2016 Supervisory Scenarios for Annual Stress Tests Required under the Dodd-Frank Act Stress Testing Rules and the Capital Plan Rule, January 28, 2016

2016 Supervisory Scenarios for Annual

Stress Tests Required under the

Dodd-Frank Act Stress Testing Rules

and the Capital Plan Rule

January 28, 2016

B O A R D O F G O V E R N O R S O F T H E F E D E R A L R E S E R V E S Y S T E M

2016 Supervisory Scenarios for Annual

Stress Tests Required under the

Dodd-Frank Act Stress Testing Rules

and the Capital Plan Rule

January 28, 2016

B O A R D O F G O V E R N O R S O F T H E F E D E R A L R E S E R V E S Y S T E M

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Introduction

............................................................................................................................... 1

Supervisory Scenarios

............................................................................................................ 3

Baseline, Adverse, and Severely Adverse Scenarios ..................................................................... 3

Global Market Shock Components for Supervisory Adverse and Severely Adverse

Scenarios ........................................................................................................................... 7

Counterparty Default Component for Supervisory Adverse and Severely Adverse

Scenarios ........................................................................................................................... 8

Variables Considered in Scenarios

..................................................................................... 9

iii

Contents

Introduction

The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer

Protection Act requires the Board of Governors of

the Federal Reserve System (Board) to conduct an

annual supervisory stress test of bank holding com-

panies (BHCs) with $50 billion or greater in total

consolidated assets (large BHCs), and to require

BHCs and state member banks with total consoli-

dated assets of more than $10 billion to conduct

company-run stress tests at least once a year.

1

This publication describes the three supervisory

scenarios—baseline, adverse, and severely adverse—

that the Board will use in its supervisory stress test

for this stress test cycle; that a BHC or state member

bank must use in conducting its annual company-run

stress test; and that a large BHC must use to estimate

projected revenues, losses, reserves, and pro forma

capital levels as part of its 2016 capital plan submis-

sion.

2

The publication also details additional compo-

nents that certain BHCs will be required to incorpo-

rate into the supervisory scenarios—the global mar-

ket shock component and the counterparty default

component.

1

12 U.S.C. 5365(i).

2

See 12 CFR 252.14(b), 12 CFR 252.54(b), and 12 CFR 225.8.

1

Supervisory Scenarios

The adverse and severely adverse scenarios describe

hypothetical sets of conditions designed to assess the

strength of banking organizations and their resilience

to adverse economic environments. The baseline sce-

nario follows a similar profile to the average projec-

tions from a survey of economic forecasters. The sce-

narios are not forecasts of the Federal Reserve.

3

The scenarios start in the first quarter of 2016 and

extend through the first quarter of 2019. Each sce-

nario includes 28 variables; this set of variables is the

same as the set provided in last year’s supervisory

scenarios. The variables describing economic devel-

opments within the United States include:

•

Six measures of economic activity and prices: per-

cent changes (at an annual rate) in real and nomi-

nal gross domestic product (GDP); the unemploy-

ment rate of the civilian noninstitutional popula-

tion aged 16 years and over; percent changes (at an

annual rate) in real and nominal disposable per-

sonal income; and the percent change (at an annual

rate) in the consumer price index (CPI);

•

Four aggregate measures of asset prices or financial

conditions: indexes of house prices, commercial

property prices, equity prices, and U.S. stock mar-

ket volatility; and,

•

Six measures of interest rates: the rate on the

3-month Treasury bill; the yield on the 5-year

Treasury bond; the yield on the 10-year Treasury

bond; the yield on a 10-year BBB corporate secu-

rity; the interest rate associated with a conforming,

conventional, fixed-rate 30-year mortgage; and the

prime rate.

The variables describing international economic con-

ditions in each scenario include three variables in

four countries or country blocks:

•

The three variables for each country or country

block: the percent change (at an annual rate) in real

GDP, the percent change (at an annual rate) in the

CPI or local equivalent, and the level of the U.S.

dollar/foreign currency exchange rate.

•

The four countries or country blocks included: the

euro area (the 19 European Union member states

that have adopted the euro as their common cur-

rency), the United Kingdom, developing Asia (the

nominal GDP-weighted aggregate of China, India,

South Korea, Hong Kong Special Administrative

Region, and Taiwan), and Japan.

Baseline, Adverse, and Severely

Adverse Scenarios

The following sections describe the baseline scenario,

the adverse scenario, and the severely adverse sce-

nario. The variables included in these scenarios are

provided in tables at the end of this document. They

can also be downloaded as a spreadsheet (together

with the historical time series of the variables) from

the Board’s website, at

http://www.federalreserve.gov/

bankinforeg/dfa-stress-tests.htm

.

Baseline Scenario

The baseline outlook for U.S. real activity, inflation,

and interest rates (see

Table 1A) is similar to the

January 2016 consensus projections from Blue Chip

Economic Indicators.

4

This scenario does not repre-

sent the forecast of the Federal Reserve.

The baseline scenario for the United States is a mod-

erate economic expansion through the projection

period. Real GDP grows at an average rate of

2½ percent per year. The unemployment rate declines

to 4½ percent in the middle of 2017 and remains

near that level through the end of the scenario

period. CPI inflation rises to 2½ percent at an annual

rate by the middle of 2017 before dropping back to

3

For more on the Federal Reserve’s framework for designing sce-

narios for stress testing, see 12 CFR 252, appendix A.

4

See Wolters Kluwer Legal and Regulatory Solutions (2016),

“Blue Chip Economic Indicators,” vol. 41, no. 1 (January 10).

3

about 2 percent in the first quarter of 2018 and

remaining near that level thereafter.

Accompanying the moderate economic expansion,

Treasury yields are assumed to rise steadily across the

maturity spectrum. Short-term Treasury rates

increase from about ½ percent at the beginning of

2016 to about 2¾ percent by the beginning of 2019,

while the yields on 10-year Treasury securities rise

from 2½ percent to about 3¾ percent over the same

period. The prime rate increases in line with short-

term Treasury rates and mortgage rates rise in line

with long-term Treasury rates. Reflecting strengthen-

ing economic conditions, spreads between yields on

investment-grade corporate bonds and yields on

long-term Treasury securities narrow modestly over

the scenario period. Equity prices rise an average of

about 4¾ percent per year and equity market volatil-

ity is assumed to remain near its historical average

level. Nominal house prices rise an average of

2¾ percent per year and commercial real estate prices

rise an average of 4¼ percent per year.

The outlook for international variables (see

Table 1B)

is similar to that reported in the January 2016 Blue

Chip Economic Indicators and the International

Monetary Fund’s October 2015 World Economic

Outlook.

5

The baseline scenario features an expan-

sion in international economic activity, albeit one

that proceeds at different rates in the four countries

or country blocks under consideration. Real GDP

growth in developing Asia averages 6 percent per

year over the scenario period; real GDP growth in

the United Kingdom averages 2¼ percent per year;

and real GDP growth in the euro area and Japan

averages 1¾ percent per year and 1 percent per year,

respectively.

Adverse Scenario

The adverse scenario is characterized by weakening

economic activity across all countries or country

blocks included in the scenario. The economic down-

turn is accompanied by a period of deflation in the

United States and in the other countries and country

blocks. It is important to note that this is a hypotheti-

cal scenario designed to assess the strength of bank-

ing organizations and their resilience to adverse eco-

nomic conditions. This scenario does not represent a

forecast of the Federal Reserve.

The adverse scenario features a moderate U.S. reces-

sion that begins in the first quarter of 2016 (see

Table 2A). Real GDP in the United States falls

1¾ percent from the pre-recession peak in the fourth

quarter of 2015 to the recession trough in the first

quarter of 2017, while the unemployment rate rises

steadily, peaking at 7½ percent in the middle of 2017.

The U.S. recession is accompanied by a mild defla-

tionary period, with consumer prices falling about

½ percent over the four quarters of 2016.

Reflecting weak economic conditions and deflation-

ary pressures, short-term interest rates in the United

States remain near zero over the projection period.

The 10-year Treasury yield declines to 1¼ percent in

early 2016 before rising gradually thereafter to 3 per-

cent in the first quarter of 2019. Financial conditions

tighten for corporations and households during the

recession, with spreads between investment-grade

corporate bond yields and 10-year Treasury yields

and spreads between mortgage rates and 10-year

Treasury yields widening through the end of 2016.

Asset prices decline in the adverse scenario. Equity

prices fall approximately 25 percent through the

fourth quarter of 2016, accompanied by a moderate

rise in equity market volatility. Aggregate house

prices and commercial real estate prices experience

moderate declines; commercial real estate prices fall

12 percent through the third quarter of 2017 and

house prices fall 12 percent through the third quarter

of 2018.

Following the end of the recession in the United

States, real activity picks up slowly at first and then

gains speed; real U.S. GDP growth rises from 1¼ per-

cent at an annual rate in the second quarter of

2017 to 3 percent at an annual rate by the middle of

2018. The unemployment rate declines modestly, to

about 7 percent by the end of the scenario period.

Consumer prices begin to rise slowly in the first quar-

ter of 2017 and inflation remains subdued through

the end of the scenario window. Consumer price

inflation reaches 1¾ percent at an annual rate in the

first quarter of 2019.

Outside of the United States, the adverse scenario

features moderate recessions in the euro area, the

United Kingdom, and Japan, as well as below-trend

growth in developing Asia (see

Table 2B). Weakness

in global demand results in deflation across all of the

foreign economies under consideration as well as a

broad-based decline in commodity prices. Headline

consumer prices decline modestly through the end of

5

See International Monetary Fund (2015), "World Economic

Outlook,"

www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2015/02.

4 Federal Reserve Supervisory Scenarios

2016 in the euro area and the United Kingdom, and

decline through the middle of 2017 in developing

Asia. Japan experiences a sharper and more pro-

longed deflationary period, with prices falling

through the second quarter of 2018. The U.S. dollar

appreciates relative to the currencies of the countries

and country blocks under consideration, reflecting

flight-to-safety capital flows; the dollar appreciates

most strongly against the euro and the currencies of

developing Asia.

Comparison of 2015 Adverse Scenario and

2016 Adverse Scenario

The main difference relative to the 2015 adverse sce-

nario is that this year’s adverse scenario features a

decline in the CPI—i.e., deflation—in the United

States. Deflation in the euro area and Japan was fea-

tured as a component of the 2015 adverse scenario,

but that scenario also featured a considerable rise in

headline U.S. inflation. In this year’s adverse sce-

nario, U.S. deflation implies substantially different

paths of U.S. Treasury yields relative to the paths in

last year’s scenario. In this year’s scenario, the yield

curve is lower and initially flatter than under baseline

assumptions, but then steepens over the scenario

period. In last year’s scenario, by contrast, the yield

curve was higher and flatter than under baseline

assumptions.

Compared with the 2015 adverse scenario, the period

of U.S. deflation that is featured in the 2016 adverse

scenario may be expected to reduce nominal house-

hold income growth and raise real effective interest

rates. These are conditions that may be expected to

reduce loan repayments and increase credit losses.

The lower path of Treasury rates may be expected to

reduce pre-provision net revenue (PPNR), largely

through reduced net interest income. However, in

addition to these scenario changes, the Federal

Reserve’s supervisory stress test projections will also

reflect changes in the structure, business focus, and

recent performance of the BHCs participating in the

exercise.

Additional Key Features of the Adverse

Scenario

As in last year’s adverse scenario, the slowdown in

euro area economic activity should be interpreted as

a broad-based contraction in euro area demand, not

as a contraction that is concentrated in a few specific

economies. In addition, the slowdown in developing

Asia should be interpreted as a weakening in eco-

nomic conditions across emerging market economies

and not merely as a weakening in Asia-specific condi-

tions. Declines in aggregate U.S. real estate prices

should be assumed to be concentrated in regions that

have experienced rapid price gains over the past sev-

eral years. Declines in prices of U.S. housing and

commercial real estate should also be assumed to be

representative of risks to house prices and commer-

cial real estate prices in foreign regions and econo-

mies that have experienced rapid price gains over the

past several years.

Severely Adverse Scenario

The severely adverse scenario is characterized by a

severe global recession, accompanied by a period of

heightened corporate financial stress and negative

yields for short-term U.S. Treasury securities. It is

important to note that this is a hypothetical scenario

designed to assess the strength of banking organiza-

tions and their resilience to unfavorable economic

conditions. This scenario does not represent a fore-

cast of the Federal Reserve.

In this scenario, the level of U.S. real GDP begins to

decline in the first quarter of 2016 and reaches a

trough in the first quarter of 2017 that is 6¼ percent

below the pre-recession peak (see

Table 3A). The

unemployment rate increases by 5 percentage points,

to 10 percent, by the middle of 2017 and headline

consumer price inflation rises from about ¼ percent

at an annual rate in the first quarter of 2016 to about

1¼ percent at an annual rate by the end of the

recession.

Asset prices drop sharply in the scenario, consistent

with the developments described above. Equity prices

fall approximately 50 percent through the end of

2016, accompanied by a surge in equity market vola-

tility, which approaches the levels attained in 2008.

House prices and commercial real estate prices also

experience considerable declines, with house prices

dropping 25 percent through the third quarter of

2018 and commercial real estate prices falling 30 per-

cent through the second quarter of 2018. Corporate

financial conditions are stressed severely, reflecting

mounting credit losses, heightened investor risk aver-

sion, and strained market liquidity conditions; the

spread between yields on investment-grade corporate

bonds and yields on long-term Treasury securities

increases to 5¾ percent by the end of 2016.

As a result of the severe decline in real activity and

subdued inflation, short-term Treasury rates fall to

January 28, 2016 5

negative ½ percent by mid-2016 and remain at that

level through the end of the scenario. For the pur-

poses of this scenario, it is assumed that the adjust-

ment to negative short-term interest rates proceeds

with no additional financial market disruptions. The

10-year Treasury yield drops to about ¼ percent in

the first quarter of 2016, rising gradually thereafter

to reach about ¾ percent by the end of the recession

in early 2017 and about 1¾ percent by the first quar-

ter of 2019.

The international component of this scenario fea-

tures severe recessions in the euro area, the United

Kingdom, and Japan, and a mild recession in devel-

oping Asia (see

Table 3B). As a result of acute eco-

nomic weakness, all foreign economies included in

the scenario experience a pronounced decline in con-

sumer prices. Reflecting flight-to-safety capital flows

during weak economic conditions, the U.S. dollar is

assumed to appreciate against the euro, the pound

sterling, and the currencies of developing Asia. The

dollar is assumed to depreciate modestly against the

yen, also in line with flight-to-safety capital flows.

Comparison of 2015 Severely Adverse

Scenario and 2016 Severely Adverse Scenario

This year’s severely adverse scenario features a more

severe downturn in the U.S. economy as compared to

last year’s scenario. This increase in severity reflects

the Federal Reserve’s scenario design framework for

stress testing, which includes countercyclical ele-

ments.

6

Under this framework, the unemployment

rate in the severely adverse scenario will reach a peak

of at least 10 percent, which leads to a progressively

greater increase in the unemployment rate if the

starting unemployment rate is below 6 percent. In

line with the more severe U.S. recession, this year’s

severely adverse scenario also features a path of

negative short-term U.S. Treasury rates. Further-

more, this year’s scenario does not feature the pro-

nounced increase in inflation that was featured in last

year’s scenario.

Compared with the 2015 severely adverse scenario,

weaker economic conditions in the 2016 severely

adverse scenario may be expected to result in higher

credit losses on a wide range of loans and securities.

Lower interest rates on Treasury securities suggest

larger gains on the existing portfolio of these securi-

ties. Negative short-term interest rates may be

expected to reduce banks’ net interest margins and

ultimately, to lower PPNR. However, in addition to

these scenario changes, the Federal Reserve’s supervi-

sory stress test projections will also reflect changes in

the structure, business focus, and recent performance

of the BHCs participating in the exercise.

Additional Key Features of the Severely

Adverse Scenario

As in the adverse scenario, the weakness in euro area

economic conditions should be interpreted as a

broad-based contraction in euro area demand,

although the impact of this contraction should be

assumed to be more protracted in countries with little

room for fiscal policy intervention. The sharp slow-

down in developing Asia is distributed unevenly

across countries, with decelerations more pronounced

in the larger economies. Economic conditions in

developing Asia should be assumed to be representa-

tive of conditions across emerging market economies.

In Europe as well as in emerging markets, the eco-

nomic downturn heightens investor concerns about

credit risk for countries with high levels of public

debt. Spreads on credit default swaps for these coun-

tries increase by magnitudes in line with those experi-

enced by Italy, Portugal, and Spain during 2011 and

by emerging markets in 2008.

Declines in aggregate U.S. commercial and residential

real estate prices should be assumed to be concen-

trated in regions that have experienced rapid price

gains over the past several years. Declines in prices of

U.S. housing and commercial real estate should also

be assumed to be representative of risks to house

prices and commercial real estate prices in foreign

regions and economies, particularly where real estate

prices have been growing at a fast clip. Domestically,

credit losses on commercial real estate loans backing

commercial mortgage-backed securities are greater

than would be expected given the general economic

and financial stress in the scenario, prompting wide-

spread investor pull-back. Spreads on commercial

mortgage-backed securities widen to attain the same

peaks reached in the 2007–2009 recession.

6

See 12 CFR 252, appendix A.

6 Federal Reserve Supervisory Scenarios

Global Market Shock Components

for Supervisory Adverse and Severely

Adverse Scenarios

The global market shock is a set of instantaneous,

hypothetical shocks to a large set of risk factors.

Generally, these shocks involve large and sudden

changes in asset prices, interest rates, and spreads,

reflecting general market distress and heightened

uncertainty.

7

BHCs with significant trading activity

will be required to include the global market shock as

part of their supervisory adverse and severely adverse

scenarios.

8

In addition, as discussed below, certain

large and highly interconnected BHCs must apply the

same global market shock to their counterparty

exposures to project losses under the counterparty

default scenario component.

The as-of date for the global market shock is Janu-

ary 4, 2016.

9

2016 Severely Adverse Scenario

The severely adverse scenario’s global market shock

is designed around three main elements: a sudden

sharp increase in general risk premiums and credit

risk; significant market illiquidity; and the distress of

one or more large entities that rapidly sell a variety of

assets into an already fragile market. Liquidity dete-

rioration is most severe in those asset markets that

are typically less liquid, such as corporate debt and

private equity markets, and is less pronounced in

those markets that are typically more liquid such as

publicly traded equity and U.S. Treasury markets.

Markets facing a significant deterioration in liquidity

experience conditions that are generally comparable

to the peak-to-trough changes in asset valuations

during the 2007–2009 period. The severity of dete-

rioration reflects the market conditions that could

occur in the event of a significant pullback in market

liquidity in which market participants are less able to

engage in market transactions that could offset and

moderate the price dislocations. Declines in markets

less affected by the deterioration in liquidity condi-

tions are generally comparable to those experienced

in the second half of 2008.

Worsening liquidity also leads prices of related assets

that would ordinarily be expected to move together

to diverge markedly. In particular, the valuation of

certain cash market securities and their derivative

counterparts—so-called basis spreads—fail to move

together because the normal market mechanics that

would ordinarily result in small pricing differentials

are impeded by a lack of market liquidity. Notably,

option-adjusted spreads on agency mortgage-backed

securities (MBS) increase significantly. Illiquidity

driven dislocations between the cash and to-be-

announced (TBA) forward markets result in larger

increases in the option adjusted spreads on securities

than in the TBA market. Similarly, relationships

between the prices of other financial assets that

would normally be expected to move together come

under pressure and are weakened. As a result, certain

hedging strategies are less effective and resulting

losses are larger.

Globally, government bond yield curves undergo

marked shifts in level and shape due to market par-

ticipants’ increased risk aversion. The flight-to-

quality and lack of liquidity in affected markets

pushes risk-free rates down across the term structure

in the United States, with some short-term rates

dropping below zero. The yield curves for govern-

ment bonds flatten or invert across Europe and Asia

while volatility increases across the term structure.

The potential for a prolonged and more acute reces-

sion in Europe drive up sovereign credit spreads in

the euro zone periphery in a manner generally consis-

tent with the experience of 2011. Emerging market

countries with deteriorating economic and fiscal

accounts would also experience a sharp increase in

sovereign spreads.

The major differences between the 2016 and 2015

severely adverse scenarios include (1) a larger widen-

ing in credit spreads for municipal, sovereign, and

advanced economies’ corporate products; (2) gener-

ally, greater declines in the value of private equity

investments, recently issued securitized products, and

non-agency residential MBS; (3) a more severe wid-

ening in basis spreads between closely related assets

such as agency MBS and TBA forwards as well as

corporate bonds and credit default swaps; and (4) a

7

The global market shock components consist of shocks to a

large number of risk factors that include a wide range of finan-

cial market variables that affect asset prices, such as a credit

spread or the yield on a bond, and, also include, in some cases,

shocks to the value of the position itself (for example, the mar-

ket value of private-equity positions).

8

For this cycle, six BHCs are subject to the global market shock

components: Bank of America Corporation; Citigroup Inc.;

The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc.; JPMorgan Chase & Co.;

Morgan Stanley; and Wells Fargo & Company. See 12 CFR

252.54(b)(2)(i)

9

A BHC may use data as of the date that corresponds to its

weekly internal risk reporting cycle as long as it falls during the

business of the as-of date for the global market shock (i.e.,

January 4, 2016 to January 8, 2016).

January 28, 2016 7

general decline in U.S. Treasury rates, resulting in

negative short-term rates, while short-term govern-

ment rates in Europe rise to positive or slightly nega-

tive levels, and Asian government rates across the

term structure flatten or invert. These differences are

intended to reflect the result of a more significant

drop in liquidity than was assumed in the 2015

severely adverse scenario and would be expected to

result in notably higher losses on more illiquid assets.

2016 Adverse Scenario

The global market shock component for the adverse

scenario simulates an extended low-growth environ-

ment and muted market volatility across most asset

classes and term structures. Domestic interest rates

move lower, particularly for longer-maturity securi-

ties, with lower volatility. Due to reduced demand,

global commodity prices decline moderately. MBS

and credit spreads widen moderately. Internationally,

yield curves move lower and flatten while sovereign

credit spreads widen moderately. Select currency mar-

kets also experience small flight-to-quality moves.

Equity markets experience a mild correction with a

measured increase in volatility.

The major difference between the 2016 and 2015

adverse scenarios is the addition of elements that are

distinct from and not mechanically linked to the

severely adverse scenario. In particular, compared to

2015, the 2016 adverse scenario includes (1) more

muted changes in price, spread, and volatility levels

across most markets; and (2) a general decline in U.S.

Treasury rates, with short-term government rates in

most other countries and regions rising in the short

term and declining in the longer term.

Counterparty Default Component for

Supervisory Adverse and Severely

Adverse Scenarios

In CCAR 2016, the eight BHCs with substantial

trading or custodial operations will be required to

incorporate a counterparty default scenario compo-

nent into their supervisory adverse and severely

adverse stress scenarios.

10

In connection with the

counterparty default scenario component, these

BHCs will be required to estimate and report the

potential losses and related effects on capital associ-

ated with the instantaneous and unexpected default

of the counterparty that would generate the largest

losses across their derivatives and securities financing

activities, including securities lending, and repur-

chase or reverse repurchase agreement activities. The

counterparty default scenario component is an

add-on to the macroeconomic conditions and finan-

cial market environment specified in the Federal

Reserve’s adverse and severely adverse stress

scenarios.

The counterparty default scenario component

involves the instantaneous and unexpected default of

the BHC’s largest counterparty.

11

Each BHC’s larg-

est counterparty will be determined by net stressed

losses; estimated by applying the global market shock

to revalue non-cash securities financing activity

assets (securities or collateral) posted or received; and

for derivatives, to the value of the trade position and

non-cash collateral exchanged. The as-of date for the

counterparty default scenario component is Janu-

ary 4, 2016—the same date as the global market

shock.

12

10

The eight BHCs subject to the counterparty default component

are as follows: Bank of America Corporation; The Bank of

New York Mellon Corp.; Citigroup Inc.; The Goldman Sachs

Group, Inc.; JPMorgan Chase & Co.; Morgan Stanley; State

Street Corp.; and Wells Fargo & Company. See 12 CFR

252.54(b)(2)(ii).

11

In selecting its largest counterparty, a BHC will not consider

certain sovereign entities (Canada, France, Germany, Italy,

Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States) or desig-

nated central clearing counterparties.

12

As with the global market shock, a BHC may use data as of the

date that corresponds to its weekly internal risk reporting cycle

as long as it falls during the business week of the as-of date for

the counterparty default scenario component (i.e., January 4 to

January 8, 2016).

8 Federal Reserve Supervisory Scenarios

Variables Considered in Scenarios

Table 1A. Supervisory baseline scenario: Domestic, Q1:2001Q1:2019

Percent unless otherwise indicated

Date

Real GDP

growth

Nominal

GDP

growth

Real

dispo-

sable

income

growth

Nominal

dispo-

sable

income

growth

Unem-

ployment

rate

CPI

inflation

rate

3-month

Treasury

rate

5-year

Treasury

yield

10-year

Treasury

yield

BBB

corporate

yield

Mortgage

rate

Prime

rate

Level

Dow

Jones

Total

Stock

Market

Index

House

Price

Index

Com-

mercial

Real

Estate

Price

Index

Market

Volatility

Index

Q1 2001 -1.1 1.4 3.5 6.3 4.2 3.9 4.8 4.9 5.3 7.4 7.0 8.6 10,645.9 113.3 139.0 32.8

Q2 2001 2.1 5.1 -0.3 1.6 4.4 2.8 3.7 4.9 5.5 7.5 7.1 7.3 11,407.2 115.2 139.0 34.7

Q3 2001 -1.3 0.0 9.8 10.1 4.8 1.1 3.2 4.6 5.3 7.3 6.9 6.6 9,563.0 117.5 141.0 43.7

Q4 2001 1.1 2.3 -4.9 -4.6 5.5 -0.3 1.9 4.2 5.1 7.2 6.8 5.2 10,707.7 119.8 136.0 35.3

Q1 2002 3.7 5.1 10.1 10.9 5.7 1.3 1.7 4.5 5.4 7.6 7.0 4.8 10,775.7 122.1 137.0 26.1

Q2 2002 2.2 3.8 2.0 5.2 5.8 3.2 1.7 4.5 5.4 7.6 6.8 4.8 9,384.0 125.4 136.0 28.4

Q3 2002 2.0 3.8 -0.5 1.5 5.7 2.2 1.6 3.4 4.5 7.3 6.2 4.8 7,773.6 128.6 139.0 45.1

Q4 2002 0.3 2.4 1.9 3.8 5.9 2.4 1.3 3.1 4.3 7.0 6.1 4.5 8,343.2 131.3 142.0 42.6

Q1 2003 2.1 4.6 1.1 4.0 5.9 4.2 1.2 2.9 4.2 6.5 5.8 4.3 8,051.9 134.1 148.0 34.7

Q2 2003 3.8 5.1 5.9 6.3 6.1 -0.7 1.0 2.6 3.8 5.7 5.5 4.2 9,342.4 137.0 149.0 29.1

Q3 2003 6.9 9.3 6.7 9.3 6.1 3.0 0.9 3.1 4.4 6.0 6.1 4.0 9,649.7 141.0 147.0 22.7

Q4 2003 4.8 6.8 1.6 3.3 5.8 1.5 0.9 3.2 4.4 5.8 5.9 4.0 10,799.6 145.9 146.0 21.1

Q1 2004 2.3 5.9 2.9 6.1 5.7 3.4 0.9 3.0 4.1 5.5 5.6 4.0 11,039.4 151.6 153.0 21.6

Q2 2004 3.0 6.6 4.0 7.0 5.6 3.2 1.1 3.7 4.7 6.1 6.2 4.0 11,144.6 157.9 160.0 20.0

Q3 2004 3.7 6.3 2.1 4.5 5.4 2.6 1.5 3.5 4.4 5.8 5.9 4.4 10,893.8 163.2 172.0 19.3

Q4 2004 3.5 6.4 5.1 8.5 5.4 4.4 2.0 3.5 4.3 5.4 5.7 4.9 11,951.5 169.2 176.0 16.6

Q1 2005 4.3 8.3 -3.8 -1.8 5.3 2.0 2.5 3.9 4.4 5.4 5.8 5.4 11,637.3 177.1 176.0 14.6

Q2 2005 2.1 5.1 3.2 6.0 5.1 2.7 2.9 3.9 4.2 5.5 5.7 5.9 11,856.7 184.5 182.0 17.7

Q3 2005 3.4 7.3 2.1 6.6 5.0 6.2 3.4 4.0 4.3 5.5 5.8 6.4 12,282.9 190.2 187.0 14.2

Q4 2005 2.3 5.4 3.4 6.6 5.0 3.8 3.8 4.4 4.6 5.9 6.2 7.0 12,497.2 194.8 195.0 16.5

Q1 2006 4.9 8.2 9.5 11.5 4.7 2.1 4.4 4.6 4.7 6.0 6.3 7.4 13,121.6 198.0 200.0 14.6

Q2 2006 1.2 4.5 0.6 3.7 4.6 3.7 4.7 5.0 5.2 6.5 6.6 7.9 12,808.9 197.1 209.0 23.8

Q3 2006 0.4 3.2 1.2 4.1 4.6 3.8 4.9 4.8 5.0 6.4 6.5 8.3 13,322.5 195.8 219.0 18.6

Q4 2006 3.2 4.6 5.3 4.6 4.4 -1.6 4.9 4.6 4.7 6.1 6.2 8.3 14,215.8 195.8 217.0 12.7

Q1 2007 0.2 4.8 2.6 6.5 4.5 4.0 5.0 4.6 4.8 6.1 6.2 8.3 14,354.0 193.3 227.0 19.6

Q2 2007 3.1 5.4 0.8 4.0 4.5 4.6 4.7 4.7 4.9 6.3 6.4 8.3 15,163.1 188.5 236.0 18.9

Q3 2007 2.7 4.2 1.1 3.4 4.7 2.6 4.3 4.5 4.8 6.5 6.5 8.2 15,317.8 183.2 249.0 30.8

Q4 2007 1.4 3.2 0.3 4.4 4.8 5.0 3.4 3.8 4.4 6.4 6.2 7.5 14,753.6 177.8 251.0 31.1

Q1 2008 -2.7 -0.5 2.9 6.5 5.0 4.4 2.1 2.8 3.9 6.5 5.9 6.2 13,284.1 171.1 240.0 32.2

Q2 2008 2.0 4.0 8.7 13.3 5.3 5.3 1.6 3.2 4.1 6.8 6.1 5.1 13,016.4 163.9 224.0 24.1

Q3 2008 -1.9 0.8 -8.9 -5.1 6.0 6.3 1.5 3.1 4.1 7.2 6.3 5.0 11,826.0 157.4 233.0 46.7

Q4 2008 -8.2 -7.7 2.6 -3.2 6.9 -8.9 0.3 2.2 3.7 9.4 5.8 4.1 9,056.7 149.5 223.0 80.9

Q1 2009 -5.4 -4.5 -0.8 -3.0 8.3 -2.7 0.2 1.9 3.2 9.0 5.0 3.3 8,044.2 143.5 209.0 56.7

Q2 2009 -0.5 -1.2 2.9 4.7 9.3 2.1 0.2 2.3 3.7 8.2 5.1 3.3 9,342.8 143.2 178.0 42.3

Q3 2009 1.3 1.2 -4.3 -1.9 9.6 3.5 0.2 2.5 3.8 6.8 5.1 3.3 10,812.8 144.3 154.0 31.3

Q4 2009 3.9 5.2 -0.5 2.2 9.9 3.2 0.1 2.3 3.7 6.1 4.9 3.3 11,385.1 145.2 155.0 30.7

Q1 2010 1.7 3.2 0.4 1.8 9.8 0.6 0.1 2.4 3.9 5.8 5.0 3.3 12,032.5 145.5 150.0 27.3

Q2 2010 3.9 5.8 5.3 5.8 9.6 -0.1 0.1 2.3 3.6 5.6 4.8 3.3 10,645.8 144.4 165.0 45.8

Q3 2010 2.7 4.6 2.0 3.2 9.5 1.2 0.2 1.6 2.9 5.1 4.4 3.3 11,814.0 141.6 167.0 32.9

(continued on next page)

9

Table 1A.—continued

Date

Real GDP

growth

Nominal

GDP

growth

Real

dispo-

sable

income

growth

Nominal

dispo-

sable

income

growth

Unem-

ployment

rate

CPI

inflation

rate

3-month

Treasury

rate

5-year

Treasury

yield

10-year

Treasury

yield

BBB

corporate

yield

Mortgage

rate

Prime

rate

Level

Dow

Jones

Total

Stock

Market

Index

House

Price

Index

Com-

mercial

Real

Estate

Price

Index

Market

Volatility

Index

Q4 2010 2.5 4.7 2.8 5.0 9.5 3.3 0.1 1.5 3.0 5.0 4.5 3.3 13,131.5 140.3 173.0 23.5

Q1 2011 -1.5 0.2 5.0 8.2 9.1 4.3 0.1 2.1 3.5 5.4 4.9 3.3 13,908.5 138.5 180.0 29.4

Q2 2011 2.9 6.0 -0.6 3.5 9.1 4.7 0.0 1.8 3.3 5.1 4.6 3.3 13,843.5 137.7 177.0 22.7

Q3 2011 0.8 3.3 2.1 4.3 9.0 2.6 0.0 1.1 2.5 4.9 4.2 3.3 11,676.5 137.7 177.0 48.0

Q4 2011 4.6 5.2 0.2 1.6 8.6 1.7 0.0 1.0 2.1 5.0 4.0 3.3 13,019.3 137.6 188.0 45.5

Q1 2012 2.7 4.9 6.7 9.2 8.3 2.2 0.1 0.9 2.1 4.7 3.9 3.3 14,627.5 139.6 188.0 23.0

Q2 2012 1.9 3.8 3.1 4.4 8.2 1.0 0.1 0.8 1.8 4.5 3.8 3.3 14,100.2 142.8 189.0 26.7

Q3 2012 0.5 2.7 -0.2 1.1 8.0 1.8 0.1 0.7 1.6 4.2 3.5 3.3 14,894.7 145.7 197.0 20.5

Q4 2012 0.1 1.7 10.9 13.3 7.8 2.6 0.1 0.7 1.7 3.9 3.4 3.3 14,834.9 149.3 198.0 22.7

Q1 2013 1.9 3.6 -15.9 -14.7 7.7 1.4 0.1 0.8 1.9 4.0 3.5 3.3 16,396.2 153.8 202.0 19.0

Q2 2013 1.1 2.1 2.7 3.1 7.5 -0.1 0.1 0.9 2.0 4.1 3.7 3.3 16,771.3 158.8 213.0 20.5

Q3 2013 3.0 4.9 2.2 3.9 7.2 2.3 0.0 1.5 2.7 4.9 4.4 3.3 17,718.3 163.0 224.0 17.0

Q4 2013 3.8 5.6 0.6 2.0 7.0 1.4 0.1 1.4 2.8 4.8 4.3 3.3 19,413.2 166.3 229.0 20.3

Q1 2014 -0.9 0.6 4.0 5.6 6.7 2.1 0.0 1.6 2.8 4.6 4.4 3.3 19,711.2 169.3 230.0 21.4

Q2 2014 4.6 6.9 3.0 5.2 6.2 2.4 0.0 1.7 2.7 4.3 4.2 3.3 20,568.7 170.7 239.0 17.0

Q3 2014 4.3 6.0 2.7 3.9 6.1 1.2 0.0 1.7 2.5 4.2 4.1 3.3 20,458.8 172.5 245.0 17.0

Q4 2014 2.1 2.2 4.7 4.2 5.7 -0.9 0.0 1.6 2.3 4.2 3.9 3.3 21,424.6 174.5 252.0 26.3

Q1 2015 0.6 0.8 3.9 1.9 5.6 -3.1 0.0 1.5 2.0 4.0 3.7 3.3 21,707.6 177.3 260.0 22.4

Q2 2015 3.9 6.1 2.6 4.9 5.4 3.0 0.0 1.5 2.2 4.2 3.8 3.3 21,630.9 179.4 264.0 18.9

Q3 2015 2.0 3.3 3.8 5.1 5.2 1.6 0.0 1.6 2.3 4.5 3.9 3.3 19,959.3 181.7 270.0 40.7

Q4 2015 1.9 1.9 3.5 3.8 5.0 0.2 0.1 1.6 2.2 4.6 3.9 3.3 21,100.9 183.1 273.4 24.4

Q1 2016 2.5 4.0 2.8 3.5 4.9 1.2 0.4 1.8 2.4 4.5 4.1 3.6 21,336.7 184.0 276.8 24.8

Q2 2016 2.6 4.0 2.5 4.3 4.8 2.2 0.6 2.0 2.6 4.7 4.2 3.8 21,578.3 185.2 280.3 24.6

Q3 2016 2.6 4.3 2.6 4.5 4.7 2.3 0.9 2.2 2.7 4.8 4.3 4.0 21,834.8 186.3 283.8 23.2

Q4 2016 2.5 4.3 2.6 4.6 4.6 2.3 1.0 2.4 2.9 4.9 4.5 4.1 22,093.2 187.5 287.4 22.7

Q1 2017 2.4 4.1 2.8 4.8 4.6 2.2 1.3 2.6 3.0 5.0 4.6 4.4 22,347.4 188.7 291.0 22.5

Q2 2017 2.5 4.6 2.6 4.8 4.6 2.4 1.5 2.7 3.1 5.1 4.7 4.6 22,626.3 189.9 294.7 22.0

Q3 2017 2.3 4.6 2.5 4.7 4.5 2.4 1.9 2.9 3.3 5.2 4.9 5.0 22,908.0 191.1 298.4 21.4

Q4 2017 2.3 4.4 2.6 4.7 4.5 2.3 2.2 3.0 3.4 5.3 5.0 5.3 23,183.2 192.2 302.1 21.7

Q1 2018 2.6 4.3 2.9 4.7 4.5 2.0 2.4 3.1 3.5 5.4 5.2 5.5 23,458.2 193.7 304.4 21.4

Q2 2018 2.4 4.2 2.6 4.6 4.6 2.1 2.6 3.2 3.6 5.5 5.3 5.7 23,733.2 195.2 306.7 21.5

Q3 2018 2.3 4.2 2.6 4.5 4.6 2.1 2.7 3.2 3.7 5.6 5.4 5.8 24,008.9 196.6 309.0 21.4

Q4 2018 2.3 4.1 2.5 4.5 4.7 2.1 2.8 3.3 3.8 5.6 5.5 5.9 24,285.1 198.1 311.4 21.5

Q1 2019 2.1 4.0 2.4 4.3 4.7 2.1 2.8 3.4 3.8 5.6 5.5 5.9 24,555.9 199.6 313.7 21.4

Note: Refer to

Notes Regarding Scenario Variables for more information on variables.

10 Federal Reserve Supervisory Scenarios

Table 1B. Supervisory baseline scenario: International, Q1:2001Q1:2019

Percent unless otherwise indicated

Date

Euro area

real GDP

growth

Euro area

inflation

Euro area

bilateral

dollar

exchange

rate

(USD/euro)

Developing

Asia

real GDP

growth

Developing

Asia

inflation

Developing

Asia

bilateral

dollar

exchange

rate

(F/USD,

index)

Japan

real GDP

growth

Japan

inflation

Japan

bilateral

dollar

exchange

rate

(yen/USD)

U.K.

real GDP

growth

U.K.

inflation

U.K.

bilateral

dollar

exchange

rate

(USD/pound)

Q1 2001 3.8 1.1 0.879 5.0 1.7 106.0 2.6 -1.2 125.5 4.6 0.1 1.419

Q2 2001 0.1 4.1 0.847 5.5 2.2 106.1 -0.7 -0.3 124.7 3.1 3.1 1.408

Q3 2001 0.3 1.4 0.910 4.7 1.1 106.4 -4.4 -1.1 119.2 2.6 1.0 1.469

Q4 2001 0.5 1.7 0.890 8.4 0.2 106.9 -0.5 -1.4 131.0 1.4 0.0 1.454

Q1 2002 0.9 3.0 0.872 7.6 0.4 107.3 -0.9 -2.7 132.7 1.6 1.9 1.425

Q2 2002 2.0 2.0 0.986 8.1 1.2 104.8 4.3 1.7 119.9 3.3 0.9 1.525

Q3 2002 1.6 1.6 0.988 7.3 1.3 105.5 2.6 -0.7 121.7 3.9 1.4 1.570

Q4 2002 0.3 2.4 1.049 6.4 0.9 104.5 1.5 -0.4 118.8 3.6 1.9 1.610

Q1 2003 -0.9 3.3 1.090 6.5 3.6 105.5 -2.2 -1.6 118.1 2.9 1.6 1.579

Q2 2003 0.4 0.3 1.150 2.3 1.2 104.0 5.2 1.7 119.9 3.7 0.3 1.653

Q3 2003 2.0 2.2 1.165 14.2 0.0 102.6 1.7 -0.7 111.4 3.1 1.7 1.662

Q4 2003 3.1 2.2 1.260 12.9 5.6 103.4 4.2 -0.6 107.1 3.0 1.7 1.784

Q1 2004 2.0 2.3 1.229 5.5 4.0 101.4 3.8 -0.9 104.2 2.7 1.3 1.840

Q2 2004 2.2 2.4 1.218 7.1 4.1 102.8 0.3 1.1 109.4 2.2 1.0 1.813

Q3 2004 1.3 2.0 1.242 8.2 3.9 102.7 0.6 0.1 110.2 0.9 1.1 1.809

Q4 2004 1.5 2.4 1.354 6.3 0.9 98.9 -1.0 1.7 102.7 1.9 2.4 1.916

Q1 2005 0.6 1.5 1.297 10.3 2.9 98.6 0.8 -2.7 107.2 2.8 2.6 1.889

Q2 2005 2.8 2.2 1.210 8.9 1.5 98.9 5.4 -1.2 110.9 4.4 1.9 1.793

Q3 2005 3.0 3.2 1.206 9.3 2.3 98.6 1.4 -1.3 113.3 4.1 2.7 1.770

Q4 2005 2.4 2.5 1.184 11.6 1.7 98.1 0.7 0.7 117.9 5.9 1.4 1.719

Q1 2006 3.7 1.7 1.214 10.9 2.4 96.8 1.7 1.3 117.5 1.5 1.9 1.739

Q2 2006 4.4 2.5 1.278 7.1 3.2 96.7 1.7 -0.1 114.5 1.2 3.0 1.849

Q3 2006 2.6 2.0 1.269 10.3 2.1 96.4 -0.3 0.5 118.0 0.5 3.3 1.872

Q4 2006 4.4 0.9 1.320 11.1 3.8 94.6 5.2 -0.4 119.0 2.3 2.6 1.959

Q1 2007 3.2 2.2 1.337 13.7 3.6 94.0 4.0 -0.2 117.6 3.9 2.6 1.969

Q2 2007 2.5 2.3 1.352 10.6 4.9 91.9 0.6 0.0 123.4 2.4 1.7 2.006

Q3 2007 2.0 2.1 1.422 8.6 7.4 90.6 -1.5 0.1 115.0 3.1 0.2 2.039

Q4 2007 2.0 4.9 1.460 12.9 6.1 89.4 3.4 2.2 111.7 3.1 4.0 1.984

Q1 2008 2.3 4.2 1.581 7.1 8.1 88.0 2.7 1.3 99.9 1.0 3.7 1.986

Q2 2008 -1.3 3.2 1.575 6.1 6.4 88.7 -4.6 1.6 106.2 -2.2 5.7 1.991

Q3 2008 -2.2 3.2 1.408 3.1 2.8 91.6 -4.1 3.6 105.9 -6.6 5.8 1.780

Q4 2008 -7.1 -1.4 1.392 0.1 -0.9 92.3 -12.5 -2.2 90.8 -8.7 0.5 1.462

Q1 2009 -11.3 -1.1 1.326 3.8 -1.4 94.2 -15.1 -3.6 99.2 -6.1 -0.1 1.430

Q2 2009 -0.8 0.0 1.402 15.4 2.3 92.3 7.1 -1.7 96.4 -0.8 2.2 1.645

Q3 2009 1.2 1.1 1.463 12.6 3.9 91.3 0.4 -1.2 89.5 0.6 3.5 1.600

Q4 2009 2.0 1.6 1.433 9.0 5.2 90.7 7.1 -1.6 93.1 1.4 3.0 1.617

Q1 2010 1.7 1.8 1.353 9.8 4.6 89.8 5.8 0.9 93.4 1.5 4.0 1.519

Q2 2010 3.9 2.0 1.229 9.8 3.4 91.1 4.6 -1.2 88.5 3.3 3.2 1.495

Q3 2010 1.9 1.6 1.360 8.8 3.9 88.4 6.1 -2.1 83.5 2.0 2.3 1.573

Q4 2010 2.1 2.6 1.327 9.3 7.7 87.4 -2.0 1.3 81.7 0.4 4.0 1.539

Q1 2011 3.5 3.6 1.418 9.5 6.3 86.5 -7.7 -0.4 82.8 3.0 6.7 1.605

Q2 2011 0.0 3.2 1.452 7.1 5.4 85.3 -2.2 -0.4 80.6 1.4 4.7 1.607

Q3 2011 -0.1 1.4 1.345 5.9 5.0 87.4 11.2 0.3 77.0 3.3 3.7 1.562

Q4 2011 -1.2 3.5 1.297 6.1 3.4 87.4 0.9 -0.7 77.0 0.6 3.4 1.554

Q1 2012 -0.7 2.7 1.333 7.1 3.2 86.4 3.6 1.9 82.4 0.9 2.1 1.599

Q2 2012 -1.3 2.3 1.267 5.9 4.0 88.1 -1.3 -0.7 79.8 -0.7 2.0 1.569

Q3 2012 -0.6 1.6 1.286 6.5 1.9 86.3 -1.9 -2.1 77.9 4.1 2.3 1.613

Q4 2012 -1.7 2.4 1.319 7.2 3.7 86.0 -0.4 0.0 86.6 -0.2 4.0 1.626

Q1 2013 -1.0 1.1 1.282 6.3 4.2 86.3 4.0 0.4 94.2 2.7 2.9 1.519

Q2 2013 1.6 0.5 1.301 7.0 3.1 87.3 3.1 0.6 99.2 2.4 1.7 1.521

Q3 2013 1.0 1.3 1.354 7.4 3.5 86.8 2.0 2.4 98.3 3.8 2.1 1.618

(continued on next page)

January 28, 2016 11

Table 1B.—continued

Date

Euro area

real GDP

growth

Euro area

inflation

Euro area

bilateral

dollar

exchange

rate

(USD/euro)

Developing

Asia

real GDP

growth

Developing

Asia

inflation

Developing

Asia

bilateral

dollar

exchange

rate

(F/USD,

index)

Japan

real GDP

growth

Japan

inflation

Japan

bilateral

dollar

exchange

rate

(yen/USD)

U.K.

real GDP

growth

U.K.

inflation

U.K.

bilateral

dollar

exchange

rate

(USD/pound)

Q4 2013 0.8 0.3 1.378 6.5 4.0 85.9 -0.7 2.3 105.3 2.6 1.5 1.657

Q1 2014 0.9 0.6 1.378 5.9 1.5 86.9 5.0 0.7 103.0 2.6 1.8 1.668

Q2 2014 0.2 0.1 1.369 7.0 2.7 86.8 -7.2 9.3 101.3 3.2 1.5 1.711

Q3 2014 1.2 0.3 1.263 7.5 2.2 87.2 -2.8 1.3 109.7 2.6 0.9 1.622

Q4 2014 1.5 -0.4 1.210 5.6 1.0 88.2 1.8 -0.8 119.9 2.7 -0.6 1.558

Q1 2015 2.2 -1.2 1.074 5.8 1.0 88.1 4.4 -0.3 120.0 1.5 -1.2 1.485

Q2 2015 1.6 2.2 1.115 6.2 2.9 88.5 -0.5 1.7 122.1 2.2 0.8 1.573

Q3 2015 1.2 -0.1 1.116 7.0 2.6 91.1 1.0 0.0 119.8 1.8 1.0 1.512

Q4 2015 1.6 -0.1 1.086 6.2 2.3 92.2 1.0 -0.3 120.3 2.4 -0.3 1.475

Q1 2016 1.7 0.9 1.072 6.1 2.3 92.8 1.1 0.7 121.1 2.3 1.1 1.476

Q2 2016 1.8 1.2 1.060 6.0 2.3 93.4 1.1 0.9 122.0 2.1 1.4 1.480

Q3 2016 1.8 1.3 1.051 5.9 2.3 94.0 1.1 1.1 122.8 2.0 1.6 1.487

Q4 2016 1.8 1.4 1.043 5.9 2.4 94.5 1.0 1.4 123.5 2.0 1.8 1.494

Q1 2017 1.8 1.5 1.050 5.9 2.6 94.4 0.8 1.7 123.9 2.2 1.9 1.501

Q2 2017 1.7 1.5 1.058 6.0 2.7 94.2 0.7 1.8 124.1 2.3 1.9 1.507

Q3 2017 1.7 1.6 1.065 6.0 2.8 94.0 0.6 1.8 124.4 2.3 1.9 1.513

Q4 2017 1.7 1.5 1.073 6.0 2.8 93.8 0.7 1.6 124.5 2.3 1.8 1.518

Q1 2018 1.6 1.5 1.079 6.0 2.8 93.7 0.8 1.4 124.0 2.2 1.8 1.521

Q2 2018 1.6 1.5 1.085 6.0 2.9 93.6 0.9 1.2 123.4 2.1 1.7 1.523

Q3 2018 1.6 1.5 1.090 6.0 2.9 93.6 1.0 1.1 122.7 2.1 1.7 1.526

Q4 2018 1.6 1.6 1.095 6.1 3.0 93.5 1.0 1.2 122.0 2.1 1.7 1.528

Q1 2019 1.6 1.6 1.102 6.2 3.2 93.4 1.0 1.3 121.0 2.1 1.7 1.533

Note: Refer to

Notes Regarding Scenario Variables for more information on variables.

12 Federal Reserve Supervisory Scenarios

Table 2A. Supervisory adverse scenario: Domestic, Q1:2001Q1:2019