon after World War I (WWI),
when AAC leaders embraced independent strategic bombing theory, ad-
vocated by Italian theorist Giulio Douhet and later by American pilots like
William “Billy” Mitchell.
7
Rapid advances in bomber range, payload, and
self-defense capability seemed to promise victory in future wars without
the need for ground combat. Further, many pilots saw bombardment the-
ory as the means to achieve their longstanding goal of independence from
ground forces’ control, given the theory’s central premise that airpower
had a unique, strategic mission.
8
By contrast, non-ying Army leaders
argued that airpower could not win wars alone, emphasizing combined
arms ghting and the need for close air-ground cooperation. Still, strategic
bombing, while purely theoretical, took an increasingly central role in US
Army Air Corps (AAC) doctrine.
Bombardment theory soon dominated the curriculum at the Air Corps
Tactical School (ACTS), the AAC’s highest educational institution and
doctrinal center during the interwar period. Major Harold George, a senior
instructor at the ACTS, emerged after Billy Mitchell’s court martial and
dismissal from the Army as one of the AAC’s most inuential proponents
of the bombardment theory. As noted by historian Thomas Hughes, “Har-
old George, more than anyone else, provided the intellectual groundwork
for what became a fully-articulated independent-strategic-air theory.”
9
Most of the other instructors soon shared George’s views on the future of
airpower, and together they emphasized bombardment theory at the ex-
pense of instruction on the use of tactical airpower.
Rapidly increasing bomber technology led to the appearance in 1936
of the B-17 “Flying Fortress,” the rst heavy bomber designed to provide
its own self-defense, thereby making ghter escorts obsolete. With Presi-
dent Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s support, the AAC budget grew rapidly,
with most of the additional funding spent on bomber development and
production. In the 1930s alone, three new bombers left American assem-
bly lines, including the B-10 in 1931, the B-12 in 1932, and the B-17 in
1936. By contrast, the US Army did not begin production of the P-40 Mus-
tang—the rst signicant development in American ghter technology in
ten years—until 1940.
10
165
Most Army pilots embraced bombardment theory, including AAC war
planners who, under the direction of General Henry “Hap” Arnold, based
their concept of airpower employment on the theory’s central tenets. An
absence of critical thinking took hold as bombardment theory increasingly
dominated AAC doctrine. With a major war brewing on the horizon, not
only pilots in the AAC and the Royal Air Force (RAF), but also many
American and British senior military and national leaders accepted the the-
ory as dogma. Some of the interwar period’s most inuential bombardment
theory advocates later acknowledged the imbalance its adoption created in
the air arm’s combined arms capability. Haywood Hansell, another ACTS
instructor and bombardment theory proponent during the interwar years,
reected after the war, “I think we got carried away so far on this strategic
thing . . . that we have decimated, we’ve emasculated our own force.”
11
Despite these challenges, some Army pilots before WWII remained
open to the idea of tactical air-to-ground support. In this contentious en
-
vironment, a young pilot named Pete Quesada emerged as an agent of
change, retaining his enthusiasm for CAS despite the AAC’s focus on stra-
tegic bombing theory. Quesada attended the Command and General Sta
College (CGSC) after the ACTS, where he developed close relationships
with many non-ying Army ocers and often discussed with them the val-
ue of tactical air support to ground combat troops. The perspective Quesa-
da gained at CGSC deepened his conviction that the AAC needed a pow-
erful tactical air capability to complement the strategic bombing mission.
12
Still, this remained a minority view, and Quesada lacked the rank or
inuence to change minds already xed on bombardment theory. He did,
however, have an excellent reputation among both ying and non-ying
ocers. He served throughout the interwar period as an aide to many se-
nior leaders, including three months working for Colonel George C. Mar-
shall during his tenure as commandant of the Infantry School at Fort Ben-
ning, Georgia. Marshall liked to y and spent many hours with Quesada in
a small observation aircraft, developing a very favorable opinion of him.
13
He also made a good impression on Hap Arnold, who brought Quesa-
da to the War Department in 1942 to serve on Arnold’s newly-designated,
independent Army Air Forces (AAF) sta. A few months later Arnold,
with Quesada in tow, traveled to London in the aftermath of the Battle of
Britain. Both Arnold and the leaders of Britain’s Royal Air Force (RAF)
saw the devastation of London as validation of bombardment theory.
Ironically, even though it was RAF ghter pilots who nally drove the
Germans out of British skies, the Battle of Britain seemingly ushered in
the age of the strategic bomber. Men like Hap Arnold believed that the
166
Germans would have won the Battle of Britain if only they had possessed
advanced bombers like the B-17.
14
When Arnold returned to the War Department he created the Air War
Planning Division (AWPD). Manned exclusively by AAF pilots commit-
ted to the independent strategic bombing concept, the AWPD developed
war plans that reected this view. As Quesada put it in a post-war inter-
view, “they allowed their doctrine to become their strategy.”
15
This strate-
gy would soon be put to the test. As Hughes wrote, “Now these men had
to justify spending billions of dollars, and the use of almost a third of the
Army’s manpower on independent air power. To do so, they created a war
plan that mirrored their beliefs and hopes.”
16
Quesada emerged from this period with his views on tactical airpower
intact, but he lacked the ability to inuence war planning. Still, the young
major possessed the talent and drive that Army Chief of Sta General
George C. Marshall valued when selecting young ocers to replace the
Army’s aging senior leaders and mobilize newly formed units for combat.
By the fall of 1942, Marshall had arranged for Quesada’s rapid promotion
from major to brigadier general, and Arnold selected him to command the
First Air Defense Wing. Quesada soon received orders to join the Allied
task force in Tunisia, only two months after Operation Torch, the amphib-
ious assault of North Africa.
17
The Air War in North Africa
Quesada arrived in Tunisia on 27 January 1943, where he soon learned
of British military leaders’ disappointment in the Americans’ combat per-
formance. If the Western Desert Forces, commanded by Lieutenant Gen-
eral Dwight D. Eisenhower, had secured Tunis before weather forced the
Allies to cease operations, they would have trapped Field Marshal Erwin
Rommel’s Afrika Korps between the British Eighth Army to the south and
Eisenhower’s forces to the north and northwest. Instead, the Germans won
the “race for Tunis” and still controlled this vital communications node,
enabling arrival by sea of supplies and reinforcements.
18
During the weather-induced pause in combat, Eisenhower reected
on the performance of his Western Desert Forces during their rst two
months in combat. Many participants and observers saw the Allies’ failure
to seize the port city of Tunis before the rainy season in December 1942 as
a failure of American leadership and evidence of the US Army’s poor state
of readiness. This led to angst among the British and American Allies that
exacerbated an already bad situation.
19
167
Concerned about the AAF’s poor performance in November and De-
cember of 1942, Eisenhower concluded that much of the problem resulted
from the air planners’ focus on bombardment strategy, and their neglect of
basic and predictable factors like weather, terrain, and disease. Challenges
created by poor planning and diculties coordinating air support between
the British Eastern Air Command and the US Twelfth Air Force—separat-
ed both by distance and nationality—convinced Eisenhower that he must
consolidate all airpower in the theater under a single command. On 5 Jan-
uary 1943, the Combined Chiefs of Sta approved creation of the Allied
Air Force. While this umbrella organization centralized control over all
air forces in the Mediterranean, it lacked the integration needed at lower
levels to improve air-ground coordination.
20
In February, Eisenhower again reorganized his air forces, creating the
Mediterranean Air Command. This headquarters commanded the new-
ly-designated Northwest African Air Forces, which further subdivided
into ve organizations, consolidating American and British air forces by
function—an unprecedented move, but one that most air and ground com-
manders supported in hopes of improving airpower’s eectiveness.
21
Signicantly, the primary air eort throughout the Tunisian campaign
remained interdiction of enemy shipping. While this mission provided no
visible benet to ground combat units, it signicantly hindered delivery
by sea of logistics materiel and reinforcements to Axis forces. By con-
trast, tactical air support, although it often provided a morale boost to the
ground forces, remained in a rudimentary stage of development. Fight-
er pilots slowly worked out basic air-to-ground procedures while facing
many challenges, including faulty radar and communication systems, dif-
culty distinguishing friend from foe, lack of established air-to-ground
coordination procedures, and slow response to air support requests.
22
Still, German air superiority remained the most signicant problem
for Allied airpower in North Africa. High-altitude bombers rarely expe-
rienced attacks by the Luftwae, but many dogghts took place between
Allied and German ghters. While AAF pilots generally performed well
in these air-to-air engagements, German control of the air often diverted
scarce tactical aircraft from assigned CAS missions, leaving ground forces
vulnerable to Stuka dive bombers. The Allies nally achieved air superior-
ity in North Africa in April 1943—just one month before the last German
units evacuated Tunis by sea. Hap Arnold, commanding the independent
Army Air Forces (AAF), sent an observer to the Mediterranean in the sum-
mer of 1943 “to capitalize on the practical eld experience . . . which may
be at variance to more established theories of air warfare.”
23
168
Eisenhower remained in Tunisia after the Allied victory to oversee
planning for upcoming operations in the Mediterranean Theater. At three
conferences held in November and December 1943, Allied military and na-
tional leaders met to forge agreements related to matters of coalition strat-
egy. During the rst Cairo Conference, from 22–26 November, Roosevelt
and Churchill met with Chiang Kai-Shek and his wife to discuss China’s
role in the Far Eastern Theater. Roosevelt and Churchill then traveled to
Tehran where, from 27 November to 2 December, they met with Joseph
Stalin to discuss the Allied invasion of Western Europe. Stalin insisted that
the invasion take place no later than May 1944, to take pressure o the Red
Army on the Eastern Front. Churchill and Roosevelt traveled directly back
to Cairo from Tehran, meeting with the Combined Chiefs of Sta from 2 to
7 December, 1943 to discuss nal plans for the invasion of Normandy. One
important decision remained in ux until 6 December, when Roosevelt
-
nally announced that he had selected Eisenhower to serve as the Supreme
Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces for Operation Overlord.
24
The Role of Air Support in Operation Overlord
Eisenhower and his sta had much to do, with D-Day of Operation
Overlord only ve months away. Reecting on his experience in North
Africa, Eisenhower knew that he must once again consolidate all ground
forces and airpower in theater under a single command structure. In this
case, however, planning for command arrangements began well before
execution of the amphibious assault in Normandy, giving senior leaders
time to prepare for their new roles in Western Europe.
25
Eisenhower expressed his concept of ground command arrangements
in a cable to Marshall on 23 December 1943.
26
While this concept worked
eectively throughout the campaign in Western Europe, the air organiza-
tion still suered from the divisive eects of bombardment theory. Sig-
nicant dierences in air leaders’ views on strategic versus tactical em-
ployment of airpower created friction both among air leaders and between
air and ground commanders. Despite several changes of command before
D-Day, this friction remained problematic throughout the war.
27
Eisenhower found these disputes and leadership changes especially
frustrating during the nal planning for Operation Overlord, when they
disrupted eorts to develop a detailed air support plan for the operation.
One of the main disputes involved the use of heavy bombers in a ground
support role. Eisenhower intended to use this method in support of Over-
lord even though many senior pilots remained opposed to it. On 22 March,
Eisenhower expressed his frustration in a memorandum for record, which
169
he instructed his aide to handle personally to keep his remarks secret: “The
actual air preparatory plan is to be the subject of a formal meeting on this
coming Saturday, March 25. . . . If a satisfactory answer is not reached I
am going to . . . request relief from this Command.”
28
Fortunately, one
critical position remained unchanged throughout operations in Western
Europe. While his peers bickered over appropriate use of strategic bomb-
ers, Pete Quesada, Promoted to Major General in April 1944, command-
ed the IX Fighter Command, composed of the IX and XIX Tactical Air
Commands. In this role, Quesada nally had both the opportunity and the
authority to develop CAS TTPs in preparation for the Normandy invasion
and follow-on operations in Western Europe.
29
In Quesada, Eisenhower had exactly what he wanted—an experienced
and respected combat air leader who remained a staunch advocate of CAS.
Quesada’s experience gave him a clear view of the halting advances in the
use of tactical airpower in Tunisia and the Mediterranean, and the remaining
challenges that needed solutions. In dealing with these challenges, Quesa-
da—now an em-
powered agent of
change—worked
closely with ground
commanders to im-
prove mission coor-
dination and devel-
op CAS TTPs that
proved essential in
the coming cam-
paigns.
30
Quesada worked
relentlessly prepar
-
ing his pilots for their
tactical support mis
-
sion. He sent newly
arrived pilots to the
Mediterranean to
learn from tactical air
units operating there
and share their new
knowledge with their
peers. He led training
events in which his
Figure 9.1. Major General Elwood R. “Pete” Quesada,
Commander, IX Fighter Command. Photo courtesy of
US Army Center of Military History.
170
pilots practiced bombing and strang techniques, essentially creating optimal
procedures from scratch. In the weeks before Operation Cobra, Quesada’s
pilots roamed the skies over France daily, attacking troop concentrations,
strong points, and troop transports. By co-locating his advance Command
Post (CP) with Bradley’s, Quesada worked with supported units to develop
new procedures for CAS. To resolve communication problems with ground
units, he had VHF radios installed in tanks, operated by a pilot serving in the
tank crew. These tanks led columns in the advance, with the air liaison pro
-
viding target information to ghter-bomber escorts. Referred to as armored
column cover, this method greatly enhanced the speed and eectiveness of
armored advances. Similarly, he provided VHF radios to ground unit CPs,
enabling tactical aircraft to provide area cover for advancing units, directed by
a reconnaissance aircraft in communication with ground forces. These meth
-
ods, employed by the IX Tactical Air Command throughout the campaigns in
Western Europe, enabled the most eective CAS US Army ground units had
ever received, greatly enhancing their oensive power.
31
By June 1944 Operation Pointblank, the strategic bombing cam-
paign against Germany’s industrial centers, had damaged German morale
and production capacity—but not to the degree anticipated by Arnold’s
AWPD. However, in defending Germany from air attacks, the Luftwae
lost aircraft and crews at an unsustainable rate. Tactical air support both
before and after D-Day focused on the destruction of airelds, supply de-
pots, and transportation infrastructure, while high-altitude heavy bombers
and ghter-bombers crippled the road, railroad, and communication net-
works, eectively isolating Normandy and preventing much-needed rein-
forcements and materiel arriving from Germany.
32
These preparatory operations also compelled the Luftwae to ght,
enabling the Allies to establish control of the skies over France before
D-Day. The Western Allies enjoyed air superiority for the rest of the war
in Europe (although anti-aircraft artillery remained a threat, particularly to
low-ying aircraft). Eisenhower later wrote that the Western Allies’ suc-
cess in the critical early stages of the Normandy invasion depended in
large measure on Allied dominance of the air.
33
The Anglo-American Allies advanced slowly after the initial invasion
and establishment of beachheads in Normandy. To the east, Lieutenant
General Miles C. Dempsey’s British Second Army had not yet secured the
city of Caen, an objective that Field Marshal Sir Bernard L. Montgomery,
21st Army Group and overall land forces commander, had planned to cap-
ture on D-Day. German control of Caen left a vital crossroads in enemy
171
hands and oered a route for a German counterattack that could poten-
tially endanger the Allied beachheads. Further, Caen’s road network con-
trolled movement to the open terrain east and southeast of the city. Most
signicantly, the protracted battle to secure Caen served as a daily remind-
er of the Allies’ slow progress, damaging morale up and down the chain
of command. Historian Martin Blumenson described the failure to capture
Caen by 1 July as “the greatest single disappointment of the invasion.”
34
To the west, Lieutenant General Omar Bradley’s American First Army
remained bogged down in the bocage, terrain that Eisenhower described
in a letter to Army Chief of Sta General George C. Marshall on 5 July
1944: “Our whole attack has to ght its way out of very narrow bottlenecks
First US
XXXX
Second Br.
The Bocage Country
2 July 1944
0 5 10 15 20 Miles
N
France
Le Havre
Allied Front
2 July 1944
Caen
Falaise
Argentan
Cherbourg
Corenton
Lessay
St. Lo
Coumont
St. Malo
Avranches
Mayenne
Alençon
Bocage
Marsh
English Channel
Gulf of
St. Malo
Normandy
Fougères
Maine
Brittany
Figure 9.2. “The Bocage Country” in Normandy, France, June 1944. Map created
by Army University Press, courtesy of the US Army Center of Military History.
172
anked by marshes and against an enemy who has a double hedgerow
and an intervening ditch almost every fty yards as ready-made strong
points.”
35
This network of sunken ditches covered by dense hedgerows
made a checkerboard of the Norman countryside, providing excellent cov-
er and concealment for German defenses in depth. While ghting in the
bocage, the First Army measured its daily progress in yards, at the cost of
28,346 casualties through 22 June.
36
A lack of port facilities further delayed the Allied advance as the front
moved away from the beachhead, lengthening supply lines. The original
invasion plan called for the liberation of Cherbourg, the port nearest to
the invasion beaches, as quickly as possible after securing the beachhead.
This would clear the way for Lieutenant General George S. Patton’s Third
Army to occupy the American right ank and clear Brittany of German
forces before turning east toward Germany.
37
By mid-June 1944, both Bradley and Montgomery, worried that the
front might devolve into a WWI-style stalemate, began planning break-
through operations. After nearly three weeks of struggling through the
bocage, the Allies needed to reach open terrain where their armored and
mechanized divisions could take advantage of their mobility and force the
determined German defenders to retreat.
38
Eisenhower’s chief of sta, Brigadier General Walter “Beetle” Smith
assessed the situation:
On June 24th, when the Supreme Commander visited Bradley, it
was plain that we would soon have Cherbourg, and the need for
elbow room was becoming very important. The Supreme Com-
mander had already made up his mind that the full weight of US
strength should be used to break out into the open on our right.
By June 30th the British Army had not captured Caen, and now
Montgomery issued his rst directive that showed an intention of
holding on the left and breaking through on the right. He directed
the British to contain the greatest possible part of the enemy forc-
es [in support of American breakthrough operations]. . . . How-
ever, as late as July 7th, Montgomery, in a letter to the Supreme
Commander, was uncertain at which point our main eort would
have to be made.
39
This uncertainty did not bode well for the success of a future break-
through attempt. With combined operations about to commence on both
sides of a boundary between Allied armies, Montgomery, as overall com-
mander of Allied land forces, should have made his intent clear both up
173
and down the chain of command. Instead, planning continued in the Brit-
ish Second Army and the American First Army headquarters in parallel,
with minimal integration of eort or information sharing.
40
In early July, Dempsey’s Second Army gained Montgomery’s approv-
al to conduct Operation Goodwood, intended to nally secure Caen and
occupy the open terrain southeast of the city. Having seemingly developed
high hopes for a British breakout, Montgomery assured Eisenhower that
his “whole eastern ank” would “burst into ames,” although the details
of his plan remained unclear to both Eisenhower and First US Army.
41
To open the way for a penetration by British armored columns, Mont-
gomery requested (and received) maximum air support to conduct prepa-
ratory bombing throughout the attack corridor. To avoid cratering along
the maneuver corridor, heavy bombers carpeted the area in and around
Cain that remained in German control while medium- and ghter-bomb-
ers engaged enemy positions with 100-pound bombs and strang attacks.
Still, as the bombing ended and Dempsey’s troops crossed the line of de-
parture, many of the German troops emerged from foxholes and trenches
to occupy well-constructed strongpoints, forming a powerful defense in
depth. Dempsey’s attack stalled after several hours, at which point Mont-
gomery reverted to a defensive posture. Despite its failed attempt at a
breakthrough, Goodwood accomplished its secondary objective of tying
down most German panzer units in the area. This left the line in front of
Bradley’s First Army relatively strong, but lacking in depth and still short
on armored support.
42
Operation Cobra
Meanwhile, Bradley and his subordinate air and ground commanders
made nal preparations for Operation Cobra as the ghting in the Cher-
bourg Peninsula continued. With Cherbourg nally captured in late June,
Bradley ordered his forces on the peninsula to leave behind just enough
troops to retain control of the city and redeploy the rest to the south to
rejoin the First Army’s front line. In early July, Bradley ordered VII Corps
to continue the oensive in the south, in hopes of reaching the eastern
edge of bocage country in preparation for a breakthrough attempt. Af-
ter several days of ghting, elements of VII Corps captured the city of
St. Lô on 18 July, weakening the German line on both sides of the city.
Bradley’s forces—now in control of key terrain that served as a gateway
to the open ground east of the hedgerows—consolidated and awaited the
breakthrough operation scheduled for 21 July (bad weather forced Bradley
to postpone Cobra until 24 July).
43
174
Bradley planned to conduct the breakthrough at a weakly defended
point just west of St. Lô, where Major General Joe Collins’ reinforced
VII Corps would penetrate the German lines after an intense preparatory
bombardment. Upon achieving a breakthrough, Collins would expand and
hold the gap open with infantry divisions while armored and mechanized
divisions poured through the opening, bypassing strong points and envel-
oping or pursuing retreating units. The plan for Operation Cobra included
a massive preparatory bombing that American medium and heavy strate-
gic bombers, along with ghter-bombers of the American IX Tactical Air
Force, would carry out.
44
During the planning for Cobra, Bradley and Collins—whose VII
Corps would lead the breakthrough attempt—met with the senior leaders
of the American air organizations scheduled to support the attack. Histo-
rian Steve Ossad has described this fateful meeting in detail. The exact
origins of the preparatory bombing plan remain unclear, although Major
General Quesada recommended to Bradley as early as 18 June that any
breakthrough attempt should begin with a massive bombardment using
heavy, medium, and ghter bombers. Whatever the original source of the
idea, Bradley maintained throughout the planning for Cobra that success
would rely on a massive preparatory bombardment.
45
Bradley met with the senior air commanders who would support this
operation on 19 July, hoping to ensure complete understanding of the plan
and gain their support. At this meeting, Bradley described the air sup-
port plan developed by his planners and air liaison ocers from Que-
sada’s IX and XIX Tactical Air Forces. Bradley intended to exploit the
eects of a massive preparatory air bombardment of a 7,000-yard-wide by
2,500-yard-deep rectangular area directly in front of First Army’s position,
just south of a straight road running northwest to southeast towards St.
Lô. Bradley noted that this road would serve as a useful navigation aid for
pilots, who could simply follow the road to the target area, ying parallel
to the long northern edge of the rectangular objective.
46
Although Bradley left the meeting believing that he had gained
concurrence on the use of a parallel ight path, leaders from bomber
command believed that they had argued successfully against a parallel
approach. Ultimately, air planners adjusted the approach to run perpen
-
dicular, not parallel to the northern long edge of the target area, since
only a perpendicular approach would enable more than 2,000 bombers to
strike the target area in the one hour allotted. Still, the air planners never
communicated this change to First Army.
47
175
Another topic of debate involved how far away from the target area
front line troops would wait during the preparatory bombing. If units did
not withdraw far enough they risked casualties caused by errant bombs; if
they withdrew too far, they risked giving the enemy too much time to re
-
cover from the bombing’s eects before engagement by ground maneuver
units. While a Ninth Air Force report on CAS during operations to clear
Cherbourg noted the importance of “Immediate Follow-Up,” its claim that
careful planning could allow ground troops to remain within 500 yards of
the bomb line seems overly optimistic.
48
Bradley initially proposed with-
drawing front line units only 800 yards, while a senior liaison ocer rep-
resenting the US Eighth Air Force argued for a minimum distance of 3,000
yards. After some debate, Bradley and the air commanders agreed to 1,500
yards, although this distance had proven inadequate in previous missions.
49
After days of waiting for the weather to clear, 24 July looked promis-
ing; but after more than 2,000 bombers departed air bases in England, low
clouds over the objective led to a weather recall. About half the bombers
received the recall order and complied, but the rest, already beyond radio
range, continued to the target area. As Collins’ reinforced VII Corps wait-
ed to attack, waves of medium and ghter-bombers arrived over the target
area as Bradley and his personal sta watched from an advance CP a few
thousand yards away. Everything seemed to be going well until the heavy
bombers began to arrive over the objective via a perpendicular approach,
dropping thousands of tons of bombs—some in the target area, and many
others south of it, on top of US troops. Confusion and chaos set in as
the “short drops” caused 156 casualties, including 25 killed. Bradley can-
celled the operation as his sta tried to sort out the extent of the damage.
50
Despite frustration over the perpendicular bomb line and the friendly
casualties, Bradley approved another attempt for the next day, 25 July. This
time weather did not interfere, so the full complement of bombers—the
largest tactical ground support bombardment to date—approached the target
area with the heavy bombers once again making a perpendicular approach.
Massive clouds of dust quickly obscured the road and dispersed smoke in-
tended to mark the objective, and once again bombs began to fall on Ameri-
can troops, this time resulting in 601 casualties, including 111 killed.
51
General Lesley J. McNair, selected by Eisenhower to replace Patton
as the commander of the ctional First US Army Group (FUSAG), visited
the front in Normandy enroute to his new assignment in England, where
the highly successful Operation Fortitude continued to tie up German forc-
es awaiting another amphibious assault in the Pas de Calais region. While
his presence at the front was intended to make his replacement of Pat-
176
ton more plausible, it also led to
his death. After experiencing a
close call on the morning of the
24th, McNair promised not to
observe the next day’s barrage
from the front lines. Howev-
er, after Soldiers told him how
much they appreciated his pres-
ence at the front, McNair once
again occupied a slit trench dan-
gerously close to the objective
area on the 25th, where an errant
bomb struck a direct hit, throw-
ing McNair’s body many yards.
Hearing rumors of the death of
a three-star general at the front,
McNair’s aides rushed forward
after the bombing ended. They
managed only to nd his West
Point class ring and the three-
star insignia from his uniform.
The loss of the highly respected
and capable McNair added to the grief of the American forces—particu-
larly the senior leaders.
52
Several factors coalesced to create the conditions that led to the tragic
events of 24 and 25 July 1944—events that nearly ended Operation Co
-
bra before the ground forces could strike. Only the initiative of perceptive
corps and division commanders—who shook o the eects of the second
morning in a row of casualties caused by errant bombs—enabled the Amer-
icans to nally break through the German line west of St. Lô on the night of
25 July. Despite the determined enemy resistance, Collins observed signs
that indicated serious trouble in the German defenses. “Noting a lack of
coordination in the German reaction, particularly in their failure to launch
prompt counterattacks, I sensed that their communications and command
structure had been damaged more than our front-line troops realized.”
53
Collins and his division commanders planned to exploit their success.
Bradley approved Collins’ request to continue the attack the next day,
when his mechanized forces pushed even farther behind the shattered
enemy lines, converting a planned breakthrough into a highly success-
ful breakout operation. Beneting greatly from the vast improvements in
Figure 9.3. General Lesley J. McNair,
Commander, Army Forces Command.
Photo courtesy of the US Army Center of
Military History.
177
American tactical air support since the campaign in Tunisia, VII Corps
penetrated enemy lines on 26 July, routing the shaken German defenders
and setting conditions for exploitation over the coming days. Indicating
the extent of the German collapse, the commander of the Panzer Lehr
division reported his unit “nally annihilated” on 27 July.
54
Perhaps most signicantly, the air-tank team concept worked bril-
liantly, as air liaisons operating from tanks directed ghter-bombers
over enemy strong points and armored columns, clearing the way for the
ground troops’ rapid advance. Months of practice perfecting new TTPs
before Operation Cobra resulted in the most eective tactical CAS the US
Army had received to date.
55
While the preparatory bombing for Operation Cobra enabled the con-
version of Bradley’s breakthrough operation into a true breakout, the high
cost in friendly casualties left many senior leaders disheartened. Eisenhow
-
er declared that he would never again use heavy bombers for CAS, al-
though time would ease his frustration. As the Anglo-American Allies con-
tinued the advance toward Germany, strategic bombers remained a source
of cross-domain repower during major operations. Never again, however,
did they achieve the level of success enjoyed during Operation Cobra.
By contrast, the development of new TTPs for tactical CAS—largely
a result of Quesada’s tireless eorts—helped make Eisenhower’s goal of
eective CAS a reality. Throughout the remaining operations in Western
Europe, Quesada’s IX Tactical Air Force continued to provide highly re-
sponsive and eective CAS to American troops, while bombardment theo-
ry advocates stubbornly continued to pursue strategic victory from the air.
Conclusion
The post-war Air Force drew surprising conclusions from the employ-
ment of airpower during WWII. The use of atomic bombs over Hiroshima
and Nagasaki in 1945 gave airpower theorists a new weapon around which
they could justify a resurgence of strategic bombing theory as an indepen-
dent, war-winning option. Air-ground relationships ebbed once again, hin-
dering critical thinking about the future of combined arms and relegating
development of cross-domain tactical res once again to a low-priority
mission. In later wars, CAS improved slowly as the threat of a common
enemy led to improved air-ground relationships and, eventually, well-es-
tablished CAS procedures.
56
Today’s US military can learn much from Operation Cobra that would
ensure better preparation for America’s next war against a peer- or near-
peer enemy. The AAC’s strong embrace of strategic bombardment theory
178
during the interwar years impeded critical thinking about the future role of
aircraft as part of the combined arms team. This led to the degradation of
tactical airpower doctrine, equipment, training, and technology, severely
limiting the eectiveness of cross-domain, air-to-ground res as the US
Army entered WWII. While modern technology and new TTPs have im-
proved the overall eectiveness of CAS in counterinsurgency and stability
operations over the past 17 years, the combined arms principle of close
multi-domain cooperation remains a matter of debate.
57
To avoid poor cross-domain coordination in future conicts, the ser-
vices must prioritize combined-arms eectiveness higher than the pursuit
of service-specic theories or dogma. During the interwar period, the
Army Air Force’s dogged determination to achieve independence from
Army Ground Forces led not only to development of an incompatible the-
ory of air operations, but also to minimal participation in pre-war maneu-
vers, depriving air and ground personnel of the opportunity to develop
eective CAS TTPs in training.
As Clausewitz argued, critical thinking about military theory requires
objective analysis of relevant historical case studies. Only this sort of un-
biased critical analysis, combined with realistic and arduous training, can
enable the conversion of theory into sound, well-tested doctrine. Without
this critical thinking and eective combined arms training, the US military
remains at risk of relearning the same dicult lessons about the use of
airpower in the next large-scale combat operation.
Additionally, friction among coalition partners can further degrade
the combat readiness of an allied force. This challenge, caused by many
factors including diering cultural perspectives and operational con-
cepts, plagued the Anglo-American Allies throughout WWII, leading to
disagreements over the proper use of airpower and diculty reaching a
common understanding, much less consensus, when planning air support
for major operations.
Finally, senior leaders must look for and enable change agents, much
like Marshall and Arnold did for Pete Quesada. While he could do lit-
tle to eect bombardment theory’s stranglehold over interwar airpower
concepts, Quesada acted as an agent of change in the employment of
tactical air support of ground troops. His close cooperation with ground
commanders, careful observation and development of cross-domain TTPs,
and passionate leadership of the IX Tactical Air Force kept tactical air-to-
ground support alive despite the hostile climate created by the embrace
of bombardment theory and the cultural and theoretical dierences that
179
created friction among the Anglo-American Allies. Quesada’s eorts as
an agent of change emerged as one of WWII’s most signicant contingent
events. Today’s senior military leaders must empower such change agents
to overcome the deleterious eects of decades of air-ground animosity and
doctrinal inconsistency—a challenge that remains operative to this day.
Although today’s US Air Force has supported ground troops with
CAS during 16 years of combat in Afghanistan and Iraq, its pilots have not
own CAS in contested airspace or against a near-peer threat. As the US
Army shifts its focus to large-scale combat operations, Army-Air Force
relationships must form and doctrine must develop in an objective, collab-
orative manner to avoid another instance of learning in combat what the
services could have practiced in pre-war training.
180
Notes
1. Rick Maze, “Radical Change Is Coming: Gen. Mark A. Milley Not
Talking About Just Tinkering around the Edges,” 13 December 2016, accessed
18 May 2018, https://www.ausa.org/articles/ radical-change-coming-gen-mark-
milley-not-talking-about-just-tinkering-around-edges; Lieutenant General
Michael D. Lundy, Commander, US Army Combined Arms Center reinforced
these concerns in his foreword to the Army’s most recent operational doctrine.
See Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 3-0, Operations (Washington,
DC: 2017).
2. US Army Capabilities Integration Center, “Multi-Domain Battle: Evolu-
tion of Combined Arms for the 21st Century, 2025–2040,” December 2017.
3. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. Michael Howard and Peter Paret, trans.
Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press,
1984), 122.
4. von Clausewitz, 156.
5. Russell B. Fette, “Ebb and Flow: Maintaining the Close Air Support Rela-
tionship through History” (master’s thesis, US Army School of Advanced Military
Studies, 2016). The term “close air support” was not yet in use during World War
II; both air and ground personnel typically referred to “direct support to ground
forces” or simply “air support.” For consistency, CAS is used throughout.
6. Fette, 82–84.
7. Giulio Douhet, “The Command of the Air,” in Roots of Strategy: Book
4, ed. David Jablonsky (Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 1999), 260–407;
William Mitchell, “Winged Defense,” in Roots of Strategy: Book 4, 408–515; for
more detail on the historical context in which strategic bombing theory devel-
oped, see Azar Gat, “Futurism, Proto-Fascist Italian Culture, and the Sources of
Douhetism,” in A History of Military Thought: From the Enlightenment to the
Cold War (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 561–597.
8. Thomas A. Hughes, Overlord: General Pete Quesada and the Triumph of
Tactical Airpower in World War II (New York: The Free Press, 1995), 54.
9. Hughes, 52–55.
10. David M. Kennedy, Freedom from Fear: The American People in
Depression and War, 1929–1945 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001),
615–19; Hughes, Overlord: General Pete Quesada, 53–54, 79.
11. Quoted in Hughes, Overlord: General Pete Quesada, 55.
12. For more on agents of change, see Kirk C. Dorr, “Developing Agents of
Change” (master’s thesis, School of Advanced Military Studies, 2003), accessed
3 June 2018, http://cgsc.cdmhost.com /u?/p4013coll3,17; Hughes, Overlord,
59–63.
13. Hughes, Overlord, 47–49.
14. Hughes, 47–49, 75.
15. Hughes, 82.
16. Hughes, 82.
17. Hughes, 79–81.
181
18. Hughes, Overlord, 84–86; For a description of the Americans’ rst tank
battle with German forces, see Freeland A. Daubin, “The Battle of Happy Val-
ley” (Monograph, The Armored School, 1948).
19. Eisenhower to Churchill, “The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower,”
Johns Hopkins University Press, accessed 17 April 2018, https://eisenhower.
press.jhu.edu, 741; Hughes, Overlord, 86–87.
20. Eisenhower to Arnold, “Eisenhower Papers,” 654; Eisenhower to Com-
bined Chiefs of Sta and British Chiefs of Sta, “Eisenhower Papers,” 747.
21. Eisenhower to Arnold,19 January 1943 “Eisenhower Papers,” 778;
Eisenhower to Marshall, 8 February 1943, “Eisenhower Papers,” 810n1.
22. Daniel R. Mortensen, A Pattern for Joint Operations: World War II
Close Air Support, North Africa (Washington, DC: Oce of Air Force History
and US Army Center of Military History, 1987), 84–88.
23. Quoted in Hughes, Overlord, 109; for more on the War Department re-
organization in March, 1942, see Forrest C. Pogue, George C. Marshall: Ordeal
and Hope, 1939–1942 (New York: Viking Press, 1966), 289–297; Mortensen, A
Pattern for Joint Operations, 86.
24. “Foreign Relations of the United States” (Washington, DC: Govern-
ment Printing Oce, 2010), accessed 3 June 2018, https://history.state.gov/
historicaldocuments/frus1943Cairo Tehran; Eisenhower Memorandum for Diary,
6 December 1943, “Eisenhower Papers,” 1408; Eisenhower to Marshall, 17
December 1943, “Eisenhower Papers,” 1423.
25. Eisenhower to Marshall, 17 December 1943, 1423.
26. Eisenhower to Marshall, 23 December 1943, 1426; Eisenhower to Mar-
shall, 26 December 1943, 1439.
27. Eisenhower to Marshall, 25 December 1943, 1428; Hughes, Overlord,
111–114.
28. Eisenhower Memorandum (for the record), 22 March 1944, “Eisenhow-
er Papers,” 1601.
29. Hughes, Overlord, 121.
30. Dorr, “Developing Agents of Change,” accessed 3 June 2018, http://
cgsc.cdmhost.com/u?/p4013coll3, 17; Hughes, Overlord, 126.
31. Martin Blumenson, Breakout and Pursuit, US Army in World War II:
European Theater of Operations (Washington, DC: US Army Center of Military
History, 1961; repr., 2005), 207–208; Steven L. Ossad, Omar Nelson Bradley:
America’s GI General, 1893–1981 (Columbia: University of Missouri Press,
2017), 210–211; Hughes, Overlord, 129, 159–169; Michael D. Doubler, Closing
with the Enemy: How the GIs Fought the War in Europe, 1944–1945, Modern
War Studies (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1994), 63–86.
32. Army Air Forces Historical Studies No. 36, “Ninth Air Force, April to
Nov 1944, 140–170.
33. Dwight D. Eisenhower, “Report by the Supreme Commander to the
Combined Chiefs of Sta on the Operations in Europe of the Allied Expedition-
ary Force, 6 June 1944 to 8 May 1945” (Washington, DC: Center of Military
History, 1994), 28.
182
34. Blumenson, Breakout and Pursuit, 13–15.
35. Eisenhower to Marshall, “The Eisenhower Papers,” 1796.
36. Blumenson, Breakout and Pursuit, 10–13; William C. Sylvan and Fran-
cis G. Smith Jr., Normandy to Victory: The War Diary of General Courney H.
Hodges & the First US Army, ed. John T. Greenwood (Lexington, KY: Univer-
sity Press of Kentucky, 2008), 30, 55; Steven L. Ossad, America’s GI General,
197; Doubler, Closing with the Enemy, 31–62.
37. Blumenson, Breakout and Pursuit, 209–10.
38. Eisenhower to Bradley, 8 July 1944, 1810.
39. Eisenhower to Bradley, 1 July 1944, 1794 (emphasis in the original).
40. Eisenhower to Bradley, 1 July 1944, 1794.
41. Quoted in Blumenson, Breakout and Pursuit, 190; Eisenhower to Brad-
ley, 1 July 1944, 1794.
42. Blumenson, Breakout and Pursuit, 188–196
43. Blumenson, 172–82.
44. Blumenson, 220–21.
45. Ossad, America’s GI General, 205.
46. Ossad, 212–20.
47. Ossad, 220–23.
48. “9th Air Force Operations, 1–30 June, 1944, With Special Study of
Close Support in the Assault on Cherbourg.”
49. Ossad, America’s GI General, 217–21; “9th Air Force Operations, 1–30
June 1944, With Special Study of Close Support in the Assault on Cherbourg.”
50. Blumenson, Breakout and Pursuit, 228–29.
51. Blumenson, 231–36.
52. Mark T. Calhoun, General Lesley J. McNair: Unsung Architect of the
US Army (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2015), 320–26; Smith to
Marshall, “Eisenhower Papers,” 1803.
53. Quoted in Ossad, America’s GI General, 225.
54. Blumenson, Breakout and Pursuit, 273.
55. Mark J. Reardon, Victory at Mortain: Stopping Hitler’s Panzer Coun-
teroensive (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2002), 12, 294–95;
Doubler, Closing with the Enemy, 63–86; Hughes, Overlord, 163–91; 228.
56. Fette, “Ebb and Flow,” 80.
57. Fette, 82–84.
183
Chapter 10
Fires and Combined Arms Maneuver: The Battle
of Vimy Ridge, 9 April 1917
David Thuell and Thomas G. Bradbeer
Throughout the period of trench warfare, the objective of all the
combatants on the Western front was the restoration of mobility to
the battle. While a visualisation of the battleeld would suggest
that its static nature was due to the rows of trenches and belts of
barbed wire, it was essentially, the superiority of defensive re-
power of that of the oensive which led to both the struggle’s in-
decisiveness and its appalling levels of bloodshed. The principal
source of this repower was the artillery; manoeuvre in the face
of unsuppressed modern ordnance proved an extremely hazardous
and costly operation.
1
—Albert Palazzo
The Industrial Revolution of the 19th Century, brought about a tech-
nical revolution in the development of weapons. This revolution increased
the eciencies of the weapons to the point where, by 1914, they com-
pletely dominated the battleeld. The battleeld being comprised of three
key elements—repower, mobility, and protection. At the start of the First
World War, repower was the dominant element, and the main source of
repower during the war was artillery. It is estimated that 60 percent of all
casualties during the war were inicted by artillery re.
2
This dominance
is the reason why all large-scale oensive operations failed to achieve
their objectives on the Western Front until April 1917.
On 9 April 1917, the Canadian Corps as part of the British First Army,
launched a well-coordinated and synchronized attack against three Ger-
man divisions of the German Sixth Army defending Vimy Ridge just
north of Arras, France. At the same time the British Third Army, under the
command of Sir Edmund Allenby, attacked along the Scarpe River toward
Arras. The Canadian Corps attack was signicant in that it was the rst
time the four Canadian divisions, totaling 97,184 men, operated in combat
together.
3
The British 5th Infantry Division was attached to the Canadian
Corps for this operation. Attacking on a four mile front, the Canadians
pushed the entrenched German divisions o of Vimy Ridge in a four day
battle. Vimy Ridge would prove to be one of the greatest tactical successes
for the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) during the entire war.
4
More im-
portantly “For Canadians, Vimy Ridge was a nation-building experience.
184
For some, then and later, it symbolized the fact that the Great War was also
Canada’s war of independence.”
5
The Canadians were able to overcome the superiority of repower
over the oensive and achieve all of their objectives assigned to the Corps
by capturing the ridge that rose 480 feet above the Douai plain. Since Oc-
tober 1914 the Germans had defended the ridge against the French Army
and fought o two major attacks, in May and September 1915 respective-
ly, and inicting more than 150,000 French casualties.
6
The ridge was sig-
nicant in that it enabled the German defenders to possess a commanding
view of the allied lines for many miles in three directions.
The Canadians were able to capture Vimy Ridge for a number of rea-
sons. First and foremost, the soldiers were well led, well trained, and ade-
quately equipped.
7
They were also, for the most part, combat veterans, hav-
ing fought on the Western Front since their introduction to combat during
the Battle of Second Ypres in April 1915. They gained even more experi
-
ence during the Battle of the Somme in 1916. By early 1917 the Canadian
soldier had earned a reputation of being among the best soldiers in the BEF.
8
Signicant to the performance of the Canadian Corps during the battle
of Vimy Ridge was the fact that the Canadians applied three signicant
changes to their doctrine in the months before the operation. The rst two
changes involved the use of artillery; the third change had to do with the
employment of infantry during oensive operations.
During the winter of 1916–1917, the British and Canadian artillery
changed its tactical doctrine from conducting artillery barrages aimed at
destroying enemy targets and instead implemented barrages that would
neutralize the target. The second change in artillery doctrine involved the
creation of the Counter-Battery Sta Oce (CBSO). This was done to
increase the eectiveness of the British artillery against its German coun-
terpart. The third doctrinal change took place in the area of small unit tac-
tics, empowering platoon commanders to use their initiative and to make
decisions that would normally be done by their company or battalion com-
manders. “Regardless of how much planning preceded an attack, lone sol-
diers or small parties were often the only means of overcoming stubborn
resistance on the Great War battleelds.”
9
Artillery in the Great War
The application of British Artillery in First World War went through
four distinct phases between 1914 and 1918. The rst phase was “Inade-
quacy,” where the artillery was ill-prepared for the many challenges they
would experience, most especially in the areas of re-planning, massing
185
guns, and concentrating res where it would inuence the battle. In 1915
the second phase evolved into “Experimentation and Build up,” with more
advanced guns and howitzers being developed, along with better and larg-
er supplies of ammunition, to include the use of gas. Tactically, the artil-
lery formations learned that if an infantry assault was to be successful they
had to produce a barrage that would better protect the attacking infantry.
The result was the “lifting” barrage.
10
By 1916 the third phase, “Destruction,” became the focus, most es-
pecially on the Western Front. The “lifting barrage” was still used but
evolved into the “rolling barrage,” and British leaders decided that the
only way to defeat an entrenched enemy was to conduct a massive days
or weeks long bombardment that would “crush” all resistance. Within the
British Army, the Royal Artillery was “tasked to restore infantry mobility
by winning the reght at the cost of surprise.”
11
Massing and concen-
trating res was evolving, and the inclusion of an artillery commander
in every British corps headquarter, greatly improved both command and
control of resources but also improved combined arms coordination. The
close battle remained the focus. During the BEF’s major oensive opera-
tion on the Western Front in 1916, the Battle of the Somme, the Royal Ar-
tillery divided its re support plan into three phases: the preliminary bom-
bardment (which was planned to last seven days), the protective barrage
(as the infantry walked across no-man’s land), and the exploitation and
consolidation phase (if and when the German lines were breeched).
12
A
major consideration for the use of “destruction” res was the vast amount
of logistics support required, primarily the amount of artillery ammuni-
tion. It took weeks to transport and stockpile the enormous amounts of
ammunition required for a two or three day barrage prior to the star of an
oensive operation. No matter how many guns were available to support
an attack, if there was not enough ammunition to sustain a high rate of re,
both before and during the attack, British and French commanders would
reduce the scale of the operations and narrow the sector of attack based on
the density of re available.
13
By early 1917 the Royal Artillery began to focus on “Neutralization,”
the fourth and nal phase.
14
The artillery’s primary purpose was no longer
to aid the infantry by destroying machine guns and obstacles, such as dense
belts of barbed wire but instead shifted to neutralizing enemy artillery.
The Canadian Corps attack on Vimy Ridge represented a half way
point between destruction and neutralization, as the preparatory artillery
barrage was to be destructive, but the creeping barrage that was to be red
during the actual attack was to neutralize the enemy artillery. “The Brit-
186
ish First Army’s Artillery Plan for the attack on Vimy Ridge in February
1917 identied that . . . at the opening of the Infantry attack the policy of
destruction must give way to neutralization.”
15
The creeping barrage, the use of heavy machine guns, the ring of
smoke, and gas barrages all represented fundamental changes in the use of
artillery. While three of these types of artillery barrages could be lethal to
exposed infantry, they were not intended to be destructive. They were all
intended to neutralize the Germans entrenched in their defensive positions.
The creeping barrage that was red by the artillery in support of the
Canadian Corps attack on Vimy Ridge was in fact a neutralizing barrage.
“The concentrated drumre from artillery and machine guns keeps the en-
emy in his deep dugouts. When the barrage lifts he hasn’t time to come out
of his subterranean galleries to work his machine guns before our infantry
are on top of him.”
16
By forcing the Germans to remain under cover, the
creeping barrage provided the attacking infantry with the protection they
needed to close with the enemy.
As Lieutenant Colonel Chalmers Johnston, Commander of the 2nd
Canadian Mounted Rie Battalion, noted about his battalions advance on
the day of the attack. “Owing to the rapid advance behind our curtain
re, enemy machine guns had no time to get into action.”
17
There was no
advantage to be gained by spending additional time and ammunition in
trying to destroy the enemy’s dugouts, when the creeping barrage would
prevent the Germans from ring on the advancing Canadians.
The Use of Smoke and Gas Barrages
Before launching their attack on Vimy Ridge, the infantry brigade
commanders from the 4th Canadian Division requested that their artillery
support include a smoke barrage to conceal the infantry’s advance from
the German defenders on Hill 145 (the highest point of the ridge) and the
knoll even further north of the ridge known as “The Pimple.”
18
The 4th
Canadian Division’s senior artillery commander agreed that “the most ef-
cient plan was to neutralize [The Pimple] with smoke.”
19
At 0530 on Easter Monday, 9 April, the Canadian artillery began to
re a creeping barrage as the infantry left their trenches. Though the ar-
tillery red a smoke barrage throughout the morning on Hill 145 and The
Pimple, the wintry weather conditions gradually opened major gaps in the
smoke screen and the greatest fears of Major General David Watson, the
commanding general of the 4th Division, came true. The Germans en-
trenched on the Pimple poured a murderous re into the attacking Canadi-
an infantry as they crossed no-man’s land toward Hill 145. The Canadians
187
also included a heavy machine gun barrage to help minimize the enlade
re coming from the Pimple, but regardless of the smoke screen and ma-
chine gun re, the 4th Division suered heavy casualties with several bat-
talions sustaining more than 50 percent casualties.
20
By the end of the rst
day of the battle, Hill 145 and the Pimple remained under German control.
It would be another 24 hours before the Canadians captured these two key
terrain features. The untested 85th Infantry Battalion from Nova Scotia
captured Hill 145 after a dusk attack on 10 April, amazingly without an
artillery barrage to support them.
21
Gas artillery shells began to arrive in the Canadian Corps sector in
March 1917. Lieutenant Colonel Andrew McNaughton, as Canadian
Counter-Battery Ocer (CCBO,) took a page from a French Army of
-
cer, Lieutenant Colonel Pascal Lucas who wrote, “the neutralization of
personnel [by gas] could supplement the always incomplete destruction
of defensive organizations.”
22
As a result the Canadian Corps artillery be-
gan using gas shells primarily against German artillery positions. At this
point in the war, both sides had eective anti-gas drills in place and suf-
fered relatively few casualties from gas. The British and Canadians used
gas primarily as a harassing agent at this point of the war. By ring it at
the German artillery positions, it would force the gun crews to wear their
gas masks while they tried to re their guns, eectively reducing their rate
of re by nearly half.
23
Figure 10.1. “The Taking of Vimy Ridge, Easter Monday 1917.” Courtesy of the
Canadian War Museum.
188
Firing a neutralizing gas barrage did not require the same level of ac-
curacy as attempting to re a destructive, high explosive barrage. The gas
shells could actually miss the German batteries but still be close enough that
the crews would be forced to wear their protective masks, decreasing their
eciency. On the actual day of the attack gas barrages were red on most
of the German artillery batteries. Hauptmann Behrmann, Reserve Infantry
Regiment 261, noted the results. “Many of the guns were swiftly overrun.
Hundreds of horses were killed in the initial gas attack, so there was no
means of dragging them to the rear when they were threatened.”
24
By killing
the horses in the initial gas barrage, the artillery actually immobilized the
German artillery batteries, allowing the attacking Canadian infantry to cap-
ture 63 German artillery pieces during the battle of Vimy Ridge.
25
The Use of Machine Guns for Neutralizing Fires
In February of 1917, the Canadian Corps began using heavy machine
guns to assist the Field and Heavy artillery with their barrages. From 4
February 1917, the War Diaries of the 2nd Canadian Infantry Brigade,
provide a list of some of the targets assigned to the heavy machine guns:
“Brigade machine guns carried out programme of indirect re against Ger-
man trench railways, Roads, X Roads, Hqrs & Field Kitchens.”
26
The 4th
Canadian Division noted that in the nights leading up to the attack, its
machine guns red “on average 15,000 rounds a night, spread out over the
whole German rear area, communications and overland tracks.”
27
The eect of these nightly machine gun barrages on the Germans abil-
ity to resupply their front lines was noted in a 4th Canadian Division after
battle report. “Prisoners stated denitely that the only way they got their
rations was by each relief bringing up sucient rations for its stay in the
trenches.”
28
Heavy machine guns were an appropriate weapon to engage
all of these targets as neutralizing them was just as eective as destroying
them, and signicantly more ecient.
The heavy machine guns also red creeping barrages in support of
the infantry’s advance during the attack on the ridge. On 9 April, the
opening day of the attack, 2nd Canadian Infantry Brigade noted that
upon advancing into the former German rear area “that many of the Ger-
man dead were killed by Machine gun re, indicating that Machine Gun
barrage . . . was [very] eective.”
29
The Counter Battery Sta Ocer
During the planning for the attack on Vimy Ridge, Lieutenant General
Sir Julian Byng, General Ocer Commanding (GOC), Canadian Corps,
189
identied four priorities for his artillery commanders: counter-battery
re, destruction of the German ghting positions, destruction of the Ger-
man barbed-wire obstacles, and interdiction of enemy re-supply eorts.
30
During this same period, the British Royal Artillery identied the require-
ment for a counter-battery expert to serve on division and corps stas who
was “free to devote their whole time, energy and brains to the one end of
defeating enemy guns.”
31
Thus, the Counter Battery Sta Ocer (CBSO)
was created to deal specically with the task of locating, destroying or
neutralizing the German artillery within their respective corps and divi-
sion areas of operations:
The British recognition of the necessity for an artillery intelli-
gence organisation enhanced their capabilities in target identica-
tion and selection, ordnance utilisation, and munition allocation.
Figure 10.2. Lieutenant General Sir Julian Byng, General Ocer Commanding
(GOC) Canadian Corps. Photo courtesy of the Imperial War Museum CO 1370.
190
The overall product of these intellectual improvements was an
enormous increase in eective repower and a higher degree of
success in counter-battery re.
32
The primary objective for the CBSO “was to have such eective
knowledge of the enemy’s artillery dispositions that his batteries could be
swamped, harassed and hampered by a deluge of accurately aimed H.E.
[high explosives] and gas shells just before the critical moment of the as-
sault and while it continued.”
33
The CBSO would consist of a senior artillery eld-grade ocer (Lieu-
tenant Colonel or Colonel) as well as a small “centralized sta of artillery
personnel dedicated to the suppression of the enemy’s batteries through
the analysis and tactical application of intelligence.”
34
They would be at-
tached to all army corps and divisions within the BEF operating in France
and Belgium. The CBSO continually sought to gain and maintain an ad-
vantage in artillery repower over the Germans, by any means possible.
In turn, the Canadian Corps established the Canadian Counter-Bat-
tery Ocer (CCBO) on 27 January 1917 when General Byng appointed
31-year-old Lieutenant Colonel Andrew G. L. McNaughton to be the rst
CCBO in the Canadian Corps.
35
McNaughton had joined the Canadian
Militia in 1909 and was commanding an artillery battery when the war
began. He had been wounded twice and done much to advance gunnery
techniques as the war progressed. During the Battle of the Somme he com-
manded the 11th (Howitzer) Brigade.
36
Prior to the war McNaughton was
a professor of engineering at McGill University in Montreal and brought
a scientist’s enquiring mind to every problem he faced.
37
He had an ex-
cellent reputation within the artillery community and was instrumental in
convincing infantry commanders of the necessity for the synchronization
of the artillery re-plan with the maneuver plan prior to any oensive
operation. He was well liked by the soldiers who served in his units and
highly respected by his senior leaders for both his expertise as well as his
critical thinking abilities.
38
One of McNaughton’s specied tasks was “to gather enemy intel-
ligence so as to harass enemy operations and destroy opposing artillery
forces.”
39
Under McNaughton’s leadership, the CCBO sta would gather
intelligence from any and all sources to include aerial observation, ae-
rial photographs, sound-ranging, ash spotting, forward artillery observ-
ers, prisoners, signalers intercepting German transmissions, night patrols,
trench raids, and even snipers who, “passed along information seen through
their telescopes.”
40
These sources were to be exploited by the CCBO to
191
assist in developing detailed target analysis against the German artillery.
Without the CCBO there would have been no possible way to combine
and interpret all of the dierent sources of information, from all of the dif-
ferent branches of the army. Since ever division and corps in the BEF had
a counter-battery ocer, they were able to share tactics, techniques and
procedures and eventually develop doctrine for the use of counter-battery
res which in turn greatly improved the overall eectiveness of the British
Army’s counter-battery re in the last year and a half of the war.
41
Prior to the attack on Vimy Ridge, McNaughton visited with his
French and British counterparts to discuss the lessons they had learned on
the application of artillery during the Battles of Verdun and the Somme,
respectively.
42
From the British he learned much about a variety of tech-
niques used with ash-spotting and sound ranging and would incorporate
these techniques into his planning for the counter-battery ght against the
German artillery behind Vimy Ridge.
43
Under McNaughton’s leadership,
Canadian artillerymen using sound-ranging techniques were able to calcu-
late the position of the enemy gun within an accuracy of 25 yards. They
were also able to identify its type, caliber, and the target it was registered
on, all in less than three minutes under good weather conditions.
44
The Artillery Plan for Vimy Ridge
The preliminary bombardment in support of the attack on Vimy Ridge
began on 20 March and consisted of ve phases. Phase One began in early
March and consisted of the pre-positioning of artillery batteries and the
stockpiling of artillery ammunition. This proved to be a logistics miracle
in itself. In all, more than 1,000 guns and howitzers had to be moved into
their ring positions to support the attack with one howitzer to every 20
yards of front and one eld gun for every ten yards.
45
1,005,000 rounds of
18-pdr gun ammunition would be issued to the 480 18-pounder guns that
would take part in the preliminary bombardment.
46
Phase Two was the
start of the preliminary barrage that was planned to last from 20 March
through 2 April. Phase Three was the nal week of the preliminary barrage
from 3–9 April. Phase Four was the bombardment to support the initial
attack and phase ve identied contingencies for the consolidation and
exploitation of the ground captured.
47
During Phase One the command relationships and coordination be-
tween the Major General Royal Artillery (MAGRA), First Army, Major
General H. F. Mercer and the Brigadier General Royal Artillery (BGRA)
E.W.B. Morrison, commander of the Canadian Corps artillery, was -
nalized. Fourteen heavy artillery brigades, consisting of 114 60-pounder
192
guns, 144 6-inch howitzers, 56 9.2-inch howitzers, 40 8-inch howitzers,
and numerous other smaller caliber guns and howitzers would support the
three week preparatory barrage. Added to this list of artillery repower
were the guns and howitzers of the divisional artillery units belonging to
the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Canadian Divisions as well as the division artillery’s
of the 5th, 31st, and 63rd (RN) British divisions. The British 5th and 11th
Brigades, Royal Field Artillery (RFA) served as the divisional artillery for
the 4th Canadian Division with a further eight brigades of artillery provid-
ing reinforcing res to the Canadian Corps once the attack began. In total,
these units provided an additional 480 18-pounders and 138 4.5-inch how-
itzers to support the assault on Vimy Ridge. Finally, six brigades of Heavy
Artillery were assigned the specic task of conducting counter-battery re
prior to and during the assault.
48
During phase one nearly all of the eld
guns were moved forward during the hours of darkness to occupy ring
positions only 500 yards behind the Canadian forward trenches. These
guns conducted registration on German targets at the start of the prepara-
tory barrage and then fell silent for the next two and a half weeks so as to
not be located by German observers.
49
In addition to the artillery, 150 of the 358 Vickers heavy machine guns
in the Canadian Corps were allocated to support the preliminary bombard-
ment. The Canadians would use the Vickers as an indirect re system very
eectively in the assault on Vimy Ridge.
50
When Phase Two began on 20 March, General Byng directed that
only half of the artillery would participate, primarily to conserve ammu
-
nition and to preserve the barrel life of the guns.
51
Counter-battery res
during this phase concentrated on located German artillery batteries via
aerial observers or by ash-spotting and sound ranging. When the loca
-
tion of the enemy batteries were conrmed, they were added to the re-
plan list and would not be red upon until the last few days of phase three,
just before the attack started.
“The Symphony of Hell”
When all of the available British and Canadian artillery opened re at
the start of Phase Three on 2 April, the eects of the barrage could be felt
12 miles away, breaking windows in the French city of Douai.
52
The bom-
bardment went on non-stop for 23 hours a day for six days allowing little
respite to the three German divisions dug-in and along Vimy Ridge. The
guns fell silent for one hour each day to allow the aircraft of Number 16
Squadron, Royal Flying Corps (RFC) the chance to conduct battle damage
assessment. The aircrews of 16 Squadron made a major contribution to
193
Lieutenant Colonel McNaughton’s counter battery operations by provid-
ing aerial photographs as well as directing artillery re both before and
during the attack on Vimy Ridge.
53
In what the Germans would later state was “The Symphony of Hell”
or “the Week of Suering,” the German positions were pounded with high
explosives and gas for six days preventing reinforcements and supplies
from reaching the forward units on Vimy Ridge.
54
With each passing day,
the British and Canadian artillery increased their rates of re incremental-
ly with 90,000 rounds being red on 5 April alone.
55
The bombardment
destroyed several German trench systems and obliterated huge segments
of the barbed-wire obstacles in front of the German trenches. To make
matters worse the German artillery experienced a shortage of ammunition
as their logistics system began to break down due to the eects of the Brit-
ish and Canadian long range res.
At 0530 on Easter Monday, 9 April 1917, the attack on Vimy Ridge be-
gan when 21 infantry battalions from the four Canadian divisions left their
trenches and began the trek across no-man’s land. With a thunderous roar
that deafened friend and foe alike “the most concentrated and powerful bom
-
bardment of the war thundered into the German Lines on Vimy Ridge.”
56
A freak snowstorm with pounding snow and sleet fell on the advancing in
-
fantry in the pre-dawn light. Even in the poor visibility German opposition
began to stien the closer the Canadians came to the enemy trenches.
As the Canadian infantry moved forward, they hugged the creeping bar
-
rage in front of them which advanced 100 yards every three minutes. Simul-
Figure 10.3. Canadian MK V 8-inch howitzers in action, April 1917. Photo
courtesy of the Canadian War Museum.
194
taneously, the standing barrage moved forward 150 yards of the creeping
barrage, bombarding the objectives along the “Black Line” while 300 yards
further on the heavy artillery pounded the rear slopes of the ridge and Mc-
Naughton’s counter-battery brigades silenced nearly 85 percent of the Ger-
man guns still in action.
57
Of the more than 400 7.7.cm eld guns available
to the German Army Group commander defending Vimy Ridge, the major
-
ity were destroyed and those that were not were eectively neutralized.
58
By the end of the rst day, three of the four Canadian divisions had
captured all of their objectives. Only the 4th Division was unable to capture
Hill 145 and The Pimple; these critical positions were captured the follow-
ing day. By 12 April the Canadians had achieved a success unparalleled
in the war to that time. The success achieved by the Canadian Corps was
due to many reasons. First and foremost it started with General Byng and
his infantry and artillery commanders. Their focus on synchronization and
planning, as well as the development and execution of an intense training
plan prior to the battle, proved to be combat multipliers that enabled the
successful assault on Vimy Ridge. Just as important, platoon commanders
and section leaders were given the authority to use their judgment as they
saw t to maintain the initiative during the attack. In doing so this also en-
abled small units to accomplish their assigned missions. It was this combi-
nation of “mission command” with a well-planned and executed artillery
re-plan that led to the defeat of the Germans on Vimy Ridge.
As for the success of the CCBO, it can be summarized in this brief
report sent by Brigadier General E.W.B. Morrison 60 minutes after the
start of the attack. “C.B.S.O.—Everything going splendidly. All our troops
on the RIDGE. . . . Practically no hostile barrage.”
59
Another measure of
the success of the CCBO was that, “By all available means the Canadian
counter-battery sta discovered 176 of the estimated 212 guns the Ger-
mans had available to defend themselves.”
60
This severely diminished the
repower the attacking infantry faced when they assaulted the ridge.
The change from destructive artillery barrages to neutralizing barrag-
es, which began in April 1917, would become doctrine within both the
British and Canadian artillery until the end of the war. Creeping barrages
which included smoke and gas shells, and heavy machine gun re, would
all continue to play signicant roles in oensive operations conducted by
the BEF. Given the importance of artillery in support of oensive opera-
tions on the Western Front, the creation of the CBSO by the British Army
in the winter of 1917, may be one of the most important doctrinal changes
of the war. Interestingly enough, the Germans were never able to duplicate
the CBSO within their armies.
61
195
Changes in Infantry Doctrine prior to Vimy Ridge
Shortly after the conclusion of the Battle of the Somme, BEF General
Headquarters issued several directives that would incorporate numerous
lessons learned from that ve month campaign. The two that impacted
the infantry most directly were SS143—Instructions for the Training of
Platoons for Oensive Action and SS144—The Normal Formation for
the Attack.
These new tactics represented a major change in infantry doctrine
within the British Army, placing greater responsibility at the lowest eche-
lon—the platoon commander. This pushed the actual command of oen-
sive operations down to the platoon level. There were two primary reasons
for this change: the lack of communications between battalion headquar-
ters and the advancing platoons once the companies and platoons left their
trenches and began crossing no-man’s land, and additional repower be-
ing allocated to the infantry platoons to make them more lethal. The addi-
tion of grenade launchers attached to the infantryman’s Lee-Eneld ries
as well as providing more of the very eective Lewis light machine guns
increased the lethality of the infantry platoon.
62
The battalion commander of the 22nd Battalion noted, “Once the attack
is launched the Battalion Commander is practically impotent . . . company
and platoons were cut o from higher headquarters.”
63
When the company
or platoon ran into a German strong-point, such as a machine gun post, they
would stop and call for support from the artillery. They would remain sta
-
tionary until support arrived. Communications between advancing infantry
and the headquarters was almost impossible, and when possible could take
hours. This would eectively stop the advance of the infantry, thereby los-
ing initiative and thus jeopardizing the whole oensive operation.
In the months prior to the attack on Vimy Ridge, General Byng had di-
rected his sta to conduct a detailed analysis of small unit tactics and train-
ing. When the British General Sta issued SS143 and SS144 in February
1917, it directed that one of the infantry platoons in each company transition
into three sections consisting of bombers (hand grenades), rie-bombers
(rie grenades) and Lewis machine gun teams to assist the infantry com-
pany with suppressing or neutralizing enemy strongpoints. The increase in
repower at the platoon level was a major lesson learned from the Battle of
the Somme. It was believed that this change to the infantry structure would
combine to provide the companies and platoons with enough repower to
deal with almost any defensive obstacle missed by the artillery. General
196
Byng directed that SS143 and SS144 be incorporated immediately into the
revised training plan for every soldier in the Canadian Corps.
64
In order for the new tactics and weapons to be successful at overcom-
ing the superiority of defensive repower, the infantry needed extensive
training on how to operate these weapons, and then on how to carry out the
new tactics. Light machine gunners, bombers, and rie grenadiers had to
learn how to operate their individual weapons but more importantly, they
needed to learn how to operate together as a team. A 4th Division weekly
report published just ve days before the attack on Vimy Ridge, stated that
146 men completed courses of instruction on use of the Lewis Gun, the
Mills Bomb (grenade) and Rie Grenade.
65
As part of the revised training program, General Byng directed that
in the coming battle every platoon would be given a specic objective.
More importantly, he provided the time for every company and platoon to
conduct rehearsals in the rear area so that they could develop battle drills.
A scale model of Vimy Ridge was built near First Army headquarters and
every soldier was to understand his role as well as the man alongside him.
Byng also provided 45,000 maps so that every platoon commander, pla-
toon sergeant and section commanders had a map and knew how to use it
to assist them in achieving their objectives.
66
Once the individual soldiers had completed training on their new weap-
ons, they would return to their platoons and begin, “training under the Bri-
gade and Battalion arrangements in the new organization of Platoons etc.”
67
For the four Canadian divisions, this training continued right up until the
day before the attack on Vimy Ridge. This intense training regime provided
the attacking infantrymen the knowledge they needed to successfully deal
with and overcome the German strongpoints they would encounter.
Now with the new tactics, weapons, and training, when the artillery
barrages failed to neutralize a German strong point, the platoon would
be able to eectively deal with these positions and continue advancing
toward their objectives.
After the Canadian Corps’s successful assault and capture of Vimy
Ridge, Major General Henry E. Burstall, commander of the 2nd Canadian
Division, reected on the two directives and their impact on his platoons:
The platoon organization has fully justied its introduction.
Whenever preparations for an attack have been complete, i.e.
wire properly cut and trench destruction thoroughly carried out,
the Infantry have been able to advance with comparatively small
197
casualties as the new organization has enabled them to overcome
opposition with the weapons at their own disposal.
68
The Canadian Corps was able to apply these changes to infantry doc-
trine because of an intense training program which contributed greatly to
capturing Vimy Ridge from an entrenched, well-led, disciplined and moti-
vated enemy, proving the soundness and eectiveness of the new doctrine.
Major General Sir Arthur Currie, commander of the 1st Canadian Division
at Vimy Ridge and future commander of the Canadian Corps, stated “There
is no use in waiting until the end of the war to make necessary changes.”
69
Conclusion
On 12 April 1917, German resistance ended and with it the Battle of
Vimy Ridge. The four Canadian divisions were positioned on the high
ground along a six mile front. The German Sixth Army, having sustained
more than 20,000 casualties, including 4,000 soldiers who became prison-
ers of war, retreated more than four miles eastwards across the Plains of
Douai and took up defensive positions where they prepared for the next
Allied attack.
70
The Canadian Corps suered 10,602 over the four day
battle with 3,598 soldiers killed and 7,004 were wounded. It would prove
to be the highest casualty rate every suered by the Canadians in their
history. Despite the casualties, the British and Canadians considered Vimy
Ridge an overwhelming success. General Byng would be promoted to
command Third Army and Major General Currie received a knighthood
from King George V on the battleeld and then assumed command of the
Canadian Corps where he would prove to be one of the most capable corps
commanders on either side during the entire war.
71
Shortly after the battle,
the Canadians received perhaps the greatest tribute when the French Army
General Sta sent a group of senior ocers to meet with the leaders of
the Canadian Corps to analyze how and why the Canadians had been so
successful at Vimy Ridge. “One of the greatest armies in the world was not
too proud to learn from an army of citizen soldiers.”
72
By implementing neutralizing and destructive artillery barrages across
BEF, creating the position of counter-battery sta ocer at the corps and
division level, and incorporating new tactics at the infantry platoon level,
the Canadian Corps was able to overcome the superiority of defensive
repower, and achieve a major tactical victory during the Battle of Vimy
Ridge. This successful large-scale combat operation demonstrated that by
conducting detailed planning at all levels—from Army to platoon—and
by synchronizing res with maneuver, well-trained and well-led soldiers
198
could defeat a near-peer enemy defending key terrain under extreme envi-
ronmental conditions.
One of the greatest strengths of the Canadian Corps prior to the Battle
of Vimy Ridge (and for the remainder of the war), was its highly integrat-
ed and exible organization. The Canadian Corps sta, under the excep-
tional leadership of General Byng, eectively planned and coordinated
the employment of all multi-domain capabilities across the operational
framework. This is just one of the many lessons that the Battle of Vimy
Ridge oers present day military professionals. As the US Army reorients
its doctrine toward the conduct of large-scale combat operations to pre-
vent peer and near-peer adversaries from gaining positions of strategic ad-
vantage, it is highly recommended that military professionals of all ranks
study and analyze how the Canadian Corps, operating as a small national
army, prepared for and successfully accomplished its assigned mission of
capturing Vimy Ridge in 1917.
199
Notes
1. Albert Palazzo, “The British Army’s Counter-Battery Sta Oce and
Control of the Enemy in World War I,” Journal of Military History 63, Issue 1,
1999, 55–74.
2. Tim Cook, “The Gunners at Vimy,” in Vimy Ridge: A Canadian Reas-
sessment, eds. Georey Hayes, Andrew Iarocci, and Mike Bechthold, (Waterloo,
Canada: Laurier Centre for Military Strategic and Disarmament Studies and
Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 2007), 110.
3. David T. Zabecki, “Vimy Ridge, France,” Military History Magazine 27,
no. 2, July 2010, 76.
4. Tim Cook, Vimy: The Battle and the Legend, (Toronto: Penguin Random
House Canada Limited, 2018), 147–149. See also Mike Chappell, The Canadian
Army at War (Oxford, UK: Osprey Publishing Ltd., 1985), 14–15; Brenda Ralph
Lewis, “Vimy Ridge 1917,” War Monthly 19, September 1975, 26–33.
5. Desmond Morton, as quoted in Edward Humphreys Great Canadian
Battles: Heroism and Courage through the Years, (London: Arcturus Publishing
Limited, 2008), 304.
6. Zabecki, “Vimy Ridge, France,” 76.
7. Alexander Turner, Vimy Ridge 1917: Byng’s Canadians Triumph at Arras
(Oxford: Osprey Publishing Ltd., 2005), 24–25.
8. Alexander Turner, Vimy Ridge 1917: Byng’s Canadians, 24–25.
9. Andrew Iarocci, in Vimy Ridge: A Canadian Reassessment, 159.
10. Paddy Grith, ed. British Fighting Methods in the Great War (London:
Frank Cass & Co. Ltd., 1996), 29.
11. Grith, 31–35.
12. Grith, 31–35.
13. Grith, 34.
14. David T. Zabecki, Steel Wind: Colonel Georg Bruchmuller and the Birth
of Modern Artillery (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 1994), 6.
15. Zabecki, 115.
16. Cook, “The Gunners at Vimy,” 109.
17. Georey Hayes, “3rd Canadian Division,” in Vimy Ridge: A Canadian
Reassessment, 201.
18. Bill Rawlings, Surviving Trench Warfare: Technology and the Canadian
Corps, 1914–1918 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1992), 120.
19. Library and Archives Canada, War Diaries, RG9-III-D-3, volume 4862,
le number 168, “War Diaries—4th Canadian Division, General Sta,” 144,
accessed 9 March 2018.
20. Tim Cook, No Place to Run: The Canadian Corps and Gas Warfare in
the First World War (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1999), 109. See also Alexander
McKee, The Battle of Vimy Ridge, (Toronto: The Ryerson Press, 1966), 137.
21. Alexander Turner, Vimy Ridge 1917: Byng’s Canadians, 79–80.
22. Cook, No Place to Run: The Canadian Corps and Gas Warfare in the
First World War, 112.
200
23. Cook, 112.
24. Jack Sheldon, The German Army on Vimy Ridge 1914–1917 (London:
Pen & Sword Books Ltd., 2008), 299.
25. Michael Krawchuk, Wall of Fire: The Battle of Vimy Ridge (Calgary:
Detselig Enterprises Ltd.), 330.
26. Library and Archives Canada, War Diaries, RG9-III-D-3, volume 4871,
le number 206, “War Diaries, 2nd Canadian Infantry Brigade,” 5, accessed 9
March 2018.
27. Library and Archives Canada, War Diaries, RG9-III-D-3, volume 4862,
le number 168, “War Diaries - 4th Canadian Division, General Sta,” 143,
accessed 10 March 2018.
28. Library and Archives Canada, War Diaries, RG9-III-D-3, volume 4862,
le number 168, “War Diaries - 4th Canadian Division, General Sta,” 143,
accessed 10 March 2018.
29. Library and Archives Canada, War Diaries, RG9-III-D-3, volume 4871,
le number 206, “War Diaries, 2nd Canadian Infantry Brigade,” pg155, accessed
10 March 2018.
30. Turner, Vimy Ridge 1917: Byng’s Canadians, 36.
31. General Sir Martin Farndale, History of the Royal Regiment of Artillery:
Western Front 1914-18, (Dorchester, UK: The Dorset Press, 1986), 186.
32. Palazzo, “The British Army’s Counter-Battery Sta,” 55–74.
33.. McKee, The Battle of Vimy Ridge, 79.
34. Palazzo, “The British Army’s Counter-Battery Sta,” 55–74.
35. Pierre Berton, Vimy (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Limited, 1986),
109–11.
36. Michael Krawchuk, Wall of Fire: The Battle of Vimy Ridge (Calgary:
Detselig Enterprises Ltd., 2009), 220.
37. Cook, Vimy: The Battle and the Legend, 45.
38. Lieutenant Colonel Andrew G.L. McNaughton was an advocate for the
development of advanced gunnery techniques within the Canadian Field Artil-
lery (CFA) throughout the war. He analyzed the wear on gun barrels, muzzle ve-
locity, the eects of weather on artillery rounds once they left the tube and was a
major advocate for sound-ranging and ash spotting of enemy artillery. Accord-
ing to Pierre Berton, one of Canada’s most renowned historians, McNaughton
was considered by the British, French and German’s as the best artillery ocer
in the BEF. In the Second World War he commanded the 1st Canadian Divi-
sion, 1939-1940; the Canadian Corps, 1940–1942 and the First Canadian Army,
1942–1943.
39. Cook, “The Gunners at Vimy,” 111.
40. Bill Rawlings, Surviving Trench Warfare, 111.
41. Palazzo, “The British Army’s Counter-Battery Sta,” 55–74.
42. Berton, Vimy, 110–11.
43. Berton, 110–11.
44. Berton, 165–66.
45. McKee, The Battle of Vimy Ridge, 53.
201
46. Farndale, History of the Royal Regiment of Artillery, 175.
47. Turner, Vimy Ridge 1917: Byng’s Canadians, 44–45.
48. Farndale, History of the Royal Regiment of Artillery, 175.
49. Farndale, 175.
50. Turner, Vimy Ridge 1917: Byng’s Canadians, 46.
51. Turner, 47.
52. Turner, 48.
53. Turner, 42–43.
54. Berton, Vimy, 183.
55. Lewis, “Vimy Ridge 1917,” 28.
56. Farndale, History of the Royal Regiment of Artillery, 175.
57. Farndale, 175–76. See also Stephen Bull, Canadian Corps Soldier
versus Royal Bavarian Soldier: Vimy Ridge to Passchendaele, 1917 (Oxford:
Osprey Publishing, 2017), 33.
58. Turner, Vimy Ridge 1917: Byng’s Canadians, 47.
59. Library and Archives Canada, War Diaries, RG9-III-D-3, volume 4957,
le number 503, “War Diaries, General Ocer Commanding, Royal Artillery,
Canadian Corps,” 169, accessed 11 March 2018.
60. Rawlings, Surviving Trench Warfare, 111.
61. Palazzo, “The British Army’s Counter-Battery Sta,” 55–74.
62. Bull, Canadian Corps Soldier versus Royal Bavarian Soldier, 13–18.
By 1916 each infantry battalion had 16 Lewis guns, with one Lewis in each
platoon. By 1918 each battalion would have 36, two per platoon plus four held
at battalion headquarters to serve in the anti-aircraft role.
63. Rawlings, Surviving Trench Warfare, 81.
64. Turner, Vimy Ridge 1917: Byng’s Canadians, 37–38.
65.Library and Archives Canada, War Diaries, RG9-III-D-3, volume 4862,
le number 168, “War Diaries—4th Canadian Division, General Sta,” 140,
accessed 12 March 2018.
66. Turner, Vimy Ridge 1917: Byng’s Canadians, 39.
67. Library and Archives Canada, War Diaries, RG9-III-D-3, volume 5070,
“War Diaries, 5th Division-Miscellaneous,” 23, accessed 12 March 2018.
68. David Campbell, “The 2nd Canadian Division,” in Vimy Ridge: A Cana-
dian Reassessment, 184.
69. Rene Chartrand, The Canadian Corps in World War I (Oxford: Osprey
Publishing Ltd., 2007), 20.
70. Humphreys, Great Canadian Battles, 310–11.
71. Humphreys, 311. See also Cook, Vimy: The Battle and the Legend, 123.
72. Mike Chappell, The Canadian Army at War (Oxford, UK: Osprey Pub-
lishing Ltd., 1985), 15.
203
Chapter 11
The Future of Fires: Dominating in Large-Scale Combat
Operations
Major General Wilson A. Shoner and
Colonel Christopher D. Compton
Success in large-scale combat operations (LSCO) is dependent on the
Army’s ability to ght with res. The Army’s long and storied past pro-
vides rich examples—several of which are highlighted in this volume—of
the successful application of res in LSCO. As the Army prepares to de-
feat technologically advanced peer and near-peer threats capable of chal-
lenging US forces in all domains, the ability to ght with res will be just
as critical to success in the future as it was in previous conicts. Army
res must be organized and equipped in a way that maximizes the timely,
accurate integration and employment of cross-domain res throughout the
depth of an increasingly lethal, expanded battlespace.
As history has shown, ghting with res is inextricably linked to ma-
neuver. The ability to integrate res and maneuver is essential to success in
future large-scale combat; we will not dominate our adversaries if we only
do one and not the other. The Army’s recently published “Functional Con-
cept for Fires 2020-2040” (TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-4) is a foundational
document for developing future res capabilities. The concept addresses
this relationship in the opening lines of the document: “The principle role of
res is to enable freedom of maneuver, while maneuver forces compel the
enemy to concentrate when they place something of value at risk.”
1
Over the
past two decades, potential adversaries have invested heavily in long-range
res and integrated air defense systems (IADS)—making it even more crit
-
ical that the US Army possess the ability to maneuver and deliver res in
depth. Solving this dilemma requires building a res force capable of pen
-
etrating the enemy’s Integrated Air Defenses and destroying the res-strike
complex from stando ranges. To that end, land-based res must be capable
of power projection across all domains, achieve overmatch for Army forces
in close combat, and ensure joint force freedom of maneuver.
2
Required Capabilities for the Future
Creating a res force with the capacity, range, and lethality to achieve
overmatch in multi-domain operations (formerly multi-domain battle) re-
quires a shift in current res force organization, capability, and employment.
Peer adversaries already employ a res-strike complex with long-range res
204
as well as integrated sensor networks along with counter-rocket, artillery,
mortar and air defense systems designed to oset the maneuver and tech-
nological advantages of US forces. To face the increasingly lethal threats of
today and tomorrow, the Army requires a formidable res complex capable
of delivering precise, responsive, eective, and multifunctional res against
targets in all domains (land, air, maritime, space, cyberspace) and at all
echelons (tactical, operational, strategic). This requires both reinvesting in
and developing new ground-based res capabilities as well as reorganizing
Army res forces, especially in echelons above brigade (EAB).
The newly formed Cross-Functional Teams (CFTs) for long-range
precision res (LRPF) and air missile defense (AMD) will increase both
range and lethality in res platforms and munitions. The main role of
the CFTs is to accelerate the development of the most critical capabili-
ties needed for the future and get those capabilities into the hands of the
warghter as soon as possible. But material solutions only solve part of
the problem. Equally important is the force structure required to integrate
and employ those capabilities on the battleeld. Analysis to determine the
optimal res force structure is occurring through the development of Op-
erational and Organizational (O&O) concepts that merge future material
solutions with robust mission command for integrating and employing
cross-domain res at echelon.
How We Got Here: AirLand Battle to Modularity
The starting point for this modernization eort involves at least a cur-
sory review of the past. Historically, the great strength of Army res was
the ability to deliver timely and accurate massed res with Field Artillery
(FA) and provide protection of critical assets with Air Defense Artillery
(ADA) throughout the depth of the battleeld to enable maneuver and
set conditions for victory. Army res units assigned to formations at all
echelons—supported by joint enablers—formed the necessary structure to
ght with res and win. Success depended upon the right capability and
the right organizations.
The res force from World War II through Operation Desert Storm
was organized to ght and win against peer and near-peer adversaries.
The Army invested heavily in FA and ADA in the 1970s through 1990s to
optimize for large-scale combat. The Army had tactical, operational, and
strategic res capability that ranged the depth of the battleeld to counter
peer adversary air and ground capabilities. The Army organized eective-
ly at echelon to deliver accurate massed res as well as create integrated
205
layers and redundancies of air defense to maximize capability and lethality
against a threat with superior numbers.
The post-Cold War operational environment drove the Army to its cur-
rent structure, characterized by the term modularity. Today’s army maxi-
mizes the readiness and lethality of the brigade combat team (BCT) along
with interoperable, rapidly deployable division and corps headquarters
capable of providing mission command of multiple BCTs and supporting
units or serving as a joint task force for a range of military operations. While
this transition meant an overall reduction in res capacity—especially at
echelons above BCT—advancements in target acquisition and precision
munitions coupled with signicant improvements in joint integration have
made today’s res force a lethal and highly eective arm of the US Army.
Fires in MDO: Optimizing for the Future Fight
While the past provides a useful reference point for determining the
right capability and organizations, re-optimizing for LSCO today requires
adapting to an operational environment (OE) where the US military will
be contested in all domains as well as in the information environment.
This emerging OE is the driving force behind the Army’s Multi-Domain
Operations (MDO) concept and is redening how the Army will employ
res on the future battleeld.
Threat anti-access/area denial strategies (A2AD) capabilities may
challenge our ability to maintain air and maritime dominance throughout
all phases of conict, creating the need to establish temporary windows
of advantage across multiple domains in time and space to enable joint
force operations. To that end, Army res forces must be structured to em-
ploy eective cross-domain res, that is, capable of employing lethal and
non-lethal eects across all domains to create multiple dilemmas for an
adversary and enable joint Force operations.
The seamless integration and synchronization of cross-domain res
throughout the depth of an expanded and contested battleeld will require
tailored res capacity at each echelon with the right mix of capability and
leadership to provide precise and responsive res. While echelon require-
ments are dierent, each requires certain organic lethal and non-lethal de-
livery capability, enhanced sensor-to-shooter linkages, and the ability to
conduct cross-domain targeting and re control using an integrated re
control network. The following analysis examines how the Army that is
optimized for LSCO could employ cross-domain res capability at the
tactical, operational, and strategic levels.
206
Tactical Cross-Domain Fires: Supporting the Close Fight
The BCT continues to be the primary ground maneuver force designed
to close with and destroy enemy forces, largely enabled by cross-domain
res. Lethal res delivered by an assigned FA battalion equipped with the
soon-to-be-elded extended-range cannon artillery (ERCA) and Short-
Range Air Defense (SHORAD) will provide the BCT the ability to shape
the close ght and protect maneuver forces while maneuvering in the close
area. The brigade res cell must have the ability to provide the BCT com-
mander with timely access to both see and strike in all domains, including
space and cyberspace. While the BCT must be able to internally integrate
cross-domain res, success in LSCO will depend heavily on eective
shaping operations from EAB formations.
In order to shape for BCTs, divisions must be capable of integrating
and employing cross-domain res beyond the range of the BCT’s cannon
artillery. To optimize for LSCO, the division requires a res organization
that can plan for and employ deep shaping res as well as protect the di-
vision’s maneuver forces and critical command and control (C2) nodes.
In addition to integrating res, this organization should have the ability to
provide mission command of assigned long-range rockets, SHORAD, and
other res capability that provide the division with increased exibility
and lethality to support BCT operations in the close area and provide the
division commander options for weighting the main eort.
The division must retain the advantages of the current Joint Air-Ground
Integration Center (JAGIC), but must expand this proven capability to
be fully cross-domain by incorporating cyber electro-magnetic activities
(CEMA), air defense and air management (ADAM), and information op-
erations (IO). Additionally, given the division’s increased long-range res
capability coupled with a growing demand for engaging targets at greater
ranges, a division will require improved ISR that is capable of both accu-
rately locating and rapidly engaging targets in the division’s deep area.
Operational Fires: Shaping the Deep Area
The employment of ground-based operational res is perhaps the most
critical requirement for the Army to optimize for LSCO because it directly
counters the enemy’s strength—the long-range res and IADS complex.
At the corps level, eective multi-domain convergence includes employ-
ing the lethal res capability of FA rockets and missiles and protective
air missile defense capability along with non-lethal res capability from
intelligence, cyberspace, electronic-warfare, and space (ICEWS). These
capabilities allow a Corps to be fully capable of executing core opera-
207
tional res requirements such as Joint Suppression of Enemy Air Defense
(J-SEAD), operational strike, and shore-to-ship res through enhance sen-
sor-to-shooter linkages over an integrated res network.
Like the division, res at this level must be well-integrated and syn-
chronized through operational targeting and re planning. To support the
Corps as a joint task force (JTF), res formations must be organized to
maximize interoperability with Joint, Interagency, and Multi-National
(JIM) partners. Conceptually, these capabilities give a corps headquarters
what it does not have today—a force res headquarters with the ability
to engage the enemy beyond the re support coordination line (FSCL)
at ranges well beyond current rocket and missile capabilities. The robust
cross-domain res capability, including the integrating functions residing
within the headquarters, will provide a corps or JTF commander with true
operational reach to strike peer adversaries attempting to engage US forc-
es from stando ranges.
Strategic Land-Based Fires: Enabling the Theater Army
The Army requires a strategic ground-based res capability as well as
a Theater Fires Command capable of integrating cross-domain res at the
theater or regional combatant command level. Expanding the Army Air
Missile Defense Command (AAMDC) and the Battleeld Coordination
Detachment (BCD) force structure into a single theater enabling command
with strategic attack capability would help optimize the Army for LSCO
and provide signicant shaping capability for the joint force commander.
The most notable addition to this concept is the inclusion of strategic
surface-to-surface res capable of striking targets beyond operational dis-
tances. Conceptually, this unit could be equipped with munitions capable
of providing additional support to corps/JTF operations or striking targets
in support of the joint force with long-range precision strike capability.
This deep strike capability—coupled with air and missile defense units
equipped with THAAD and Patriot launchers to provide protection for
strategic nodes in the theater—the Theater Army would have fully inte-
grated surface-to-surface and surface-to-air capability.
Another unique capability that has both strategic and operational im-
plications is the development of the multi-domain task force (MDTF).
This formation is designed specically to counter threat A2AD strate-
gies by opening windows of advantage for joint force exploitation. The
MDTF’s ability to position forward in theater during the competition
period and protect critical nodes early in operational phases of conict
provides increased decision space for the joint force commander, exibil-
208
ity to address emerging threats with massed cross-domain res, and the
capability required to prevent sequential threat escalation activities. The
MDTF’s ability to employ cross-domain res to disrupt and destroy threat
formations prior to their interdiction of the joint force sets the conditions
for follow-on operations and campaigns. In addition, the MDTF provides
the Army with the ability to experiment with dierent concepts in the em-
ployment of ICEWS capabilities.
Conclusion
Optimizing for LSCO against emerging peer and near-peer threats re-
quires a force capable of employing precise, responsive, and multi-func-
tional cross-domain res throughout the depth of the battleeld. The Army
is no stranger to LSCO and has—throughout its history—risen to meet the
challenges posed by peer and near-peer threats of the past. As the Army
adapts to the current and future operational environment, developing a
capable res force that meets the challenging demands of our most capa-
ble adversaries is a critical component to the solution. By building on our
knowledge of the past, expanding on the advancements in the current res
force, and adapting to the changing demands of the emerging operational
environment, the Army can once again regain the technological and orga-
nizational advantage required to ght and win in LSCO.
Fighting with res on the future battleeld is not an option. As such,
the Army must not only continue its pursuit of material solutions in long-
range res and air defense to improve range and lethality but must also
build the right force structure at each echelon to integrate and employ
cross-domain res throughout the depth of the battleeld. Future large-
scale combat requires the return of the Fires to a position of dominance on
the battleeld, but it must be coupled with the integration of multi-domain
capability that creates multiple dilemmas for the enemy and enable friend-
ly freedom of maneuver.
209
Notes
1. Department of the Army, TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-4, “The US Army
Functional Concept for Fires 2020-2040,” February 2017, iii.
2.Department of the Army, TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-4, iii.
211
About the Authors
G. Kirk Alexander
Lieutenant Colonel G. Kirk Alexander is an active-duty eld artil-
lery ocer and serves as the Battalion Commander for 1st Battalion, 31st
Field Artillery, Basic Combat Training at Fort Sill, Oklahoma. He earned
an MA from Webster University and a Master’s in Military Art and Sci-
ence from the US Army Command and General Sta College’s School
of Advanced Military Studies. His assignments include three combat de
-
ployments to the Middle East while supporting Operation Enduring Free-
dom and Operation Iraqi Freedom.
Joe R. Bailey
Joe R. Bailey is the Assistant Command Historian for the US Army
Combined Arms Center and Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. He earned a BS
in History, an MA in Military History from Austin Peay State Universi-
ty, and a PhD in American History from Kansas State University. He is
the co-general editor of Essential to Success: Historical Case Studies in
the Art of Command at Echelons Above Brigade (Fort Leavenworth, KS:
Army University Press, 2017). His research areas include American Mili-
tary History and History and Memory.
Thomas G. Bradbeer
Lieutenant Colonel (Retired) Thomas G. Bradbeer is the Major Gen-
eral Fox Conner Chair of Leadership Studies for the US Army Command
and General Sta College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. He earned a BA
in History from the University of Akron, Master’s in Adult Education from
the University of Saint Mary and in Military Art and Science from the US
Army Command and General Sta College, and a PhD in History from
the University of Kansas. His chapter on General Matthew B. Ridgway
appeared in The Art of Command: Military Leadership from George Wash-
ington to Colin Powell, 2nd ed. (Lexington, KY: University of Kentucky
Press, 2017) and his Spring 2010 Army History article “General Cota and
the Battle of the Hurtgen Forest: A Failure of Battle Command?” received
the Army Historical Foundation Distinguished Writing Award in 2010.
His research areas include Air Warfare—specically the First and Second
World Wars, the British Army in the 20th Century, and the Korean War.
Mark T. Calhoun
Lieutenant Colonel (Retired) Mark T. Calhoun is an Associate Profes-
sor at the US Army School of Advanced Military Studies at Fort Leaven-
212
worth, Kansas. He earned a BS in Chemistry from the University of Lou-
isiana at Lafayette; a Master’s in Military Art and Science from the US
Army Command and General Sta College’s School of Advanced Military
Studies and a PhD in History from the University of Kansas in 2012. His
published works include Lesley J. McNair: Unsung Architect of the U.S.
Army (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2015), the rst compre-
hensive biography of General Lesley J. McNair. He also wrote a chapter in
Unifying Themes in Complex Systems, Volume V (New York City: Springer
Press, 2011), “Clausewitz and Jomini: Contrasting Intellectual Traditions in
Military Theory” in the Summer 2011 Army History, and various encyclo
-
pedia entries and book reviews. His research centers on the US Army during
the interwar period and World War II.
Christopher D. Compton
Colonel Christopher D. Compton is the Chief of Concepts Develop-
ment Division, Fires Center of Excellence at Fort Sill, Oklahoma. He has
Master’s degrees in Public Administration from the University of Okla-
homa, in Strategic Studies from the Army War College, and in National
Security and Strategic Studies from the Naval War College. He had two
combat deployments in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom. His recent
assignments include Deputy Chief of Sta, US Army Central; Chief of
Fires, 25th Infantry Division; and Commander of 2nd Battalion, 2nd Field
Artillery. He is co-author of “The Fires Complex: Organizing to Win in
Large-Scale Combat Operations,” Fires Journal, May 2018; “Confronting
Conict in the Gray Zone,” Breaking Defense, June 2016; “Gray Zone:
Why We’re Losing the New Era of National Security,” Defense One, June
2016, and “Outplayed: Regaining Strategic Initiative in the Gray Zone,”
Strategic Studies Institute, June 2016.
Boyd L. Dastrup
Boyd L. Dastrup received his PhD from Kansas State University in
1980 and is currently the US Army Field Artillery School Historian. He
is the author of numerous books, including The U.S. Army Command and
General Sta College: A Centennial History (1982), Crusade in Nurem-
berg: Military Occupation, 1945–1949 (1985), King of Battle: A Branch
History of the U.S. Army’s Field Artillery (1992, 1993), Modernizing the
King of Battle: 1973–1991 (1994, 2003), The Field Artillery: History and
Sourcebook (1994), Cedat Fortuna Peritis: A History of the Field Artillery
School (2011), and Artillery Strong: Modernizing the Field Artillery for
the 21st Century (2018). He has also served as a subject matter expert
213
for the History Channel on “Dangerous Missions: Forward Observation”
(2001) and for the Discovery Channel on “Artillery Strikes” (2005).
Mark E. Grotelueschen
A 1991 graduate of the US Air Force Academy (USAFA), Lieutenant
Colonel (USAF-Retired) Mark E. Grotelueschen teaches in the Acade-
my’s Department of Military and Strategic Studies. He previously served
as Professor of History at USAFA. He received an MA from the Univer-
sity of Calgary and a PhD from Texas A&M University. He is the author
of Doctrine Under Trial: American Artillery Employment in World War I
(2000); The AEF Way of War: The American Army and Combat in World
War I (2007), which has been named repeatedly to the US Army Chief
of Sta’s Professional Reading List; and Into the Fight: April–June 1918
(2018), a volume in the US Army Center of Military History’s World War
I commemoration series.
David M. Rodriguez
General (Retired) David M. “Rod” Rodriguez is a 1976 graduate
of the United States Military Academy at West Point. In his last assign-
ment, he was Commander, Joint Task Force-82 in Afghanistan. His most
recent commands included Commander of the US Africa Command
(2013–2016); Commanding General of the US Army Forces Command
(2011–2013); Commander, International Security Assistance Force Joint
Command (IJC), and Deputy Commander, US Forces–Afghanistan (US-
FOR-A) from 2009–2011. He also commanded the 82nd Airborne Di-
vision; the 2nd Brigade, 82nd Airborne Division; and the 2d Battalion,
502nd Infantry Regiment, 101st Airborne Division. Rodriguez’s extensive
combat experience included G-3 Planner, XVIII Airborne Corps, Opera-
tion Just Cause, 1989–1990; Operations Ocer, 1st Battalion, 505th Para-
chute Infantry Regiment, 82nd Airborne Division, Desert Shield/Desert
Storm, 1990–1991; Assistant Division Commander, 4th Infantry Division
(Mechanized), 2002– 2003; Commander, Multi-National Division–North-
west, 2005; Special Assistant to the Commander, Multi-National Corps–
Iraq, 2006. He received a Master of Arts in National Security and Strategic
Studies from the US Naval War College and a Master’s of Military Art and
Science from the US Army Command and General Sta College’s School
of Advanced Military Studies in 1989.
Wilson A. “Al” Shoner
Major General Wilson A. Shoner is a 1988 graduate of the US Mili-
tary Academy at West Point, where he earned a Bachelor of Science degree
214
in International Relations. Major General Shoner’s command experience
includes B Battery, 3rd Battalion, 319th Field Artillery Regiment, 2d Bat-
talion, 319th Airborne Field Artillery Regiment, and the 18th Fires Brigade.
Operational deployments include Saudi Arabia and Iraq during Operation
Desert Shield and Desert Storm, and Afghanistan in 2003 as the Chief of
Plans, 82nd Airborne Division during Operation Enduring Freedom. From
2003–05, Major General Shoner served as the Deputy Chief of Plans for
the NATO Allied Rapid Reaction Corps. Prior to assuming command of
Fort Sill and the Fires Center of Excellence in November 2017, he served
on the Army Sta in the Pentagon as Director, Army Talent Management
Task Force, and Director of Operations, Army Rapid Capabilities Oce.
He earned a Master of Military Art and Science from the US Army Com-
mand and General Sta College’s School of Advanced Military Studies and
a Master of Arts in National Security and Strategic Studies from the Naval
War College.
David Thuell
David Thuell earned a BA in Economics from Carleton University in
1996. He has worked in the telecommunications industry and is pursuing
a Master’s degree in History at Norwich University. His primary area of
research is the Western Front, First World War.
Lincoln R. Ward
Major Lincoln R. Ward recently completed a tour of duty as a Joint
Plans Ocer, Combined Joint Task Force–Horn of Africa, in Djibouti. He
earned a BA in History from Washington State University, a Master’s of
Education from Western Kentucky University, and a Master’s in Military
Art and Science from the US Army Command and General Sta Col
-
lege’s School of Advanced Military Studies. He is a eld artillery ocer
and has served with infantry, heavy, and Stryker brigade combat teams in
Korea, Iraq, and Afghanistan.
Jerey S. Wright
Major Jerey S. Wright is assigned to the Department of Military In-
struction, US Military Academy. Previously he was Operations Ocer
for 3-16th Field Artillery, 2d Armored Brigade Combat Team, 1st Cav-
alry Division. He earned a BS in European History from the US Military
Academy, an MA in International Relations from Webster University, and
a Master’s in Military Art and Science from the US Army Command and
General Sta College’s School of Advanced Military Studies.
U.S. Army Combined Arms Center
