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within the limits of these policies.
3
As a result, the D&O insurer serves
as an intermediary between injured shareholders and the managers
who harmed them. This intermediary role has important implications
for corporate governance that have been largely overlooked by corpo-
rate and securities law scholars.
4
The primary goal of liability rules in corporate and securities law,
it is often said, is to deter corporate officers and directors from engag-
ing in conduct harmful to their shareholders.
5
Yet it is typically a third-
party insurer that satisfies these liabilities under the terms of the cor-
poration’s D&O policy.
6
The deterrence goals of corporate and securi-
purchased D&O insurance). Prior surveys report slightly lower percentages. The annual Tilling-
hast D&O survey is based on a nonrandom, self-selecting sample of companies. It is also the only
systematic source of information on D&O insurance purchasing patterns in the U.S. We there-
fore draw upon it as a source of aggregate data in spite of its methodological weaknesses.
3
See, for example, James D. Cox, Making Securities Fraud Class Actions Virtuous, 39 Ariz
L Rev 497, 512 (1997) (“[A]pproximately 96% of securities class action settlements are within
the typical insurance coverage, with the insurance proceeds often being the sole source of set-
tlement funds.”). Using U.S. data, Cornerstone Research reports that “over 65% of all [securities
class action] settlements in 2004 were for less than $10 million,” a figure within the policy limits
of most publicly traded corporations, and that only seven settlements were larger than $100
million. See Laura E. Simmons and Ellen M. Ryan, Post-Reform Act Securities Settlements: Up-
dated through December 2004 3 (Cornerstone Research 2005). Small-cap companies typically
have D&O insurance policies in excess of $20 million, and large-cap companies typically have
D&O insurance policy limits in excess of $100 million. See Tillinghast, 2005 Survey at 29 table
17C (cited in note 2). There may be a recent trend in the U.S. toward increasing (but still small)
numbers of settlements above the D&O policy limits. See Elaine Buckberg, Todd Foster, and
Ronald I. Miller, Recent Trends in Shareholder Class Action Litigation: Are WorldCom and Enron
the New Standard? 1 (NERA Economic Consulting 2005) (noting that in both the WorldCom and
the then-pending Enron case, directors were making settlement payments out of their personal
assets). Recent research demonstrates that outside directors almost never have to use their own
funds. See Bernard S. Black, Brian R. Cheffins, and Michael Klausner, Outside Director Liability,
58 Stan L Rev 1055, 1059–60 (2006) (“Since 1980, outside directors have only once made per-
sonal payments after a trial.”).
4
But see Black, Cheffins, and Klausner, 58 Stan L Rev at 1056. See also generally Roberta
Romano, Corporate Governance in the Aftermath of the Insurance Crisis, 39 Emory L J 1155
(1990) (studying the effect of the D&O insurance crisis on corporate governance); Roberta
Romano, What Went Wrong with Directors’ and Officers’ Liability Insurance?, 14 Del J Corp L 1
(1989) (exploring the causes of the D&O insurance market crisis of the mid 1980s).
5
See Reinier Kraakman, Hyun Park, and Steven Shavell, When Are Shareholder Suits in
Shareholder Interests?, 82 Georgetown L J 1733, 1738 (1994) (modeling when shareholder litiga-
tion should and should not be pursued). In this Article, we adopt the standard assumptions of
mainstream corporate and securities law scholarship—that the corporation is designed to maxi-
mize shareholder welfare (as opposed to some other constituency) and that deterrence is af-
fected principally through the costs of liability rules. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Corporation
Law and Economics 28 (Foundation 2002). These assumptions have been critiqued. See gener-
ally, for example, Lawrence A. Mitchell, ed, Progressive Corporate Law (Westview 1995). But
that debate is beyond the scope of this Article.
6
See Sean J. Griffith, Uncovering a Gatekeeper: Why the SEC Should Mandate Disclosure
of Details Concerning Directors’ and Officers’ Liability Insurance Policies, 154 U Pa L Rev 1147,
1149–50 (2006) (describing the intermediary role of the D&O insurer and arguing for public
disclosure of D&O insurance policy premiums and contract provisions).