CROSSING
THE STRAIT
Edited by
Joel Wuthnow, Derek Grossman, Phillip C. Saunders,
Andrew Scobell, Andrew N.D. Yang
China’s Military Prepares for War with Taiwan
CROSSING THE STRAIT
CROSSING THE STRAIT
China’s Military Prepares for
War with Taiwan
Edited by
Joel Wuthnow
Derek Grossman
Phillip C. Saunders
Andrew Scobell
Andrew N.D. Yang
National Defense University
Press
Washington, D.C.
2022
Published in the United States by National Defense University Press. Portions of
this book may be quoted or reprinted without permission, provided that a stan-
dard source credit line is included. NDU Press would appreciate a courtesy copy of
reprints or reviews.
Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are solely
those of the contributors and do not necessarily represent the views of the Depart-
ment of Defense or any other agency of the Federal Government. Cleared for public
release; distribution unlimited.
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Cover image: Amphibious tanks and People’s Liberation Army Navy Marine Corps
forces participate in amphibious landing drill during Sino-Russian Peace Mission
2005 joint military exercise, held in China’s Shandong Peninsula, August 24, 2005
(AP Photo/Xinhua/Li Gang)
is book is dedicated to Rear Admiral Eric McVadon,
U.S. Navy (Ret.), and Alan D. Romberg in appreciation
for decades of friendship and their many contributions
to PLA studies and cross-strait relations.
Foreword
Michael T. Plehn ............................................................................................ ix
Acknowledgments .........................................................................................xi
Introduction
Crossing the Strait: PLA Modernization and Taiwan
Phillip C. Saunders and Joel Wuthnow ........................................................ 1
Part I: China’s Decisionmaking Calculus
1 ree Logics of Chinese Policy Toward Taiwan: An Analytic Framework
Phillip C. Saunders ....................................................................................... 35
2 China’s Calculus on the Use of Force: Futures, Costs, Benets, Risks,
and Goals
Andrew Scobell ............................................................................................65
Part II: PLA Operations and Concepts for Taiwan
3 An Assessment of China’s Options for Military Coercion of Taiwan
Mathieu Duchâtel ........................................................................................87
4 Firepower Strike, Blockade, Landing: PLA Campaigns for a
Cross-Strait Conict
Michael Casey ............................................................................................113
CONTENTSCONTENTS
vii
viii
5 “Killing Rats in a Porcelain Shop”: PLA Urban Warfare in a
Taiwan Campaign
Sale Lilly ......................................................................................................139
Part III: Chinese Forces and the Impact of Reform
6 PLA Army and Marine Corps Amphibious Brigades in a
Post-Reform Military
Joshua Arostegui ........................................................................................161
7 e PLA Airborne Corps in a Taiwan Scenario
Roderick Lee ............................................................................................... 195
8 Getting ere: Chinese Military and Civilian Sealift in a
Cross-Strait Invasion
Conor M. Kennedy .....................................................................................223
9 PLA Logistics and Mobilization Capacity in a Taiwan Invasion
Chieh Chung ...............................................................................................253
10 Who Does What? Chinese Command and Control in a Taiwan Scenario
Joel Wuthnow .............................................................................................277
Part IV: Strengthening Taiwan’s Defenses
11 A Net Assessment of Taiwan’s Overall Defense Concept
Alexander Chieh-cheng Huang ................................................................307
12 Winning the Fight Taiwan Cannot Aord to Lose
Drew ompson ......................................................................................... 321
About the Contributors ............................................................................... 345
Index ................................................................................................................351
E
ven as Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has turned attention to Europe,
China is continuing meticulous preparations for a conict with anoth-
er democracy—Taiwan. For more than 30 years, China’s People’s Lib-
eration Army (PLA) has identied Taiwan and the United States as its major
opponents and a conict in the Taiwan Strait as its main contingency. China’s
Communist Party would prefer to win without ghting, but it has tasked the
PLA to develop the military means to coerce Taiwan’s leadership and to be
prepared to seize and occupy the island. Under Chinese leader Xi Jinping’s
tenure, PLA reforms and fast-paced modernization have increased the mili-
tary threat to Taiwan.
e 2022 National Defense Strategy makes clear that the United States will
continue to prioritize peace and stability in the Indo-Pacic region. China is
the pacing challenge for the Department of Defense and Taiwan is the pacing
scenario. Any use of force by the PLA against Taiwan would have serious con-
sequences for U.S. national interests and for the future of Taiwan’s democ-
racy. To meet this challenge, policymakers and strategists need high-quality
insights into Chinese strategic decisionmaking, Chinese military capabilities,
and PLA plans, policies, and systems. We also need to continue rening our
own joint warghting concepts and capabilities.
National Defense University’s Center for the Study of Chinese Military
Aairs is a leading source of high-quality, objective analysis on China and
the Chinese military. For more than 15 years, the center has partnered with
the RAND Corporation and Taiwan’s Council on Advanced Policy Studies to
FOREWORD
ix
organize an annual conference on the Chinese military. is volume is the
fruit of a November 2020 conference focused on providing an up-to-date
public assessment of the Chinese military threat to Taiwan.
e book provides a detailed analysis of the political and military context
of cross-strait relations, with a focus on understanding the Chinese decision
calculus and options for using force, the capabilities the PLA would bring to
the ght, and what Taiwan can do to strengthen its defenses. It concludes that
the PLA has made major advances to prepare itself for a conict across the
Taiwan Strait, but also faces continued challenges and vulnerabilities in some
areas. e book oers suggestions on how Taiwan and the United States can
work together to improve Taiwan’s defenses and increase stability across the
Taiwan Strait. It is highly recommended reading for students and policy prac-
titioners focused on China, Taiwan, and the Indo-Pacic region.
MICHAEL T. PLEHN, Lt Gen, USAF
President, National Defense University
x Foreword
T
his volume is the latest publication from a longstanding series of an-
nual conferences on the People’s Republic of China’s People’s Lib-
eration Army, sponsored by Taiwan’s Council on Advanced Policy
Studies (CAPS), the RAND Corporation, and the U.S. National Defense Univer-
sity (NDU). For their continued support, we are grateful to the leaders of our
respective institutions, including CAPS Secretary-General Andrew N.D. Yang;
RAND’s National Defense Research Institute Director Jack Riley, Arroyo Cen-
ter Director Sally Sleeper, Project Air Force directors Jim Chow and Ted Harsh-
berger, and Acting Director Anthony Rosello; NDU Presidents Vice Admiral
Frederick J. Roegge, USN, and Lieutenant General Michael T. Plehn, USAF; and
Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS) Director Laura Junor-Pulzone.
e chapters were originally presented at the 2020 conference, which
was held virtually from November 18 to 20. For keeping things on track,
we thank the moderators: Cortez Cooper, Mark Cozad, T.X. Hammes, An-
drew Scobell, Cynthia Watson, and Andrew N.D. Yang. Also contributing
to a successful conference behind the scenes were RAND colleagues Mark
Cozad and Derek Grossman; RAND IT specialists Sonia Wellington, Da-
vid Cherry, and Carmen Richard; INSS Dean of Administration Catherine
Reese; and INSS colleagues Brett Swaney, Kira McFadden, and Kevin Mc-
Guiness. On the Taiwan side, CAPS thanks Yi-Su Yang and Zivon Wang.
e nal roundtable also enriched the conference by providing wider per-
spectives on Chinese military threats and policy responses. e panelists
included Admiral Richard Chen, Taiwan Navy (Ret.), Michael Coullahan,
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
xi
David Finkelstein, Rear Admiral Michael McDevitt, USN (Ret.), the Honor-
able Randall Schriver, and Andrew N.D. Yang.
e discussants took time out of their busy schedules to oer construc-
tive verbal and written feedback that helped transform conference papers
into book chapters. e discussants included Fiona Cunningham, Bonnie
Glaser, Derek Grossman, Kristen Gunness, Scott Harold, Yuan-Chou Jing, Ma
Chengkun, Che-Chuan Lee, Joanna Yu Taylor, and Kharis Templeman. Sev-
eral chapter authors also received helpful feedback from other colleagues.
We were fortunate to collaborate with the excellent team once again at
NDU Press, which shepherded our earlier volumes e PLA Beyond Bor-
ders: Chinese Military Operations in Regional and Global Context (2021) and
Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA: Assessing Chinese Military Reforms (2019),
and others. e team includes NDU Press Director William T. Eliason, Execu-
tive Editor Jerey D. Smotherman, Senior Editor John J. Church, and Internet
Publications Editor Joanna E. Seich. We also thank many others who helped
turn this into a polished volume, including the editing team at VTR Technical
Resources and Lisa Yambrick and proofreader and indexer Susan Carroll. We
also would like to thank Jill A. Schwartz and Cameron R. Morse at the Defense
Oce of Prepublication and Security Review for their help in stewarding this
publication through the review process.
Finally, the editors would like to acknowledge Tiany Batiste, Margaret
Baughman, CDR Jason Brandt, Maj H.C. Carnice, CAPT Bernard Cole (Ret.),
Jessica Drun, Xiaobing Feng, Sarah Gamberini, LTC Joshua Goodrich, Chris-
tine Gramlich, MAJ Michelle Haines, Kyle Harness, Danielle Homestead, Col
Kyle Marcrum, Capt Joshua L. Nicholson, Corrie Robb, MSgt Daniel Salis-
bury, Meghan Shoop, CPT Dereck Wisniewski, LtCol John Kintz, Lt Col Jerey
Wright, MAJ Justin Woodward, Beth Wootten, and CPT Xiaotao Xu for their
help in proofreading the manuscript.
xii Acknowledgments
Map 1. Taiwan
I
n an atmosphere of increasing U.S.-China strategic competition, Taiwan
stands out as the issue with the greatest potential to trigger a major war
between the United States and the People’s Republic of China (PRC), two
nuclear-armed powers. e stakes are high for both countries and for the
23 million people of Taiwan. Moreover, the issue is becoming increasingly
militarized as China’s military, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), seeks to
develop the capabilities needed to achieve unication through coercion, in-
cluding in the face of potential U.S. military intervention on Taiwan’s behalf.
is introductory chapter begins with a concise review of how the cur-
rent situation developed, including a review of the policy positions and the
stakes for China, Taiwan, and the United States. It then reviews the impact
of PLA modernization on the cross-strait military balance and on the PLA’s
ability to execute the major military options available to Chinese leaders. e
third section reviews the current debate on when the PLA might be able to
conduct the most demanding option—an amphibious invasion of Taiwan—
and what factors might inuence the Chinese calculus about whether to pur-
sue forced unication. e fourth section presents ve key ndings from the
book, followed by brief summaries of the individual chapters. e conclusion
INTRODUCTION
Crossing the Strait:
PLA Modernization and Taiwan
Phillip C. Saunders and Joel Wuthnow
1
2 Saunders and Wuthnow
considers the relative role of military and political factors in determining de-
terrence and stability in the Taiwan Strait.
Background and Stakes of the Taiwan Issue
For Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leaders, Taiwan is an integral part of Chi-
na that was forcibly seized by Japan in 1895 following the Sino-Japanese War
and which became a haven for the Republic of China (ROC) government and
military after their 1949 defeat in the Chinese Civil War. Taiwan is thus con-
nected both to the Chinese nationalist goal of restoring China’s sovereignty
and territorial integrity after the so-called century of humiliation and to the
CCP’s nal political victory over the Chinese Nationalist Party (the Kuomint-
ang, or KMT). CCP leaders have pledged their commitment to the goal of uni-
cation and have repeatedly expressed willingness to ght to prevent Taiwan
independence, including in the 2005 Anti-Secession Law that authorizes the
use of “non-peaceful means” if necessary. Taiwan’s status is a sensitive do-
mestic political issue, with CCP leaders vulnerable to criticism by national-
ists inside and outside the party if they are viewed as too weak in defending
China’s “core interest” in sovereignty and territorial integrity. Since 2017, CCP
leaders have linked Taiwan unication to “the great rejuvenation of the Chi-
nese people,” which is to be achieved by 2049, creating an implicit deadline.
1
For the United States, support for Taiwan coalesced in the context of ear-
ly Cold War anti-Communist sentiment: Washington supported the ROC as
the sole legitimate government of all China for more than two decades. Tai-
wan’s status was a major issue in the U.S. opening to China in the 1970s, with
U.S. political leaders seeking to avoid the domestic and international costs of
abandoning Taiwan to the Communist regime in China. e eventual solu-
tion, worked out in three U.S.-China joint communiques, was for the United
States to terminate its defense treaty with the ROC and withdraw U.S. military
forces from Taiwan, shift diplomatic recognition to the PRC, and maintain
only unocial relations with the people on Taiwan. Beijing asserted that Tai-
wan was an integral part of China, while the United States acknowledged this
position without formally accepting it.
2
e United States enacted the 1979
Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) to provide the legal basis for its unocial rela-
tions with Taiwan. Among other things, the TRA requires the United States
to make defensive arms available to Taiwan and states that it will “consider
Introduction 3
any eort to determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means,
including by boycotts or embargoes, a threat to the peace and security of the
Western Pacic area and of grave concern to the United States.” e TRA also
states that U.S. policy is to retain the capability to resist the use of force or
coercion to undermine Taiwan’s security.
3
Although the United States does not have a formal commitment to defend
Taiwan, the TRA’s language and decades of policy have linked the credibility
Map 2. Pratas and Taiping islands, marked in black
4 Saunders and Wuthnow
of U.S. regional alliance commitments to its actions regarding Taiwan. U.S.
stakes deepened further with Taiwan’s democratization in the late 1980s and
early 1990s, which increased Taiwan’s appeal relative to the authoritarian
PRC regime and strengthened U.S. political sympathy and support for Tai-
wan, especially in Congress.
4
Moreover, some U.S. strategists have come to
view a Taiwan not under PRC control as having signicant geopolitical value
in limiting PLA power projection capability.
5
Recent testimony by a Biden ad-
ministration ocial implied that U.S. policy might accept this view and seek
to prevent unication rather than simply shape the procedural conditions
under which negotiations between China and Taiwan take place.
6
us, the
stakes are high for Washington in terms of domestic politics, the credibility of
U.S. alliance commitments, and the regional balance of power.
For more than two decades after its 1949 defeat in the Chinese Civil War,
the authoritarian KMT government ruling Taiwan beneted from a formal
security alliance with the United States and U.S. diplomatic support for its po-
sition that the ROC was the sole legitimate government of all China, and thus
entitled to membership in the United Nations (UN) and control of China’s
permanent seat in the UN Security Council.
7
e KMT government main-
tained the goal of overthrowing the CCP and regaining control of Mainland
China, agreeing that the mainland and Taiwan were both part of a larger Chi-
na. Like the PRC, the ROC government rejected the notion of dual represen-
tation and insisted that countries choose between diplomatic relations with
the PRC or the ROC. is position eventually became untenable as the ROC
was expelled from the United Nations in 1971 and more and more countries
switched diplomatic relations to the PRC, including the United States in 1979.
is left Taiwan internationally isolated, with few formal diplomatic allies
and only unocial relations with most major countries.
Taiwan’s attitude toward China changed with democratization in the
late 1980s and early 1990s, which ended KMT authoritarian rule and allowed
other political parties to compete for power, including the pro-independence
Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). Taiwan’s government (and its policy
toward China) became more responsive to the concerns of the native Tai-
wanese who constitute the majority of the population.
8
e traditional ROC
position is that the ROC government has sovereignty over both Taiwan and
Mainland China, but in practice only exercises jurisdiction over the main
Introduction 5
island of Taiwan; various oshore islands such as the Penghus, Pratas/Dong-
sha, Matsu, Jinmen, and Wuchiu; and Taiping/Itu Aba Island in the South
China Sea.
9
(See map 2 showing Pratas/Dongsha Island and Taiping/Itu Aba
Island, respectively.)
e issue of Taiwan’s relationship with China is highly contested, but
public opinion on Taiwan strongly supports the continuation of the current
status quo and the population increasingly identies as Taiwanese rather
than Chinese.
10
Credible PRC threats to use force deter a declaration or refer-
endum that would formally assert Taiwan’s independence. At the same time,
the current DPP government has refused to acknowledge that Taiwan is part
of China, arguing that Taiwan is already an independent sovereign state and
that a formal declaration of independence is unnecessary. is position is
in great tension with the PRC’s “one China principle” and ultimate goal of
unication as well as the KMT’s acceptance of the 1992 Consensus, which
involved a vague commitment to one China.
11
is disagreement about Tai-
wan’s exact status relative to China is the fundamental basis of the political
dispute between Beijing and Taipei.
Despite these diering interpretations, this ambiguous “one China”
framework has served the minimal needs of political leaders and people in
China, Taiwan, and the United States for more than 40 years, supporting eco-
nomic growth, development of robust cross-strait economic and cultural ties,
and political development of Taiwan’s democracy. Although political ten-
sions have waxed and waned over time, the CCP’s “reform and opening up”
policy and the interest of the Taiwan government and business community in
exploiting economic opportunities in China have allowed cross-strait trade
and investment to grow to the point where China is Taiwan’s largest market,
and the two economies are deeply intertwined despite Taiwan government
eorts to reduce economic dependence on the mainland.
Nevertheless, long-term political, military, and economic trends are
eroding the stability of the status quo and increasing the potential for military
conict.
12
China’s policy toward Taiwan shifted from its initial emphasis on
“liberating Taiwan” by force to a focus on achieving “peaceful unication,”
but CCP leaders have refused to rule out the use of force, either to prevent
Taiwan independence or to compel unication under certain conditions.
13
Taiwan’s status is fundamentally a political question, but the military balance
6 Saunders and Wuthnow
between China and Taiwan and between China and the United States is an
increasingly important factor shaping cross-strait relations.
e importance and sensitivity of these issues is illustrated by China’s
response to Taiwan President Lee Teng-hui’s June 1995 unocial visit to the
United States. Lee’s visit triggered a military crisis that included the PLA r-
ing ballistic missiles near Taiwan’s two main harbors prior to the March 1996
presidential election and President Bill Clinton ordering the deployment of
two U.S. aircraft carriers to waters near Taiwan as a military show of force.
14
Since then, a Taiwan contingency has become the principal focus of Chi-
nese military modernization, and the PLA has assumed that the U.S. military
would intervene on Taiwan’s behalf in a conict. is has fueled PLA eorts
to develop the capabilities necessary to invade Taiwan, including advanced
antiaccess/area-denial (A2/AD) systems to counter a potential U.S. military
intervention. e PLA’s successes in military modernization and reform in-
creasingly challenge Taiwan’s ability to defend itself in the face of numerically
and qualitatively superior Chinese forces and raise the costs and risks of U.S.
intervention on Taiwan’s behalf.
A Changing Military Balance
e military balance between Taiwan and China has shifted decisively in
Beijing’s favor over the last three decades. Taiwan has historically benet-
ed from the inherent defensive advantages provided by its island geogra-
phy and a technological edge based on access to advanced U.S. weapons
and training. PLA modernization has eroded Taiwan’s technological ad-
vantage, and the PLA now maintains qualitative advantages across the
spectrum of conict. Taiwan’s conventional force capabilities are out-
matched by the PLA’s size and advantages in personnel, weapon systems,
and defense budgets. e table compares Taiwan military forces with the
PLA’s Eastern and Southern theater commands (TCs) that would be most
involved in a Taiwan scenario to establish a baseline of the conventional
military challenge Taiwan faces.
15
In addition to the forces depicted in the table, the PLA Rocket Force oper-
ates 100 ground-launched cruise missile launchers, 250 short-range ballistic
missile launchers, and 250 medium-range ballistic missile launchers with the
collective capability of ring at least 1,900 missiles.
16
Introduction 7
e PLA has several options to apply its military capabilities against
Taiwan, including low-level military coercion, coordinated missile and air-
strikes, a blockade, and a full-edged invasion of the island. (ese options
are detailed and assessed more fully in the chapters by Mathieu Duchâtel and
Michael Casey in this volume.) However, even with China’s considerable mil-
itary advantages, there would still be signicant costs and risks in trying to
resolve Taiwan’s status by force.
e PLA has periodically employed military coercion against Taiwan in the
form of targeted military exercises, demonstrations of force, and deployments.
ese actions have sought to signal China’s capability and resolve while stay-
ing in the gray zonethat is, below the level of lethal force. However, low-level
coercion could potentially grow to include limited use of lethal force, such as
seizing oshore islands controlled by Taiwan or kinetic attacks against Taiwan’s
Table. Comparison of PLA and Taiwan Military Forces
Capability PLA Eastern and Southern
TCs
Taiwan
Ground Force Personnel 416,000 88,000 (active duty)
Tanks 6,300 across PLAA 800
Artillery Pieces 7,000 across PLAA 1,100
Aircraft Carriers 1 (2 total) 0
Major Surface Combatants 96 (132 total) 26
Landing Ships 49 (57 total) 14
Attack Submarines 35 (65 total) 2 (diesel attack)
Coastal Patrol Boats
(Missile)
68 (86 total) 44
Fighter Aircraft 700 (1,600 total) 400
Bomber Aircraft 250 (450 total) 0
Transport Aircraft 20 (400 total) 30
Special Mission Aircraft 100 (150 total) 30
Source: Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s
Republic of China 2021 (Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2021), 161–162.
8 Saunders and Wuthnow
infrastructure. Some actions have come in response to specic Chinese con-
cerns about possible movement toward Taiwan independence, such as the
1995–1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis and PLA deployments in 2008 during the nal
months of Chen Shui-bian’s presidency. Although China used only limited mil-
itary coercion for most of Ma Ying-jeou’s presidency (2009–2016), it has ramped
up military pressure against Taiwan since then, citing Tsai Ing-wen’s refusal to
accept the 1992 Consensus as justication. ese actions have included island
landing exercises, circumnavigation of Taiwan by PLA Navy aircraft carriers
and aircraft, and repeated intrusions into Taiwan’s Air Defense Identication
Zone.
17
e PLA appears to have escalated the number and intensity of these
actions in 2020 and 2021 to increase military pressure on Taiwan.
A joint repower strike campaign would employ PLA missile and air strikes
to inict sucient damage to compel Taiwan to accept Chinese terms. e rst
phase would employ precision strikes to degrade Taiwan’s air and missile de-
fenses and achieve air superiority. A second phase of attacks would strike mil-
itary and infrastructure targets to inict punishment on Taiwan’s leaders and
population. China has the military capabilities to inict heavy punishment on
Taiwan, but these attacks would generate signicant international reaction and
provide time for the United States to mobilize and deploy forces. Moreover, the
historical record indicates that strategic bombing campaigns tend to produce
rallying eects rather than cause leaders and the public to surrender.
18
Taiwan
also has its own oensive missile capabilities that it could use to mount limited
strikes against the mainland in response. Taiwan’s 2021 Quadrennial Defense
Review and 2019 National Defense Report address these realities in depth and
highlight the training, defense spending increases, and foreign military sales
acquisitions to signicantly add risk and cost to this option for the PLA.
19
A joint blockade campaign would employ kinetic blockades of maritime
and air trac to Taiwan to cut o vital imports. e blockade would likely
include mines, missile strikes, and possible seizures of Taiwan’s oshore is-
lands and could be tailored in scope and intensity.
20
A full blockade could
employ the entire suite of PLA capabilities, including electronic warfare, cy-
ber warfare, and information operations. Chinese submarine warfare capa-
bilities and the PLA’s ability to launch antiship cruise missiles and ballistic
missiles from a variety of platforms would greatly complicate Taiwan’s de-
fenses. A blockade would disrupt commercial shipping in the region and
Introduction 9
generate signicant international reactions. e extended duration of the
blockade necessary to compel Taiwan into accepting Chinese terms would
have substantive military, economic, and political costs and provide time for
the international community to impose sanctions and for the U.S. military to
deploy forces to intervene militarily. is option carries substantial costs and
risks with uncertain prospects of compelling Taiwan to capitulate.
A joint island landing campaign would involve a full amphibious invasion
that might build on prior blockade and strike campaigns. is option has the
highest military costs and risks but oers the prospect of a decisive military vic-
tory. e PLA routinely exercises the military skills that would be employed in
an amphibious invasion.
21
An invasion would require a massive mobilization of
PLA forces, equipment, and logistics capabilities. e rst phase would involve
eorts to degrade Taiwan’s air and naval defenses in preparation for an am-
phibious assault. e PLA would utilize precision ballistic and cruise missile
strikes against Taiwan’s air and missile defenses, precision long-range artillery,
airstrikes with medium-range bombers and ghters, and antiship cruise mis-
sile and submarine attacks against Taiwan’s naval assets. Taiwan would employ
its air and missile defense and air force and naval assets to defend targets and
contest PLA eorts to gain maritime and air superiority.
22
e PLA would then
need to execute an amphibious assault to establish a beachhead on Taiwan
and an airborne/air assault attack to try to seize an aireld and a port facility
that could allow the PLA to use civilian transportation assets to provide air and
sea lift. e PLA would then have to land sucient ground combat forces to de-
feat Taiwan’s ground forces and provide sucient ammunition, fuel, and other
supplies to support these forces during combat operations.
Since the 1995–1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis, the PLA has assumed that the
United States would intervene in a Taiwan conict and has sought to deter or
delay U.S. intervention via an array of A2/AD capabilities that would raise the
costs and risks for U.S. forces operating near China.
23
ese include advanced
diesel submarines, which could attack U.S. naval forces deploying into the
Western Pacic; surface-to-air missiles such as the Russian S-300, which could
target U.S. ghters and bombers; and antiship cruise and ballistic missiles op-
timized to attack U.S. aircraft carrier battle groups.
24
China has invested in a
range of accurate conventional missiles that could target the bases and ports
the U.S. military would use in a conict, including most recently the DF-17
10 Saunders and Wuthnow
intermediate-range ballistic missile with a hypersonic glide vehicle. China has
also sought to exploit U.S. military dependence on space systems by develop-
ing a range of antisatellite capabilities that could degrade, interfere with, or di-
rectly attack U.S. satellites and their associated ground stations. It has invested
in cyber capabilities to collect intelligence and to degrade the U.S. military’s
ability to employ computer networks in a crisis or conict. In a conict, the
PLA would attempt to use multidomain attacks to paralyze U.S. intelligence,
communications, and command and control systems and force individual
units to ght in isolation, at a huge disadvantage.
25
China is also likely to deal
with the risks of U.S. intervention by seeking to win a quick victory before the
United States could fully deploy its forces to the theater, thereby presenting the
United States with a hard-to-reverse fait accompli.
e implications for the U.S. ability to defend Taiwan are signicant.
While the PLA has not caught up to the U.S. military in aggregate military ca-
pabilities, it does not need parity to frustrate U.S. intervention in a short con-
ict on its immediate periphery.
26
e RAND Corporation’s 2015 evaluation
of U.S.-China military force capability trends found that the United States had
“major advantages” in 7 of 10 critical capability areas in a Taiwan scenario
in 1996 but that by 2017 the United States would have clear “advantages” in
only three categories, and the PLA would enjoy advantages in two: its ability
to attack U.S. airbases and carriers.
27
China’s advances in ballistic missiles,
cruise missiles, and modern diesel attack submarines now give it capabilities
it did not have during the 1995–1996 stando, which might aect how the U.S.
military chooses to forward deploy forces.
28
Of course, Taiwan and the United States are not standing still. Taiwan’s
Overall Defense Concept, described in the chapters by Alexander Chieh-
cheng Huang and Drew ompson, seeks to use asymmetric capabilities to
increase the challenges for invading PLA forces. ese include investments
in rapid mine deployments and mobile missile platforms that would target
invading forces and complement Taiwan’s geographic advantages. e con-
cept also includes investments to make Taiwan’s forces more survivable and
eective in preventing a post-landing breakout. Taiwan’s 2021 Quadrennial
Defense Review and 2019 National Defense Report spend considerable time
highlighting the training, defense spending increases, and foreign military
sales acquisitions to add risk and cost to PLA military options.
29
Introduction 11
e Department of Defense (DOD) is working to adapt U.S. weapons and
operational concepts to ght the PLA in an A2/AD environment, including
increased forward deployment of forces and supplies to overcome the “tyr-
anny of distance.” is thinking is evident in the 2018 National Defense Strat-
egy and in the joint concept of “globally integrated operations” that seeks to
leverage information and U.S. global capabilities to achieve decisive strate-
gic eects in regional contingencies. At the request of Congress, then U.S.
Indo-Pacic Command commander Admiral Philip Davidson developed
a 6-year, $20 billion investment program for the U.S. military to “regain the
advantage” over China in the Indo-Pacic region. Congress appears likely to
continue to fund this request.
30
e U.S. Services all have active eorts under way to adapt systems and
doctrine to meet A2/AD threats, with a clear focus on China. For the Navy, this
involves eorts to disrupt the “kill chain” necessary for Chinese missiles to lo-
cate and target U.S. carriers and to develop the ability to operate and reload ship
armaments from a diverse set of nontraditional port facilities. For the Air Force,
this involves eorts to develop both stando and penetrating platforms
31
and
improve the Service’s ability to conduct expeditionary, distributed operations
from austere airelds with reduced logistics and maintenance requirements,
which the Air Force calls Agile Combat Employment.
32
e Army has created
new “multidomain task forces” that combine artillery and precision strike ca-
pabilities with a range of cyber, electronic warfare, space, and intelligence ca-
pabilities to operate within and degrade an adversary’s A2/AD capabilities. e
initial pilot program was conducted under U.S. Army Pacic, and the rst oper-
ational task force has been established at Joint Base Lewis-McChord, which is
aligned to the Indo-Pacic theater.
33
e Marine Corps has made a major shift
in its force modernization over the next decade to improve its ability to conduct
expeditionary advanced base operations in contested environments.
34
Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin III has repeatedly described China as
the “pacing challenge” for DOD. In a December 2021 speech, he highlighted
how DOD has been stepping up its eorts on China:
Our China Task Force sharpened the Department’s priorities and charted a
path to greater focus and coordination. We made the Department’s larg-
est-ever budget request for research, development, testing, and evaluation.
And we’re investing in new capabilities that will make us more lethal from
12 Saunders and Wuthnow
greater distances, and more capable of operating stealthy and unmanned
platforms, and more resilient under the seas and in space and in cyberspace.
We’re also pursuing a more distributed force posture in the Indo-Pacic—
one that will help us bolster deterrence, and counter coercion, and operate
forward with our trusted allies and partners.
And we’re developing new concepts of operations that will bring the Amer-
ican way of war into the 21
st
century, working closely with our unparal-
leled global network of partners and allies.
Austin highlighted “integrated deterrence” as the cornerstone concept of a
new National Defense Strategy that was released in early 2022. He described
it as “integrating our eorts across domains and across the spectrum of con-
ict to ensure that the U.S. military—in close cooperation with the rest of the
U.S. Government and our allies and partners—makes the folly and costs of
aggression very clear.”
35
Assessing the Risks
Most military analysts would agree that the PLA has made considerable mili-
tary advances. Secretary Austin stated in December 2021 that “two decades of
breakneck modernization” have put the PLA on pace “to become a peer com-
petitor to the United States in Asia—and eventually around the world.”
36
In its
2021 annual report, the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commis-
sion found that “improvements in China’s military capabilities have funda-
mentally transformed the strategic environment and weakened the military
dimension of cross-strait deterrence.”
37
e PLA clearly has the capability to apply low-level coercive pressure
and to conduct air and missile strikes against Taiwan and probably has the
capability to execute a blockade absent U.S. intervention. Disagreements
come in assessing the PLA’s capability to execute the most demanding mil-
itary option—an amphibious invasion of Taiwan—especially in the face of
U.S. intervention. e Oce of the Secretary of Defense 2021 report on the
PLA highlights the challenges and risks:
Large-scale amphibious invasion is one of the most complicated and di-
cult military operations, requiring air and maritime superiority, the rapid
Introduction 13
buildup and sustainment of supplies onshore, and uninterrupted support.
An attempt to invade Taiwan would likely strain PRC’s armed forces and
invite international intervention. ese stresses, combined with the PRC’s
combat force attrition and the complexity of urban warfare and counter-
insurgency, even assuming a successful landing and breakout, make an
amphibious invasion of Taiwan a signicant political and military risk for
Xi Jinping and the Chinese Communist Party.
38
Some have expressed concern that the PLA might acquire the ability to
mount an invasion soon. In March 2021, Admiral Philip Davidson, then com-
mander of U.S. Indo-Pacic Command, told Congress that China’s threat to
Taiwan could manifest “in the next six years.”
39
Davidson’s judgment was not
a coordinated U.S. Government position, and other DOD ocials have not
repeated this assessment.
40
Davidson’s successor, Admiral John Aquilino, de-
clined to oer a specic time estimate but testied that China considers es-
tablishing control over Taiwan to be its “number one priority” and that “this
problem is much closer to us than most think.”
41
e U.S.-China Economic
and Security Review Commission judged in its 2021 report that “PLA leaders
now likely assess they have, or will soon have, the initial capability to conduct
a high-risk invasion of Taiwan if ordered to do so.”
42
Similarly, Taiwan Min-
ister of Defense Chiu Kuo-cheng told the Taiwan legislature that Mainland
China will have the ability to mount a full-scale invasion of Taiwan by 2025,
though he also noted that Chinese leaders would still “need to think about
the cost and consequence of starting a war.”
43
Oriana Skylar Mastro argued in Foreign Aairs in July 2021 that advances
in military modernization mean that Chinese leaders now consider a military
campaign to take back Taiwan “a real possibility” and that “once China has
the military capabilities to nally solve the Taiwan problem, Xi could nd it
politically untenable not to do so” due to strong nationalist pressures.
44
She
sketches PLA military options and argues that the PLA could already execute
the less demanding scenarios, while noting that an amphibious assault on the
island “is far from guaranteed to succeed.” Nevertheless, Mastro argues that
“Chinese leaders’ perceptions of their chances of victory will matter more
than their actual chances of victory.” She argues that China would hope for a
short, decisive campaign that would limit costs, but might believe that it has
social and economic advantages that would help it prevail over the United
14 Saunders and Wuthnow
States in a protracted war. She acknowledges that economic and diplomat-
ic costs of war would be part of Beijing’s decision calculus but argues that
Chinese leaders may believe that these costs are signicantly less than U.S.
decisionmakers and analysts assume. Mastro concludes that Xi “may believe
he can regain control of Taiwan without jeopardizing his Chinese dream.”
Other scholars question various aspects of this assessment. In a rejoin-
der published in the next issue of Foreign Aairs, Rachel Esplin Odell and Eric
Heginbotham argue that the PLA’s chances of succeeding in a cross-strait inva-
sion are poor today and will remain so for at least a decade.
45
ey cite limita-
tions in PLA lift and logistics capability and argue that “the PLA still lacks the
naval and air assets necessary to pull o a successful cross-strait attack. Just as
important, it suers from weaknesses in training, in the willingness or ability
of junior ocers to take initiative, and in the ability to coordinate ground, sea,
and air forces in large, complex operations.” Odell and Heginbotham also ques-
tion whether CCP leaders are eager to resolve the situation with force, noting
that “although some of these options are more realistic than others, all would
carry immense risk. . . . Beijing is unlikely to attempt any of them unless it feels
backed into a corner.” Similarly, Bonny Lin and David Sacks agree that “it is
far from clear that China could defeat Taiwan’s military, subdue its population,
and occupy and control its territory. Nor is it clear that the PLA could hold o
any U.S. forces that came to Taiwan’s aid or that Beijing would be willing to un-
dertake a campaign that could spark a larger and far more costly war with the
United States.”
46
ey cite the likely costs of using force, arguing that “a Chinese
invasion would invite signicant international political, economic, and diplo-
matic backlash that could undermine China’s political, social, and economic
development goals. It would also spur the formation of powerful anti-China
coalitions, bringing to fruition Beijing’s long-standing fear of “strategic encir-
clement” by powers aligned against it.” us, despite the PLA’s considerable
modernization gains over the last 20 years, experts continue to debate whether
and when it will be able to invade at a cost and risk acceptable to CCP leaders.
Key Conclusions
is edited volume contributes to the debate by addressing the problem at
three levels: China’s decisionmaking calculus, its military capabilities and
operations, and potential policy responses by Taiwan and the United States.
Introduction 15
It contains up-to-date analysis from multiple perspectives, including schol-
ars from the United States, Taiwan, and France and analysis by academics,
think-tank experts, and government analysts. e analysis draws on a wide
range of sources, including PLA internal writings about military campaigns
and the logistics and transportation requirements for an invasion of Taiwan.
e analysis also looks beyond hardware to consider how recent orga-
nizational reforms and revised command and control arrangements would
aect the PLA’s ability to conduct complicated, high-risk integrated joint op-
erations in the face of opposition by Taiwan and U.S. military forces. It builds
on previous books produced from the Taiwan’s Council of Advanced Policy
Studies–RAND Corporation–National Defense University conference series.
47
e analysis also digs deeper into some underappreciated areas, such as PLA
urban warfare, logistics, and airborne capabilities.
While looking at China’s military threat to Taiwan through dierent lens-
es, the contributors to this volume reached several common conclusions.
First, any Chinese decision to use force is much more likely to result from
a deliberate cost-benet calculus incorporating both domestic and external
considerations than from unintended escalation. Andrew Scobell emphasiz-
es domestic economic and political resilience as keys to the use of force—a
Chinese Communist Party that sees itself as “ascendant” and buered from
sanctions and other predictable consequences might accept the risks of a
war to resolve a remaining obstacle to “national rejuvenation,” while a par-
ty struggling to govern a “stagnant” mainland might conclude that the risks
outweigh the benets. Other authors assess that upgraded hardware and a
more cohesive command structure following the reforms could increase the
leadership’s condence in the PLA’s ability to act decisively while keeping es-
calation at an acceptable level.
Political trends in Taiwan are also likely to inform China’s calculus. Phillip
Saunders argues that low support for unication in Taiwan, which has dimin-
ished further with China’s dismantling of individual freedoms in Hong Kong
and repression against ethnic Uighurs in Xinjiang, has reduced China’s con-
dence in the prospects for a settlement based on a “one country, two systems”
model. For Beijing, the closing of other options increases the relative attrac-
tiveness of military intimidation (and the potential use of force should coer-
cion fail) to prevent a slide toward Taiwan independence in the near term and
16 Saunders and Wuthnow
to convince Taiwan’s leadership to accept reconciliation on China’s terms in
the future. Nevertheless, as Mathieu Duchâtel notes, Beijing might be cautious
about more provocative tactics short of war, such as the seizure of one of Tai-
wan’s outlying islands, that leave Taiwan’s leadership intact and might galva-
nize greater support for independence, rather than cowing Taiwan’s public.
For some authors, the U.S. factor is also prominent in Chinese decision-
making. Drew ompson and Alexander Chieh-cheng Huang both argue
that increasing military coordination between the two sides and continued
U.S. arms sales are essential for improving Taiwan’s defenses, thus enhancing
deterrence by denial and raising the stakes for Beijing, which would prefer
not to have to ght a war with the United States. From a military perspective,
however, Michael Casey emphasizes that Chinese anticipation of U.S. inter-
vention—which is already assumed in PLA doctrinal writings—encourages
Beijing to prefer an invasion over less extreme options, such as a blockade,
that would give the United States time to mobilize forces across the Western
Pacic and assemble a broader coalition.
Second, while the prospects for peaceful unication are narrowing, Chi-
na’s menu of military intimidation and warghting options is expanding.
Peacetime saber-rattling, which is most useful in dissuading Taiwan’s pur-
suit of de jure independence, has become more routine and varied. Joshua
Arostegui assesses that Beijing has used amphibious exercises to intimidate
Taiwan’s public: while part of the annual training cycle, the PLA has publi-
cized some exercises to underscore China’s resolve and capabilities to Taiwan
and the United States. Mathieu Duchâtel tracks the dramatic expansion of
Chinese ghter incursions across the midline of the Taiwan Strait and the in-
creasing tempo and complexity of PLA Air Force (PLAAF) and naval aviation
ights within Taiwan’s southwestern Air Defense Identication Zone. Such
operations serve multiple goals, such as normalizing more intense military
activities, testing U.S. resolve, deterring Taiwan independence, and catering
to a nationalistic domestic audience.
Authors also discuss a variety of military measures that Beijing has not
yet employed. Duchâtel assesses that the PLA could seize an outlying island
such as Dongsha/Pratas to gradually extend its control over territory cur-
rently held by Taiwan—a higher risk version of the “salami-slicing” tactics
that China has used in the South China Sea. He also describes an escalating
Introduction 17
series of cyber attacks against Taiwan, including targeting civilian infra-
structure, as a possible next step in China’s pressure campaign.
48
Higher
forms of coercion discussed in Chinese writings, and likely within current
PLA capabilities, include missile bombardments or a maritime, air, and in-
formation blockade. As Michael Casey discusses, these campaigns could be
used in isolation to attempt to force Taiwan’s leaders to the negotiating ta-
ble or to set conditions for an invasion. Joshua Arostegui notes that China’s
amphibious forces, though essential to an island landing, would also help
safeguard critical sea lanes during a blockade.
e most signicant Chinese military threat to Taiwan, as discussed in
many scholarly and media publications, remains a full invasion.
49
As Casey
demonstrates, the concepts for a landing are well established within PLA doc-
trinal writings. Numerous chapters in this volume, as discussed below, esh out
how various PLA forces and systems are being improved to tackle the challenges
of crossing the strait with sucient force, after attrition, to establish a foothold.
A question that has received much less attention is what comes next. Chinese
writings sometimes assume that any resistance would quickly collapse, though
as Sale Lilly points out, the PLA has increased urban warfare training, develop-
ing skills that could become relevant if Taiwan does not easily concede.
ird, the PLA is making wholesale changes to ready itself for higher
end Taiwan contingencies. Several chapters address the implications of re-
forms carried out during the Xi Jinping era. Conor Kennedy, Roderick Lee,
and Joshua Arostegui all highlight the conversion of pre-reform divisions into
brigades as a key part of the “below the neck” reforms that took place in 2017.
Kennedy notes that the PLA Army’s watercraft units, which complement the
navy’s sealift assets, have been “brigadized,” with newer ships coming online
to replace those of Cold War vintage. Lee sketches the PLAAF Airborne Corps’
transition from divisions to brigades, which increases those units’ maneuver-
ability, and catalogues their structure and hardware. Arostegui argues that
the army’s shift to a atter brigade structure encourages greater “initiative
and independence” for its six amphibious brigades. He also notes that the
relocation of forces has allowed for “improved mobilization timelines.”
Other chapters assess how the reforms generated a more cohesive “sys-
tem of systems,” bringing together the PLA’s diverse capabilities. Joel Wuthnow
argues that a joint command structure, modeled in part on the U.S. system,
18 Saunders and Wuthnow
allows theater commanders greater control over conventional forces while
strengthening the ability of the Central Military Commission to allocate “na-
tional assets,” such as the Strategic Support Force or long-range Rocket Force
conventional missiles that might be used for counterintervention purposes or
to deter other rivals during a Taiwan crisis. Chieh Chung describes a similar
centralization of PLA logistics forces, which are now better postured to allo-
cate and redeploy munitions and other supplies along an extended front. He
also provides a rare look inside China’s mobilization system, which has been
recongured so that multiple provinces—some of them far from the Taiwan
Strait—are mobilized to facilitate the ow of materiel during a conict.
Contributors also describe new hardware and equipment that would
allow the PLA to better execute its primary cross-strait operations. Ken-
nedy argues that the launch of multiple Type-075 large-deck amphibious
ships, which carry 30 helicopters, would increase the PLA’s ability to deliver
forces across the strait. His chapter also describes the potential enlistment
of civilian merchant ships, including high-capacity roll-on/roll-o vessels
and semi-submersible ships, to reduce the PLA’s sealift decit.
50
Arostegui
highlights new ZLT-05 amphibious ghting vehicles, whose 105-millimeter
assault guns will “improve commanders’ ability to direct res in optimal con-
ditions,” while Roderick Lee suggests that the new 4x4 tactical vehicles in the
PLAAF Airborne Corps will “improve the mobility and lethality of those units
equipped with [them].” No less important, Chieh Chung anticipates that lo-
gistics bases will soon be upgraded with specialized equipment to accelerate
the loading and unloading of supplies.
Fourth, despite recent reforms and new capabilities, the PLA continues
to wrestle with challenges in hardware, organization, training, and doctrine.
A common observation concerns insucient military air- and sealift to trans-
port multiple echelons of troops and equipment across the strait. Kennedy
describes the attention to civilian shipping as a response to insucient “gray
hull” sealift, though this approach raises questions about how well civil-
ian assets would perform in a combat environment. Kennedy also suggests
that dicult tidal conditions would reduce the utility of some of those as-
sets. Lee identies a similar shortfall of military airlift, which the PLA could
resolve by accelerating production of transport aircraft by 2030; the more
challenging problem is the limited capacity of mainland airelds to handle
Introduction 19
frequent sorties in a compressed timeframe. He also argues that the PLAAF
Airborne Corps will face dicult choices in how to employ those forces (such
as between oensive and defense ground operations). In the logistics arena,
Chung describes continuing constraints in warehouse capacity and medical
supplies, which could impede operations.
PLA reforms strengthened parts of the organizational structure but
might have created new weaknesses. Joshua Arostegui observes that the
army’s drive to emphasize combined arms battalions as the basic maneu-
ver unit could lead to overburdened command and sta at lower levels who
would be “faced with vulnerabilities resulting from networked command
and information systems; competing requirements from subordinate, lat-
eral, and higher units; and operations in a complex electromagnetic envi-
ronment.” He also notes that marine corps units remain nonstandardized
and thus less able to be plugged into an army-centric amphibious campaign.
Joel Wuthnow describes tensions in the joint command structure between a
recognition that commanders at the operational and tactical levels need to
be empowered to make dicult decisions and a simultaneous eort during
the Xi era to increase centralized decisionmaking and strengthen the role of
party committees throughout the PLA.
Authors also describe a variety of training and doctrinal impediments.
Sale Lilly notes that while the PLA has increased its urban warfare training, it
might have drawn the wrong lessons from U.S. experiences, highlighting the
allure of “decapitation strikes” and avoiding serious analysis of the drawn-out
insurgencies that U.S. forces faced in Afghanistan and Iraq. He concludes that
the PLA may be unprepared for a protracted resistance. e lack of combined
arms and joint training could also reduce the PLA’s battleeld eectiveness:
Arostegui notes that amphibious units rarely participate in opposition force
training, and older army watercraft units barely train at all, while Lee nds
that the PLAAF Airborne Corps has not conducted joint training (which
would be essential to support amphibious troops). Casey observes that PLA
doctrine has not been updated for over a decade, though a joint operations
outline approved by the Central Military Commission in November 2020
could set the stage for updated joint doctrine.
51
Finally, opportunities remain to strengthen Taiwan’s defense.
Wuthnow argues that the PLA’s Leninist organizational culture—which
20 Saunders and Wuthnow
emphasizes careful decisionmaking, along with a shift to a “system of
systems” architecture where the failure of a given system could have
broader implications for the cohesiveness of China’s military opera-
tions—supports operational concepts that confront PLA decisionmak-
ers with unforeseen and difficult-to-resolve dilemmas. This requires
precision-guided munitions combined with cyber and information op-
erations.
52
Chung similarly contends that Taiwan should target China’s
centralized logistics systems and networks to slow the PLA’s ability to
mobilize and sustain forces.
Several authors also encourage Taiwan to strengthen its asymmetric war-
ghting capabilities to deter or delay a PLA invasion. Casey suggests that lim-
ited sealift could require the PLA to focus its landing on just one part of the
island, which would allow Taiwan to concentrate its limited munitions. He also
argues that large amphibious ships, which could become high-value targets in
a cross-strait campaign, are better suited for global power projection opera-
tions. Kennedy suggests that Taiwan’s Overall Defense Concept, which prior-
itizes investments in antiship missiles, could exacerbate PLA concerns about
the likely attrition of its amphibious forces and therefore enhance deterrence.
Drew ompson notes that Taiwan has either built or procured several key sys-
tems associated with the concept, including modern sea mines, fast attack ves-
sels, Harpoon coastal defense missiles, howitzers, and Stinger missiles.
Nevertheless, Taiwan’s defenses remain troubled by factors beyond
China’s military threat. According to Huang, domestic problems include re-
cruitment shortfalls as Taiwan shifts to an all-volunteer force, the need to
maintain expensive legacy systems that have less utility in a war, such as
ghters and large surface ships, and a population that has trouble “imagin-
ing an actual war.” He also worries that the Overall Defense Concept’s sin-
gular focus on preparing for invasion could leave Taiwan less well-prepared
for gray zone coercion and other problems, such as a blockade. ompson
argues that while Taiwan has made progress in hardware, it needs to focus
more on personnel issues, including strengthening the reserve force and on
stockpiling critical supplies to weather a blockade. Huang and ompson
both argue that U.S. and Taiwan defense establishments could work to im-
prove Taiwan’s posture, though progress requires a higher level of political
and scal commitment from Taiwan.
Introduction 21
Outline of the Book
is edited volume is divided into four parts. e rst considers the political
and strategic calculus informing Chinese decisions toward Taiwan. In chap-
ter 1, Phillip Saunders evaluates three logics underlying Beijing’s choices over
the past three decades—what he terms leverage, united front, and persuasion.
He argues that authoritarian political trends in China; sharply declining sup-
port for unication in Taiwan, driven in part by the cautionary example of
Hong Kong; and shifts in Taiwan’s domestic politics have reduced the viabil-
ity of a conciliatory path to unication and increased Beijing’s focus on more
coercive tools. In chapter 2, Andrew Scobell suggests that China’s calculus
on the costs, risks, and benets of using force will be shaped by the country’s
trajectory. He describes four scenarios, arguing that Beijing would likely be
most war-prone in an “ascendant” future, where Taiwan remains a singular
obstacle to national greatness, or in an “imploding” future, where the Chi-
nese Communist Party bets its future on a risky conict.
e second part of this volume explores Chinese military options along
the spectrum of conict. Mathieu Duchâtel considers gray zone tactics below
the level of armed conict in chapter 3. He explains why military and political
factors could lead Beijing to move beyond its recent expansion of coercive
operations in Taiwan’s Air Defense Identication Zone and consider even
more provocative moves, including incursions into Taiwan’s territorial seas
and airspace, an intensied cyber campaign, or the seizure of one of Taiwan’s
key oshore islands. Such actions, despite their risks, could be seen as useful
in manufacturing a “series of crises” that demonstrate resolve while creating
a pretext for escalation above the gray zone.
e following chapters explore how PLA combat operations across the
Taiwan Strait might unfold. In chapter 4, Michael Casey details the three pri-
mary cross-strait campaigns discussed in PLA doctrinal writings: joint re-
power strike, joint blockade, and joint island landing. For each campaign,
Casey describes PLA assessments of critical decision points, operational
phasing, and military requirements, while also relaying how Chinese writings
discuss the task of countering U.S. or other foreign intervention. In chapter
5, Sale Lilly addresses how the PLA is preparing for resistance on the island
in the post-landing phase of an invasion. He documents more frequent PLA
22 Saunders and Wuthnow
urban warfare training over the last decade, though he suggests that PLA au-
thors, inuenced by the fall of Saddam Hussein in 2003, may be overly opti-
mistic about the chance of a quick victory.
e third part of this volume dives deeper into specic Chinese forces and
systems that would be critical to a cross-strait campaign, beginning with the
landing forces. In chapter 6, Joshua Arostegui describes the structure of the PLA’s
amphibious units. He argues that a recent shift from divisions to brigades im-
proved the PLA’s ability to conduct a blockade or a landing, though inadequate
sealift means that these forces are likely most useful in the near term in deterring
Taiwan independence through exercises held on the mainland. Arostegui also
explains the division of labor between the army, whose six amphibious brigades
are focused on cross-strait operations, and the PLA Navy Marine Corps, which
prepares for more diverse missions. In chapter 7, Roderick Lee sketches the
composition of the PLA’s airborne forces. He explains how the reformed PLAAF
Airborne Corps would be instrumental in an island seizure, though he identies
limited airlift, airport capacity, and training as possible constraints.
Another pair of chapters looks more closely at PLA logistics require-
ments. Conor Kennedy, in chapter 8, argues that the PLA might address a
shortfall in military sealift by using civilian merchant ships to ferry some
troops and equipment across the Taiwan Strait. Reviewing Chinese technical
publications, he nds that the PLA is exploring how forces could be moved
ashore both with and without an operational port. In the latter case, there
are signs that the PLA is investigating how to use articial harbors, like the
Mulberry harbors used in the Normandy invasion. In chapter 9, Chieh Chung
describes the PLA’s new logistics structure and catalogues its prodigious lo-
gistics needs for a cross-strait campaign in three areas: materiel, medical
support, and transportation. He also explains how recent improvements in
China’s mobilization system could lead to a more ecient transition of soci-
ety from a peacetime to a wartime footing.
Chapter 10 by Joel Wuthnow discusses how reforms have created a com-
mand structure better suited to joint operations. In the Taiwan context, the
Eastern eater Command conducts contingency planning and joint train-
ing in peacetime and would oversee ground, naval, and air forces during a
campaign. Nevertheless, the command structure remains prone to problems
of centralized or consensus-oriented decisionmaking and other issues that
Introduction 23
could reduce the eectiveness of PLA operations. He suggests that Taiwan
and the United States could exploit these problems during a crisis through
rapid and hard-to-predict operations that force overwhelmed leaders to
make dicult decisions under strenuous circumstances.
e nal part of this volume focuses on improving Taiwan’s defenses. In
chapter 11, Alexander Chieh-cheng Huang argues that the Overall Defense
Concept has shown promise in positioning Taiwan to withstand a PLA landing
but is less useful in countering Chinese gray zone coercion or other PLA combat
operations, such as a blockade. He recommends a renement of the concept,
underwritten by a consensus that needs to be strengthened across Taiwan’s
political landscape. In the nal chapter, Drew ompson considers the capa-
bilities needed to prevail in the ght “Taiwan cannot aord to lose,” suggesting
that Taiwan should continue to develop its asymmetric approaches, giving more
attention to personnel and logistics issues. He also suggests ways to strengthen
U.S.-Taiwan defense cooperation, including more intensive bilateral planning
and integration of Taiwan’s sensors with U.S. stando strike weapons.
Conclusion
e analysis in this volume suggests that the PLA already has the capability to
apply low-level coercive pressure and conduct air and missile strikes against
Taiwan. e PLA likely also has the capability to execute a blockade absent
U.S. intervention. However, these military options would leave the sitting Tai-
wan government intact, would provide time for U.S. forces to intervene, and
would likely entail considerable diplomatic, economic, and military costs in
addition to the risk of escalation into a major war with the United States.
A cross-strait invasion could potentially be decisive but probably lies be-
yond current PLA capabilities given known gaps in airlift, sealift, and logis-
tics, as well as other limitations identied by the contributors to this volume.
e PLA is working hard to improve its capabilities and rectify its shortfalls.
However, the U.S. and Taiwan militaries are also improving their capabilities,
including by acquiring new weapons, developing new operational concepts,
and improving ghting eectiveness in confronting the PLA. e PLA has
made considerable progress over the last 20 years in building the capabilities
necessary for an invasion and in closing the qualitative gap with the U.S. mil-
itary, but future progress is not guaranteed.
24 Saunders and Wuthnow
A full assessment of CCP decisionmaking about Taiwan must include
both costs and risks.
53
Costs are the known diplomatic, military, and eco-
nomic losses that CCP leaders would expect if they decided to use force to try
to resolve the issue of Taiwan’s status. Risks include estimates of additional
costs that China might have to pay depending on how the conict unfolds.
ese could be calculated by multiplying the potential additional costs by
the probability that China would ultimately have to pay them. ese costs
and risks could potentially be assessed by outside analysts, but, ultimately,
it is the subjective assessments of CCP and PLA leaders that matter most.
54
e operational challenges the Russian military encountered in its invasion
of Ukraine and the political and economic sanctions imposed on Moscow
following the invasion will likely cause Chinese leaders to increase their esti-
mates of the possible costs and risks of taking military action against Taiwan.
Within the military sphere, there are considerable uncertainties in as-
sessing how a military conict might play out. If the United States does not
intervene and Taiwan’s will to resist collapses quickly, China might achieve
its political goals at a lower-than-expected cost without having to execute
an invasion. However, Chinese leaders cannot assume this outcome and
would have to be prepared for less favorable results, including sti Taiwan
resistance and rapid U.S. intervention. As this volume discusses, the PLA
currently has specic capability gaps that hinder its ability to successful-
ly execute an invasion. e PLA also has broader weaknesses, including
in senior leadership command ability, limited experience with conduct-
ing integrated joint operations, and lack of combat experience. Moreover,
there are no real-world examples of advanced militaries using the full suite
of advanced information-warfare capabilities against equally capable
adversaries; neither are there examples of two nuclear-armed countries
ghting a major war against each other. e diculty of assessing the like-
ly outcome of a military conict—and the high costs of protracted war or
nuclear escalation—will give leaders in China and the United States strong
incentives to try to avoid a conict.
Moreover, there are considerable nonmilitary costs and risks that ex-
tend beyond the correlation of forces. In the case of a U.S.-China conict
over Taiwan, PRC risks include a military failure that might jeopardize the
political survival of top CCP leaders, the potential for a protracted war that
Introduction 25
threatens China’s economy and political stability, and a postwar situation
with a powerful and hostile United States and other countries more willing
to participate in an anti-China coalition. ese costs might occur even if the
PLA successfully achieves its operational objectives. If the PLA continues to
make up ground in its military modernization, deterrence might rest more
heavily on these nonmilitary factors.
CCP statements that China would prefer to pursue peaceful unication
with Taiwan are logical considering the high costs and risks of resolving the
issue with force.
55
is highlights the need for greater attention to the politi-
cal foundations of cross-strait relations and of U.S.-China relations. As noted
above, neither China, nor Taiwan, nor the United States is fully satised with
the current framework of cross-strait relations. Nevertheless, this framework
has met the minimal requirements of all three sides for more than 40 years.
For this situation to continue, restraint and political creativity will be nec-
essary on all sides. Beijing will need to continue to reemphasize its objective of
peaceful unication and nd creative ways to move beyond the “one country,
two systems” framework that has little appeal on Taiwan. is will require rec-
ognizing the high costs and risks of seeking a military solution and that eorts
to achieve a decisive military force advantage will have extremely negative ef-
fects on U.S.-China relations and on regional stability, which in turn will aect
China’s economy and domestic stability. Even in the absence of a conict, the
costs of seeking PRC military superiority are likely to continue to rise.
Taiwan leaders will need to acknowledge the high risks of not only for-
mally declaring independence but also of foreclosing the possibility of uni-
cation at some future date under more favorable circumstances. Such
restraint would likely be necessary to maintain U.S. support, which is critical
if Taiwan is to maintain its current de facto sovereignty in the face of China’s
power advantage. Although heightened U.S.-China strategic competition has
created new opportunities for Taiwan to improve relations with Washington,
more adversarial U.S.-China relations that include signicant economic de-
coupling would have negative consequences for cross-strait relations. Taiwan
leaders might ultimately have to consider whether a negotiated political ar-
rangement that preserves much of Taiwan’s current de facto sovereignty is
preferrable to a hostile relationship with China that damages Taiwan’s econ-
omy and security environment.
56
26 Saunders and Wuthnow
Washington will need to not only weigh its stakes and obligations to Tai-
wan but also consider its obligations under the communiqués that it signed
with China as part of normalizing relations. Recent years have seen a steady
blossoming of the relationship between the U.S. and Taiwan governments
and of that between the U.S. and Taiwan militaries. Beijing opposes any in-
crease in U.S.-Taiwan cooperation, but developments that further erode U.S.
“one China” commitments could prompt China to take limited military ac-
tion to reestablish limits on unocial U.S. relations with Taiwan. e United
States has historically focused on encouraging a peaceful, noncoercive envi-
ronment for cross-strait relations rather than pursuing a specic resolution of
Taiwan’s status. e United States should continue that policy and not adopt
a policy of preventing unication.
If Chinese leaders conclude that the prospects of peaceful unica-
tion have disappeared, then the potential for war over Taiwan—despite its
known high costs and unfathomable risks—would increase dramatically.
e United States must be careful that actions intended to deter a conict
do not end up precipitating one.
Notes
1
“Full Text of Xi Jinping’s Report at 19
th
CPC National Congress,” Xinhua, October 18,
2017, available at <http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/special/2017-11/03/c_136725942.htm>.
2
At the time, the Republic of China (ROC) government also asserted that Taiwan was an
integral part of China.
3
For a concise overview of the Taiwan Relations Act and U.S. policy, see Richard C. Bush,
A One-China Policy Primer, East Asia Policy Paper 10 (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution,
March 2017), available at <https://www.brookings.edu/research/a-one-china-policy-primer/>.
4
For a mainstream case on why Taiwan matters to the United States, see Toward a
Stronger U.S.-Taiwan Relationship: A Report of the CSIS Task Force on U.S. Policy Toward Taiwan
(Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2020), available at <https://
csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/201021_Glaser_TaskForce_
Toward_A_Stronger_USTaiwan_Relationship_0.pdf>.
5
Elbridge Colby, “e United States Should Defend Taiwan,” National Review, December
2, 2021, available at <https://www.nationalreview.com/magazine/2021/12/20/the-united-
states-should-defend-taiwan/>.
Introduction 27
6
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Indo-Pacic Security Aairs Ely Ratner described
Taiwan as a “critical node within the rst island chain, anchoring a network of U.S. allies and
partners—stretching from the Japanese archipelago down to the Philippines and into the South
China Sea—that is critical to the region’s security and critical to the defense of vital U.S. interests
in the Indo-Pacic.” See Ely Ratner, Statement to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Hearing
on e Future of U.S. Policy on Taiwan, 117
th
Cong., 1
st
sess., December 8, 2021, available at
<https://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/120821_Ratner_Testimony1.pdf>. For a critical
assessment of Ratner’s testimony, see Paul Heer, “Has Washington’s Policy Toward Taiwan Crossed
the Rubicon?” e National Interest, December 10, 2021, available at <https://nationalinterest.org/
feature/has-washington%E2%80%99s-policy-toward-taiwan-crossed-rubicon-197877>.
7
e United States initially adopted a policy of “letting the dust settle” after the Chinese
Communist Party (CCP)’s 1949 victory in the Chinese Civil War, but the People’s Republic of
China (PRC)’s decision to “lean to one side” by joining the socialist bloc, and especially its
intervention in the Korean War in October 1950, solidied U.S. support for the ROC. e Mutual
Defense Treaty Between the United States of America and the Republic of China was signed in
December 1954 and took eect in March 1955.
8
Mainlanders who arrived in 1949 and their descendants make up about 14 percent of
the population in Taiwan.
9
is position is expressed in the 1992 Act Governing Relations between the People of
the Taiwan Area and the Mainland Area, which distinguishes between territory under ROC and
PRC jurisdiction in the period “before national unication.” Laws and Regulations Database of
the Republic of China, Act Governing Relations between the People of the Taiwan Area and the
Mainland Area, Mainland Aairs Council, amended July 24, 2019, available at <https://law.moj.
gov.tw/Eng/LawClass/LawAll.aspx?PCode=Q0010001>.
10
Kat Devlin and Christine Huang, “In Taiwan, Views of Mainland China Mostly
Negative,” Pew Research Center, May 12, 2020, available at <https://www.pewresearch.org/
global/2020/05/12/in-taiwan-views-of-mainland-china-mostly-negative/>.
11
e Chinese Nationalist Party (the Kuomintang) regards the 1992 Consensus as
involving “one China, separate interpretations” and interprets the “one China” that Taiwan
belongs to as the Republic of China. e CCP regards the 1992 Consensus as acknowledging that
China and Taiwan are both part of the same sovereign political entity.
12
See Phillip C. Saunders, “Long-Term Trends in China-Taiwan Relations: Implications
for U.S. Taiwan Policy,” Asian Survey 45, no. 6 (November/December 2005), 970–991; Susan
A. ornton, “Whither the Status Quo? A Cross-Taiwan Strait Trilateral Dialogue,” National
Committee on American Foreign Policy, December 17, 2021, available at <https://www.ncafp.
org/read-new-cross-strait-trilateral-report/>.
13
At various times CCP leaders have mentioned several factors that might justify
the use of force, including formal declaration of Taiwan independence; movement toward
Taiwan independence; internal unrest in Taiwan; Taiwan’s acquisition of nuclear weapons;
indenite (sine die) delays in the resumption of cross-strait dialogue on unication; and foreign
military intervention in Taiwan’s internal aairs. See Annual Report to Congress: Military and
Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2021 (Washington, DC: Oce
of the Secretary of Defense, 2021), 115–116, available at <https://media.defense.gov/2021/
nov/03/2002885874/-1/-1/0/2021-cmpr-nal.pdf>.
28 Saunders and Wuthnow
14
John W. Garver, Face O: China, the United States, and Taiwan’s Democratization
(Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1997); Robert S. Ross, “e 1995–1996 Taiwan Strait
Confrontation: Coercion, Credibility, and the Use of Force,” International Security 25, no. 2
(Fall 2000), 87–123. See also James R. Lilley and Chuck Downs, eds., Crisis in the Taiwan Strait
(Washington, DC: NDU Press, 1997).
15
Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2021,
161–163.
16
Ibid., 163.
17
Ibid., 98–99.
18
See Robert Pape, Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War (Ithaca, NY: Cornell
University Press, 1996); Heather Venable and Sebastian Lukasik, “‘Bombing to Win’ at 25,” War
on the Rocks, June 25, 2021, available at <https://warontherocks.com/2021/06/bombing-to-win-
at-25/>.
19
2021 Quadrennial Defense Review (Taipei: Ministry of National Defense, 2021),
available at <https://www.ustaiwandefense.com/tdnswp/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/2021-
Taiwan-Quadrennial-Defense-Review-QDR.pdf>; and 2019 National Defense Report (Taipei:
Ministry of National Defense, 2019), available at <https://www.ustaiwandefense.com/tdnswp/
wp-content/uploads/2020/02/Taiwan-National-Defense-Report-2019.pdf>.
20
Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2021, 116.
21
Ibid., 117.
22
Ibid., 120.
23
Roger Cli et al., Entering the Dragon’s Lair: Chinese Antiaccess Strategies and eir
Implications for the United States (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2007).
24
For a discussion of naval aspects of People’s Liberation Army (PLA) antiaccess/area-
denial capabilities, see Michael McDevitt, China as a Twenty-First-Century Naval Power: eory,
Practice, and Implications (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2020).
25
e PLA calls this “systems attack” or “systems confrontation.” See Je Engstrom,
Systems Confrontation and System Destruction Warfare: How the Chinese People’s Liberation
Army Seeks to Wage Modern Warfare (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2018). For an earlier analysis,
see omas J. Christensen, “Posing Problems Without Catching Up: China’s Rise and Challenges
for U.S. Security Policy,” International Security 25, no. 4 (2001), 5–40.
26
For an inuential assessment of how much ground the Chinese military has made
up relative to the United States, see Eric Heginbotham et al., e U.S.-China Military Scorecard
Forces, Geography, and the Evolving Balance of Power, 1996–2017 (Santa Monica, CA: RAND,
2015), available at <https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR392.html>.
27
“An Interactive Look at the U.S.-China Military Scorecard,” RAND Project Air Force,
available at <https://www.rand.org/paf/projects/us-china-scorecard.html>. RAND dened
advantage to mean that one side could achieve its primary objectives in an operationally relevant
period while the other side would have trouble doing so.
Introduction 29
28
For example, the U.S. Air Force ended its 16-year continuous bomber presence on Guam
in late April 2020, although it has continued rotational deployments. See Stephen Bryen, “Why the
U.S. Withdrew Its Bombers from Guam,” Asia Times, April 28, 2020, available at <https://asiatimes.
com/2020/04/why-the-us-withdrew-its-bombers-from-guam/>; Mikaley Kline, “B-1s Train with
JASDF, Return to Andersen Air Force Base for BTF Deployment,” Andersen Air Force Base Web site,
September 11, 2020, available at <https://www.andersen.af.mil/News/Features/Article/2345627/
b-1s-train-with-jasdf-return-to-andersen-air-force-base-for-btf-deployment/>; Lee Jeong-ho,
“China Releases Footage of ‘Guam Killer’ DF-26 Ballistic Missile in ‘Clear Message to the U.S.,’”
South China Morning Post, January 28, 2019, available at <https://www.scmp.com/news/china/
military/article/2183972/china-releases-footage-guam-killer-df-26-ballistic-missile-clear>.
29
2021 Quadrennial Defense Review; 2019 National Defense Report.
30
Mallory Shelbourne, “INDOPACOM Wants $20B Over the Next Six Years to Execute
National Defense Strategy,” Inside Defense, April 2, 2020, available at <https://insidedefense.com/
daily-news/indopacom-wants-20b-over-next-six-years-execute-national-defense-strategy>;
Tony Bertuca, “White House Report on China Sets Stage for New Indo-Pacic Investments,”
Inside Defense, May 21, 2020, available at <https://insidedefense.com/daily-news/white-house-
report-china-sets-stage-new-indo-pacic-investments>; Jim Inhofe and Jack Reed, “e Pacic
Deterrence Initiative: Peace rough Strength in the Indo-Pacic,” War on the Rocks, May 28,
2020, available at <https://warontherocks.com/2020/05/the-pacic-deterrence-initiative-
peace-through-strength-in-the-indo-pacic/>.
31
Alex Grynkewich, “e Future of Air Superiority, Part III: Defeating A2/AD,” War on
the Rocks, January 13, 2017, available at <https://warontherocks.com/2017/01/the-future-of-air-
superiority-part-iii-defeating-a2ad/>.
32
Brian M. Killough, “e Complicated Combat Future of the U.S. Air Force,” e National
Interest, February 9, 2020, available at <https://nationalinterest.org/feature/complicated-
combat-future-us-air-force-121226>.
33
Sean Kimmons, “Army to Build ree Multi-Domain Task Forces Using Lessons from
Pilot,” Army News Service, October 15, 2019, available at <https://www.army.mil/article/228393/
army_to_build_three_multi_domain_task_forces_using_lessons_from_pilot>.
34
David H. Berger, “Notes on Designing the Marine Corps of the Future,” War on
the Rocks, December 5, 2019, available at <https://warontherocks.com/2019/12/notes-on-
designing-the-marine-corps-of-the-future/>; “Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations
(EABO),” Headquarters Marine Corps, August 2, 2021, available at <https://www.marines.
mil/News/News-Display/Article/2708120/expeditionary-advanced-base-operations-eabo/>;
Michael R. Gordon, “Marines Plan to Retool to Meet China reat,” Wall Street Journal, March
22, 2020, available at <https://www.wsj.com/articles/marines-plan-to-retool-to-meet-china-
threat-11584897014>.
35
Lloyd J. Austin III, speech, Reagan National Defense Forum, Department of
Defense, December 4, 2021, available at <https://www.defense.gov/News/Speeches/Speech/
Article/2861931/remarks-by-secretary-of-defense-lloyd-j-austin-iii-at-the-reagan-national-
defen/>.
36
Ibid.
37
U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Report to Congress 2021
(Washington, DC: Government Publishing Oce, November 2021), 387, available at <https://
www.uscc.gov/sites/default/les/2021-11/2021_Annual_Report_to_Congress.pdf>.
38
Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2021, 117.
30 Saunders and Wuthnow
39
Philip Davidson, Testimony Before the Senate Armed Services Committee, U.S. Indo-
Pacic Command Review of the Defense Authorization Request for Fiscal Year 2022, and the
Future Years Defense Program, 117
th
Cong., 1
st
sess., March 9, 2021, available at <https://www.
armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/21-10_03-09-2021.pdf>.
40
Fred Kaplan claims that Davidson did not clear his testimony with the Pentagon in
advance; the 6-year estimate is not in the written testimony but came in response to a question.
See the discussion in Fred Kaplan, “Will China Really Invade Taiwan?” Slate, November 9, 2021,
available at <https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2021/11/china-taiwan-invasion-philip-
davidson-military-threat.html>.
41
Admiral John Aquilino, Testimony Before the Senate Armed Services Committee, To
Consider the Nomination of Admiral John C. Aquilino, USN, for Reappointment to the Grade of
Admiral and to Be Commander, U.S. Indo-Pacic Command, 117
th
Cong., 1
st
sess., March 23,
2021, available at <https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/21-14_03-23-2021.
pdf>; Brad Lendon, “Chinese reat to Taiwan ‘Closer to Us an Most ink,’ Top U.S. Admiral
Says,” CNN, March 24, 2021, available at <https://www.cnn.com/2021/03/24/asia/indo-pacic-
commander-aquilino-hearing-taiwan-intl-hnk-ml/index.html>.
42
U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Report to Congress 2021, 387.
43
Lawrence Chung, “Beijing ‘Fully Able’ to Invade Taiwan by 2025, Island’s Defence
Minister Says,” South China Morning Post, October 6, 2021, available at <https://www.scmp.
com/news/china/military/article/3151340/beijing-capable-taiwan-invasion-2025-islands-
defence-minister>.
44
Oriana Skylar Mastro, “e Taiwan Temptation: Why Beijing Might Resort to Force,”
Foreign Aairs 100, no. 4 (July/August 2021), 58–67.
45
Rachel Esplin Odell and Eric Heginbotham, “Don’t Fall for the Invasion Panic,” Foreign
Aairs 100, no. 5 (September/October 2021), 216–220.
46
Bonny Lin and David Sacks, “Force Is Still a Last Resort,” Foreign Aairs 100, no. 5
(September/October 2021), 222–226.
47
Phillip C. Saunders and Andrew Scobell, eds., PLA Inuence on China’s National
Security Policymaking (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2015); Andrew Scobell et al., eds.,
e People’s Liberation Army and Contingency Planning in China (Washington, DC: NDU Press,
2015); Phillip C. Saunders et al., eds., Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA: Assessing Chinese Military
Reforms (Washington, DC: NDU Press, 2019); Joel Wuthnow et al., eds., e PLA Beyond Borders:
Chinese Military Operations in Regional and Global Context (Washington, DC: NDU Press, 2021).
48
For additional discussion, see Ying-Yu Lin, “A New Type of Cross-Border Attack: e
PLA’s Cyber Force,” in Wuthnow et al., e PLA Beyond Borders, 295–310.
49
See, for example, Ian Easton, e Chinese Invasion reat: Taiwan’s Defense and
American Strategy in Asia (Washington, DC: Project 2049 Institute, 2017); Lonnie Henley, PLA
Operational Concepts and Centers of Gravity in a Taiwan Conict, Testimony Before the U.S.-
China Economic and Security Review Commission, 117
th
Cong., 1
st
sess., February 18, 2021;
“T-Day: e Battle for Taiwan,” Reuters, November 5, 2021, available at <https://www.reuters.
com/investigates/special-report/taiwan-china-wargames/>.
50
For additional analysis, see J. Michael Dahm, Ferry Tales: e PLA’s Use of Civilian
Shipping in Support of Over-the-Shore Logistics (Newport, RI: China Maritime Studies Institute,
2021); omas Shugart, “Mind the Gap: How China’s Civilian Shipping Could Enable a Taiwan
Invasion,” War on the Rocks, August 16, 2021, available at <https://warontherocks.com/2021/08/
mind-the-gap-how-chinas-civilian-shipping-could-enable-a-taiwan-invasion/>.
Introduction 31
51
For a more thorough discussion, see David M. Finkelstein, e PLA’s New Joint Doctrine:
e Capstone of the New Era Operations Regulation System (Arlington, VA: CNA, 2021).
52
For a fuller analysis, see Joel Wuthnow, System Overload: Can China’s Military Be
Distracted in a War over Taiwan? China Strategic Perspectives No. 15 (Washington, DC: NDU
Press, 2020).
53
We assume, based on past experience, that CCP leaders make decisions on a rational
cost-benet basis.
54
e role of perception and misperception in Beijing’s decisionmaking calculus vis-à-
vis Taiwan should not be underestimated. See Andrew Scobell, “Perception and Misperception
in U.S.-China Relations,” Political Science Quarterly 135, no. 4 (Winter 2020), 637–664.
55
Although some argue that China has given up hope of peaceful unication, CCP leaders
continue to emphasize a preference for peaceful unication in speeches. See Xi Jinping, “Speech
at Meeting Marking the 110
th
Anniversary of the Revolution of 1911,” China Daily, October 9,
2021, available at <http://www.news.cn/english/2021-10/13/c_1310242627.htm>. Also see
Michael D. Swaine, “Recent Chinese Views on the Taiwan Issue,” China Leadership Monitor 70,
December 1, 2021, available at <https://www.prcleader.org/swaine-3>.
56
See Richard C. Bush, Dicult Choices: Taiwan’s Quest for Security and the Good Life
(Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2021).
I
China’s Decisionmaking Calculus
F
or Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leaders, Taiwan is an integral part
of Chinese territory that was forcibly seized by Japan in 1895 following
the Sino-Japanese War and became a haven for the Republic of China
(ROC) government and military after their 1949 defeat in the Chinese Civil
War. Taiwan is thus connected both to the Chinese nationalist goal of restoring
China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity after the so-called century of hu-
miliation and to the CCP’s nal political victory over the Chinese Nationalist
Party (the Kuomintang, or KMT). Since the founding of the People’s Republic
of China (PRC) in October 1949, core elements of CCP policy toward Taiwan
have remained constant. CCP leaders have insisted that the PRC is the sole
legitimate government of China and that Taiwan is an integral part of Chinese
territory that cannot be allowed independence and must eventually be unied
with the PRC.
1
Although the ROC government continues to exercise jurisdic-
tion over Taiwan and various other islands, the PRC has sought to make accep-
tance of its “one China principle” a condition for diplomatic relations and has
prevailed on most countries and the United Nations to accept this position.
2
e core principles of PRC policy toward Taiwan have remained con-
stant, but there has been variation in the policies, strategies, and tactics CCP
CHAPTER 1
Three Logics of Chinese Policy Toward
Taiwan: An Analytic Framework
Phillip C. Saunders
35
36 Saunders
leaders have employed to deter Taiwan independence and make progress
toward unication. e PRC initially declared its intent to “liberate Taiwan”
by force, but this ambition was frustrated by the operational challenges of an
amphibious invasion and by U.S. military intervention after the outbreak of
the Korean War in 1950. In 1979, the PRC announced a new policy of “peaceful
unication” while reserving the right to use force under some circumstanc-
es. Beijing subsequently elaborated its vision for what peaceful unication
might look like, advancing a “one country, two systems” model that would
allow Taiwan to keep its capitalist system and its military and to enjoy a high
degree of autonomy. is model was eventually applied to Hong Kong and
Macao, which became special administrative regions within the PRC in 1997
and 1999, respectively.
e CCP’s insistence that the PRC is the sole legitimate government of
China led PRC leaders to refuse to recognize the ROC government or have
direct contacts with its leaders, but the two sides eventually found ways to
negotiate through party-to-party and semi-ocial channels, especially the
PRC’s Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait (ARATS) and Taiwan’s
Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF).
3
e peaceful unication policy and “one
country, two systems” formula elaborated under Deng Xiaoping from 1979 to
1982 continues to dene the basic parameters of PRC policy toward Taiwan,
but there have still been signicant variations over time.
4
is chapter pres-
ents an analytic framework to help analyze and explain those variations.
China’s policy toward Taiwan is the product of a complex policymaking
process that involves senior leadership competition, domestic political con-
siderations in a nationalistic policy environment, and PRC assessments of
political conditions in Taiwan, the United States, and the broader geopolitical
forces at play in the Indo-Pacic region. Mapping the relevant policy actors
within China and understanding the content and context of PRC policy de-
bates are challenging analytic tasks: the political sensitivity of policy toward
Taiwan creates strong incentives for exaggerated nationalist views in public
writings and speeches and encourages Chinese scholars to conform to the
preferences of senior leaders in internal writings provided as policy inputs.
5
Moreover, because Taiwan policy has signicant implications for the political
standing of senior CCP leaders, the circle of key decisionmakers is relatively
small and policy initiatives are closely held. As a result, the debates taking
Three Logics of Chinese Policy Toward Taiwan 37
place in public and at lower levels of the Chinese system may not actually re-
ect the views and concerns of senior CCP leaders making policy decisions.
6
e poor quality of available information on high-level internal debates
makes analyzing Chinese policy toward Taiwan a challenge.
An alternative way of understanding China’s approach toward Taiwan fo-
cuses on three distinct causal logics: leverage, united front, and persuasion.
is analytic framework oers considerable explanatory, analytical, and per-
haps even predictive power in assessing Beijing’s positions. In particular, it
provides a means of understanding the mix of coercion and inducements in
PRC policy toward Taiwan at any given moment of time while highlighting
PRC strategies and tactics that persist despite the ups and downs of cross-
strait relations. It also provides a concise way to think about the interests and
relevance of dierent PRC policy actors in the policymaking and policy im-
plementation process. One key nding is that changes in Taiwan politics and
identity, the authoritarian turn in China, and the PRC’s implementation of
“one country, two systems” in Hong Kong have made the united front and
persuasion logics less eective and could lead CCP leaders to rely more heav-
ily on leverage and coercion in the future. is raises questions about the
continued viability of the PRC’s policy of seeking peaceful unication.
is chapter outlines the three logics and their respective approaches
to Taiwan, illustrates some implications of the coexistence of multiple logics
for PRC policy, and applies this analytic framework to explain shifts in the
PRC policy approach toward Taiwan under dierent Taiwan leaders from Lee
Teng-hui to Tsai Ing-wen. It then considers the relevance of each logic go-
ing forward considering recent political developments in China, Taiwan, and
Hong Kong and how shifts in relevance might aect China’s policy choices
as Beijing considers a shift from deterring Taiwan independence toward the
more ambitious and dicult goal of achieving unication.
Three Logics of Chinese Policy Toward Taiwan
A causal logic is not a policy, strategy, or tactic. Rather, it is the underlying
reasoning about how specic policies, strategies, or tactics are supposed to
help achieve or advance a policy objective. A causal logic explains the “ways”
in an ends-ways-means chain that connects actions to policy goals. Causal
logics can be useful in grouping policies, strategies, and tactics that work in
38 Saunders
similar ways into conceptual baskets, highlighting hidden commonalities.
e rest of this section discusses the PRC’s objectives and explores three dis-
tinct causal logics evident in its policy toward Taiwan.
China’s Taiwan policy has two primary objectives: preventing Taiwan
from attaining independence and achieving unication of China and Tai-
wan. China’s most urgent objective is preventing Taiwan independence. Even
though the Taiwan government currently exercises jurisdiction over Taiwan
and various islands, most of the international community does not recognize
Taiwan as a sovereign state separate from China. A formal statement or ref-
erendum declaring Taiwan independence would present PRC leaders with a
major crisis involving China’s core interest in sovereignty and territorial in-
tegrity. Chinese leaders have repeatedly and credibly declared a willingness
to ght to prevent Taiwan independence.
7
e CCP’s ultimate objective is to achieve unication by bringing Taiwan
under the political control of the PRC.
8
e question is how best to accom-
plish that goal at an acceptable cost and risk and in a reasonable period. CCP
leaders have been careful not to establish a precise deadline for unication,
which would limit exibility and present unpalatable choices as the deadline
approached and turned into a de facto ultimatum. At that point Beijing would
either have to publicly back down or use force regardless of the costs, risks,
and political circumstances. China has not set an explicit deadline for uni-
cation, but Xi Jinping stated in 2013 and 2019 that the Taiwan issue “should
not be passed down generation after generation.”
9
Since 2017, CCP leaders
have linked Taiwan unication to “the great rejuvenation of the Chinese
people” that is to be achieved by 2049, creating an implicit deadline that still
leaves some room for maneuver.
10
Leverage
Leverage interprets China’s relations with Taiwan in terms of a zero-sum view
of relations across the strait. It is a measure of one party’s potential ability to
use military, economic, and diplomatic coercion to impose costs on the oth-
er.
11
Leverage is an implicit and passive form of coercion that exists and could
inuence behavior even absent specic threats by one side to employ coer-
cion for deterrent or compellent ends.
12
However, leverage manifests as coer-
cion once one side makes active threats to use force, pressure, or punishment
Three Logics of Chinese Policy Toward Taiwan 39
if the other does not take specic actions (compellence) or refrain from tak-
ing specic actions (deterrence). As omas Schelling noted, eective coer-
cion requires that threats be accompanied by credible assurances that the
threatened costs will not be imposed if the other side complies with the de-
mands.
13
Deterrence is generally easier to achieve than compellence, but this
nding depends on what is being demanded in the deterrent and compellent
cases.
14
For Taiwan, the costs of accepting unwanted unication are consider-
ably higher than the lost benets of foregoing desired independence, making
it easier for the PRC to deter Taiwan independence than to coerce Taiwan into
accepting unication. is conclusion is also consistent with prospect theory
(see Andrew Scobell’s chapter in this volume).
China’s ability to deter Taiwan from moving toward independence rests
on its capacity to use its economic and diplomatic power to impose costs and
to deny Taiwan international recognition and its military ability to threaten
the island with unacceptable punishment. is leverage is translated into de-
terrence by the PRC’s conditional threat to employ coercive means if Taiwan
takes actions to proclaim its status as an independent entity separate from
China. e more leverage China has, the greater Beijing’s condence that it
can deter Taiwan independence. is logic suggests a focus on eorts to in-
crease Chinese strength and to weaken Taiwan via diplomatic isolation, eco-
nomic dependence, and an end to U.S. arms sales to Taiwan.
is logic also implies that China could eventually achieve unication
by increasing its leverage to the point where Taiwan’s diplomatic, econom-
ic, and military position becomes untenable in the face of potential Chinese
coercive threats. is logic assumes that at some point China could confront
Taiwan and force capitulation or that Taiwan’s leaders would ultimately have
to make the best deal they could from a position of weakness. e more lever-
age China has, the sooner that day will come and the more the deal will reect
PRC interests. At the limit, leverage could be converted into coercive eorts to
employ economic and military power to compel Taiwan to accept unication
or the use of military means to achieve unication by force.
Sophisticated versions of this logic embrace the idea of making fur-
ther economic and even diplomatic concessions to Taiwan that increase
its dependence on Beijing’s continued good will, thus generating addi-
tional leverage.
15
China could then remove or threaten to remove these
40 Saunders
concessions in the future as a coercive tactic, creating an economic or do-
mestic political crisis for Taiwan leaders.
Leverage is best understood as potential coercive power that CCP lead-
ers can choose to employ as circumstances dictate. is includes ramping up
political, economic, or military pressure to punish perceived Taiwan moves
toward independence or to try to coerce Taiwan into accepting the PRC “one
China” position or the PRC agenda for cross-strait relations. CCP leaders might
also choose to decrease pressure on Taiwan to support cross-strait political ini-
tiatives or to reward Taiwan actions that signal interest in a closer relationship
with the mainland (or that promise restraint in pushing toward independence).
While leverage can always be banked for future use, employing leverage by
coercing Taiwan is a tactical calculation based on PRC objectives at a given
moment in time, expectations about how eective coercion could be, and the
positive or negative externalities in terms of other PRC policy goals.
PRC leaders rely on coercion to deter Taiwan leaders from pursuing in-
dependence. e PRC has consistently refused to rule out the use of force if
Taiwan takes overt actions toward independence and has built military capa-
bilities to make this threat credible. At the same time, China has limited the
circumstances under which it says it would employ force to assure Taiwan
that restraint in pursuing independence will be reciprocated with Chinese
restraint in not employing force.
16
PRC leaders have preserved a degree of
ambiguity about exactly which actions would prompt it to use force, both to
preserve exibility in deciding how to respond and to prevent Taiwan from
taking incremental actions that stop just short of Beijing’s red lines. China has
sometimes taken specic actions to reinforce its deterrent threats, including
two rounds of ballistic missile tests in the 1995–1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis and
passing the Anti-Secession Law in 2005 that laid a legal basis for “non-peace-
ful actions” in the event of Taiwan independence.
China has also periodically employed limited coercion to compel Tai-
wan to accept its denition of the relationship between China and Taiwan or
to enter political talks about unication. Despite good cross-strait relations
during Taiwan President Ma Ying-jeou’s two terms in oce (May 2009–May
2016), China began using various coercive measures in 2015 to pressure Ma
to begin formal talks about Taiwan’s political status. When Ma’s successor,
Tsai Ing-wen, refused to accept the 1992 Consensus as the political basis for
Three Logics of Chinese Policy Toward Taiwan 41
cross-strait dialogue, the PRC responded by encouraging Taiwan’s diplomatic
allies to switch recognition to the PRC, applying economic pressure by lim-
iting Chinese tourist visits to Taiwan, and conducting military exercises and
deployments aimed at Taiwan.
17
Leverage has some inherent drawbacks and limitations. e most ex-
treme forms of coercion, such as the use of brute force to achieve unication,
have very high economic, military, and diplomatic costs and risks, including
the possibility of a nuclear conict with the United States. Beijing’s desire to
avoid these costs is why Chinese leaders consistently express a preference
for peaceful unication. Even limited forms of economic and military co-
ercion aimed against Taiwan damage China’s peaceful image and lead oth-
er countries to be concerned about Chinese intentions and cautious about
cooperation that would leave them vulnerable to Chinese coercion. Taiwan
could also take some actions to reduce China’s leverage, such as improving
its defense capabilities and diversifying its economic relationships to make
itself less vulnerable to Chinese coercion. e high costs and risks of the PRC
employing force to achieve unication might also make coercive threats that
would be sucient to compel Taiwan to accept unication seem less cred-
ible. Finally, PRC willingness to employ extreme coercive threats to compel
Taiwan to accept a unication agreement undercuts the credibility of any as-
surances that Beijing would abide by the agreement’s terms.
United Front
United front tactics have a rich history in the CCP’s approach to domestic and
international politics. A united front is a means for communist parties to co-
operate with non-communist parties and groups by nding common ground
and downplaying dierences. e CCP has an elaborate organizational in-
frastructure to engage various domestic and international groups, some of
which falls under the heading of the CCP United Front Work Department.
18
Because the CCP seeks to maintain its monopoly on power and maximize
its ability to dictate outcomes—goals not shared by non-communist political
actors—such cooperation is inherently limited and restricted to areas where
short-term interests overlap. Although the CCP seeks to enlist non-commu-
nist parties and groups to work on behalf of CCP goals, in practice united
front tactics are most useful in building coalitions to oppose shared threats.
19
42 Saunders
(CCP eorts to enlist support for its positive goals are better captured by the
logic of persuasion, considered below.)
In the Taiwan context, the CCP denes the principal threat as individu-
als or groups who advocate Taiwan independence. For example, China’s 2019
defense white paper refers to the “very small number of ‘Taiwan indepen-
dence’ separatists and their activities.”
20
In December 2020, the CCP issued
an updated version of its united front work regulations, which described the
mission of united front worked aimed at Taiwan as
Implementing the CCP Central Committee’s work on Taiwan, adhering to
the “One-China Principle,” broadly uniting Taiwan compatriots at home
and abroad, developing and strengthening Taiwan’s patriotic reunica-
tion force, opposing Taiwan’s secessionist activities, and continuing to pro-
mote peace in the motherland for the process of reunication and jointly
realize the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation with one heart.
21
Although the regulations include some positive objectives such as strength-
ening “reunication forces” in Taiwan, a united front logic emphasizes
opposition to a common threat or enemy by cooperation with groups and
individuals that might not support the CCP’s ultimate objectives.
e primary focus of CCP united front tactics has been on strengthening
opposition to pro-independence leaders and political parties (such as the
Democratic Progressive Party [DPP], the Taiwan Solidarity Union, and the
New Power Party) and their policy initiatives (such as constitutional referenda
and de-Sinication of the educational system). China’s eorts have included
building formal party-to-party ties with the KMT and People First parties, mo-
bilizing international actors to oppose Taiwan independence as a threat to re-
gional stability, and reaching out to members of the DPP to wean them away
from support for Taiwan independence. China has also employed united front
tactics by organizing retired ocer dialogues, encouraging Taiwan business
leaders operating in the mainland to oppose separatist activities and support
unication, and engaging Taiwan mayors and local government ocials.
22
Although the Taiwan independence movement has been the primary
target of CCP united front tactics, Beijing has also tried to build a united front
against Japan by harnessing anti-Japanese sentiment in Taiwan over the is-
sue of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. e islands are claimed by Japan, Taiwan,
Three Logics of Chinese Policy Toward Taiwan 43
and the PRC (which asserts that the islands belong to Taiwan, which is part
of the PRC). Especially after Japan’s nationalization of some of the islands in
2012, when the Japanese government purchased three of the islands from a
private Japanese owner, the CCP has tried to use the issue to drive a wedge
between Taiwan and Japan and to make common cause with Taiwan groups
that support Taiwan’s claims to the islands. China has followed similar tactics
with respect to Taiwan’s territorial claims in the South China Sea, trying to
appeal to nationalists in Taiwan by asserting that it is more willing to stand up
for Chinese territorial claims than the government in Taipei.
United front tactics have some inherent limitations in the Taiwan context.
ere are political actors in Taiwan who identify as Chinese and oppose inde-
pendence because they believe that Taiwan is part of a larger China, but few of
them are eager to subject Taiwan to CCP control as part of the PRC. Moreover,
the political power of this group has declined over time due to Taiwan’s democ-
ratization and generational change that has reduced personal ties to mainland
China.
23
Others in Taiwan oppose movement toward independence on the
practical grounds that it might precipitate a devastating war, but this pragmatic
view yields support for maintaining the political status quo rather than for po-
litical talks aimed at unication. Public opinion polls consistently indicate that
this “conditional preference” for the status quo rather than independence is
the dominant view in Taiwan.
24
From a PRC viewpoint, this suggests that tactics
based on a united front logic are much more eective in preventing Taiwan’s
movement toward independence (largely due to concerns about precipitating a
war) than in convincing actors in Taiwan and elsewhere to embrace unication.
Persuasion
Persuasion focuses on convincing key actors (especially in Taiwan, but also in
the international community) that unication is an acceptable or even desir-
able outcome. is is a judgment made partly in the context of alternatives,
including China’s threat to use force. However, this logic emphasizes CCP ef-
forts to increase the benets and reduce the potential costs of unication for
key actors in Taiwan and to promulgate a positive vision of what life would be
like as part of the PRC.
One line of eort involves reassuring Taiwan that unication would not
cause fundamental changes in Taiwan’s political system (via Deng Xiaoping’s
44 Saunders
“one country, two systems” proposal and subsequent oers to allow Taiwan
to keep its own military, not have PRC troops on its soil, have substantial au-
tonomy over its aairs, and so forth). Another involves demonstrating the val-
ue of a closer relationship between China and Taiwan by providing economic
opportunities and facilitating a larger international presence (with the poten-
tial for even greater benets if Taiwan accepts unication). A third involves
eorts to inuence conceptions of identity in Taiwan in ways that emphasize
cultural and historical ties with China and make unication more acceptable.
Persuasion has limitations in the Taiwan context. Because this logic in-
volves projecting a positive vision of Taiwan’s role in a future unied China,
people in Taiwan will judge the vision’s appeal based on expectations of the
political future of the PRC and the CCP, the specic terms oered, and the
credibility of the CCP’s pledge to respect those terms in the future when Tai-
wan would have limited ability to enforce a bargain with Beijing. China’s rap-
id economic growth and rising power could have potential appeal for people
in Taiwan, oering signicant economic opportunities and the chance to be
associated with a country that has growing international inuence. Howev-
er, Taiwan already enjoys signicant economic access because CCP leaders
believe this is benecial for the Chinese economy, allowing Taiwan to enjoy
most of these potential benets without a more formal political relationship.
Moreover, the growing authoritarian trend in China and crackdown on polit-
ical expression over the last decade make a closer political association with
the PRC much less attractive.
China’s various formulations of what “one country, two systems” might
look like in Taiwan include several specic assurances if Taiwan accepts
peaceful unication. ese include pledges that Taiwan would enjoy a high
degree of autonomy, could manage local aairs without interference, would
be able to retain its armed forces, and could keep its current socioeconomic
system.
25
However, some of these assurances have been weakened in recent
PRC speeches about Taiwan, and they must be judged against PRC pledges
in other contexts, such as the high degree of autonomy promised to Hong
Kong in the reversion agreement. e PRC’s eorts to roll back democratic
institutions and impose a political crackdown in Hong Kong in the name of
security have severely damaged the CCP’s credibility with the Taiwan pub-
lic. In this context, persuading Taiwan people of the benets of unication
Three Logics of Chinese Policy Toward Taiwan 45
is an increasingly dicult task. Finally, the PRC’s conditional threat to use
force if Taiwan declares independence and its increasing military pres-
sure undercut eorts to persuade Taiwan leaders and people that they can
achieve security, prosperity, and a sucient degree of freedom and auton-
omy as part of a unied China.
Implications of Multiple Causal Logics
What are the implications of the three logics underlying Chinese policy? Us-
ing multiple logics can explain several important points about Chinese pol-
icy. ese include patterns of continuity and change in PRC policies toward
Taiwan, coalition-building on policy decisions, and how the fungibility of
policy tools across the three logics shapes the positions of PRC policy actors.
A starting point is to view Chinese policy from the perspective of a unitary
actor responding rationally to changing assessments of the threat of Taiwan in-
dependence and opportunities to move toward unication. Since policies de-
rived from the three logics have varying utility for the separate goals of deterring
independence and achieving unication, China’s policy mix should shift over
time based on changes in its assessment of threats and opportunities. is ap-
proach could be used to tease out the evolving mix of Chinese policies. Such
a perspective also suggests that if Beijing feels that the threat of Taiwan inde-
pendence has declined and opportunities for unication have increased, then
China’s policy mix might shift in the direction of policy measures that make
sense under the logic of persuasion. Conversely, if the threat of independence
has increased, Beijing is likely to lean more heavily on tools that rest on lever-
age and united front logics to deter movement toward Taiwan independence.
is approach could be helpful in revealing patterns of continuity and
change in PRC policy. In terms of continuity, the PRC has consistently refused
to rule out the use of force to deter Taiwan independence, continued united
front eorts aimed at groups in Taiwan that might be mobilized to oppose
independence and support unication, and sought to articulate and demon-
strate the benets that unication might have for Taiwan. PRC policy toward
Taiwan has largely stayed within the principles and parameters established
from 1979 to 1982 under Deng Xiaoping, but there have been signicant vari-
ations over time in the use of coercive measures to deter independence and
46 Saunders
encourage political talks on unication; to mobilize groups in Taiwan to op-
pose specic leaders, parties, and policies that Beijing regards as promoting
separation from China; and to provide or deny economic benets to specic
groups in Taiwan. Viewing these changes in terms of shifts in the relative im-
portance of the three logics is a parsimonious way to describe and analyze
changes in Chinese policy.
A second point is that the existence of multiple logics could aect
prospects for building domestic coalitions on Taiwan policy within the
PRC. A number of PRC actors have important interests in Taiwan policy:
economic and local ocials want to use Taiwan trade and investment to
increase economic growth. Businesses seek technology from Taiwan to
move up the knowledge ladder. Political leaders want to win points with
nationalists for moving toward unication (and avoid losses if Taiwan
moves toward independence). Foreign Ministry ocials regard isolating
Taiwan internationally as a core part of their mission. e military feels a
special responsibility for defending China’s sovereignty and territorial in-
tegrity, especially by achieving unication.
26
If a policy makes sense under all three logics, then Chinese leaders would
nd it easier to build a consensus on that policy even if the rationales that
individual actors use to support the policy are dierent or mutually incon-
sistent. For example, China’s liberalization of fruit imports from southern
Taiwan increases Taiwan’s dependence on the mainland market (potentially
creating economic leverage), creates new economic interests for a traditional
DPP constituency (potentially drawing them into a united front), and shows
that closer political ties with the mainland could produce important econom-
ic benets for Taiwan (demonstrating potential benets of unication). e
corollary is that China nds it harder to adopt policies that make strong sense
from one logic, but which are counterproductive from other perspectives.
27
For instance, facilitating Taiwan’s participation in the World Health Assembly
makes sense in terms of united front logic and persuasion logic but undercuts
eorts to increase Chinese leverage by isolating Taiwan.
28
A third point involves the extent to which inuential policy actors are
associated with tools that are fungible across the dierent logics or tools
that only make sense under one logic. Chinese businesses and local PRC
leaders focused on expanding cross-strait economic contacts benet from
Three Logics of Chinese Policy Toward Taiwan 47
the fact that their preferred policies potentially make sense under all three
logics.
29
Such policies make Taiwan more dependent economically on the
PRC, generating leverage that might be used in the future to reward fa-
vored groups with opportunities, to punish those viewed as enemies, and
to provide benets to the Taiwan people that demonstrate the gains from
improved cross-strait relations.
Conversely, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is heavily associated with
military tools, such as developing ballistic missiles and deploying them oppo-
site Taiwan, which make sense only under the logic of leverage and might have
negative eects on other policy goals. If Chinese policy actors are only relevant
under one logic (leverage), then they would tend to support policies that make
sense under that logic and oppose those that are costly or counterproductive
from their institutional point of view. us, many in the PLA support acceler-
ated military modernization to generate more leverage and oppose substan-
tive military condence-building measures that might reduce or constrain
China’s ability to generate and employ military power. A focus on competing
policy logics and the utility of tools under each logic could potentially help
identify the likely positions of key Chinese actors, help predict their positions
in terms of supporting or opposing specic policy measures, and help assess
the relative inuence of dierent actors in the PRC policy process.
e CCP has a deliberative process for policymaking about Taiwan, with
decisions generally made at the top of the system based on input from lower
levels.
30
is does not mean, however, that the unitary rational actor model
explains all policy decisions. In practice, CCP policy toward Taiwan appears
to be the product of a relatively cautious, bureaucratic process with multiple
competing players operating within a policy environment with well-estab-
lished principles and constraints. In such a system, powerful actors such as
the military could invoke the logic of leverage to resist proposals that might
hurt their institutional interests (even if these might advance PRC goals by
winning support from people in Taiwan). Conversely, less-inuential actors
might need to frame their policy proposals in terms of multiple logics to build
consensus in adopting them. Viewing policy debates from the perspective of
multiple causal logics can add richness to analysis of the bureaucratic and
political interests of the dierent groups involved in making and implement-
ing China’s policy toward Taiwan. Finally, it is important to remember that
48 Saunders
some PRC statements and actions may be the product of bargaining between
policy actors or reect domestic political calculations rather than any expec-
tation that they would advance PRC policy goals.
The Three Logics Framework and Historical Analysis of
Cross-Strait Relations
is section sketches the mix of the three logics in China’s policy during dif-
ferent political administrations in Taiwan. Because this chapter focuses on
PRC policy toward Taiwan, it might appear logical to follow the conventional
path of organizing the analysis in terms of successive CCP top leaders. It is
certainly true that there are important and distinctive policy developments
associated with each leader.
Deng Xiaoping launched China’s “opening up and reform” policy that
emphasized stability and placed a higher priority on the contributions Tai-
wan could make to PRC economic development. He also shifted policy from
“liberating Taiwan” to “peaceful unication” and proposed the “one coun-
try, two systems” model for unication. Jiang Zemin (1989–2002) proposed
a path toward unication in his “eight points” speech. He also approved
ballistic missile tests near Taiwan ports following Lee Teng-hui’s 1995 visit
to the United States and increased PLA budgets after the 1995–1996 Taiwan
Strait Crisis. Hu Jintao (2002–2012) supported the 2005 Anti-Secession Law
to strengthen deterrence of Taiwan independence. Xi Jinping (2012–present)
has emphasized improvements in PRC military capabilities, exhibited great-
er willingness to employ coercion and pressure against Taiwan, and placed
greater stress on achieving unication.
In practice, however, changes in PRC policy toward Taiwan have been
driven primarily by PRC assessments of the intentions of dierent Taiwan
leaders and the balance between the urgency of the perceived threat of Tai-
wan independence and the perceived opportunity to improve relations and
move toward unication. China’s policy has remained within the framework
of principles and parameters established by the early 1980s under Deng.
Even Xi Jinping, widely viewed as the most powerful PRC leader since Deng,
continues to operate within this basic framework.
Lee Teng-hui (1988–1994). Lee’s time as president can be divided into two
phases. As the rst Taiwan president to be born on the island, Lee navigated
Three Logics of Chinese Policy Toward Taiwan 49
through the KMT’s mainlander-dominated factional politics to attain power
after Chiang Ching-kuo’s death in 1988 and to pursue democratization and
the end of the authoritarian governance structures that marked KMT rule.
Taiwan elites accepted the reality that Taiwan was never going to conquer the
PRC, focused on implementing democratic governance of the territory that
Taiwan did control, and began eorts to develop a working relationship with
the PRC. e governments Lee led during this period included mainlanders
committed to eventual unication with China and policies that reected the
KMT’s mainlander-dominated factional politics. Notable actions includ-
ed Taiwan’s 1991 Guidelines for National Unication, which were based on
a “one China” foundation and articulated a three-stage process that would
culminate in planning for the unication of a “democratic, free, and equita-
bly prosperous China.”
31
Taiwan and China also expanded economic ties and
established the semi-ocial SEF-ARATS mechanism in 1991 as a channel for
cross-strait dialogue and coordination.
Lee Teng-hui (1995–2000). Lee eventually consolidated his power base
within the KMT, replacing many older party and government ocials with
native-born appointees. In January 1995, Jiang Zemin sought to lay out a
positive PRC roadmap for improving cross-strait relations that might appeal
to people in Taiwan with his eight points speech. Lee spurned Jiang’s initia-
tive and launched a successful lobbying eort to win permission to visit the
United States and give a speech at Cornell University, which ultimately trig-
gered the 1995–1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis. PRC policies subsequently empha-
sized building economic leverage and accelerating military modernization,
coupled with united front tactics targeting conservative elements within the
KMT that might support unication and oppose movement toward Taiwan
independence. Lee’s 1999 announcement that cross-strait relations were
best characterized as “special state-to-state relations” reinforced PRC sus-
picions that Lee had a pro-independence agenda and led to a suspension of
the ARATS-SEF channel until June 2008.
Chen Shui-bian (2000–2008). PRC suspicions of Chen and the pro-in-
dependence DPP were partly oset by his moderate inauguration speech
and KMT control of the Legislative Yuan throughout his tenure in oce,
which constrained Chen’s ability to pursue independence through legis-
lative means. However, Chen’s pursuit of de-Sinication and referendums
50 Saunders
asserting Taiwan’s independent status raised concerns and prompted the
PRC to pass the Anti-Secession Law in 2005 as a warning of its willingness to
pursue “non-peaceful means” to prevent Taiwan independence. Economic
ties continued to grow despite the absence of cross-strait political dialogue.
e PRC continued to pursue economic and military leverage and intensied
united front eorts to harness the KMT to oppose Chen and prevent moves
toward Taiwan independence.
Ma Ying-jeou (2008–2016). Ma’s involvement in previous cross-strait di-
alogue and willingness to expand and deepen cross-strait ties reduced CCP
concerns about Taiwan independence and provided new opportunities to
deepen and institutionalize cross-strait ties, including by establishing the
“three links” (direct mail, transport, and trade) and negotiating the Econom-
ic Cooperation Framework Agreement. PLA modernization continued, but
China was careful to avoid provocative military exercises in the strait. Unit-
ed front tactics were less useful with the KMT in power, but the CCP tried
to create an anti-Japanese united front focused on the Senkaku/Diaoyu Is-
lands, which Ma defused by negotiating an agreement that gave Taiwan sh-
ers access to shing grounds near the islands.
32
e CCP also allowed limited
Taiwan participation in some international organizations such as the World
Health Assembly. Both sides explored the notion of a peace accord that
might pave the way for eventual unication.
33
In 2014, Ma’s attempt to push
the Cross-Strait Service Trade Agreement through the legislature sparked the
student Sunower movement opposing further expansion of cross-strait eco-
nomic ties.
34
CCP leaders eventually grew frustrated at Ma’s ability to control
the cross-strait agenda and began applying economic and military pressure
on Taiwan to begin talks on political issues.
Tsai Ing-wen (2016–present). PRC leaders were deeply suspicious of Tsai
due to her role in Lee’s cabinet, including her involvement in developing the
“two states theory” and her DPP party aliation. Tsai made some accommo-
dating gestures in her inauguration speech but refused to accept the 1992 Con-
sensus. Chinese leaders chose to use this as a rationale to break o ARATS-SEF
contacts rather than seek a mutually acceptable formulation that could serve
as a political basis for cross-strait contacts.
35
China has applied various forms
of economic, diplomatic, and military pressure, including restrictions on tour-
ists coming to Taiwan, ending previous restraint on peeling away Taiwan’s
Three Logics of Chinese Policy Toward Taiwan 51
diplomatic allies, successfully opposing Taiwan’s participation in international
organizations, resuming military exercises opposite Taiwan, and using air force
and navy maneuvers near Taiwan to exert pressure on Tsai and the Taiwan mili-
tary (for a discussion on these operations, see the chapter by Mathieu Duchâtel
in this volume). China tried to increase united front approaches to the KMT
and to DPP local ocials, including allegations of illegal funding and inu-
ence operations to support some KMT candidates. ese eorts had some
success in the 2018 Taiwan local elections but faltered in the face of anti-Chi-
na sentiment in the aftermath of the Hong Kong protests. e PRC made few
eorts under the persuasion logic: the conditions oered for peaceful uni-
cation in Xi Jinping’s 2019 Taiwan policy speech were less generous than
those that had previously been oered.
36
e table describes the perceived
mix of threat and opportunity under dierent Taiwan leaders and PRC policy
eorts under each of the three logics.
Table. Three Logics in Historical Perspective
Taiwan
Leader
Perceived
Threat of In-
dependence
Perceived
Opportunity
to Improve
Cross-Strait
Relations
Leverage United Front Persuasion
Lee
Teng-hui
(1988–1994)
Limited due
to influence
of KMT main-
landers
National
Unification
Guidelines
reaffirmed goal
of unification;
establishment
of semiofficial
dialogue; 1992
Consensus
Increasing cross-
strait economic
ties; incremental
progress in PLA
modernization
Efforts to
engage KMT;
efforts to
engage Taiwan
business and
retired military
Jiang Zemin’s
“8 points”
speech;
benefits of
cross-strait
trade
Lee
Teng-hui
(1995–2000)
Increasing,
especially
after 1995 U.S.
visit and 1999
“two states
theory”
Lee rejected
Jiang’s 8 points
proposal;
cross-strait
dialogue sus-
pended by PRC
in 1999
Increasing
economic ties;
1995–1996 missile
tests; increasing
PLA budgets after
1996
Efforts to
engage
conservative
“deep blue”
elements in
KMT; efforts to
engage Taiwan
business and
retired military
Benefits of
cross-strait
trade
52 Saunders
Taiwan
Leader
Perceived
Threat of In-
dependence
Perceived
Opportunity
to Improve
Cross-Strait
Relations
Leverage United Front Persuasion
Chen
Shui-bian
(2000–2008)
DPP inde-
pendence
platform,
Taiwanization,
and pro-
independence
actions create
deep suspicion
Economic ties
separated from
political ten-
sions; cross-
strait dialogue
remained
suspended
Increasing
economic ties;
PLA modernization
accelerates; PLA
emphasis on deter-
rence; Anti-Seces-
sion Law (2005)
Increased
efforts to
engage oppo-
sition KMT via
party-to-party
channels
Benefits of
cross-strait
trade
Ma
Ying-jeou
(2008–2016)
Receding due
to KMT control
of executive
and legislative
branches and
acceptance of
1992 Consen-
sus
Opportunity to
deepen and
institutionalize
cross-strait
ties; expansion
of cross-strait
semi-official
contacts; PRC
hope for start
of political
dialogue
Increasing
economic ties;
PLA modernization
continues; military
balance shifts in
PRC’s favor
Efforts to build
anti-Japan
united front
Cross-strait
agreements
that benefit
Taiwan; ex-
panded inter-
national space;
diplomatic
truce; limits
on PLA exer-
cises aimed at
Taiwan; PRC
growth and
status have
some appeal
Tsai Ing-
wen (2016–
present)
Tsai’s refusal
to accept 1992
Consensus
heightens PRC
suspicion;
restraint on
sovereignty
issues not
acknowledged;
DPP control
of executive
and legislative
branches
heightens PRC
concerns
PRC refus-
es to deal
directly with
Tsai and the
DPP; breaks
cross-strait
semi-official
contacts
PLA exercises
aimed at Taiwan
resume; PLA mil-
itary pressure on
Taiwan increases;
diplomatic truce
ends; economic
pressure exerted
through limits
on PRC tourism;
squeezing of Tai-
wan’s international
space; linkage
between unifi-
cation and great
rejuvenation of the
Chinese people
Increased ef-
forts to engage
opposition
KMT and DPP
local leaders;
PRC efforts
to influence
2018 local and
2020 national
elections
Benefits of
cross-strait
trade; Xi
Jinping’s 2019
speech laying
out benefits
of unification
less generous
than Jiang’s 8
points
Key: DPP: Democratic Progressive Party; KMT: Kuomintang; PLA: People’s Liberation Army; PRC: People’s
Republic of China
Three Logics of Chinese Policy Toward Taiwan 53
is concise historical review illustrates how the three logics may help
explain PRC policies toward Taiwan in dierent periods, including patterns of
continuity and change. Policies that made sense under all three logics, such
as expanding economic relations with Taiwan, continued throughout despite
leadership changes in Taiwan and the PRC and signicant ups and downs in
cross-strait relations. Eorts to develop military leverage over Taiwan, strong-
ly supported by powerful PLA leaders, accelerated after the 1995–1996 Tai-
wan Strait Crisis, but CCP leaders exercised tight control over the timing and
amount of military coercion applied against Taiwan. is may be explained
partly in terms of the continuing high costs and risks of using lethal military
force, but concerns about undermining political initiatives aimed at building
support in Taiwan for unication were also a factor in determining whether
and how the PRC applied military coercion.
e review also suggests ndings about the employment of policies as-
sociated with the three logics in dierent political conditions. e logic of
building leverage applies throughout all periods and the PRC has consistent-
ly employed coercive threats to deter potential movement toward Taiwan in-
dependence. Variation has come in terms of PRC eorts to use military shows
of force when it perceived the need to reinforce deterrence and in PRC deci-
sions about whether to apply accumulated leverage in an attempt to coerce
Taiwan leaders to move toward unication.
e potential utility of united front tactics largely depends on whether
the KMT is in power or in opposition. It is relatively easy for the CCP and the
KMT to cooperate in opposing the DPP and its policies aimed at promoting
a separate Taiwan identity or promoting independence. When the KMT is in
power, however, PRC pressure to move toward unication highlights the dif-
ferences in ultimate goals and places the KMT in the untenable position of
acting against the preference of most of the Taiwan people to maintain the
status quo. Under these conditions, united front tactics lose much of their ef-
fectiveness. PRC eorts to substitute an anti-Japan united front over the Sen-
kaku/Diaoyu Islands issue or to rally Taiwan support against Southeast Asian
claimants for the Spratly Islands have been ineective.
China’s willingness to emphasize tools under the persuasion logic ebbs
and ows with conditions. In the early period of Lee’s presidency and during
Ma’s term in oce, the PRC made a number of positive gestures as part of
54 Saunders
its eorts to improve cross-strait relations and build support in Taiwan for
unication. However, when the PRC feels the need to oppose moves by a
pro-independence Taiwan leader, as in the later period of Lee’s presidency
and during Chen’s term in oce, coercion is used even though it undercuts
PRC eorts to build support for unication.
One interesting implication of this historical analysis is that it suggests
Chinese policy has been driven more by PRC assessments of the threats and
opportunities caused by political developments in Taiwan (and to a lesser
degree in the United States) than by leadership changes or domestic polit-
ical developments in the PRC. Chinese policy toward Taiwan over the past
40 years has tended to follow a consistent, fairly conservative set of princi-
ples initially articulated by Deng. Policy changes have generally come in
reaction to developments in Taiwan rather than proactive PRC eorts to
inuence conditions on the island. is may be due to the political sensitiv-
ity of the Taiwan issue and the nationalist policy environment in the PRC,
both of which discourage creative proposals that might have more appeal
to people in Taiwan.
Looking to the Future
Can this analytic framework help predict future PRC policy toward Taiwan?
is section reviews Taiwan survey data on identity, party aliation, and
preferences on independence and unication and the implications for Tai-
wan politics and policy toward the mainland. It considers the relevance of the
leverage, united front, and persuasion logics going forward and how shifts in
their relevance might aect China’s future policy choices. It then considers
PRC perceptions about the risks of Taiwan independence and whether PRC
politics are likely to shift from an emphasis on deterring Taiwan indepen-
dence toward the more ambitious and dicult goal of achieving unication.
Survey data in Taiwan over the last 30 years shows an increasing sense
of Taiwan identity, a consistent preference for maintaining the cross-strait
status quo coupled with decreasing interest in unication and increasing
party aliation with the DPP and declining aliation with the KMT. Data
from the December 2021 survey by National Chengchi University’s Election
Study Center show that 62.3 percent of respondents identify as Taiwanese,
31.7 identify as both Taiwanese and Chinese, and only 2.8 percent identify as
Three Logics of Chinese Policy Toward Taiwan 55
Chinese. e long-term trendlines show Taiwanese identity increasing dra-
matically over time (from just 17.6 percent in 1992 to 62.3 percent in 2021)
and a gradually decreasing, but still signicant, number of respondents who
self-identify as both Taiwanese and Chinese.
37
Preferences about unication versus independence are more complicat-
ed to analyze, but the survey data show a consistent preference for maintain-
ing the status quo for now (the choice of 85.6 percent of respondents in the
most recent survey) rather than moving quickly toward unication (1.4 per-
cent) or independence (6 percent). ere is declining interest in the option of
unication, with a peak of 22 percent favoring rapid or eventual unication in
1996 but only 7.4 percent in the 2021 survey. Although declining from its 2006
peak of 38.7 percent, 28.4 percent of respondents want to maintain the status
quo and decide at a later date, keeping eventual unication open as a poten-
tial option.
38
A more detailed analysis that probes conditional preferences by
examining “easy” or “hard” scenarios for unication and independence con-
cludes that “clear pluralities [of status quo respondents] are willing to have
easy independence, but strong majorities are not willing to accept unication
even in the easiest scenario.”
39
e survey data also show that a plurality of Taiwan citizens (45.5 per-
cent) identify as independents or did not report a party aliation in 2021.
DPP aliation is volatile but has averaged about 27–28 percent from 2015
to 2021, while KMT aliation has declined signicantly from a peak of 39.5
percent in 2011 to 17.1 percent in the 2021 survey.
40
e survey data suggest a Taiwan electorate that increasingly identi-
es as Taiwanese, is cautious about moving away from the status quo, and
has declining interest in unication. For the PRC, these results should be
good news in terms of deterring Taiwan independence and bad news in
terms of achieving unication. e DPP’s road to winning the presidency,
assembling a majority in the Legislative Yuan, and ambition to become a
permanent ruling party has required it to move away from the pledge to
declare independence in its original platform to a more moderate position
that can win support from the Taiwan public.
41
is democratic ltering ef-
fect has produced more pragmatic and cautious DPP candidates, although
this may be tested if the current vice president, William Lai Ching-te—who
declared himself “a political worker who advocates Taiwan independence”
56 Saunders
in 2017 while serving as premier—wins the DPP nomination in 2024. While
the Taiwan electorate and outside observers regard DPP leaders such as
Tsai Ing-wen as pragmatic and moderate, PRC ocials and analysts view
them with deep suspicion, citing past statements and actions as evidence
of their independence inclinations.
e identity and unication/independence preference data cited sug-
gest the Taiwan public is relatively content with the status quo, averse to tak-
ing risks, and has limited interest in unication. is presents the PRC with
a dicult challenge in persuading Taiwan leaders and the Taiwan public to
accept unication. China’s recent trend toward more authoritarian politics
and decreased freedom of expression makes unication with the PRC less
attractive to a Taiwan public used to living in a democratic society. Beijing’s
crackdown on democracy and civil rights in Hong Kong has led many people
in Taiwan to conclude that CCP leaders cannot be trusted to live up to the
terms of a negotiated agreement. is suggests that PRC policies, strategies,
and tactics that rely on persuasion may be less eective in the future because
it will be increasingly dicult to convince a reluctant Taiwan public that Chi-
na’s vision of future unication is better than the current status quo. e PRC
might ultimately have to threaten the current status quo to push Taiwan to ac-
cept unication—an approach that would challenge U.S. policy that opposes
unilateral changes to the status quo by either China or Taiwan.
United front tactics may also have less utility for the PRC in the future.
Demographic changes and declining interest in unication among the Tai-
wan electorate will make it harder for parties supporting unication to win
power, as the KMT’s dwindling party identication gures suggest. In 2021,
KMT party chair Johnny Chiang proposed adjustments in KMT policies to-
ward China that might have more appeal to the Taiwan public, but party el-
ders such as Lien Chan and Ma Ying-jeou weighed in against him and Chiang
was defeated in his bid for reelection. New KMT chair Eric Chu promptly sent
a letter to Xi Jinping rearming the 1992 Consensus and calling for coopera-
tion in opposing Taiwan independence.
42
is outcome is consistent with the
CCP’s united front logic, but this approach is unlikely to have much appeal
in Taiwan politics, especially given continuing PRC military coercion against
Taiwan. e result may be a KMT that becomes increasingly marginalized
and perhaps incapable of functioning as an eective opposition party. At the
Three Logics of Chinese Policy Toward Taiwan 57
same time, the DPP’s relatively cautious and incremental approach on policy
toward China makes it dicult to use opposition to Taiwan independence as
a political rallying cry.
e declining utility of policies associated with united front and per-
suasion logics leaves CCP leaders increasingly reliant on policy instruments
based on leverage and coercion. ese tools are likely to be eective in de-
terring overt moves toward Taiwan independence, given pragmatic Taiwan
leadership, a risk-averse Taiwan public, and the high costs of war for Taiwan,
the United States, and China.
At present, the most likely source of conict would be a Chinese leader-
ship that redenes its red lines about which actions promoting Taiwan inde-
pendence are unacceptable and decides that it must use a show of force to
deter “creeping independence.” PRC complaints about deepening U.S.-Tai-
wan military cooperation and U.S.-Taiwan relations taking on an increas-
ingly ocial dimension highlight this risk. Beijing opposes any increase in
U.S.-Taiwan cooperation, but developments that further erode the U.S. “one
China” commitments made in the three communiques could prompt China
to take limited military action to reestablish limits on U.S. unocial rela-
tions with Taiwan, as it did in 1995–1996.
e longer term issue is whether the PRC can remain patient about its
ultimate goal of achieving unication or whether CCP leaders will conclude
that a distinctive Taiwan identity is becoming consolidated, which would
permanently separate Taiwan from China. e United States is a factor in this
calculus, given heightened U.S.-China strategic competition and the sugges-
tion by some U.S. strategists that U.S. geostrategic interests require prevent-
ing Taiwan’s unication with China.
43
Some U.S. analysts worry that China is
likely to attack Taiwan as soon as it has the military capability to do so or that
nationalistic pressures might force PRC leaders to make a risky decision to
use force.
44
As other chapters in this volume document, the CCP has invested
signicant resources to develop military options for unication, even though
the PLA has not yet put all the necessary pieces in place for an invasion.
Xi Jinping and CCP leaders in Beijing are clearly not satised with the
political status quo in Taiwan. Yet they also appear to have implicitly accept-
ed that conditions will not be ripe for unication for some time and have re-
cently reiterated their faith in the Taiwan people and their commitment to
58 Saunders
the policy of peaceful unication.
45
Although nationalist pressures exist and
might be growing, CCP control over the media and propaganda apparatus
and the ability to tolerate or suppress public protests make it unlikely that
such pressures will force CCP leaders to take unwanted actions, such as start-
ing a conict that China might not win.
46
Moreover, CCP leaders could create
political room to maneuver by toggling between emphasizing the easy-to-
achieve goal of deterring Taiwan independence or the more ambitious but
harder-to-accomplish goal of unication as circumstances warrant.
e most likely PRC approach for the near term is continued pressure on
Taiwan’s DPP government to accept the 1992 Consensus coupled with eorts
to accumulate additional political, economic, and military leverage to strength
Beijing’s coercive options for dealing with Taiwan and the United States. e
PRC is also likely to continue to employ united front tactics and to seek to per-
suade the Taiwan public that unication would have positive benets, despite
the declining eectiveness of these lines of eort. Press reports suggest that the
CCP’s National Party Congress in fall 2022 is likely to adopt a new guiding pol-
icy on Taiwan that may provide a clearer sense of the PRC’s policy direction.
47
Conclusion
CCP leaders may ultimately decide that time and political trends in Taiwan
are moving against the PRC and that force will be necessary to achieve uni-
cation despite the high political, economic, and military costs and risks. Such
a decision would be based on the leadership’s assessment of the perceived
costs and risks of various courses of action and of the perceived costs of in-
action in terms of accepting Taiwan independence or losing the chance for
unication. Andrew Scobell’s chapter in this volume discusses the potential
CCP leadership calculus in more detail, and the chapters by Mathieu Duchâ-
tel and Michael Casey discuss the pros and cons of available PRC military
options. It is worth emphasizing that all of China’s top leaders have repeat-
edly stated that they are willing to ght, if necessary, to protect China’s core
interest in sovereignty and territorial integrity.
Taiwan and the United States can take some actions to reduce the like-
lihood of CCP leaders reaching the point where a costly and risky decision
to use force appears to be the PRC’s best course of action. One line of eort
involves concerted eorts to improve Taiwan’s defenses and focus them on
Three Logics of Chinese Policy Toward Taiwan 59
increasing the costs and risks of PRC military options, as discussed in the
chapters by Drew ompson and Alexander Huang. ese eorts should
focus on concrete actions to improve military capability rather than sym-
bolic measures of U.S. support for Taiwan. Ukraine’s resistance to Russia’s
February 2022 invasion demonstrates that targeted investments in defense
can be eective against a more powerful military. e U.S. military is also
increasing its emphasis on developing new capabilities and operational
concepts to prevail in a conict with the PRC over Taiwan. However, it is
equally important to inuence the other side of the CCP leadership calcu-
lus by keeping the possibility of peaceful unication alive. is suggests
that Taiwan should not denitively rule out the possibility of unication if
conditions change in China. For the same reason, U.S. policy should con-
tinue to focus on process (for example, any unication must be achieved
peacefully with the consent of the Taiwan people) rather than explicitly op-
pose unication regardless of the circumstances. Placing the PRC in a posi-
tion where war is the only option for achieving unication would increase
the risks of a military conict with potentially devastating consequences
for China, Taiwan, and the United States.
e author thanks Michael Glosny, Joel Wuthnow, Bonnie Glaser, omas Chris-
tensen, Stapleton Roy, and Isaac Kardon for helpful comments on earlier drafts
and Jessica Drun for research assistance.
Notes
1
See e Taiwan Question and Reunication of China (Beijing: State Council Information
Oce and Taiwan Aairs Oce, August 1993), available at <https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/ce/ceno/
eng/ztxw/twwt/t110654.htm>; Richard C. Bush, Untying the Knot: Making Peace in the Taiwan
Strait (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2005); Alan D. Romberg, Rein in at the Brink
of the Precipice: American Policy Toward Taiwan and U.S.-PRC Relations (Washington, DC: e
Henry L. Stimson Center, 2003), 225–227.
2
As of this writing, Taiwan maintains diplomatic relations with 13 United Nations member
states and the Vatican. Note that the U.S. “one China” policy does not accept all elements of the
PRC “one China” principle. For a full explication of U.S. policy, see Romberg, Rein in at the Brink
of the Precipice. For a concise explanation, see Richard C. Bush, A One-China Policy Primer, East
Asia Policy Paper 10 (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, March 2017), available at <https://
www.brookings.edu/research/a-one-china-policy-primer/>.
3
See Bush, Untying the Knot, 35–45.
60 Saunders
4
For a recent statement showing the endurance of these principles, see Xi Jinping,
“Speech at a Meeting Marking the 110
th
Anniversary of the Revolution Of 1911,” Xinhua, October
9, 2021, available at <https://www.mfa.gov.cn/ce/ceus//eng/zgyw/t1913454.htm>.
5
Some People’s Republic of China (PRC) academics and think tank analysts have privately
indicated that some experts hesitate to challenge the preconceptions of PRC policymakers in
their internal writings. Author’s discussions with PRC scholars and analysts, 2016–2018.
6
A senior PRC academic noted privately that even fairly senior ocials within the Taiwan
Aairs Oce (Taiban) might not be privy to Xi Jinping’s real thinking or aware of the content of
forthcoming policy statements on Taiwan. Discussion with the author, 2018.
7
One of the things that distinguishes Chinese core interests from lesser interests is a
willingness to ght to defend core interests.
8
Some solutions proposed by scholars involve a confederation that would include both
the PRC and the Republic of China (ROC) as equals, but ocial PRC proposals envision a unied
Taiwan that is a subordinate part of the PRC.
9
Xi rst stated this in a 2013 meeting with Vincent Siew, Taiwan’s representative at the
2013 Asia Pacic Economic Cooperation Summit, and reiterated it in his 2019 New Year’s speech.
See “China’s Xi Says Political Solution for Taiwan Can’t Wait Forever,” Reuters, October 6, 2013,
available at <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-asia-apec-china-taiwan/chinas-xi-says-
political-solution-for-taiwan-cant-wait-forever-idUSBRE99503Q20131006>; Richard C. Bush, “8
Key ings to Notice from Xi Jinping’s New Year Speech on Taiwan,” Brookings Institution, January
7, 2019, available at <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2019/01/07/8-key-
things-to-notice-from-xi-jinpings-new-year-speech-on-taiwan/>.
10
“Full Text of Xi Jinping’s Report at 19
th
CPC National Congress,” Xinhua, October 18,
2017, available at <http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/special/2017-11/03/c_136725942.htm>.
11
An analogy could be drawn with potential energy (leverage) and kinetic energy
(coercion).
12
For example, a weaker state might choose to forgo actions that it knows or expects
would antagonize a stronger state that has signicant leverage over it, even if that stronger state
has not made specic deterrent threats.
13
omas C. Schelling, e Strategy of Conict (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press, 1960); omas C. Schelling, Arms and Inuence (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966).
14
is argument originates with Schelling, who emphasizes higher costs due to the
greater visibility of concessions and the likelihood of concessions leading to additional demands
in the compellence case. Schelling, Arms and Inuence, 69–91. More recent formulations ground
this conclusion in prospect theory, which draws on social psychology to argue that the perceived
costs of giving up something one already has are valued more highly than prospective gains of
attaining something one wants. See Gary Schaub, Jr., “Deterrence, Compellence, and Prospect
eory,” Political Psychology 25, no. 3 (June 2004), 389–411.
15
See Albert Hirschman, National Power and the Structure of Foreign Trade (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1945).
Three Logics of Chinese Policy Toward Taiwan 61
16
Chinese Community Party (CCP) leaders have mentioned several actions that might
justify the use of force, including formal declaration of Taiwan independence, movement toward
Taiwan independence, internal unrest in Taiwan, Taiwan’s acquisition of nuclear weapons,
indenite (sine die) delays in the resumption of cross-strait dialogue on unication, and foreign
military intervention in Taiwan’s internal aairs. See Annual Report to Congress: Military and
Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2021 (Washington, DC: Oce
of the Secretary of Defense, 2021), 115–116, available at <https://media.defense.gov/2021/
nov/03/2002885874/-1/-1/0/2021-cmpr-nal.pdf>.
17
e Kuomintang regards the 1992 Consensus as involving “one China, separate
interpretations” and interprets the “one China” as the ROC. e CCP regards the 1992 Consensus
as acknowledging that China and Taiwan are both part of the same sovereign political entity.
e term 1992 Consensus was coined by Su Chi in 2000 as shorthand for the 1992 agreement
that allowed the Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait–Straits Exchange Foundation
talks to move forward. See Yu-Jie Chen and Jerome A. Cohen, “China-Taiwan Relations Re-
Examined: e ‘1992 Consensus’ and Cross-Strait Agreements,” University of Pennsylvania Asian
Law Review 14, nos. 1/2 (2019), 1–40, available at <https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/cgi/
viewcontent.cgi?article=1039&context=alr>.
18
See Larry Diamond and Orville Schell, eds., China’s Inuence & American Interests:
Promoting Constructive Vigilance (Stanford: Hoover Institution, 2018), appendix I, available at
<https://www.hoover.org/research/chinas-inuence-american-interests-promoting-constructive-
vigilance>.
19
is is partly because united fronts to oppose common enemies divert attention from
the incompatibility of the CCP’s ultimate goals with those of other members of the united front.
20
China’s National Defense in the New Era (Beijing: State Council Information Oce,
July 2019), available at <https://english.www.gov.cn/archive/whitepaper/201907/24/content_
WS5d3941ddc6d08408f502283d.html>.
21
Translation adapted from Russell Hsiao, “Political Warfare Alert: CCP Updates United
Front Regulations Expanding Foreign Inuence Mission,” Global Taiwan Brief 6, no. 3 (February
10, 2021), available at <https://globaltaiwan.org/2021/02/vol-6-issue-3/>.
22
See June Teufel Dreyer, “China’s United Front Strategy and Taiwan,” Taiwan Insight,
February 19, 2018, available at <https://taiwaninsight.org/2018/02/19/chinas-united-front-
strategy-and-taiwan/>.
23
Moreover, the author’s personal conversations suggest that for many Taiwan people
increased contacts with the PRC through employment, study, or tourism tend to reinforce an
awareness of dierences rather than build a sense of shared identity.
24
Emerson M.S. Niou, “Understanding Taiwan Independence and Its Policy Implications,”
Asian Survey 44, no. 4 (August 2004), 555–567, available at <https://doi.org/10.1525/
as.2004.44.4.555>.
25
See “Ye Jianying on Taiwan’s Return to Motherland and Peaceful Reunication,”
September 30, 1981, available at <http://www.china.org.cn/english/7945.htm>; “Jan 30, 1995:
President Jiang Zemin Puts Forward Eight Propositions on Development of Relations Between
Two Sides of Taiwan Straits,” China Daily, January 30, 2011, available at <https://www.chinadaily.
com.cn/china/19thcpcnationalcongress/2011-01/30/content_29715090.htm>. Also see Bush,
Untying the Knot, 36–39.
26
Ibid.
62 Saunders
27
is may be conceptualized as the extent to which a policy proposal has positive
externalities (which facilitates coalition-building) or negative externalities (which highlights
tradeos and generates opposition from groups whose interests would be harmed).
28
is circle is somewhat squared by China’s approach of making Taiwan’s participation
contingent on Beijing’s approval each year, which generates continuing leverage for China.
29
In some cases, China might consciously decide to limit cross-strait economic activities
that would increase competition and hurt politically important constituencies in Taiwan.
30
See Michael D. Swaine, “Chinese Decision-Making Regarding Taiwan, 1979–2000,” in
e Making of Chinese Foreign and Security Policy in the Era of Reform, 1978–2000, ed. David M.
Lampton (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001), 289–336; Bonnie S. Glaser, “e PLA Role
in China’s Taiwan Policymaking,” in PLA Inuence on China’s National Security Policymaking,
ed. Phillip C. Saunders and Andrew Scobell (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2015), 166–197.
31
See National Unication Council, Guidelines for National Unication,
March 4, 1991, available at <https://www.mac.gov.tw/en/news_content.
aspx?n=bec36a4a0bb0663c&sms=bf821f021b282251&s=d0017062a39af1c0>.
32
Tetsuo Kotani, “e Japan-Taiwan Fishery Agreement: Strategic Success, Tactical
Failure?” Center for Strategic and International Studies, October 20, 2015, available at <https://
amti.csis.org/the-japan-taiwan-shery-agreement-strategic-success-tactical-failure/>.
33
See Phillip C. Saunders and Scott L. Kastner, “Bridge Over Troubled Water? Envisioning
a China-Taiwan Peace Agreement,” International Security 33, no. 4 (Spring 2009), 87–114.
34
David G. Brown and Kevin Scott, “A Breakthrough and a Deadlock,” Comparative
Connections 16, no. 1 (May 2014), available at <https://cc.pacforum.org/2014/05/a-
breakthrough-and-a-deadlock/>.
35
Alan D. Romberg, “Tsai Ing-wen Takes Oce: A New Era in Cross-Strait Relations,”
China Leadership Monitor, no. 50 (Summer 2016), available at <https://www.hoover.org/
research/tsai-ing-wen-takes-oce-new-era-cross-strait-relations>; and Alan D. Romberg, “e
First 100 Days: Crossing the River While Feeling the Stones,” China Leadership Monitor, no. 51
(Fall 2016), available at <https://www.hoover.org/research/rst-100-days-crossing-river-while-
feeling-stones>.
36
See Bush, “8 Key ings to Notice from Xi Jinping’s New Year Speech on Taiwan.”
37
“Taiwanese/Chinese Identity (1992/06–2021/12),” Election Study Center, National
Chengchi University, January 10, 2022, available at <https://esc.nccu.edu.tw/PageDoc/
Detail?d=7800&id=6961>.
38
“Taiwan Independence vs. Unication with the Mainland (1994/12–2021/12),” Election
Study Center, National Chengchi University, January 10, 2022, available at <https://esc.nccu.
edu.tw/PageDoc/Detail?d=7801&id=6963>.
39
Nathan Batto, “Unication, Independence, SQ, and Polling,” Frozen Garlic, January 10,
2022, available at <https://frozengarlic.wordpress.com/2022/01/10/unication-independence-
sq-and-polling/>. Also see the article Batto cites by Hsiao Yi-ching [蕭怡靖] and Yu Ching-hsin
[游清鑫], “Re-Examining the 6-Itemed Measurement of Citizen’s Preference on the Issue of
Independence vs. Unication in Taiwan: A Proposed Advancement” [檢測台灣民眾六分類統
獨立場:一個測量改進的提出], Taiwanese Political Science Review [台灣政治學刊] 16, no. 2
(November 2012), 67–118, available at <https://www.tpsr.tw/zh-hant/zh-hant/paper/jian-ce-
tai-wan-min-zhong-liu-fen-lei-tong-du-li-chang-yi-ge-ce-liang-gai-jin-de-ti>.
40
“Party Preferences (1992/06–2021/12),” Election Study Center, National
Chengchi University, January 10, 2022, available at <https://esc.nccu.edu.tw/PageDoc/
Detail?d=7802&id=6964>.
Three Logics of Chinese Policy Toward Taiwan 63
41
is shift included a 1995 pledge by Democratic Progressive Party (DDP) Chair Shih
Ming-teh [施明德] that the DPP would not declare independence if it won the presidency,
downplaying the Taiwan independence plank in the party platform, and eventually claiming
that Taiwan is already an independent sovereign state so that a declaration of independence is
unnecessary. See Batto, “Unication, Independence, SQ, and Polling.”
42
Nathan Batto, “Change Under Chu? Never Mind,” Frozen Garlic, September 27, 2021,
available at <https://frozengarlic.wordpress.com/2021/09/27/change-under-chu-never-mind/>.
43
Elbridge Colby, “e United States Should Defend Taiwan,” National Review,
December 2, 2021, available at <https://www.nationalreview.com/magazine/2021/12/20/the-
united-states-should-defend-taiwan/>. Also see Assistant Secretary of Defense for Indo-Pacic
Security Aairs Ely Ratner’s testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee where
he describes Taiwan as a “critical node within the rst island chain.” Ely Ratner, Statement to
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 117
th
Cong., 1
st
sess., December 8, 2021, available at
<https://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/120821_Ratner_Testimony1.pdf>.
44
Oriana Skylar Mastro, “e Taiwan Temptation: Why Beijing Might Resort to Force,”
Foreign Aairs 100, no. 4 (July/August 2021), 58–67.
45
Xi, “Speech at a Meeting Marking the 110
th
Anniversary of the Revolution Of 1911”; Liu
Jieyi, “Video Speech at the Meeting to Commemorate the 110
th
Anniversary of the Revolution of
1911 in Hong Kong,” September 24, 2021.
46
See Jessica Chen Weiss, Powerful Patriots: Nationalist Protest in China’s Foreign
Relations (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014).
47
Amber Wang, “‘Only a Matter of Time’ Before Taiwan Has No Allies, Chinese Vice
Foreign Minister Says,” South China Morning Post, January 18, 2022, available at <https://www.
scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3163815/only-matter-time-taiwan-has-no-allies-
chinese-vice-foreign?utm_source=rss_feed>.
T
he People’s Republic of China (PRC) considers Taiwan a rogue prov-
ince—the last holdout from the long-suspended Chinese Civil War.
Since 1979, the PRC has formally adopted a policy of “peaceful reuni-
cation” and ocially embraced a strategy of political reconciliation with the
island. Despite this signicant change from the Mao Zedong–era mantra of
“liberation,” it is noteworthy that the PRC’s Communist rulers have refused to
renounce the use of armed force to unify Taiwan with the mainland. Indeed,
for decades the central warghting scenario for the People’s Liberation Army
(PLA) has been the Taiwan Strait.
Most observers assume that, when it comes to Taiwan, the ruling Chinese
Communist Party (CCP) is gravely serious about optioning the use of armed force.
Unication with Taiwan is a CCP central objective and the PLA’s most important
military objective.
1
Yet any use of armed force across the Taiwan Strait would en-
tail a major military operation the likes of which the PLA has not conducted in
more than 40 years.
2
Moreover, four decades of mostly conciliatory and peaceful
cross-strait ties have provided a foundation for an unprecedentedly vibrant and
dense web of relations between the island and the mainland. ese interactions
have produced considerable prosperity and economic dynamism for the PRC.
CHAPTER 2
China’s Calculus on the Use of Force:
Futures, Costs, Benefits, Risks, and Goals
By Andrew Scobell
65
66 Scobell
Is Beijing prepared to use armed force against Taiwan in the 21
st
centu-
ry? Under what circumstances might Beijing be prepared to use force across
the strait? In the previous chapter, Phillip C. Saunders explored an array
of measures short of the use of force that Beijing could pursue to advance
its goal of national unication. is chapter unpacks the assumption that
Beijing is prepared to use armed force, considering the circumstances un-
der which the PRC might use force, the ends force might serve, and how
force might be employed. China’s calculus regarding the use of force against
Taiwan will be explored by considering ve variables: alternative futures,
costs, risks, benets, and goals.
is chapter adopts a medium- to long-term perspective (looking out 10
to 30 years) to assess Beijing’s calculus of coercion against Taiwan. ere are
two main reasons for this perspective. First, the Taiwan issue is not likely to be
resolved peacefully in the near term, and a cross-strait stando will likely per-
sist for decades. Both sides are adamant in their respective stances: Beijing
is highly unlikely to renounce its claim on the island in the near future, and
Taipei will almost certainly refuse to concede to the PRC’s demands to unify
under the auspices of the CCP. Second, neither Beijing nor Taipei is likely to
engage in extreme behavior in the coming months or years because leaders
on both sides of the Taiwan Strait are currently operating in the domain of
gains. In other words, at present, Beijing and Taipei both assess that their own
respective situations are acceptable, and neither is disposed to take costly ac-
tions that risk losing what they already possess.
e chapter is organized into four sections. e rst section sketches out
the framework and approach employed, including assumptions, concepts,
and denitions. e second section describes Beijing’s grand strategy and
outlines alternative futures for China. e third section builds on these alter-
native futures by exploring ve alternative Taiwan Strait scenarios sketched
out according to a range of possible cost-benet calculations that Beijing
might make. e nal section oers some tentative conclusions.
Framework and Approach
is section rst identies fundamental assumptions and denes key terms
and concepts. It then outlines a framework adapted from prospect theory to
analyze China’s calculus of coercion against Taiwan.
China’s Calculus on the Use of Force 67
Assumptions
is chapter makes four fundamental assumptions. First, it assumes that Tai-
wan will continue to be a high priority for the ruling CCP. Beijing classies
Taiwan as a “core interest” [hexin liyi, 核心利益]—the PRC’s version of what
the United States would label a “vital national security interest.”
3
is designa-
tion underscores the island’s continuing central importance to the CCP and
strongly suggests that Beijing believes Taiwan is worth ghting for. Indeed, au-
thoritative Chinese documents articulate this very position. e 2019 PRC De-
fense White Paper states, “China must be and will be reunited. . . . We [China]
make no promise to renounce the use of force and reserve the option of taking
all necessary measures. . . . e PLA will resolutely defeat anyone attempting
to separate Taiwan from China and safeguard national unity at all costs.”
4
Second, this chapter assumes that the PRC’s political and military rulers
are fundamentally rational within the bounds of their particular situational
context.
5
However, all individuals possess cognitive biases; psychological fac-
tors, including perceptions and misperceptions, also play signicant roles in
decisionmaking.
6
While Taiwan clearly constitutes an emotional and even
personal issue for CCP and PLA leaders, the regime’s approach to the issue is
largely logical and pragmatic. Hence, decisions by the PRC’s senior political
leadership about a course of action vis-à-vis Taiwan almost certainly will be
made after weighing the perceived costs, benets, and risks against the de-
sired goal. Since regime perpetuation remains the highest priority, deliber-
ations about the use of force against the island include consideration of the
essentiality of such action to the continued rule by the CCP and the risks to the
Party’s survival in the case of a serious military setback.
ird, this chapter assumes that any decision to use military force
against Taiwan will be made by the top echelon of CCP leaders. e PRC’s
senior political leadership has decided every signicant employment of
armed force since 1949, always pursuant to the wishes of the most prom-
inent individual at the apex of the power structure. is includes Mao Ze-
dong (1949–1976), Deng Xiaoping (1978–1989), Jiang Zemin (1989–2002),
Hu Jintao (2002–2012), and Xi Jinping (2012–present). For the purposes of
analytic elegance, this chapter treats PRC senior leadership as a unitary ra-
tional actor. However, this is not to say that multiple individuals and entities
will not inuence the outcome. Indeed, while the ultimate decision will be
68 Scobell
made at the top, this decision will almost certainly be made only after in-
put from, or in consultation with, military leaders.
7
In this chapter, Beijing is
used as shorthand for the PRC’s top political and military leaders and Taipei
refers to Taiwan’s top political and military leaders.
Fourth, this chapter assumes that, under most circumstances, the PRC’s
military leaders will obey the orders of their political superiors and exe-
cute a campaign plan against Taiwan. Indeed, where Taiwan is concerned,
“there is no evidence that the PLA has ever acted in contradiction to [CCP]
orders.”
8
is dictum has certainly been the case for the largest military op-
erations, including the dispatch of armed forces into Korea in 1950 and the
invasion of Vietnam in 1979.
9
e cases of the military being directed to
restore order in the late 1960s during the most tumultuous phase of the Cul-
tural Revolution and the PLA being ordered to clear the streets of Beijing in
1989 after weeks of popular protests are each complicated and convoluted.
And yet, in both instances, once the paramount leader issued clear-cut or-
ders, the armed forces obeyed.
10
Denitions and Concepts
is chapter denes the use of armed force in expansive terms.
11
It does not
require actual combat between the armed forces of two states, any loss of life,
or a formal declaration of war.
12
An instance of the use of force involves the
employment of overt military or paramilitary power, including the explicit
credible threat of military or paramilitary action backed by troop movements,
exercises, missile or artillery tests, or the construction or expansion of military
installations at or beyond a state’s boundaries.
13
is denition, as applied
to China, is broader than actual warghting and encompasses combat and
noncombat actions by other elements of the PRC’s armed forces, including
the People’s Armed Police, the China Coast Guard, and the People’s Militia.
According to this denition, it is clear that the PRC has been willing to
use armed force against Taiwan on multiple occasions since 1949. e Taiwan
Strait has been the location of battles and skirmishes, as well as artillery bar-
rages and serial crises, across the decades. ese crises have involved troop
movements, military exercises, missile tests, and periodic credible threats of
the use of violence.
14
is chapter, however, focuses on Beijing’s decision-
making calculus for launching major large-scale military operations against
China’s Calculus on the Use of Force 69
Taiwan—invasion, blockade, and re strikes (see Michael Casey’s chapter in
this volume for details on each of these campaigns). Lesser actions will re-
ceive only limited attention.
Beijing will weigh the anticipated costs of the use of armed force against
Taiwan with the anticipated benets. Political and military leaders will as-
sume that achieving their objective concerning Taiwan will almost certainly
incur signicant costs, although expected costs may not be equivalent to actu-
al costs. e costs could be material or nonmaterial. e former includes mil-
itary costs (budgetary allocations for the eort, the human toll in personnel
killed and wounded, and equipment and armaments destroyed), economic
costs (direct and indirect via sanctions and changed partner behavior), and
diplomatic costs (sanctions and damage to bilateral relations with a range
of countries). Nonmaterial costs include the impact on the reputation of the
Party or PLA in the eyes of the Chinese people. ere might also be costs to
China’s image as a peaceable power outside of the country. e nonmateri-
al costs could be net positive or negative depending on the outcome of the
operation. As for benets, Beijing must consider what it currently possesses
compared with possible future benets. Beijing’s decision to employ force
against Taiwan would involve some form of cost-benet analysis, although
these assessments would be subjective, based on incomplete information,
and prone to cognitive biases.
Risk Management
While a cost-benet analysis would be a key component of any decision-
making calculus about whether to launch a large-scale military campaign
against Taiwan, it almost certainly would also involve some evaluation of the
associated risks. A key factor would be the degree of military and political
risk acceptable to PRC leaders. Such an assessment of risk would be situa-
tionally dependent and colored by the outlook of decisionmakers in Beijing
at a particular point in time. Chinese leaders may be quite conservative and
risk averse under some circumstances, while under other circumstances they
may be more adventurous and risk acceptant. ese risks are explored in ve
scenarios later in the chapter.
A review of the PRC’s use of armed force across the decades reveals that
Beijing has long demonstrated a willingness to take calculated risks.
15
However,
70 Scobell
that level of risk tolerance has uctuated over time. is chapter uses prospect
theory to explore China’s calculus of coercion vis-à-vis Taiwan and of when,
why, and how Beijing might use armed force against the island.
Prospect theory suggests that an actor is more likely to be risk averse when
operating in the domain of gains and risk acceptant when operating in the do-
main of losses.
16
In essence, individuals tend to fear losing something they al-
ready possess more than they value gaining something they do not have. Take,
for example, the behavior of a gambler at a casino. An individual who is on a
winning streak is often more cautious in subsequent wagers to protect his win-
nings. An individual who is on a losing streak, by contrast, is likely more daring
in subsequent wagers to compensate for earlier losses. Of course, an individ-
ual on a winning streak could become overcondent and emboldened, while
an individual after a string of losses could decide it is time to leave the casino.
Whether it be the case of a casino gambler or of Beijing weighing a deci-
sion to use large-scale force in the Taiwan Strait, the psychological impact of
an actor assessing whether he or she is operating in the domain of gains or in
the domain of losses will be signicant. Under most circumstances, Chinese
leaders emphasize protecting what they already possess. In the domain of
gains, Beijing may be risk averse and focused more on successfully deterring
Taiwan from pursuing independence and sustaining regime perpetuation
than on achieving unication.
In a time of crisis or conict, however, if Chinese leaders perceive that
they have lost or are in imminent danger of losing what they already have,
their coercive calculus regarding Taiwan would likely change. In the domain
of losses—if Taiwan is assessed to be independent or almost independent,
and/or if PRC regime survival is at stake—Beijing may be more disposed to
risk using armed force to achieve unication or ratcheting up coercion to ac-
celerate unication. Indeed, Chinese leaders do perceive that domestic po-
litical security and the status of Taiwan are intimately intertwined.
17
Hence,
when in the domain of gains, Chinese leaders would focus on risk-averse
strategies to perpetuate CCP rule, whereas in the domain of losses Chinese
leaders would pursue risk-acceptant strategies aimed at ensuring CCP sur-
vival (see the next section).
e logic of prospect theory is readily applicable to extreme situations,
such as when an actor has recently experienced either a series of spectacular
China’s Calculus on the Use of Force 71
wins or devasting losses. In the China-Taiwan context, these extreme situ-
ations would occur during political-military crises and deliberations over
whether to use large-scale armed force (see below).
18
However, top-level
Chinese leaders have more on the line concerning Taiwan than does a high-
stakes casino gambler—not only large sums of money but also sizable armed
formations and expensive military assets, as well as sustaining CCP rule.
is chapter adopts a modied version of Kai He’s political survival pros-
pect model in formulating two propositions.
19
First, when PRC leaders’ polit-
ical survival status is framed in the domain of gains, they are more likely to
behave in an accommodating way and select risk-averse coercive courses of
action (COAs) vis-à-vis Taiwan. Second, when PRC leaders’ political survival
status is framed in the domain of losses, they are more likely to behave in
a coercive way and select risk-acceptant coercive COAs concerning Taiwan.
Although no eventuality can be ruled out, Taiwan’s leaders recognize
that an extreme action or declaration would automatically trigger a harsh
response from Beijing, which almost certainly would include the use of
armed force. ere is also always the possibility that a small step or series
of incremental steps by Taipei may provoke the PRC.
20
Yet Beijing would be
reluctant to engage in any extreme action in the near term because Chinese
leaders remain uncertain that using armed force against Taiwan would be
successful. In other words, the risks are too great and the costs too high. e
CCP is currently operating in the domain of gains, and hence, PRC leaders
are risk averse and reluctant to incur costs associated with the use of armed
force against Taiwan. At present, China’s economy remains robust because
the country seems to have weathered COVID-19 better than any other Great
Power in the world, and the CCP enjoys strong popular support. erefore,
discussion about the increased likelihood of Beijing using force against the
island in 2020 constituted stimulating but unsubstantiated speculation.
21
e mainland defense establishment is currently involved in a compre-
hensive reorganization and upgrading of weaponry and training; however,
these transformations will take a decade or two to complete.
22
It is far too early
for China’s armed forces to be reaping the fruits of Xi’s massive defense over-
haul that was initiated in 2015. Commander in chief Xi’s admonitions to the
military to “ght and win informatized wars” remain aspirational. e PLA
candidly acknowledges that it remains in the process of mechanization, with
72 Scobell
informatization as the next challenge.
23
Ongoing organizational restructuring
is necessary but insucient to realize this goal: more inputs must be incorpo-
rated, and more time needs to elapse. China’s military has embraced a “sys-
tem of systems approach”
24
as it plans for a future of conducting “integrated
joint operations,” whereby the PLA will master “very complex combinations
of systems and subsystems to [be able to] kinetically or non-kinetically de-
feat or paralyze key point nodes in enemy operational systems all within the
enemy’s decision cycle.”
25
Hence, the PLA would prefer to postpone military
action against Taiwan at least until the 2030s. Of course, circumstances could
change; if Beijing assesses that its situation has become bleak, then CCP and
PLA leaders could become more risk acceptant.
Beijing’s Grand Strategy and Alternative China Futures
PRC political and military leaders are best characterized as ambitious
alarmists, focused on the medium and long term.
26
While conventional
scholarly wisdom denes Beijing’s paramount goal as regime survival, this
term is rather misleading in ordinary circumstances.
27
e word survival
implies that the mindset of China’s Communist rulers is one of despera-
tion—that they are fearful of near-term collapse or being overthrown. is
could be so in a crisis or conict situation as noted above. But in ordinary
circumstances, CCP leaders are less worried about the end coming next
week, next month, or next year than they are about being able to meet the
challenges of the medium and long term. While day-to-day vigilance is es-
sential, CCP leaders are consumed with regime perpetuation, which means
paying considerable attention to planning. If CCP leaders were consumed
with immediate threats, why would they put so much eort into formulat-
ing and implementing multiyear over-the-horizon planning in areas rang-
ing from economics and technology to national defense?
e PRC possesses a grand strategy, dened as “the process by which a
state relates long-term ends to means under the rubric of an overarching and
enduring vision to advance the national interest.”
28
Nevertheless, adoption of
this long-term view does not imply that there is no near-term possibility of
military action against Taiwan. Indeed, the dynamics and factors discussed
in this chapter will also be in play in the coming few years. Yet, as long as its
calculus of coercion regarding Taiwan remains in the domain of gains, Beijing
China’s Calculus on the Use of Force 73
is unlikely to decide to use armed force against the island—and the near-term
outlook seems relatively positive.
In thinking about China’s long-term future out to 2050, it is useful to consid-
er a range of scenarios depending on the degree of success Beijing might have
in executing its grand strategy. China’s grand strategy since 2004 can be labeled
national rejuvenation.
29
Beijing has four strategic priorities that have been con-
sistent across the decades: maintaining political control and social stability, sus-
taining economic growth, advancing science and technology, and modernizing
the national defense establishment.
30
Broad targets have been identied in each
of these areas to be attained in the coming decades.
31
In national defense, the
target is the PLA becoming a “world-class military” by midcentury. As M. Taylor
Fravel notes, this does not mean “being the single best” but rather “to be among
the best.”
32
In Beijing’s eyes, the gold standard for a world-class military is the
U.S. Armed Forces. Being a true peer or near-peer competitor of the U.S. nation-
al defense establishment is therefore the overarching goal.
Recent RAND research has sketched out four alternative futures depend-
ing on how successful CCP leaders would be in achieving their grand stra-
tegic goals in the coming decades.
33
In a triumphant China future, Beijing is
remarkably successful in realizing its grand strategy. In an ascendant China
future, Beijing is successful in achieving many, but not all, of the goals of its
grand strategy. In a stagnant China future, Beijing fails to achieve its long-
term goals. In an imploding China future, Beijing is besieged by a multitude
of problems that threaten the existence of the Communist regime. Currently,
Beijing appears to be on an ascending China trajectory, although the specter
of a stagnant China may be looming. Whatever the future holds for China, cen-
tral to Beijing’s calculus of coercion toward Taiwan will be the level of risk it is
prepared to tolerate and the costs it is willing to accept versus the perceived
benet. Risk tolerance and cost acceptance will likely uctuate according to
the degree of success that China achieves in realizing its grand strategic goals.
Targeting Taiwan? Alternative Cross-Strait Scenarios
Unication with Taiwan is implicitly part and parcel of the PRC fully attaining
its grand strategy of national rejuvenation, although no explicit deadline or
timeline has been identied for realizing this outcome.
34
In the meantime,
maintaining the status quo in the Taiwan Strait, which entails deterring any
74 Scobell
perceived steps by Taiwan toward de jure independence, is a high priority.
Beijing thus has little motivation to resort to a major use of armed force. Sta-
tus quo, however, is dened dierently by each of the major actors in this
drama—China, Taiwan, and the United States. But, objectively speaking,
each actor has been responsible for some related change. In the 1990s and
the 2000s, change was driven by developments on the island: democratiza-
tion and eorts by political leaders to expand Taiwan’s international space.
In the 2010s, particularly the latter part of that decade, the change came from
the United States, as Washington gradually sought to enhance its relationship
with Taipei in ocial and quasi-ocial ways. Will it be the PRC’s turn to drive
change in the 2020s and beyond?
Unsurprisingly, the PRC has never been a completely passive actor across
the decades. Yet, from Beijing’s perspective, it has been quite consistent and
unwavering in its approach to the island. Beijing believes that change has
been instigated by Taiwan and the United States, while “change” on its part
has been only in reaction to actions by Taipei or Washington. Nevertheless,
the PRC itself has changed, if only by growing economically stronger and
more militarily powerful. As a result, the China-Taiwan balance of power has
become ever more skewed in favor of the PRC. If signicant change in the
cross-strait status quo occurs during the 2020s or in subsequent decades, it
would likely be triggered by Beijing.
To explore Beijing’s calculus on the launch of a large-scale military cam-
paign against Taiwan in a more concrete manner, it is useful to examine ve
specic scenarios, considering for each the levels of benet and cost, Beijing’s
risk propensity in conjunction with alternative Chinese future, and possible
outcomes (see table 1). e ve notional scenarios—each framed in terms of
relative cost and benet accruing to Beijing—are:
■
low cost/high benet
■
high cost/high benet
■
low cost/no benet
■
very high cost/low benet
■
ultimate cost/no benet.
Beijing’s priorities and goals vis-à-vis Taiwan are likely to vary accord-
ing to the alternative future China follows. us, the level of risk PRC rulers
China’s Calculus on the Use of Force 75
are prepared to entertain (see table 2) and the cost-benet assessment
they make (see table 1) will likely depend on the future scenario in which
they nd themselves.
Scenario 1: Low Cost/High Benet
is scenario would most likely play out in a future in which the CCP achieves
stunning success in attaining its grand strategic objectives. A triumphant Chi-
na would view unrealized unication with Taiwan as especially frustrating.
35
However, in this scenario, cross-strait unication could occur peacefully if
Taipei concludes that further stalling or resistance is futile in the face of an
overwhelming and growing imbalance of hard power in favor of Beijing. PRC
assurances, if credible, could make this undesirable outcome more accept-
able to the people of Taiwan.
36
In a triumphant future, achieving complete na-
tional unication would be a top CCP priority, although Beijing would tend to
Table 1. Unification by Force: Cost/Benefit, Futures, Scenarios, and Military
Campaigns
COST
BENEFIT
(unification)
LOW HIGH
ACHIEVED
TRIUMPHANT FUTURE
Taiwan succumbs to coer-
cion without a major use of
force
ASCENDANT FUTURE
Scenario 1
INVASION
FAILURE
STAGNANT FUTURE
Scenario 2
BLOCKADE
IMPLODING FUTURE
Scenario 3 and Scenario 4
FIRESTRIKE/FIRESTRIKE
Table 2. Beijing’s Calculus of Coercion Against Taiwan: Priorities, Goals, and Risks
FUTURE PRIORITY GOAL RISK PROPENSITY
Triumphant Top Solve Risk averse
Ascendant High Compel/Solve Risk tolerant
Stagnant Medium Deter/Manage Risk tolerant
Imploding Low Distract Risk acceptant
76 Scobell
be risk averse. Hence, if Taipei did not readily accept outright peaceful reuni-
cation, then PRC leaders would intensify an array of measures, including us-
ing the military, paramilitary, and nonmilitary means to coerce (or persuade)
Taiwan into accepting unication. ese measures would not involve large-
scale use of armed force. Rather, this eort would constitute a whole-of-gov-
ernment and whole-of-society COA conducted entirely below the threshold
of actual military conict. From Beijing’s perspective, this would be a low
cost/maximum benet COA (see table 1). Beijing might also consider this
COA low risk because it would conclude that the United States, Japan, and
other countries would be hesitant to confront an extremely powerful and tri-
umphant China. Moreover, Taipei might harbor grave doubts over whether
third countries would continue to back the island and thus would be more
likely to succumb to Beijing’s coercion.
Scenario 2: High Cost/High Benet
is scenario would most likely unfold if Beijing were able to achieve many,
but not all, of its grand strategic goals. For an ascendant China future, unre-
alized unication with Taiwan would almost certainly be near the top of the
agenda (see table 2). Taiwan would be “a signicant source of frustration”
across the decades as the PRC approached midcentury.
37
CCP leaders would
feel considerable self-imposed pressure to complete national unication, es-
pecially as high-prole commemorations approached, notably the centenary
of the PLA and the PRC in 2027 and 2049, respectively. is latter date would
carry special psychological weight because of Xi’s designation of midcentu-
ry as the deadline for realizing national rejuvenation. While popular expec-
tations could likely be managed, top CCP leaders could feel psychologically
burdened by their own failure to deliver on a prominent and publicly an-
nounced commitment. Hence, there could be a sense of urgency to compel
Taipei to accept unication, and Beijing might be risk tolerant (see table 2)
and prepared to bear considerable costs (see table 1) to achieve the goal.
Chinese leaders might conclude that the prospects for unication were
promising enough to seek nal resolution via invasion. Under such circum-
stances, Beijing could be ready to pay a high cost, and PRC civilian and mil-
itary leaders might be more prepared to solve the Taiwan issue once and for
all. In other words, Beijing would aim to seize control of the island via armed
China’s Calculus on the Use of Force 77
force. As a top priority, PRC and PLA leaders would be willing to accept a high
price for attaining the goal—including signicant military losses, consider-
able damage to the Chinese economy, and diplomatic ostracism.
However, while signicant costs in blood and treasure would be accept-
able in the event of success, Beijing would be wary of risking a high-prole
military catastrophe because top leaders would worry that this could call into
question their judgment within a key constituency—the PLA. is uncertain-
ty could mean that all campaign options would be on the table and that Chi-
nese leaders would be prepared to engage in a protracted military eort to
achieve unication. Yet Beijing could begin with less risky military operations
and gradually increase the costs of resistance to Taipei.
38
is method could
include a military operation to seize one of Taiwan’s oshore islands (as de-
scribed in Mathieu Duchâtel’s chapter in this volume). Beijing could then
ratchet up military operations to a blockade and then a re strike campaign.
Scenario 3: Low Cost/No Benet
is scenario would likely take place in a stagnant China future. In such
circumstances, unication with Taiwan would be less of a priority (see ta-
ble 2) since Beijing would confront a considerable number of other serious
challenges. Nevertheless, the island’s continued de facto independent status
would remain a matter of “frustration.”
39
Beijing would likely be inclined to
manage cross-strait relations while staying alert to a Taipei tempted to op-
portunistically exploit the CCP’s diculties to move closer to independence.
is situation could prompt Beijing to be risk tolerant (see table 2) while un-
dertaking low-cost coercive actions (see table 1). e goal would be to deter
Taipei from moving toward independence and work to manage cross-strait
relations (see table 2). Under such circumstances, the CCP would be most
likely to launch coercive activities below the threshold of war, including step-
ping up military exercises and missile tests in the vicinity of Taiwan, increas-
ing incursions into the island’s waters and airspace, and conducting multiple
barrages of cyber attacks against the island.
ese PRC provocations would likely generate alarm and anger in Tai-
wan and heighten concern in Washington that Beijing might gear up for
large-scale military action against the island. In response, the United States
would issue stern public and private warnings to Beijing and ramp up its air
78 Scobell
and naval presence in the vicinity while urging restraint to Taipei. In the face
of this U.S. response, if Taipei refrained from high-prole pro-independence
actions and inammatory pro-independence rhetoric, the PRC would be un-
likely to escalate. Indeed, Beijing would likely wind down its provocations
and declare victory. e PRC would claim that it had successfully deterred
separatists in Taipei from achieving independence, similar to how Beijing de-
clared victory following the 1995–1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis.
40
Yet in reality, the
benets achieved and costs incurred would be low (see table 1): no tangible
progress on unication but no major costs in military hardware or casual-
ties, along with a likely modest but discernible hit to China’s already stagnant
economy after weeks of elevated tensions in the Taiwan Strait.
Scenario 4: Very High Cost/Low Benet
is scenario would likely play out in a future beset by daunting multiple cri-
ses at home and abroad. In an imploding China future, Taiwan would be a
low priority for Beijing.
41
Emboldened by a mainland roiled by chronic chaos, Taipei could take
steps that amount to a unilateral declaration of independence. Under
these circumstances, Beijing’s only alternative might be to respond with
a large-scale use of armed force. PRC leaders would realize that doing so
would be a high-risk (see table 2) and high-cost operation (see table 1).
Beijing would perceive that the very survival of the regime was at stake and
hence prepare to roll the dice. Launching a large-scale military operation
against Taiwan would invite U.S. intervention. Given the level of chaos and
turmoil within the borders of the PRC, the PLA would experience consider-
able challenges as it prepared to mount re strikes and/or an amphibious
invasion of Taiwan. ese diculties would delay preparations, and indi-
cators of mobilization would probably be readily discernible to Taipei and
Washington. As such, the armed forces of Taiwan and the United States
would likely have a week or more of warning, giving them time to prepare
for a Chinese attack.
us, the potential for the PRC to be decisively defeated by the com-
bined military responses of Taiwan and the United States would be high.
e upshot could easily be regime collapse or the ouster of one or more
top CCP leaders, who would become the scapegoats of a colossal and
China’s Calculus on the Use of Force 79
humiliating military failure in the Taiwan Strait. e costs would be high in
terms of military losses and domestic political fallout without any discern-
ible benet—save the regime just barely staving o collapse. Indeed, the
scope and array of crises in an imploding future might overwhelm the re-
gime and call into question the assumption of Beijing as a unitary actor. e
pressures could fracture the Party and the armed forces. is future would
generate considerable volatility in the outcomes and implications, which
would be dicult to predict. In an imploding China with fractured political
elites but a relatively unied PLA, the specter of a military coup could loom.
A cohesive military could proclaim it was acting on behalf of the CCP and
scapegoat the ousted political leadership for the cross-strait asco and po-
litical-economic morass.
A more likely variant of this scenario would be deep ssures in both the
CCP and the PLA, which would increase the potential for risk-prone behavior
by one or more Chinese actors. Such a situation raises the real prospect of
multiple armed factions deciding to launch missile strikes against Taiwan.
is possibility is frighteningly plausible if Taipei decided to take advantage
of a mainland in complete chaos to formally declare itself a separate and
independent state, with heightened expectations that some third countries
might be brave enough, in the face of a PRC in total disarray, to ocially
recognize Taiwan as a sovereign state. In this variant, regime survival would
be far more tenuous, and interventions by third countries would be highly
plausible. ese interventions could be prompted by the desire to secure
loose nuclear warheads and ballistic missiles, stabilize conditions and con-
tain refugee outows, seize territory, and/or carve out spheres of inuence.
ird-country interventions might be executed unilaterally, with little or no
coordination between states, or they might be conducted multilaterally with
close cooperation or coordination. Nevertheless, third-country interventions
would not necessarily preclude the survival of a rump PRC.
42
Scenario 5: Ultimate Cost/No Benet
is scenario would also likely happen in an imploding China future beset
by daunting multiple crises at home and abroad. ese circumstances would
make unication with Taiwan a low priority for Beijing.
43
Nevertheless, faced
with specic developments in the Taiwan Strait, Beijing could feel pressure to
80 Scobell
use armed force. A plausible scenario would be a Beijing desperate to distract
the Chinese people from upheaval at home. Rather than top leaders purpose-
ly launching a diversionary war, Beijing could initiate heightened provoca-
tions in the Taiwan Strait with the intention of keeping these acts below the
threshold of war and avoiding the use of large-scale military operations.
44
PRC leaders would be risk acceptant in terms of the potential for unintended
escalation (see table 2) because they would perceive themselves as operating
in the domain of losses, with the survival of CCP rule on the line. e goal be-
hind instigating provocations against Taiwan would be a desperate attempt
to rally support for a regime in crisis and build a semblance of unity among
disparate factions. Under these circumstances, however, PRC leaders would
be reluctant to accept a high cost, especially in terms of military losses since
the armed forces would be needed to deal with internal unrest.
In the end, Beijing could pay the ultimate cost without accruing any
benet (see table 1). Beijing would be playing an intricate two-level game:
a provocation in the Taiwan Strait would not only aim to rally domestic con-
stituencies around the ag but also seek to signal to external audiences in
Taipei, Washington, and elsewhere not to trie with a PRC in distress.
45
At the
same time, with multiple major crises, Beijing would seek a low-cost action
to preserve its forces and capabilities for other contingencies, and thus aim to
avoid large-scale use of armed force.
Despite Beijing’s desire to keep actions in the Taiwan Strait at the level of a
“diversionary spectacle,”
46
a series of miscalculations and misperceptions could
trigger a set of action-reaction spirals that would escalate to a massive conven-
tional conict and perhaps even a nuclear exchange with the United States.
47
e result would almost certainly be the complete collapse of CCP rule.
Conclusion
At the start of the third decade of the 21
st
century, three centenaries loomed
for Beijing: those of the CCP in mid-2021, of the PLA in 2027, and of the PRC
in 2049. Each of these commemorations serves not only as a celebration of
regime accomplishments but also as a reminder of unnished business. e
issue of Taiwan was certainly the most signicant piece of unnished busi-
ness in July 2021, and this sentiment will likely remain in August 2027, and
perhaps in October 2049.
China’s Calculus on the Use of Force 81
A—if not the—key determinant in Taiwan’s future will be the status of the
PRC because Beijing’s readiness to employ armed force against the island is
likely to correlate with the CCP’s perceived degree of success in achieving its
grand strategic goals in the coming decades. e higher the level of overall
success, the more willing Beijing will be to accept higher costs, but at the
same time less willing to accept risk, to realize unication. Meanwhile, the
greater the degree of failure in achieving its grand strategic goals, the less
willing Beijing will be to accept higher costs but the more willing it will be to
tolerate risk. Fortunately, the most ominous alternative Chinese futures for
Taiwan are also the least likely: a triumphant China or an imploding China.
In the former, Beijing could be prepared to use force no matter the cost, al-
though PRC leadership is likely to be risk averse. In the latter, Beijing could
be prepared to use force against the island and willing to take considerable
risks to do so. Nevertheless, the most likely futures—an ascending China or
a stagnant China—while less ominous for Taiwan, also hold signicant peril
for the island. In the former, Beijing could experience considerable pressure
to “do something” about Taiwan and be risk tolerant. In the latter, Beijing
would be risk tolerant and cost averse.
Taiwan will certainly persist as a long-term regime priority, but Beijing’s
specic short-term goals vis-à-vis Taiwan will inevitably uctuate according
to changing conditions. e PRC’s calculus of coercion against the island will
be determined by how Beijing weighs costs, benets, and risks against spe-
cic short-term goals. ese assessments will change in the coming decades
depending on the future trajectory of the PRC.
Notes
1
See, for example, Bonnie S. Glaser, “e PLA Role in China’s Taiwan Policymaking,” in
PLA Inuence on China’s National Security Policymaking, ed. Phillip C. Saunders and Andrew
Scobell (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2015), 166.
2
Arguably, an operation to unify Taiwan would be unprecedented in the People’s
Republic of China’s (PRC’s) military history. Yet the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has engaged
in operations to seize islands before. Far and away the most signicant and challenging of these
was the 2-month-long campaign to capture Hainan Island in the spring of 1950.
82 Scobell
3
Xi Jinping told PLA delegates to the National People’s Congress in March 2014 that
“national sovereignty, security, and development interests” constitute the PRC’s core interests.
See Feng Yahui and Duan Xinyi, “Xi Jinping Attends PLA Delegation Plenary Meeting” [习近
平出席解放军代表团 全体会议], People’s Daily [人民网], March 12, 2014, available at <http://
lianghui.people.com.cn/2014npc/n/2014/0312/c376707-24609511.html>.
4
State Council Information Oce of the People’s Republic of China, “Section II:
China’s Defensive National Defense Policy in the New Era,” in China’s National Defense in the
New Era (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 2019), available at <http://www.xinhuanet.com/
english/2019-07/24/c_138253389.htm>.
5
Herbert A. Simon, Models of Man: Social and Rational (New York: John Wiley & Sons,
1957).
6
Martie G. Haselton, Daniel Nettle, and Paul W. Andrews, “e Evolution of Cognitive
Bias,” in Handbook of Evolutionary Psychology, ed. David M. Buss (New York: John Wiley & Sons,
2005), 724–746.
7
For the ways in which military leaders provide input or consultation, see Saunders and
Scobell, PLA Inuence on China’s National Security Policymaking.
8
Glaser, “e PLA Role in China’s Taiwan Policymaking,” 167.
9
Andrew Scobell, China’s Use of Military Force: Beyond the Great Wall and the Long
March (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), chapters 4, 6.
10
Ibid., chapters 5, 7.
11
is draws on Andrew Scobell, “Reassessing China’s Use of Military Force,” in e PLA
Beyond Borders: Chinese Military Operations in Regional and Global Context, ed. Joel Wuthnow
et al. (Washington, DC: NDU Press, 2021), 183–197.
12
Scobell, China’s Use of Military Force, 10.
13
is denition is a revised version of the one that appears in Scobell, China’s Use of
Military Force, 9–10. e original version omitted reference to paramilitary forces and included
the phrase “in a border area.”
14
See, for example, omas E. Stolper, China, Taiwan, and the Oshore Islands (Armonk,
NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1985); and James R. Lilley and Chuck Downs, eds., Crisis in the Taiwan Strait
(Washington, DC: NDU Press, 1997).
15
See, for example, Scobell, “Reassessing China’s Use of Military Force”; and Allen S.
Whiting, “China’s Use of Force, 1950–96, and Taiwan,” International Security 26, no. 2 (Fall 2001),
103–131.
16
Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, “Prospect eory: An Analysis of Decision Under
Risk,” Econometrica 47, no. 2 (March 1979), 263–292.
17
Timothy R. Heath, “e ‘Holistic Security Concept’: e Securitization of Policy and
Increasing Risk of Militarized Crisis,” RAND Blog, June 27, 2015, available at <https://www.rand.
org/blog/2015/06/the-holistic-security-concept-the-securitization.html>.
18
See, for example, Kai He, China’s Crisis Behavior: Political Survival and Foreign Policy
After the Cold War (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2016).
19
Ibid., 43. ese two propositions, which are focused on the use of force, are modied
versions of four hypotheses formulated by Kai He to analyze Chinese crisis behavior.
20
ere is, for example, a small but nontrivial possibility that a Democratic Progressive
Party president after Tsai Ing-wen could press more vigorously toward the goal of de jure
independence for Taiwan.
China’s Calculus on the Use of Force 83
21
See, for example, Tim Willasey-Wilsey, “e Question: Why Would China Not Invade
Taiwan Now?” Military Review 100, no. 5 (September–October 2020), 6–9. e essay originally
appeared June 4, 2020, in the Cipher Brief, available at <https://www.thecipherbrief.com/the-
question-why-would-china-not-invade-taiwan-now>. For a more plausible analysis, see Dan
Blumenthal, “Is China Getting Ready to Start a War over Taiwan?” e National Interest, October
29, 2020, available at <https://nationalinterest.org/blog/reboot/china-getting-ready-start-war-
over-taiwan-171611>.
22
Andrew Scobell et al., China’s Grand Strategy: Trends, Trajectories, and Long-Term
Competition (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2020), 96.
23
See, for example, Michael S. Chase et al., China’s Incomplete Military Transformation:
Assessing the Weaknesses of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2015).
See also Andrew Scobell, “China’s Post-Pandemic Future: Wuhan Wobbly?” War on the Rocks,
February 3, 2021, available at <https://warontherocks.com/2021/02/chinas-post-covid-future-
wuhan-wobbly/>.
24
See, for example, Jerey Engstrom, Systems Confrontation and System Destruction
Warfare: How the Chinese People’s Liberation Army Seeks to Wage Modern Warfare (Santa
Monica, CA: RAND, 2018).
25
Scobell et al., China’s Grand Strategy, 85.
26
Ibid., 25–26.
27
See, for example, John W. Garver, China’s Quest: e History of the Foreign Relations of
the People’s Republic of China (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016).
28
Scobell et al., China’s Grand Strategy, 5.
29
Ibid., 17–18.
30
Ibid., 18–19.
31
For details, see ibid., chapters 3, 4, 5.
32
M. Taylor Fravel, “China’s ‘World-Class Military’ Ambitions: Origins and Implications,”
e Washington Quarterly 43, no. 1 (2020), 85–99, quotes on 85.
33
Scobell et al., China’s Grand Strategy, 102–111.
34
Xi has implied that national rejuvenation will be achieved by 2050. See Xi Jinping,
“Chinese Communist Party 19
th
National Congress Report” [中国共产党第十九次全国代表
大会报告], October 28, 2017, available at <http://www.mofcom.gov.cn/article/zt_topic19/
zywj/201710/20171002661169.shtml>.
35
e notional triumphant China scenario is described in Scobell et al., China’s Grand
Strategy, 105. In this scenario, by 2050, the Taiwan issue has been resolved, although the
resolution process is unspecied.
36
See, for example, Phillip C. Saunders and Scott L. Kastner, “Bridge over Troubled
Water? Envisioning a China-Taiwan Peace Agreement,” International Security 33, no. 4 (Spring
2009), 87–114.
37
Ibid., 107.
38
Statement of Lonnie Henley, PLA Operational Concepts and Centers of Gravity in a
Taiwan Conict, Testimony Before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission
Hearing on Cross-Strait Deterrence, February 18, 2021, available at <https://www.uscc.gov/
sites/default/les/2021-02/Lonnie_Henley_Testimony.pdf>.
39
Scobell et al., China’s Grand Strategy, 108.
40
Andrew Scobell, “Show of Force: Chinese Soldiers, Statesmen, and the 1995–1996
Taiwan Strait Crisis,” Political Science Quarterly 115, no. 2 (June 2000), 227–246.
84 Scobell
41
Taiwan’s status and Beijing’s disposition vis-à-vis Taipei is not addressed in this future.
See Scobell et al., China’s Grand Strategy, 109–111.
42
Indeed, the continued existence of some form of a weakened Chinese government—
although not necessarily a communist one—could be extremely useful to these third countries,
which would be unlikely to want to occupy China indenitely. A weak and pliant Chinese
government could permit third countries to shape a postintervention domestic political solution
deemed conducive to establishing a more stable future China. Such a Chinese government could
be one with redrawn borders and/or recongured political institutions.
43
Scobell et al., China’s Grand Strategy, 109–111.
44
Diversionary wars are far less frequent than is widely believed. See Amy Oakes,
Diversionary War: Domestic Unrest and International Conict (Stanford: Stanford University
Press, 2012).
45
Robert D. Putnam, “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: e Logic of Two-Level Games,”
International Organization 42, no. 3 (Summer 1988), 427–460.
46
Oakes, Diversionary War.
47
Inadvertent escalation between the United States and China is more likely than is
widely assumed for two reasons. First, Beijing believes it is skilled at escalation control and
crisis management. Second, dyadic interactive cognitive dynamics increase the impact of
misperceptions in U.S.-China relations in times of crisis or confrontation. On the former, see
Lonnie D. Henley, “War Control: Chinese Concepts of Escalation Management,” in Shaping
China’s Security Environment: e Role of the People’s Liberation Army, ed. Andrew Scobell and
Larry M. Wortzel (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2006), 81–104. On the latter,
see Andrew Scobell, “Perception and Misperception in U.S.-China Relations,” Political Science
Quarterly 135, no. 4 (September 2020), 637–664.
II
PLA Operations and Concepts for Taiwan
CHAPTER 3
An Assessment of China’s Options for
Military Coercion of Taiwan
Mathieu Duchâtel
87
P
resident Tsai Ing-wen has described People’s Liberation Army (PLA)
Air Force (PLAAF) operations inside Taiwan’s Air Defense Identica-
tion Zone (ADIZ) and approaching the Taiwan Strait’s median line
that was established in 2019 as “Chinese Communist aircraft harassing Tai-
wan.”
1
e use of coercive military power is not new in China’s Taiwan policy:
the 1995–1996 crisis is a textbook case.
2
Military coercion is the use or threat of
using military power to “seek changes in the behavior” of a state “by making
the choice preferred by the coercer appear more attractive than the alterna-
tive, which the coercer wishes to avoid.”
3
Military coercion diers from gray
zone operations, which are dened as “an operational space between peace
and war, involving coercive actions to change the status quo below a thresh-
old that, in most cases, would prompt a conventional military response, often
by blurring the line between military and nonmilitary actions and the attri-
bution for events.”
4
Coercion does not exploit ambiguity around attribution
between military and nonmilitary means, even though in some Taiwan Strait
scenarios nonmilitary assets or cyber attacks that raise an attribution chal-
lenge could be used to enhance coercion. is chapter denes military co-
ercion in the context of the Taiwan Strait as hostile operations that involve
88 Duchâtel
the limited use of military assets and aim to lay the foundations for Taiwan’s
future capitulation. is denition excludes high-end combat scenarios such
as a missile strike campaign, a blockade, or a large-scale invasion of Taiwan.
What factors might convince Beijing that military coercion is an attrac-
tive option? is chapter examines ve possible motives for China to carry
out further military coercion against Taiwan:
■
employing deterrence
■
gradually establishing a position of military superiority
■
expanding China’s administrative control inside Taiwan’s ADIZ and
possibly over some of Taiwan’s outlying islands
■
securing domestic political gains
■
testing U.S. resolve.
China has real options, a record of calculated risk under Xi Jinping, and
concerns regarding the future course of the U.S.-China-Taiwan security trian-
gle. China also lacks realistic soft alternatives to “seduce” the Taiwan popula-
tion given the rejection of China’s preferred framework for “one country, two
systems” in Taiwan and the lack of attractiveness of China’s governance model
under Xi. is unique combination of factors makes the use of military coer-
cion likely, but not certain. China’s future decisions will reect a cost-bene-
t analysis regarding the outcomes and consequences of coercive actions for
Taiwan’s international position and domestic morale. Actions that erode the
position of Taiwan and the resolve of the Taiwan public to resist might be un-
dertaken, but not without a larger assessment of their possible costs.
e chapter is divided into four main sections. e rst section propos-
es an analytical framework based on available sources and the record of
the use of military power in territorial disputes under Xi to assess Chinese
thinking on military coercion and understand how Beijing evaluates gains
and costs. e second section analyzes the benets China seeks from its
current campaign of military coercion against Taiwan, which consists of air
force operations in Taiwan’s ADIZ and approaching the median line of the
strait. e third section explores how this framework may apply to three
future scenarios of military coercion against Taiwan: PLA operations in Tai-
wan’s territorial waters and airspace, PLA seizure of an oshore island held
by Taiwan, and a PLA cyber campaign. e conclusion details implications
China’s Options for Military Coercion of Taiwan 89
for maintaining the status quo in the Taiwan Strait, which is understood as
the survival in Taiwan of a democratic system of separation of powers that
protects a free and open society.
Possible Gains of Military Coercion
An analytical framework to evaluate how Beijing assesses the benets and
costs of coercion in the Taiwan Strait should combine two elements: patterns
in China’s use of coercive power under Xi and patterns in China’s Taiwan pol-
icy. During Xi’s tenure, nonpeaceful means have been increasingly used as
a tool to advance Chinese interests in territorial disputes. In addition to Tai-
wan, this assertiveness has been on display in the East and South China seas
and in the 2020 Himalayan border clashes with India during the COVID-19
pandemic. Since 2012, China has eectively seized control of Scarborough
Shoal and between 300 and 1,000 square kilometers of Indian territory across
the Line of Actual Control (LAC), established a dominant military presence
in the Spratly Islands vis-à-vis other claimants, and established a permanent
coast guard presence in the territorial sea of the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, al-
lowing China to argue that the eective administration of the islands is de
facto shared. ese actions exhibit a common pattern of oensive behavior
to transform the territorial status quo. ey constitute a change of scale com-
pared with what some analysts described as Chinese assertiveness in mari-
time disputes under the leadership of Hu Jintao, which mainly materialized
in an intensication of China’s law enforcement and naval presence in the
East and South China seas in 2007–2008.
5
China’s Taiwan Strait dispute diers in many ways from its territorial
disputes with Japan, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei, and India.
Key dierences include the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)’s denition of
cross-strait relations as the continuation of the Chinese Civil War, the oper-
ational challenge of defeating an island of 24 million people supported by
the United States, the degree of cross-strait economic integration, and the
importance for many Chinese interest groups to access Taiwan capital and
technology. Integrating Taiwan into the People’s Republic of China is without
question the highest strategic priority, enshrined in the Chinese constitution
and central to the strategic rivalry between China and the United States. A
cost-benet analytical framework should not only consider the specics of
90 Duchâtel
the cross-strait security equation but also incorporate the more general views
on the use of military power in China’s current strategic environment and Xi’s
appetite for risk in managing territorial disputes. is section combines these
two elements to describe ve possible motivations for coercion against Tai-
wan: competitive military advantage gains, expanding administrative con-
trol, punishment/deterrence, testing U.S. resolve, and catering to domestic
political gains. It then examines the factors Beijing may consider in assessing
the risks of a coercive campaign.
Competitive Military Advantage Gains
An essential component of Chinese policy under Xi is building a position of
superiority in terms of intelligence, readiness, and force deployment. e
PLA and law enforcement agencies have enhanced their presence to aect
the balance of power in territorial disputes. is strategy is a pattern in the
East and South China seas and in border disputes with India. e regular
presence of the China coast guard in the territorial sea and contiguous zone
in the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, for instance, has constituted a change of the
status quo, justied in the Chinese narrative as a response to the public pur-
chase of three of the islands by the Japanese government in 2012. e regular
paramilitary presence aims to create a shared administration.
6
e construction of militarized articial islands in the Spratlys is anoth-
er example of how China employs its military to shift the balance of power.
China has constructed port facilities and ghter jet hangars on Fiery Cross,
Mischief, and Subi reefs, and it has deployed YJ-12B and YJ-62 antiship cruise
missiles, HQ-9 surface-to-air missiles, radars, and sensor arrays on those is-
lands.
7
is mix of force deployment and military infrastructure construction
as an eort to support possible further deployment complicates the calculus
of other claimants in the South China Sea. Despite their vulnerability to cruise
missiles and other weapons, these structures have the potential to raise the
costs for the United States of operating in the South China Sea in times of
U.S.-China conict before they are successfully neutralized.
8
is pattern of enhancing presence to aect the military balance under
Xi’s leadership can also be observed in China’s border conict with India in
the Himalayas. In 2017, the PLA’s construction of a road in disputed Doklam,
which would allow easier deployment of Chinese ground forces, led to a
China’s Options for Military Coercion of Taiwan 91
military stando with India.
9
In the 2020–2021 Sino-Indian clashes along the
LAC, China’s perception that Indian construction activity to improve logistics
support for military deployments and thus reduce the gap with China’s more
advanced network of roads and facilities was a key determinant of China’s
initiation of simultaneous incidents at several spots.
10
In the Taiwan Strait, China’s military deployments and force posture aim
to gain comparative advantages over the Taiwan military and create options
to impose costs on the United States. is goal has been the key determinant
of China’s military modernization and of many specic equipment choices,
such as the programs of short- and medium-range ballistic missiles targeting
Taiwan and the operational deployment of an antiship ballistic missile to de-
ter U.S. aircraft carrier battle groups from approaching the area.
Expanding Administrative Control
Another of China’s motivations is expanding de facto control over territory
claimed by Beijing. is approach, in the context of the South China Sea,
has been described as “salami slicing” or “the slow accumulation of small
actions, none of which is a casus belli, but which add up over time to a major
strategic change.”
11
In the context of the East China Sea, the preferred term
has been gray zone coercion to emphasize the diculty for others to respond
to Chinese law enforcement deployments.
12
e unifying theme between sa-
lami slicing and gray zone coercion is the outcome of such actions: expan-
sion of China’s control.
In unusually candid remarks in 2014, Rear Admiral Zhang Zhaoying,
deputy commander of the South Sea Fleet, described China’s strategy in
the South China Sea as aimed at “continuously expanding the strength of
Chinese administrative control” in order to achieve “eective administrative
control” over the territories and waters claimed by China.
13
is approach
has materialized in China’s land reclamation work in the Spratlys and in the
construction of military facilities to support the deployment of air and na-
val assets, as well as law enforcement operations. e PLA and the China
coast guard have increased their maritime domain awareness through this
infrastructure eort. e last step consistent with this approach of exerting
eective administrative control is the adoption of the Coast Guard Law,
which allows the China coast guard to open re against foreign ships and to
92 Duchâtel
dismantle foreign structures built on islands and reefs in waters considered
to be under Chinese jurisdiction.
14
e East China Sea has witnessed a gradual increase in the pattern of
China coast guard presence, playing on not only the frequency but also the
duration of the navigation inside the 12-nautical-mile territorial sea and the
contiguous zone and the number of ships being deployed. For example, Japa-
nese gures show a jump in intrusions from 819 in 2013 to 1,097 in 2019, and
in 2020, for the rst time, China coast guard ships were deployed for more
than 100 consecutive days.
15
Expanding eective administrative control is less clear-cut in the border
disputes with India. Some reports claim that India lost 300 square kilometers
of land during the period of clashes with the Chinese military in 2020. How-
ever, there has been no ocial conrmation on either side, given the am-
biguity both countries maintain regarding the delimitation of the LAC.
16
(In
Doklam, however, the 2017 stando in India was caused by road construction
in an area unequivocally controlled by Bhutan.)
Under Xi, apart from the ongoing PLAAF campaign against Taiwan,
this pattern of expanding China’s eective administrative control over areas
previously under the control of Taipei has never surfaced. On the contrary,
during the 1958 Taiwan Strait Crisis, Mao Zedong opted not to seize Jinmen,
despite the PLA’s capability to complete the operation. Mao’s thinking was
that Jinmen and Matsu were Taiwan’s link to the mainland and that cutting
the link would diminish the prospects for cross-strait unication.
Punishment/Deterrence
A third motive is signaling China’s dissatisfaction with those opposing its
agenda and deterring others from taking contrary positions in territorial dis-
putes. In the East and South China seas disputes, this approach has been de-
scribed as “reactive assertiveness,” by which the Chinese leadership frames
actions taken by rival claimants as unilateral violations of the status quo to
justify force deployments that tilt the balance in favor of China.
17
While the
outcome is expansion of administrative control, elements of deterrence and
punishment remain essential in Beijing’s calculation. Of all the factors that
explain Chinese military coercion under Xi, this is the only one stressed in
the Chinese narrative of the various crises or moments of tension. In their
China’s Options for Military Coercion of Taiwan 93
analysis of the 2020–2021 clashes with India, for example, Chinese analysts
place particular emphasis on the moves undertaken by the Narendra Modi
government that signaled an Indian intention to gain the upper hand in the
disputes.
18
e intention to stop a trend in the behavior of a rival claimant
thus seems to be a strong determinant of China’s behavior.
e punishment/deterrence element is particularly strong in China’s Tai-
wan policy. It was a key determinant of Zhu Rongji’s threats before the 2000
presidential elections in Taiwan and has been codied in article 8 of Chi-
na’s 2005 Anti-Secession Law on the employment of “non-peaceful means”
against Taiwan. Moreover, the 1995–1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis provides a clear
illustration of the use of coercive force to express Beijing’s views of long-term
trends in Taiwan’s domestic politics and in U.S.-Taiwan relations.
19
Testing U.S. Resolve
China has a strategic interest to obtain accurate intelligence on how the U.S.
military would react to PLA moves in the Taiwan Strait, as well as to gradually
erode the resolve of the United States to support China’s rival claimants in
all territorial disputes. Testing U.S. resolve aects the strategic calculus of all
states in the region because deterrence relies on expected punishment, which
considers “the perceived costs of the punishments the actor can inict, and
the perceived probability that he will inict them.”
20
For example, the Barack
Obama administration’s failure to stop China from seizing Scarborough
Shoal in 2012 undermined many countries’ condence in U.S. determination
to defend the status quo in East Asia. Conversely, clear statements by U.S.
ocials that the Senkaku Islands fall under the U.S.-Japan Mutual Defense
Treaty, or the deployment of U.S. air assets over Scarborough Shoal in 2016,
likely deterred China from further action toward Japan and from conducting
land reclamation in Scarborough Shoal.
Testing U.S. resolve is especially valuable for China during the transition of
U.S. Presidential administrations. For example, there seems to have been a mo-
ment of optimism in Beijing during the transition from the Donald Trump ad-
ministration to the Joseph Biden administration in 2020–2021. Chinese media
commentaries suggested that Biden would leave much less space to the Dem-
ocratic Progressive Party (DPP) administration for “playing the U.S. against
China.”
21
e Trump administration was particularly supportive of Taiwan
94 Duchâtel
with strong and consequential measures, such as the change of the process for
arms sales and allowing requests from Taiwan to be examined by Congress on
a case-by-case basis.
22
Toward the end of Trump’s term, the State Department
lifted restrictions on political contacts between U.S. and Taiwan ocials after
a considerable easing on such restrictions led to visits of the U.S. Secretary of
Health and Human Services and an Under Secretary of State.
23
Evaluating the
continuity of such policies on arms exports and political contacts is an incen-
tive for China to test a new U.S. administration. Beyond policies, China also
needs to evaluate whether the discussion regarding Taiwan Strait security will
continue moving in the direction of “strategic clarity,” a concept initially advo-
cated by U.S. defense experts such as Joseph Bosco that began to be adopted by
foreign policy generalists toward the end of the Trump administration.
24
Catering to Domestic Political Gains
China may also have domestic political incentives to expand military coercion
against its rivals. e construction of articial islands in the Spratlys gured
prominently in the work report presented by Xi to the 19
th
Party Congress; it
was mentioned on the second page, as part of the “major achievements in
economic development” secured by the 18
th
Central Committee of the CCP.
25
Demonstrating the capacity to change the status quo to an internal audience
is a logical incentive for the Party, albeit one that is dicult to measure given
the nature of the Chinese political system. While public opinion matters, so
does that of constituencies, including the PLA.
Risk Assessment
is section has analyzed China’s possible perception of gains in military co-
ercion of Taiwan. However, any Chinese decision to engage in coercion will
also result from a careful assessment of the possible risks and costs. is as-
sessment will likely involve several elements. First is the perceived impact
on Taiwan’s domestic politics. China is more likely to coerce if the outcome
would be the weakening of the DPP, particularly the pro-independence “deep
green” elements. Any action assessed to result in strengthening Taiwan’s in-
dependence movement is likely to be rejected in Beijing—similar to the policy
implemented by the Taiwan Aairs Oce to “distribute benets” [rang li, 让
利] to segments of Taiwan’s economy, which was pronounced a failure when
Tsai and the DPP won the January 2016 presidential and legislative elections.
China’s Options for Military Coercion of Taiwan 95
Second is the impact on U.S.-Taiwan relations. A crisis that is expected to
end in a deepened U.S. commitment to Taiwan’s security, through increased
arms sales, greater strategic clarity, greater troop deployments in East Asia, or
even a military presence in Taiwan through various forms (for example, port
calls), is likely to be considered a failure in Beijing.
ird, the risk of escalation is a particularly important element in a deci-
sion that essentially rests on ensuring that no escalation occurs. A coercion
strategy must include a realistic exit plan. China’s assessment of the level
of resistance of the people of Taiwan, the risk of targeted retaliation against
Chinese military assets, the possibility of U.S. military intervention, and im-
position of costs are all decisive factors in determining whether to initiate
coercion. e calculation of possible human losses may also restrain a Chi-
nese decision to launch an operation. In sum, the absence of condence that
escalation risks could be managed would make coercive options much less
appealing to the Chinese leadership.
China’s Air Campaign Against Taiwan
Since 2019, and more intensely since Tsai’s January 2020 reelection, Chinese
military pressure has taken center stage in the Taiwan Strait. In March 2019,
two ghter jets from the PLAAF intruded into Taiwan’s side of the median
line. is was a major development because the PLAAF had not crossed the
midline since 1999. In September 2020, a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokes-
man stated, “ere is no so-called median line in the Strait,” repeating the
point made earlier by a PLAAF ghter pilot.
26
As a journal of the Central Com-
mittee of Fujian Province made clear, once the Foreign Ministry claried Chi-
na’s ocial position, “the presence of the PLAAF’s ghter jets is normalized,
and they can come and go unconstrained inside the airspace of Taiwan.”
27
e PLAAF campaign against Taiwan may be a new normal [xin changtai,
新常态], to use one of Xi’s signature terms. is section outlines the key facts
and analyzes the political and operational aims of the air campaign. e ongo-
ing operations against Taiwan demonstrate a clear search for military advan-
tage gains, an attempt to expand Chinese military control over part of Taiwan’s
ADIZ, and an intention to deter Taiwan’s pro-independence forces based on
the assumption that they are encouraged by deepening U.S.-Taiwan ties. Given
the timing, these activities might also be considered an eort to test the resolve
96 Duchâtel
of the new U.S. administration. However, aside from the intensication of the
PLAAF presence in Taiwan’s ADIZ itself, there is no strong open-source evi-
dence to back that claim. Similarly, the search for domestic gains as part of the
nationalistic mobilization of the Chinese population and intraparty politics is
likely but appears to be a less solid explanation than the rst three factors.
PLAAF Operations Against Taiwan Since 2019
Within an 18-month span, PLAAF operations against Taiwan reached such a
threat level as to force the Taiwan Defense Ministry to change its public com-
munication and choose transparency over its initial approach of selectively
releasing information. Until September 2020, information released by the
Defense Ministry indicated that the PLAAF had crossed the median line of
the Taiwan Strait four times. e crossings occurred in February and August
2020, in operations designed to coincide with U.S. Health and Human Ser-
vices Secretary Alex Azar’s visit to Taiwan
28
and U.S. Under Secretary of State
Keith Krach’s visit in September 2020.
29
is, however, was only the tip of the iceberg. is selective communi-
cation on specic operations was abandoned in September 2020 when the
ministry began releasing daily updates on PLAAF activities inside Taiwan’s
ADIZ, including details regarding aircraft formations and itineraries.
30
e
new information unveiled PLAAF operations in the southwestern corner of
Taiwan’s ADIZ, close to the Bashi Channel. e PLAAF has exerted pres-
sure on Taiwan’s air defense system by conducting circumnavigation ights
around the island since Tsai’s election in 2016.
31
Deployments of H-6K
bomber formations escorted by ghter planes and KJ-500 early-warning or
Y-8 electronic warfare aircraft aim to acquire the capacity to open an east-
ern front in a Taiwan scenario, as many Taiwan air and sea assets are based
on the east coast of the island.
However, the PLA presence in Taiwan’s southwestern ADIZ is a new and
enduring reality for Taiwan’s defense authorities. During the rst months of
2021, PLAAF assets were continuously deployed in Taiwan’s ADIZ, breaking
new records. For example, the number of deployed aircraft reached a new
height in April 2021 when 25 warplanes—including 14 Shenyang J-16 ght-
er jets, 4 Chengdu J-10 ghters, 4 Xian H-6 bombers, 2 Shaanxi Y-8 antisub-
marine warfare planes, and 1 Shaanxi KJ-500 airborne early warning and
China’s Options for Military Coercion of Taiwan 97
control aircraft—were simultaneously present in Taiwan’s ADIZ.
32
PLA pres-
ence is now so regular that the Taiwan Defense Ministry announced in March
2021 that it would no longer systematically send ghter jets on interception
missions and would instead rely on monitoring the incoming ights with
land-based missile forces.
33
is practice is similar to that of the Japan Air
Self-Defense Force, which since March 2021 has mostly monitored Chinese
intrusions with ground-based missile systems and radar planes.
34
Altogether, the Defense Ministry announced that the Taiwan Air Force
had scrambled 217 times for PLA aircraft intruding into the southwestern
corner of Taiwan’s ADIZ and 76 times against incoming aircraft crossing the
median line of the strait. Taiwan’s defense minister counted 49 cases of ac-
tual crossing of the line by the PLAAF between January and early October
2020.
35
For 2020, the consolidated number was 380 intrusions inside Taiwan’s
ADIZ.
36
In 2021, as of mid-April, the PLAAF had intruded on 92 days.
37
Political and Military Goals of PLAAF Operations
From a military perspective, PLAAF operations test the reaction time of Tai-
wan’s air defense. When the Taiwan air force scrambles and intercepts—
which has been less the case since the March 2021 decision—it creates a risk
of collision. Retired Air Force Lieutenant General Chang Yen-ting outlines
two additional military motives for China: a short-term goal of collecting
data on Taiwan’s air defense and a longer term strategic goal of engaging the
Taiwan air force “in a war of attrition by putting its frontline personnel under
enough pressure to force military planners to divert attention and resources
from other areas.”
38
is dimension of gaining an advantage over Taiwan’s air
defense is illustrated by some specic operations of the PLAAF. For example,
to test Taiwan’s radar response, in April 2021, a Y-8 tactical reconnaissance
aircraft entered Taiwan’s ADIZ ying at an altitude as low as 30 meters.
39
Such operations represent a marked shift from the 1990s, when the Tai-
wan air force enjoyed overwhelming superiority and was patrolling deep into
the strait (there was no unocial boundary in the median line of the Taiwan
Strait until the 1995–1996 missile crisis). Building air superiority over Taiwan is
a long-term PLA goal that requires investment in equipment as well as training
exercises.
40
e military balance perspective is important for both sides and
is reected in the actual geographic operational space of the two air forces,
98 Duchâtel
which has changed continuously over time. Some Chinese military analysts,
when arguing that there is no “stable median line,” explain that there is only
a changing balance of airpower between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait.
41
Taiwan’s Defense Ministry assesses that over the long term, the PLAAF
intends to gradually establish a permanent presence in the strait because it
allows access into the First Island Chain and is used by U.S. planes to conduct
surveillance operations of Chinese maritime activities.
42
e regular pres-
ence of antisubmarine warfare (ASW) aircraft in Chinese formations strongly
suggests a motive to exercise ASW capabilities in an area where U.S. and, in
the future, Taiwan submarines could operate in wartime. erefore, the sec-
ond type of gain described in the analytical framework (expanding China’s
administrative control) cannot literally apply to the PLAAF’s presence inside
Taiwan’s ADIZ, which is not territorial space under international law, but it
still provides a useful explanation because one of its key elements is regular
presence—as exemplied in the East and South China seas.
Punishment and deterrence are other factors. is was especially the
case in 2020, when the Trump administration was still in oce. Since 2020,
China has conducted its Taiwan policy in an environment that has consid-
erably deteriorated by the standards of its own unication goal. e Tsai ad-
ministration enjoys a relatively high satisfaction rate in comparison with most
Western democracies.
43
e Trump administration broke with past restraint
in conducting military exchanges with Taiwan and pushing back in the South
China Sea.
44
e 2018 Taiwan Travel Act has enabled high-level visits by se-
nior U.S. administration ocials to Taiwan. In the West, the COVID-19 pan-
demic has greatly enhanced Taiwan’s image and seriously damaged China’s.
A recent article in the China Reunication Forum captures this sense of
vulnerability. e author lists the following negative trends facing China: Tai-
wan independence is now ideologically mainstream in Taiwan, pro-indepen-
dence forces are now structurally stronger than pro-unication forces, and the
door to cross-strait political consultations has been shut by the DPP. However,
the main risk the author sees is U.S. behavior: “We should not rule out the
possibility that the U.S. under certain circumstances might encourage Taiwan
independence forces to go to the extreme, nor should we rule out the pos-
sibility that the U.S. could take the risk to initiate dangerous military opera-
tions against China.”
45
In a reverse analysis of the lessons of the Korean War,
China’s Options for Military Coercion of Taiwan 99
the author concludes that the DPP government should learn from history and
avoid the grave misperception regarding Chinese determination to defeat Tai-
wan independence, which would inadvertently lead to war.
46
Such views suggest that military pressure constitutes an attempt to re-
gain the initiative in the Taiwan Strait against trends that are highly unfavor-
able to China, at least in the short term. Indeed, retired Senior Colonel Wang
Xiangsui, a professor at Beihang University and co-author of Unrestricted
Warfare, describes the PLA’s summer 2020 actions as “very clearly aimed at
signaling to the United States that they should not take military risks.”
47
He
argues that this “kind of prevention is necessary” given Beijing’s assessments
that the U.S. election would lead to a period of confusion, which increases the
risk of hostile U.S. action against China.
e PLAAF air campaign can also be explained as a form of signaling fo-
cused on Taiwan and the United States. Ma Xiaoguang, spokesperson of Chi-
na’s Taiwan Aairs Oce, describes these patrols as a response to the Taiwan
government’s attempts to “use force to reject unication” [yi wu ju tong, 以武
拒统].
48
e PLA’s Eastern eater Command communicates on operations
aimed at defeating “Taiwan independence separatist activities.”
49
is resumption of PLAAF activity appears to result from greater U.S.
military presence in the area and in the South China Sea in the later days of
the Trump administration—a practice that was maintained early in the Biden
administration. e U.S. factor also explains China’s current focus on south-
west Taiwan. Several exercises, including the PLAAF’s rst nighttime training
mission, have taken place in that zone.
50
An air presence in the Bashi Chan-
nel, between Taiwan and the Philippines, sends political messages not only
across the strait but also toward the South China Sea. Moreover, as Taiwan’s
military power is relatively concentrated in the north of the island, China’s
intention seems to be to stretch Taiwan’s defense resources, which led to
Taiwan’s decision to abandon systematic interception in favor of monitoring
with ground-based air defense missiles.
Air force patrols and other exercises are part of China’s “cognitive do-
main warfare” [renzhi yu zuozhan, 认知域作战].
51
is message is captured
by an editorial in the Global Times: “e paradox is that the more Taiwan au-
thorities obtain from the United States, the closer they are to an unbearable
turning point.”
52
By saturating Taiwan’s information space with the idea of
10 0 Duchâtel
a risk of war, these operations seek maximal psychological gains. Frequent
PLAAF operations across the Taiwan Strait midline eectively convey that
China does not fear the consequences of an accidental collision or a decision
to take down an aircraft. us, the pressure to avoid escalation is on Taiwan,
the defensive side. Indeed, during the February intrusion, one of the Chinese
J-11 ghters locked its re control radar on a Taiwan F-16 jet.
53
Explaining China’s political motives, Shen Ming-shih of Taiwan’s National
Defense University argues that PLAAF operations focus on “paralyzing Tai-
wan’s psychology. Having the Taiwanese getting used to regular air operations
by the Communist military would be equivalent to inviting the PLA ghters
to cross the line and invade.”
54
Lee Kuan-cheng, from the Institute of National
Defense and Security Research, similarly concludes that China follows a two-
pronged strategy: PLA exercises rst create an environment of fear, and then
the responsibility of causing tension is blamed on “Taiwan’s ambitious politi-
cians.”
55
is strategy creates the impression that Taiwan faces a binary choice
between being China-friendly and peaceful, or dangerously anti-China.
Several exercises conducted by the PLA in late 2020 are an eective re-
minder that psychological eects sometimes matter more than the actual
demonstration of capabilities. First, in August, the Eastern eater Command
announced that live-re exercises would be conducted simultaneously in the
north and the south of Taiwan; however, in reality, only small-scale maneuvers
took place, and very close to the coastline of the Chinese mainland.
56
Second,
at the end of the month, the PLA Rocket Force test-red DF-26B (intermedi-
ate-range) and DF-21D (medium-range) antiship ballistic missiles in the South
China Sea.
57
e test generated confusion regarding the actual number of mis-
siles tested and whether they had correctly reached their target. is, in turn,
raised legitimate questions about the reliability of the guidance system of a ca-
pability that is still under development and needs high maneuverability to hit
moving targets at sea. ird, in September, the Eastern eater Command con-
ducted missile drills and released a video titled “If War Broke Out Today.” How-
ever, Taiwan military analysts were quick to question the video’s authenticity
and the actual location of the exercises, and they noted that the most important
dimension of the PLA’s action was taking place on its social media accounts.
58
e line between deterring the deepening of U.S.-Taiwan ties and test-
ing U.S. resolve to defend Taiwan is thin in practice and dicult to dene
China’s Options for Military Coercion of Taiwan 101
because it depends on the extent to which air operations are conceived in
Beijing as defensive or oensive—a question that cannot be satisfactorily
answered based on any open-source material. However, China’s decision to
intensify its presence in Taiwan’s ADIZ after Washington’s change of admin-
istration is certainly aimed to assess the U.S. response at a moment when the
new national security and East Asia teams were not entirely in place.
In sum, the ongoing air campaign against Taiwan, spanning two U.S.
administrations, has clear operational and psychological objectives. e de-
cisive factor appears to be the PLA’s attempt to impose its superiority over
a new geographic area of specic strategic value, especially for submarine
operations. e intention to deter Taiwan’s independence forces from being
encouraged by favorable U.S. policies is another likely driver of Chinese ac-
tions, which also have a clear oensive component.
Looking Ahead: Three Scenarios of Military Coercion
At present, there is a contrast between the permanent presence established
by the PLAAF inside Taiwan’s ADIZ and the absence of a clear political signal
to further turn the screws on Taiwan. e January 2021 Taiwan work confer-
ence of the CCP mentioned “turning our growing comprehensive strength
and signicant systemic advantages into greater eciency in our Taiwan
w o rk .”
59
e work report of the Chinese government to the National People’s
Congress restated “peaceful development of Cross-Strait relations” and Chi-
na’s “vigilance against” and intention to “resolutely deter any separatist ac-
tivity seeking ‘Taiwan Independence.’”
60
ere is no sign in policy statements
that China is warning of further coercive action in the short term.
Indeed, a full-scale invasion of Taiwan is not realistic in the coming
years: China would risk losing, and a Tsai administration could seize the
opportunity to formally declare independence. However, at the time of this
writing—a year before the 20
th
Party Congress, a few months after the U.S.
Presidential election, and the year of the centennial of the CCP’s foundation
in Shanghai—limited coercive actions to reach some of the gains described
herein are not unrealistic. e next sections explore how the motives de-
scribed thus far could play into three types of coercive campaigns against
Taiwan: further incursions into Taiwan’s territorial airspace and waters, sei-
zure of an outlying island, or a major cyber oensive.
102 Duchâtel
Military Operations Inside Taiwan’s Airspace and/or Territorial Waters
Taiwan defense analysts must consider scenarios in which the PLAAF
penetrates Taiwan airspace or a PLA Navy ship enters Taiwan’s territorial
seas.
61
Such actions would be highly escalatory. Recent operations have tak-
en place in Taiwan’s ADIZ, which under international law is international
airspace and not above Taiwan’s territory or within its territorial seas. Al-
though Taiwan’s rules of engagement are not public, it is likely that such
Chinese provocations would result in Taiwan forces opening re, leading to
major risks of escalation. In April 2021, after Chinese drones were identied
circling the island, the Taiwan coast guard commented on the possibility
that a Chinese drone would enter Taiwan airspace over the Pratas Islands,
stating, “After it enters it will be handled under the rules. If we need to open
re, we open re.”
62
e statement was intentionally vague about the con-
ditions under which the Taiwan side would open re, but it made clear that
the rules of engagement listed specic circumstances under which intrud-
ers would be shot down.
e Global Times has suggested that the deepening of U.S.-Taiwan po-
litical and defense ties might lead to such an outcome: “e PLA is still re-
strained. Every time a high-ranking U.S. ocial visits Taiwan, the ghter jets
of the PLA should be one step closer to the island. If the U.S. secretary of
state or secretary of defense comes to Taiwan, the PLA should y its aircraft
over the island and conduct exercises above it.”
63
In October 2020, Global
Times editor Hu Xijin argued that the PLA should “prepare a series of plans
that would punish the Taiwan authorities, including sending PLA jets on
missions over the island.”
64
A decision by China to enter Taiwan’s airspace or territorial seas would
not simply be to signal or seek operational and political outcomes; it would
suggest that China does not fear the risks of escalation. Indeed, there would
be no administrative control gains in such a move, which could be a one-o
or the prelude to a war. If the escalation risks were managed, the deterrence/
punishment and the resolve-testing factors would be the most salient ele-
ments of such behavior. Domestic political gains would be uncertain; how-
ever, given the highly escalatory potential of such an action, CCP leadership
may gamble on its political value in terms of emotional mobilization in the
PLA or for the politicized segments of the Chinese population.
China’s Options for Military Coercion of Taiwan 103
Seizing Dongsha Island or Other Outlying Islands
Rumors of a PLA operation to seize Dongsha Island made headlines in East
Asia during the summer of 2020.
65
e “Four Sea exercises” carried out by
the PLA in August triggered discussions in Taiwan regarding such a scenar-
io.
66
ese rumors were strengthened by an interview given by retired Major
General Li Daguang in which he presented Dongsha as a possible “fortress”
for the PLA Navy to facilitate access from Hainan to the Pacic Ocean and as
a location that the PLA should avoid seeing leased by the Taiwan government
to the United States.
67
Retired Lieutenant General Wang Hongguang, former
deputy commander of the Nanjing Military Region, argued in December
2019 that occupying Dongsha and the Penghu Islands could suppress Taiwan
strategically.
68
Asked about that opinion, the spokesperson of the Chinese
Defense Ministry answered that the ministry did not comment on the per-
sonal views of experts and scholars.
69
Aside from the above, there are very few Chinese sources on possible
Dongsha operations—other than Internet and social media commentaries,
which have limited value in assessing top-level policy debates. A Chinese
commentator notes, for example, that seizing Dongsha is not a matter of Chi-
na’s capability but one of political choice: operationally, it is an easy task, but
“just taking Dongsha Island has little signicance.” e only scenario in which
seizing Dongsha would have perceived strategic value is as retaliation against
actions undertaken by the Taiwan government; this thinking applies to all
of Taiwan’s outlying islands.
70
Similarly, author Alexander Cheung argues in
a mainland Chinese publication that a single operation to capture Dongsha
independent of a larger unication war is not a reasonable strategic choice.
71
A capture of Dongsha Island could include gray zone elements, such as
the use of coast guard and maritime militia assets. If successful, the maneuver
would have some military value in expanding China’s sea control and mari-
time domain awareness in the South China Sea and in supporting antisubma-
rine warfare operations. e seizure of Dongsha would be the quintessential
scenario of expanding China’s administrative control over an area under ef-
fective Taiwan jurisdiction. It could lead to an intense campaign of emotional
mobilization in China, especially if Taiwan resists and China suers casualties.
ere are, however, two major risks for China. First is the risk that the
Taiwan government does not respond and abandons Dongsha as part of a
104 Duchâtel
pro-independence project to revise the Taiwan constitution. After all, if Tai-
wan authorities lose control over territories that are historically theirs, this
strengthens the argument to get rid of Taiwan’s constitutional framework and
to recenter the constitution on Taiwan island. Second is the risk of escala-
tion, including through U.S. intervention. Taiwan and the United States are
silent regarding their likely response to such an operation. Allowing Chinese
decisionmakers to assess the possible costs based on almost no substantial
information on likely responses is the current approach in Taipei and Wash-
ington. Some political gures in Taiwan’s deep green camp argue that the loss
of Dongsha may represent a major boost for the Taiwan independence move-
ment but only a minor strategic cost for Taiwan—an outcome that would be a
strong deterrent for Chinese actions. China may, however, calculate that forc-
ing the status quo to change by using force in Dongsha could be represented
as a major victorious development.
Cyber Attacks
Taiwan routinely faces cyber attacks from China. In 2018, Taiwan’s Depart-
ment of Cyber Security counted between 20 million and 40 million cyber
attacks per month against targets on the island.
72
e Taiwan Foreign Min-
istry suered an average of 2,100 cyber attacks per day in 2020.
73
e Taiwan
government releases some information on inltration operations. In August
2020, the Taiwan Investigation Bureau’s Cyber Security Investigation Oce
accused China of a sustained inltration campaign that over 2 years targeted
10 government agencies and succeeded in stealing data from 6,000 ocials.
74
In addition to such intrusions, which seem most likely to be motivated
by intelligence-collection aims, Taiwan critical infrastructure companies
have been targeted by cyber attacks. Taiwan’s national companies China
Petroleum Corporation and Formosa Petrochemical Group were hit during
the spring of 2020.
75
National Taiwan University Hospital was also targeted
around the same time. e sequence of operations led some analysts to spec-
ulate that these attacks were a test of Taiwan’s cyber defenses in the lead-up
to Tsai’s second inauguration.
76
As is typical in such events—given that the
attribution, the nature of the attack, and the extent of the damage are sen-
sitive—not all information has been released. However, the PLA should be
expected to train for cyber attacks resulting in physical damage to Taiwan’s
China’s Options for Military Coercion of Taiwan 105
infrastructure on the model of reported Israeli and Russian cyber operations
against Iran and Ukraine, respectively.
Cyber attacks could be standalone coercive operations, although they are
sometimes described as initial steps in a larger Taiwan campaign. For exam-
ple, retired Lieutenant General Wang Hongguang sees cyber attacks, in com-
bination with electromagnetic pulse weapons, as a “necessary pre-battle step”
to disrupt Taiwan’s military command systems, Internet, and various local
and transmission networks. He adds, “ere are also more eective technical
methods that can temporarily turn Taiwan into a state of mental disorder and
the Taiwan military into [a] quadriplegic vegetative state. For reasons of con-
dentiality, these methods will not be discussed for the time being.”
77
A cyber attack damaging Taiwan’s physical infrastructure would demon-
strate Chinese capabilities and help China collect new intelligence regarding the
level of Taiwan’s defense, although China would run the risk of Taiwan’s retali-
ation. e cross-strait oense-defense balance in cyberspace is one of the least
understood elements of the military balance in the Taiwan Strait. States do not
communicate about the level of their oensive and defensive capabilities, and
crises reveal only some elements. Both sides would be able to use some plausi-
ble deniability, but if cyber attacks expand into physical infrastructure, analysis
of attribution would point to the obvious source. Such an operation could be
carried out with a goal of punishment/deterrence, although testing U.S. resolve
could be another driver of the operation. It is not entirely out of the question that
U.S. defensive capabilities could have a role in fending o an attack or that the
United States could retaliate with an element of plausible deniability to reassert
the credibility of its deterrence posture vis-à-vis China in the Taiwan Strait.
Conclusion
is chapter has constructed an analytical framework to assess the likelihood
of further Chinese military coercion of Taiwan. It has highlighted the gains
that China might seek from coercive operations: comparative military advan-
tages, expanding China’s administrative control, punishment/deterrence,
testing U.S. resolve, and catering to domestic gains, especially the politicized
public and groups/individuals within the CCP and the PLA.
e ongoing PLAAF campaign inside Taiwan’s ADIZ and toward the
median line in the Taiwan Strait is a case of coercion of Taiwan. China seeks
106 Duchâtel
to tilt the airpower balance with Taiwan further in its favor by collecting in-
telligence on Taiwan’s air defenses and wearing down the Taiwan air force.
ese activities practically expand China’s ability to operate and maintain a
regular air presence within Taiwan’s southwestern ADIZ and seek to nullify
the concept of the median line in the Taiwan Strait as an air border. e ac-
tivities also seek punishment and deterrence based on China’s sense of vul-
nerability regarding public opinion trends in Taiwan and the deepening of
U.S.-Taiwan relations. After the inauguration of Joe Biden, the deterrence goal
has morphed to some extent into an attempt to test the resolve of the new
U.S. leadership. Domestic gains are hard to measure and appear secondary to
the other factors, but there is an element of emotional mobilization spurring
cross-strait tensions during an intense U.S.-China strategic competition. e
risks identied in the analytical framework—including risks of counterpro-
ductive eects on trends in Taiwan’s domestic politics and on the deepening
of U.S.-Taiwan ties, as well as risks of escalation not well planned or man-
aged—appear under control from a Chinese perspective.
Is further coercion likely? e chapter has discussed three possible op-
tions, as summarized in the table. All options seek to achieve goals in terms of
comparative military advantages, punishment/deterrence, and the testing of
U.S. resolve. Only by seizing Dongsha would China’s eective territorial con-
trol expand and generate a successful emotional mobilization of the Chinese
population. All three scenarios carry high risks of escalation not being prop-
erly planned or managed, including through U.S. intervention. e seizing of
Dongsha Island carries the highest political risk, as Taiwan’s independence
forces within and outside the DPP could advocate refraining from defending
the island and announce that the Taiwan constitution is no longer valid since
its territory has been altered. is scenario could have a powerful nonmilitary
deterrent eect on Chinese thinking, but it could also be part of a long-term
strategy in which seizing an outlying island of Taiwan pushes the two sides
to confrontation—giving the PLA a pretext to launch a war. A cyber attack on
physical infrastructure in Taiwan is also potentially highly escalatory given
that Taiwan likely has credible oensive cyber capabilities that enable it to
retaliate with some degree of plausible deniability.
Chinese sources tend to present the three operations described above ei-
ther as punishment or part of a larger campaign against Taiwan. is chapter
China’s Options for Military Coercion of Taiwan 107
has analyzed the specic merits and risks of such operations by isolating them;
however, it could be argued that coercive operations could contribute to achiev-
ing larger Chinese strategic goals over a longer time frame by sequencing hostil-
ities against Taiwan in a series of crises that demonstrate China’s determination
to take risks. erefore, the notion of possible gains is critical in planning poli-
cies that reduce the likelihood of coercive Chinese actions, a goal that could be
achieved only by aecting China’s perception of possible risks and costs.
Notes
1
“Taiwan President Visits Air Defense Battery as China Tensions Rise,” Reuters,
September 11, 2020, available at <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-taiwan-china-security/
taiwan-president-visits-air-defence-battery-as-china-tensions-rise-idUSKBN2620Y0>.
2
See, for example, Suisheng Zhao, “Military Coercion and Peaceful Oence: Beijing’s
Strategy of National Reunication with Taiwan,” Pacic Aairs 72, no. 4 (1999–2000), 495–512;
Robert S. Ross, “e 1995–96 Taiwan Strait Confrontation: Coercion, Credibility, and the Use of
Force,” International Security 25, no. 2 (Fall 2000), 87–123.
3
David E. Johnson, Karl P. Mueller, and William H. Taft, Conventional Coercion Across the
Spectrum of Operations: e Utility of U.S. Military Forces in the Emerging Security Environment
(Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2003).
4
Lyle J. Morris et al., Gaining Competitive Advantage in the Gray Zone: Response Options
for Coercive Aggression Below the reshold of Major War (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2019).
Table. Possible Gains of Military Coercion
Military Operations
Inside Taiwan’s Airspace
or Territorial Sea
Seizing
Dongsha
Island
Cyber
Attacks
Comparative Military
Advantage Gains
X X X
Expanding Administrative
Control
X
Punishment/Deterrence
X X X
Testing U.S. Resolve
X X X
Catering to Domestic
Political Gains
Secondary X Secondary
108 Duchâtel
5
Michael D. Swaine and M. Taylor Fravel, “China’s Assertive Behavior Part II: e
Maritime Periphery,” China Leadership Monitor, no. 35 (2011), available at <https://taylorfravel.
com/documents/research/fravel.2011.CLM.maritime.periphery.pdf>.
6
Lyle J. Morris, “Blunt Defenders of Sovereignty—e Rise of Coast Guards in East and
Southeast Asia,” Naval War College Review 70, no. 2 (2017), 75–112.
7
Derek Grossman, “Military Build-Up in the South China Sea,” in e South China Sea:
From a Regional Maritime Dispute to a Geo-Strategic Competition, ed. Leszek Buszynski and Do
anh Hai (New York: Routledge, 2020).
8
Gregory B. Poling, “e Conventional Wisdom on China’s Island Bases Is Dangerously
Wrong,” War on the Rocks, January 10, 2020, available at <https://warontherocks.com/2020/01/
the-conventional-wisdom-on-chinas-island-bases-is-dangerously-wrong/>.
9
Harsh V. Pant, “China and India Pull Back on Doklam,” Yale Global Online, September
14, 2017, available at <https://archive-yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/china-and-india-pull-back-
doklam>.
10
Ashley J. Tellis, “Hustling in the Himalayas: e Sino-Indian Border Confrontation,”
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, June 2020, available at <https://
carnegieendowment.org/les/Tellis_Himalayan_Border_Standos1.pdf>.
11
Robert Haddick, “Salami Slicing in the South China Sea,” Foreign Policy, August 3, 2012,
available at <https://foreignpolicy.com/2012/08/03/salami-slicing-in-the-south-china-sea/>.
12
Tetsuo Kotani, “e East China Sea: Chinese Eorts to Establish a ‘New Normal’ and
Prospects for Peaceful Management,” Maritime Issues, July 8, 2017, available at <http://www.
maritimeissues.com/politics/the-east-china-sea-chinese-eorts-to-establish-a-new-normal-
and-prospects-for-peaceful-management.html>.
13
Ryan D. Martinson, “Panning for Gold: Assessing Chinese Maritime Strategy from
Primary Sources,” Naval War College Review 69, no. 3 (2016), 22–44.
14
“China Set to Authorize Coast Guard to Remove Foreign Structures,” e Japanese
News, November 8, 2020.
15
Alessio Patalano, “A Gathering Storm? e Chinese ‘Attrition’ Strategy for the Senkaku/
Diaoyu Islands,” RUSI Newsbrief 40, no. 7 (August 21, 2020), available at <https://rusi.org/
explore-our-research/publications/rusi-newsbrief/gathering-storm-chinese-attrition-strategy-
senkakudiaoyu-islands>.
16
“China Gained Ground on India During Bloody Summer in Himalayas,” Bloomberg,
November 1, 2020, available at <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2020-11-01/
china-gained-ground-on-india-during-bloody-summer-in-himalayas>.
17
Reactive assertiveness has been developed by the International Crisis Group’s team in
Beijing to analyze China’s behavior in maritime disputes. See, for example, Stephanie Kleine-
Ahlbrandt, “China: New Leaders, Same Assertive Foreign Policy,” CNN, March 8, 2013, available
at <https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/north-east-asia/china/china-new-leaders-same-assertive-
foreign-policy>.
18
Mathieu Duchâtel, “e Border Clashes with India: In the Shadow of the U.S.,” in Military
Options for Xi’s Strategic Ambitions, China Trends #8 (Paris: Institut Montaigne, February 2021),
available at <https://www.institutmontaigne.org/en/publications/china-trends-8-military-
options-xis-strategic-ambitions>.
19
omas J. Christensen, “Windows and War: Trend Analysis and Beijing’s Use of Force,”
in New Directions in the Study of China’s Foreign Policy, ed. Alastair Iain Johnston and Robert S.
Ross (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2006).
China’s Options for Military Coercion of Taiwan 109
20
Robert Jervis, “Deterrence and Perception,” International Security 7, no. 3 (1982–1983),
3–30.
21
“e U.S. Election as a Turning Point? Will the DPP Be Able to Continue Following the
Path of ‘Playing the U.S. Against China’?” [美国大选是转机? 民进党是否会检讨“联美抗中”路线],
Cross Strait Commentary [两岸快评], November 10, 2020, available at <http://www.taiwan.cn/
plzhx/plyzl/202011/t20201110_12305977.htm>.
22
“Trump’s Ten Arms Sales to Taiwan, Military Rebalance in the Taiwan Strait,” Institute
for National Policy Research (Taiwan), n.d., available at <http://inpr.org.tw/m/405-1728-
8533,c111.php?Lang=en>.
23
“U.S. Lifts ‘Self-Imposed Restrictions’ on Taiwan Relationship: Pompeo,” Nikkei Asia,
January 10, 2021, available at <https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/International-relations/US-lifts-
self-imposed-restrictions-on-Taiwan-relationship-Pompeo>.
24
Richard Haass and David Sacks, “American Support for Taiwan Must Be Unambiguous,”
Foreign Aairs, September 2, 2020, available at <https://www.foreignaairs.com/articles/
united-states/american-support-taiwan-must-be-unambiguous>.
25
Xi Jinping, “Secure a Decisive Victory in Building a Moderately Prosperous Society in
All Respects and Strive for the Great Success of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New
Era,” speech delivered at the 19
th
National Congress of the Communist Party of China, Beijing,
October 18, 2017, available at <http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/download/Xi_Jinping’s_
report_at_19th_CPC_National_Congress.pdf>.
26
Kelvin Chen, “China Denies Existence of Median Line in Taiwan Strait,” Taiwan News,
September 22, 2020, available at <https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/en/news/4014231>.
27
Cai Guoyan [蔡国烟], “ere Is No ‘Median Line’ in the Strait” [海峡无“中线”], Haixia
Tongxun [海峡通讯] 12 (2020), 60–61.
28
“Chinese Military Planes Cross Median Line of Taiwan Strait,” CNA, February 10,
2020, available at <https://focustaiwan.tw/politics/202002100016>; Keoni Everington, “Over 20
Chinese Fighter Jets Menaced Taiwan Strait’s Median Line Monday,” Taiwan News, August 14,
2020, available at <https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/en/news/3987348>.
29
Chang Yan-ting, “Military Needs Reform to Counter PLA reat,” Taipei Times,
September 27, 2020, available at <https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/editorials/
archives/2020/09/27/2003744140>.
30
See Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense Web site, available at <https://www.mnd.
gov.tw>.
31
Nathan Beauchamp-Mustafaga, Derek Grossman, and Logan Ma, “Chinese Bomber
Flights Around Taiwan, For What Purpose?” War on the Rocks, September 13, 2017, available
at <https://warontherocks.com/2017/09/chinese-bomber-ights-around-taiwan-for-what-
purpose/>.
32
Eric Chang, “25 Chinese Military Aircraft Intrude into Taiwan’s ADIZ,” Taiwan News,
April 13, 2021, available at <https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/en/news/4175573>.
33
“Taiwan Says Tracks Intruding Chinese Aircraft with Missiles, Not Always Scrambling,”
Reuters, March 29, 2021, available at <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-taiwan-security-
idUSKBN2BL0JS>.
34
“Japan Scrambling Jets Less Against China as More F-35 Deployment Eyed,” Kyodo
News, March 3, 2021, available at <https://english.kyodonews.net/news/2021/03/ef1d2ba18bec-
japan-scrambling-jets-less-against-china-as-more-f-35-deployment-eyed.html>.
110 Duchâtel
35
Yu Kaixiang, “Yen De-fa: 49 Cases of Communist Aircraft Crossing the Median Line
in the Taiwan Strait, the Largest Number in 30 Years” [嚴德發: 49架次共機逾越台海中線 30年
來最多], Central News Agency, October 7, 2020, available at <https://www.cna.com.tw/news/
rstnews/202010070130.aspx>.
36
“Taiwan: 380 Communist Planes Harass Taiwan in 2020” [台灣: 共軍軍機2020年擾台逾
380次], Lienhebao [聯合報], January 1, 2021.
37
“e PLA Air Force Intruded in Our Southwestern Air Space Almost Every Day in April”
[解放軍4月幾乎天天侵我西南空域], Apple Daily [蘋果日報], April 19, 2021, available at <https://
tw.appledaily.com/politics/20210419/DHRRFQ674ZBPBE4OXDQLUBYOOM/>.
38
Chang Yan-ting, “Outfoxing China’s War of Attrition,” Taipei Times, September 9, 2020,
available at <https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/editorials/archives/2020/09/09/2003743059>.
39
Keoni Everington, “Taiwan Catches PLA Plane Trying to Sneak Below Radar at Only
30 Meters,” Taiwan News, April 27, 2021, available at <https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/en/
news/4188046>.
40
According to the gures of the U.S. Department of Defense, the People’s Liberation
Army Air Force (PLAAF) had 1,500 ghter jets in 2020, including 600 in its Eastern and Southern
theaters, versus 400 for Taiwan. e PLAAF also operates 250 bombers in its Eastern and Southern
theaters (450 in total), while the Taiwan air force does not operate bombers. See Military and
Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2020: Annual Report to Congress
(Washington, DC: Oce of the Secretary of Defense, 2020), available at <https://media.defense.
gov/2020/sep/01/2002488689/-1/-1/1/2020-dod-china-military-power-report-nal.pdf>.
41
Wu Peihuan, “e ‘Median Line in the Taiwan Strait,’ History of Taiwan Security’s Most
Sensitive Neurological Line” [“台海中线,” 台湾安全最敏感的神经器史话], Tanks and Armored
Vehicles [坦克装甲车辆] 5 (2019), 53–57.
42
Author’s interview with a senior Defense Ministry ocial, September 2020.
43
“New Peak for Tsai Ing-wen’s Satisfaction Rate” [蔡英文滿意度新高], Tianxia [天下],
January 13, 2021, available at <https://news.cts.com.tw/cts/politics/202101/202101132027665.
html>.
44
Mathieu Duchâtel, Generally Stable? Facing U.S. Pushback in the South China Sea,
China Trends #6 (Paris: Institut Montaigne, August 6, 2020), available at <https://www.
institutmontaigne.org/en/blog/china-trends-6-generally-stable-facing-us-pushback-south-
china-sea>.
45
Pan Jiatang [潘佳瑭], “A Brief Assessment of the Security Situation in the Taiwan Strait,
Part I” [略论台海安全局势及战略研判], China Reunication Forum [统一论谈], August 26, 2020,
available at <http://www.zhongguotongcuhui.org.cn/tylt/202003/202008/t20200826_12292359.
html>.
46
Pan Jiatang [潘佳瑭], “A Brief Assessment of the Security Situation in the Taiwan
Strait, Part II” [略论台海安全局势及战略研判II], China Reunication Forum [统一论谈],
August 27, 2020, available at <http://www.zhongguotongcuhui.org.cn/tylt/202004/202008/
t20200827_12292539.html>.
47
Wang Xiangsui [王湘穗], “An In-Depth Analysis of U.S.-China Relations and eir
Future” [深度解析中美关系及未来走向], speech delivered at the Moganshan Meeting,
November 11, 2020, available at <http://www.aisixiang.com/data/123490.html>.
48
“PLA Conducts Training in Taiwan’s Southwestern ADIZ for Two Consecutive Days,
DPP Authorities Hold a Press Conference” [解放军连续2天在台西南空域演训 民进党当局紧急
开记者会], Taiwan.cn [中国台湾网], September 11, 2020, available at <http://www.taiwan.cn/
taiwan/jsxw/202009/t20200911_12295186.htm>.
China’s Options for Military Coercion of Taiwan 111
49
“China’s Eastern eater Command Says Recent Naval and Air Exercises in Taiwan Strait
Are Necessary Measures to Deal with the Current Situation in the Taiwan Strait” [中国东部战区称
近日海空兵力在台海演练是应对当前台海局势必要举措], Reuters, September 18, 2020, available
at <https://www.reuters.com/article/china-mod-pla-tw-exercise-0918-idcnkbs2690bu>.
50
“Chinese Warplanes Fly First Nighttime Mission Near Taiwan: MND,” Central News
Agency, March 17, 2020, available at <https://focustaiwan.tw/politics/202003170009>.
51
Elsa B. Kania, “Minds at War: China’s Pursuit of Military Dominance rough the
Cognitive Sciences and Biotechnology,” PRISM 8, no. 3 (2019), 86–87.
52
“PLA Fighter Jets Send a Clear Signal to Taiwan and the United States” [解放军战机向
台美发出明确信息], Global Times, August 11, 2020, available at <https://opinion.huanqiu.com/
article/3zPlOiskJKq>.
53
Lu Li-shih, “Changing the Rules of Engagement,” Taipei Times, February 28, 2020,
available at <http://taipeitimes.com/News/editorials/archives/2020/02/28/2003731740>.
54
Shen Ming-shih [沈明室], “e Intent and Implication of PLA Air Force and Navy
Circling Taiwan and Taiwan’s Responses” [共軍機艦編隊繞臺意圖,影響及臺灣因應作為],
Prospect & Exploration [展望與探索] 16, no. 7 (2018), 21–27.
55
Kuan-Chen Lee [李冠成], “e CCP’s Dual Strategies of Military Intimidation Against
Taiwan and Calling for Restraint” [中共對台軍事恫嚇與呼籲克制的兩手策略], National Defense
Security Biweekly [國防安全雙週報] 11 (2020), 19–25.
56
“e Location of China’s Taiwan Strait Exercises Is Revealed! Wang Ding-yu Highlights
ree Characteristics” [中國台海軍演位置圖曝光! 王定宇曝3項特色], Liberty Times [自由時報],
August 17, 2020, available at <https://news.ltn.com.tw/news/politics/breakingnews/3263115>.
57
Joseph Trevithick, “China Tests Long-Range Anti-Ship Ballistic Missiles as U.S. Spy
Plane Watches It All,” e Drive, August 26, 2020, available at <https://www.thedrive.com/the-
war-zone/36004/china-tests-long-range-anti-ship-ballistic-missiles-as-u-s-spy-plane-watches-
it-all>.
58
Kuan-Chen Lee [李冠成], “e Logic of PLA’s Muscle-Flexing on Social Media:
Observations on the Ocial Sina Weibo Account of the PLA Eastern eater Command” [解放
軍於社群媒體秀肌肉的邏輯: 以東部戰區微博為例], National Defense Security Biweekly [國防安
全雙週報] 13 (2020), 13–18.
59
“e Communist Party Holds Its 2021 Taiwan Work Conference, Wang Yang Mentions
‘Four Musts’” [中共召開2021年對台工作會議 汪洋提出 “四要”], Central News Agency, January
18, 2021, available at <https://www.cna.com.tw/news/acn/202101180254.aspx>.
60
Li Keqiang, “Report on the Work of the Government: Delivered at the Fourth Session of
the 13
th
National People’s Congress of the People’s Republic of China on March 5, 2021,” Xinhua,
March 12, 2021, available at <http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2021-03/12/c_139806315.
htm>.
61
Author’s interviews at the Institute for National Defense and Security Research, Taipei,
September 2020.
62
Yimou Lee, “Taiwan Says It May Shoot Down Chinese Drones in the South China Sea,”
Reuters, April 7, 2021, available at <https://www.businessinsider.com/taiwan-may-shoot-down-
chinese-drones-in-south-china-sea-2021-4?IR=T>.
63
“PLA Friday Drills Not Warning, but Rehearsal for Taiwan Takeover,” Global Times,
September 18, 2020, available at <https://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1201338.shtml>.
64
Hu Xijin, “PLA Could Send Jets over Taiwan to Defend Sovereignty if U.S. Military Jets
Fly over Island,” Global Times, October 24, 2020, available at <https://www.globaltimes.cn/
content/1204487.shtml>.
11 2 Duchâtel
65
“‘Shock in Taiwan’ as the PLA Exercise to Take Control over Dongsha Island” [解放
军拟演练夺东沙 “震动台岛”], Ta Kung Pao [大公报], May 14, 2020, available at <http://www.
takungpao.com/news/232110/2020/0514/448392.html>.
66
See, for example, Luo Tianbin, “Communist Military Conrms the August Island Seizing
Exercise” [共軍證實8月模擬奪島演習], Liberty Times [自由時報], August 4, 2020, available at
<https://news.ltn.com.tw/news/politics/breakingnews/3249054>.
67
Guo Yuandan and Sun Xiuping, “e PLA’s ‘Island Taking Exercises’ in Dongsha Waters
in August? Taiwanese Media Again Play a War Scenario” [解放军8月将在东沙岛海域进行“夺岛
演习”? 台媒幻想的战争戏码又编好了], Huanqiu Shibao [环球时报], August 4, 2020, available at
<https://www.sohu.com/a/411313221_162522>.
68
Leng Shumei and Liu Xin, “Forum Debates Taiwan Options,” Global Times, December
22, 2019, available at <https://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1174433.shtml>.
69
“Why the Views of Wang Hongguang and Li Yi Are Not Advisable” [为啥李毅王洪光的
这个观点均不可取], Voice of Xia Dynasty [夏朝之音], May 14, 2020, available at <https://user.
guancha.cn/main/content?id=307334>.
70
“Should We Take Taiwan’s Outlying Islands? Of Course!” [要不要拿下台湾外岛?
当然!], Wang Yi [网易], November 2, 2020, available at <https://3g.163.com/dy/article/
FQEF2BO40534NARR.html>.
71
Alexander Cheung, “Simulation of a PLA Attack to Seize Control of Dongsha Island and
Analysis” [解放军东沙岛夺岛作战兵棋推演及其分析], Zhihu [知乎], August 4, 2020, available at
<https://zhuanlan.zhihu.com/p/163521290>.
72
Crystal D. Pryor, “Taiwan’s Cybersecurity Landscape and Opportunities for Regional
Partnership,” in Perspectives on Taiwan: Insights from the 2018 Taiwan-U.S. Policy Program,
ed. Bonnie S. Glaser and Matthew P. Funaiole (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and
International Studies, 2019), 10–15.
73
Matthew Strong, “Cyberattacks on Taiwan’s Ministry of Foreign Aairs Increased 40-
Fold in 2020,” Taiwan News, March 30, 2021, available at <https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/en/
news/4164261>.
74
Yimou Lee, “Taiwan Says China Behind Cyberattacks on Government Agencies,
Emails,” Reuters, August 19, 2020, available at <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-taiwan-
cyber-china-idUSKCN25F0JK>.
75
“Taiwan Sees China as Likely Source of Coordinated Cyberattacks on ree Major
Companies,” Industrial Cyber, May 12, 2020, available at <https://industrialcyber.co/
threats-attacks/industrial-cyber-attacks/taiwan-sees-china-as-likely-source-of-coordinated-
cyberattacks-on-three-major-companies/>.
76
“Public Companies in Taiwan Target by Hackers, Ocials Suggest is May Be Related
to Tsai Ing-wen’s Inauguration Ceremony” [台湾公营企业网络受黑客攻击, 官员声称是针对蔡
英文就职典礼], Haixia Daobao She [海峡导报社], May 5, 2020, available at <https://www.sohu.
com/a/393156049_120135071>.
77
Wang Hongguang [王洪光], “‘Reunication by Force,’ How to Do It? PLA Major General:
Six Types of Operations for a Victory in ree Days” [“武统”台湾到底怎么打? 解放军中将: 六种
战法, 三天拿下], Huanqiu Wang [环球网], March 27, 2018, available at <https://taiwan.huanqiu.
com/article/9CaKrnK7519>.
11 3
CHAPTER 4
Firepower Strike, Blockade, Landing:
PLA Campaigns for a Cross-Strait Conflict
By
Michael Casey
11 3
S
ince the 1990s, the primary aim of China’s defense modernization has
been to provide Chinese leaders with credible options to deter Taiwan
independence or compel unication by force. Indeed, military force has
been a central component of Beijing’s larger strategy to steer Taiwan toward
unication—a goal Chinese President Xi Jinping explicitly linked in 2019 to his
vision of realizing the “great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation” by midcentu-
ry.
1
e need to bolster the combat capabilities of the People’s Liberation Army
(PLA) was apparent after confrontations in the Taiwan Strait in 1995 and 1996,
when Beijing’s threats and PLA missile launches into the waters o Taiwan’s
coast prompted U.S. intervention. Taipei’s deance of Beijing’s intimidation
tactics and the deployment of the U.S. 7
th
Fleet revealed signicant weakness-
es in the PLA’s ability to deter Taiwan independence. Chinese leaders subse-
quently pursued reforms to PLA doctrine, training, and force structure, placing
priority on developing modern air, missile, and electronic warfare forces inte-
gral to deterring or defeating an advanced adversary such as the United States.
2
e shift in China’s national military strategy to a focus on Taiwan also
prompted PLA planners to develop military campaigns for Taiwan-relat-
ed contingencies, such as a repower strike campaign intended to punish
11 4 Casey
Taiwan or support a blockade or invasion, a blockade campaign to coerce
Taipei or lay the groundwork for an invasion, and an island-landing cam-
paign meant to achieve unication.
3
Should Taipei declare independence,
Chinese leaders may call on the PLA to threaten or apply violence to press
Taiwan to reverse course and restore the status quo ante. Beijing may resort
to force to compel Taiwan’s leaders to the negotiating table in the event China
no longer views peaceful unication as realistic. Chinese leaders may forgo
limited military means, such as punitive missile strikes or a naval blockade,
in favor of decisive military action—an amphibious invasion to seize control
of the island—to accomplish their policy objectives.
Beijing’s perception of the PLA’s joint operational capabilities and its
view of the risk of intervention by the United States and its allies and partners
would be key factors in Beijing’s decisionmaking calculus and the course of
Figure. Notional PLA Wartime C2 Structure for the Joint Island Landing Campaign
Sources: Adapted from Zhang Peigao, Lectures on Joint Campaign Command [联合作战指挥教程]
(Beijing: Military Sciences Press, 2001), 12; Jiang Fanrang, ed., Joint Operations Headquarters Work
[联合作战司令部工作] (Beijing: Military Sciences Press, 2004), 386.
Supreme Command
Strategic Reserves
Air Operations Group Maritime Operations Group
Land Operations Group Missile Assault Operations Group
Airborne Operations Group Information Operations Group
Special Operations Group
Strategic IO Forces Nuclear Deterrence and Counterstrike
ETC Joint Operations Command Center
CMC Joint Operations Command Center
Eastern Theater Command
PLA Campaigns for a Cross-Strait Conflict 11 5
action Chinese leaders choose to take. Concern over the PLA’s ability to en-
gage in high-intensity combat could lead Chinese leaders to opt for less de-
manding missile or blockade campaigns and forgo an amphibious assault.
Alternately, fear of foreign military intervention may motivate Beijing to risk
an invasion of Taiwan rather than undertake a prolonged blockade, with the
aim of securing China’s objectives as quickly as possible and presenting its
control of the island as a fait accompli to the international community.
is chapter provides an overview of three possible Chinese military
campaigns for a cross-strait conict outlined in PLA doctrinal writings over
the past 20 years: a joint repower strike campaign, joint blockade campaign,
and joint island landing campaign. e chapter begins by summarizing PLA
campaign planning and operational art, followed by reviewing the three ma-
jor campaigns. Each overview includes a discussion of campaign phasing, the
general military requirements to successfully execute them, and factors that
would shape the campaign’s ability to achieve China’s strategic objectives.
ese include the campaign’s expected duration and the threat of U.S. inter-
vention on its outcome. e chapter concludes with a brief discussion of how
new PLA capabilities could shape future campaign development.
PLA Campaign Planning and Operational Art
e PLA’s approach to warfare at the operational level has been to develop
a series of “campaigns” [zhanyi, 战役] that outline the types of activities re-
quired by “campaign large formations” [zhanyi juntuan, 战役军团] to achieve
Beijing’s strategic objectives across likely conict scenarios. Falling between
wars [zhanzheng, 战争] and battles [zhandou, 战斗], a campaign is dened
as “combat operations consisting of a series of battles conducted by army
corps-level units under a unied command to achieve a local or overall ob-
jective in a war.”
4
Campaign scenarios span the spectrum of conict, from
border skirmishes to large-scale multinational wars.
Each PLA service has its own service campaigns [junzhong zhanyi, 军
种战役] reecting its capabilities, roles, and missions. PLA Navy (PLAN)
campaigns, for example, include the sea blockade campaign and sea line of
communications attack campaign,
5
while the PLA Air Force (PLAAF) must
be able to execute air oensive, air defensive, and airborne campaigns.
6
e PLA has also developed joint campaigns [lianhe zhanyi, 联合战役] to
11 6 Casey
harness the collective strength of multiple services for synergistic eects.
ese campaigns include the joint blockade, joint island landing, joint anti–
air raid, and joint repower strike campaigns.
7
In practice, the campaign
commander adjusts, combines, and layers these service and joint cam-
paigns to develop a war plan.
8
A summary of the PLA’s doctrinal campaigns
is included in the table.
In Chinese military science, PLA “war zone” [zhanqu, 战区] commanders
develop joint operational plans or campaign plans consisting of a base order
and supporting documents detailing the execution of the campaign’s opera-
tional concept. Available PLA texts describe campaign plans as documents born
of the PLA’s tradition of top-down, detailed planning and operations research.
9
Historically, the size and scope of the war zone were shaped by the contingency
at hand and China’s wartime objectives. e PLA established an ad hoc joint
war zone command in the lead-up to war—a potentially slow and cumbersome
process driven by the PLA’s ground force–centric military regions’ lack of opera-
tional control over naval, air, and missile forces.
10
e creation of standing joint
theater commands to replace the military regions in 2016 demonstrated a need
to position the PLA to more rapidly respond to crises and conicts, as well as
more eectively train and plan as a joint force for specic missions.
11
For a Taiwan conict, the Eastern eater commander and his sta in the
theater joint operations command center (JOCC) would develop a campaign
plan consisting of an activity plan [xingdong jiahua, 行动计划] and support
plan [baozhang jihua, 保障计划]. According to the 2004 PLA book Joint Oper-
ations Headquarters Work, the activity plan includes the campaign’s concept
of operations, a situation assessment, the higher headquarters’ intent, oper-
ational missions, the campaign’s phasing and timelines, the organization of
the commander’s forces, and the missions of the campaign large formation’s
operations groups. During wartime, the PLA plans to organize its forces into
functional and domain-specic “operations groups” [jituan, 集团], subor-
dinate to the theater command, to lead forces in their areas or domains of
responsibility. e activity plan also includes branch plans that, unlike U.S.
military branch plans that detail operations for potential contingencies, lay out
key campaign activities such as air, naval, and repower operations. e sec-
ond component of the campaign plan, the support plan, covers activities (for
example, reconnaissance, communication support, transportation, logistics,
PLA Campaigns for a Cross-Strait Conflict 11 7
meteorology and hydrology support, political work) needed for the campaign
large formation to execute the actions described in the activity plan.
12
e Eastern eater Command and the Chinese high command will
develop the Taiwan war plan—whether it is a missile, blockade, or invasion
campaign—around the PLA’s view of “informationized” [xinxihua, 信息化]
warfare and systems theory. According to PLA strategists, the demands of
modern warfare require Chinese forces to “fuse” the operational strengths
of “all services and branches” by conducting “integrated joint operations”
[zonghe lianhe xingdong, 综合联合行动].
13
e 2013 Academy of Military Sci-
ence (AMS) textbook Science of Strategy denes integrated joint operations as
multiservice operations that “rely on a networked military information sys-
tem, employ digitized weapons and equipment, and employ corresponding
operational methods in land, sea, air, outer space, and cyber space.”
14
While
Chinese forces will attempt to seize air, maritime, and information superiori-
ty—or what the PLA describes as the “three dominances” [san quan, 三权]—
during a campaign against Taiwan, the volume’s authors view information
superiority as central to victory in modern wars.
15
e PLA considers mod-
ern warfare to be a confrontation between adversary “operational systems”
[zuozhan tixi, 作战体系] and has developed an approach to warfare that PLA
strategists term “system destruction warfare” [tixi po ji zhan, 体系破击战], in
which one achieves victory by targeting the critical linkages and nodes that
hold an adversary’s operational system together.
16
As such, any PLA war plan
would revolve around the need to successfully conduct joint operations,
achieve information superiority—particularly at the outset of a campaign—
and execute precision strikes against key strategic and operational targets
such as command and control (C2) and logistics nodes. Additional character-
istics of PLA operational art that would inform the Taiwan war plan include a
heavy emphasis on deception, surprise, and seizing the initiative.
17
Finally, one of the most important—if not the most important—plan-
ning considerations for the PLA would be the risk of U.S. military interven-
tion. PLA strategists anticipate some form of intervention by the United
States, or what PLA texts call a “strong” or “powerful enemy” [qiang di, 强
敌], across most major contingencies. e PLA would dedicate much of its
resources attempting to deter, degrade, or defeat U.S. military intervention
should Washington decide to enter a Taiwan conict.
18
Chinese leaders
11 8 Casey
remain skeptical of the PLA’s current ability to succeed in a major conict
against the United States, having set long-term modernization goals of de-
veloping the PLA into an informationized force by 2035 and a “world-class”
military by 2049.
19
As a result, any PLA campaign against Taiwan would be
accompanied by aggressive diplomatic, informational, and economic ef-
forts to isolate Taiwan from the international community, justify Beijing’s
actions, erode support for the Taiwan government, and dissuade the United
States from challenging China’s use of force.
Should Chinese leaders come to view U.S. intervention as imminent,
they may seek to balance the need to bolster China’s deterrence eorts with
a desire to avoid undue escalation into a wider war. e intensity of PLA ac-
tivities directed at the United States would depend on what likely eects U.S.
military operations were seen as having on the Taiwan campaign. at is not
to say that Beijing intends to wait for strikes against its own forces before au-
thorizing a response. PLA texts such as the 2013 AMS Science of Strategy and
the 2015 National Defense University (NDU) Science of Strategy recommend
aggressive, asymmetric attacks, particularly in the cyber and space domains,
as a means to exploit a powerful adversary’s weaknesses and compensate
for PLA shortfalls.
20
e PLA principle of “active defense” [jiji fangyu, 积极
防御] also allows for oensive action at the operational and tactical levels
in response to an adversary’s perceived rst strike, suggesting the PLA may
conduct attacks against U.S. forces or territory early in a crisis or conict to
both demonstrate Beijing’s resolve and achieve operational eects.
21
Joint Firepower Strike Campaign
e rst campaign under consideration is the joint repower strike cam-
paign (JFSC). PLA sources describe joint repower strikes as oensive
operations with multiple services coordinating the planning, timing, and
spacing of long-range precision strikes. According to the PLA textbook
Science of Joint Operations, the purpose of the JFSC is to intimidate an ad-
versary’s leadership and population, break its will to resist, and force it to
abandon or reverse its strategic intentions.
22
In a Taiwan contingency, the
scale and scope of the JFSC would depend on China’s strategic objectives.
A limited strike against symbolic targets, for instance, could be used to
demonstrate Beijing’s disapproval of Taipei’s actions, while more extensive
PLA Campaigns for a Cross-Strait Conflict 119
strikes might be used to paralyze Taiwan’s political, military, and economic
systems. e PLA can execute the JFSC in isolation or in combination with
other campaigns. As part of a joint blockade campaign, for example, the
JFSC would attempt to annihilate antiblockade operations; in a joint island
landing campaign, the JFSC would target Taiwan’s defenses to prepare the
way for amphibious forces to cross the Taiwan Strait. is section largely
treats the JFSC in isolation, with the joint blockade and joint island landing
campaigns addressed in the following sections.
Military Calculus
Chinese leaders may choose to execute a JFSC against Taiwan for two reasons.
First, the exibility of the JFSC aords Beijing opportunities to shape how the
conict unfolds. e PLA possesses a sizable and growing military advantage
over the Taiwan military after decades of modernization eorts. In the event
of conict, Beijing would likely retain escalation dominance over Taipei, al-
lowing the Chinese high command to calibrate the use of force for desired
eects. Firepower strikes accompanied by operational pauses would allow
room for political negotiations and for Taiwan’s continued intransigence to
be met with additional attacks. e JFSC can transition to a blockade or an
amphibious invasion if necessary. Alternatively, such as in the face of immi-
nent foreign military intervention, Chinese leaders can cease operations and
pursue an end to the war with relatively few costs.
Second, Beijing is condent that it can accurately forecast the result of a
JFSC. is condence is based on extensive preconict eorts to surveil Tai-
wan political, military, and economic targets, as well as reconnoiter Taiwan
computer networks, which would support mission planning for the JFSC.
23
e military balance in the Taiwan Strait and the JFSC’s relative chance of
success compared with a blockade or invasion mean that, in many scenarios,
the JFSC carries signicantly less risk than do other courses of action.
Nevertheless, the JFSC may be insucient to fulll Beijing’s objectives.
PLA texts on joint repower strike operations stress the need to tailor attacks
to degrade an enemy’s will; however, the history of modern airpower cam-
paigns—from Vietnam to Afghanistan—is replete with examples of missile
strikes proving unable to achieve desired eects on the battleeld. Bombing
campaigns can spur local populations to rally around adversary leadership,
120 Casey
while targeted governments, economies, and militaries nd means to re-
structure and survive in new, more resilient forms.
24
erefore, the PLA’s abil-
ity to dismantle Taiwan’s “operational system” may not translate to strategic
success if the government in Taipei is left intact.
25
Images of Taiwan holding
out against PLA attacks could also rally global public support around Taipei,
leaving China susceptible to international sanctions or a military coalition
coming to Taiwan’s defense.
Campaign Phasing
e timing and phasing of the JFSC depends on its size and scope and whether
the PLA conducts it in isolation or as part of a larger joint campaign, as well as on
the terrain, disposition of forces, weather, and level of risk acceptable to the high
command. An independent JFSC would likely be limited in scale and timed in
relation to the reaction of Taiwan and the international community to PLA op-
erations. Available PLA texts generally describe joint repower strike operations
as beginning with a preliminary phase characterized by mobilization activities;
initial deployment of strike systems; and intelligence, surveillance, and recon-
naissance (ISR) operations.
26
e campaign then moves to a primary phase fea-
turing waves of kinetic and nonkinetic attacks sequenced according to target
and munition type, and it concludes with ISR units conducting post-strike battle
damage assessment.
27
A JFSC may feature only ballistic missiles employed by
the PLA Rocket Force (PLARF) or a combination of ballistic and cruise missiles,
artillery, electronic warfare systems, and oensive cyber activities.
Preliminary mobilization and ISR activities could take place days to
weeks before the initiation of hostilities against Taiwan.
28
e PLA is likely
to increase the readiness of its forces in the Eastern eater, which would
include recalling personnel, conducting equipment maintenance, stockpil-
ing munitions, and organizing last-minute training, among other activities.
Depending on the size of the JFSC, the PLAAF may forward-deploy special
mission aircraft and unmanned aerial vehicles, as well as ghter and bomb-
er aircraft, to airelds along the Taiwan Strait, while the PLAN may supple-
ment the Eastern eater’s naval operations group with surface combatants,
submarines, and support ships from the Northern and Southern theater
navies, if needed. PLARF launch units would depart from garrison and, de-
pending on the campaign’s time requirements, deploy to hide sites or move
PLA Campaigns for a Cross-Strait Conflict 121
directly to launch locations.
29
Finally, ISR units would provide updates on
enemy disposition and readiness and on environmental conditions relevant
to the movement of PLA forces. e 2004 PLA textbook Science of Second Ar-
tillery Campaigns notes that conventional missile forces are most eective
when Chinese forces can achieve surprise and the enemy is unprepared for
the attack. is suggests that the PLA will mask its activities and quickly con-
clude preliminary operations.
30
e main attack phase of the JFSC features waves of kinetic and nonki-
netic attacks. PLA texts such as the Science of Second Artillery Campaigns
and the 2006 Science of Campaigns identify adversary air bases, C2 centers,
and logistics bases as key targets.
31
If the goal is to degrade Taiwan’s warght-
ing ability, the PLA would likely target transportation infrastructure such as
highways, bridges, and tunnels; energy infrastructure such as power stations
and petroleum, oil, and lubricant (POL) storage sites; and intelligence collec-
tion facilities. Taiwan’s air defenses and long-range strike systems, including
coastal defense cruise missile launchers, ghter aircraft, and artillery, are also
high-priority targets. Science of Joint Operations describes the sequencing of
joint repower operations as beginning with electronic attacks, followed by
“preliminary-round strikes, follow-up strikes, and supplemental strikes.”
32
Table. Canonical PLA Campaigns
Army
Maneuver warfare campaign, mountain offensive campaign,
positional offensive campaign, anti-terrorism maintaining stabil-
ity operations campaign
Navy
Sea force–group campaign to eliminate the enemy, sealine
of interdicting campaign, offensive campaign against coral
island reefs, sea line guarding campaign, naval base defense
campaign
Air Force
Air offensive campaign, air defensive campaign, airborne
campaign
Rocket Force
Nuclear counterattack campaign, conventional missile assault
campaign
Joint
Firepower strike campaign, blockade campaign, anti–air raid
campaign, island-landing campaign
Source: Zhang Yuliang, ed., Science of Campaigns [战役学] (Beijing: National Defense University
Press, 2006), vii–xii.
122 Casey
Electronic attack operations would be used to degrade adversary C2 and
early warning systems, such as air defense radars, to facilitate subsequent
missile strikes and ensure freedom of maneuver for manned aircraft. Prelim-
inary-round kinetic strikes would then hit C2 nodes and communications
infrastructure, with follow-up strikes targeting enemy surface-to-air missile
systems, air defense artillery, and other strike systems that could be used to
counterattack PLA forces. During an invasion, the PLA may also destroy tacti-
cal assets such as armored vehicles, xed-gun emplacements, and artillery sys-
tems. Having eliminated Taiwan’s immediate defensive capabilities, the JFSC
would then move to destroy Taipei’s war potential and ability to reconstitute its
forces, including strikes on food, water, POL, and other economic targets.
Military Requirements
e JFSC’s military requirements vary greatly depending on the size and
complexity of the campaign. PLA texts, such as Science of Campaigns and
Joint Operations Headquarters Work, emphasize the careful selection of tar-
gets, unied planning and command, concealment and surprise, coordi-
nation across services and combat arms, and sucient logistics to sustain
high-intensity combat operations. Accurate and timely ISR would be essen-
tial for target analysis and the ecient allocation of repower, particularly for
dynamic targets such as ships, aircraft, and armored vehicles. Each PLA ser-
vice possesses its own organic ISR assets, while the Strategic Support Force,
created in 2016, manages national platforms such as China’s intelligence
satellites.
33
More demanding joint repower operations likely would require
the PLA to quickly collect information from a wide number of ISR platforms,
fuse that data into actionable intelligence, and disseminate it across services
and command echelons. It remains unclear how eectively the theater com-
mands would be able to task national assets normally subordinate to the
Central Military Commission (CMC) joint operations command center, or
whether interoperability between information systems used by dierent ser-
vices would be adequate to support a common operating picture between
strike platforms and command posts.
Similarly, to deconict operations and synchronize attacks, the JFSC
requires close coordination between PLA services and operations groups.
PLA texts describe the PLAAF and Second Artillery Forces (now the PLARF)
PLA Campaigns for a Cross-Strait Conflict 123
as taking the lead role in JSFC planning. Science of Campaigns identies a
repower center within the campaign main command as responsible for
planning and coordinating repower strike operations. Following the 2016
reforms, this presumably means that there is a joint repower center with-
in the theater JOCC or that one would be established as part of the prima-
ry command post in the lead-up to war.
34
However, the prociency of joint
commanders and planners in the JOCC remains unclear, as do the command
relationships and division of responsibility between the JOCC, its repower
center, and the various operations groups.
Finally, as with the joint blockade and joint island landing campaigns,
preparation for third-party intervention is a key JFSC requirement. e PLA
is likely to allocate some ISR resources to monitoring foreign military activ-
ities for indications of intervention, which could strain the bandwidth of its
intelligence-collection and processing systems. A portion of the PLA’s air,
naval, and missile forces would probably remain postured to confront for-
eign military intervention if necessary. Limited C2 and ISR resources and
the need to reserve key weapons systems for a war against a major adversary
like the United States or Japan may also factor into JFSC planning during
larger conict scenarios.
Joint Blockade Campaign
e second doctrinal joint PLA campaign for cross-strait operations is the
joint blockade campaign (JBC). PLA sources dene the JBC as a “protracted
campaign” that “aims to sever enemy economic conditions” to “compel the
enemy to submit to campaign goals.”
35
Science of Campaigns describes the
JBC’s primary mission as isolating the enemy island from the outside world
and undermining the enemy’s will and war potential.
36
e size and scope
of the JBC depend on Beijing’s strategic objectives. A scenario in which Chi-
na aims to punish Taiwan could feature establishing a limited blockade with
cyber operations used to degrade Taiwan’s access to the global Internet or
deploying the PLAN or China coast guard to inspect or detain commercial
maritime trac to and from the island. A goal to compel Taiwan’s unica-
tion with the mainland would likely entail a larger campaign coupled with
repower strikes against Taiwan ports, airelds, and other military targets to
seize air, maritime, and information superiority.
124 Casey
As with the JFSC, the PLA could execute the JBC in isolation or as part
of a broader campaign, such as an amphibious invasion. e JBC could set
the conditions for the joint island landing campaign by degrading Taiwan’s
defenses and war potential for subsequent amphibious operations. e
Chinese high command may also wait to see the eects of the JBC, allow-
ing time for negotiations and intensifying blockade operations or transi-
tioning to an invasion should Taipei refuse to relent to Beijing’s demands.
Conversely, Chinese leadership could call o the JBC if foreign intervention
threatened the blockade.
Military Calculus
Factors that could drive Beijing to order the JBC against Taiwan include po-
litical or military provocations by Taipei, a calculation that international cir-
cumstances are favorable to military operations, and a positive evaluation of
the PLA’s capability to execute the campaign. e 2015 NDU Science of Strate-
gy states that a main characteristic of a strategic blockade is its “strong politi-
cal quality, policy quality, and legal principle quality.”
37
Science of Campaigns
also notes that blockades by their very nature involve the interests of multiple
countries, requiring commanders to pay heed to the “overall situation” and
relevant international laws and norms that may restrict blockade activities.
38
Before and during the JBC, China would conduct aggressive, whole-of-gov-
ernment public opinion, psychological, and legal eorts—or what PLA
strategists describe as the “ree Warfares”—to justify its actions and limit in-
ternational pushback. While Beijing almost certainly would hope for a quick
resolution to the war, PLA texts acknowledge that the armed forces must be
prepared for a protracted campaign, heightening the risk of an external en-
emy’s military intervention.
39
e PLA’s ability to simultaneously execute the
blockade against Taiwan while deterring and defeating foreign intervention
would prove central to Beijing’s decisionmaking calculus. e broad scope of
the battleeld, number of forces and combat methods involved, and ferocity
of Taiwan resistance may tax PLA capabilities.
Doubts about PLA capabilities could drive the Chinese high command
to choose a less risky course of action. e signicant mobilization and
sustainment requirements of the JBC, compared with the JFSC, mean that
Chinese leaders have less political and military exibility when committing
PLA Campaigns for a Cross-Strait Conflict 125
to blockade. ose same requirements increase the risk that Taiwan or the
international community identies indicators of impending PLA action and
organizes a response. Moreover, the allocation of sizable PLA air and naval
forces to enforce the blockade and the need to prepare for foreign military
intervention inherently obligate Beijing to assume risk in other regions, such
as along the Sino-Indian border and South China Sea. PLA strategists are
concerned with “chain reaction” warfare in which regional countries, do-
mestic enemies, or the United States exploit a crisis, such as over Taiwan, to
instigate conicts around China’s periphery while Chinese forces are preoc-
cupied in the main theater of operations.
40
Campaign Phasing
Science of Campaigns outlines a blockade campaign with four phases: an
initial deployment phase, an oensive operations phase, a blockade sustain-
ment phase, and a concluding phase.
41
Mobilization activities would presum-
ably occur prior to the initial deployment phase, with military, government,
and civilian sectors transitioning to a wartime footing. Under China’s na-
tional defense system, mobilization could include requisitioning civilian ve-
hicles to transport military equipment or civilian ships to support blockade
enforcement. e initial deployment phase of the JBC would feature air and
naval forces of the campaign large formation moving toward the operational
area, which could include the discreet movement of aircraft to airelds along
the Taiwan Strait, ships to at-sea staging areas, and missile units to concealed
locations. Covert minelaying by air and naval units, particularly submarines,
would also occur during this phase, as would the intensication of ISR activi-
ty to support blockade enforcement and repower strike operations.
e oensive operations phase would begin with a public declaration
that a blockade has been established, quickly followed by eorts to achieve
information superiority over the adversary.
42
Science of Campaigns and other
texts describe information dominance as a necessary precursor to establish-
ing air and naval control for a blockade, recommending that the PLA con-
duct missile and electronic attacks against enemy observation, early warning,
electronic warfare, and long-range precision strike systems.
43
With informa-
tion dominance in hand, the PLA then would move to achieve air dominance,
targeting air defenses, C2 facilities, airelds, and combat aircraft—preferably
126 Casey
while they are on the ground.
44
e oensive operations phase would con-
clude with the PLAN establishing sea dominance around Taiwan and its out-
er islands. Primary targets would be enemy antisubmarine forces, surface
combatants, mine clearing ships, and submarines.
45
e blockade sustainment phase would involve the continuous disrup-
tion of Taiwan’s air and sea lines of communication. Key activities would
include blockading ports, inspecting maritime trac, intercepting and
expelling aircraft, and attacking adversary military forces as necessary.
46
Ground forces may occupy Taiwan’s outer islands to eliminate threats to
blockade enforcement operations. Because blockades normally cover a wide
geographic area, the authors of Joint Operations Headquarters Work recom-
mend that the campaign command identify main and secondary blockade
directions, with stricter blockade enforcement occurring along the main
direction. Taiwan’s largest ports are Kaohsiung and Taichung, suggesting a
main direction to the south and a secondary direction to the north.
47
For co-
ordination and deconiction purposes, Science of Campaigns and Science of
Second Artillery Campaigns further divide the blockade area into blockade
zones, air and maritime intercept zones, and repower blockade zones.
48
e China coast guard, supported by maritime militia, would likely take the
lead in conducting visit, board, search, and seizure operations, allowing the
PLAN to focus on military forces attempting to break the blockade. Once the
JBC achieves its objectives, the concluding phase would begin. In this phase,
the PLA would withdraw participating forces; replenish air, naval, and mis-
sile systems; and prepare units for follow-on deployments.
Defensive operations occur across all phases of the JBC. Relevant ser-
vice campaigns include the PLAN’s naval base defense campaign and the
PLAAF’s air defensive campaign, which would entail deployment of coastal
defense cruise missile and surface-to-air missile systems, as well as patrol
craft, to key facilities and along the Taiwan Strait. As described in Science of
Campaigns, the joint anti–air raid campaign provides the PLA with a tem-
plate for how to conduct counterintervention operations during the JBC.
49
ese activities would aim to deter Washington and its allies and partners
from entering the conict, as well as help sustain the blockade against air
and missile attacks. If the United States did intervene, China’s response
would involve kinetic and nonkinetic attacks that would increase in intensity
PLA Campaigns for a Cross-Strait Conflict 127
as the campaign progresses to signal Beijing’s resolve. If the Chinese high
command viewed the blockade as beginning to fail, it would likely expand
the scope and scale of attacks against U.S. forces. Plausible oensive activ-
ities include antiship ballistic missile strikes against U.S. aircraft carriers or
joint repower strikes against U.S. bases in Japan and Guam. A signicant
escalation of the conict could compel Chinese leaders to abandon the
blockade and shift the PLA’s primary eort to the joint anti–air raid cam-
paign and major combat against the United States.
Military Requirements
e military requirements of the JBC depend on the campaign’s objectives.
Joint Operations Headquarters Work denes a blockade according to its in-
tensity (closed, general, or relaxed) and level of isolation (complete, basic,
or partial). A closed blockade or complete isolation requires that 80 percent
of ships and aircraft be unable to pass through the blockade zone.
50
Sustain-
ment is likely to be a primary requirement to meet those objectives during
a protracted conict. Ships and aircraft enforcement of the blockade would
remain on station until they could be relieved and return to their home
ports and airelds for resupply and maintenance (the PLAN’s ability to re-
load weapons at sea remains unclear). Attrition would tax the PLA’s ability
to maintain the blockade around Taiwan, likely forcing dicult tradeos
on where and how to allocate forces. Similar issues are likely to arise in
the PLA’s management of potential third-party intervention: some portion
of the PLA, particularly long-range strike systems supported by ISR units,
would be postured to deter or defeat U.S. forces instead of participating in
the blockade. Given the PLAN’s current logistics capabilities, sustaining a
naval presence outside the First Island Chain as part of counterintervention
operations would be challenging. Questions remain about the PLAN’s ability
to conduct antisubmarine and air defense operations far from the Chinese
mainland and against the United States.
Additional JBC requirements highlighted in Science of Campaigns include
preconict preparations, seizing the initiative, unied command, and close
coordination.
51
A JBC would probably feature signicantly greater mobiliza-
tion activities than would a JFSC in anticipation of a long-term blockade. Se-
crecy would also be of utmost importance for mobilization activities to ensure
128 Casey
surprise and minimize the risk of foreign intervention. China’s National Defense
Mobilization Law stipulates that the State Council and CMC jointly lead mobi-
lization through the National Defense Mobilization Committee (NDMC). Pro-
vincial governments also have their own NDMCs, and the eective sustainment
of the JBC would likely require them to work closely with the Eastern eater
Command and Joint Logistic Support Force (JLSF). However, the post-reform
command relationships between the theaters, JLSF, and NDMCs at various lev-
els and their subordinate oces are unclear. Like the JFSC, the JBC is likely to re-
quire eective joint planning and close coordination between the services and
other entities, such as the China coast guard. e need to intercept foreign civil-
ian and military aircraft and ships while reducing the risk of inadvertent escala-
tion would require strict adherence to approved rules of engagement, as well as
devolving decisionmaking responsibilities to frontline units, which could prove
troublesome for the PLA’s centralized command structure.
Joint Island Landing Campaign
e third major joint campaign is the joint island landing campaign (JILC).
According to PLA sources, the JILC is a large-scale joint oensive campaign
to “break through the enemy’s seacoast, and to seize and occupy landing
elds or coastal airelds and harbors, so as to create favorable conditions for
subsequent operational activities.”
52
e JILC could be executed against the
main island of Taiwan or against smaller islands, such as Jinmen or Matsu,
held by Taiwan. e JILC, like the JFSC and JBC, would incorporate other
campaigns, such as the joint anti–air raid campaign, as embedded or subor-
dinate campaign activities.
e primary aim of the JILC is likely to secure the quick capitulation of
Taiwan’s political and military leadership and to ensure unication under
Beijing’s terms while deterring or, if necessary, defeating foreign military in-
tervention. To accomplish these war aims, the PLA would likely attempt to
occupy Taipei and isolate Taiwan politically, economically, and militarily;
neutralize Taiwan’s military capacity to resist; and prevent U.S. forces from
interfering with PLA operations.
53
Beijing is also likely to try to minimize
the conict’s eects on China’s other national objectives, such as econom-
ic modernization and continued Chinese Communist Party rule, through
continued access to international markets and increased domestic security
PLA Campaigns for a Cross-Strait Conflict 129
measures. With Taipei under its control, the PLA would then move to se-
cure the rest of the island, establish a new civilian government, eliminate
any remaining resistance, and prepare for potential counter-landings by the
United States and its allies and partners.
54
Military Calculus
Key considerations for a decision to execute the JILC would likely include
Chinese leaders’ evaluation of the need for decisive military action, the
strength of the PLA’s joint operational capabilities, and the perceived risk of
campaign failure. While both the JFSC and JBC would aim for a quick res-
olution to the ghting, both campaigns carry the risk of Taiwan refusing to
accede to Beijing’s demands, which would allow time for international re-
sistance to coalesce. As a result, Beijing may view the JILC as the only viable
means to achieve unication. Like the JFSC and JBC, the JILC would be ac-
companied by aggressive diplomatic, economic, and information eorts to
isolate Taiwan, deter foreign intervention, and legitimize China’s actions.
Chinese leaders would probably be wary of undertaking an invasion
unless they were condent the PLA could successfully execute a campaign
against Taiwan while ghting the United States. e political and military
costs of a failed invasion would be high—possibly prohibitively so. Succes-
sive generations of Chinese leaders have dened unication with Taiwan as
a key condition for national rejuvenation and thus as central to the Party’s
legitimacy.
55
However, high-intensity combat against Taiwan, and potential-
ly the United States, could result in high attrition of PLA forces and set Chi-
na’s military modernization back decades. Consequently, Chinese leaders
may view a failed invasion campaign as an existential threat to the regime.
Chinese and Western scholars alike have raised the possibility that Beijing
may consider using nuclear weapons under such conditions despite China’s
no-rst-use nuclear pledge.
56
Regardless, the perceived costs of failure would
probably motivate Beijing to conduct aggressive conventional deterrence ac-
tivities against the United States, including oensive cyber and counterspace
operations, across all phases of the conict.
57
Campaign Phasing
PLA texts describe the JILC as consisting of four phases: a preliminary stage
featuring eorts to achieve air, maritime, and information superiority; a
130 Casey
sea-crossing phase; a landing phase; and a concluding phase characterized
by the expansion of landing sites and an initial push inland.
58
Similar to the
JBC, mobilization activities would likely take place for several months before
the onset of hostilities, based on the high logistics requirements and num-
ber of forces involved. Key mobilization eorts would likely include elevating
units to higher states of readiness; forward-deploying air, missile, and ground
forces; and positioning naval forces around Taiwan (and possibly deploying
them to the western Pacic and South China Sea to counter U.S. interven-
tion).
59
Covert mining of Taiwan’s ports by aircraft and submarines and ISR
activity directed against Taiwan, the United States, and regional powers such
as Japan, would also occur prior to the conict.
Once mobilization is complete, the JILC would move to a preliminary
phase. According to Science of Campaigns, the goals of this phase include
paralyzing the enemy’s operational system and seizing the initiative to enable
the amphibious assault. Here, the PLA would execute the JFSC as part of the
invasion campaign, targeting air and naval bases, C2 nodes, and long-range
strike systems, as well as the joint anti–air raid campaign to defend against
Taiwan counterattacks and foreign military intervention.
e sea-crossing and landing phases of the JILC would feature the de-
ployment of amphibious, air assault, and airborne forces across the Taiwan
Strait in what the PLA describes as a “three-dimensional landing” [liti den-
glu, 立体登陆]. e Eastern eater’s amphibious combined-arms brigades
would depart garrison to their embarkation points, load onto PLAN amphib-
ious ships, maneuver to assembly areas o the Taiwan coast, disembark,
and begin assault operations.
60
e amphibious force would be defended
by naval screening groups and preceded by minesweeping vessels tasked
with clearing assault lanes. PLA amphibious doctrine emphasizes landing at
multiple sites and conducting anking attacks with mobile units.
61
While the
bulk of the invasion force would be delivered by sea, the standing up of army
air assault units and elding of new transport helicopters and the Y-20 heavy
transport aircraft in recent years suggest that the PLA would also rely heavily
on air delivery of forces for an invasion.
62
e key targets for these troops are
likely to include Taiwan’s major ports and airelds to facilitate the ow of
second- and third-echelon forces and logistics supplies.
63
(For more on the
airborne corps, see the chapter by Roderick Lee in this volume.)
PLA Campaigns for a Cross-Strait Conflict 131
e concluding phase of the JILC is the expansion and consolidation of
established beachheads and initial push inland. How the PLA intends to con-
solidate its control over the rest of Taiwan is not readily apparent from avail-
able PLA texts, though, as Sale Lilly’s chapter in this volume demonstrates, the
PLA has increased urban warfare training that may be relevant to cross-strait
operations. Science of Campaigns abruptly ends its discussion of the JILC’s
phases after PLA forces complete their landings. e PLA Army’s maneuver
warfare and mountain oensive campaigns would likely serve as templates
for operations on Taiwan. Given the PLA’s aim for speed and a quick victory,
ground forces are likely to advance inland on Taipei, employing three-dimen-
sional maneuvers to ank or bypass the remaining Taiwan defenders. Special
operations forces would be the rst into Taipei to neutralize Taiwan civilian
and government leaders and seize key sites. People’s Armed Police and other
security forces would presumably backll the PLA as conventional maneuver
units advance across the rest of the island.
64
Military Requirements
A major amphibious invasion is one of the most complex and dicult mili-
tary operations. e Department of Defense publication Military and Secu-
rity Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2020 notes that
success “depends upon air and maritime superiority, the rapid buildup and
sustainment of supplies onshore, and uninterrupted support.”
65
Prior to the
onset of the conict, national defense mobilization would require preparing
the Chinese economy and society for a protracted conict, probably limiting
China’s ability to transition to a wartime footing without alerting Taiwan or
the United States to its intentions. Nevertheless, the PLA may aim to achieve
operational surprise through denial and deception eorts and through the
normalization of PLA operations, such as through routine deployments and
exercises around Taiwan, in the lead-up to war.
e campaign’s logistics requirements would be immense. Execu-
tion of the JILC carries signicant risk because of the PLAN’s limited in-
ventory of amphibious ships. Barring a major amphibious ship buildup,
lift constraints may compel the PLA to focus its assault on a single region
of Taiwan, such as the north, to quickly seize Taipei rather than conduct
a multipronged invasion. Such a scenario would almost certainly impose
132 Casey
additional requirements to seize or destroy key lines of communication,
such as major highways connecting the north and south of the island, to
limit Taiwan’s ability to reinforce its defenses in the north. e question
also remains of whether the PLA has been building amphibious lift opti-
mized for a Taiwan scenario: Military and Security Developments Involving
the People’s Republic of China 2020 points out that much of the PLAN’s re-
cent amphibious construction has focused on large multipurpose vessels
such as helicopter landing docks, which would become high-value targets
for enemy missiles and thus are more suited to expeditionary operations in
places like the South China Sea.
66
(For further analysis of these issues, see
the chapters by Conor Kennedy and Chieh Chung in this volume.)
Force preservation would also be a priority for PLA landing forces. Tai-
wan’s ability to destroy or degrade elements of the initial invasion force
would require second-echelon units to quickly land and secure critical in-
frastructure, particularly major ports, to ensure the timely ow of follow-on
forces and supplies while defending against Taiwan counterattacks. Closely
associated with this goal would be optimizing the campaign’s joint repower
strikes for self-preservation: failure could expose landing forces to adversary
air or missile strikes, thus jeopardizing the success of the entire campaign.
Joint Operations Headquarters Work highlights securing the “three domi-
nances” as critical to the campaign’s success because of the vulnerability of
amphibious forces to enemy long-range precision strikes.
67
A nal key campaign requirement would be to deter, degrade, or defeat
foreign military intervention. According to the 2001 AMS Science of Military
Strategy, key capabilities enabling success in the anti–air raid campaign in-
clude ISR and early warning, air and missile defenses, and long-range pre-
cision strikes.
68
Joint Operations Headquarters Work also describes eective
C2 and campaign planning as essential requirements, given the number of
forces involved and the size of the potential operating area.
69
ese require-
ments would tax PLA capabilities even under the most ideal conditions. e
worst-case scenario for PLA planners would be conducting high-intensity
operations against Taiwan, the United States, Japan, and other U.S. allies and
partners simultaneously. is type of ghting would require close coordina-
tion between all PLA services and multiple theaters, as well as overall cam-
paign supervision by the PLA high command.
70
PLA Campaigns for a Cross-Strait Conflict 133
Conclusion
is chapter has focused on the main doctrinal campaigns the PLA would
use to build operational plans for wartime contingencies involving Taiwan:
the JFSC, JBC, and JILC. e chapter outlined the political and military fac-
tors Chinese leaders would likely consider before deciding to undertake each
campaign; how the overall campaign would unfold based on available PLA
texts, operational constraints, and geographic realities; and the military re-
quirements the PLA describes as necessary for their successful execution.
Across all campaigns, the PLA highlights the need for logistics preparations
and campaign planning, eective C2 and joint coordination across the ser-
vices, situational awareness of the battlespace, and information operations.
While this chapter has not assessed the PLA’s current capabilities to
execute the above campaigns, it has identied certain limitations and vul-
nerabilities, such as immature command institutions and insucient am-
phibious lift. A primary variable in each scenario is potential intervention by
foreign military forces—specically, those of the United States. Much of the
PLA’s campaign planning and resources would be spent preparing to deter
intervention and limit escalation given this variable. Information operations
in the form of cyber, electronic warfare, and counterspace activities appear to
be key to deterring and defeating the “powerful adversary.”
71
New capabilities and missions almost certainly will drive the PLA to
complete new doctrinal campaigns. Military and Security Developments In-
volving the People’s Republic of China 2020 notes in a special topic on emerg-
ing campaign concepts:
e People’s Liberation Army . . . will likely need to update its existing doc-
trine, concepts, and campaigns to adapt to the long-term trends in global
military aairs, meet the [People’s Republic of China] evolving national
security needs, and account for signicant changes in the PLA’s structural
capabilities. Evolving campaign concepts will aim to advance the PLA’s
goal to become a fully modern and “informatized” force by 2035.
72
e report states that future campaigns will seek to integrate capabilities
across all domains, particularly counterspace capabilities brought to bear
by the Strategic Support Force, as well as potential forces stationed over-
seas. e PLA’s long-term goal of increasing its long-range precision strike
134 Casey
capabilities and air and naval presence outside the First Island Chain could
lead to campaigns that emphasize control over distant-sea operational areas
in support of the anti–air raid campaign. Any new campaigns or updates to
existing campaigns would likely be in the form of a new generation of “opera-
tional regulations” [zuozhan tiaoling, 作战条令]. e regulations are roughly
the equivalent to Western military doctrine, comprising “combat regulations”
[zhandou tiaoling, 战斗条令] and “campaign outlines” [zhanyi gangyao, 战役
纲要]. It appears the PLA delayed releasing its fth generation of regulations
(the fourth generation was published in 1999), perhaps due to bureaucratic
inghting or because the PLA hoped to rst complete the 2015 military re-
forms.
73
With the latest round of reforms completed or near completion, as
well as the CMC’s approval of a trial “Outline of Joint Operations for the Peo-
ple’s Liberation Army” in November 2020, new regulations and associated
campaigns likely should be expected within the next several years.
74
Finally, future analysis must consider the range of available PLA sources
given that much of the publicly available PLA literature is increasingly dat-
ed. Texts such as Science of Campaigns and Joint Operations Headquarters
Work are now a decade and a half old. e most recent AMS versions of Sci-
ence of Strategy is 8 years old.
75
at these latter sources mention campaigns
discussed in older texts helps conrm that the broad contours of these cam-
paigns continue to be relevant to contemporary PLA campaign planning.
PLA writings on topics such as informationization and systems confrontation
warfare are somewhat more recent. Future analysis on PLA doctrine must at-
tempt to leverage texts researched and published by institutions such as AMS
and NDU following PLA reforms launched in 2015. Translating these texts so
they are accessible to a wider audience must also be prioritized.
Notes
1
“Highlights of Xi’s Speech at Gathering Marking 40
th
Anniversary of Message to
Compatriots in Taiwan,” Xinhua, January 2, 2019, available at <http://www.xinhuanet.com/
english/2019-01/02/c_137715300.htm>.
2
John Wilson Lewis and Xue Litai, Imagined Enemies: China Prepares for Uncertain War
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2006), 10.
3
M. Taylor Fravel, Active Defense: China’s Military Strategy Since 1949 (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 2019), 209–210.
PLA Campaigns for a Cross-Strait Conflict 135
4
Zhang Yuliang, ed., Science of Campaigns [战役学] (Beijing: National Defense University
Press, 2006), 19.
5
Ibid., 500–522.
6
Ibid., 557–574.
7
Ibid., 271–291.
8
Ibid., 217.
9
Jiang Fanrang, ed., Joint Operations Headquarters Work [联合作战司令部工作] (Beijing:
Military Sciences Press, 2004), 189–191; Dang Chongmin and Zhang Yu, eds., Science of Joint
Operations [联合作战学] (Beijing: PLA Press, 2009), 205–312.
10
Phillip C. Saunders et al., eds., Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA: Assessing Chinese
Military Reforms (Washington, DC: NDU Press, 2019), 1–9.
11
Ibid.
12
Jiang, Joint Operations Headquarters Work, 189–191.
13
Edmund J. Burke et al., People’s Liberation Army Operational Concepts (Santa Monica,
CA: RAND, 2020), 6.
14
Shou Xiaosong, ed., Science of Strategy [战略学] (Beijing: Military Sciences Press, 2013),
124.
15
Ibid., 130.
16
Jerey Engstrom, Systems Confrontation and System Destruction Warfare: How the
Chinese People’s Liberation Army Seeks to Wage Modern Warfare (Santa Monica, CA: RAND,
2018), 1–3.
17
Burke et al., People’s Liberation Army Operational Concepts, 3.
18
Shou, Science of Strategy, 100.
19
Dennis J. Blasko, “e Chinese Military Speaks to Itself, Revealing Doubts,” War on
the Rocks, February 18, 2019, available at <https://warontherocks.com/2019/02/the-chinese-
military-speaks-to-itself-revealing-doubts/>; Military and Security Developments Involving
the People’s Republic of China 2020: Annual Report to Congress (Washington, DC: Oce of the
Secretary of Defense, 2020), i–ii.
20
Shou, Science of Strategy, 134–140; Xiao Tianliang, ed., Science of Strategy [战略学]
(Beijing: National Defense University Press, 2015), 121–123.
21
Alison A. Kaufman and Daniel M. Hartnett, Managing Conict: Examining Recent
PLA Writings on Escalation Control (Arlington, VA: CNA, 2016), 63–64; Military and Security
Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2020, 24.
22
Dang and Zhang, Science of Joint Operations, 173–174.
23
Peter Mattis, “A Guide to Chinese Intelligence Operations,” War on the Rocks, August
18, 2015, available at <https://warontherocks.com/2015/08/a-guide-to-chinese-intelligence-
operations/>.
24
Robert A. Pape, “e True Worth of Air Power,” Foreign Aairs (April–March 2004),
available at <https://www.foreignaairs.com/articles/2004-03-01/true-worth-air-power>.
25
Engstrom, Systems Confrontation and System Destruction Warfare, 121; Matthew Adam
Kocher, omas B. Pepinsky, and Stathis N. Kalyvas, “Aerial Bombing and Counterinsurgency in
the Vietnam War,” American Journal of Political Science 55, no. 2 (April 2011), 201–218.
26
Jiang, Joint Operations Headquarters Work, 331–341.
27
Zhang, Science of Campaigns, 84.
28
Ian Easton, e Chinese Invasion reat: Taiwan’s Defense and American Strategy in
Asia (Arlington, VA: Project 2049 Institute, 2017), 71–84.
136 Casey
29
Yu Jixun, ed., Science of Second Artillery Campaigns [第二炮兵战役学] (Beijing: PLA
Press, 2004), 336–338; Zhang, Science of Campaigns, 184.
30
Yu, Science of Second Artillery Campaigns, 319–320.
31
Ibid., 314; Zhang, Science of Campaigns, 361.
32
Dang and Zhang, Science of Joint Operations, 218–219.
33
Mark Stokes, Yang Kuang-shun, and Eric Lee, Preparing for the Nightmare: Readiness
and Ad Hoc Coalition Operations in the Taiwan Strait (Arlington, VA: Project 2049 Institute,
2020), 7.
34
Zhang, Science of Campaigns, 375.
35
Ibid., 292.
36
Ibid.
37
Xiao, Science of Strategy, 204.
38
Zhang, Science of Campaigns, 292.
39
Jiang, Joint Operations Headquarters Work, 17.
40
Joel Wuthnow, System Overload: Can China’s Military Be Distracted in a War over
Taiwan? China Strategic Perspectives No. 15 (Washington, DC: NDU Press, 2020), 10.
41
Zhang, Science of Campaigns, 297.
42
Jiang, Joint Operations Headquarters Work, 188.
43
Zhang, Science of Campaigns, 39.
44
Ibid., 340.
45
Ibid., 342.
46
Ibid., 304.
47
Jiang, Joint Operations Headquarters Work, 176.
48
Zhang, Science of Campaigns, 249, 349; Yu, Science of Second Artillery Campaigns, 140.
49
Zhang, Science of Campaigns, 331–348.
50
Jiang, Joint Operations Headquarters Work, 176.
51
Zhang, Science of Campaigns, 334.
52
Dang and Zhang, Science of Joint Operations, 226.
53
Easton, e Chinese Invasion reat, 93–113.
54
Ibid., 110–113.
55
Ministry of Foreign Aairs of the People’s Republic of China, “Full Text of Jiang Zemin’s
Report at the 16
th
Party Congress on Nov. 8, 2002,” November 18, 2002, available at < http://
www.china.org.cn/english/2002/Nov/49107.htm>; “Full Text of Hu’s Report at the 18
th
Party
Congress,” China Daily, November 18, 2012, available at <https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/
china/19thcpcnationalcongress/2012-11/18/content_29578562.htm>.
56
Fiona S. Cunningham and M. Taylor Fravel, “Dangerous Condence? Chinese Views on
Nuclear Escalation,” International Security 44, no. 2 (2019), 79.
57
Fiona S. Cunningham, “Maximizing Leverage: Explaining Strategic Force Postures in
Limited Wars” (Ph.D. diss., Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2018), 1–10.
58
Zhang, Science of Campaigns, 316–330.
59
Roderick Lee, “e PLA Navy’s ZHANLAN Training Series: Supporting Oensive Strike
on the High Seas,” China Brief, April 13, 2020, available at <https://jamestown.org/program/the-
pla-navys-zhanlan-training-series-supporting-oensive-strike-on-the-high-seas/>.
PLA Campaigns for a Cross-Strait Conflict 137
60
e PLAN Marine Corps recently established two combined arms brigades in the
Eastern eater, but its role in a Taiwan invasion is uncertain. For the next several years, it likely
will not be part of the main assault force, as the People’s Liberation Army’s Navy continues to
outt and train the new units. See Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s
Republic of China 2020, 48.
61
Ying-Yu Lin, “New Wine into New Wineskins: e Evolving Role of the PLA Navy Marine
Corps in Amphibious Warfare and Other Mission Areas,” China Brief 20, no. 2 (January 29, 2020),
available at <https://jamestown.org/program/new-wine-into-new-wineskins-the-evolving-
role-of-the-pla-navy-marine-corps-in-amphibious-warfare-and-other-mission-areas/>.
62
Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2020, 42.
63
Zhang, Science of Campaigns, 372.
64
Easton, e Chinese Invasion reat, 134–141.
65
Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2020, 114.
66
Ibid., 47.
67
Jiang, Joint Operations Headquarters Work, 213.
68
Peng Guangqian and Yao Youzhi, eds., Science of Military Strategy [战略学] (Beijing:
Military Science Publishing House, 2005 [English translation of 2001 publication]), 167.
69
Jiang, Joint Operations Headquarters Work, 242.
70
e Central Military Committee’s joint operations command center would likely
function as the command element representative of China’s highest wartime authority—the
Supreme Command consisting of senior-most political and military leaders.
71
Dennis J. Blasko, “China’s Evolving Approach to Strategic Deterrence,” in China’s
Evolving Military Strategy, ed. Joe McReynolds (Washington, DC: e Jamestown Foundation,
2016), 335–355.
72
Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2020, 163.
73
Elsa Kania, “e PLA’s Forthcoming Fifth-Generation Operational Regulations—
e Latest ‘Revolution in Doctrinal Aairs’?” China Brief 16, no. 7 (April 21, 2016), available
at <https://jamestown.org/program/the-plas-forthcoming-fth-generation-operational-
regulations-the-latest-revolution-in-doctrinal-aairs/>.
74
Ministry of National Defense of the People’s Republic of China, “Approved by Xi
Jinping, Chairman of the Central Military Commission, the Central Military Commission Issued
the ‘Outline of Joint Operations for the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (Trial),’” November 13,
2020, available at <http://www.mod.gov.cn/topnews/2020-11/13/content_4874081.htm>.
75
However, in 2020, the National Defense University issued a new, slightly updated
version of this book. e last major overhaul of the NDU version came in 2015.
CHAPTER 5
“Killing Rats in a Porcelain Shop”: PLA
Urban Warfare in a Taiwan Campaign
By
Sale Lilly
139
I
f China intends to complete a historic mission of recovering Taiwan,
which Beijing regards as a renegade province, the People’s Liberation
Army (PLA) must cross the Taiwan Strait, land on hostile shores, and
seize Taipei—the island’s capital and political center. To date, military and
academic scholarship on Taiwan contingency scenarios has emphasized PLA
capabilities to gain superiority in the air, sea, and subsurface approaches in
and around Taiwan before embarking on an amphibious assault force of the
island’s beaches.
1
However, Western scholarship, simulations, and wargames
tend not to consider what happens next: how urban warfare and other types
of post-landing operations might unfold.
Nevertheless, PLA views on operations following the initial assault may
be highly inuential in the decision to use force and in the outcome of an
island landing. A PLA that believes successful decapitation strikes are su-
cient to prevail in a Taiwan scenario may signicantly overestimate its pros-
pects for victory while underestimating the costs. U.S. leaders in 2003 and
Russian leadership in 1996 both seriously misjudged the will of urban popu-
lations to resist external governance established by military force in Iraq and
Chechnya, respectively. U.S. and Russian leaders also underestimated the
140 Lilly
long timelines that accompanied stability operations in urban areas. If the
past three decades of global combat operations on urban terrain are indica-
tive of the kinds of wars the PLA could face in the future, combat operations
could progress over months and years, not days and weeks.
It is telling that urban warfare is largely absent from the PLA literature,
including even longer doctrinal writings that cover campaigns aimed at the
conquest of Taiwan. While PLA sources acknowledge seizing cities as cen-
tral to eventual victory in a Taiwan contingency, the same sources often dis-
miss the task of subduing a modern military and the 24 million people the
PLA would have to govern or suppress in an urban occupation.
2
One PLA
source blithely advises troops, following a successful amphibious landing,
to “organize some force to thoroughly mop up the remnants of the enemy,
particularly those in the hidden areas inside the buildings and the under-
ground engineering facilities.”
3
is may be easier said than done. If “some
force” is an afterthought, then one would expect PLA thought, guidance,
and training on urban warfare to be relatively limited. However, if “some
force” is a more developed concept, then there should be evidence of PLA
thought and training on the matter.
is chapter nds that the PLA has been strongly developing its urban war-
fare capabilities since at least 2009, but it may have reached some wrong conclu-
sions about the prospects for a rapid victory in an urban conict with Taiwan.
PLA writings suggest a focus on foreign cases of rapid tactical success, especially
U.S. experiences in Iraq and Syria. ese writings also downplay the protracted
insurgencies that followed those initial victories and ignore cases in which the
oensive side suered setbacks. And while the PLA has conducted extensive
training and even oriented two of its three urban warfare training bases toward
Taiwan scenarios, it has still focused on decapitation strikes rather than coun-
terinsurgency. e evidence also suggests that the People’s Armed Police (PAP),
which has gained counterinsurgency experience in Xinjiang, would likely be
employed in Taiwan only after a permissive environment was established.
is chapter is divided into four main parts. e rst section provides an
overview of PLA concepts of urban warfare and analyzes periods of height-
ened PLA interest in this topic over the past two decades. e second section
utilizes ocial PLA publications to identify the foreign urban warfare exam-
ples the PLA has focused on, and the lessons drawn by PLA authors from those
PLA Urban Warfare in a Taiwan Campaign 141
experiences. e third section reviews publicly disclosed PLA training events
that have featured urban warfare components and considers the extent to
which these scenarios have resembled the conditions the PLA might face in
a cross-strait operation. is section also examines how PLA urban warfare
exercises have matured since the establishment of a dedicated urban warfare
exercise site in 2009. e nal section summarizes the key ndings and de-
rives implications for PLA operations, U.S. policy, and further research.
PLA History and Definitions of Urban Warfare
When explaining the development of the PLA’s recently built Military Oper-
ations on Urban Terrain (MOUT) facility and urban warfare doctrine review,
Division Commander Wang Bin characterized the diculties of contesting
control of a city by reciting the idiom of “killing rats in a porcelain shop”
[ciqidian li da laoshu, 瓷器店里打老鼠].
4
is expression captures both the
brutality of urban warfare and the caution the “rat killer” should exercise in
preserving the “porcelain.” e phrase was reportedly coined by PLA 3
rd
Field
Army Commander Chen Yi during the campaign to take Shanghai from the
Nationalist Army in the spring of 1949.
5
In the 2-week battle, the PLA cap-
tured Shanghai while preventing the destruction of the city, eectively killing
rats while not breaking too much porcelain in the process. Urban warfare, in
short, is not a new concept for the PLA; similar caution would be warranted
in trying to wrest control of Taiwan from urban defenders.
PLA publications use nuanced but somewhat inconsistent language
when addressing urban warfare. A review of articles and news releases
from 2000 to 2020 generated by the Ministry of National Defense, PLA Dai-
ly, the PLA’s public-facing Web site 81.cn, and PLA authors publishing in
journals indexed in the China National Knowledge Infrastructure database
indicates that the PLA utilizes four terms as synonyms of urban warfare
or city warfare [chengshi zuozhan, 城市作战]. PLA authors also include
several subordinate but not mutually exclusive terms (for example, under-
ground warfare in urban locations such as shopping centers and parking
facilities). Some PLA discussions also include the terms drone warfare,
electro-magnetic warfare, and sniper warfare in an urban warfare context.
Figure 1 identies the major terms that accompany PLA urban warfare
texts, and table 1 provides brief denitions.
142 Lilly
e frequency of PLA publications on urban warfare over time also oers
clues as to when the Chinese military has paid special attention to this topic.
Figure 2 illustrates the annual number of PLA mentions of four urban warfare
terms between 2000 and 2020: urban warfare, street ghting, urban oensive,
and city oense-defense. Two apparent spikes in attention occur in 2004–2005
and 2016–2019. It is tempting, given the timing, to attribute these spikes to
negative trends in Taiwan; after all, the independence-leaning Democratic
Progressive Party of Taiwan won major presidential victories in both periods.
However, analysis of primary source documents indicates that both
spikes reected increased PLA attention to U.S. operations in the Middle
East and had little to do with developments across the Taiwan Strait. e rst
spike, in 2004–2005, can be attributed to PLA case studies of U.S. urban war-
fare experiences in the early stages of the Iraq War, in particular the battle of
Baghdad and the rst and second battles of Fallujah. e second spike, in
2016–2019, reects a combination of Chinese observations of U.S. urban war-
fare during the multiyear battle of Aleppo in Syria and the battle of Mosul in
Iraq. Moreover, a simple content review suggests a maturation of PLA thought
on urban warfare, shifting from topical reporting to greater introspection on
how PLA soldiers ght in urban spaces.
Urban Warfare
[城市作战]
Street Fighting
[巷战]
Urban Offense
[城市进攻]
City Offense-Defense
[城镇攻防]
Underground Warfare [地下战]
Megacity Warfare [超大城市战]
Night Warfare [夜战]
Tunnel Warfare [地道战]
Barricade Combat [街垒战斗]
Figure 1. Select PLA Urban Warfare Terms and Hierarchy of Use
Sources: 81.cn, mod.gov.cn, PLA Daily, and China National Knowledge Infrastructure publications
sponsored by affiliated People’s Liberation Army entities.
PLA Urban Warfare in a Taiwan Campaign 143
Table 1. PLA Urban Warfare Terms and Subordinate Concepts Defined
Terms
Urban warfare [chengshi zuozhan, 城市作战]. A doctrinal term, and the most
generic term employed in PLA use, formally defined as combat operations in urban
areas, and divided into urban offensive and urban defensive operations.
*
The term
encompasses PLA foreign military experiences or study as well as counterterror-
ism scenarios on urban terrain.
Street fighting [xiangzhan, 巷战]. Not a doctrinal term but formally acknowledged
in some PLA publications as depicting “tenacious resistance.”
†
In the context of
PLA and pro-PLA military blogs, the term helps cue the audience toward the bru-
tality required to achieve capture of an urban target, often in describing Russian,
Israeli, or American experiences in urban warfare.
‡
Urban offense [chengshi jingong,城市进攻]. A doctrinal term, formally defined
as “an offensive campaign against enemies who rely on the defense of the city
and its periphery.”
§
Often used in lieu of the term urban warfare (even though the
general term includes a category of defensive operations), when PLA publications
are describing a PLA training evolution or study emphasis. Does not cover foreign
military experiences in urban warfare, and the term most likely to be employed in
discussing the capture of Taipei or other Taiwan cities.
City offense-defense [chengzhen gongfang, 城镇攻防]. Not a doctrinal term, al-
though often used interchangeably with urban offense. Nuanced use includes pub-
lications on PLA training evolutions where a dedicated opposition force provides
a defensive opposition to the PLA unit practicing Military Operations on Urban
Terrain, presumably because both units benefit from training on urban terrain. Not
employed to describe foreign militaries or counterterrorism on urban terrain.
Subordinate Concepts
Underground warfare [dixia zhan, 地下战]. Distinct from tunnel warfare and
military constructed underground facilities (UGF), this term encompasses
commercial, civilian, and local government facilities, such as subway lines and
underground shopping centers.
¶
Megacity warfare [chaoda chengshi zhan, 超大城市战]. Urban warfare that takes
place in sprawling city metropolises that include populations of 10 million or more. PLA
authors often cite U.S. Army publications in attempting to define this term and treat
megacity warfare as a special case of urban warfare and as a general global trend.
**
Night warfare [ye zhan, 夜战]. Combat in darkness and highlighted by use of night-vi-
sion equipment, infrared, and lasers.
††
PLA urban warfare publications also identify
the city as an artificial cause of darkness, including the interior of powerless buildings,
underground shopping facilities, and so forth, and as perhaps a necessary but undesir-
able consequence of having launched “paralyzing” attacks against an enemy.
‡‡
144 Lilly
The PLA’s (Misguided) Lessons from Iraq
What has the PLA learned from the U.S. urban warfare experience? While
Western scholars widely acknowledge that U.S. conduct in the 1991 Gulf War
heavily inuenced PLA strategic thinking on joint and systems warfare, less
well known is the impact of the 2003 battle of Baghdad and the 2004 sec-
ond battle of Fallujah on PLA strategic thought.
6
Nevertheless, as discussed
already, PLA authors have been preoccupied with these two battles.
7
Evi-
dence suggests that PLA urban warfare analysts believe the battle of Bagh-
dad demonstrated that a mechanized force can quickly seize an opponent’s
capital with relatively few casualties. ere is also evidence that the PLA in-
terpreted the outcome of the second battle of Fallujah, which occurred only
1 year after the fall of Baghdad, as proof that an active urban insurgency can
be quickly isolated and crushed.
8
Chinese authors describe that battle as “the
Tunnel warfare [didao zhan, 地道战]. Used in conjunction with more traditional
concepts of military bunkers, tunnels, and UGF. Term also used to describe urban
combat environments such as Stalingrad and Aleppo where combatants excavate
tunnels to facilitate combat resupply.
Barricade combat [jielei zhandou, 街垒战斗]. Combat through and on obstacles
in urban pathways to “create conditions for the development of offensives along
the streets.”
§§
Notes:
*
Academy of Military Sciences [军事科学院] (AMS), PLA Dictionary of Military Terminology [中国
人民解放军军语] (Beijing: Military Sciences Press, 2011), 73.
†
Ibid., 135.
‡
Ren Ruijuan [任瑞娟], “The Chinese Army Must Attach Great Importance to the Study of Urban
Warfare” [中国军队须高度重视城市战研究], PLA Daily [解放军报], January 15, 2008, available at
<http://military.china.com.cn/txt/2008-01/15/content_9534439.htm>.
§
AMS, PLA Dictionary of Military Terminology, 110.
¶
Shi Chunmin [石纯民] and Dong Jianmin [董建敏], “Underground Space: A Key Battlefield for
Future Wars” [地下空间:未来战争的关键战场], China National Defense News [中国国防报],
October 18, 2018, available at <http://www.mod.gov.cn/jmsd/2018-10/18/content_4826976.htm>.
**
Huang Anwei [皇安伟], Xiao Huixin [肖慧鑫], and Xin Juntao [辛军涛], “Megacity Subway System
Defense” [超大城市地铁系统防护研究], National Defense [国防], No. 9 (2019), 77.
††
AMS, PLA Dictionary of Military Terminology, 77.
‡‡
Wang Wang [王王] and Wang Hangdong [王航东], “A Preliminary Study on Physical and Mental
Adaptability Training in Urban Underground Space Combat Environment” [城市地下空间作战环境
身心适应性训练初探 ], Journal of Military Physical Education and Sports [军事体育学报] 36, no. 3
(2017), 8.
§§
AMS, PLA Dictionary of Military Terminology, 676.
PLA Urban Warfare in a Taiwan Campaign 145
largest, shortest, and most eective urban combat operation carried out by
the U.S. military after the Vietnam War.”
9
PLA authors correctly observed the near-term tactical success of these U.S.
operations; however, they failed to grasp their aftermath. e second battle of
Fallujah points to success for the oensive side, but only in contrast to the rst
battle of Fallujah, in which U.S. forces attempted and failed to secure the city
with an economy of force operation. PLA interpretations of the battle of Bagh-
dad are also rose-colored, in that various authors assess the collapse of the
sitting government as a mechanized game of “capture the ag,” with campaign
victory conditions equivalent to reaching a destination. ese interpretations
ignore that the U.S. war experience in Iraq from 2003 to 2011 was without a
clear victory, with resistance intensifying over time, increasing casualties
in occupation to stabilization forces, and a worrying tactical trend wherein
mechanized armor was exposed to asymmetric threats such as improvised ex-
plosive devices.
10
PLA authors similarly describe Saddam Hussein’s rapid fall
in 2003 as an example of “beheading” via special forces, allowing an aggressor
to “cut o the head of a snake” [qieduan shetou, 切断蛇头].
11
at the 2003
fall of Baghdad ended only one brief phase of the war and opened an almost
decade-long second phase seems to be of negligible interest to PLA authors.
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
Urban warfare (offensive), street fight from 81.cn
PLA Daily articles on urban warfare, urban offensive ops and street fighting
CNKI articles on urban warfare per year
Figure 2. Open-Source PLA Citations of Urban Warfare Themes
Sources: 81.cn, mod.gov.cn, PLA Daily, and China National Knowledge Infrastructure publications
sponsored by affiliated People’s Liberation Army entities.
146 Lilly
Read dierently, PLA writers’ perceptions of successful U.S. urban war-
fare experiences in Iraq could represent the style of campaign the PLA hopes
to execute following an amphibious landing on Taiwan. If the PLA leadership
has absorbed similar lessons from recent U.S. urban contests, then they al-
most certainly know that these conicts can last months, if not years. Based
on the available PLA literature, one can conclude that the only urban warfare
the PLA intends to ght is the kind that lasts a few days. Perhaps that is why
one author urges the PLA to view the second battle of Fallujah, a battle fought
in the span of 2 weeks, as an urban warfare archetype.
12
PLA scholars, by con-
trast, focus much less on the lessons from less successful, protracted conicts
in places such as Mogadishu, Grozny, and Vietnam—signaling that they do
not believe the PLA intends to face such situations.
Yet the PLA’s preoccupation with the “quick victory” cases of Baghdad
and Fallujah ignores realities that could make a battle for Taipei more compli-
cated. Both the battle of Baghdad and the second battle of Fallujah occurred
in relatively permissive environments where the U.S. military used time to
its favor to build friendly forces, execute information operations to gain the
support of local civilians, and, in the case of Fallujah, conduct blocking move-
ments to halt defender resupply.
13
ere is no reason to believe that, in a sce-
nario in which time is of the essence—either to counter U.S. intervention or to
minimize the window during which the international community might rally
to the cause of the defender—the PLA would have the same time advantages
credited to the U.S. military in Baghdad and Fallujah.
e dierences in campaign scale between Taipei and the two coalition
urban warfare battles in Iraq are also signicant. e larger Taipei urban re-
gion encompasses Taipei, New Taipei City, and Taoyuan, including a popu-
lation of around 10 million as of 2021. is region meets one of the common
thresholds for the term megacity and is approximately twice the size of Bagh-
dad’s population in 2003 and perhaps 20 times the size of Fallujah’s popula-
tion in 2004. Problems such as refugee ows and insurgencies may intensify
as the base population increases.
Taiwan’s manmade vertical expanses above and below sea level place
even more demands on those planning for urban warfare. For the Syrian
and Iraqi urban battleelds, the multilevel buildings that dominated the
cities could still be characterized as “low-rise.”
14
As average building height
PLA Urban Warfare in a Taiwan Campaign 147
increases, a range of urban combat considerations may become relevant,
such as tank barrel azimuth suitability and helicopter vulnerability. In ad-
dition to the height of Taipei’s skyscrapers, subterranean commercial struc-
tures, including parking garages, underground shopping centers, and metros,
greatly expand the combat areas for urban warfare, posing unique challenges
to an invader and providing substantial space for a defender to resist aggres-
sion.
15
In sum, a review of PLA writings indicates that the Chinese military has
closely observed urban conicts across the globe but may have drawn incom-
plete ndings or the wrong lessons for an urban conict specic to Taiwan.
PLA Urban Warfare Training: An Incipient Focus on Taiwan
While there are relatively few explicit mentions of a Taiwan urban warfare
scenario in PLA sources, evidence suggests this scenario has inuenced
recent Military Operations on Urban Terrain training. Analysis of PLA ur-
ban warfare publications provides details on urban warfare exercise tempo
and sometimes on specic MOUT facility locations. Since at least 2009, the
PLA has used dedicated MOUT spaces in at least three locations: the main
MOUT facility within the greater Zhurihe Training Base [zhurihe xunlian
jidi, 朱日和训练基地] in Inner Mongolia, which has been used since 2009;
a potential pilot or legacy facility at Yanshan [yanshan, 燕山] that may still
be available for smaller scale MOUT exercises in mountainous terrains;
and, perhaps most relevant for a Taiwan scenario, a mock city complete
with “a library, coee shop, and power plant” located at a “certain training
eld in Northern Jiangsu” mentioned in a PLA video distributed on JS7TV
and Zhihu.com in 2020.
16
e MOUT training calendar seems to have annual exercises incorpo-
rated into the larger Stride series of exercises located at Zhurihe. Outside of
these exercises, which receive annual pro forma reporting, typically during
the summer months, there are mentions of urban warfare–focused training
exercises, sometimes directly associated with “urban oense.” MOUT exer-
cises are sometimes carried out during multinational training events focused
on counterterrorism, such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization Peace
Mission exercises.
17
Based on the exercises the PLA chose to publicize, there
is a clear evolution in terms of size, as well as a geographic expansion of mil-
itary units that receive priority training beyond the Beijing-based brigades
147
148 Lilly
that seemed to receive early emphasis from 2008 to 2015. A summary of these
exercises is provided in table 2.
It is unclear if the 2020 exercise at the Jiangsu MOUT facility represents
a to-be-determined exercise slate and whether any additional facilities
were developed. A possible motive is that Jiangsu is better situated by mili-
tary region, climate, and unit needs to support MOUT operations in Taiwan
compared with the MOUT facilities at Zhurihe. (Inner Mongolia sits in the
Central Asia Plateau, is mainly grassland and desert, and is subject to at least
3 months of snow and freezing temperatures.
18
e location is thus ideal for
artillery drills but cannot simulate Taiwan’s subtropical climate and moun-
tainous geography.) e Jiangsu MOUT facility also reects a focus on real-
istic training for a Taiwan scenario. Limited reporting indicates that the PLA
Table 2. Select PLA Urban Warfare Training Exercises, 2008–2020
Training
Evolution
*
Participating Units
(Theater Command)
Location Urban Warfare
Term(s)
Employed
2008: Urban
Warfare Study
Group, Pilot
†
Mountain Warfare Brigade–
Tongbai Mountain Guerrillas
‡
Yanshan Urban warfare,
street fighting,
urban offense
2009: Zhurihe
MOUT
Inauguration
Unnamed Beijing motorized
infantry brigade, with PLAAF,
PLARF, and PAP units of
unmentioned sizes
Zhurihe
Training Base
Urban warfare,
urban offense
Peace Mission
2014
Multinational-Shanghai
Cooperation Organization
partners, SOF detachment
Zhurihe
Training Base
Urban warfare,
street fighting
Stride 2015-B,
C
§
Unnamed Beijing motorized
infantry brigade with
subordinate army aviation
and SOF detachment
Zhurihe
Training Base
Urban warfare,
street fighting
Stride 2017
¶
80
th
Army Group–“Storm
Group” (Northern); 81
st
Army Group-“Prairie
Wolves” (Central); both
motorized infantry brigades
Zhurihe
Training Base
Urban offense
PLA Urban Warfare in a Taiwan Campaign 149
Training
Evolution
*
Participating Units
(Theater Command)
Location Urban Warfare
Term(s)
Employed
2018:
Unnamed
**
79
th
Army Group (Northern)
Aviation Brigade
Liaoning
Province
Urban warfare
Stride 2018
††
81
st
Army Group (Central) Zhurihe
Training Base
Urban offense
Stride 2019-A
‡‡
Unnamed brigade-size unit Zhurihe
Training Base
Urban offense
2020: Unnamed 73
rd
Army Group (Eastern) Jiangsu
Province
MOUT Facility
City offense-
defense
Key: MOUT: Military Operations on Urban Terrain; PAP: People’s Armed Police; PLAAF: PLA Air Force;
PLARF: PLA Rocket Force; SOF: special operations forces.
Notes:
*
Only some evolutions were mentioned by exercise iteration in a calendar year: 2019-A, 2015-C,
and so forth.
†
“The Beijing Military Region Group Army Organized Modern Urban Offensive Combat Exercises”
[北京军区集团军组织现代城市进攻作战演练], PLA Daily [解放军报], August 23, 2009, available at
<http://mil.news.sina.com.cn/2009-08-23/0627563459.html>.
‡
Division Commander Wang Bin stated that he had repurposed a mountain warfare unit to fulfill
a March 2008 request by the Beijing Military Region to simulate realistic urban warfare scenarios.
The unit was identified as the Tongbai Mountain Guerrillas [tongbaishan youji dui, 桐柏山游击队].
The location Yanshan may have been intentional or incidental to the exercise based on the units’
parent command.
§
Wu Yuanjin [武元晋], “Urban Combat, New Combat Forces Are Emerging: Review of the Exercise
‘Stride-2015 Zhurihe C’ by a Motorized Infantry Brigade of the Beijing Military Region” [城市作战, 新
型作战力量初露锋芒-北京军区某摩步旅“跨越-2015·朱日和C”演习复盘见闻], PLA Daily [解放军
报], July 21, 2015, available at <http://news.mod.gov.cn/action/2015-07/21/content_4601789.htm>.
¶
Li Tianpeng [李天鹏], “‘Stride–2017 Zhurihe’: A Thousand-Word Summary of the ‘Storm
Force’ Battalion Commander” [“跨越—2017·朱日和”-“暴风雨部队” 营长的千字总结], China
Military Online [中国军网], September 21, 2017, available at <http://www.81.cn/syjdt/2017-09/21/
content_7765024.htm>.
**
Hao Hailong [郝海龙], “The Iron Wings Whirl, the ‘Battlefield’ Goes from the Wilderness to the
City” [铁翼飞旋 “战场” 由荒原到城区], PLA Daily [解放军报], February 25, 2018, available at <http://
www.81.cn/jfjbmap/content/2018-02/25/content_200236.htm>.
††
“‘Stride–2018 Zhurihe’ Exercise Begins” [“跨越-2018·朱日和”演习拉开战幕], PLA Daily [解放
军], July 23, 2018, available at <http://www.xinhuanet.com/mil/2018-07/23/c_129918673.htm>.
‡‡
“‘Stride-2019 Zhurihe A’ A Certain Army Brigade Accepts Battlefield Inspection for the First Time
as a Red and Blue Dual Identity” [“跨越-2019·朱日和A” 陆军某旅首次以红蓝双重身份接受战场检
验], PLA Daily [解放军报], July 12, 2019, available at <http://www.81.cn/jmywyl/2019-07/12>.
150 Lilly
has adopted more realistic urban warfare features, using many of the urban
battleeld debris training aids initially employed by the U.S. Army’s Zussman
Urban Combat Training Center at Fort Knox, Kentucky.
19
Despite its dissimilarities with Taiwan, Zhurihe remains valuable due
to the presence of mock-ups of key Taipei sites, including Taiwan’s Presi-
dential Oce Building and possibly the Legislative Yuan.
20
ese buildings
will likely have special relevance for practicing the decapitation strikes the
PLA believes are critical in replicating the initial U.S. successes in Bagh-
dad.
21
If strategic signaling were Beijing’s only goal, it would seem un-
necessary for the PLA to upgrade what already appears to be a credible
reproduction of the “head of the snake,” though some have cast these de-
velopments as potential evidence of an entrepreneurial service (the PLA)
proving its relevance amid competition for funds and signicance.
22
PLA
leadership, which has often been urged by Xi Jinping to make military
training more combat-realistic, may have been moved to make further ur-
ban warfare investments.
23
In total, the Taipei urban replicas can be viewed
as one element of a multipart urban warfare training capability that is re-
quired to authentically develop urban warfare capabilities.
China’s PAP has also prepared for urban warfare scenarios, but its role in
a Taiwan contingency is less clear than that of the PLA. e PAP has gained
experience in urban operations in Xinjiang and Hong Kong.
24
ese opera-
tions have similarities in mission proles that could include counterterror-
ism operations, special operations forces or SWAT-like police capabilities,
riot or crowd control, and other broadly dened force protection measures.
25
At a March 2021 inspection of the 2
nd
Mobile Contingent Headquarters—a
unit that might have support responsibilities for a PLA invasion of Taiwan
26
—
in Fuzhou City, Fujian Province, Xi and Central Military Commission Vice
Chairman Xu Qiliang observed a demonstration of the PAP performing many
tactical pieces of urban combat.
27
While Xi’s visit emphasizes the importance placed on the PAP in support-
ing the PLA, it is the latter’s job to ght and win wars. Notably, in the 200 PLA
sources reviewed for this chapter, the PAP was not mentioned once as a con-
tributing force. Additionally, analogous reasoning from the PLA’s preferred
case studies—Baghdad and Fallujah—does not mention the U.S. military’s
use of National Guard units. e National Guard’s role is not identical to that
PLA Urban Warfare in a Taiwan Campaign 151
of the PAP within China’s armed forces. However, the concept of relief in place
for urban operations, which has been explored extensively in the U.S. experi-
ences in Iraq and Afghanistan, goes unmentioned in existing PLA coverage of
the battles.
28
If the PAP is to be relevant in Taiwan, its utility and experience,
drawn from places such as Xinjiang and Tibet, would seem to be most useful
after the PLA has secured a victory and is anticipating a long occupation. e
PAP appears less relevant during, and immediately after, the initial assault on
Taiwan. e PLA reckoning on the likelihood of either of those scenarios may
be driving this relative silence on the PAP and urban warfare.
Conclusion
is chapter has identied three key ndings from a review of the PLA’s
scholarly reection on urban combat and its public record of urban warfare
exercises. First, PLA scholarship suggests a preoccupation with conicts that
were relatively short and successful for the attacker. Yet drawing lessons from
cases such as Baghdad and Fallujah does not accurately represent the vast
majority of urban warfare experiences in the 20
th
and 21
st
centuries. e expe-
rience of oensive armies in multiple urban warfare conicts, such as the rst
and second battles of Grozny, Hue City, and Aleppo, suggests that battles oc-
cur over weeks, if not months. In addition, the PLA’s emphasis on U.S. tactical
success in these cases ignores that U.S. and coalition forces fought for years
afterward to secure these cities despite material and technological advantag-
es. In one conict (Baghdad), successful decapitation strikes seemed to play
little or no role in preventing a multiyear conict.
Second, the PLA is building a dedicated urban warfare capability. De-
veloping training facilities specically for this purpose began with a pilot or
test capability MOUT facility and expanded to include a designated space
at the PLA’s Inner Mongolia training facility and an urban warfare mock-up
in Jiangsu Province. PLA urban combat capabilities are nurtured by at least
annual training exercises that include elements of decapitation strikes and
block-to-block ghting with armored and dismounted infantry forces.
ird, the PLA’s urban warfare capability appears increasingly directed
at Taiwan. At least two of the PLA’s three MOUT facilities could be associ-
ated with simulating conditions on Taiwan. e Zhurihe facility possesses
credible replicas of Taipei’s key political sites (reecting the focus on quick
152 Lilly
decapitation strikes), and the Northern Jiangsu facility is situated in the PLA’s
Eastern eater Command and bears resemblance to the island in terms of
topology and climate. While the PLA might need to conduct additional urban
warfare scenarios, including noncombatant evacuation operations in a far-
ung location, stability operations in a possible Korean Peninsula crisis, and
urban operations in locations such as Xinjiang, evidence indicates that PLA
urban combat training is increasingly oriented toward Taiwan.
ese ndings have implications for wargaming, policy, PLA studies,
and Taiwan’s military readiness. First, Taiwan scenario wargaming should
take urban conict settings into account. Many publicly available wargame
discussions include multiphase Taiwan contingencies that model conict in
the land, sea, and air domains. However, these studies usually treat the land
as synonymous with Taiwan’s beaches. As the PLA builds a credible urban
warfare combat capability, it will be increasingly important to examine how
defenders can repulse an aggressor force attempting to transition through
warfare disciplines (for example, amphibious to urban, jungle to urban) to
test assumptions about PLA actions and defender responses. Modeling ur-
ban combat for unclassied discussions may be dicult, but commercially
available systems have already been used by the U.S. military to introduce
urban warfare mechanics as a part of professional military education.
29
ese
games could also examine the propensity for Taiwan’s population to resist an
occupying force and include sensitivity analysis for comprehensive, partial,
or scant support for starting and sustaining armed resistance.
Second, PLA attempts to modernize its urban warfare capabilities have
implications for U.S. scientic and technological cooperation with China.
As one example, this chapter’s literature review found mention of PLA ur-
ban warfare requirements for a tactical method to employ radar “that can
penetrate brick walls, wooden doors, rubble and other non-metal obstacles
to detect human life characteristics” to better identify and defeat embedded
defenders.
30
In that light, discussions on China’s eorts to acquire foreign
technologies might be viewed dierently. China’s military research insti-
tutes have participated in four iterations of the International Radar Con-
ference, which has been held in China and to which Western and Japanese
academics have been invited to present research ndings on such topics
as “Radars for Non-Contact Vital Sign Detection,” a call for papers that
PLA Urban Warfare in a Taiwan Campaign 153
included an interest in “ru-Wall Detection Radar,” and a demonstration
night titled “Human Activity Classication with Radar.”
31
ere are certainly
nonmilitary uses for wall-penetrating radar in humanitarian and disaster
relief. However, considering a stated PLA military need and the PLA’s par-
ticipation at these types of events, increased professional caution should be
exercised when sharing ndings that could provide a technological solution
to kill a Taiwanese defender.
32
ird, future research should address several questions about the
PLA’s ability to integrate urban warfare into larger plans for cross-strait op-
erations. For instance, what force and unit structure could the PLA employ
to conduct urban warfare operations in Taiwan? Identifying these forces
is important for two reasons. First, the identied unit and echelon could
illuminate the equipment, repower, and doctrine these soldiers bring to
the ght. Second, there is an opportunity to compare PLA depictions of
an amphibious landing package with the units the PLA intends to use to
seize Taiwan’s cities. Do the force compositions match? If not, what could
explain the lack of urban warfare forces in the amphibious group? e an-
swers have implications for predicting whether protracted on-island op-
erations may unfold in ways that are not benecial for a force hoping to
achieve a fait accompli or quick recognition of the People’s Republic of
China’s sovereignty over Taiwan.
Another set of questions concerns the fungibility of PLA forces. If Bei-
jing has identied battalion-size landing units as optimal for Taiwan inva-
sion scenarios, with “three infantry companies, three amphibious assault
vehicle/tank companies, one air defense company, and one anti-tank com-
pany,”
33
then a key question for the PLA is how eectively these units could
be reconstituted into ones capable of conducting urban operations. Due to
the weight and size restrictions for amphibious vehicles moving on sand and
gravel, there are inherent limitations in the mobile protected repower assets
identied as “necessary” to win modern urban warfare battles.
34
Given recent
evidence from Syria and eastern Ukraine, stando infantry weapons and light
armored vehicles—the exact type mentioned in a potential PLA amphibious
landing package—are insucient to succeed in modern urban warfare.
35
Will
these lessons be something the PLA learns only in defeat, or can it adapt to
this feature of urban warfare prior to the onset of hostilities? is is only one
154 Lilly
issue that will determine whether the PLA can realize its vision of rapid urban
operations to subdue the enemy.
Fourth, those responsible for ensuring Taiwan’s military readiness
could take PLA urban warfare preparations as an opportunity to rethink
the capacity in which the island’s military and civilian populations are
prepared for national defense. Conformal military design—the concept of
integrating sensor and weapons functionality into the natural contours of
military ships and aircraft—could be extended to urban landscape design.
Much the same way that modern or aesthetically designed heavy-base ce-
ment pots or planters have become standard antiterrorism force protection
barriers in the U.S. Capitol region and other sensitive areas, Taiwan’s urban
design could (or may already) contain design features that complicate an
invading force’s mobility. For example, the 2018 unnamed PLA urban avia-
tion exercise near Liaoning specically mentioned attempts to land rotary
aircraft on high-rise buildings, suggesting that hazards to rotors, perhaps
conformal to urban needs, could represent an approach to making urban
warfare more hazardous to an invader.
Another consideration for Taiwan’s military readiness is the extent to
which the population could readily adopt conventional munitions and com-
mercial technology to resist an invader. As coalition forces in Iraq experienced
from 2004 to 2011, conventional military ordnance, dispersed in the early days
of conict, combined with modern retail electronics and ingenuity, helped
create a lethal and eective improvised explosive device campaign to harass,
ambush, and assault coalition vehicle movements. e hundreds of motorcy-
cle and scooter repair shops that abound on the streets of Taipei today serve a
relevant commercial function. But the same metal crimpers, spooled copper
wire, batteries, and multitools that serve repair work today are not all that dif-
ferent from the materials used in the improvised explosive device workshops
of Fallujah or Kandahar. Providing Taiwan’s military or military reservists with
basic insurgency techniques and training may also be a way to signal the is-
land’s resolve to complicate and extend any invasion time frame well beyond
a few days of conict. In a test of wills, the Chinese Communist Party may need
to ask itself if the PLA is able and willing to begin such a ght in which the en-
emy may be willing to destroy the “porcelain shop.”
PLA Urban Warfare in a Taiwan Campaign 155
Notes
1
David A. Shlapak, David T. Orletsky, and Barry A. Wilson, Dire Strait? Military Aspects
of the China-Taiwan Confrontation and Options for U.S. Policy (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2000),
12; Steve Tsang, If China Attacks Taiwan: Military Strategy, Politics, and Economics (London:
Routledge, 2006); Timothy R. Heath, Chinese Political and Military inking Regarding Taiwan
and the East and South China Seas (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2017), available at <https://www.
rand.org/pubs/testimonies/CT470.html>.
2
Sun Longhai [孙龙海], Cao Zhengrong [曹正荣], and Yang Ying [杨颖], Informatized
Army Operations [信息化陆军作战] (Beijing: National Defense University Press, 2014), 173, 179,
191.
3
Ibid., 205, 206.
4
“e Beijing Military Region Group Army Organized Modern Urban Oensive Combat
Exercises” [北京军区集团军组织现代城市进攻作战演练], PLA Daily [解放军报], August 23,
2009, available at <http://mil.news.sina.com.cn/2009-08-23/0627563459.html>.
5
“Chen Yi: Liberation of Shanghai Was Like ‘Killing Rats in a Porcelain Shop’” [陈毅: 解放
上海就像 ‘瓷器店里打老鼠’], People’s Daily, May 27, 2009, available at <http://cpc.people.com.
cn/GB/64162/64172/85037/85039/5991763.html>.
6
Dean Cheng, “Chinese Lessons from the Gulf Wars,” in Chinese Lessons from Other
Peoples’ Wars, ed. Andrew Scobell, David Lai, and Roy Kamphausen (Carlisle, PA: Strategic
Studies Institute, 2011), 153, 168–170.
7
See Li Jiufeng [李久峰], “A Classic of City-Siege Warfare: A Perspective on Fallujah’s
Operation ‘Phantom Fury’” [城市攻坚战的不老经典—费卢杰 “幻影愤怒” 行动透视], Military
Digest [军事文摘] (2019), 55.
8
See Liu Peng [刘鹏], “Stones of Other Mountains—Fierce Battle of Fallujah: Classic
Cases of U.S. Army Urban Warfare” [他山之石- 激战费卢杰: 美军城市作战经典战例], Sina
Military Aairs, May 28, 2018, available at <http://mil.news.sina.com.cn/2018-05-28/doc-
ihcaquev4225234.shtml>.
9
Li, “A Classic of City-Siege Warfare,” 55.
10
Andrew J. Bacevich, e Limits of Power: e End of American Exceptionalism (New
York: Henry Holt and Company, 2008), 157.
11
Ren Ruijuan [任瑞娟], “e Chinese Army Must Attach Great Importance to the Study
of Urban Warfare” [中国军队须高度重视城市战研究], PLA Daily [解放军报], January 15, 2008,
available at <http://military.china.com.cn/txt/2008-01/15/content_9534439.htm>.
12
Xia Wei [夏维] et al., “Using the Second Battle of Fallujah as a Blueprint to Promote
Modern Urban Warfare Research” [以第二次费卢杰战役为蓝本推动现代城市作战研究],
Conmilit [现代军事], November 5, 2016, 86.
13
Gian Gentile et al., Reimagining the Character of Urban Operations for the U.S. Army
(Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2017), 65–67.
14
Haider J.E. Al-Saaidy and Dhirgham Alobaydi, “Studying Street Centrality and Human
Density in Dierent Urban Forms in Baghdad, Iraq,” Ain Shams Engineering Journal 12, no. 1
(March 2021), 1111, 1113.
15
Public polling in Taiwan over the past 20 years has indicated a range of assessments on
its citizens’ will to ght in the event of an invasion by the People’s Republic of China. See Russell
Hsiao, “What Would Taiwan Do If China Invaded?” National Interest, April 24, 2018, available at
<https://nationalinterest.org/feature/what-would-taiwan-do-if-china-invaded-25542>.
156 Lilly
16
Video from a September 2020 posting used the phrase certain training eld in Northern
Jiangsu [苏北某训练] 地基. “Red and Blue Confrontation Tests the Oensive and Defensive
Capabilities of the Combined Forces in Cities and Towns” [陆军第73集团军某合成旅: 红蓝对
抗检验合成部队城镇攻防能力], PLA TV Web [中国军视网], video, 3:36, September 24, 2020,
available at <http://www.js7tv.cn/video/202009_230306.html>.
17
“Chinese Special Operation Members in Urban Anti-Terrorism Training,” China
Military Online, August 26, 2014, available at <http://www.ecns.cn/visual/2014/08-26/131543.
shtml>.
18
Yongfei Bai et al., “Primary Production and Rain Use Eciency Across a Precipitation
Gradient on the Mongolia Plateau,” Ecology 89, no. 8 (August 2008), 2140–2153.
19
Feng Fei [冯非] et al., “A Combined Brigade of the 73
rd
Army Group”; Michael
Behlin, 3
rd
Sustainment Command (Expeditionary) Public Aairs, “19
th
Engineers Conduct
Platoon Certication Exercise,” Army.mil, June 14, 2011, available at <https://www.army.mil/
article/59574/19th_engineers_conduct_platoon_certication_exercise>.
20
Victor Robert Lee, “Satellite Imagery: China Staging Mock Invasion of Taiwan?” e
Diplomat, August 9, 2015, available at <https://thediplomat.com/2015/08/satellite-imagery-
from-china-suggests-mock-invasion-of-taiwan/>. Comparisons of Zhurihe public overhead
imagery between August 9, 2015, when e Diplomat reported on the mock attack on the
presidential oce, and 2020 indicate a possible expansion of fabrications that might include a
building representing the size and general orientation of the Legislative Yuan.
21
Ren, “e Chinese Army Must Attach Great Importance to the Study of Urban Warfare.”
22
Greg Austin, “China’s Military Trains for Taiwan Invasion with Mock-Ups,” e
Diplomat, August 11, 2015, available at <https://thediplomat.com/2015/08/chinas-military-
trains-for-taiwan-invasion-with-mock-ups/>.
23
Dennis J. Blasko, “e Chinese Military Speaks to Itself, Revealing Doubts,” War on
the Rocks, February 18, 2019, available at <https://warontherocks.com/2019/02/the-chinese-
military-speaks-to-itself-revealing-doubts/>.
24
Greg Torode, “Exclusive: China’s Internal Security Force on Frontlines of Hong Kong
Protests,” Reuters, March 18, 2020, available at <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-hongkong-
protests-military-exclusive/exclusive-chinas-internal-security-force-on-frontlines-of-hong-
kong-protests-idUSKBN2150JZ>.
25
Joel Wuthnow, China’s Other Army: e People’s Armed Police in an Era of Reform,
China Strategic Perspectives No. 14 (Washington, DC: NDU Press, 2019), 21.
26
Ibid., 13.
27
China Global Television Network, “Xi Instructs Armed Police to Enhance Military
Training, Combat Readiness,” CCTV, March 26, 2021, available at <https://www.cctvplus.com/
news/20210326/8183713.shtml>.
28
Larry Minear, “e U.S. Citizen-Soldier and the Global War on Terror: e National
Guard Experience” (master’s thesis, Tufts University, 2007), 13–15.
29
James Lacey, “How Does the Next Great Power Conict Play Out? Lessons from a
Wargame,” War on the Rocks, April 22, 2019, available at <https://warontherocks.com/2019/04/
how-does-the-next-great-power-conict-play-out-lessons-from-a-wargame/>.
30
Han Qinggui, “Adapt to the Characteristics of Urban Operations and Continuously
Improve the Level of Weaponry and Equipment” [适应城市作战特点不断提升武器装备能力建
设水平], National Defense [国防], no. 1 (2018), 78.
31
See Institute of Engineering and Technology International Radar Conference 2020
“Call for Papers,” available at <http://www.ietradar.org/down/CFP.pdf>.
PLA Urban Warfare in a Taiwan Campaign 157
32
e 2015 International Radar Conference held in Hangzhou, China, supported nine
papers on wall-penetrating radar, four of which included authors aliated with the People’s
Liberation Army. All are available at <https://digital-library.theiet.org/content/conferences/
cp677>.
33
Ian Easton, e Chinese Invasion reat: Taiwan’s Defense and American Strategy in
Asia (Manchester: Eastbridge Books, 2019), 337.
34
Gentile et al., Reimagining the Character of Urban Operations for the U.S. Army, xi.
35
Ibid., 60–62.
III
Chinese Forces and the Impact of Reform
CHAPTER 6
PLA Army and Marine Corps Amphibious
Brigades in a Post-Reform Military
Joshua Arostegui
161
T
here is much speculation about a potential Chinese invasion of Tai-
wan, but whether the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) can achieve
victory will ultimately depend on the quantity and quality of its am-
phibious forces. e dierence between PLA Army (PLAA) and PLA Navy
Marine Corps (PLANMC) amphibious units has become increasingly clear
following the 2017 reforms to PLA organizations at the corps level and be-
low. While much analytic attention has been paid to the expanded and more
expeditionary-focused PLANMC, the transition of two PLAA amphibious
mechanized infantry divisions and a single amphibious armor brigade into
six amphibious combined arms brigades demonstrates renewed emphasis
on Taiwan and lays the foundation for actual warghting capabilities. Al-
though each service now maintains six amphibious-capable brigades, the
dierences in organization, command structure, equipment, and training
represent the varying directions the PLAA and PLA Navy (PLAN) are taking
in preparing for future landing operations.
According to the U.S. Department of Defense report Military and Se-
curity Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2020, the
PLA has 12 brigades available to conduct amphibious operations in a joint
162 Arostegui
island landing campaign against Taiwan.
1
e PLANMC, however, has far
fewer amphibious heavy combined arms battalions than those within the
PLAA’s six amphibious brigades. is disparity does not represent a lack of
PLANMC combat power but exemplies a force designed and equipped for
securing Chinese overseas interests in a wide range of environments be-
yond the Taiwan Strait. To enable such planned operations, the PLANMC
added lighter and more mobile battalions as part of a transition from am-
phibious to multidimensional brigades.
2
In contrast, the PLAA remains focused on cross-strait operations. e
2017 reforms pushed enough combat power down to the 24 PLAA amphibious
combined arms battalions so that each battalion now has nearly as much com-
bat support capacity as its mechanized infantry regiment predecessor. e six
PLAA amphibious brigades are fully standardized and similarly equipped and
designed to execute opposed landings using previous division-regiment doc-
trine at smaller scales. us, the transformation from the division-regiment
to the brigade-battalion construct does not signify changes at the strategic
campaign level as much as at the operational and tactical levels. According
to the PLA, the attened chain of command enables lower echelon leaders to
execute landing operations with more initiative and independence.
3
However,
the PLAA amphibious brigades’ size and heavy equipment require adequate
naval transport that currently exists in limited numbers and a robust logistics
capability that remains untested. Without sucient PLAN medium and heavy
lift, the PLAA amphibious brigades are at best a tool for deterrence, enabling
China to inuence the outlook of Taiwan and regional competitors with in-
creased publicity of amphibious brigades’ training operations tempo.
is chapter develops these arguments in four main sections. e rst
discusses the restructure of PLAA and PLANMC amphibious units following
the 2017 force-wide reform. e second section outlines the possible roles
of the PLA’s amphibious units in a Taiwan island-landing campaign. e
third details how PLA amphibious unit exercises and training have become
more extensive and complex following the 2017 reform. e fourth section
provides insight into the potential challenges that PLA amphibious units face
in carrying out landing operations because of the restructure. Each section
is based on a foundation of ocial PLA media sources, military texts, and
journal articles, while materials from the U.S. Government and professional
PLA Amphibious Brigades in a Post-Reform Military 163
corporations such as Jane’s Information Group (Janes) assist with in-depth
understanding of system and force capabilities.
PLAA and PLANMC Brigade Reorganization
Following decades of both successful and unsuccessful island landings, the
PLA has long recognized the need to maintain capable amphibious forces. Suc-
cessful near-shore island-landing operations in 1955, along with the seizure of
the Vietnam-occupied Paracel Islands in 1974, demonstrated the PLA’s willing-
ness to execute joint landing operations under relatively favorable conditions.
However, the PLA’s inability to cross the Taiwan Strait to defeat Chiang Kai-
shek’s Nationalists in and after 1949 remains the ultimate reminder that Beijing
requires a competent and sizable amphibious capability to achieve reunica-
tion by force.
4
is mission resulted in the establishment of permanent PLA
amphibious forces that have been restructured multiple times. is section
details the latest reforms to both the PLAA and PLANMC amphibious units.
e New PLAA Amphibious Brigade
e PLA’s rst fully amphibious unit was a short-lived marine division estab-
lished in 1954. After its disbanding in 1957, the PLA lacked dedicated amphib-
ious units until 1980, when the PLAN’s 1
st
Marine Brigade was established.
5
Nearly 20 years later, the PLAN created the 164
th
Marine Brigade from an army
division, while around the same time the PLAA transitioned the historic 1
st
Motorized Infantry Division, 1
st
Group Army,
6
Nanjing Military Region, into
the 1
st
Amphibious Mechanized Infantry Division (hereafter referred to as am-
phibious division). e 124
th
Amphibious Division, 42
nd
Group Army, Guang-
zhou Military Region, appeared not long after. ese two divisions, along with
the existing 14
th
Armor Brigade, 31
st
Group Army, Nanjing Military Region,
constituted the only mechanized amphibious forces in the PLAA.
7
Figure 1
provides an organizational overview of the former PLAA amphibious division.
Following the 2017 PLA “below the neck” reforms, the two amphibious divi-
sions split into four amphibious combined arms brigades, while the amphibious
armor brigade and elements from motorized infantry units transitioned into an-
other two amphibious combined arms brigades. Each of the new brigades, like
its division predecessors, fell under group armies within the PLA Eastern e-
ater Command (located across from Taiwan) and the adjacent Southern eater
164 Arostegui
Command.
8
e new amphibious brigades pushed most of the same capabili-
ties that existed in the earlier construct down to the battalion level, allowing the
PLAA to retain its amphibious doctrine and tactics, techniques, and procedures
(TTPs).
9
Table 1 and gure 2 outline the theater command and group army or-
ganization of the amphibious brigades according to Janes.
10
e new PLAA amphibious brigade, made up of approximately 5,000 sol-
diers, is a variant of the new heavy combined arms brigade modeled after the
U.S. Army’s Armored Brigade Combat Team.
11
Table 2 and gure 3 detail the
organization, equipment, and elements of the new amphibious brigade.
12
e new PLAA combined arms brigade is a modular formation that provides
the commander interchangeable combat and functional support battalions and
companies to build mission-specic operational units. e amphibious bri-
gade’s battalions also mirror the group army’s organization, improving its ability
Figure 1. Former PLAA Amphibious Mechanized Infantry Division
Amphibious
Mechanized
Infantry Division
155mm Howitzer
Battalion
AAA Battalion
122mm Howitzer
Battalion
AAA Battalion
122mm Howitzer
Battalion
Surface-to-Air
Missile Battalion
122mm Rocket
Artillery Battalion
Artillery
Battalion
Anti-Tank
Battalion
Amphibious
Mechanized
Infantry Battalion
Amphibious
Mechanized
Infantry Battalion
Artillery
Battalion
Amphibious
Mechanized
Infantry Regiment
Amphibious
Mechanized
Infantry Regiment
Amphibious
Armor Regiment
Artillery
Regiment
Air Defense
Regiment
Reconnaissance
Battalion
Signal Battalion
Engineer &
Chemical Defense
Battalion
Amphibious
Armor Battalion
Amphibious
Armor Battalion
Amphibious
Armor Battalion
Amphibious
Mechanized
Infantry Battalion
Amphibious
Mechanized
Infantry Battalion
Amphibious
Mechanized
Infantry Battalion
Artillery
Battalion
Amphibious
Mechanized
Infantry Battalion
Amphibious
Mechanized
Infantry Battalion
PLA Amphibious Brigades in a Post-Reform Military 165
to call on corps-level res, intelligence and reconnaissance, and other capa-
bilities. e plug-and-play modularity of the PLAA amphibious brigade- and
corps-level force structure is also reected in its four amphibious combined
arms battalions, which improves tactical combat power generation.
13
Figure 2. Post-2017 PLAA Group Army Structure
Key:
BDE = Brigade
CA = Combined arms
5
th
Amphibious
CA BDE
72
nd
Group Army 73
rd
Group Army 74
th
Group Army
72
nd
Artillery
BDE
3
rd
Light
CA BDE
73
rd
Artillery
BDE
1
st
Amphibious
CA BDE
74
th
Artillery
BDE
10
th
Heavy
CA BDE
72
nd
Air Defense
BDE
14
th
Amphibious
CA BDE
73
rd
Air Defense
BDE
16
th
Heavy
CA BDE
74
th
Air Defense
BDE
34
th
Medium
CA BDE
72
nd
Army
Aviation BDE
86
th
Heavy
CA BDE
73
rd
Army
Aviation BDE
125
th
Amphibious
CA BDE
74
th
Army
Aviation BDE
85
th
Medium
CA BDE
72
nd
Special
Operations BDE
91
st
Amphibious
CA BDE
73
rd
Special
Operations BDE
132
nd
Light
CA BDE
74
th
Special
Operations BDE
90
th
Light
CA BDE
72
nd
Service
Support BDE
92
nd
Light
CA BDE
73
rd
Engineer &
Chemical Defense
BDE
154
th
Light
CA BDE
74
th
Service
Support BDE
124
th
Amphibious
CA BDE
72
nd
Engineer
BDE
145
th
Medium
CA BDE
73
rd
Service
Support BDE
164
rd
Light
CA BDE
74
th
Engineer
BDE
72
nd
Chemical
Defense BDE
74
th
Chemical
Defense BDE
Table 1. Post-2017 PLAA Amphibious Brigades
Theater Command Group Army Amphibious Brigade Garrison
Eastern
72
nd
5
th
Combined Arms
Hangzhou
124
th
Combined Arms
73
rd
14
th
Combined Arms
Zhangzhou
91
st
Combined Arms
Southern 74
th
1
st
Combined Arms
Guangzhou
125
th
Combined Arms
166 Arostegui
In PLAA island-landing operations, the brigade is responsible for a land-
ing section [denglu diduan, 登陆地段] with multiple battalion landing points
[denglu dian, 登陆点].
14
e new amphibious combined arms battalion is
better equipped and organized to execute the mission against a landing point
compared with its single service arm battalion predecessor, which required the
Table 2. PLAA Amphibious Brigade Equipment/Elements
Battalion Equipment/Elements
Combined Arms BN x 4
Amphibious 105mm assault guns
Amphibious IFVs
Amphibious APCs
Amphibious engineering vehicles
Heavy mortar elements
Air defense elements with MANPADS
Reconnaissance elements
Reconnaissance BN
Amphibious reconnaissance vehicles with UAVs
Technical reconnaissance troops
Artillery BN
Amphibious 122mm howitzers
Tracked 122mm rocket artillery
Tracked anti-tank guided missile systems
Air Defense BN
Tracked AAA systems
Tracked short-range SAM systems
MANPADS
Operational Support BN
Command and control systems
Electronic warfare systems
Engineering platforms
Chemical defense platforms
Security elements
Service Support BN
Logistics elements
Medical support elements
Equipment repair and maintenance elements
Key: APC: armored personnel carrier; BN: battalion; IFV: infantry fighting vehicle; MANPADS:
man-portable air-defense system; SAM: surface-to-air missile: UAV: unmanned aerial vehicle.
PLA Amphibious Brigades in a Post-Reform Military 167
creation of temporary combined arms formations. Table 3 contrasts the new
amphibious combined arms battalion with its pre-restructure equivalents.
15
e New PLANMC Brigade
At the same time as the new PLAA structure became clear, the PLANMC ex-
panded from two to six marine brigades, in addition to a new special opera-
tions forces (SOF) brigade and an aviation brigade. Along with establishing
a PLANMC headquarters and removing the rst two brigades from the com-
mand of the PLAN South Sea Fleet, the four new brigades were construct-
ed from PLAA coastal defense units and an infantry brigade, providing the
PLAN’s naval infantry with troops trained in littoral combat, while the SOF
and aviation brigades were built from standing PLAN units.
16
Figure 3. PLAA Amphibious Combined Arms Battalion Organization
Table 3. Pre- and Post-Reform Amphibious Battalion Structure
Amphibious
Maneuver
Battalion Type
Amphibious
Assault
Vehicles
Amphibious
IFVs
Organic Artillery
and Air Defense
Organic
Engineering
Organic
Reconnais-
sance
Pre-reform
Amphibious
Mechanized
Infantry Battalion
Task-
assigned
31 IFVs
(3 companies)
6 100mm mortars
(2 platoons)
Task-assigned from regiment
Pre-reform
Amphibious
Armor Battalion
31 assault
guns
(3 companies)
Task-
assigned
Task-assigned
Current
Amphibious
Combined Arms
Battalion
28 assault
guns
(2 companies)
28 IFVs
(2 companies)
6 100mm mortars
(2 platoons);
4 MANPADS
(1 platoon)
1 platoon 1 platoon
Key: IFV: infantry fighting vehicle; MANPADS: man-portable air-defense system.
Amphibious 105mm Assault Gun Company
Amphibious 105mm Assault Gun Company
Amphibious Mechanized Infantry Company
Amphibious Mechanized Infantry Company
Firepower Company
Service Support Company
168 Arostegui
Before 2017, the two original PLANMC brigades shared the same struc-
ture and were both primarily focused on South China Sea and conventional
amphibious operations.
17
Each PLANMC brigade included four light infantry
battalions and combat support battalions, as well as an organic amphibious
armor regiment that included an amphibious tank battalion, two amphibious
armored infantry battalions, and a self-propelled howitzer battalion.
18
After
the restructure, all PLANMC brigades took on organizations similar to their
PLAA combined arms brigade counterparts.
e PLANMC chain of command, nevertheless, is dierent from a PLAA
group army. e PLANMC headquarters, a corps-level command located
in Guangdong Province, falls directly under the PLAN headquarters rather
than a theater command. e PLANMC’s unique chain of command, with
garrisons along the entire Chinese coast, indicates that it is a national-level
strategic asset like the PLA Air Force (PLAAF) Airborne Corps. Based on this
command structure, it is unlikely that the PLANMC or PLAAF Airborne Corps
will ever be deployed as a complete unit like a PLAA group army, but rather in
reinforced brigades or smaller elements.
19
Following the 2017 expansion and the deployment of PLANMC units to
the PLA’s base in Djibouti, the PLAN’s naval infantry component appears to
be Beijing’s choice for joint expeditionary operations abroad, while main-
taining some capability for small reef and island operations in the South
China Sea and expanding its training to additional regions and climates. e
PLANMC is moving toward a lighter force structure that would also optimize
its capacity for nonwar military activities, especially those that protect Chi-
na’s overseas interests,
but would limit its use to small island operations or
auxiliary roles in a large-scale campaign against Taiwan.
20
Unlike the PLAA amphibious brigades, the six new PLANMC brigades
are neither standardized nor designed to t into a group army–centric is-
land-landing group. Little is known about some of the newest PLANMC
brigades, particularly those that transitioned from PLAA coastal defense
units. Although the 1
st
and 2
nd
brigades remain fully equipped with the
Type-05 tracked amphibious series of vehicles and smaller numbers of
wheeled mechanized chassis, three of the four new brigades appear to be
equipped dierently.
21
Table 4 details the known equipment holdings for
each PLANMC brigade.
22
PLA Amphibious Brigades in a Post-Reform Military 169
Table 4. PLANMC Equipment
Brigade Known Equipment
1
st
Type-05 heavy amphibious tracked chassis;
Type-09 8x8 wheeled chassis
*
2
nd
Type-05 heavy amphibious tracked chassis;
Type-09 8x8 wheeled chassis
†
3
rd
Type-09 8x8 wheeled chassis
‡
4
th
Type-09 8x8 wheeled chassis
§
5
th
Type-09 8x8 wheeled chassis
¶
6
th
Type-05 amphibious tracked chassis;
Type-09 8x8 wheeled chassis;
Lynx 8x8 all-terrain vehicle
Notes:
*
“Under the Guidance of Xi Jinping’s Thoughts on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics—
New Era, New Methods, New Chapter—Forging a Powerful Force that Can Quickly Respond to All
Areas” [在习近平新时代中国特色社会主义思想指引下一新时代新作为新篇章 锻造合成多
能快速反应全域运用的精兵劲旅], CCTV [央视网], October 14, 2020, available at <https://tv.cctv.
com/2020/10/14/VIDEJa9VkX29qsf5U1agxiHG201014.shtml>. The video shows elements of a PLA
Navy Marine Corps Tiger Brigade, an honorific for the 1st PLANMC Brigade. The brigade in Djibouti
operates Type-09 wheeled vehicles. It is unclear if those vehicles are also found in the brigade’s
table of equipment in China.
†
Song Xin [宋歆], “‘Blade Warriors’: Always Following Orders and Waiting for Peace”
[“刀锋战士”: 时刻听从号令, 为和平而守候], China Military Online [中国军网], September 9, 2019,
available at <http://www.81.cn/tzjy/2019-09/09/content_9615797.htm>. The 2nd PLANMC Brigade showed
a mechanized infantry company with Type-09 platforms participating in peacekeeping training.
‡
“A Certain PLANMC Brigade: Implement the Spirit of the Plenary Session and Strive to be a Pioneer
in Transformation” [海军陆战队某旅: 贯彻全会精神 争做转型先锋], China Military TV Online [中国
军视网], November 23, 2020, available at <http://www.js7tv.cn/video/202011_234913.html>.
§
“Direct Fire Training Range—The Marine Corps Kicked off with a ‘Good Start’ with Live Firing and
New Equipment” [直击演训场海军陆战队实弹射击新装备打响 “开门红”], CCTV [央视网], July 12,
2020, available at <https://tv.cctv.com/2020/07/12/VIDEw5Cg3mFAHPCKwmcvRCoi200712.shtml>.
¶
People’s Navy Official WeChat Microblog [人民海军官方微信], “Marine Corps, You’re So
Handsome!” [海军陆战队, 你真帅!], WeChat [微信], October 17, 2020, available at <https://mp.weixin.
qq.com/s/vSJZCcNaZcjkp2iisvwaEQ>.
170 Arostegui
e 6
th
PLANMC Brigade appears to have at least three dierent types of
battalions: heavy amphibious, medium wheeled, and light air assault. If the
6
th
Brigade is a model for the other brigades, the PLANMC would be able to
eld a future force package equipped for both amphibious operations and
nonwar military activities. However, based on existing amphibious opera-
tions doctrine, the brigade’s limited number of heavy armored amphibious
platforms would make a PLANMC brigade unsuitable as a rst echelon main
landing force during an opposed Taiwan landing.
e PLAA and PLANMC’s primary amphibious armored vehicle, the
Type-05 series, has no parallel in foreign military forces. e Type-05 vehicle
series, which was developed solely for amphibious landing operations, pro-
vides a PLA landing force with a universal armored combat platform able to
swim long distances. e Type-05 series consists of three primary maneuver
and res platforms, detailed in table 5.
23
According to Janes, the following variants of the Type-05 are also eld-
ed in the PLAA and PLANMC: armored personnel carrier, armored recovery
vehicle, command and control vehicle, artillery command vehicle, commu-
nications vehicle, armored breaching vehicle, and reconnaissance vehicle.
24
Although the Type-05 series has been elded to most of the PLAA amphibious
brigades, some units are still equipped with rst-generation equipment, such
as the Type-63A light amphibious tank.
25
e Type-09 8x8 wheeled vehicles—
including the ZBL-09 infantry ghting vehicle and the ZTL-11 105-millimeter
Table 5. PLAA and PLANMC Vehicles
Platform Type Weapons Crew Capacity
ZBD-05 IFV 30mm cannon;
7.62mm MG;
HJ-73 ATGM
3 crew + 8 infantry
ZLT-05
(also called ZTD-05)
Assault
gun
105mm gun;
12.7mm MG;
7.62mm MG
4
PLZ-07B Howitzer 122mm gun;
12.7mm MG
5
Key: ATGM: anti-tank guided missile; IFV: infantry fighting vehicle; MG: machine gun.
PLA Amphibious Brigades in a Post-Reform Military 171
assault gun, found in nonamphibious PLAA brigades and in each PLANMC
brigade—are designed to be capable of amphibious operations, though their
aoat speed is signicantly slower than that of the Type-05.
26
With the unique
capabilities each type of amphibious vehicle brings to the force, the post-re-
structure PLAA and PLANMC amphibious brigades are equipped to carry out
a wide range of similar missions diering in scale and force projection.
PLA Amphibious Unit Role in Joint Blockade and
Island Landing Campaigns
e PLA’s 2013 Science of Military Strategy lists participation in large-scale op-
erations to preserve national unity in the “main strategic direction” [zhuyao
zhanlüe fangxiang, 主要战略方向], a reference to the Taiwan Strait, as the rst
of several strategic missions for the PLAA.
27
As the primary ground component
in a large-scale joint operation, the text species that the PLAA would need to
participate in blockade and control operations, repower strikes, island-land-
ing operations, and defensive operations (for a description of the primary
cross-strait campaigns, see Michael Casey’s chapter in this volume). Most im-
portant, the document claries that the PLAA will assault beaches, conduct
on-island assaults, assault fortied positions in urban areas, and participate in
postconict stabilization operations in joint island-landing operations.
Various pre-reform PLAA operational art texts assessed that the PLANMC
brigades would play roles in opening up sea lines and securing landing points
for the PLAA amphibious division breakthrough as an initial landing force.
28
While the original two PLANMC brigades were adequately outtted with heavy
amphibious platforms to perform these roles, the structure of the new PLANMC
brigades indicates that the PLAN does not intend to use its naval infantry as an
initial landing force in a joint island landing campaign against Taiwan. e new
brigades, however, do provide the PLAN with some capabilities to participate in
island-blockade operations and small-scale actions that support a landing cam-
paign. e following sections describe how PLAA and PLANMC units would
participate in both a joint island blockade and joint island landing campaign.
Joint Island Blockade Campaign
e PLA’s 2009 Science of Army Operations describes island blockade and
control operations implicitly targeting Taiwan as a high-priority mission for
172 Arostegui
the PLAA.
29
PLAA contributions to an island blockade include not only ki-
netic and nonkinetic res to assist the PLAN and PLAAF but also maneuver
forces to land on key oshore islands. e army’s role in a joint island block-
ade campaign is to help cut o Taiwan’s economic and military ties with the
outside world, thereby isolating and intimidating the government into sub-
mission and creating favorable conditions for follow-on landing operations.
30
e new PLAA amphibious brigades and the more established PLANMC
brigades are well suited for island blockade operations. Science of Army Oper-
ations notes that ground forces participate in four phases of island blockade
operations: deploying forces and posturing for combat, paralyzing the ene-
my and seizing control over the blockaded area, implementing a sustainable
blockade to gradually weaken and exhaust the enemy, and combining strikes
and defensive actions to defeat the enemy’s counterblockade oensives.
31
In the deployment phase, PLAA amphibious brigades in the 72
nd
and 73
rd
group armies are already garrisoned in locations that enable rapid maneuver
to Chinese coastlines adjacent to the Taiwan Strait.
32
While the PLAN, PLAAF,
PLA Rocket Force, and PLA Strategic Support Force focus long-range and
strategic capabilities against Taiwan, the repower and amphibious landing
assets of the PLAA and PLANMC could deliver landing forces to Taiwan’s
oshore islands such as Jinmen and Matsu. e PLAA amphibious brigades,
once in place, could use their organic reconnaissance and electronic war-
fare systems to maintain situational awareness on these islands, while the air
defense battalion could provide point defense of key command and control
hubs for PLAA units participating in the blockade operations.
In the paralysis phase, the PLAA amphibious brigades are also cong-
ured to participate in a joint repower strike. PLAA amphibious brigades
have a strong advantage over PLANMC brigades in this respect. PLAA am-
phibious brigade howitzers and rocket artillery have the range and accuracy
to suppress tactical defensive targets on Jinmen and much of the Matsu Is-
lands.
33
While all PLANMC brigades maintain re support battalions, not all
are equipped with self-propelled chassis. It is unclear if PLANMC brigades
have rocket artillery, which would limit their organic res to tube artillery.
e new PLAA amphibious brigades could also play a role in information
dominance in this phase through their new organic electronic warfare com-
pany, a capability the PLANMC apparently lacks.
34
PLA Amphibious Brigades in a Post-Reform Military 173
e paralysis phase also includes seizure of Taiwan’s smaller oshore is-
lands to disrupt counterblockade operations and conne the movement of
enemy ships and planes.
35
e PLAA views near-shore island oensive oper-
ations as “three-dimensional” missions to capture a portion of large islands
or entire smaller islands. ese operations would likely be PLAA-centric and
require minimal participation of the other services. Near-shore operations
would allow PLAA amphibious brigades to land without the need for trans-
port vessels because PLAA amphibious brigade assets, such as the Type-05
series vehicles, are able to swim from coast to island in suitable weather and
sea states. PLAA small island-landing doctrine also calls for air assault units to
secure key positions.
36
Because PLAA SOF brigades and light combined arms
brigades train for air mobility operations with army aviation brigades, units
from the same group army could be used for rear area landings and close air
support. e PLANMC would almost certainly rely on joint support for similar
operations despite some brigades maintaining organic air assault assets.
Joint Island Landing Campaign
If given the order to reunify Taiwan through military means, the PLAA would
take the lead in breaking through the enemy’s coastal defenses, establishing
a beachhead, destroying and repelling entrenched defenders, and creating
favorable conditions for second-echelon forces. Science of Army Operations
notes that this large-scale campaign would occur only after political and dip-
lomatic eorts were exhausted and would be used to devastate separatist forc-
es while attempting to limit unnecessary civilian casualties and preserving
civilian infrastructure. According to the text, based on the Taiwan Strait’s mon-
soon and typhoon seasons, a period between late March and late April or late
September to mid-October would be most suitable for a landing operation.
37
Science of Campaigns notes that a landing campaign could normally be divid-
ed into three major phases: advance operations, embarkation and sea-cross-
ing, and assault onto land to establish a landing site; however, passages from
the PLA’s Army Combined Arms Tactics Under Informationized Conditions
provide more specic details about the sea-crossing and landing phases.
38
Advance Operations. A joint repower strike, as part of the advance
operations phase of the landing campaign, is carried out concurrently
with attempts to gain information, sea, and air dominance.
39
Neither PLAA
174 Arostegui
amphibious brigades nor PLANMC brigades are designed and equipped for
participation in this phase of operations, except for providing limited point
air defense capabilities. Both brigade types lack long-range repower and
electronic warfare systems capable of reaching Taiwan’s shores, and they are
not designed to carry out antiship res.
Embarkation and Sea-Crossing. e PLAA’s capability to participate
in the embarkation and sea-crossing phase of the island-landing campaign
was greatly improved with the conversion of amphibious divisions into am-
phibious brigades. Following the 2017 restructure, the amphibious brigades
centralized all their subordinate battalions into one location, allowing for im-
proved mobilization timelines. e PLAA amphibious brigades are now stra-
tegically garrisoned near ports of embarkation to facilitate rapid movement
to their assembly areas and loading onto amphibious-capable vessels. is
positioning limits their exposure to enemy res during the pivotal loading
and transport phases, especially if executed during nighttime.
40
e PLAA amphibious brigade is equipped to provide its own point air
defense system at loading zones. e amphibious brigade’s air defense bat-
talion and combined arms battalion assets could provide short-range protec-
tion for the embarkation area and at sea, complementing PLAN, PLAAF, and
PLAA medium- to long-range air defense systems.
41
PLANMC brigades are also located near major ports of embarkation,
which ensures minimal diculty in moving the units to their loading zones.
Although PLANMC brigades have air defense battalions, they appear to be
primarily equipped with older towed anti-aircraft artillery guns. ese weap-
ons could serve as close-range point air defense but lack the range, accuracy,
and mobility of equipment currently elded in PLAA amphibious brigades.
is deciency would leave these PLANMC brigades reliant on higher eche-
lon PLAN and PLAAF air defense systems.
Selection of Landing Sections and Points. Modern PLAA amphibi-
ous brigades are equipped to assault a wider landing section compared
with their smaller regimental predecessors. An amphibious brigade com-
mander could assign 2 amphibious combined arms battalions (56 amphib-
ious assault guns and 56 amphibious infantry ghting vehicles) to defeat
2 defending companies on a 2- to 4-kilometer (km) front—an objective
previously assigned to a reinforced amphibious infantry regiment (93
PLA Amphibious Brigades in a Post-Reform Military 175
amphibious infantry ghting vehicles and at least 1 company of task-as-
signed amphibious assault guns).
42
In the pre-reform PLAA, amphibious landing battalions concentrated on
landing points with a width of 0.5 to 1 km.
43
Now, an amphibious brigade com-
mander can transfer brigade-echelon elements down to the combined arms
battalions to increase combat power against the main landing point while en-
suring that the secondary landing point and reserve combined arms battal-
ions remain in close enough proximity for mutual support within the landing
section.
44
An individual amphibious combined arms battalion now likely has
an expanded landing point width of 1.5 to 2 km, which would make the bri-
gade landing section an approximately 3- to 4-km front. If accurate, two am-
phibious brigades could land in an area roughly the same as a division.
Troop Allocation and Deployment. According to the PLA’s Army Com-
bined Arms Tactics Under Informationized Conditions, the commander of one
of the PLAA’s former amphibious divisions would utilize 10 primary groups in 3
to 5 assault waves.
45
e new amphibious brigade’s modular structure enables
the same operational group structure as its division predecessor (see table 6).
New PLANMC brigades lack many of the self-propelled weapons systems and
access to corps-level aviation assets required for a similar organization.
Table 6. PLAA Amphibious Brigade Landing Groups
Group Mission Amphibious
Division Unit
Assigned
Amphibious
Brigade
Equivalent
Advance
Landing
Group
Get ashore first to seize key
points; provide reconnais-
sance to landing units
Task-assigned:
one SOF BN or two
PLANMC BNs
Reconnaissance
BN and com-
bined arms BN
reconnaissance
platoons
Air
Assault
Group
Seize enemy frontline posi-
tions and key points in-depth;
stop enemy combat reserve
from counterattacking
Task-assigned: one
air assault BN
Task-assigned:
one air assault
BN
176 Arostegui
Group Mission Amphibious
Division Unit
Assigned
Amphibious
Brigade
Equivalent
Assault
Landing
Group
Land on main and secondary
directions; seize and control
landing section; ensure deep
assault group can enter
combat
Two amphibious
infantry regiments;
task-assigned am-
phibious tank, ar-
tillery, air defense,
engineer, and
chemical defense
elements
Two amphibious
combined arms
BNs
Deep
Assault
Group
Attack and occupy defensive
in-depth positions; expand
and consolidate landing
section; ensure follow-up
landing troops get ashore
Amphibious armor
regiment; task-
assigned amphib-
ious infantry, artil-
lery, and engineer
elements
One amphibious
combined arms
BN
Fire-
power
Assault
Group
Destroy enemy artillery, C2,
EW, ISR locations; strike
enemy armored targets and
fortified defense works; at-
tack enemy helicopters and
assist air assault group
Artillery regiment
(with organic
anti-tank BN);
task-assigned army
aviation platforms
Artillery BN;
task-assigned
army aviation
platforms
Combat
Reserve
Group
Go ashore immediately after
deep assault group; carry
out mobile combat tasks
to deal with unexpected
scenarios
One task-assigned
combined arms
BN with anti-tank,
engineer, and
chemical defense
elements
One amphibious
combined arms
BN
Air
Defense
Group
Go ashore with deep assault
group or firepower assault
group; conduct aerial recon-
naissance, prevent enemy
reconnaissance, defeat
enemy aviation and airborne
weapons over the combat
area
Air defense
regiment
Air defense BN
PLA Amphibious Brigades in a Post-Reform Military 177
Opening of Landing Pathways. e new amphibious brigade struc-
ture provides each amphibious combined arms battalion with its own re-
connaissance and engineering platoons that could be supplemented with
brigade-level elements to open up landing pathways, a role that previously
required regimental assets.
46
e combined arms battalion sta enables co-
ordination with supporting aviation units to provide cover re for these initial
landing teams. Additionally, evidence suggests that at least one amphibious
brigade could use a new unmanned system to destroy water obstacles near
the shore prior to engineering troops landing.
47
PLA media indicate that the
1
st
and 2
nd
PLANMC brigades, and likely the 6
th
Brigade, have similar engi-
neering and reconnaissance capabilities at the brigade and battalion levels;
however, it is unknown whether the new brigades also have their own sup-
port elements at the same echelons.
48
Debarkation, Swimming, and Direct Fires. According to PLA doctrine,
amphibious armor typically debarks transport vessels 4 to 8 km from shore to
begin their swim. e initial waves include obstacle removal elements as de-
scribed above, followed by assaulting infantry and armor and nally by artil-
lery and supporting forces.
49
While the restructure likely had minimal eect on
Group Mission Amphibious
Division Unit
Assigned
Amphibious
Brigade
Equivalent
Elec-
tronic
Warfare
Group
Conduct communications
and radar jamming; intercept
enemy radio communica-
tions and radar signals
EW BN (if organic)
or group army
task-assigned EW
elements
Operational
support BN EW
company
Obstacle
Clearing
Group
Open passageways at the
water’s edge and through
beach barriers to ensure
assault units get ashore
Engineer and
chemical defense
BN elements
Combined arms
BN engineer
platoons
Combat
Engineer
Reserve
Group
Construct command posts,
open temporary piers,
enable follow-up troops get
ashore
Engineer and
chemical defense
BN elements
Operational
support BN engi-
neer company
Key: BN: battalion; C2: command and control; EW: electronic warfare; ISR: intelligence, surveillance,
and reconnaissance; PLANMC: PLA Navy Marine Corps; SOF: special operations forces.
178 Arostegui
debarkation TTPs, the inclusion of 28 amphibious assault guns in each com-
bined arms battalion increased the amount of direct re support for the as-
saulting waves. New units equipped with ZLT-05 105-millimeter assault guns
and Type-05 reconnaissance vehicles improve the commander’s capability, in
optimal conditions, to direct res against important enemy targets, especially
fortications, ring points, and armored vehicles up to 2 km from shore.
50
In addition, the PLAA combined arms battalion sta often includes an
integrated PLAA aviation ocer. eoretically, this arrangement means that
the participating combined arms battalions could request attack helicopter
support, allowing them to achieve superior eects on landing points com-
pared with their predecessors. However, the prociency level of PLAA close
air support during the landing phase remains questionable. e PLAN does
not have attack helicopters, which forces the PLANMC brigades to rely on
joint land-based aviation support. is situation could change as the PLAN-
MC Aviation Brigade develops.
Beachhead Landing and Expansion. e PLA expects the landing of
amphibious combined arms battalions on the enemy shore to remain the
most violent operation in a joint island landing campaign, even after the joint
repower strike. PLA scholars believe that Taiwan military defenders would
concentrate all repower on landing armored vehicles and that destroyed ve-
hicles could block the number of available pathways onto the beach.
51
e 2017 reforms attened the PLAA’s command structure, enabling the
amphibious brigade’s subordinate combined arms battalion to replace the
amphibious regiment as the basic ground unit in a joint island landing cam-
paign. As a result, the amphibious combined arms battalion could now inde-
pendently react to situations on the shore and request higher echelon PLAA
and joint support when required. is arrangement allows joint commanders
to respond to successes and failures at dierent landing points and to pass
down orders more quickly through digital communications and a reduced
number of command echelons.
52
e arrangement also ensures that PLAA
air assault units and PLAAF Airborne Corps brigades landing farther inland
would be better prepared to connect with troops coming from the beachhead.
e new amphibious brigades and amphibious combined arms battal-
ions also have advantages in combat support compared with their predeces-
sors. Previously, the regiment controlled functions such as material support,
PLA Amphibious Brigades in a Post-Reform Military 179
equipment recovery, and medical rescue. e establishment of amphibious
brigade service support battalions and combined arms battalion service
support companies enables lower echelon units to independently execute
these functions.
53
For instance, the amphibious combined arms battalion is
equipped with armored recovery and medical vehicles to manage casualties
and is able to request support from nearby amphibious brigades and other
services. New combat information systems also allow combined arms bat-
talion sta members to monitor ammunition and fuel consumption to better
react to logistics requirements.
54
After successfully destroying enemy defenses, securing a beachhead,
and establishing on-site command posts, amphibious brigades would be
used to defeat enemy counterattacks and expand the area of control. is
would enable nonamphibious platforms to come ashore via landing craft to
relieve the rst echelon landing troops and connect with air assault units
landing 2 to 4 km away from the shoreline. ese follow-on units could
also participate in operations to connect with PLAAF Airborne Corps units
dropped farther to the rear (for more on the Airborne Corps, see the chapter
by Roderick Lee in this volume).
55
e two original PLANMC brigades could conduct similar assaults,
though their capacity to call on higher echelon ground component and joint
support remains unclear. e level of protection required for assaulting am-
phibious armored vehicles leaves the remaining four PLANMC brigades in-
capable of executing this type of large-scale landing operation. e transfer
of landing point control to follow-on forces would also be more dicult for
a PLANMC brigade than it would be for a PLAA amphibious brigade in the
same group army as its relief.
Training and Exercises
Due to the complex nature of opposed amphibious landings, the PLA has al-
ways placed a premium on amphibious training. Prior to and after the 2017
restructure, PLAA amphibious units maintained regular training cycles fo-
cused on amphibious landing throughout the year, with most exercises occur-
ring between May and September.
56
By contrast, even before the reforms, the
two PLANMC brigades had begun to train for operations in a wide spectrum
of environments, including arctic, forest, plateau, and desert conditions.
57
180 Arostegui
Despite the expanded focus on operational environments, the PLANMC has
continued to dedicate much of its training to amphibious landings.
PLAA Amphibious Brigade Training: 2017–2020
PLAA amphibious training became gradually more complex after the April
2017 reorganization, with brigades initially focused on training at smaller
echelons. Although the amphibious brigades were newly established, they
all came from former amphibious divisions or an amphibious-capable armor
brigade, ensuring that training could continue without a major disruption and
that doctrine would remain roughly consistent. us, during the remainder
of 2017 and all of 2018, PLAA amphibious brigade training events appeared
to concentrate on improving the capabilities of the new amphibious com-
bined arms battalions and their stas.
58
Beginning in 2019, more emphasis
was placed on multibattalion amphibious exercises, while also ramping up
training on complex TTPs such as loading and unloading at sea and conduct-
ing nighttime operations.
59
By 2020, PLAA amphibious brigades were more
condent in publicizing brigade-level exercises and the capabilities of their
new operational support and reconnaissance battalions.
60
An amphibious brigade of the 73
rd
Group Army became a focal point in
2020 as the PLA published videos and articles throughout the May to Sep-
tember training cycle demonstrating the unit’s capabilities. In October 2020,
ocial PLA media sources posted a series of videos detailing the nal bri-
gade-level multibattalion exercise that took place in September. e videos
described the landing operation in full and included footage of the amphibi-
ous brigade loading onto PLAN vessels under the cover of darkness and bri-
gade electronic warfare vehicles setting up for combat. e PLA also used the
exercise to demonstrate the capabilities of new seaborne unmanned obstacle
destruction systems and load-carrying unmanned ground vehicles. is type
of landing exercise, however, serves more than simply training PLAA troops
in amphibious operations.
61
As referenced in Military and Security Developments Involving the Peo-
ple’s Republic of China 2020, a large-scale amphibious invasion is one of
the most complicated and dicult military operations and would likely
strain the PLA’s capabilities. e report acknowledges that the PLA is bet-
ter suited for small island-landing operations, such as those against Matsu
PLA Amphibious Brigades in a Post-Reform Military 181
or Jinmen; however, even those missions include signicant political risk.
62
Despite the recognized challenges in executing large-scale landing opera-
tions, PLA media frequently display the amphibious brigades landing in
opposed force exercises. e existence and high-prole training of these
units serve a purpose in Chinese deterrence: to intimidate Taiwan and
demonstrate to other regional powers the PLA’s resolve to execute com-
plex amphibious operations against Taiwan if ordered. According to a 2019
RAND study, China uses large-scale military exercises as a form of gray
zone operations, with military intimidation used to threaten potential mil-
itary attack or military escalation.
63
During periods of strained relations between China and Taiwan, such as
during a U.S. Cabinet member’s visit to Taiwan for Lee Teng-hui’s memorial
service in September 2020, a heavy focus is placed on publicizing detailed
landing operations to signal both to Taiwan and to U.S. audiences. Chinese
media services such as Global Times, considered a propaganda outlet by the
U.S. Government, often describe those exercises as warnings against Taiwan
independence and demonstrations to the United States that the PLA has the
capability to execute a reunication-by-force operation.
64
is is an example
of how normal PLA amphibious training events could be repurposed for stra-
tegic eect as part of China’s “ree Warfares” [san zhan, 三战]. Along with
Beijing’s use of legal warfare, PLA media outlets use videos and images of the
amphibious training events as forms of media warfare to shape global opin-
ion and psychological warfare to inuence foreign decisionmakers.
65
PLANMC Brigade Training: 2017–2020
Because the rst two PLANMC brigades remained mostly intact, a clear re-
duction in training events did not occur after the 2017 restructure. Several
small-scale exercises during 2017 continued to demonstrate the capability of
the 1
st
and 2
nd
brigades to execute small island and reef seizures.
66
e four
new PLANMC brigades, as they transitioned from PLAA light infantry forces
to naval infantry, were understandably absent from known training events
throughout 2017. However, the 6
th
Brigade became a regular xture in PLA
media beginning in 2018, and by 2020, the 1
st
, 2
nd
, and 6
th
brigades were ob-
served executing larger landing exercises with an emphasis on the inclusion
of multiple service arms. However, the events appeared mostly in line with
182 Arostegui
the traditional PLANMC South China Sea mission set.
67
In addition, the 4
th
and 5
th
brigades appeared in PLA videos and articles with new wheeled Type-
09 vehicles, although their training was limited to driving and ring events,
such as those the PLANMC publicizes about its forces in Djibouti, where
complex amphibious landings are not required.
68
e PLANMC, unlike PLAA amphibious brigades, uses its naval infan-
try to engage with international partners abroad and at home. Although
most training events appeared to use PLANMC SOF brigade elements, the
PLANMC’s conventional forces were also playing larger roles in international
exercises. During the May 2019 Sino-ai joint naval exercise Blue Comman-
do–2019, elements of a PLANMC heavy combined arms battalion executed
a landing in southern Guangdong Province.
69
In January 2020, PLANMC el-
ements participated in joint landing drills with Pakistan’s marine forces.
70
PLANMC armored vehicle elements also continuously participated in Rus-
sia’s International Army Games “Seaborne Assault” event from 2015 to 2019,
even hosting the program in 2018.
71
e PLA likely uses these exercises to
demonstrate its prowess to regional competitors and the capabilities of its
amphibious vehicles to potential buyers of Chinese weaponry and systems.
Post-Reform Disadvantages and Challenges
Although the 2017 restructure improved the ability of PLAA amphibious bri-
gades to carry out amphibious landings against Taiwan, the large number of
changes to structure, stas, and equipment types resulted in new challenges
for commanders. Similarly, PLANMC brigade commanders lack a full table
of equipment and adequate training in amphibious operations. Most import-
ant, lack of adequate amphibious transport limits the ability of units from
both services to participate in a joint island landing campaign.
e establishment of PLAA amphibious brigades to replace the former
amphibious divisions improved the independence of action and speed of
information ow. However, the increase in combat power at the amphibious
brigade and amphibious combined arms battalion levels included a new
set of problems for tactical commanders. e overall size of combined arms
battalions increased with the move from a single service arm to more than
10 in each battalion. Amphibious combined arms battalion commanders
no longer command only infantry companies but gained responsibility for
PLA Amphibious Brigades in a Post-Reform Military 183
armor, artillery, air defense, reconnaissance, signal, engineering, chemical
defense, and other service arms that were formerly found only at the bri-
gade and division levels. According to PLA Daily, a new amphibious com-
bined arms battalion sta enables the commander to lead more than twice
the number of amphibious platforms compared with before the restructure.
It also enables the commander to use real-time battalion reconnaissance
capabilities to adjust operations before landing the troops.
72
Even with a
small combined arms battalion sta, however, tactical commanders would
be faced with vulnerabilities resulting from networked command and in-
formation systems; competing requirements from subordinate, lateral, and
higher units; and operations in a complex electromagnetic environment.
ese new requirements could lead to accidents and poor combat deci-
sions during a landing operation.
73
e small number of large-scale amphibious landing exercises may also
reduce the eectiveness of the amphibious brigades. Because brigade-size
landing events became common only in 2020, the PLA will likely need sev-
eral more years before it is comfortable executing larger training events with
multiple amphibious brigades landing simultaneously. Although recent
smaller scale exercises utilized joint capabilities, with PLAN vessels deliver-
ing PLAA landing forces and PLAAF aircraft providing re support, the lim-
ited scale is not representative of the realistic requirements expected during
a joint island landing campaign.
74
Limited opposing force training also reduces the combat potential of the
amphibious units. e army’s amphibious brigades, unlike other PLAA com-
bined arms brigades, have not made the cross-theater trip to the PLA’s Joint
Training Base at Zhurihe in Inner Mongolia, which plays a role like that of the
U.S. Army’s National Training Center. As a result, the amphibious brigades have
not had the opportunity to train against that base’s dedicated limited opposing
force unit in large exercises such as Stride. Without such experience, the PLAA
amphibious brigades likely train against themselves or theoretical opponents.
Because much of the amphibious force, like most other army units, is lled
with 2-year conscripts, the lack of realistic training leaves it unprepared for
the high-intensity confrontation expected during a Taiwan landing. is fac-
tor, compounded by the need for troops to operate modern digitized systems,
could lead to failure up and down the chain of command during the landing.
75
184 Arostegui
Logistics support is another challenge for PLAA amphibious brigades.
e PLAA established group army service support brigades, combined arms
brigade service support battalions, and combined arms battalion service sup-
port companies to form a continuous campaign- to tactical-level supply chain
during wartime. However, the PLAA’s service support brigades are primarily re-
sponsible for supporting group army command posts. is arrangement leaves
the amphibious brigades and battalions reliant on their own logistics capacity
and on support from the PLA Joint Logistic Support Force.
76
e PLA expects
the rapid consumption of fuel, ammunition, and other materials to challenge
landing forces because they can carry only their own loadouts during the initial
assault.
77
Although tactical support forces within the amphibious brigades par-
ticipate in landing exercises, it remains unclear how closely, if at all, the Joint Lo-
gistic Support Force participates in these events. Without a robust relationship
with the Joint Logistic Support Force prior to a landing campaign, the amphib-
ious brigades could struggle to remain ready for combat after the battle begins.
e primary disadvantage facing the new PLANMC brigades is the slow
pace of equipment elding.
78
Although the 1
st
and 2
nd
brigades maintain their
pre-reform equipment holdings, three of the four new brigades lack su-
cient mechanized forces to enable the full spectrum of overseas operations
for which they must prepare, such as humanitarian assistance and disaster
relief, and other nonwar military activities. e new 6
th
Brigade, transitioned
from the former PLAA 77
th
Motorized Infantry Brigade, appears to be the
only other combat-ready unit based on equipment elding and training op-
erations tempo.
79
e 4
th
and 5
th
brigades both eld at least one battalion of
medium-wheeled Type-08 chassis, but this leaves them relatively combat-in-
eective for any kind of amphibious landing or overseas deployment except
supplying troops to the PLAN base in Djibouti.
e new PLANMC brigades, like the PLAA amphibious brigades, also suf-
fer from a lack of realistic training and exercises. Although the 1
st
and 2
nd
bri-
gades have trained for operations in dierent environments, and the 6
th
Brigade
is seemingly testing a new organizational construct, the remaining brigades
appear only to train on the use of newly elded systems. While the PLA often
portrays the PLANMC as operationally ready for unique reconnaissance and
shipboard operations, many of these media reports and videos focus on PLAN-
MC SOF brigade capabilities rather than those of the amphibious brigades.
PLA Amphibious Brigades in a Post-Reform Military 185
Finally, the most serious challenge facing PLA amphibious brigades is the
lack of available PLAN amphibious transport (for further detail, see the chap-
ter by Conor Kennedy in this volume). In island-landing training, both ser-
vices rely on the limited number of modern PLAN vessels, such as the Yuzhao
Type-071 dock landing ship allocated to the PLAN South and East sea eets
and smaller vessels such as the Type-072 tank landing ships.
80
Although the
PLAN continues to build new amphibious vessels, notably the two new Yush-
en Type-075 helicopter assault ships, the numbers remain modest.
81
PLAA
coastal defense brigades also maintain small transport squadrons with old
Type-271 landing craft that could be used in near-island operations, but they
rarely participate in large-scale amphibious training.
82
According to the U.S.
Department of Defense, the limited increase in large oceangoing amphibious
ships indicates a near-term focus on regional and eventually global expedi-
tionary missions rather than preparation for a beach assault on Taiwan.
83
Although the PLA has trained to transport forces using civilian ship-
ping such as ferries and roll-on/roll-o vessels, use of those unprotect-
ed ships would be unsuitable for a Taiwan beach landing (although they
could deliver forces if a port or harbor were captured).
84
Without adequate
PLAN medium and heavy lift for the PLAA amphibious brigades, PLA over-
all eectiveness in a joint island landing campaign would be questionable.
Moreover, if PLANMC brigades were tasked with smaller independent op-
erations during the campaign, uncertainties might arise over which ser-
vice’s amphibious units would get transport priority. Because the joint
island landing campaign relies so heavily on the PLAA’s amphibious beach
landing to shape conditions for victory, the PLAA would likely win that
competition.
85
However, whether the PLAN is willing to place its expensive
new amphibious transport vessels near a landing zone and potential Tai-
wan antiship res is another question that remains unanswered.
Conclusion
e 2017 PLA force-wide restructure expanded the size of the PLANMC’s
amphibious force while concurrently turning the PLAA’s existing amphibi-
ous divisions into more modular combined arms brigades. As a result, both
PLA services improved their capabilities to execute dierent future missions.
e PLANMC amphibious brigades appear to be turning into potential “rst
186 Arostegui
responders” for a wide range of contingencies throughout Asia, while PLAA
amphibious brigades have become increasingly focused on the sole mission
of a Taiwan landing campaign. Indeed, holding onto this mission was critical
for a PLAA that otherwise faced steep cuts under the recent reforms.
86
However, that heavy PLAA force may not adequately represent the fu-
ture of Chinese amphibious operations. According to an October 2018 PLA
Daily article, the future of amphibious operations is changing from one of
“large-scale amphibious landings” to “small-scale special operations.”
87
ese changes would adjust combat requirements from using amphibious
armored vehicles to “seize a beachhead and establish a zone” to “attacking
a point to control an area” using a full-spectrum approach that includes all
the operational domains. e article also mentions amphibious equipment
requirements changing from the capability to “break through beach defens-
es” to “ensuring ships reach targets.” ere is also a specic focus in the arti-
cle on adjusting from “last-minute urgent deployment” to “routine forward
deployment” and adjusting combat support from the “beachhead on land”
to the “oating base at sea.” Each factor indicates that some thinkers in the
PLA believe the future of amphibious operations lies in the PLANMC and its
potential ability to carry out full-spectrum operations abroad.
e PLA Daily article also details how future amphibious operations
could require dynamic and precise command as well as a transition from
large numbers and scale to “streamlined and highly capable.” e new PLAA
amphibious brigades have already started implementing these concepts.
e authors conclude that future amphibious operations could change from
“manned and informationized” to “unmanned and intelligentized.”
88
ere is
already evidence that the PLAA amphibious brigades are in the initial stages
of incorporating new unmanned technologies for obstacle destruction and
load-carrying equipment.
89
ese developments indicate that the amphibi-
ous brigades are at the forefront of technological advancement in the service,
signaling that their level of importance to the PLAA remains high despite fu-
ture amphibious goals better suited to their PLANMC counterparts.
e article does not, however, address the future of amphibious opera-
tions in a joint island landing campaign against Taiwan. e PLA’s campaign
requirements for timely mobilization, rapid transport, and complex landings
to establish beachheads in a heavily opposed assault demand more than
PLA Amphibious Brigades in a Post-Reform Military 187
small-scale special operations to attack key points and gain support from
oating bases. e campaign would require well-trained heavy amphibious
mechanized units that could land in multiple locations to overrun Taiwan’s
defenders on shore.
90
e PLA’s most powerful amphibious landing units re-
main in the hands of the PLAA, whose brigades regularly demonstrate their
prociency in island-landing operations. Yet, without a dedicated approach
to building sucient naval lift, these forces remain heavily deterrent in nature.
e author thanks Dennis Blasko for his review of the draft.
Notes
1
Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2020:
Annual Report to Congress (Washington, DC: Oce of the Secretary of Defense, 2020), 118.
2
Chen Guoquan [陈国全] and Wu Haoyu [吴浩宇], “e Marine Corps Builds a Multi-
Dimensional Integrated New-Type Combat Force” [海军陆战队打造多维一体新型作战力量],
Xinhua, May 5, 2020, available at <http://www.xinhuanet.com/2020-05/05/c_1210604164.htm>.
3
Zhang Xuhang [张旭航], Wang Weiqing [王伟庆], and Qiu Ruiqing [邱瑞清], “From
Establishing Combined Arms to Combat Power Integration—e Combined Arms Battalion
‘Asks for Directions’ to the Beachhead” [从编制合成到战斗力合成 营 “问路” 水际滩头], China
Military Online [中国军网], December 18, 2019, available at <http://www.chinamil.com.cn/
lj/2019-12/18/content_9699027.htm>.
4
Kevin McCauley, “Amphibious Operations: Lessons of Past Campaigns for Today’s
P L A ,” China Brief 18, no. 3 (February 26, 2018), available at <https://jamestown.org/program/
amphibious-operations-lessons-past-campaigns-todays-pla/>; David Simpler, “Saigon Says
Chinese Control Islands, But Refuses to Admit Complete Defeat,” New York Times, January
21, 1974, available at <https://www.nytimes.com/1974/01/21/archives/saigon-says-chinese-
control-islands-but-refuses-to-admit-complete.html>.
5
Li Faxin [李发新], e Chinese PLA Navy Marine Corps [中国人民解放军海军陆战队]
(Beijing: Wuzhou Communications, 2013), 1–5.
6
e PLA Army (PLAA) group army is roughly equivalent to a U.S. Army corps.
7
Dennis J. Blasko, “PLA Amphibious Capabilities: Structured for Deterrence,” China Brief
10, no. 17 (August 19, 2010), available at <https://jamestown.org/program/pla-amphibious-
capabilities-structured-for-deterrence/>.
8
Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment—China and Northeast Asia: China—Army,
September 22, 2020, available at <https://customer.janes.com/Janes/Display/JWARA133-CNA>;
Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2019: Annual Report
to Congress (Washington, DC: Oce of the Secretary of Defense, 2019), 86–89.
188 Arostegui
9
Dennis J. Blasko, “e PLA Army After ‘Below the Neck’ Reforms: Contributing to
China’s Joint Warghting, Deterrence, and MOOTW Posture,” Journal of Strategic Studies 44, no. 2
(2021), 14–16; Ping Zhiwei [平志伟] and Wang Lijie [王立杰], Army Combined Arms Tactics Under
Informationized Conditions [信息化条件下陆军合同战术] (Beijing: PLA Press, 2009), 133–134;
Xu Ping [徐平], “What Is the Combined Arms Battalion? Do You Understand the Organization of
the Battalion in the Service?” [什么是合成营? 你了解军队中营的编制吗], China Military Online
[中国军网], March 23, 2020, available at <http://www.chinamil.com.cn/theory/2020-03/23/
content_9775313.htm>. e article does not specically reference amphibious combined arms
battalions, but it discusses how the PLAA combined arms battalion replaced the regiment as the
basic combat unit.
10
Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment: China—Army. e 72
nd
and 74
th
Group Armies either
split their Engineer and Chemical Defense Brigade into two separate brigades. See “A 72
nd
Group
Army Engineer Brigade Took the Initiative to Solve Grassroots Problems” [第72集团军某工兵旅
主动为基层排忧解难], China Military Online [中国军网], January 16, 2019, available at <http://
www.81.cn/jfjbmap/content/2019-01/16/content_225391.htm>; Zhao Shuoyang [臧朔阳] and
Yang Huihuang [杨辉煌], “A 72
nd
Group Army Chemical Defense Brigade Conducts Actual Realistic
Combat Training” [陆军第72集团军某防化旅开展实战化训练], China Military Online [中国
军网], February 26, 2019, available at <http://www.81.cn/jwgz/2019-02/26/content_9434416.
htm>; Peng Xi [彭希], “China’s 18
th
Batch of Peacekeeping Construction Engineer Elements Set
O to Lebanon” [中国第十八批赴黎巴嫩维和建筑工兵分队出征] ], China Military Online [中国
军网], May 19, 2019, available at <http://www.81.cn/jwgz/2019-05/19/content_9507014.htm>;
Zhang Shishui [张石水], “Energetic Barracks: Our New Way of Doing ings Between Classes”
[活力军营 我们的课间新花样], China Military Online [中国军网], March 17, 2019, available at
<http://www.81.cn/jfjbmap/content/2019-03/17/content_229430.htm>.
11
Blasko, “e PLA Army After ‘Below the Neck’ Reforms,” 16.
12
All the equipment and elements listed here have been viewed or referenced in multiple
PLA videos and articles. Nonamphibious variants of each system are also common to the PLAA’s
conventional heavy combined arms battalions.
13
Liu Xuanzun, “Combined Arms Battalion Becomes Basic Combat Unit of PLA,” Global
Times, March 22, 2020, available at <https://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1183390.shtml>;
Liu Jianwei [刘建伟] and Zhang Ning [张宁], “Pay Attention to the Construction of the Army
Combined Arms Battalion: 1 + 1 > 2, Combat Power Integration Is the Ultimate Goal!” [关注陆
军合成营建设: 1+1>2, 战斗力合成才是最终目标!], China Youth Daily Online [中国青年网], May
11, 2020, available at <http://military.china.com.cn/2020-05/11/content_76029419.htm>.
14
Ping and Wang, Army Combined Arms Tactics Under Informationized Conditions, 152.
15
“In Depth: China Built the World’s Strongest Amphibious Assault Units with over
1,000 Combat Vehicles,” Sina Military [新浪军事], September 2, 2016, available at <https://mil.
sina.cn/sd/2016-09-02/detail-ifxvqcts9244954.d.html>; “112 Tanks + 112 IFVs, the PLA’s Heavy
Combined Arms Brigade Crushes Similar Elements in the U.S. and Russia” [112辆坦克+112辆
步战车, 我军重型合成旅碾压美俄同级别], Sohu [搜狐], July 18, 2019, available at <https://new.
qq.com/omn/20190718/20190718A0MBHH00.html>.
16
Dennis J. Blasko and Roderick Lee, “e Chinese Navy’s Marine Corps, Part 1: Expansion
and Reorganization,” China Brief 19, no. 3 (February 1, 2019), available at <https://jamestown.
org/program/the-chinese-navys-marine-corps-part-1-expansion-and-reorganization/>.
17
Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2020, 48.
18
Dennis J. Blasko, e Chinese Army Today, 2
nd
ed. (New York: Routledge, 2012), 103.
PLA Amphibious Brigades in a Post-Reform Military 189
19
Dennis J. Blasko and Roderick Lee, “e Chinese Navy’s Marine Corps, Part 2: Chain-
of-Command Reforms and Evolving Training,” China Brief 19, no. 4 (February 15, 2019),
available at <https://jamestown.org/program/the-chinese-navys-marine-corps-part-2-chain-
of-command-reforms-and-evolving-training/>.
20
Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2020, 48.
21
Blasko and Lee, “e Chinese Navy’s Marine Corps, Part 1.”
22
Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment—China and Northeast Asia: China—Navy, October
19, 2020, available at <https://customer.janes.com/Janes/Display/JWNA0034-CNA>.
23
Jane’s Land Warfare Platforms: Armoured Fighting Vehicles—Type 05, ZBD-05, ZTD-05,
PLZ-07B, October 8, 2020, available at <https://customer.janes.com/Janes/Display/JAA_A071-
JAFV>.
24
Ibid.
25
Jane’s Land Warfare Platforms: Armoured Fighting Vehicles—Type 63, Type 77, August
26, 2020, available at <https://customer.janes.com/Janes/Display/JAA_1272-JAFV>.
26
Jane’s Land Warfare Platforms: Armoured Fighting Vehicles—Type 09; ZBL-09, VN1,
October 20, 2020, available at <https://customer.janes.com/Janes/Display/JAA_A095-JAFV>.
27
Shou Xiaosong [寿晓松], ed., Science of Military Strategy [战略学] (Beijing: Military
Science Press, 2013), 199.
28
Ping and Wang, Army Combined Arms Tactics Under Informationized Conditions, 155.
29
Cui Yafeng [崔亚峰], Science of Army Operations [陆军作战学] (Beijing: PLA Press,
2009), 186.
30
Ibid., 186–187; Zhang Yuliang [张玉良], ed., Science of Campaigns [战役学] (Beijing:
National Defense University Press, 2006), 292.
31
Cui, Science of Army Operations, 188–190.
32
Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment: China—Army.
33
Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2019, 81;
Jane’s Land Warfare Platforms: Artillery and Air Defence—Type 89 (40 Round) 122mm, September
7, 2020, available at <https://customer.janes.com/Janes/Display/JAA_0588-JAAD>.
34
“Multiple Combat Arms Held a Joint ree-Dimensional Cross-Sea Landing on China’s
Southeastern Coast” [中国东南沿海多兵种举行联合立体渡海登陆], CCTV [央视网], October
11, 2020, available at <https://tv.cctv.com/2020/10/11/VIDEmdsVKMslVAmB4dmBdDfk201011.
shtml>.
35
Cui, Science of Army Operations, 188–189.
36
Ping and Wang, Army Combined Arms Tactics Under Informationized Conditions, 189.
37
Cui, Science of Army Operations, 190.
38
Zhang, Science of Campaigns, 316; Ping and Wang, Army Combined Arms Tactics Under
Informationized Conditions, 167.
39
Zhang, Science of Campaigns, 316.
40
Ping and Wang, Army Combined Arms Tactics Under Informationized Conditions, 166.
41
“e Amphibious Armored Vehicle Carries a MANPADS Operator for Mobile Surface-
to-Air Firing” [两栖装甲输送车搭载单兵便携式防空导弹操作手进行机动对空射击], Sina News,
September 20, 2019.
42
Ping and Wang, Army Combined Arms Tactics Under Informationized Conditions, 142.
43
Ibid., 152.
44
Ibid., 145–146.
45
Ibid., 154–156.
190 Arostegui
46
“Amphibious Armored Unit” [两栖装甲部队], CCTV [央视网], November 23, 2019,
available at <http://tv.cctv.com/2019/11/23/VIDEdRpPB5An13Wx2GN2EECM191123.shtml>;
Ping and Wang, Army Combined Arms Tactics Under Informationized Conditions, 174–175.
47
“Multiple Combat Arms Held a Joint ree-Dimensional Cross-Sea Landing on China’s
Southeastern Coast.”
48
Jane’s Land Warfare Platforms: Armoured Fighting Vehicles—Type 05, ZBD-05, ZTD-05,
PLZ-07B.
49
Ping and Wang, Army Combined Arms Tactics Under Informationized Conditions, 171–
172.
50
Ibid., 177; Lin Wei [林炜], Qu Yang [屈洋], and Liu Hongkun [刘洪坤], “e Analysis of
the Amphibious Tank Company’s Aquatic ermodynamic Power Support Action on the System
Dynamics” [基于SD的两栖坦克连水上火力支援行动分析], Fire Control and Command Control
[火力与指挥控制] 37, no. 2 (2012), 6; Zhu Yinggui [朱英贵], Li Su [李苏], and Zhao Jianjiang [赵
建江], “Application of Fire to the Amphibious Tank Elements in the Phase of Assault Landing”
[水陆坦克分队突击上陆阶段火力运用], Fire Control and Command Control [火力与指挥控制]
33, no. 2 (2008), 57–58.
51
Weng Hui [翁辉], Liu Jun [柳俊], and Jiang Guanghe [姜广贺], “Research on Landing
Operations Amphibious Armored Equipment Combat Damage” [登陆作战两栖装甲装备战损
研究], Journal of Military Transportation University [军事交通学院学报] 21, no. 10 (2019), 45.
52
Zhu Feng [朱峰], Guan Qunsheng [管群生], and Chen Zijian [陈子建], “Research on
the Construction of Army Force Projection Capability” [陆军兵力投送能力建设研究], Journal of
Military Transportation University [军事交通学院学报] 20, no. 5 (2018), 4; Zhang, Wang, and
Qiu, “From Establishing Combined Arms to Combat Power Integration.”
53
Zhong Chongling [仲崇岭], “More than 800 Days After Birth: e Growth of the Service
Support Battalion” [诞生800余天: 勤务保障营成长记], China Military Online [中国军网],
November 7, 2019, available at <http://www.81.cn/lj/2019-11/07/content_9670563.htm>.
54
Huang Qian [黄谦] and Wang Hongqi [王红旗], “Amphibious Heavy Combined Arms
Brigade Landing Operations Logistics Support” [两栖重型合成旅登陆作战后勤保障], National
Defense Technology [国防科技], 40, no. 3 (2019), 91–92.
55
Ping and Wang, Army Combined Arms Tactics Under Informationized Conditions, 177–
181.
56
Blasko, e Chinese Army Today, 188.
57
Blasko and Lee, “e Chinese Navy’s Marine Corps, Part 2.”
58
“A Certain Brigade of the 73
rd
GA: Amphibious Armored Forces Landed on the
Beach” [第73集团军某旅: 两栖装甲部队抢滩登陆], CCTV [央视网], August 16, 2017, available
at <http://tv.cctv.com/2017/08/16/VIDEvueFwKEGYsl7XPqQXrwN170816.shtml>; “How Is
the Amphibious Steel Powerhouse Forged? It’s Blown from a Trumpet” [两栖钢铁劲旅如何
锻造? 从一把小号说起], PLA Daily [解放军报], September 26, 2017, available at <http://81.
cn/lj/2017-09/26/content_7769137_2.htm>; “A Certain Brigade of the 74
th
GA: Amphibious
Combat Vehicles Float and Fire on the Waves” [第74集团军某合成旅: 泛水编波 两栖战车海
上浮渡射击], CCTV [央视网], April 20, 2018, available at <http://tv.cctv.com/2018/04/20/
VIDE3EEV6vHkzlUPU2O1X8zI180420.shtml>.
59
Eastern eater Command Ocial WeChat Microblog [人民前线], “Day and Night:
External Training, the Smell of Soldiers!” [昼夜不停: 外训, 最有 “兵味”!], WeChat [微信], July 9,
2019; Zhang, Wang, and Qiu, “From Establishing Combined Arms to Combat Power Integration.”
PLA Amphibious Brigades in a Post-Reform Military 191
60
Peng Zhuowu [彭卓武], Sheng Yangdi [盛洋迪], and Li Huaikun [李怀坤], “Integrated
into the System, Open Up the Channels, is Operational Support Battalion Makes a Fist” [融
入体系, 打通 “经脉”, 这个作战支援营做到攥指成拳], PLA Daily [解放军报], August 16, 2020,
available at <http://www.81.cn/jmywyl/2020-08/16/content_9882860.htm>; “Amphibious
Reconnaissance Vehicle Launches First Drone at Sea” [两栖侦察车首次海上发射无人机], China
Military TV Online [中国军网八一电视], September 18, 2020, available at <http://tv.81.cn/
jbmdm/2020-09/18/content_9875313.htm>; “Service Arms Coordinate a ree-Dimensional
Oense and Defense to Forge an Amphibious Combat Force” [兵种协同立体攻防 锻造两栖作战
劲旅], China Military TV Online [中国军视网], August 8, 2020.
61
“A Certain Heavy Amphibious Combined Arms Brigade of the 73
rd
Group Army
Organized a Live Fire Test at Sea” [陆军第73集团军某两栖重型合成旅组织海上实弹考核],
China Military TV Online [中国军视网], June 2, 2020, available at <http://www.js7tv.cn/
video/202006_218933.html>; “Multiple Combat Arms Held a Joint ree-Dimensional Cross-Sea
Landing on China’s Southeastern Coast.” e artillery battalion rocket artillery may have been
simulating a joint repower strike.
62
Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2020, 114.
63
Lyle J. Morris et al., Gaining Competitive Advantage in the Gray Zone (Santa Monica,
CA: RAND, 2019), 8, 30–31. According to this study, the gray zone is dened as an “operational
space between peace and war, involving coercive actions to change the status quo below a
threshold that, in most cases, would prompt a conventional military response, often by blurring
the line between military and nonmilitary actions and the attribution for events.”
64
Liu Xuanzun, “PLA Holds Amphibious Landing Drills to ‘Show Firm Will Against
Taiwan Secessionists,’” Global Times, October 12, 2020, available at <https://www.globaltimes.
cn/content/1203126.shtml>; Mark Magnier, “U.S. Sending State Department Ocial Keith
Krach to Taiwan for Lee Teng-hui Memorial Service,” South China Morning Post, September 17,
2020, available at <https://www.scmp.com/news/world/united-states-canada/article/3101848/
senior-us-state-department-ocial-keith-krach>; David Brunnstrom and Humeyra Pamuk,
“U.S. Designates Four Major Chinese Media Outlets as Foreign Missions,” Reuters, June 22,
2020, available at <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-china-media-restrictions/u-s-
designates-four-major-chinese-media-outlets-as-foreign-missions-idUSKBN23T2Y8>.
65
Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2020, 130.
66
Huang Panyue, “Marines Rush Enemy Positions in Amphibious Raid Rehearsal,” China
Military Online, August 29, 2017.
67
Zhang Yan [张彦], Shang Wenbin [尚文斌], and Pan Ruichen [潘瑞晨], “Transformation:
How Did a Certain Marine Brigade Start is Must-Win Battle Without Gunpowder?” [转型:
海军陆战某旅如何打响这场没有硝烟的必赢战], China Military Online [中国军网], June 7,
2018, available at <http://www.81.cn/syjdt/2018-06/07/content_8055360.htm>; PLAN Ocial
Weibo Microblog [中国人民解放军海军官方微博], “Amphibious Elite South China Sea ree-
Dimensional Assault” [两栖精锐南海滩涂立体突击], Sina Weibo [新浪微博], October 14, 2020,
available at <https://m.weibo.cn/detail/4559944038222402>; “Amphibious Armored Equipment
Is Full of Firepower—A Live Fire Drill Aoat at Sea” [两栖装甲装备火力十足 直击海上浮渡实弹
射击演练], China Military TV Online [中国军视网], August 29, 2020, available at <http://www.
js7tv.cn/video/202008_227937.html>.
192 Arostegui
68
Zhao Lei and Zhou Jin, “Live-Fire Exercises Conducted by PLA Base in Djibouti,” China
Daily, November 25, 2017, available at <https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2017-11/25/
content_34966883.htm>; “Direct Fire Training Range—e Marine Corps Kicked O with a
‘Good Start’ with Live Firing and New Equipment” [直击演训场 海军陆战队实弹射击 新装备
打响 “开门红”], CCTV [央视网], July 12, 2020, available at <https://tv.cctv.com/2020/07/12/
VIDEw5Cg3mFAHPCKwmcvRCoi200712.shtml>; “Marine Corps, You’re So Handsome!” [海军
陆战队, 你真帅!], WeChat [微信], October 17, 2020, available at <https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/
vSJZCcNaZcjkp2iisvwaEQ>.
69
Huang Panyue, “Chinese-ai Marines Conduct Joint Beach-Landing Operation,”
China Military Online, May 13, 2019, available at <http://eng.chinamil.com.cn/view/2019-
05/13/content_9502155.htm>.
70
“China-Pakistan ‘Sea Guardian-2020’ Maritime Exercise: Fighting Side-by-Side,
Chinese and Pakistani Marines Train Together” [中巴 “海洋卫士-2020” 海上联合演习并
肩战斗中巴海军陆战队员混编同训], CCTV, January 8, 2020, available at <http://tv.cctv.
com/2020/01/08/VIDEZ6xPH4OgIs3phJHWIqqJ200108.shtml>.
71
Xu Yi, “PLA Teams Complete Preparations for IAG 2019,” China Military Online, July 25,
2019, available at <http://eng.chinamil.com.cn/view/2019-07/25/content_9567870.htm>; Liang
Yu, “‘Seaborne Assault’ Concluded in China,” Xinhua, August 11, 2018, available at <http://www.
xinhuanet.com/english/2018-08/11/c_137383614.htm>.
72
Zhang, Wang, and Qiu, “From Establishing Combined Arms to Combat Power
Integration.”
73
Weng, Liu, and Jiang, “Research on Landing Operations Amphibious Armored
Equipment Combat Damage,” 44; Wang Delin [王德林], Fan Xu [范旭], and Zhao Junye [赵俊
业], “Army Combined Arms Battalion Sta Ocer Training” [陆军合成营参谋训练], National
Defense Technology [国防科技] 40, no. 2 (2019), 104.
74
Weng, Liu, and Jiang, “Research on Landing Operations Amphibious Armored
Equipment Combat Damage,” 44–45.
75
Ibid., 45.
76
Li Zihao [李子豪], “Research on Problems with Army Combined Arms Brigade
Logistics Support” [陆军合成旅后勤保障问题研究], National Defense Technology [国防科技] 40,
no. 1 (2019), 115–117.
77
Huang and Wang, “Amphibious Heavy Combined Arms Brigade Landing Operations
Logistics Support,” 90.
78
Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2020, 48.
79
Blasko, “e PLA Army After ‘Below the Neck’ Reforms,” 22.
80
Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment—China and Northeast Asia: China—Navy,
September 22, 2020, available at <https://customer.janes.com/Janes/Display/JWNA0034-CNA>.
81
Rick Joe, “e Future of China’s Amphibious Assault Fleet,” e Diplomat, July 17, 2019,
available at <https://thediplomat.com/2019/07/the-future-of-chinas-amphibious-assault-
eet/>.
82
Wang Shichun [王世纯], “e Maritime Transport Squadron of an Eastern eater Army
Coastal Defense Brigade Recently Launched a Landing Training Event with the Army” [东部战
区陆军海防旅船艇大队近日联合陆军开展了海上登陆训练], e Observer Online [观察者网],
August 18, 2018, available at <https://www.guancha.cn/military-aairs/2018_08_18_468639.
shtml?web>.
83
Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2020, 117.
PLA Amphibious Brigades in a Post-Reform Military 193
84
Zhao Jiaqing [赵佳庆], Zhang Xu [张旭], and Zhang Shaokai [张劭锴], “‘Raptors’ Cross
the Sea—A Record of the Shenyang Joint Logistic Support Center’s Cross-Sea Projection Exercise
Jointly Held with a Shipping Company” [“猛龙” 过海一沈阳联勤保障中心联合航运船企开展跨
海投送 演练纪实], PLA Pictorial [解放军画报], no. 8 (2019), 84–87.
85
Zhang, Science of Campaigns, 355.
86
For more information on cuts the PLAA faced during the reform, see John Chen,
“Choosing the ‘Least Bad Option’: Organizational Interests and Change in the PLA Ground
Forces,” in Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA: Assessing Chinese Military Reforms, ed. Phillip C.
Saunders et al. (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press), 85–124.
87
“Amphibious Operations, No Longer the Way You ink” [两栖作战, 早已不是你
以为的那种打法], PLA Daily [解放军报], October 2, 2018, available at <http://www.81.cn/
jmywyl/2018-10/02/content_9302793.htm>.
88
Ibid.
89
“Multiple Combat Arms Held a Joint ree-Dimensional Cross-Sea Landing on China’s
Southeastern Coast.”
90
Zhang, Science of Campaigns, 371.
CHAPTER 7
The PLA Airborne Corps in a
Taiwan Scenario
Roderick Lee
195
A
ir-delivered People’s Liberation Army (PLA) forces will be a cru-
cial component of a joint island landing campaign (JILC) directed
toward Taiwan, yet Western scholars have paid limited attention
to these forces. A nested airborne campaign is critical to the larger JILC, as
airborne forces are expected to land in conjunction with amphibious forces
and improve the overall chance of success during the landing phase. is
chapter provides a detailed understanding of the PLA Air Force (PLAAF)
Airborne Corps and associated forces needed to execute an airborne cam-
paign vis-à-vis Taiwan.
is chapter nds that the PLAAF Airborne Corps has evolved into a
capable and modern combined arms force and that the PLA has gradually
improved its ability to load and deliver these forces to landing areas in Tai-
wan. However, four major limitations could complicate the PLA’s ability to
execute an airborne campaign as part of a JILC: insucient transport capac-
ity to support airborne operations, insucient capacity for aerial ports of
embarkation, lack of combined arms and joint training (specically in con-
ducting formation escort and joint res), and limited options for oensive
and defensive ground operations.
196 Lee
e chapter rst discusses the PLAAF Airborne Corps’ organization,
equipment, and training. It then identies airlift capabilities that could sup-
port an airborne campaign. e next section discusses the aerial ports of
embarkation (APOEs) that could be used to load airborne forces. Next, the
limiting factors that would hamper PLA airborne operations are identied.
e chapter concludes with a discussion of how the PLA is attempting to
overcome some of these weaknesses, along with further complicating factors
that Taiwan could introduce through its own defensive operations.
Structure, Organization, and Training
To understand the potential unfolding of an airborne campaign and the ca-
pability limitations that might frustrate those operations, one must rst un-
derstand the basic characteristics of the PLAAF Airborne Corps. is section
discusses the structure, organization, and training of the corps and other PLA
airborne and air assault forces.
Basic Structure
e PLAAF Airborne Corps constitutes the bulk of the PLA’s air-deliverable
ground forces and is the most likely force to be used in an airborne cam-
paign. e People’s Republic of China (PRC)’s 2019 Defense White Paper
suggests that the PLAAF Airborne Corps is administratively and operation-
ally subordinate to PLAAF Headquarters. A limited body of PLA command
and control literature suggests that, in wartime, a theater ground operations
group command [lu shang zuozhan jituan zhihui bu, 陆上作战集团指挥部]
may have an operational control relationship [jizhong zhikong guanxi, 集
中指控关系] with airborne units.
1
However, besides PLAAF-specic media
outlets, the Central eater Command appears to be the primary outlet for
peacetime reports on PLAAF Airborne Corps training. is line of reporting
makes sense geographically, as all PLAAF Airborne Corps units are based
within the Central eater Command area of responsibility. However, this
arrangement may pose challenges in a Taiwan scenario, where the Eastern
eater Command is likely the primary command.
Prior to 2017, the PLAAF Airborne Corps was called the 15
th
Airborne
Corps.
2
e 15
th
Airborne Corps oversaw the 43
rd
, 44
th
, and 45
th
Airborne di-
visions, which in turn oversaw subordinate regiments and battalions that,
The PLA Airborne Corps in a Taiwan Scenario 197
for administrative purposes, were typically organized around troop type.
3
Although this arrangement worked from a management perspective, it was
not ideal from an operational perspective. is division-regiment structure
meant that only a full division-sized formation could execute combined arms
operations. is arrangement lacked operational exibility and was further
hampered by the PLA’s inability to deliver a full division using its convention-
al xed-wing transport aircraft eet.
During the 2017 “below the neck” reform, the PLA rearranged the struc-
ture of its airborne force by renaming the 15
th
Airborne Corps the PLAAF
Airborne Corps and breaking up the airborne divisions into more exible
and easier-to-deploy brigades. is corps-level command now oversees six
identied combined arms brigades, a special operations brigade, an opera-
tional support brigade, an aviation transport brigade, a training base, and a
new training brigade (see gure 1).
4
However, the tables of organization and
equipment for these six combined arms brigades vary greatly, which in turn
denes the types of operations each unit can conduct.
In general, a PLAAF Airborne Corps combined arms brigade consists of
four combined arms battalions (see gure 2).
5
e PLAAF may designate an
airborne combined arms battalion as a mechanized battalion, motorized bat-
talion, or assault battalion depending on the battalion’s table of organization
and equipment.
6
Each combined arms brigade also has an artillery battalion,
reconnaissance and pathnder battalion, operations support battalion, ser-
vice support battalion, and possibly a transportation battalion.
7
Some, if not all, PLAAF Airborne Corps brigades also maintain reserve
personnel to supplement active-duty personnel in wartime. Both the 128
th
Figure 1. General Organizational Structure of the PLAAF Airborne Corps
127
th
Airborne
Brigade
128
th
Airborne
Brigade
130
th
Airborne
Brigade
131
st
Airborne
Brigade
133
rd
Airborne
Brigade
134
th
Airborne
Brigade
Special
Operations
Brigade
Training
Brigade
PLAAF Airborne
Corps
Aviation
Transport
Brigade
Training Base
198 Lee
and 131
st
Combined Arms brigades have at least 100 reserve personnel.
8
Assuming that all units have such reserve elements and that the observed
batches of reserve personnel conducting training represent only a fraction
of the total, each brigade likely has anywhere between one company to one
battalion’s worth of additional reserve personnel available.
e combined arms battalion is the basic maneuver unit for the PLAAF
Airborne Corps, just as it is for other parts of the PLA, including the ground
force amphibious units (see the chapter by Joshua Arostegui in this volume
for details). Although the size of a combined arms battalion varies across
brigades, most battalions consist of roughly 500 soldiers and ocers.
9
Each
combined arms battalion typically has three infantry companies, which may
be designated as mechanized, motorized, or assault (based on the battalion
type); a weapons company; and likely a command company (see gure 3).
10
e artillery battalion provides most of a combined arms brigade’s indi-
rect re support. For nonmechanized units, these battalions could also pro-
vide direct re options if howitzers and anti-aircraft artillery are used in a
direct re role. Although available information is insucient to provide a full
table of organization and equipment breakdown, each battalion likely oper-
ates the following elements (see gure 4):
Figure 2. Standard PLAAF Airborne Corps Combined Arms Brigade Structure
Combined Arms
Battalion
[合成营合成营] (x 4)
Artillery Battalion
[炮兵营炮兵营]
Reconnaissance
Battalion [侦察营侦察营]
Operations
Support Battalion
[作战支援营作战支援营]
Support Battalion
[保障营保障营]
Transportation
Battalion [运输营运输营]
Combined Arms
Brigade [合成旅合成旅]
Figure 3. Standard PLAAF Airborne Corps Combined Arms Battalion Structure
Infantry Company
[机步/摩步摩步/突击连] x 3
Weapons Company
[机炮连机炮连]
Combined Arms
Battalion [合成营合成营]
Command Company
[指挥连指挥连]
The PLA Airborne Corps in a Taiwan Scenario 199
■
at least one howitzer company equipped with roughly ve PL-96
122-millimeter (mm) howitzers
11
■
a mortar element equipped with an unidentied number of 82mm
mortars
12
■
at least one multiple rocket launcher element equipped with roughly
six Type 63 107mm multiple rocket launchers
13
■
an anti-air missile company equipped with man-portable air defense
systems
14
■
an anti-aircraft artillery element
15
■
an anti-tank guided missile element.
16
A combined arms brigade’s reconnaissance and pathnder battalion
provides an advanced echelon unit that marks landing zones, provides trans-
port pilots with navigational aids, assists with securing the landing zone,
and provides organic surveillance systems (including small unmanned ae-
rial vehicles) for the brigade. is battalion consists at least of a pathnder
company, armed reconnaissance company, and instrument reconnaissance
company (see gure 5).
17
Although this unit is lightly equipped and provides
limited repower, widespread issuance of night-vision devices means that
these units are among the best equipped to conduct night operations.
Operational support, service support, and transportation battalions
provide additional support services to the combined arms brigade. Key
functions include communications; intelligence, surveillance, and recon-
naissance; logistics; engineering; and transportation. ese battalions
include a communications company, parachute service company, and lo-
gistics service company.
18
Figure 4. Assessed PLAAF Airborne Corps Artillery Battalion Structure
Howitzer Company
[榴炮连榴炮连]
Mortar Company
(assessed)
Multiple Rocket
Launcher Company
(assessed)
Anti-Air Missile
Company
[防空导弹连防空导弹连]
Anti-Air Artillery
Company
(assessed)
Anti-Tank
Company
(assessed)
Artillery Battalion
[炮兵营炮兵营]
Command Company
[指挥连指挥连]
200 Lee
Subordinate Units
Despite their similar organizational structure, the airborne combined arms
brigades dier widely in their weapons and equipment. Half the brigades
are likely light motorized units, which are easiest to deliver via xed-wing
aircraft but lack heavy vehicles often needed for ground maneuver oper-
ations outside of urban environments. Two brigades are mechanized bri-
gades equipped with light armored combat vehicles, which enables these
units to engage in maneuver operations. e nal brigade is an air assault
brigade with its own organic rotary-wing assets to provide vertical lift and
direct re support. e subsequent sections discuss the six combined arms
brigades in greater detail.
Light Motorized Combined Arms Brigades. e 127
th
, 128
th
, and 131
st
Combined Arms brigades are the PLAAF Airborne Corps’ light motorized
units. Based on PRC press and video reporting, these units appear to be
equipped with a mix of Mengshi 4x4 vehicles and Bobcat 8x8 all-terrain vehi-
cles.
19
Given their garrison size, it is unlikely that these brigades are fully mo-
torized. Instead, they operate a mix of motorized and light infantry battalions.
ese brigades are likely the fastest and most deployable within the
PLAAF Airborne Corps. Given their lack of heavy equipment, they can be
easily loaded and deployed by a wide range of aircraft, as well as from a range
of airelds. ese brigades thus provide the PLAAF with a exible force to be
used against lower end threat targets, including assaulting fortications, seiz-
ing targets in restrictive terrain, and defending areas against light and mech-
anized forces. However, the lack of heavy equipment and mobility means
these units are ill-suited for oensive operations in open terrain.
Figure 5. Assessed Organization of a PLAAF Airborne Corps Reconnaissance
and Pathfinder Battalion
Pathfinder Company
[引导连引导连]
Armed Reconnaissance
Company [武装侦察连武装侦察连]
Instrument
Reconnaissance
Company [仪器侦察连仪器侦察连]
Reconnaissance and
Pathfinder Battalion
[侦察引导营侦察引导营]
Command Company
[指挥连指挥连]
The PLA Airborne Corps in a Taiwan Scenario 201
Air Assault Brigade. e 130
th
Combined Arms Brigade is the PLAAF’s only
known dedicated air assault unit. e unit can execute both airborne (troops
delivered to the battleeld via parachute) and air assault (troops delivered di-
rectly to the battleeld by rotary-wing aircraft) operations.
20
e 130
th
Brigade’s
distinguishing feature is its subordinate helicopter regiment, which operates
three ight groups.
21
Based on identied helicopter tail numbers, one ight
group operates roughly 12 Z-9WZ utility helicopters, another operates rough-
ly 12 Z-8KA transport helicopters, and a third operates at least 17 Z-10 attack
helicopters. is regiment provides the brigade with a wide array of transport,
reconnaissance, and re support options. However, capability is limited to the
helicopters’ on-station time. If the rotary-wing component is unavailable, the
130
th
essentially becomes an understrength light combined arms brigade.
Compared with other combined arms brigades, the 130
th
Brigade likely
consists of a much smaller ground combat element. Like other brigades, the
unit’s major ground combat element resides within its four assault battal-
ions.
22
e probable rst battalion is likely a roughly full-size assault battalion
consisting of more than 400 soldiers and ocers. However, the brigade’s sec-
ond, third, and fourth assault battalions appear to be understrength “half bat-
talions” consisting of roughly 260 personnel each.
23
e PLAAF may intend to
deliver these smaller half battalions using the brigade’s transport helicopters,
while the larger 400-person battalion is delivered by xed-wing aircraft.
is brigade is partially motorized, with each platoon equipped with at
least 14 CS/VP11 4x4 small all-terrain vehicles.
24
Roughly two vehicles per
platoon have 12.7mm heavy machine guns axed to the roof, with another
two tted with an unidentied crew-served weapon (possibly QLZ04 35mm
grenade launchers or Type 88 general purpose machine guns). Although
the vehicles are designed to accommodate four soldiers—two seated in the
front and two in the rear—they can carry at least seven soldiers over short
distances.
25
ese vehicles provide a limited amount of tactical mobility and
repower to air assault platoons. Beginning in 2020, the PLAAF began issu-
ing night-vision devices to select assault companies.
26
is makes the 130
th
Brigade the only known PLAAF Airborne Corps combined arms brigade with
relatively widespread availability of personal night-vision devices.
Mechanized Brigades. e 133
rd
Combined Arms Brigade is one of two
mechanized combined arms brigades in the PLAAF Airborne Corps.
27
In the
202 Lee
spring of 2020, this unit began receiving a Norinco-produced 4x4 light tactical
armored vehicle.
28
A standard mechanized infantry company under this bri-
gade likely includes 10 to 14 standard vehicles equipped with 12.7mm heavy
machine guns and 5 vehicles tted with a 30mm cannon.
29
With 3 such com-
panies per battalion, a full combined arms battalion under the 133
rd
Brigade
operates at least 56 vehicles. e artillery battalion likely operates several ad-
ditional vehicles as prime movers.
e other mechanized brigade is the 134
th
.
30
As of 2020, it is likely the
only PLAAF Airborne Corps brigade that operates the air-droppable ZBD-03
infantry ghting vehicle and PCP001 82mm rapid re mortar system. Based
on observed vehicle numbers, handheld photography of these systems, and
available vehicle storage at the 134
th
Brigade’s garrison, each battalion likely
operates between 40 and 50 ZBD-03s allocated across 3 mechanized infantry
companies, along with 6 PCP001s in a repower company.
31
is brigade may
also operate an unknown number of multiple rocket launch systems mount-
ed to a Mengshi chassis.
32
Il-76s and Y-20s are the only aircraft capable of delivering the ZBD-03
infantry ghting vehicle. Although a ZBD-03 might t into the cargo hold of a
Y-9, the need to deploy extensive cushioning to prevent the vehicle from be-
ing damaged on landing and the lack of reporting on Y-9s paradropping ZBD-
03s suggest that the PLA is currently unable to paradrop a ZBD-03 from a Y-9.
e PLAAF has demonstrated the ability to airdrop three ZBD-03s, although
most training typically involves dropping only one or two.
33
us, delivering a
full mechanized infantry battalion would require between 13 and 16 Y-20s or
Il-76s along with at least 12 Y-8s or Y-9s.
Airborne Training
PLAAF Airborne Corps brigades have trained to execute all four major air-
borne campaign ground operations activities: capturing landing sites, es-
tablishing a landing base, conducting ground oensives, and transitioning
into defensive operations.
34
Most training appears to have been held at the
battalion level, with only a few events consisting of a brigade-size element.
35
Airborne training often occurs at night, although most units lack night-vision
devices.
36
Units also train to drop into a variety of environments, including
regions with possible water hazards.
37
e maximum acceptable wind speed
The PLA Airborne Corps in a Taiwan Scenario 203
for training is 8 meters per second with gusts of 10 meters per second.
38
Per-
sonnel train to drop in roughly 1-second intervals per column and use both
the ramp and side doors to egress the aircraft.
39
A typical PLAAF Airborne Corps training event involves pathnder and re-
connaissance elements to guide aircraft to drop zones, an initial assault echelon
that secures the immediate area, subsequent assault once repower and other
support elements are available, and a transition to defensive operations.
40
No-
tional blue—that is, enemy—targets in these training events include airports,
fortied positions, and other unidentied strategic points.
41
Although PLA
press typically does not identify the size of the blue force, on at least one occa-
sion a 76
th
Group Army 12
th
Heavy Armor Combined Arms Brigade combined
arms battalion acted as the blue force against a PLAAF Airborne battalion-size
element acting as the red force.
42
is example suggests that PLAAF Airborne
units do train to operate against mechanized and armored formations.
PLAAF Airborne Corps units train regularly with select PLAAF transport
units as well as local civilian elements involved in transportation. However,
no observed training event in 2019 or 2020 involved cooperative joint training
with PLAAF xed-wing combat aircraft or any other PLA service.
PLA Army and Navy Units
In addition to the PLAAF Airborne Corps, several other PLA units train to be
delivered by air. Although most of these units will likely be allocated to spe-
cial operations missions for other campaigns during a Taiwan scenario and
therefore would be unavailable to support an airborne campaign, they train
to conduct airborne or air assault operations and thus provide nonconven-
tional options to supplement the PLAAF Airborne Corps.
e PLA Army maintains two air assault brigades that could support an
airborne campaign. Both of their home garrisons are out of range of Taiwan,
and thus both units would have to redeploy to prepared or ad hoc airelds
closer to Taiwan before conducting island operations.
43
However, these units
are likely allocated to support other island-landing campaign groups and not
an airborne campaign that is part of the main invasion eort. Some, if not
all, PLA Army special operations force brigades, PLA Army combined arms
brigade reconnaissance battalions, and PLAN Marine Corps elements also
train to jump from xed-wing or rotary-wing aircraft.
44
However, much like
204 Lee
the PLA Army air assault units, these units would likely be assigned to other
missions rather than an airborne campaign.
Air Transport
e PLA maintains a growing eet of transport aircraft to deliver its array of
PLA airborne and air assault units. is section summarizes the PLA’s avail-
able airlift that can support an airborne campaign directed toward Taiwan.
Although any PLA unit equipped with transport aircraft can participate in
an airborne campaign, only certain PLAAF transport units train regularly to
conduct such operations. us, this section does not discuss theater air force
transport and rescue brigades, training units, or any other PLA aviation units
that may operate transport aircraft but that have no training experience in
airborne operations. Although the PLA would also have access to many ci-
vilian aircraft mobilized for wartime operations, the PLA could not use these
aircraft during the initial airborne campaign, as they are not designed to sup-
port static line jumps.
e PLAAF’s 4
th
and 13
th
Transport divisions as well as the Airborne
Corps’ aviation transport brigade provide the bulk of the PLA’s xed-wing air-
lift capability. PLA press has widely recognized these three units for providing
airlift in support of the COVID-19 pandemic relief eorts in Wuhan in early
2020. is suggests that these units are the preferred means of air transport.
45
Reporting on PLAAF Airborne Corps training also suggests that these three
units are the primary providers of airlift.
46
e 4
th
Transport Division, which is subordinate to the Western eater
Command Air Force, oversees three transport regiments.
47
Based on handheld
photography of known airframes associated with the 4
th
Transport Division
and high-count values for active probable Y-20s and Y-8s or Y-9s at known 4
th
Transport Division operating areas, this unit actively operates approximately 13
Y-20s and 24 Y-9s.
48
ere are several older Y-8s and Y-7s at probable 4
th
Trans-
port Division facilities, but the lack of activity from 2019 to 2020 suggests these
are inactive airframes. Although this unit is nearly 1,000 kilometers (km) away
from most PLAAF Airborne Corps units, its relative proximity to the airborne
training area near Golmud means it regularly trains with the Airborne Corps.
49
e 13
th
Transport Division, which is subordinate to the Central eater
Command Air Force, also oversees three transport regiments.
50
Based on
The PLA Airborne Corps in a Taiwan Scenario 205
handheld photography of known airframes associated with the 13
th
Trans-
port Division and high-count values for active probable aircraft at known 13
th
Division operating areas, this unit likely operates approximately 10 Y-20s, 22
Il-76s, and 20 Y-8s or Y-9s.
51
e Airborne Corps also operates its own organic aviation transport bri-
gade.
52
is unit is equipped with a mix of Y-8s, Y-12s, and An-2s. Although
the Airborne Corps frequently uses this unit to conduct jump training, it
operates only roughly six Y-8s.
53
In an airborne campaign, Y-12s and An-2s
could be pressed into service, but the limited passenger and cargo capacity
of these aircraft means that they could deliver only sabotage detachments
or pathnders. Furthermore, the limited range of these aircraft would force
them to operate from airelds relatively close to Taiwan. erefore, only Y-8s
under this brigade are considered when tallying the PLA’s total xed-wing lift
capacity in the discussion below.
In addition to the 130
th
Brigade’s helicopter regiment, the PLA has several
rotary-wing units that could be used in either an air assault or airdrop role
during an airborne campaign. e PLA Army operates a total of 15 aviation or
air assault brigades, while the PLAN Marine Corps operates an additional avi-
ation brigade.
54
Although these brigades vary in composition, each brigade
can transport between two and four companies, depending on the number
and types of transport helicopters available. As such, the PLA rotary-wing
eet can transport roughly two to ve light infantry brigade equivalents.
Aerial Ports of Embarkation
e 2006 Science of Campaigns states that the concentration and assembly
of the airborne force must be conducted in secret and that the commander
must select unexposed areas in the rear, while also carrying out deceptive
activities. Since the PLA emphasizes denial and deception to obfuscate the
early stages of an airborne campaign, this section identies the viable APOEs
that the PLA can use in a Taiwan invasion scenario. ese include current
transport unit bases and any other PLA or civilian aireld capable of accom-
modating Y-8 or larger transport aircraft.
55
e PLA maintains 59 airelds capable of accommodating and loading a
Shaanxi Y-8 or Y-9 transport aircraft on an apron (see table 1). irty-six of those
airelds are also capable of accommodating a Xi’an Y-20 transport aircraft. Only
206 Lee
33 can accommodate 15 or more Y-8 or Y-9 transport aircraft. At least 13 of these
33 airelds host another unit, and thus the resident unit would have to vacate
the aireld for it to be used by transports. Qionglai Air Base is the only aireld
that has two runways to allow for a higher volume of takeos and landings.
Given China’s military-civil fusion strategy’s emphasis on increasing
resource-sharing between the military and civilian sectors, the PLA can
expect greater access to civilian airelds in the coming years.
56
ere are
approximately 89 civilian airelds in the PRC with an International Civil
Aviation Organization (ICAO) aerodrome reference code of 4D or higher
(referring to airelds with the longest runways and capable of handling
Table 1. PLA Airfields Capable of Accommodating Y-8/Y-9 Transport Aircraft
Name on Wikipedia Y-8/9 Max Y-20 Max
Qionglai Air Base 82 63
Beijing Nanjiao Air Base 67 52
Changzhou Benniu Air Base 38 29
Kaifeng Air Base 34 26
Leizhuang Airfield 30 23
Yangluo Airfield 30 23
Nanning Wuxu Air Base 43 22
Lhasa Gonggar Airport 48 20
Guiping Mengshu Air Base 24 16
Dangyang Air Base 20 15
Mahuiling Air Base 19 14
Tuchengzi Air Base 18 13
Laiyang Air Base 16 12
Lalin Air Base 37 11
Yantai Southwest Air Base 15 11
Leiyang Air Base 30 10
Golmud Air Base 26 9
The PLA Airborne Corps in a Taiwan Scenario 207
planes with relatively long wingspans).
57
However, airelds rated as 4D of-
ten have very limited apron space and thus would be able to accommodate
fewer than ve large military transport aircraft. Airelds rated 4E or 4F are
more likely to accommodate more than ve Y-8 or Y-9s and thus are the
minimum threshold used in this section. e PRC has roughly 55 civilian
airelds with an ICAO aerodrome reference code of 4E or 4F. Although this
chapter does not provide a breakdown of apron space for these airelds, 20
of the 55 4E or 4F airelds have 2 or more runways. ese 20 airelds can
accommodate a higher volume of air trac relative to military airelds that
are predominantly single-runway facilities. Figure 6 provides a map with
applicable military and civilian airelds.
Name on Wikipedia Y-8/9 Max Y-20 Max
Qihe Air Base 19 9
Shanhaiguan Air Base 17 8
Qingyang Air Base 22 7
Dehong Mangshi Airport 23 6
Shadi Air Base 18 6
Yinchuan/Xincheng Air Base 20 6
Lintong Air Base 26 5
Liancheng/Lianfeng Air Base 18 3
Taihe Air Base 20 3
Luzhou Airfield 16 2
Anqing Airport 32 0
Beijing Shahezhen Air Base 18 0
Nanjing Luhe Airport 44 0
Shanghai Dachang Air Base 15 0
Shaoyang Wugang Airport 20 0
Shenyang Yu Hung Tun Air Base 16 0
208 Lee
e PLA maintains only two dedicated rotary-wing airelds within 400
km of Taiwan: Hui’an Air Base and an unidentied site in Zhangpu County,
both located in Fujian Province. Hui’an is the home garrison of the 73
rd
Group
Army’s aviation brigade.
58
e PLA began construction on the unidentied
Zhangpu site in 2020. PLA rotary-wing assets could also utilize seven other
PLA aireld stations within 400 km of Taiwan; however, using these facilities
for rotary-wing lift across the strait would mean temporarily halting xed-wing
operations. As of 2020, there are an additional seven civilian airports (with
two more under construction) within 400 km of Taiwan that could be used
for cross-strait operations. PLA Army aviation units also occasionally train to
operate from prepared forward-operating bases along the coast.
59
ese sites
consist of a large clearing and several small concrete pads for takeo and land-
ing. e PLA may have several such sites within 400 km of Taiwan already pre-
pared and could easily establish more with a few weeks’ notice.
Figure 6. Airfields Capable of Supporting Large-Scale Airborne Operations
Legend: Icons in yellow are civilian airfields capable of supporting large-scale airborne operations.
Icons in red are military airfields capable of supporting large-scale airborne operations.
The PLA Airborne Corps in a Taiwan Scenario 209
Limiting Factors
Despite the PLA’s eorts to reform and modernize its airborne and xed-wing
transport forces and their supporting infrastructure, several potential chal-
lenges could limit the size of an airborne campaign or reduce its chances of
success. Given the current size and equipment of the PLAAF Airborne Corps,
available airlift, and infrastructure, this section identies four limitations in
an airborne campaign: available airlift, available ports of embarkation, joint
training, and deployable ground forces. ese factors are based predom-
inantly on the constraints posed by available physical assets and observed
standard tactics, techniques, and procedures.
Limited Airlift
e rst challenge in any airborne campaign concerns available airlift. Al-
though the PLA has more than 100 medium-size transport aircraft in its in-
ventory, only some units train to support airborne operations. Specically,
only 3 division-level units, with 47 heavy and 63 medium-sized transports at
their disposal, train to conduct airborne operations. Assuming a 90 percent
readiness level, this number would be further reduced to roughly 40 heavy
and 57 medium-sized transports. A related issue is aircraft load capacity.
Some Western and Chinese sources state that a Y-9 can carry upward of 100
paratroopers, and an Il-76 or Y-20 can carry more than 125 paratroopers.
60
However, footage of PLAAF Airborne Corps training indicates that those g-
ures are actually only 65 and 90, respectively.
61
ere are also clear constraints
on the vehicles that can be transported by xed-wing aircraft: for example,
an ocer assigned to a brigade’s support department, likely referencing the
Y-20s and Il-76s, stated that “two types of our large transport aircraft can drop
three of these vehicles [referring to tactical 4x4 vehicles] at a time.”
62
Based on these lower gures, table 2 shows three lift congurations if the
entire available transport eet is used. e table reveals that the PLA could
deliver either 1 mechanized brigade combat element consisting of 2,300
combat personnel and 120 ZBD-03 armored ghting vehicles or 2 light bri-
gade combat elements consisting of 5,240 combat personnel and limited re
support. ese numbers indicate the PLA would need to double the size of
its current airlift eet to transport the majority of the PLAAF Airborne Corps
in two trips. e PLA would likely also require even more aircraft to sustain
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airborne forces beyond the initial 24 to 48 hours of combat operations. Given
that the PLA is continuing production of Y-20s and Y-9s, and assuming the
PLA will acquire sucient airframes to deliver a full brigade combat element,
one could expect the PLA’s airlift inventory to grow by at least 50 percent to
address this challenge.
Rotary-wing transport can supplement the PLAAF’s xed-wing eet;
however, there will likely be competing requirements for these units. As such,
an airborne campaign commander may not be able to rely on such forces to
move troops across the Taiwan Strait.
Limited Aerial Ports of Embarkation
e second constraint is limited availability of APOE hubs able to support
large-scale air transport operations. Wuhan and Kaifeng/Zhengzhou are the
most convenient hubs because they are near PLAAF Airborne Corps garri-
sons (see table 3). However, both hubs are suboptimal for loading the entire
eet of Y-20s or Il-76s with heavy equipment because the combined apron
Table 2. Notional Lift Configurations
Heavy Mechanized Deployment (134
th
Brigade)
Payload Personnel ZBD-03 Tactical 4x4 Mengshi Bobcat Howitzers MLRs
IL-76/Y-20 120
Y-8/Y-9 2,300 30 10 6
Mechanized Deployment (133
rd
Brigade)
Payload Personnel ZBD-03 Tactical 4x4 Mengshi Bobcat Howitzers MLRs
IL-76/Y-20 104 10 12
Y-8/Y-9 3,700
Light Infantry Deployment (127
th
, 128
th
, 131
st
, or 130
th
Brigades)
Payload Personnel ZBD-03 Tactical 4x4 Mengshi Bobcat Howitzers MLRs
IL-76/Y-20 1,540 28 22 10 12
Y-8/Y-9 3,700
The PLA Airborne Corps in a Taiwan Scenario 2 11
space at these hubs is insucient to land and load the entire airlift eet and
would require the PLA to split its loading phase across two or more hubs.
Furthermore, each hub features only three runways (one at a military APOE
and two at a civilian APOE). e PLAAF would thus take roughly an hour to
get an entire aviation transport group of 110 aircraft into the air given a very
generous 1.5-minute takeo interval at each APOE.
63
Chengdu and Beijing provide much better options as APOE hubs given
the large number of airelds in proximity, which would cut the total time to get
an entire aviation transport group of 110 aircraft into the air to under 30 min-
utes. However, these facilities are relatively far from PLAAF Airborne Corps
garrisons and would require units to rst transport equipment by rail, likely
adding at least a day of transit time.
64
Table 4 shows a notional transit break-
down for the 134
th
Brigade to travel from Wuhan to Beijing using Department
of Defense Standardization of Work Measurement times as guidelines.
Inadequate Combined Arms and Joint Training
Despite the growing importance of joint operations in PLA operational
thought, PLA airborne forces only have limited experience with them. is
limitation becomes apparent when examining how the PLA envisions orga-
nizing an airborne operation. An airborne campaign has clear groupings that
in turn reveal locations for joint training requirements.
65
As table 5 shows,
many of the campaign groupings involve other PLAAF forces or forces from
other PLA services. However, the PLA appears to be decient in training to
execute the expected missions for some of these groupings.
Although the Airborne Corps regularly trains with xed-wing transport
aircraft, other elements needed to execute the airborne component of a JILC
Table 3. Likely Aerial Port of Embarkation Hubs for Airborne Operations
APOE Hub Constituent APOEs Number of Runways
Wuhan Yangluo Airfield, ZHHH 3
Kaifeng/Zhengzhou Kaifeng Air Base, ZHCC 3
Beijing Beijing Nanjiao Air Base, Beijing
Shahezhen Air Base, ZBAA, ZBAD
9
Chengdu Qionglai Air Base, ZUUU, ZUTF 6
212 Lee
have not been incorporated into these exercises. Specically, based on ob-
servations from 2019 and 2020, the PLA lacks training in three areas relevant
to airborne campaigns. First, no observed training events involved PLAAF
xed-wing combat aircraft providing cover for xed-wing transport aircraft.
e only known instances of such coordination involved a few cases of ght-
ers providing ceremonial escorts for PLAAF transport aircraft returning the
remains of PLA soldiers found in North Korea. Second, the PLA did not pub-
licize any training events involving xed-wing aircraft providing re support
for PLAAF Airborne Corps units on the ground. ird, no known training in-
volved supporting res from PLA Army, Navy, or Rocket Force units. Given
the importance of escorts in ensuring the survivability of transport aircraft
while transiting the air corridor and joint res to support PLAAF airborne
units on the ground, the lack of training in these areas may prove to be major
challenges during an airborne campaign.
ere may be several reasons behind this lack of combined arms or joint
training. e current PLA training schedule might not allow for such train-
ing due to a prioritization of other training subjects. Another possibility is
that the PLA no longer envisions the need to provide signicant joint res in
Table 4. Notional Travel Times from PLAAF Garrison (Wuhan) to Aerial Port of
Embarkation Hub (Beijing)
Wuhan to Beijing Rail Transit
Load and Secure Vehicles on Flatbed Trucks 30 min
Transit from 134
th
Garrison to Wuhan Station 50 min
Unload Vehicles from Flatbed Trucks 15 min
Load Vehicles onto Rail Flatbed Cars 60 min
Rail Transit from Wuhan to Beijing 270 min
Unload Vehicles from Rail Flatbed Cars 30 min
Load Vehicles onto Flatbed Trucks 30 min
Transit to Beijing Daxing 60 min
Flatbed Truck Unload at Beijing Daxing 15 min
Total Time 9 hr 20 min
The PLA Airborne Corps in a Taiwan Scenario 213
support of an airborne campaign once forces have landed due to improve-
ments in an airborne brigade’s organic re support. e PLA might also
believe that it will not have to provide signicant ghter cover because of
having greater condence in achieving air superiority prior to an airborne
campaign. A nal possibility is that the PLA simply does not perceive the
Table 5. Airborne Campaign Groupings
Campaign Grouping Eligible Units
Air Assault Group
[空中突击集团]
PLAAF brigades equipped with 4.5-generation
fighters or JH-7 fighter bombers
Air Cover Group [空中掩护集团] Most PLAAF fighter brigades
Missile Assault Group
[导弹突击集团]
PLARF SRBM and LACM-equipped brigades,
some PLA Army artillery elements if within
range
Reconnaissance Group
[侦察编队]
Ground-based meteorology support elements,
PLAAF or PLAN special mission aircraft
divisions
Jamming Group [干扰编队] PLAAF special mission aircraft divisions, other
PLAAF aviation brigades fitted with ECM pods
Suppression Formation
[压制编队]
Most PLAAF fighter brigades
Air Transport Group
[空中运输集团]
4
th
and 13
th
Transport divisions, Airborne Avia-
tion Transport Brigade, rotary wing units
Sabotage Detachment
[破袭分队]
Special operations force units
Advanced Echelon [先遣梯队] Airborne pathfinder and reconnaissance
battalions, combined arms battalions
Assault Echelon [突击梯队] Airborne combined arms battalions, operation-
al support engineering elements
Rear Echelon [后方梯队] Airborne combined arms battalions, artillery
battalions, and support elements
Follow-On Echelon [后续梯队] Additional airborne elements as needed
Key: ECM: electronic countermeasures; LACM: land attack cruise missiles; PLAAF: PLA Air Force;
PLAN: PLA Navy; PLARF: PLA Rocket Force; SRBM: short range ballistic missiles.
214 Lee
need to spend training resources preparing today’s warghters for a mission
they do not envision executing soon.
Limited Ground Operations
Although the current PLAAF combined arms brigades are much more capa-
ble than airborne formations a decade ago, current constraints on deliverable
forces limit operations on the ground. Using the notional lift congurations
of a single-wave heavy mechanized, light mechanized, and light infantry de-
ployment depicted in table 2, one can establish the upper bounds of what
types of ground operations might be possible in an airborne campaign. e
PLA, in short, would have to make key tradeos in each of these scenarios.
A heavy mechanized brigade-level formation consisting of three mech-
anized combined arms battalions, one light combined arms battalion, and
an augmented artillery battalion likely represents the high end of an air-de-
livered force intended to conduct maneuver warfare against a mechanized,
armored, or heavily entrenched adversary. is conguration, however, does
not allow for more than one primary brigade-level objective because the sin-
gle light combined arms battalion is the only element capable of acting as the
advanced echelon. For example, if the Republic of China (ROC) Army de-
fended Taoyuan Airport and air base with a battalion-size element, this PLA
airborne mechanized brigade formation is likely suited to seize the airport
and air base.
66
However, should additional ROC Army elements counterat-
tack, the formation may be unable to secure its own base of operations during
the ground oensive phase. In this scenario, the single light combined arms
battalion that initially seized the landing area would be the sole defending
PLA unit. Also, the PLA formation would be unable to simultaneously seize
another objective due to all available forces being committed to the Taoyu-
an Airport oensive. e PLA would likely deploy several additional airborne
battalion-sized elements to better secure the initial base of operations in the
area, as well as to seize secondary objectives of interest.
A light mechanized formation of two light mechanized combined arms
battalions, four light combined arms battalions, and two artillery battalions
provides a campaign commander greater exibility to assault or defend mul-
tiple points. is conguration can be divided into two brigade-level forma-
tions capable of conducting independent operations, each including one
The PLA Airborne Corps in a Taiwan Scenario 215
mechanized combined arms battalion, two light combined arms battalions,
and an artillery battalion. Such a conguration would be adequate to seize
two lightly defended points, such as communications stations, radar sites,
or even air defense sites, so long as they are defended by a company-size or
smaller ROC Army element. However, such lightly defended points are un-
likely to be of signicant campaign value unless ROC forces failed to recog-
nize a target’s importance.
Should an airborne campaign commander focus on seizing undefend-
ed or lightly defended points and holding them against counterattacks, the
commander could opt to deploy a light infantry conguration consisting
of eight light combined arms battalions, two artillery battalions, and only
enough prime movers to support the artillery battalions. is option allows
for essentially two nearly full-size brigade formations that could defend two
separate sectors with four combined arms battalions and an artillery battal-
ion assigned to each sector. e commander may, alternatively, opt to defend
four to eight smaller points with one to two battalions each while assigning
the artillery battalions as the situation evolves. is conguration requires
landing in a lightly defended or undefended area to allow the initially dis-
persed forces to consolidate into a defensible position. e central areas of
Taiwan between Taichung and Chiayi would be ideal for such a deployment.
However, deploying to this area has little campaign value besides blocking
ROC Army forces in southern Taiwan from deploying north to defend Taipei.
Conclusion
e PLA’s ability to successfully execute an airborne campaign has im-
proved dramatically since 2010. e reorganization of the PLAAF Airborne
Corps into a brigade-centric force has made it a more exible, maneuver-
able, and lethal force. Introduction of the new 4x4 tactical vehicle also im-
proves the mobility and lethality of those units equipped with it. Not only
have these airborne units been reorganized and better equipped, but they
also are continuously improving their training quality. e extensive im-
provements to China’s military and civilian airelds have simplied the
logistics of loading airborne forces into xed- and rotary-wing aircraft. Fi-
nally, the introduction of large airlift assets such as the Y-20 and Y-9 has
improved the PLA’s overall airlift capacity.
216 Lee
ese reforms and modernization achievements have led to a PLAAF
Airborne Corps with a reasonable chance of seizing a key target defended
by up to a battalion-size ROC Army element or seizing an undefended area
and subsequently defending it against one or more ROC Army brigade-size
elements. However, the PLA’s ability to execute more extensive operations is
hampered by several limitations, most of which it is actively trying to over-
come. e lack of sucient airlift is the most important limitation for an air-
borne campaign, but it is not the only challenge. e relatively small size of
the PLA’s current transport aircraft eet is one of the easiest limitations to
resolve given additional Y-20 and Y-9 production. Although it is hard to deter-
mine the exact production rates for either aircraft, the PLA could likely dou-
ble its current airlift capacity by 2030, should it choose to do so.
Harder to address are other limitations, such as the challenge of loading
brigade-size airborne elements onto aircraft. Although the PLAAF Airborne
Corps occasionally trains to conduct up to a brigade-sized drop, it does not ap-
pear to train to execute a multibrigade deployment. Moving two brigade-size
airborne elements, transport forces, and support units to the right location
under wartime conditions with little to no training would almost certainly
be a tall order. Similarly, while the PLA emphasizes joint training overall, the
PLAAF Airborne Corps does not appear to be following suit. Escorting large
transport formations and conducting joint res are unique and challenging
mission sets that the PLA has not yet developed for airborne operations. e
PLA must allocate training time to the pertinent units, despite what is almost
certainly a busy training schedule.
Two crucial factors not addressed in this chapter merit additional evalua-
tion. First, this chapter has focused entirely on a “rst wave” and did not explore
follow-on personnel and materiel requirements for airborne forces deployed on
the ground. is subject demands an entirely separate study, given the complex-
ities associated with projecting force-on-force engagements and the materiel
consumption associated with those engagements. However, the foundational
data on airlift and APOEs presented here may be of use for such research.
Second, the adversary always has a say. is chapter did not account for
the ROC military’s and greater Taiwan’s response to an airborne campaign.
For instance, the air transport group is inevitably a slow and vulnerable
target, while air and ground force echelons are highly reliant on continued
The PLA Airborne Corps in a Taiwan Scenario 217
supplies and joint re support. ROC military forces have a geographic and
comparative advantage when contesting these capabilities. Current capabili-
ties that Taipei is acquiring under the Overall Defense Concept are very much
in line with contesting an airborne landing (for details, see the chapters by
Drew ompson and Alexander Chieh-cheng Huang in this volume). Short-
range air defense systems, whether vehicle-mounted or man-portable, are
extremely eective against slow aircraft such as Y-20s and Y-9s. ey would
also be extremely resilient in the face of PLA suppression of enemy air de-
fense missions due to their small physical and emissions signature. Further
exploration of what exactly would be needed to neutralize PLAAF Airborne
units once on the ground is another topic that deserves additional study.
Notes
1
Liu Wei [刘伟], eater Joint Operations Command [战区联合作战指挥] (Beijing:
National Defense University Press, 2016).
2
Kevin Pollpeter and Kenneth W. Allen, eds., e PLA as Organization v2.0 (Vienna, VA:
Defense Group, Inc., 2015), 368.
3
Ibid.
4
Guo Qing [郭庆] and Jiang Long [蒋龙], “Airborne Troops Accelerate eir
Transformation into a Synthetic ‘Flying Army’” [空降兵加速转型成为合成 “飞行军”], China
Youth Daily [中国青年报], May 7, 2020, available at <http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/2020-
05/07/c_1125950453.htm>; Xu Xiongshi [徐雄师] and Deng Huiwen [邓惠文], “90 Minutes to
Test 11 Subjects for a Special Operations Brigade of Airborne Troops for Integrated Assessment”
[90分钟考11个科目空降兵某特种作战旅进行融合式考核], CCTV Military Channel [央广军事],
April 8, 2019, available at <http://www.mod.gov.cn/power/2019-04/08/content_4839012.htm>;
“Military Mission: Reappearing ‘e Most Beautiful Retrograde’ in the New Year” [军人使命
新春再现 “最美逆行”], Air Force Reporter [空军记者], February 14, 2018, available at <https://
xw.qq.com/amphtml/20180214A05LSY00>; CCTV-7 Military Report [军事报道], video, 24:59,
July 10, 2019, available at <https://tv.cctv.com/v/v1/VIDExFTHmF57h2YxEBiQvSXN190710.
html>; Chen Xi [陈曦], “A Training Base for Airborne Troops Organizes Comprehensive Drills
Across Regions for Graduates” [空降兵某训练基地组织毕业学员千里跨区综合演练], Xinhua,
July 10, 2018, available at <https://www.xinhuanet.com/mil/2018-07/10/c_129910871.htm>;
CCTV-7 Military Report [军事报道], video, 6:49, January 30, 2019, available at <https://tv.cctv.
com/2019/01/30/VIDEMNEV3O1tZNYt23UAsqbl190130.shtml>.
218 Lee
5
“Hundreds of Paratroopers Are Fully Equipped for Airborne Combat” [实拍数百伞兵
全副武装空降战斗空中绽放密集伞花], CCTV News [央视新闻], August 13, 2018, available at
<http://m.news.cctv.com/2018/08/13/ARTI3u9o4Rfc7oJnIf33GHkA180813.shtml>; Liu Kang
[刘康] and Li Dongdong [李冬冬], “An Interview with Li Xiangdong, the Commander of the 3
rd
Mechanized Infantry Battalion of an Airborne Corps Brigade,” Air Force News [空军报], April
13, 2018, 1; Xiong Hao [熊浩] and Jiang Long [蒋龙], “Zhou Liwen, Commander of the Fourth
Battalion of a Brigade of Paratroopers: ‘Steel Piles’ on the Dam” [空降兵某旅四营营长周立文:
堤坝上不倒的“钢桩”], PLA Daily [解放军报], August 17, 2020, available at <http://www.81.
cn/tzjy/2020-08/17/content_9883267.htm>.
6
Xiong and Jiang, “Zhou Liwen, Commander of the Fourth Battalion of a Brigade of
Paratroopers”; Liu and Li, “An Interview with Li Xiangdong”; CCTV-7 Military Report, February
27, 2019.
7
Xie Chengyu [谢程宇], “Go to the Next Company to Listen to Class. . . .” [走, 去隔壁连队
听听课], Air Force News [空军新闻], May 14, 2020, available at <https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/_
BdFMDMyRZfAYanxnrjr_Q>; CCTV-7 Military Report [军事报道], video, 25:29, March 10,
2019, available at <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Y7tRqcFUXr0>; Tang Zhiqiang [汤志
强], “Hard Fight ≠ Actual Combat” [苦战化≠实战化], PLA Daily [解放军报], October 19, 2020,
available at <http://m.yunnan.cn/system/2020/10/19/031049310.shtml>; Tang Jiajun [唐家军]
and Jiang Long [蒋龙], “Airborne Support Battalion Improves Military Skills,” Air Force News [空
军报], May 21, 2019, 2; CCTV-7 Military Report, June 12, 2019.
8
Zhang Hongbing [张洪兵] and Xiong Huaming [熊华明], “Veterans Return to
Camp to Restore ‘Muscle Memory’” [退伍老兵回营恢复 “肌肉记忆”], China National
Defense News [中国国防报], November 25, 2018, available at <https://mp.weixin.qq.com/
s/6CVSV8PN7SsuD1uVhHJMbg>; Chen Qian [陈倩], “One Hundred Pre-Regimented
Reserve Soldiers of a Certain Brigade of Airborne Troops Stationed in Hubei Obtained
‘Certicates’ on the Battleeld” [驻汉空降兵某旅百名预编预备役士兵取得战场 “合格证”],
Chutian City Daily News [楚天都市报], November 12, 2018, available at <https://k.sina.cn/
article_1720962692_6693ce8402000ji51.html%3Ffrom%3Dmil+&cd=3&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us>.
9
Liu Kang [刘康], “Join Force as Elite Soldiers and Strike Out” [合力成势精兵出击], Air
Force News [空军报], September 11, 2018, 1.
10
Xiao Yanfei [肖艳飞], “Fighting Fiercely in the Northwest Desert, ‘Post-00’ Recruits Join
the Battle Sequence!” [鏖战西北大漠, “00后” 新兵加入战斗序列!], Air Force News [空军新闻],
June 4, 2020, available at <https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/Mz8oNNj_z-8NQWI_BdCQLQ>; Xie,
“Go to the Next Company to Listen to Class.”
11
“Directly Attack the Front Line of the Training Exercise” [进驻就打检验部队远程机动
作战能力], CCTV-7 Noon National Defense [正午国防军事], video, 1:36, June 15, 2020, available
at <https://tv.cctv.com/2020/06/15/VIDESJqbFEFhyeO9ezRxSiAi200615.shtml>; CCTV-7
Military Report, April 14, 2019.
12
“Directly Attack the Front Line of the Training Exercise.”
13
Ibid.
14
CCTV-7 Military Report, February 27, 2019.
15
CCTV-7 Military Report, April 14, 2019.
16
CCTV-7 Military Report [军事报道], June 22, 2020, available at <https://v.cctv.
com/2020/06/22/VIDE6Rb3HoW2kCJnIyUrDHuA200622.shtml>.
The PLA Airborne Corps in a Taiwan Scenario 219
17
Huang Linying [黄琳颖], “e Battle Begins at 4:30 in the Morning—A Glimpse of the
Tactical Operations of a Certain Brigade of Airborne Troops with Live Ammunition for Seven
Days and Nights” [战斗, 从凌晨四点半开始—空降兵某旅七昼夜实兵实装实弹战术行动一
瞥], Air Force Online [空军在线], February 4, 2019, available at <https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/
FYIVImKZl5UKEJZ8NfIGDg>; Xiao Yanfei, “Scouts Are Going to Fight” [侦察兵就要拼], China
Youth Daily [中国青年报], March 26, 2020, available at <https://tech.sina.cn/2020-03-26/detail-
iimxyqwa3209103.d.html>; “Directly Attack the Front Line of the Training Exercise.”
18
“e Same Paratrooper, She Fought for the Country, But She Fought for the Nationality,
Which One Is More Beautiful?” [同样是空降兵, 她为国而战, 而她却为国籍而战, 哪个更美],
Military Discipline House [军纪之家], April 13, 2019, available at <https://kknews.cc/military/
eypgmxy.html>; Zeng Yanfeng [曾艳峰] and Tang Jiajun [唐家军], “Newly Formed Airborne
Brigade Emphasizes Safety and Stability Work,” Air Force News [空军报], May 29, 2018, 1; CCTV-7
Military Report, July 19, 2019.
19
CCTV-7 Military Report, October 29, 2020.
20
CCTV-7 Military Report, September 5, 2020.
21
Yang Xuan [杨璇], Zuo Lixiang [左礼响], and Xuan Shihao [宣世豪], “Air Assault, Bravely
Strive for the First! He Is the First Batch of Direct 10K Instructors and Captain Liu Dongliang!!” [空
中突击, 勇争第一! 他就是第一批直-10K教员, 机长刘栋梁!!], Our Sky [我们的天空], April 9, 2020,
available at <https://zhuanlan.zhihu.com/p/128450591>.
22
CCTV-7 Military Report, July 29, 2019.
23
Source available from the CASI Media Archive, May 1, 2019.
24
CCTV-7 Military Report, October 28, 2020.
25
CCTV-7 Military Report, September 17, 2020.
26
CCTV-7 Military Report, September 5, 2020.
27
“e Municipal Bureau of Commerce Launches Party Day Activities on the eme of
‘July 1
st
, Do Not Forget the Original Heart, Keep in Mind the Mission’” [市商务局开展迎 “七一
不忘初心, 牢记使命” 主题党日活动], Wuhan Bureau of Commerce [武汉市商务局], July 3, 2019,
available at <http://sw.wuhan.gov.cn/ztzl_26/jgjs/bwcxljsmztjyhd/202001/t20200106_570569.
shtml>; CCTV-7 Military Report, November 2, 2020.
28
Guo Qing [郭庆] et al., “New Equipment Lined Up with Paratroopers! ‘Aerial Combined
Force’ Is Taking Shape” [新装备列装空降兵! “空中合成部队” 正在形成], Air Force News [空军
新闻], May 27, 2020, available at <https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/-I3DF9A2BKiNwOclX2DQ-w>.
29
CCTV-7 Military Report, November 2, 2020.
30
Zhao Ke [赵克], “e Veteran of the Shangganling Campaign Seeks to Realize the
Dream of the Troops: I Finally Met My Family” [上甘岭战役老兵寻当年部队终圆梦: 我终于见
到家人了], Engineering Machinery Daka [工程机械大咖], October 19, 2020, available at <https://
mp.weixin.qq.com/s/siDhBqZNtJmGNzr7YlXTxQ>.
31
“When Will e ‘One Hero and ree Gangs’ Be Realized as the Only Main Tank of
Our Airborne Troops?” [我军空降兵唯一主力战车,何时实现 “一个好汉三个帮”?], Frame Spot
[帧察], December 15, 2019; Yao Jianing, “Vehicle-Mounted Rapid Fire Mortars in Live-
Fire Test,” China Military Online, June 12, 2016, available at <http://english.chinamil.
com.cn/news-channels/photo-reports/2016-06/12/content_7096660.htm>; CCTV-7
Military Report [军事报道], June 7, 2020, available at <https://v.cctv.com/2020/06/07/
VIDE68n1Yyg2gr33CGSteq7u200607.shtml>; Yao, “Vehicle-Mounted Rapid Fire Mortars In Live-
Fire Test.”
32
CCTV-7 Military Report, September 17, 2020.
220 Lee
33
CCTV-7 Military Report, September 25, 2020; Volga Dnepr Airlines, “Volga Dnepr
Airlines Il-76TD-90VD,” available at <https://www.volga-dnepr.com/les/booklet/il-76e_nal.
pdf>.
34
Zhang Yuliang [张玉良], ed., Science of Campaigns [战役学] (Beijing: NDU Press, 2006),
589–599.
35
Liu, “Join Force as Elite Soldiers and Strike Out,” 1; Zhang Xiangfeng [张祥锋], “Airborne
Troops on Central Media: Cross-Regional Assault, Airborne Troops Will Be Delivered in an
Integrated System!” [央媒上的空降兵: 跨区域突击, 空降兵整建制投送!], Our Sky [我们的天空],
September 25, 2020, available at <https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/EoDKOnLMoc8vFqkMvCwL8w>.
36
Zhang Pengbei [张朋倍] and Zhang Zhe [张哲], “Airborne Troops on the Central Media:
Shocked, Let’s Watch the Parachuting Training of Airborne Troops on the Water!” [央媒上的空降
兵: 震撼, 一起来看空降兵水上集群伞降训练!], Our Sky [我们的天空], August 6, 2020, available
at <https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/GSM1djw_M8GrNT2X3Q-XMA>.
37
Ibid.
38
Liu Kang [刘康], “Paratroopers” [空降神兵], China Armed Forces [中国军队], August 1,
2018, 103.
39
CCTV-7 Military Report, June 30, 2019.
40
Fang Chao [方超], He Yonghui [贺勇辉], and Xia Peng [夏澎], “e Central Part of the
Sword, Fierce Soldiers Tempering the ‘Iron Fist’ in the Desert” [中部论剑, 鏖兵大漠淬炼 “铁
拳”], Central eater Trumpet [中部战区号角], June 11, 2020, available at <https://mp.weixin.
qq.com/s/KRWDquLaE-C7WqRjBQuC4A>; Xiao, “Fighting Fiercely in the Northwest Desert”;
Zhang, “Airborne Troops Will Be Delivered in an Integrated System!”
41
Huang, “e Battle Begins at 4:30 in the Morning”; CASI, “3ndTCEd,” CASI Periodical
Archive, November 25, 2019; Fang et al., “e Central Part of the Sword.”
42
Li Zhongyuan [李忠元] and Sun Yufei [孙玉飞], “Synthetic Battalion vs. Paratroopers,
Land and Air Rivals Each Other!” [合成营VS空降兵, 陆空互为对手!], Western Army Strong Military
[西陆强军号], August 17, 2020, available at <https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/fp49lxK6ZU7P-
0oTvTJziw>.
43
Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2020:
Annual Report to Congress (Washington, DC: Oce of the Secretary of Defense, 2020), 77.
44
Mao Shichuan [毛世川], Zhang Di [张迪], and Xiang Jialiang [向家良], “e First Big
Plane Jump, Parachute Blossoms in Snowy Plateau” [首次大飞机实跳, 伞花绽放雪域高原],
Western Army Strong Military [西陆强军号], September 24, 2020, available at <https://mp.weixin.
qq.com/s/eESSbXTc-Ik9nV1k2eMIUg>; CCTV-7 Military Report, October 30, 2020; CCTV-7
Military Express, October 14, 2020, available at <http://www.js7tv.cn/video/202010_231825.
html>.
45
Zhao Wenhan [赵文涵], “Urgent Air Freight! e High-Denition Big Picture Is Here!”
[紧急大空运! 高清大图来了!], Our Sky [我们的天空], February 14, 2020, available at <http://
www.xinhuanet.com/politics/2020-02/14/c_1125573788.htm>.
46
CCTV-7 Military Express, September 28, 2020; CCTV-7 Military Report, October 23,
2020; CCTV-7 Military Report, July 25, 2020.
47
“China: Air Force,” Janes World Air Forces, October 5, 2020.
48
European Space Agency (ESA), Sentinel Hub EO, January 1, 2020, available at <https://
apps.sentinel-hub.com/eo-browser/>.
49
CCTV-7 Military Express, September 28, 2020.
50
Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2020, 111;
Janes, “China: Air Force.”
The PLA Airborne Corps in a Taiwan Scenario 221
51
ESA, Sentinel Hub EO.
52
Janes, “China: Air Force.”
53
ESA, Sentinel Hub EO.
54
Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2020, 48.
55
e estimates for xed-wing airelds below are based on the following requirements:
■
minimum ICAO aerodrome reference code equivalent of 4D or better
■
a 5-meter (m) buer at each end of each apron
■
apron depth of at least 70 m to accommodate and load a Shaanxi Y-8 or Y-9 transport
aircraft
■
apron width of at least 50 m per Y-8 or Y-9 to accommodate the wingspan of the air-
craft as well as space between an adjacent aircraft’s wingtip
■
apron depth of at least 100 m to accommodate and load a Xi’an Y-20 transport air-
craft
■
apron width of at least 65 m per Y-20 to accommodate the wingspan of the aircraft as
well as space between an adjacent aircraft’s wingtip
■
within roughly 2,000 km of Taiwan.
56
Alex Stone and Peter Wood, China’s Military-Civil Fusion Strategy (Montgomery, AL:
China Aerospace Studies Institute, 2020), 57.
57
An International Civil Aviation Organization aerodrome reference code is a two-part
designation that indicates an aireld’s overall length and width. is in turn informs users
whether a particular aircraft can land at a particular aireld.
58
Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2020, 98.
59
CCTV-7 Military Report [军事报道], April 27, 2020, available at <http://www.js7tv.cn/
video/202004_214931.html>; CCTV-7 Military Report, November 6, 2020.
60
Andrew Tate, “China Mass Producing Y-9 Surveillance Aircraft,” Janes, December
9, 2019, available at <https://www.janes.com/defence-news/news-detail/china-mass-
producing-y-9-surveillance-aircraft>; “Il-76 CANDID: Status and Outlook for the Soviets’
Major Transportation Aircraft Program,” Central Intelligence Agency Directorate of Intelligence
Research Paper, December 1, 1985.
61
Liu, “Join Forces as Elite Soldiers and Strike Out,” 1; CCTV-7 Military
Report [军事报道], October 16, 2018, available at <http://tv.cctv.com/2018/10/16/
VIDEy3WrkiLCbgXPQzdEdoGG181016.shtml>.
62
Liu Kun [刘坤], “My Country’s First Batch of Certain Wheeled Armored Vehicles
Developed and Produced by the Ordnance Industry Group Was Ocially Installed” [由兵器工
业集团研制生产的我国首批某型轮式装甲车正式列装], China North Industries Group [中国
兵器工业集团], May 8, 2020, available at <https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/4Hb29CoyTahN_9Co_
YoDkQ>.
63
Federal Aviation Administration, “Federal Aviation Administration Airport Trac
Control—Terminal Departure Procedures and Separation,” FAA Order JO 7110.65Y, July 16, 2020,
available at <https://www.faa.gov/documentLibrary/media/Order/7110.65Y.pdf>.
64
Standardization of Work Measurement Volume IX: Miscellaneous Occupations
(Washington, DC: Defense Industrial Resources Support Oce, January 1977), 345.
65
Zhang, Science of Campaigns, 597.
66
is and all subsequent speculative scenarios assume a 3:1 attacker-to-defender ratio
is needed.
CHAPTER 8
Getting There: Chinese Military and Civilian
Sealift in a Cross-Strait Invasion
Conor M. Kennedy
223
I
n mid-October 2020, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) held amphib-
ious exercises o Fujian and Guangdong provinces involving multiple
arms of the 73
rd
Group Army. Video coverage of the event showed an im-
pressive number of capabilities clearly intended as a message for Taiwan.
1
e exercise was also of practical signicance: despite advancements in
xed- and rotary-wing transport aircraft, sealift remains the primary means
for transporting heavy equipment, as well as personnel, fuel, and cargo,
across the Taiwan Strait. is primacy reects both the proximity of the main-
land to Taiwan and the large capacity of ships.
Due to the hostile combat environment, initial assault waves by the Peo-
ple’s Republic of China (PRC) on Taiwan would be embarked primarily on
PLA Navy (PLAN) and PLA Army (PLAA) amphibious ships. e amphibious
assault would comprise the PLAA’s amphibious combined arms brigades and
units from the PLAN Marine Corps (PLANMC). However, a current weakness
of a cross-strait invasion is the lack of a sucient number of PLA landing ships.
As this chapter discusses, new and old PLAN and PLAA platforms still make up
the core amphibious lift capabilities for the landing force, but PLAN construc-
tion has largely focused on developing large ocean-going amphibious ships.
224 Kennedy
As a potential workaround, a PLA study on reactivating mothballed
PLAN landing ships for entry into PLAA watercraft units raised the possibility
of a short-term surge in amphibious lift capacity.
2
Even with this solution,
however, the likely attrition in the amphibious eet during the opening sal-
vos of the conict would mean the PLA drawing on China’s civilian merchant
eet to get follow-on forces ashore. e PRC has the legal authority to assume
control over its large civilian shipping eets and to mobilize them for military
use. Recent developments—such as implementing national defense require-
ments in merchant eet construction and modication, organization, and
military training, along with other logistics solutions—indicate that the PLA
is actively working to resolve problems within the merchant eet to make up
for shortcomings in organic PLA sealift. e PLA is also making eorts to en-
sure successful debarkation operations in a variety of situations, such as ex-
ploring the use of articial harbors to help establish landing bases. Also, large
numbers of China Coast Guard (CCG) and maritime militia forces are avail-
able to supplement PLA transportation operations in a cross-strait landing.
is chapter explores such problems and developments in amphibious
lift in three main sections. e rst assesses PLAN and PLAA organic am-
phibious lift capacity. e second discusses the role of the civilian merchant
eet in transporting PLA forces across the strait and explains two scenarios
on the debarkation of those forces. e third briey examines how the CCG
and the maritime militia eets might support amphibious landing operations
in a Taiwan invasion. Each section draws from Chinese-language and PLA-af-
liated sources to inform its analysis.
A caveat: this chapter does not attempt to predict which landing sites
PLA planners could select. Rather, it focuses on the PLA’s ability to get forc-
es across the strait and commence landing and debarkation operations. is
discussion omits several critical factors, including phases of bombardment,
the battle for air superiority, the struggle for sea control, mine and obstacle
clearance, U.S. intervention, and countless other variables that could each
inuence the outcome of a PLA landing operation.
The PLAN Amphibious Fleet
Although PLAN ships would form the core of the amphibious eet, they
would be supplemented and supported by PLAA landing vessels. Consisting
Chinese Military and Civilian Sealift in a Cross-Strait Invasion 225
225
of both new and old classes of ships, this combined eet would be tasked
with delivering combat troops onto Taiwan’s coastline and sustaining them
until landing zones are built up or a suitable port is secured and made oper-
able. e PLAN eet is organized into several landing ship zhidui [支队] and
dadui [大队] units in the Southern, Eastern, and Northern theater command
navies.
3
Table 1 details the number of ships in each of the theater command
navies and their total capacity in troops and amphibious armored vehicles,
based on the author’s assessment from Chinese open-source reporting. In
the aggregate, the PLAN can generate enough lift for up to 19,080 combat
troops and approximately 666 ZTD-05 amphibious assault vehicles. Table 2
lists the capacities of individual types of PLAN and PLAA landing ships.
Overall, amphibious shipping is limited compared with PLA amphibious
combat forces. In addition to 8 Type-071 amphibious transport docks (also
known as landing platform docks [LPDs]), the landing ship, tank (LST)/landing
ship medium (LSM) eet stands at about 29 and 32, respectively, assigned un-
evenly to the Northern, Eastern, and Southern theater commands.
4
is capaci-
ty is sucient to land the PLANMC’s 1
st
and 2
nd
brigades with their amphibious
armor and possibly some of the newly created marine brigades, provided they
are equipped for the ght.
5
However, PLAN landing ships will not exclusively
transport PLANMC forces. Southern eater navy landing ship units primarily
train with the 1
st
and 2
nd
Marine brigades, while the Eastern and Northern theater
navies’ landing ship units frequently train with army units.
6
Table 1 demonstrates
that the Eastern and Southern theater commands’ landing ships have the capac-
ity to transport more than a single brigade each. Additionally, the initial landing
units would comprise reconnaissance and obstacle clearance elements and as-
saulting infantry and armor units under naval re support. Artillery and support
units would come ashore in later waves.
7
Capable oshore transfer and lighterage
systems could free up landing ship vehicle decks to maximize the number of am-
phibious assault units from multiple brigades in the initial waves. Nonetheless,
PLAN amphibious ships alone would be insucient to get all six PLAA amphib-
ious combined arms brigades of the 72
nd
, 73
rd
, and 74
th
group armies across the
strait in the rst assault. ese brigades likely total somewhere between 30,000 to
36,000 personnel and thousands of vehicles and armor—signicantly more than
the PLAN landing ship capacity displayed in table 1.
8
ose forces would have to
embark on a mix of PLAN and PLAA watercraft landing ships.
226 Kennedy
Table 1. PLAN Landing Ships by Assignment and Total Lift Capacity
Northern
Theater
Navy
Southern
Theater
Navy
Eastern
Theater
Navy
Hong
Kong
Garrison
Assignment
Unknown
Total
Type-071 LPD 0 4 2 0
2
8
Type-072B LST 0 0 6 0 0 6
Type-072A LST 3 5 1 0 0 9
Type-072III LST 0 4 6 0 0 10
Type-072II LST 0 1 3 0 0 4
Type-073A LSM 0 6 4 0 0 10
Type-073III
LSM
0 1 0 0 0 1
Type-074A LSM 3 4 3 0 0 10
Type-074 LSM 8 0 0 3 0 11
Type-958 LCAC 0 2 0 0 3 5
Total Capacity
2,960
troops;
66 ZTD-
05s
7,190
troops;
276 ZTD-
05s
6,300
troops;
252 ZTD-
05s
750
troops; 9
ZTD-05s
1,880
troops; 63
ZTD-05s
19,080
troops; 666
ZTD-05s
Key: LCAC: landing craft air cushion; LPD: amphibious transport dock; LSM: landing ship medium; LST:
landing ship, tank.
Sources: Various People's Liberation Army and People's Republic of China Web sites and news reports.
Notes: These figures use the ZTD-05 amphibious assault vehicle due to its large size (length: 31 feet;
weight: 29 tons) and common assignment to both PLA Navy Marine Corps and PLA Army amphibious
units. ZBD-05 amphibious infantry fighting vehicles are similar in size but weigh slightly lighter. Ship
capacity has been adjusted as many are listed according to their ability to transport 40-ton main
battle tanks, while accounting for well-deck spatial dimensions where possible. Type-958 LCAC, also
known as the Zubr-class, is included due to its size and likely role in shore-to-shore missions. This
craft does not embark on a parent ship, unless carried by a semi-submersible platform. An eighth LPD
is included due to progress on the ship as of fall 2020, which could potentially press it into service
early. This table also assumes the complete retirement of the Type-079 LSM class. Any inaccuracies
in total lift capacity are the author’s own. The eighth LPD Qilianshan (祁连山) was launched in June
2019. See “After the 8th Type-071 Amphibious Dock Landing Ship Is Launched, Hudong Shipyard Will
Fully Build the Type-075 Amphibious Assault Ship” [第8艘071登陆舰下水后 沪东船厂将全力建
造075两栖舰], Sina Military [新浪军事], June 11, 2019, available at <https://mil.news.sina.com.cn/
jssd/2019-06-11/doc-ihvhiews8037051.shtml>.
Chinese Military and Civilian Sealift in a Cross-Strait Invasion 227
Table 2. Landing Ship Capacity
Capacity
Type-075 LHA 1,200 troops, potentially 50–60 ZTD-05s, 30 helicopters, 3 Type-726 LCACs
Type-071 LPD 730 troops, 24 ZTD-05s, 2–4 helicopters, up to 4 Type-726 LCACs
Type-072B LST 260 troops, 10 ZTD-05s, 1 helipad
Type-072A LST 250 troops, 10 ZTD-05s, 1 helipad
Type-072III LST 250 troops, 10 ZTD-05s, 1 helipad
Type-072II LST 200 troops, 10–11 ZTD-05s
Type-073A LSM 180 troops, 8–10 ZTD-05s
Type-073III LSM 180 troops, 6–7 ZTD-05s
Type-074A LSM 70 troops, 4 ZTD-05s
Type-074 LSM 250 troops or 2–3 ZTD-05s
Type-958 LCAC 360 troops or 3 main battle tanks
Type-271IIIA 200 troops or 3 main battle tanks
Type-271III 200 troops or 3 main battle tanks
Type-271II 200 troops or 2 main battle tanks
Key: LCAC: landing craft air cushion; LHA: landing helicopter assault; LPD: amphibious transport
dock; LSM: landing ship medium; LST: landing ship, tank.
Sources: Xuan Ya [悬崖], “Discussion on China’s Landing Ships” [漫谈中国登陆舰艇], Ordnance
Knowledge [兵器知识], No. 5 (2016), 18; Wu Ge [吴戈] and Che Fude [车福德], “The Type-071
Amphibious Dock Landing Ship is Far from Enough” [071型两栖船坞登陆舰是远远不够的], Modern
Ships [现代舰船], No. 9A, (2013), 11. The numbers used in this assessment are based on a Republic
of China Ministry of National Defense report. See Jian Yijian [簡一建], “Research and Analysis of the
Development of the Communist Army’s ‘Amphibious Combat Capabilities’” [共軍“兩棲作戰能力” 發
展之研析], Army Academic Bimonthly [陸軍學術雙月刊], December 2017, 58. For Type-075: “Type-
075 Amphibious Assault Ship” [075型两栖攻击舰], Shipborne Weapons [舰载武器], March 2020, 15.
The Type-075 is frequently compared to the U.S. Navy’s Wasp-class LHDs, which can carry up to 61
amphibious assault vehicles (AAVs): 40 stowed in the well deck and 21 in the upper vehicle storage
area. While the total vehicle stowage area is unavailable, the AAV occupies slightly less space than
the Type-05, which could impact total vehicle stowage. See “LHD-1 Wasp Class,” Federation of
American Scientists Military Analysis Network, May 9, 2000, available at <https://fas.org/man/dod-
101/sys/ship/lhd-1.htm>. See also Chen Yize [陈弋泽], “The Historic Mission of a Domestically-Built
Amphibious Assault Ship” [国产两栖攻击舰的历史使命], Modern Ships [现代舰船], No. 24 (2019),
30. For Type-071: The PLA Navy—New Capabilities and Missions for the 21
st
Century (Suitland, MD:
Office of Naval Intelligence, 2015), 18; Liao Zhiyong [廖志勇] and Chen Ran [陈冉], “Move When You
Hear the Order, Move Like the Wind: A Marine Corps Brigade War Vehicle Spits the Waves [闻令而
228 Kennedy
Secondary PLA amphibious landing capability would come from the
PLAA coastal defense force’s watercraft units [chuanting budui, 船艇部队].
Recently placed under the PLAA and reorganized into brigade-level units,
coastal defense brigades [haifang lü, 海防旅] reportedly contain a total of 10
watercraft dadui.
9
Each dadui has several landing craft assigned to subordi-
nate zhongdui [中队], made up primarily of older Type-271II, Type-271III, and
Type-271IIIA landing craft.
10
ese more numerous but smaller displacement
craft played a notable role during the major amphibious exercises held in the
Taiwan Strait during the 1995–1996 crisis and remain an essential resource for
PLAA amphibious training and operations.
11
Each Type-271 can carry up to 5
ZTD-05 assault vehicles or 200 combat troops.
12
Estimates of this eet range
from 80 Type-271 series up to 200 ships when counting older classes of ves-
sels still potentially in the force.
13
Although estimating the total forces that
PLAA watercraft units could transport is dicult, they are widely considered
a sizable supplement to the PLAN’s amphibious eet. While older, smaller,
and slower than PLAN landing ships, they do have the range to reach landing
动, 动若风发: 海军陆战队某旅-战车劈开万重浪], People’s Navy [人民海军], January 9, 2018, 2.
Type-072B: Xuan, “Discussion on China’s Landing Ships,” 17; Dennis J. Blasko, “The PLA Navy’s Yin
and Yang: China’s Advancing Amphibious Force and Missile Craft,” in China’s Evolving Surface Fleet,
China Maritime Studies Institute Report No. 14, ed. Peter A. Dutton and Ryan D. Martinson (Newport,
RI: U.S. Naval War College, 2017), 6. For Type-072A, Type-072III, and Type-072II, Type-073A, Type-
073III, Type-074A, and Type-074: Jian, “Research and Analysis of the Development of the Communist
Army’s ‘Amphibious Combat Capabilities,’” 58–61; Blasko, “The PLA Navy’s Yin and Yang,” 6. For
Type-958: “The PLAN Bison Hovercraft Is Defective and Cannot Be Used During the Day” [中国海军
野牛气垫船有缺陷 1年有上白天不能全速使用], Sina Military [新浪军事], May 15, 2019, available
at <https://mil.news.sina.com.cn/jssd/2019-05-15/doc-ihvhiqax8857206.shtml>. For Type-271II, Type-
271III, and Type-271IIIA: “Graphics: 271-Series Landing Craft (Yulian class)” [图文资料: 271系列登陆
艇 (玉连级)], News.ifeng.com [凤凰资讯], January 31, 2008, available at <http://news.ifeng.com/mil/
special/planland/doc/200801/0131_2720_386505.shtml>; Zhao Xing [赵星], “A Half Century’s Journey:
A Record of the Development of PLAN Amphibious Ships” [半个世纪的征程: 记中国海军两栖舰艇
的发展], Shipborne Weapons [舰载武器], No. 5 (2006), 11–12.
Notes: Chinese estimates of the capacity of landing ships can sometimes be exaggerated. For
example, one analyst states that the six Type-072B LSTs in the Eastern Theater Navy can satisfy the
transport requirements of a PLAA brigade at one reinforced battalion of troops and equipment per
ship. This is unlikely even with the stowing of vehicles on the top decks of some LSTs. Other analysts
claim that the Type-071 LPD has a capacity between 500 and 800 troops and 24-35 ZBD-05 vehicles, the
equivalent of a PLAN Marine Corps battalion. This could be true depending on the operation. A leaner
complement of amphibious forces would be embarked in missions to distant areas due to sustainment
and berthing limitations. However, in a cross-strait landing mission, larger numbers of troops can be
loaded since ships would not be required to provide extensive support for the short trip.
Chinese Military and Civilian Sealift in a Cross-Strait Invasion 229
zones if weather conditions are not too severe. at said, watercraft units must
modernize to provide more reliable cross-strait lift options to the PLA.
As part of the larger PLA reforms, the PLAA watercraft units are undergo-
ing a shift to better support a “projection-type army” [tousongxing lujun, 投送
型陆军]. is revised focus is intended to enhance watercraft units’ ability to
work jointly with the PLAN, expand operations in the “near seas,” and improve
support for a cross-sea landing.
14
To meet these requirements, the PLAA ap-
pears to be developing new landing craft to replace its aging eet of Type-271s.
A new landing craft developed by the PLAA, revealed in late 2015, displac-
es less than 500 tons, though it is unclear if larger scale production has com-
menced or whether the landing craft is intended as a replacement platform.
15
In a signicant development, experts from the PLAA’s Military Transpor-
tation University sought to identify and evaluate decommissioned PLAN ships
for reassignment to the PLAA’s coastal defense watercraft force. ese experts
state that this eort would rapidly ll the gap in current transportation capac-
ity while the PLAA develops new classes of watercraft vessels. ey identify
5,000-ton class LSTs and 2,000-ton class LSMs built between 1960 and 1980
as a considerable resource to utilize while addressing challenges in balancing
suitability, technical issues, costs, and infrastructure. ey note that the PLAN’s
strict equipment management practices have left many vessels in good working
condition with many years of service remaining. Furthermore, these decom-
missioned ships should be deployed with the watercraft units of the Eastern
and Southern theater commands and become a main force in large-scale mar-
itime transport of operational forces.
16
Although many hurdles must likely be
overcome to bring numerous mothballed PLAN landing ships back into ser-
vice, this plan does raise the possibility of a short-term surge in lift capacity.
Growth in the PLAN amphibious eet has mainly been concentrated in
large blue water platforms such as LPDs and landing helicopter dock (LHD)
amphibious assault ships, with relatively little change in more tradition-
al amphibious platforms such as LSMs and LSTs.
17
e PLAN’s eighth LPD
was launched in June 2019 and close to commissioning in mid-2021; its rst
Type-075 LHD was launched in September 2019, followed by a second and
third hull in April 2020 and February 2021, respectively.
18
e Type-075 is un-
likely be fully operational for some time. With the rst hull commissioned in
April 2021, the Type-075 LHD class would add modest capacity for a Taiwan
230 Kennedy
invasion, but its real strength lies in its aerial delivery capabilities.
19
Each ship
has a capacity of about 1,200 troops, 30 helicopters, and a large number of
vehicles.
20
One Chinese observer argues that the Type-075 could put an entire
PLANMC infantry battalion ashore in a single trip if equipped with up to 20
Z-18 transport helicopters.
21
is arrangement may not be possible if the goal
is also to bring light vehicles and other equipment to bolster maneuverabil-
ity and repower. Rapid vertical envelopment operations by the PLANMC’s
new “air assault battalions” [kongzhong tuji ying, 空中突击营] from dozens of
miles o Taiwan’s coast would add a useful, but relatively limited near-term
capability for the amphibious assault.
22
Together, the Type-071 and Type-075
platforms would eventually provide large-scale multidimensional landing
capabilities, but the Taiwan Strait presents a constrained battlespace that
may reward volume over range.
First-wave amphibious assault units would depend mainly on PLAN and
PLAA landing ships to get to their landing zones. Protected by screens and
supported by naval gunre, numerous swimming vehicles and assault craft
would depart their ships and head toward Taiwan’s beaches. Once ashore,
they would get to work on establishing and expanding beachheads in their
respective landing sectors. Large numbers of PLAA ground combat forces
would likely be near staging areas or already embarked in numerous trans-
port ships in oshore areas to prevent clutter in the amphibious area of op-
erations. ese follow-on forces would most likely contain main battle tanks,
artillery systems, and other heavy equipment that could not join the amphib-
ious assault waves. To be sure, several variables could determine the eec-
tiveness of the joint island landing campaign (for a description, see Michael
Casey’s chapter in this volume). For example, air defense of amphibious task
forces provided by land-based aircraft or by PLAN surface ships would have
to be robust. Although beyond the scope of this chapter, this concern is pres-
ent in PLAN writings.
23
e next section addresses China’s merchant eet and
outcomes when the PLA does and does not secure a usable port.
Civilian Merchant Fleets
Given likely attrition during a landing, PLAN and PLAA landing ships are cur-
rently insucient to deliver successive assault waves. Absent dedicated PLA or
government-owned squadrons of merchant ships such as those operated by
Chinese Military and Civilian Sealift in a Cross-Strait Invasion 231
the U.S. Military Sealift Command, the ship-to-shore movement of the entire
assault force and follow-on echelons must continue using ships drawn from the
civilian merchant eet. is section rst discusses the interaction of merchant
shipping with the PLA before exploring two scenarios: rst, when the PLA can
secure and use a port, and second, when it must ooad troops across Taiwan’s
beaches. It then considers new shipboard ramp technologies that may enable a
unique amphibious role for some types of merchant shipping.
Merchant Fleet–PLA Integration
As of 2019, China ranked third in ownership, by tonnage, of the world’s
eet. is includes 3,987 PRC-agged ships of 1,000 tons or greater, totaling
90,930,376 deadweight tons. ese gures more than double when PRC-
owned but foreign-agged ships are counted.
24
When PRC-agged seagoing
ships over 100 tons, excluding inland waterway and shing ships, are con-
sidered, this number rises to 6,197 total ships—including 1,515 bulk carriers,
862 general cargo ships, 322 container ships, and 2,530 other types of ships.
25
Furthermore, China has the most registered mariners in the world; at the
end of 2017, the total was 1,483,247 personnel, with 52.2 percent working in
inland waters and the rest in coastal and international routes.
26
In 2018, the
licensed merchant marine reached 363,281 personnel, including 34,652 cap-
tains, 24,152 rst mates, and 32,192 chief engineers.
27
Although most of Chi-
na’s merchant eets have little experience working with the military, some
are involved in supporting PLA transport requirements.
e PRC government has the legal authority to assume control over ci-
vilian shipping carriers and make them available for military purposes. is
power stems from several laws and regulations governing mobilization of
civil transport, including the 1995 Regulation on National Defense Trans-
portation, the 2003 Regulations on National Defense Mobilization of Civ-
il Transport Resources, the 2010 National Defense Mobilization Law, and,
most recently, the 2016 National Defense Transportation Law. ese rules
allowed for the creation of National Defense Transportation Support Forces
[guofang jiaotong baozhang duiwu, 国防交通保障队伍] in civilian transpor-
tation enterprises that would carry out a range of supporting functions, in-
cluding transportation support.
28
e 2016 law expanded what was largely a
domestic-focused transportation support force, obligating medium and large
232 Kennedy
transport companies operating overseas to support PLA operations. It also
established new “strategic projection support forces” [zhanlüe tousong zhi-
yuan liliang, 战略投送支援力量] focused on providing “rapid, long-distance,
and large-scale national defense transportation support.”
29
Although the ex-
act numbers of organized units are dicult to assess, these forces represent a
vast resource pool of domestic and long-range transportation support forces
for a cross-strait landing.
Incorporation of defense requirements into merchant shipping construc-
tion and training would greatly amplify their use in cross-strait transport.
Ship registries and capacity are reported to the military, while governments
support the implementation of defense requirements by ship operators and
in shipbuilding.
30
e approval of Technical Standards for New Civilian Ships
to Implement National Defense Requirements provides signicant guidance
for ensuring that newly built ships are technically ready for military service,
reducing the time needed for modication.
31
Nevertheless, obstacles such
as cost and burdensome oversight appear to have kept many current ships
from implementing these requirements. In 2017, a deputy commander of the
Northern eater Command Army explained that fewer than 2,000 transport
vessels are suited for “direct mobilization.”
32
Organizing transport units and providing relevant training could em-
power civilian shipping to better coordinate with the military. Starting in
2012, the PLA began establishing “strategic projection support ship eets”
in major shipping companies. ese units included roll-on/roll-o (RO-
RO) ships, container vessels, bulk carriers, tankers, auxiliary crane ships,
barges, and semi-submersible ships.
33
ese civilian support eets are
organized into transport zongdui, dadui, and zhongdui [haiyun zongdui/
dadui/zhongdui, 海运总队/大队/中队] for unit, fuel, and cargo transport.
34
Organization into transport units will help ready vessels and their crews
for future tasking.
Maintaining operationally ready transportation support forces that could
coordinate with the PLAN also requires eective training. In 2015, the Na-
tional Transportation War Readiness Oce released the rst formal “Outline
for Training and Evaluation of National Defense Transportation Specialized
Support Forces” to guide and standardize instruction of the strategic projec-
tion support ships and other national defense transportation support units.
35
Chinese Military and Civilian Sealift in a Cross-Strait Invasion 233
Training is conducted at each of the strategic projection support eet’s three
levels. Zongdui establish annual training plans for the dadui to implement,
while coordinating shipping activities with support for PLA unit–training ac-
tivities. Exercises include formation maneuvers, command and control, com-
munications, and lifesaving with PLAN ships.
36
Yet problems in the implementation of training exist. Local Transporta-
tion War Readiness oces monitor only training, leaving regular planning
and implementation up to the enterprises themselves.
37
is arrangement
has resulted in mixed outcomes for crew instruction. One 2017 PLA study, for
instance, found that many enterprises neglected training implementation.
38
at said, some units have performed well, actively training with the PLA on
numerous occasions.
39
Even limited training and PLA involvement in vessel
operations could be enough for eective transportation support.
Ooading from Merchant Ships: Two Scenarios
With enemy forces approaching, Taiwan defenders would likely attempt to
render their own ports inoperable through demolition or channel obstruc-
tion. Repairing these port terminals would require signicant manpower and
materials and would take far too long.
40
e next two sections focus on when
Taiwan fails to prevent the PLA from accessing its ports and when it succeeds
in forcing alternative means of debarking forces.
Port Secured. China’s extensive merchant shipping capacity could be
utilized only if those ships could eectively ooad troops and equipment.
is capability would depend heavily on operable port terminals in Taiwan
and unobstructed channels. Early PLA amphibious operations would thus
prioritize the capture of a port and aireld, while clearance teams and repair
units would rush to bring damaged and degraded ports back online. is sec-
tion examines the role of RO-RO ships, which are widely recognized by the
PLA as essential to the transport of follow-on forces in a cross-strait landing.
41
e rst ships in port would urgently unload combat reinforcements
and critical munitions for ground operations on Taiwan. With the proper
requirements or modications, fast RO-RO ships are a key enabler for this
mission, capable of rapidly transporting PLAA Group Army motorized and
mechanized units that can ooad under their own power. is transport
mode also allows units to quickly organize for combat after completing
234 Kennedy
transit and debarkation operations. According to PLA experts, 63 civilian
RO-RO ships are currently suitable for use by military units, totaling 140,000
deadweight tons.
42
It is unknown if all these ships have the necessary mod-
ications for carrying heavy equipment, such as high-strength ramps and
deck structures. If so, the RO-RO eet could carry a signicant number of
units, including heavy combat forces sorely needed to reinforce the lightly
armored amphibious forces.
e following list identies companies with “transport dadui” operating
large RO-RO ships; the number of ships in each company is also given. How-
ever, it is unclear how many of these ships are part of the strategic projection
support ship eet.
■
Fifth Transport Dadui [海运五大队], CSC RORO Logistics Co., Ltd. [深
圳长航滚装物流有限公司]: 25 car carriers of varying sizes
43
■
Eighth Transport Dadui [海运八大队], Bohai Ferry Group [渤海轮渡
股份有限公司]: 17 RO-RO ferries (20,000- to 45,000-ton ships)
■
Ninth Transport Dadui [海运九大队], Hainan Strait Shipping Co., Ltd.
[海南海峡航运股份有限公司]: 18 RO-RO ferries (6,000- to 11,000-ton
ships)
44
■
Unidentied Transport Dadui, Zhoushan Strait Ferry Group Co., Ltd.
[舟山海峡轮渡集团有限公司]: 45 various types of small to medium
coastal ferries (passenger, high-speed passenger, passenger-vehicle,
cargo, hazardous materials, etc.).
45
e Bohai Ferry Group merits close examination. is company runs
quick routes daily from ports in Shandong Province to Dalian and Lüshun
in Liaoning Province, as well as some regional international routes. Over the
years, the PLA has repeatedly recognized company leadership for its commit-
ment to constructing ships that implement national defense requirements.
e company invested a considerable sum of money on 7 large RO-RO ships
with modications and reinforced deck structures for PLA transport and reg-
ularly participates in large-scale military exercises and maritime transpor-
tation support, completing more than 40 transport missions for the PLA to
date. is cooperation has proved so successful that the former PLA Logistics
Academy named the company a professional education training base for per-
sonnel majoring in military transportation.
46
Chinese Military and Civilian Sealift in a Cross-Strait Invasion 235
Overall, the company operates 17 large RO-RO ships, displacing 460,000
tons.
47
e company began implementing national defense requirements
when the former Jinan Military Region Military Transportation Department
joined in the design process for the Bohai Cuizhu [渤海翠珠] in 2010. is
35,000-ton RO-RO ship would be the company’s rst to include various de-
signs for PLA support, such as improved communications and command
systems, stronger ramps, space reserved for medical facilities, and a helipad.
Its maiden voyage was marked with a PLA embarkation exercise of armored
vehicles, artillery pieces, and transport trucks.
48
ese requirements were implemented in the company’s following ships,
including three additional 35,000-ton models.
49
In September 2020, an im-
proved 45,000-ton class RO-RO passenger ship, Zhonghua Fuxing [中华复
兴], entered operation, with three more of this class planned.
50
e compa-
ny also launched two new multipurpose 25,000-ton RO-RO ships in October
2020. ese new classes feature improvements such as quarter-stern ramps
in addition to their straight stern and bow ramps, which enable more exible
options for loading and unloading at terminals not congured for RO-RO.
51
It
is also likely that several of the 20,000-ton-class ships built prior to 2012 would
also be available to provide rapid terminal-to-terminal transport support, ei-
ther as part of the strategic projection support eet or through requisitioning
mechanisms. Chinese media hails a 20,000-ton car carrier built to national de-
fense specications for a separate company, CSC RORO Logistics Co., Ltd., as
another model example. is ship is reportedly able to transport two mecha-
nized infantry battalions and contains additional supporting spaces for forces
embarked for longer durations.
52
Assuming similar capabilities in Bohai Ferry
Group’s seven ferries built after the Bohai Cuizhu, some of which are signi-
cantly larger, this company alone could easily transport entire brigades.
Securing a port would not directly allow many of these RO-RO ships to de-
bark their forces. Many Chinese RO-RO ships use straight stern and bow ramps
to load and unload at terminals equipped with approach walls, breasting dol-
phins, and adjustable shore ramps to match the height of the ships’ freight
decks and ramps. Such terminals can be found in Yantai, Dalian, and Haikou.
At conventional quay wall terminals, the RO-RO ships would have to execute
a Mediterranean mooring in unfamiliar harbors, a challenging maneuver
complicated by currents and wind. Before the delivery of a large, brand-new
236 Kennedy
RO-RO terminal nearby, the Hainan Strait Shipping Company’s ferries used
this method of mooring regularly in their operations at Hai’an Port. ese fer-
ries typically drop a stern anchor and land on sloped steps of varying heights
along the quay wall.
53
However, a variety of tugboats and pushing craft would
likely be available to assist due to the importance of their cargoes in a cross-
strait operation. Additionally, the Bohai Ferry Group has conducted this form
of mooring at conventional docks with its 35,000-ton-class ships to comply
with military requirements.
54
One advantage of this procedure is that it occu-
pies less quay frontage, allowing multiple RO-RO ships to debark simultane-
ously. Should a terminal be partially damaged, only several meters would be
needed to accommodate ship ramps and an unobstructed approach.
55
More challenging than executing a Mediterranean mooring in Taiwan
would be uncontrollable variables at debarkation sites. Apart from currents and
wind, accounting for vessel freight deck height relative to the vertical height of
the dock surface at varying tidal states would determine the window of time for
these ships to successfully unload cargo. If the slope of ramps is too extreme
at low or high tide, many vehicles could have trouble debarking. Tracked and
wheeled armored vehicles may be more exible, and military trucks often have
high undercarriage clearance to prevent bottoming out. Dealing with the vari-
able slope of ramps and measures to ensure smooth unloading could slow down
operations. Lightening these vessels during unloading could also inuence the
operation of ramps. e task becomes even more complex when factoring in the
varying sizes and ramp congurations of the RO-RO eet. PLA transportation
experts who have carefully examined these operations recognize that RO-RO
unloading operations would have to be carefully timed and have thus construct-
ed models to predict dockside operational windows.
56
Should a port terminal
become secure enough to enable RO-RO operations, planners could use the
destination terminal’s quay wall height and available tidal data to predict the
volume of reinforcements and cargo that could be delivered in a given time.
To mitigate these problems, the PLA has highlighted embark-debark op-
erations at conventional docks in recent exercises. ough there is a focus on
supporting the transport of combined arms maneuver units, other services
are also prepared for RO-RO transport. For example, the PLA Air Force trans-
ported air defense units in 2014 by embarking them at general cargo termi-
nals and debarking at container terminals.
57
Open sources indicate several
Chinese Military and Civilian Sealift in a Cross-Strait Invasion 237
PLA Air Force exercises utilizing RO-RO ships for long-distance transport in
recent years.
58
Gaining prociency in moving units onto RO-RO ships may
be a decisive factor inuencing the speed and volume at which the PLA
could use these ships to reinforce combat units already ashore. Additionally,
PLA military transportation personnel may be directly involved in training
RO-RO crews or supervising operations on board vessels.
59
e extent of this
direct involvement in large-scale operations, however, is unclear.
PLA scholars recognize that logistic xed targets and transportation
forces, even at their embarkation sites, would be under pressure from ene-
my attacks.
60
RO-RO ships may aord some cover for the massing of force
by allowing PLA forces to embark at ports far away from the expected cross-
ing. Changes to the regular ferry services of the Bohai Ferry Group or Hainan
Strait Shipping Company could potentially serve as an early-warning indica-
tor. At the same time, covert preparations would leave little room for preinva-
sion rehearsals on any signicant scale, as doing so would alert adversaries.
Over the Beaches. Without an operating terminal, the PLA would strug-
gle to get its forces ashore quickly and in large numbers, placing the entire
invasion in jeopardy. is challenge requires the PLA to bring the temporary
infrastructure needed to facilitate the ooading and marshaling of follow-on
forces. Once a landing area is secured, PLA sources would advise that a land-
ing base [denglu jidi, 登陆基地] be established that includes piers, medical
stations, depots, and repair sites. Apart from command, logistics, and equip-
ment elements, debarkation components would be set up to assemble the
lightering and transfer equipment, clear obstacles, prepare beach areas for
vehicle movement, and coordinate joint forces going ashore. According
to one estimate, aoat ooading systems would begin assembling at sea 2
hours after forces capture the beach. Shore-based landing bases would begin
assembly no later than 6 hours after.
61
Also, landing bases would establish
helicopter landing zones for vertical lift movement.
62
PLA experts note that articial harbors like those used during the Nor-
mandy landings during World War II would be a critical requirement for a
large-scale landing operation. Despite the changes in amphibious warfare
toward sea and air integrated landing operations, these scholars argue that
articial harbors would play a key role throughout an entire campaign.
63
According to PLAN experts, the scale of the battlespace, highly transparent
238 Kennedy
operations, and the threat of long-range precision strikes present major chal-
lenges for support operations at degraded conventional ports. Many PLA
texts urge the development of modern articial port systems that utilize oat-
ing wave attenuators, modular mobile berthing and transfer platforms, trans-
fer platforms for RO-RO ships, assembled trestle wharves, oating causeway
systems for crossing tidal mudats, amphibious materials transfer platforms,
and mat systems for moving vehicles across beaches.
64
Extensive oating sys-
tems would solve the problem of unloading operations with RO-RO and oth-
er ship types, as both ship and platform would ride the tides.
For close to 20 years, the PLA has developed and experimented with
equipment for ooading personnel and supplies without access to port facil-
ities; however, experts note that obstacles remain for RO-RO ship operations,
oshore lightering, amphibious unloading, container handling in coastal
areas and at sea, and general low eciency across many systems.
65
For in-
stance, much of the PLA’s current “pier-less” unloading equipment is in pro-
totype, not in production. ese experts argue for limited allocation of core
equipment for training exercises and a concurrent investment in the storage
and maintenance of such equipment.
66
Nevertheless, China has demonstrated the engineering capacity to build
and deploy articial harbor and landing bases. Its major construction and
engineering companies regularly generate news reports around the world
with the scale of their projects, whether large-scale articial land reclamation
and construction in the Spratly Islands or massive port infrastructure projects
overseas. e PLA would seek to leverage these companies to achieve large-
scale oshore debarkation. ese activities include bringing along numerous
commercial platforms, such as deck barges onto which cargo ships would o-
load, semi-submersible barges, oating storage equipment, and even mobile
harbor platforms used in the shing industry.
67
Two PLAN engineers discuss-
ing pier-less unloading noted that some platforms are currently introducing
oshore platform leg stabilization and suction anchor technologies used in
commercial industries to enhance wind and wave resistance of debarkation
structures.
68
Stronger mooring systems could help prevent damage from se-
vere weather conditions, such as when the U.S. articial harbor Mulberry
“A” was destroyed by an unforeseen storm during the Normandy landings.
69
Nonetheless, these structures would need to span from deep water to the
Chinese Military and Civilian Sealift in a Cross-Strait Invasion 239
surf zones and across exposed areas at low tide—putting them under signif-
icant stress. One 2010 Chinese source stated that most of the PLA’s existing
platforms for heavy equipment can operate in sea state three (1.6- to 4-foot
swells) and survive in sea states four to ve (8- to 13-foot swells).
70
e PLA is also developing civilian semi-submersible ships to support
amphibious and transfer operations when conventional facilities are un-
available. Part of the strategic projection support eet, these ships could
carry amphibious forces and various landing craft or serve as a transfer plat-
form from larger cargo or RO-RO ships with the requisite modications for
transfer operations.
71
is ability provides additional oshore capacity to
support the amphibious assault. Some of these vessels are built as dual ci-
vilian and military use platforms, fullling intermediate support roles such
as fueling and rearming platforms for helicopter operations. Such tasks were
publicized in an August 2020 Eastern eater Command exercise involving
the 40,000-ton Zhenhua-28 and an aviation brigade of the 71
st
Group Army.
72
ese operations require the civilian vessel to have munitions storage com-
partments, fueling containers, hose connections, and other features to sup-
port multiple types of helicopters.
73
Semi-submersible ships could also greatly enhance the construction of
landing bases. Many ships have large open decks and could deliver the key
components for aoat mobile port equipment, including mobile loading equip-
ment, barges, pontoon wharves, ramp systems, and other equipment used in
the debarkation and transfer process.
74
Crane barges, deck barges, mooring sys-
tems, concrete structures, and various other equipment could also be delivered
into oshore positions. ese systems could be oated o once in position and,
if capable, assembled under their own power or by tugs and other pushing craft
to help form articial harbors and causeways to reach the beaches.
Signicant amounts of equipment could be delivered through the
semi-submersible eet. e PLAN’s only semi-submersible ship, the mobile
landing platform Donghaidao delivered in July 2015, displaces 20,000 tons.
75
However, the largest vessels are found in the commercial sector. Of the 34
large open-deck commercial semi-submersible ships built globally over the
past 25 years, 27 are owned by Chinese companies.
76
An unknown number
have already joined the strategic projection support ship eet and could be
readily mobilized and modied for PLA use.
77
ese large vessels, many with
240 Kennedy
dynamic positioning systems, could prove valuable in eet operational ma-
neuvers during a cross-strait landing.
COSCO Shipping Specialized Carriers Company, Ltd., operates eight
vessels, the largest of which was launched in 2016 and is capable of carry-
ing 98,000 metric tons.
78
Shanghai Zhenhua Heavy Industries Company, Ltd.,
has seven vessels with capacities from over 30,000 to 50,000 tons.
79
Its latest
semi-submersible, the Zhenhua-33, is a 50,000-ton civil-military dual-use
ship launched in 2016 and built with oversight by the PLAN and the Wuxi
Joint Logistic Support Center.
80
e Zhenhua-33’s main deck covers 7,700
square meters.
81
It was publicly shown sporting four designated helicopter
landing pads and marked areas for fuel and ammunition support. is large
deck could also transport numerous landing craft or dozens of amphibious
vehicles pre-staged for launch.
82
e ship would need to simply submerge its
stern to allow vehicles to easily drive o into the sea. Several of these ships
could provide a signicant boost for the PLAN’s amphibious eet.
Augmenting Ship-to-Shore Movement
China’s RO-RO vessels also have a potential role in directly supporting the
ship-to-shore movement of landing forces. In 2016, PLA reports described
a RO-RO ferry equipped with ramps that could launch amphibious armor.
83
is new ramp system was demonstrated during PLANMC exercises in July
2020 with a 15,560-ton RO-RO ferry owned and operated by COSCO Shipping
Ferry Co., Ltd.
84
During the drill, Type-05 armor embarked aboard the RO-RO
ship at the Southern eater Navy 6
th
Landing Ship Zhidui facility and were
launched from its modied stern ramp oshore at the amphibious training
area. e new ramp system was directly driven by large hydraulic rams and
support arms connecting the top of the freight deck to mounting assemblies
installed on an elongated stern ramp. Additional hydraulic rams on the back-
side of the ramp connecting to the ramp ap may also articulate further to
assist vehicle recovery.
85
e system keeps the ramp rigid while deployed into
the water, whereas normal ramps with preventer stays could be snapped o
by the dynamic stress caused by currents.
Given the number of RO-RO ships available and their carrying capacity,
this new capability, when combined with PLAN landing ships, could signi-
cantly increase estimates of China’s total amphibious lift capacity. Surging
Chinese Military and Civilian Sealift in a Cross-Strait Invasion 241
241
construction of the PLA’s landing ships would logically precede a preinva-
sion buildup, taking months or years of preparation and remaining easily vis-
ible to overhead imagery or ship spotters. However, this ramp system may
allow the PLA a faster and cheaper means of surging amphibious lift, raising
the question of how early such ramp conversions could be detected. Large
RO-RO ships also allow units to load well ahead of a planned invasion, sup-
porting personnel with shipboard amenities normally enjoyed by the public.
ey could load during optimal periods, such as on low-visibility nights with
cloud cover, easing pressure on assembly and embarkation timelines.
The CCG and Maritime Militia
A cross-strait invasion would also involve the China Coast Guard and mari-
time militia forces, both of which are the world’s largest.
86
ese paramilitary
forces would be available to PLA commanders during wartime and repre-
sent signicant volume in the number of ships China could generate during
a cross-strait landing.
e CCG operates a eet of more than 130 ships larger than 1,000 tons,
including 2 cutters displacing 12,000 tons—by far a larger force than that of
any other coast guard.
87
Using these capabilities, the CCG would mobilize to
provide a variety of support functions to the joint island landing campaign, in-
cluding evacuating casualties, replacing PLAN attrition in manpower and pos-
sibly some platforms, performing escort duties, potentially engaging in some
antisubmarine warfare, and participating in both direct and indirect combat.
88
While the cutter eet lacks signicant organic amphibious capabilities, its
sheer size cannot be ignored. With limited armaments, CCG ships are fast and
require fewer sensors and exquisite combat systems, likely leaving ample ship-
board space to support rapid transits of personnel to and from Taiwan.
e maritime militia constitutes another important supplement to a
cross-strait landing.
89
ese forces, as a subset of a nationwide militia system,
are managed through the provincial military district system. e militias have
a deep history supporting PLA landings against Nationalist-held oshore is-
lands in the 1950s. Between April and May 1950, maritime militias from the
provinces of Zhejiang, Fujian, Guangdong, and Guangxi contributed more
than 16,700 vessels and 48,000 personnel to support the PLA’s capture of
Hainan Island, the Zhoushan Archipelago, the Wanshan Archipelago, and
242 Kennedy
other coastal islands.
90
Although maritime militia missions have expanded in
recent years with the emphasis on maritime rights protection in peacetime,
their wartime support functions have not changed. Maritime militia transport
units today leverage faster and larger tonnage merchant and shing eets as
well as modern technologies to enhance support performance and coordina-
tion.
91
ese upgrades mean that maritime militias in coastal provinces still
represent a vast pool of manpower and vessels—and a range of capabilities.
Like the strategic projection support ship eets, maritime militias train
with active-duty forces and are familiar with the types of modications re-
quired to accelerate their activation and readiness. Militias organized for trans-
port support are formed with PLA units in mind, designating vessels based
on unit requirements. Larger transport ships are allocated for artillery, air de-
fense, and armored units, and smaller vessels for lighter motorized units. PLA
units coordinate their requirements in terms of ships, missions, armaments,
modications, and support with transport units to generate plans, measures,
and solutions for problems in delivering these capabilities, which are then
submitted to the relevant provincial military and government authorities to
resolve. Maritime militia transport units were previously organized based
on PLA ship transport units into “militia ship transport regiments” [minbing
chuanyuntuan, 民兵船运团], with several subordinate “transport zhongdui”
and “supporting fendui.”
92
ese units comprised a mix of merchant cargo and
shing vessels and conducted training with PLA units for cross-strait transport
operations.
93
ey have likely been reorganized into “maritime militia trans-
port dadui” [haishang minbing yunshu dadui, 海上民兵运输大队].
94
For ex-
ample, the militia transport dadui formed in the Nanjing Twin Rivers Shipping
Co., Ltd., operates large bulk carriers forming smaller zhongdui units.
95
In a cross-strait landing, maritime militias could be mobilized to provide
numerous supporting missions. ese include minelaying, reconnaissance,
deception, logistics support, and various other functions.
96
For instance, mari-
time militia units could utilize civilian covers to support a variety of PLA opera-
tions. Under the guise of shing, they could potentially insert special operations
forces and PLANMC frogmen to begin the critical mine and obstacle clearance
operations for approaching amphibious units. e maritime militia might also
carry PLA personnel to conduct coastal and beach reconnaissance ahead of a
landing, including the use of unmanned aerial and surface vehicles.
97
Chinese Military and Civilian Sealift in a Cross-Strait Invasion 243
Maritime militia ships may provide additional capacity to transport
troops and equipment across the strait. Nationwide, likely thousands of
vessels could be mobilized for this mission. Coastal provinces would have
at least several dozen units at their disposal, but estimating the number and
type of units, as well as their ships, is dicult.
98
eir readiness, capacity, and
coordination are also dicult to assess, though PLA texts stress continued
eorts at leveraging the maritime militia. One 2004 source, for instance, sug-
gests that some maritime militia transport units would deliver combat troops
directly onto beachheads.
99
ese units would likely contain smaller draft
shing vessels operating in greater numbers and would probably not be with
the rst waves. Larger militia transport ships would remain in rear transport
anchorage areas, transferring their cargoes to vessels going ashore.
Conclusion
e organic PLAN and PLAA amphibious landing ships most relevant to a
cross-strait landing have not increased tremendously but remain a robust
core capability. Although challenges remain in assessing these forces, such
as quantifying the number of landing craft in the PLAA’s watercraft forc-
es and estimating the potential to reactivate decommissioned ships, this
chapter has explored the possibility that commercial ships such as RO-RO,
semi-submersible, and maritime militia ships could ll some of the gaps in
overall sealift. Speed would be crucial, as demonstrated by the development
of a robust RO-RO ship-based transport eet. In his chapter in this volume,
Chieh Chung notes the importance of faster and more ecient PLA logistics
support, which gives Taiwan less time to transition to a wartime footing and
mobilize its forces. His chapter provides extensive detail on an improving
logistics and mobilization system throughout China that connects all the
critical links in moving PLA forces into operational areas and supporting
them. Such work highlights the importance of examining China’s progress
in the civilian sector in addition to PLA lift capacity. Some activities, such
as changes in regular ferry services across the Bohai Gulf or the Qiongzhou
Strait, could provide early indicators of mobilization eorts. ey deserve
close attention. e potential ability of modied RO-RO ships in delivering
landing forces using modied ramp systems also raises new concerns on the
overall estimate of total landing forces crossing the strait.
244 Kennedy
Greater use of civilian ships in an island-landing scenario would also
require the PLA to overcome technical challenges. For instance, one im-
portant problem is the PLA’s approach to using numerous PRC-owned
foreign ag of convenience ships—and whether the PLA could maintain
a registry of these ships and their capabilities. Some experts are condent
that these vessels would be called up if needed.
100
How the PLA would or-
ganize shipping for large-scale transport is another problem. One study by
the Naval Research Institute focuses on vessel requisition planning in large-
scale transport operations and seeks to optimize vessel selection and as-
signment when loading forces at numerous embarkation sites. e authors
describe the problem set:
National Transportation War Readiness Departments select and cong-
ure the various types of mobilized civilian vessels of shipping companies
according to the scale and types of equipment and materials required of
a maritime strategic projection mission. e number of various types of
ships are determined to minimize the transport time and cost to com-
plete a projection mission.
is study builds a model to simulate various means of disposition that satisfy
overall transport volume, time, and cost requirements and is predicated on the
PLAN’s reliance on a multitude of mobilized civilian ships to increase capacity
in current and future operations, including future island-landing operations.
101
Current PLA amphibious lift capacity leaves little room for error or attri-
tion in a joint island landing campaign. Attrition levels may worsen if Taiwan
makes signicant progress implementing many of the measures of the Over-
all Defense Concept (for details, see the chapters by Alexander Chieh-cheng
Huang and Drew ompson in this volume). Losses to the limited PLAN/
PLAA amphibious eet by Taiwan’s antiship missiles could prove catastroph-
ic to the entire endeavor, halting the movement of numerous PLA follow-on
units onboard civil transports transiting toward the island. at said, the PLA
continues to demonstrate careful study and planning of logistics operations
to deliver essential follow-on heavy forces with or without an intact port ter-
minal—a factor that could determine how long amphibious and airborne
combat units must hold Taiwan’s beaches and key areas and the degree of
attrition those forces could expect to suer.
Chinese Military and Civilian Sealift in a Cross-Strait Invasion 245
Notes
1
For a video of this exercise, see “Projecting Real Combat! People’s Liberation Army
Landing Exercises on the Southeast Coast” [突出实战
!
解放军在东南沿海登陆演练], CCTV–Asia
Today [CCTV今日亚洲], video, 24:18, October 17, 2020, available at <https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=lCDcAg9ItGk>.
2
Gu Yin [顾因] et al., “Research on Improving Shipping Ability Structure with
Decommissioned Vessels” [利用退役舰艇改善船艇部队运力结构研究], Journal of Military
Transportation University [军事交通学院学报], no. 1 (2018), 19–22.
3
e terms zhidui and dadui are often translated as “ship detachment” and “ship group,”
respectively, but they are not consistently translated in various sources. For accuracy, it is often
best to use the original Chinese terms. In this chapter, the terms zongdui [总队], zhidui [支队],
dadui [大队], and zhongdui [中队] are used from highest to lowest levels of unit organization. For a
superior explanation of this translation issue, see Kevin Pollpeter and Kenneth W. Allen, eds., e
PLA as Organization v2.0 (Vienna, VA: Defense Group, Inc., 2015), 50, available at <https://www.
airuniversity.af.edu/CASI/Display/Article/1586201/pla-as-organization-20/>.
4
is chapter’s assessment of landing ships diers from the Department of Defense 2020
China Military Power Report’s count of 21 landing ships medium and 31 landing ships, tank, in
the Northern, Eastern, and Southern theater navies.
5
New PLA Navy Marine Corps brigades in the Northern eater Command likely
conduct training with landing ships of the Northern eater Navy. See Pan Ruichen [潘瑞晨]
and Li Jinxing [李金星], “Combined Strike” [合同打击], People’s Navy [人民海军], July 2, 2018, 3.
6
Dennis J. Blasko, “e PLA Navy’s Yin and Yang: China’s Advancing Amphibious Force
and Missile Craft,” in China’s Evolving Surface Fleet, China Maritime Studies Institute (CMSI)
China Maritime Report No. 14, ed. Peter A. Dutton and Ryan D. Martinson (Newport, RI: Naval
War College Press, July 2017), 8.
7
See the chapter by Joshua Arostegui in this volume.
8
Estimates of PLA Army (PLAA) combined arms brigade personnel range from 5,000 to
6,000 but may vary by brigade type. See Dennis J. Blasko, “e PLA Army After ‘Below the Neck’
Reforms: Contributing to China’s Joint Warghting, Deterrence and MOOTW Posture,” Journal
of Strategic Studies 44, no. 2 (December 2019), 164–165.
9
Coastal defense units were previously the responsibility of the provincial military district
system. Recent reforms have consolidated many coastal defense regiments into brigades. It is
unclear how this consolidation has aected the watercraft units. See “Coastal Defense, Reserve,
and Experimental Troops Transferred to the Army to Aid Ground Force Transformation” [海防,
预备役及实验部队转隶陆军 助推陆军转型], e Observer [观察者网], May 17, 2017, available at
<https://www.guancha.cn/military-aairs/2017_05_17_408788.shtml>.
10
Blasko, “e PLA Navy’s Yin and Yang,” 8.
11
Despite their age, these craft are still valued for their versatility in PLAA coastal
operations. See “e Eastern eater Command Army Coastal Defense Brigade Ship Dadui
Recently Conducted Maritime Landing Training with the Army” [东部战区陆军海防旅船艇大
队近日联合陆军开展了海上登陆训练], e Observer [观察者网], August 18, 2018, available at
<https://www.guancha.cn/military-aairs/2018_08_18_468639.shtml?s=zwyxgtjbt>.
12
“Graphics: 271-Series Landing Craft (Yulian class)” [图文资料: 271系列登陆艇 (玉连
级)], Ifeng.com [凤凰资讯], January 31, 2008, available at <http://news.ifeng.com/mil/special/
planland/doc/200801/0131_2720_386505.shtml>.
246 Kennedy
13
Rick Joe, “e Future of China’s Amphibious Assault Fleet,” e Diplomat, July 17, 2019,
available at <https://thediplomat.com/2019/07/the-future-of-chinas-amphibious-assault-eet/>;
Blasko, “e PLA Navy’s Yin and Yang,” 8.
14
Other new missions include greater support to forces garrisoned on coastal islands,
protection of underwater cables, patrols in the near seas, and reconnaissance and security
functions at sea. See Chen Zhengfei [陈正飞] et al., “Crises and Opportunity in Construction of
Frontier and Coastal Defense Watercraft Forces in New Period” [新时期边海防船艇部队建设的
危与机], Journal of Military Transportation University [军事交通学院学报], no. 9 (2019), 39–40.
15
“High Resolution: Army Special-Use rough Deck Landing Ship Unveiled” [高清: 陆
军专用直通甲板登陆舰亮相], Global Times [环球网], November 11, 2015, available at <http://
military.people.com.cn/n/2015/1111/c1011-27803829.html>; Xuan Ya [悬崖], “Discussion on
China’s Landing Ships” [漫谈中国登陆舰艇], Ordnance Knowledge [兵器知识], no. 5 (2016), 18.
16
Gu et al., “Improving Shipping Ability Structure with Decommissioned Vessels,” 19–22.
17
Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s
Republic of China 2020 (Washington, DC: Oce of the Secretary of Defense, 2020), 117.
18
Wang Shichun [王世纯], “ird 075 Launched and May Have Sea Trial Within the Year”
[075三号舰下水 或于年内试航], e Observer [观察者网], January 29, 2021, available at <https://
cj.sina.com.cn/articles/view/1887344341/707e96d5020010r39>.
19
Xavier Vavasseur, “China Commissions a Type-055 DDG, a Type-075 LHD and a Type-
094 SSBN in a Single Day,” Naval News, April 24, 2021, available at <https://www.navalnews.
com/naval-news/2021/04/china-commissions-a-type-055-ddg-a-type-075-lhd-and-a-type-
094-ssbn-in-a-single-day/>.
20
“Type-075 Amphibious Assault Ship” [075型两栖攻击舰], Shipborne Weapons [舰载武
器], March 2020, 15.
21
Ibid., 19.
22
Niu Tao [牛涛] and Fan Xudong [范旭东], “A Certain Marine Corps Brigade Improves
the Quality and Eectiveness of Training and Preparation: Heng Ge Will Soon Write a New
Chapter” [海军陆战队某旅提升练兵备战质效: 横戈马上再写新篇], People’s Navy [人民海军],
July 24, 2018, 3.
23
For an example from the 4
th
Landing Ship Dadui in Haikou, see Yin Fengmin [尹凤敏],
“Interaction Analysis About Air-Defense Firepower’s Conjunction Use in the Amphibious Ship
Formation” [两栖作战编队防空火力协同的交互性分析], Ship Electronic Engineering [舰船电子
工程] 30, no. 9 (2010), 45.
24
ese gures comprise vessels more than 1,000 tons. When compared, the United
States has 822 national ag vessels totaling 9.5 million in deadweight tonnage. Refer to table
2.6 in United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Geneva, “Review of Maritime
Transport 2019,” January 31, 2020, 37, available at <https://unctad.org/system/les/ocial-
document/rmt2019_en.pdf>.
25
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, “Merchant Fleet by Flag of
Registration and by Type of Ship, Annual,” available at <https://unctadstat.unctad.org/wds/
TableViewer/tableView.aspx?ReportId=93>.
26
“2017 China Crew Development Report” [2017年中国船员发展报告], Ministry of
Transport of the People’s Republic of China [中华人民共和国交通运输部新闻办公室], June
2018, 5.
27
Duan Zunlei [段尊雷], Li Ye [李烨], and Liu Jinjing [刘金晶], “Team-Building
Characteristics and Countermeasures of Our Seamen in the New Situation [新形势下中国海员
队伍发展的特点与对策], Maritime Education Research [航海教育研究], no. 4 (2018), 1–2.
Chinese Military and Civilian Sealift in a Cross-Strait Invasion 247
28
See chapter 6 in National Defense Transportation Regulations
[国防交通条例], February 24, 1995, available at <https://baike.baidu.com/
item/%E5%9B%BD%E9%98%B2%E4%BA%A4%E9%80%9A%E6%9D%A1%E4%BE%8B>; article 2
of National Defense Mobilization of Civil Transport Resources Regulations [民用运力国防动员条例],
2003, available at <http://en.pkulaw.cn/display.aspx?cgid=f121bea40b0cb4a6bdfb&lib=law>;
chapter 10 of the National Defense Mobilization Law [国防动员法], 2010, available at <http://
www.gov.cn/fg/2010-02/26/content_1544415.htm>; the PRC National Defense Transportation
Law [中华人民共和国国防交通法], September 3, 2016.
29
See articles 36–38 of the PRC National Defense Transportation Law. For more details
on the organization and national authorities involved in constructing civil transport forces, see
Conor M. Kennedy, Civil Transport in PLA Power Projection, CMSI China Maritime Report No. 4
(Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, December 2019), available at <https://digital-commons.
usnwc.edu/cmsi-maritime-reports/>.
30
Article 31, PRC National Defense Transportation Law.
31
ese standards covered ve categories of vessels, including container, roll-on/roll-o
(RO-RO), multipurpose, bulk carriers, and break bulk. See Zhao Lei, “New Rules Mean Ships
Can Be Used by Military,” China Daily, June 18, 2015, available at <http://www.chinadaily.com.
cn/china/2015-06/18/content_21036944.htm>; Liu Hang [刘航], “China’s ‘Technical Standards
for New Civilian Ships to Implement National Defense Requirements’ Formally Promulgated”
[我国 “新造民船贯彻国防要求技术标准” 正式颁布实施], China Military Online [中国军网],
June 5, 2015.
32
“Hu Xiubin: ‘Four Insucients’ Present in the Construction of China’s Maritime
Strategic Projection Reserve Forces” [胡修斌: 我国海上战略投送后备力量建设存在 “四个不足”],
China National Radio [央广网], March 9, 2017, available at <http://news.cnr.cn/zt2017/2017h/
ppzb/lhzkzyt/zkzythxb/zbkx/20170309/t20170309_523647186.shtml>.
33
Cao Wuge [曹吴戈] and Ye Haolong [叶皓龙], “Merchant Ships Join the Military:
Chinese Version of Expeditionary Landing Ship Dock Emerge” [民船参军: 中国版远征船坞登陆
舰浮出水面], Transportation of Guangdong [广东交通], no. 2 (2017), 17; Liu Gang [刘刚] and
Yu Pengcheng [虞鹏程], “Our Reection on the Quick Organization of Military Sealift Reserve
Forces” [关于组建快速动员海运力量的思考], National Defense Transportation Engineering and
Technology [国防交通工程与技术], no. 3 (2014), 3.
34
Ibid.
35
Zhou Jixiao [周济晓] and Zhang Ge [张歌], “National Defense Transportation
Specialized Support Forces Now Have eir First Training and Evaluation Outline” [国防交通专
业保障队伍有了首部训考大纲], PLA Daily [解放军报], February 7, 2015.
36
He Guoben [何国本] et al., “Current Situation and Countermeasures of Strategic
Projection Support Fleet Training” [战略投送支援船队训练现状及对策], Journal of Military
Transportation University [军事交通学院学报], no. 5 (2017), 2.
37
Ibid., 2.
38
Ibid., 1–4.
39
Several examples can be found in Kennedy, Civil Transport in PLA Power Projection.
40
Jiang Kaihui [蒋凯辉] and Han Shuang [韩爽], “Development in Support Technology
for Sea-Shore Handling Heavy Equipment” [重装备岸海转运保障技术与发展], National Defense
Transportation Engineering and Technology [国防交通工程与技术], no. 1 (2010), 2.
41
Other ships, such as oilers, cargo, and container carriers, merit attention as the primary
movers of PLA war materiel and fuel but are omitted to bring attention to the key capabilities
enabling combat units to get to their operational areas.
248 Kennedy
42
Li Peng [李鹏], Sun Hao [孙浩], and Zhao Xiqing [赵喜庆], “Impact of National
Strategic Delivery Capability Development on Construction of Combined Arms Forces and
Countermeasures” [国家战略投送能力发展对合成部队建设的影响与对策], Journal of Military
Transportation University [军事交通学院学报], no. 8 (2019), 3.
43
CSC RORO Logistics Co., Ltd. [深圳长航滚装物流有限公司], “Red Research Promotes
the Spirit of the Long March: Reviewing History to Strengthen National Defense Awareness” [红
色研学弘扬长征精神: 重温历史增强国防意识].
44
Li Yuanxing [李远星] and Wang Bing [王丙], “Research on Construction and Use of
Strategic Projection Support Forces in the New Era” [新时代战略投送支援力量建设运用研究],
National Defense [国防], no. 12 (2017), 20–23; Hainan Strait Shipping Co., Ltd. [海南海峡航运股
份有限公司], “Business Scope” [业务范围], available at <http://www.hnss.net.cn/col/col17598/
index.html>.
45
“Zhejiang Civil Transport Ferries Active in Military Exercise” [浙江民运航渡活跃演
兵场], PLA Daily [解放军报], February 22, 2017, available at <http://military.people.com.cn/
n1/2017/0222/c1011-29099602.html>; “Straits Ferry to Invest 200 Million Yuan to Create a New
Landscape of ‘Blue Highways’” [海峡轮渡将投入2亿元 打造 “蓝色公路” 新风景], Zhoushan
Daily [舟山日报], January 21, 2018, available at <https://zj.zjol.com.cn/news.html?id=854956>;
“Strait Ferry’s First Hazardous Chemical RO-RO Ship ‘Zhou-20’ Commences Operations” [海
峡轮渡首艘危化品滚装船 “舟渡20” 投入运营], Eworldship.com [国际船舶网], August 18, 2019,
available at <http://www.eworldship.com/html/2019/OperatingShip_0818/151959.html>.
46
Bohai Ferry Group Co., Ltd. [渤海轮渡集团股份有限公司], “National Defense
Mobilization Work Advanced Individual Award Ceremony Held in Yantai” [全国国防动员工作
先进个人颁奖仪式在烟台举行], July 4, 2020, available at <http://www.bhferry.com/e/action/
ShowInfo.php?classid=11&id=81>.
47
Bohai Ferry Group Co., Ltd. [渤海轮渡集团股份有限公司], “Who We Are” [我们是谁],
available at <http://www.bhferry.com/brief.html>.
48
Li Xiang [李响], “Record of a Successful Practice in Civil-Military Fusion: the RO-RO
Ship ‘Bohai Cuizhu’ Enhances Our Military’s Maritime Strategic Projection Capabilities” [军民融
合领域的一次成功实践: “渤海翠珠” 滚装船提升我军海上战略投送能力纪实], National Defense
Science and Technology Industry [国防科技工业], no. 1 (2012), 53.
49
Bohai Ferry Group Co., Ltd. [渤海轮渡集团股份有限公司], “Bohai Zuanzhu” [渤海钻
珠], available at <http://www.bhferry.com/zuanzhu.html>.
50
Bohai Ferry Group Co., Ltd. [渤海轮渡集团股份有限公司], “‘Zhonghua Fuxing’
Ocially Entered Operations in the Bohai Gulf” [“中华复兴” 轮正式投入渤海湾营运], September
25, 2020, available at <http://www.bhferry.com/e/action/ShowInfo.php?classid=11&id=96>.
51
Bohai Ferry Group Co., Ltd. [渤海轮渡集团股份有限公司], “Multipurpose RO-RO Ship
‘Bohai Hengda’ Launched” [多用途滚装船 “渤海恒达” 轮下水], October 19, 2020, available at
<http://www.bhferry.com/e/action/ShowInfo.php?classid=11&id=99>.
52
“Five Years of Endurance: Exhibition of Grand Achievement, Various Types of Naval
Equipment Lay a Foundation to Compete for Sea Power” [砥砺奋进的五年: 大型成就展 海军多
种装备为争夺制海权打下基础], China.org [中国网], October 19, 2017, available at <http://mil.
qianlong.com/2017/1019/2107258_8.shtml>.
Chinese Military and Civilian Sealift in a Cross-Strait Invasion 249
53
Ferry terminals are used to handle annual surges in transport volume. For example, RO-
RO ferry and rail ferry services across the Qiongzhou Strait during the weeklong travel period for
National Day in October 2019 were able to move 365,025 passengers and 78,498 vehicles. New and
old ferry terminals are in operation. See “48 RO-RO Passenger Ships Put into Use on the Qiongzhou
Strait Route from Zhanjiang to Haikou to Deal with Peak Passenger Flow of ‘October 1
st
’” [ 琼州
海峡湛江至海口航线投入48艘客滚船迎战 “十一” 客流高峰], CNR [央广网], September 30, 2020,
available at <http://news.cnr.cn/native/city/20200930/t20200930_525284389.shtml>.
54
Bohai Ferry Group Co., Ltd., “National Defense Mobilization Work Advanced Individual
Award Ceremony Held in Yantai.”
55
Jiang and Han, “Development in Support Technology for Sea-Shore Handling Heavy
Equipment,” 2.
56
For two examples citing actual PLA cases, see Zhao Junguo [赵俊国] and Liu Baoxin [
刘宝新], “Loading and Unloading Support of RO-RO Ship with Stern Straight Type Springboard
T-Type Berthing at Vertical Lifting Wharf” [艉直式跳板滚装船丁靠直立式码头装卸载保障],
Port & Waterway Engineering [水运工程], no. 6 (2017), 77–80; Yao Yuan [姚远] et al., “Study on
Loading and Unloading Times of RO-RO Ship Berthing at Vertical Wharf” [滚装船靠泊直立式
码头装卸载时间研究”], Journal of Military Transportation University [军事交通学院学报], no.
5 (2019), 91–95.
57
Liu Baoxin [刘宝新], Zhao Junguo [赵俊国], and Hu Weiping [胡维平], “Research on
Loading and Unloading Support of RO-RO Ship Mooring Alongside Vertical Lifting Wharf” [滚装
船靠泊直立式吊装码头装卸载保障研究], Journal of Military Transportation University [军事交
通学院学报], no. 12 (2016), 26.
58
Kennedy, Civil Transport in PLA Power Projection.
59
One such example can be seen in a June 2014 Guangzhou Military Region exercise in
which military transportation department personnel were present on the bridge of a RO-RO ferry
carrying an unidentied PLAA mechanized infantry company. is training event could be a one-
o experiment. See “Guangzhou Military Region’s First Exercise Using a Civilian Ship to Load and
Unload Live Troops” [广州军区首次民船成建制实兵装卸演练], CCTV [央视网], video, 2:35, June
20, 2014, available at <https://news.cctv.com/2014/06/20/VIDE1403241489289947.shtml>.
60
Chen Xuanyu [陈炫宇], Ren Cong [任聪], and Wang Fengzhong [王凤忠], “Problems to
Countermeasures in Logistical Support in Cross-Strait and Beach Landing Transportation” [渡海
登岛运输勤务保障面临的问题和对策], Logistics Technology [物流技术], no. 10 (2016), 166–169.
61
For an ocial denition of the term landing base, see Academy of Military Sciences
[军事科学院], PLA Directory of Military Terminology [中国人民解放军军语] (Beijing: Military
Sciences Press, 2011), 94; Wang Xin [汪欣] and Wang Guangdong [王广东], “Research on the
Application of Transportation and Projection Forces in the Establishment of Landing Bases
for Cross-Sea Landing Operations” [运输投送力量在跨海登岛作战登陆基地开设中的运用研
究], National Defense Transportation Engineering and Technology [国防交通工程与技术], no. 5
(2019), 12–13.
62
Zhao Delong [赵德龙] et al., “Study on Base Support for Mechanized Infantry Brigade’s
Landing Operation” [机械化步兵旅登陆作战基地保障研究], Journal of Military Transportation
University [军事交通学院学报], no. 9 (2014), 46.
63
Luo Lei [罗雷] et al., “Construction and Enlightenment of Normandy Landing Articial
Port” [诺曼底登陆人工港的建设与启示], Journal of Military Transportation University [军事交
通学院学报], no. 1 (2020), 15–18.
250 Kennedy
64
Cai Jingtao [蔡惊涛], Diao Jinghua [刁景华], and Li Zengzhi [李增志], “Review and
Revelation of Articial Harbor Construction in Normandy Landing” [诺曼底登陆战役人工港建
设的回顾和启示], Value Engineering [价值工程], no. 6 (2014), 327–328; Zhao et al., “Study on
Base Support for Mechanized Infantry Brigade’s Landing Operation,” 45.
65
ese developments can be compared to U.S. military (joint) logistics over the shore
operations.
66
Luo et al., “Construction and Enlightenment of Normandy Landing Articial Port,”
15–18.
67
Yang Maoduo [杨茂铎], “Eorts to Solve Dicult Problems to Improve Aviation Military
Trac and Transportation Support Capabilities” [着力破解难题, 提升航务军交运输保障能力],
National Defense [国防], no. 4 (2017), 75–77.
68
Lin Wei [林伟] and Liu Lijie [刘立洁], “Research on the Replenishment Mode of Island
Transportation” [岛礁运输补给方式研究], China Storage & Transport [中国储运], no. 8 (2016),
133.
69
Luo et al., “Construction and Enlightenment of Normandy Landing Articial Port,” 18;
Jiang and Han, “Development in Support Technology for Sea-Shore Handling Heavy Equipment,” 2.
70
For the ocial description of sea states by the National Marine Environmental
Forecasting Center, see National Marine Environmental Forecasting Center [国家海洋环境预
报中心], “Table of Sea State Levels” [海况等级表], available at <http://www.nmefc.cn/nr/cont.
aspx?itemid=301&id=3726>; Jiang and Han, “Development in Support Technology for Sea-Shore
Handling Heavy Equipment,” 2.
71
Liu Gang [刘刚], “On the Needs for the Mobilization of Civilian Semi-Submersible
Vessels in China and the Prospects of their Potentialities” [我国半潜式运输船动员需求及能力
展望], National Defense Transportation Engineering and Technology [国防交通工程与技术], no.
3 (2015), 1–2.
72
“Eastern eater Command Army Aviation Multi-Type Helicopter Trains with a
Maritime Civilian Platform for Take O and Landing” [东部战区陆航多型直升机训练海上民
用平台起降], CCTV-7 Military Report [军事报道], August 20, 2020, available at <https://www.
guancha.cn/military-aairs/2020_08_20_562254.shtml>.
73
Cao and Ye, “Merchant Ships Join the Military,” 17.
74
Gao Jie [高洁] and Lai Yuhong [赖瑜鸿], “Another Merchant Ship ‘Joins the Military’:
Damaged Chinese Warships Have an Exclusive Vehicle” [又一艘民船 “参军,” 中国战损舰船有
了专属座驾], PLA Press Department [解放军记者部], April 16, 2017, available at <http://inews.
ifeng.com/50948428/news.shtml?&back>.
75
Mike Yeo, “China Commissions First MLP-Like Logistics Ship, Headed for South
Sea Fleet,” USNI News, July 14, 2015, available at <https://news.usni.org/2015/07/14/chinas-
commissions-rst-mlp-like-logistics-ship-headed-for-south-sea-eet>.
76
Chen Chuli [陈矗立], “Strategic Analysis of the Semi-Submersible Transport Market
Based on the ‘Porter’s Five Forces’ Model” [基于 “波特五力” 模型的半潜船运输市场战略分析],
World Shipping [世界海运], no. 8 (2019), 12–13.
77
Gao and Lai, “Another Merchant Ship ‘Joins the Military.’”
78
Yang Hongsuo [杨洪所], Zhang Qun [张群], and Hu Shuang [胡双], “Competition and
Prospects of the Global Semi-Submersible Vessel Transport Industry” [全球半潜船运输行业
竞争格局与前景], Plant Maintenance and Engineering [设备管理与维修], no. 12 (2018), 116;
“China’s Largest Semi-Submersible Ship ‘Xin Guanghua’ Begins Operations” [我国最大半潜船 “
新光华” 轮投入运营], China Ocean News [中国海洋报], December 9, 2016, available at <http://
www.oceanol.com/keji/kjdt/2016-12-09/65182.html>.
Chinese Military and Civilian Sealift in a Cross-Strait Invasion 251
79
Yang, Zhang, and Hu, “Competition and Prospects of the Global Semi-Submersible
Vessel Transport Industry,” 116.
80
“China’s First Dual Use Semi-Submersible Ship Completed and Enters Use in Nantong”
[中国首艘军民两用半潜船在南通启动建成投入使用], CCTV [央广网], March 15, 2017, available
at <http://www.ntjoy.com/news/yw/2017/03/2017-03-15554678.html>.
81
Wang Xin, “China’s First Dual-Use Semi-Submersible Put into Operation,” China Plus,
March 15, 2017, available at <http://chinaplus.cri.cn/news/china/9/20170315/1540.html>.
82
Potential amphibious vehicle lift assuming vehicle spacing of 1.2 meters fore and aft
and 0.5 meters starboard and port, as well as sucient ush-deck fastening points or appropriate
modication; this means the Zhenhua-33 could handle up to 150 ZTD-05 vehicles. is
assumption is based on a total of 51 square meters per vehicle using one PLA author’s estimates
for RO-RO loading and spacing of tracked equipment and artillery, which accounts for vehicle
movement while at sea as well as space for proper fastening. Spacing is only slightly dierent
for fore-and-aft wheeled vehicles. See Chen Yiping [陈益平], “Research on Issues Related to
Military Use RO-RO Transportation” [军用车辆船舶滚装运输有关问题研究], National Defense
Transportation Engineering and Technology [国防交通工程与技术], no. 5 (2018), 5.
83
Li Hong [李宏] and Gao Jie [高洁], “Strategic Delivery Support Fleet Enters the Joint
Exercise Field” [战略投送支援船队开进联合演练场], PLA Daily [解放军报], September 11, 2016.
84
COSCO Shipping Ferry Co., Ltd. [中远海运客运有限公司], “Bang Chui Dao” [棒棰岛].
85
“China’s Navy: Landing Combat Exercise Develops Amphibious Combat Capabilities”
[中国海军: 渡海登陆作战演练锤炼两栖作战能力], CCTV [央视网], video, 1:38, August 3, 2020,
available at <https://tv.cctv.com/2020/08/03/VIDEf15KuSr28oMmGTNd63Nz200803.shtml>.
86
Andrew S. Erickson, “Maritime Numbers Game: Understanding and Responding to
China’s ree Sea Forces,” Indo-Pacic Defense Forum, January 28, 2019, available at <https://
ipdefenseforum.com/2019/01/maritime-numbers-game/>.
87
Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2020, 71;
Kyle Mizokami, “China Launches Another Monster Coast Guard Cutter,” Popular Mechanics,
January 14, 2016, available at <https://www.popularmechanics.com/military/navy-ships/
a18990/china-launches-second-monster-coast-guard-cutter/>.
88
Ye Jun [叶军], “On Building China Coast Guard as Supporting Force for China Navy in
Time of War” [海警在战时对海军进行支援的问题探讨], Journal of China Maritime Police [公安
海警学院报], no. 1 (2012), 6–8; Liu Zhangren [刘章仁], “Strengthening Coordination Between
Navy and Coast Guard to Improve Marine Control Ability” [论海警海军协同配合提高海洋管控
能力], Journal of China Maritime Police Academy [公安海警学院学报], no. 3 (2014), 53–54. For
an in-depth examination of the growth and militarization of the China Coast Guard, see Ryan
D. Martinson, e Arming of China’s Maritime Frontier, CMSI China Maritime Report No. 2
(Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, June 2017), 2.
89
Wu Pingxiang [吴品祥], “Vigorously Strengthen the Construction of Militia Shipping
Regiments” [大力加强民兵船运团建设], National Defense [国防], no. 2 (2004), 42. For a more
recent inclusion of the maritime militia in a cross-strait joint landing campaign, see Zhao et al.,
“Study on Base Support for Mechanized Infantry Brigade’s Landing Operation,” 45.
90
Han Huaizhi [韩怀智], ed., Contemporary Chinese Militia [当代中国民兵] (Beijing:
China Social Sciences Press, 1989), 234.
91
Kou Zhenyun [寇振云] and Feng Shi [冯时], “‘Four Requirements’ in Strengthening
Maritime Militia Construction” [加强海上民兵建设 “四要”], National Defense [国防], no. 5
(2016), 41–42.
252 Kennedy
92
Guo Suqing [郭苏青], “Creating Militia Ship Transport Regiments to Support Units in
a Cross-Sea Landing Operation” [组建民兵船运团保障部队渡海登陆作战], National Defense [国
防], no. 12 (2004), 35.
93
For two examples in Zhejiang Province, see “Xiangshan County Militia Shipping
Regiment Assists PLA Amphibious Landing Training” [象山县民兵船运团助力解放军两栖
登陆训练], Xinhua [新华网], September 25, 2013, available at <http://www.chinanews.com/
mil/2013/09-25/5319125.shtml>; “Zhoushan City Formed a Militia Shipping Group” [舟山
市组建成立民兵船运团], PLA Daily [解放军报], October 24, 2003, available at <http://news.
sina.com.cn/c/2003-10-24/1547984589s.shtml>. e 1
st
Militia Ship Transport Regiment in
Taizhou Has Several Subordinate “Fishing Zhongdui” and “Transport Zhongdui.” See “Taizhou
City Establishes a Militia Ship Transport Regiment” [台州市组建民兵船运团], Zhejiang Online
News [浙江在线新闻网站], July 14, 2004, available at <http://zjnews.zjol.com.cn/05zjnews/
system/2004/07/14/003047058.shtml>.
94
Wang Haitao [王海涛], “Implement the Overall National Security Concept and Actively
Promote the Transformation of Coastal Defense Construction” [贯彻总体国家安全观, 积极推进
海防建设转型], National Defense [国防], no. 10 (2014), 54.
95
Nanjing Twin Rivers Shipping Co., Ltd. [南京两江海运股份有限公司], “Company
Conducts Maritime Militia Training” [公司开展海上民兵训练], September 2, 2019.
96
Liu Zili [刘自力] and Chen Qingsong [陈青宋], “Tasks and Operations of the Maritime
Militia When Participating in Maritime Combat” [海上民兵参加海战的任务与行动], National
Defense [国防], no. 11 (2018), 50–51.
97
In wartime, contingents of special operations forces and marine corps reconnaissance
units could likely form special operations detachments centered on the maritime militia. See
ibid., 51.
98
e author found 63 individual maritime militia units in the various counties of
Zhejiang Province; however, there are likely more, particularly in major port areas. It should be
noted that not all are units organized for transport missions, but they could serve in this role
through some degree of modication. See exhibits 0-3 and 0-5 in Andrew S. Erickson and Ryan
D. Martinson, eds., China’s Maritime Gray Zone Operations (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press,
2019).
99
Guo, “Creating Militia Ship Transport Regiments to Support Units in a Cross-Sea
Landing Operation,” 37.
100
Chinese national defense mobilization laws allow for requisition of Chinese-owned
vessels despite being foreign agged. See Liu Baoxin [刘宝新] and Liu Jiasheng [刘嘉生],
“Research on National Defense Mobilization of Chinese-Funded Ship with Flag of Convenience”
[中资方便旗船国防动员问题研究], Journal of Military Transportation University [军事交通学院
学报], no. 1 (2018), 15–18.
101
Li Zhouqing [李周清] et al., “Selection, Deployment and Optimization of Merchant
Ships for Maritime Strategic Projection” [海上战略投送动员民船多点选型配置优化], Journal of
Military Transportation University [军事交通学院学报], no. 3 (2019), 4–7.
CHAPTER 9
PLA Logistics and Mobilization Capacity in
a Taiwan Invasion
Chieh Chung
253
M
ainland Chinese analysts often use the term large-scale joint
operations [da guimo lianhe zuozhan, 大规模联合作战] to de-
scribe taking Taiwan by force. Given the People’s Liberation Army
(PLA)’s perception that Chinese military actions against Taiwan will invite
foreign intervention, ghting “a quick battle for a quick result” [suzhan sujue,
速战速决] has become exceedingly important for PLA doctrine.
1
However,
the PLA has not yet acquired the capability to ght a quick battle in the Tai-
wan Strait. A key reason is the limited capacity of its joint logistics support
and national defense mobilization systems. e PLA has recently made ef-
forts to improve its logistics mobilization capabilities; some of these were put
to the test in the ght against the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020, when the PLA
needed to move resources across the country in an accelerated time frame.
2
Yet there are still indications that the PLA would face challenges in transport-
ing and sustaining forces across the strait.
is chapter analyzes recent improvements in Chinese military logistics
as well as continuing challenges in providing logistics support for cross-strait
operations. It nds that the 2015–2016 reforms led to progress in the structure
of the logistics and national defense mobilization system. e chapter also
254 Chung
surveys the estimated requirements and perceived shortages in the logistics
arena during wartime and analyzes possible follow-on improvements. e
chapter nds that, due to the complexity and scale of the operations and the
remaining weaknesses and limitations, it will take the PLA considerable time
to improve these systems to the point that a quick battle for a quick result
could be attained. Taiwan must take advantage of this window of opportunity
to strengthen its own ability to counter China’s logistics operations.
e chapter is divided into four sections. e rst section reviews the
PLA’s post-reform joint logistics structure, including the relationships be-
tween the logistics system and the theater commands. e second section
details the PLA’s perceived logistics requirements for a cross-strait inva-
sion in three areas—materiel support, medical support, and transporta-
tion—and documents weaknesses in each area. e third section describes
the structure of, and weaknesses in, the PLA’s mobilization system, which
would also be called on to contribute logistics support in wartime. e
fourth section considers improvements to infrastructure, personnel, and
information systems that might be pursued in the coming years to support
both systems. is analysis establishes a framework for further research
on the PLA’s eorts to upgrade its logistics mobilization capabilities for an
invasion of Taiwan.
e chapter draws on underutilized research published in PLA periodi-
cals including the Journal of Military Transportation University and National
Defense, as well as books published by the PLA National Defense Universi-
ty and the PLA Logistics Academic Research Center. Most authors of these
papers and publications are active-duty PLA commanders and sta ocers
directly involved in logistics or mobilization systems, military academics who
specialize in these subjects, or ocers enrolled at PLA academies. eir writ-
ings provide diverse perspectives on key topics and are more thorough and
informative than articles in PLA propaganda outlets such as PLA Daily.
The PLA’s Post-Reform Logistics System
At the end of 2012, Central Military Commission (CMC) Chairman Xi Jin-
ping instructed the military to “build a logistics system that ensures victo-
ry in modern warfare, serves the needs of the military in its move toward
modernization, and enables a transformation into an informatized mode of
PLA Logistics and Mobilization Capacity in a Taiwan Invasion 255
operation.” Collectively, these admonitions composed the “three major tasks
in the construction of modern logistics.”
3
Acting on Xi’s instructions, the PLA
drew up plans for restructuring the logistics system between 2013 and 2015.
In late 2015, the CMC, as part of its general outline for military reform, decid-
ed to do the following:
Adjust and reform the logistics support system’s leadership and man-
agement on the basis of the current system, to optimize the relationship
between logistics support forces and their leaders, and to build a logistics
support system that is compatible with the joint operations command
mechanism and that incorporates and combines general and specialized
logistics support.
4
To better understand how the new joint logistics system will contribute to
PLA operations against Taiwan, this section rst reviews key organizational
changes and then identies the relationship between the joint logistics and
command systems.
Basic Organization
e new organizational structure consists of a CMC Logistic Support Depart-
ment (LSD) responsible for logistics management, a Joint Logistic Support
Force (JLSF) responsible for operational support, and logistics departments
in each of the services.
5
At the CMC level, the previous General Logistics De-
partment was reorganized and renamed the LSD. is organization serves as
the CMC’s “sta, service, and executive unit” for logistics aairs, including
“executing plans for the logistics support system across the services, con-
ducting policy research, setting standards, checking, and supervising.”
6
e
LSD is also the primary agent for providing logistics support to the CMC Joint
Operations Command Center (JOCC), which would serve as the PLA’s top
command post in wartime.
7
On September 13, 2016, the CMC inaugurated the JLSF as the main force
to execute joint logistics support as well as strategic and campaign support
missions.
8
e JLSF is the strategic and campaign support’s “st force” [quan-
tou liliang, 拳头力量] directly subordinate to the CMC and will thus play a key
role in logistics support for joint operations.
9
It is headquartered at the Wuhan
Joint Logistics Support Base, formerly known as the General Logistics Depart-
ment Wuhan Rear Area Base, which, according to one PLA article, takes orders
256 Chung
directly from the CMC JOCC.
10
In early 2018, the Wuhan base was upgraded
from corps to theater deputy leader grade, symbolizing its important status
within the PLA’s joint operations system. Exercising power equivalent to a ma-
jor PLA component, the JLSF has nearly acquired the status of an independent
service.
11
In addition to hosting the JLSF command sta, the base maintains
strategic reserves that may be allocated to any theater in a contingency.
12
e JLSF headquarters in turn oversees ve Joint Logistic Support Cen-
ters (JLSCs), each based in one of the ve PLA theater commands. e JLSC
headquarters are in Wuxi (Eastern eater), Guilin (Southern eater),
Zhengzhou (Central eater), Xining (Western eater), and Shenyang
(Northern eater). eir mission is to provide support—including materiel
supply, medical, transportation and delivery, and military facility support—
to units based in these theaters.
13
Below this level, dedicated logistics units
and other units with relevant equipment have been combined into new lo-
gistics support departments. ey are responsible for unit-specic logistics
and equipment buildup, logistics and equipment support, and joint logistics
support missions for designated areas.
14
While the PLA has strengthened its joint logistics capabilities, a division
of labor remains between joint and service logistics. e PLA describes “joint
logistics forces as the backbone and elements of all the PLA’s services as aux-
iliary forces, with a combination of centralized and decentralized modes of
operation and a separate treatment of general-purpose and service-specif-
ic hardware.”
15
Based on this distinction, the PLA Army has built up its LSD,
while the PLA Navy, Air Force, and Rocket Force have consolidated their re-
spective logistics support departments to guide “service-specic logistics”
[junzhong zhuanyong houqin, 军中专用后勤] construction projects and
organize service logistics support.
16
One exception is the Strategic Support
Force, which has directed its Operational Logistics Planning Bureau [zhanqin
jihua ju, 战种计划局] to take responsibility for both general logistics support
and coordination of general-purpose equipment support.
17
rough the structural adjustments mentioned above, a “peacetime ad-
ministrative chain of command” and a “wartime operational chain of com-
mand” have been formed within the logistics support system of the PLA.
According to one PLA analyst, an “administrative chain of command” ex-
tends from the CMC to the Wuhan Joint Logistics Support Base and service
PLA Logistics and Mobilization Capacity in a Taiwan Invasion 257
logistics departments to the JLSCs and theater service logistics forces to joint
logistics support forces. is system is responsible for the construction and
management of joint logistics support at all levels.
18
Its focus is on transpor-
tation and delivery; emergency logistics; logistics support base construction;
and “military-civil fusion” [junmin ronghe, 军民融合], which refers to the use
of civilian resources to boost logistics support capacity and quality.
19
PLA sources describe a “wartime operational chain of command” sep-
arate from the logistics support department under the CMC JOCC and the
CMC LSD to the theater service logistics departments and JLSCs to joint lo-
gistics support forces. is logistics support mechanism is integrated into the
joint operations command system centered on the ve theater commands.
20
It features a shallow depth and a broad width, meeting the requirements of
modern information warfare for a at organization.
21
Integration into the Joint Operations Command System
e relationship between the new logistics system and the theaters varies
between peacetime and wartime conditions. In peacetime, operational units
submit requests for general materiel to theater-based JLSCs and requests for
service-specic materiel to theater service logistics support departments. Af-
ter reviewing the requests, these two authorities send the requested materiel
to subordinate rear warehouses. e materiel is then delivered by the ware-
houses and their materiel support departments (or detachments) via local
transportation means to the requesting units.
22
ere would be a stronger integration of joint logistics forces into the
theater structure during wartime compared with during peacetime arrange-
ments. Specically, operational planning bureaus within the theater joint
sta departments would direct both the JLSCs and the theater service logis-
tics support departments. ese joint logistics commands would coordinate
the distribution of resources to operational units.
23
In particular, PLA sources
indicate that materiel requested by operational units would be distributed
via relevant operational planning departments and delivery forces to theater
JLSCs (general materiel) and theater service logistics support departments
(service-specic materiel).
24
e two distribution channels would then de-
liver materiel to designated destinations. Guidance would also be oered to
these requesting units to teach them how to use the materiel.
25
258 Chung
If a specic theater command cannot meet the requirements based on
its internal capabilities, the theater commander would likely submit requests
to the LSD through the CMC JOCC. at organization, managed by the CMC
Joint Sta Department, would generate replenishment plans and order the-
ater commanders in other regions to provide support to the main theater. If
more than two theaters are involved in a joint campaign, the LSD would likely
coordinate the distribution of logistics resources to enable cross-theater joint
operations through the CMC JOCC.
Logistics Requirements for an Invasion of Taiwan
PLA publications on logistics support often refer to the use of force against
Taiwan as “large-scale joint operations” to “achieve the goal of unifying the
country.”
26
e aim of such operations has changed from “anti-Taiwan in-
dependence” to “promoting unication.” e modes of operations have
also changed from warning strikes and partial blockades to a wider variety
of means, including strategic deterrence, a general blockade, paralysis with
large-scale repower strikes, and an amphibious landing on parts of the is-
land (for a discussion of the primary campaigns, see the chapter by Michael
Casey in this volume).
27
Potential theaters of operations have also expanded
to encompass eastern Taiwan and its coastal waters.
28
If the PLA launches large-scale joint operations against Taiwan, such op-
erations would surely involve troops from multiple theater commands and
services. e number of troops involved, the scale and extent of the operations,
the intensity of the conict, and the amount of materiel consumed would be
enormous. e logistics support capacity needed for such a campaign would
likely surpass that for any previous campaigns that the PLA has ever launched.
More important, the PLA must be prepared for a possible intervention
by the “strong enemy”—that is, the United States—and a “chain reaction in
other strategic directions,”
29
meaning the expansion of the conict to other
theaters. e PLA thus hopes that it can bring the campaign against Taiwan to
a conclusion within a short time frame and that the strategic goal of “the rst
engagement as the nal engagement” [shouzhan ji juezhan, 首战即决战] can
be achieved through quick and decisive tactical operations.
30
To satisfy this objective, large-scale joint operations will require an in-
crease in materiel consumption and a surge in the demand for mobilization
PLA Logistics and Mobilization Capacity in a Taiwan Invasion 259
within a short period of time.
31
e PLA would need to manage logistics tasks
including materiel supply support, medical service support, and transporta-
tion and delivery support. e following sections review PLA estimates of these
logistics requirements and oer an analysis of current deciencies in each area.
Materiel Supply Support
According to a study by the PLA Logistics Academic Research Center, the
materials necessary for an amphibious landing would total more than 30
million metric tons, with 5.6 million metric tons of oil consumed.
32
Amphib-
ious landing operations by a single combined arms brigade consume an es-
timated 625,457 kilograms of petrol and diesel per day.
33
Compounding the
sheer scale of the eort, PLA sources suggest that materiel supply faces sev-
eral problems. First, logistics support is described as “being relatively small
in scale, having a low degree of materialization, a low level of mechanization,
and sub-standard professionalism on the part of reserve logistics support
forces, and being weak in specic logistics support (especially for maritime
forces and airborne troops).”
34
is system cannot meet the requirements for
large-scale joint operations.
Second, regarding military warehousing capacity, the PLA’s land-based
logistics support bases are well developed, but large and comprehensive
modernized logistics support bases that can provide support for all the PLA’s
services to conduct joint operations remain unsatisfactory. Also, there are
currently no prepositioned and forward-deployed logistics support bases.
35
In terms of the amount of materiel stored, the PLA had by 2016 stockpiled
enough materials and equipment to meet the requirements for a medi-
um-sized campaign. However, current stores—especially military rations and
reserve equipment—are insucient to satisfy the logistics support demands
of large-scale joint operations.
36
ird, with respect to the distribution of materiel, there is a self-assessed
problem of “rst-line units low in their stocks, second-line units weak in
their capabilities, and third-line units faraway in their locations.” First-line
units, with relatively few military warehouses and large military wharves at
their disposal, have limited materiel storage and cargo-handling capacity,
and their distribution and comprehensive logistics support capabilities are
relatively weak.
37
Given that the PLA lacks sucient supplies for a major
260 Chung
campaign, additional supplies that can be obtained through the national de-
fense mobilization system are crucial. e eciency of the mobilization sys-
tem, as discussed below, plays a key role in this respect.
Medical Service Support
According to estimates from the PLA Logistics Academic Research Cen-
ter, considering the “enemy’s capability to conduct surveillance and recon-
naissance and precision strikes with deadly weapons” and the diculty in
launching cross-strait operations, the PLA would suer a high “combat at-
trition rate.” e specic rate cited for the ground combat force is about 7
percent, maritime combat force about 15 percent, air combat force about 10
percent, and Rocket Force about 5 percent. e total estimated number of in-
jured PLA personnel is about 120,000.
38
Nearly 48,000 beds would be needed
to take care of the wounded troops.
39
In the 2020 ght against the coronavirus pandemic, the PLA tested its
medical service capacity as it mobilized personnel and materials in large
numbers and delivered them to Wuhan. By February 25, a total of 150,000
beds were available in designated hospitals, mobile cabin hospitals, isolation
care points, and medical observation points. is experience demonstrates
that the PLA’s emergency medical response capacity could quantitatively
meet the basic requirements for future large-scale joint operations. Mean-
while, the “mobile cabin hospitals, designated hospitals, and hospitals for
critical and serious illnesses and conditions” that the PLA jointly established
with the private medical sector won recognition from PLA leaders.
40
is
type of cooperation is likely to continue to provide support to theaters in
large-scale military actions.
Several other signs indicate that the PLA has improved its medical service
support capacity. First, the completion rate of military medical service facil-
ity construction projects has been over 86 percent.
41
Second, the land-based
mobile medical service support system can now set up 46 eld hospitals and
an additional 43 army division-level rst aid stations within a short period
of time, and has the capacity to treat 36,000 patients daily.
42
ird, the PLA
owns rear hospitals that, once expanded, can treat 70,000 patients daily.
43
is gure may further increase with a boost in the treatment capacity of the
private medical sector in coastal provinces in southeast China. Fourth, stocks
PLA Logistics and Mobilization Capacity in a Taiwan Invasion 261
of medicine for use by individual soldiers are enough to support 600,000 ser-
vicemembers. Stocks of commonly used medicines for wartime needs can
support 500,000 soldiers for a duration of 30 days.
44
Although the PLA does not seem to have a serious problem with the
quantity of readily available resources, it appears to lack the capability to
reach the goal of ghting a quick battle for a quick result. Its current speed in
transporting and delivering medical service personnel and materiel, as well
as its ability to make prior preparations, are insucient to achieve the PLA’s
goals in a large-scale operation. In the ght against COVID-19, for instance,
despite an all-out eort to provide medical service support to Wuhan, it still
took 10 days for the PLA to complete the construction of a single makeshift
hospital and a host of mobile cabin hospitals.
Moreover, since large-scale joint operations against Taiwan will cover
parts of mainland China, maritime areas, and Taiwan proper, PLA troops will
be greatly exhausted after the long journey, not to mention the prior move-
ment to assembly points and preparations for war.
45
Various types of warfare
and counter-warfare will be launched at the same time. Campaigns will un-
fold on the ground, at sea, and in the air simultaneously, resulting in a surge
in casualties within a short time that will be scattered unevenly in dierent
regions.
46
Such casualties will include soldiers who fall overboard, especially
in waters east of Taiwan, and those injured while executing “multiple-point
simultaneous parachuting” missions over Taiwan. None of these casualties
will be easily located and evacuated.
47
is situation makes the overall logis-
tics support plan for the campaign even more dicult.
Transportation and Delivery Support
To invade Taiwan, the PLA needs to launch large-scale joint operations by
sea and air. e number of troops to be projected to medium- and long-range
destinations would be in the “hundreds of thousands.”
48
As studies by the PLA
Logistics Academic Research Center point out, advance troops are estimated
to be in the tens of thousands, roughly the main strength of six combined
arms brigades.
49
Some of these troops must be projected by air, including
about two brigades projected by helicopters to perform air maneuver op-
erations.
50
Seaborne delivery requires the capacity to transport two to three
pre-reform heavy army divisions at a time.
51
262 Chung
Such operations are highly challenging in terms of the number of troops,
equipment, and wounded troops to be transported. According to the PLA Lo-
gistics Academic Research Center, the entire operation would require about
3,000 train trips, 1 million vehicle trips, 2,100 aircraft sorties, 15 oil pipeline
battalions [dadui, 大队], and more than 8,000 ship voyages.
52
ere has been
little mention of operational tempo in open-source research papers, though
it appears the PLA wants group armies to complete the loading of outbound
materiel within 24 hours, and brigades and regiments within 4 hours.
53
To complete these tasks, the PLA has built both aviation- and sea-based
delivery forces, but problems remain. By the end of 2017, the PLA could
transport less than two brigades, or regiments, of armed paratroopers when
80 percent of its Y-20, Il-76, and Y-8C transport aircraft were ready for ac-
tion.
54
ere is still a considerable dierence between that gure and the pro-
jected four to ve combined arms brigades needed to accomplish an initial
blitzkrieg-style invasion of Taiwan. Moreover, military helicopters, though
capable of making up some of the shortfall created by insucient transport
aircraft, had the problem of being “of one same type, incapable of transport-
ing heavy equipment and large amounts of materiel for emergency use,” a
condition that lasted at least until early 2020.
55
Much attention has been given to the use of civilian aircraft in supple-
menting military airlift. Nevertheless, the civil aircraft eet can perform only
some wartime functions because features such as cabin door sizes, cabin siz-
es, and cabin oor bearing loads do not necessarily meet military require-
ments.
56
Other problems include loading and unloading facilities at airports
and other technical limits. erefore, in an island landing, the civil aircraft
eet can transport troops and materiel only to designated assembly areas or
points of departure. Also, only after the PLA has paralyzed Taiwan’s air de-
fense system and taken control of a main airport could these civil aircraft
begin to transport troops and materiel. During the critical early stages of a
campaign, the PLA must therefore rely solely on its own organic air transport
assets to execute sea-crossing troop and materiel transportation missions.
Several similar deciencies are apparent in the military’s sealift force. First,
there is a shortage of standardized active delivery equipment. Problems with
the PLA’s marine transportation include “a severe shortage of large standardized
ocean-going logistics vessels and an even smaller number of ships that can be
PLA Logistics and Mobilization Capacity in a Taiwan Invasion 263
used to carry troops across the strait to conduct amphibious landing operations,
with existing ships small in tonnage and capable of carrying only a small num-
ber of troops.”
57
In the rst half of 2018, it was estimated that even if the PLA used
all the transport ships and landing vessels at its disposal, it could project only
two army brigades and four marine corps–reinforced battalions across the Tai-
wan Strait
58
—a far cry from the goal of sending two to three pre–military reform
heavy divisions. PLA analysts have also noted as another issue the “failure to
provide logistics support of various sorts for large-scale operations.”
59
Second, the PLA would attempt to bridge the gap in military sealift by en-
listing civilian ships. Yet, while the PLA established the rst civilian seaborne
strategic delivery support eet in Shanghai in July 2013,
60
roll-on/roll-o
ships suitable for carrying heavy equipment for rapid delivery are assessed
as insucient.
61
As discussed in Conor Kennedy’s chapter in this volume, the
PLA also continues to rely on civilian merchant eets. Such forces, howev-
er, seldom if ever participate in maritime training and important missions,
which can directly diminish the eectiveness of mobilization of troops for
seaborne strategic delivery.
62
As of early 2020, the problem of “landing ships
being too diverse in type, scattered in deployment, and relatively weak in sys-
tematic delivery support” also remained.
63
In sum, the PLA’s logistics support
capabilities for large-scale joint operations, in terms of materiel supply, med-
ical service, and transportation and delivery support, are presently unable to
support the goal of a quick battle for a quick result.
Adapting the Logistics Mobilization System
In 2016, PLA Academy of Military Sciences National Defense Comprehensive
Research Oce Deputy Director Han Qinggu wrote that a large-scale joint
operation is a strategic joint warfare campaign organized by the high com-
mand and executed jointly by one or several theater commands and units
of dierent services and service branches under them.
64
“Partial mobiliza-
tion” by a single theater command is insucient given the immense logistics
requirements of this joint warfare campaign.
65
erefore, dierent levels of
logistics mobilization must be launched in adjacent theaters depending on
combat needs in specic areas or conditions.
66
is section rst describes
how the mobilization system is organized to meet these requirements and
then describes the attendant challenges.
264 Chung
Post-Reform Mobilization System
PLA reforms have produced a top-down mobilization system that would
organize support for forces during a Taiwan contingency. e system would
be led by a logistics support department within the CMC JOCC. Below this
level, joint logistics command and defense mobilization command mecha-
nisms would be established under the Eastern eater Command JOCC to
collect and distribute resources in this and other theaters. e mobilization
bureau under the Eastern eater’s Joint Sta Department would coordi-
nate with provincial, municipal, and county national defense mobilization
commissions to form dierent levels of joint mobilization command or-
ganizations.
67
is bureau would select options from among mobilization
plans prepared in advance, adjusting according to the status and limita-
tions of national defense mobilization. e bureau would then provide mo-
bilization orders to various units and enact timely adjustments depending
on the battle’s progress.
68
Provincial military districts are key to the success of the mobilization. In
peacetime, the districts are led by the CMC National Defense Mobilization De-
partment and carry out such functions as organizing militia units to participate
in search and rescue, security, policing, anti-terror, and social order mainte-
nance missions.
69
In wartime, districts would be placed under the theater joint
operations command mechanism to handle “organizing and commanding na-
tional defense mobilization,” “organizing reserve troops to provide support to
combat action,” and “supporting combat troops’ trans-regional maneuvers.”
70
Given the anticipated scope of a cross-strait campaign, resources in
several geographic locations would be mobilized. First, provinces and cities
within the Eastern eater Command would be regarded as basic mobili-
zation areas [jiben dongyuan qu, 基本动员区], implying full mobilization in
all areas.
71
By 2019, Shanghai City and Fujian Province, both located within
this theater, had completed national defense mobilization systems covering
the whole city or province. ese wider mobilization systems appear to have
solved or greatly reduced information problems and improved integration
between previously fragmented mobilization systems.
72
Second, provinces and cities adjacent to the Eastern eater Command
would be regarded as auxiliary mobilization areas [fuzhu dongyuan qu, 辅
助动员区]. ese zones would mobilize resources and personnel to a more
PLA Logistics and Mobilization Capacity in a Taiwan Invasion 265
limited extent to make up for resource deciencies in the basic mobilization
areas.
73
As troops and materials from other theaters are transported to the
Eastern eater, the provinces they transit will form “troop maneuver sup-
port command mechanisms” based on provincial military districts and na-
tional defense mobilization commissions to mobilize personnel, economic
resources, transportation means, and civil air defense facilities to provide lo-
gistics support to troops and materials.
74
ird, anticipating a possible expansion of the conict through what
Chinese strategists refer to as chain reaction warfare, other theaters may be
regarded as stand-by mobilization areas [yubei dongyuan qu, 预备动员区],
which implement target-specic mobilization in limited areas, such as ter-
ritorial air defense, border defense, maintenance of social order, production
of military items, and evacuation. Logistics mobilization in these areas can
ensure the eective neutralization of armed conicts and disruptive activities
incited by domestic and hostile elements overseas.
75
In early 2016, the Eastern eater Command was notably tasked with the
experimental mission of establishing a “theater command military-local coor-
dination mechanism that supports the military and provides frontline support”
[zhanqu yong jun zhi qian jun di xietiao jizhi, 战区拥军支前军地协调机制].
76
e command formulated relevant regulations with the local governments
of the Shanghai, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Anhui, Fujian, Jiangxi, and Guangdong
provinces, specifying rules for civilian support for military operations. Sup-
plemental measures—such as the establishment of joint meetings, situation
reports, and inspection and assessment systems—have also been approved.
77
ese regulations suggest that the moment the PLA uses forces against Tai-
wan, Guangdong Province, within the Southern eater Command’s area of
responsibility, will execute full mobilization similar to the six provinces and
cities within the Eastern eater Command’s area of responsibility.
In addition to area-specic “partial mobilization,” large-scale joint oper-
ations against Taiwan would also involve “specic mobilization” [zhuanxiang
dongyuan, 专项动员] covering multiple specialty areas, including the infor-
mation, transportation, materiel, medical service, building, energy, and busi-
ness sectors, all of which would be mobilized to diering extents. Based on
available evidence, the information, communication, oil, and energy sectors
would enforce full mobilization.
78
266 Chung
Mobilization System Weaknesses
Although highly praised in Chinese media reports, the PLA’s national defense
mobilization system still faces various problems. First, there are command and
control issues. Provincial military districts, which are responsible for preparing
for mobilization in peacetime, remain outside the theater command structure
and instead report to the CMC National Defense Mobilization Department.
Whether this arrangement will aect the mobilization system’s integration into
the joint operations command mechanism during wartime remains under de-
bate in the PLA. Moreover, there is virtually no peacetime communication link
between theaters and civil government agencies capable of providing resourc-
es. erefore, mobilization command departments established under theater
commands during wartime will surely need time to get on track.
Second, there is evidence of poor planning in the provincial military
districts. In the 2020 pandemic response, some districts acted in impromp-
tu ways rather than according to plan. is experience could demonstrate
that the PLA, in drafting its mobilization plans, focuses only on active troops
without giving much attention to reserve troops or civilian resources. PLA
scholars also report that plans for military operations other than war and
government emergency response plans are not closely linked.
79
is assess-
ment suggests that, in terms of advance planning, the PLA’s national defense
mobilization system has yet to make the improvements necessary to meet the
requirements for an invasion of Taiwan.
ird, there are human capital and technical problems. For instance, pro-
vincial military districts generally do not have specialized units or personnel,
nor are their examination criteria compatible with local norms. Insucient
informatization has also resulted in failure to achieve seamless alignment with
real combat requirements.
80
In addition, the national defense mobilization com-
mand mechanism faces self-described problems such as outdated communica-
tions equipment, lack of unied data standards, poor integration of military and
local government information systems, and an unsound assessment system.
81
Follow-On Improvements
Due to the continuing weaknesses of the joint logistics and national defense
mobilization systems, the PLA will likely make additional improvements.
is section considers several changes that may be made in both systems in
PLA Logistics and Mobilization Capacity in a Taiwan Invasion 267
three areas: strengthened infrastructure; enhanced force capability, especial-
ly among reserve and militia logistics forces; and increased capacity to trans-
port forces, equipment, and wounded personnel.
Strengthened Infrastructure
One set of changes will involve strengthening the basic infrastructure needed
to provide logistics support. PLA sources describe the need to implement lo-
gistics support at three points:
82
■
“strategic rear area logistics support points,” which are responsible
for the collection of strategic materials, long-distance projection, and
long-distance evacuation
■
“campaign logistics support points,” which engage in the collection,
storage, and transportation of campaign-level materials
■
“tactical eld logistics support points,” which conduct logistics sup-
port missions near the frontlines.
83
Other sources argue that provincial military districts should work with local
governments to establish “key area mobilization centers” [zhongdian quyu
dongyuan zhongxin, 重点区域动员中心] along major trac routes.
84
is
could form the basis of a “prepositioning mobilization” model leveraging ci-
vilian and military resources.
Aside from supply points, the PLA will also likely strengthen transpor-
tation facilities such as large ports and airports near the coast, as well as
comprehensive logistics support bases.
85
Also likely will be an expansion of
specialized capabilities needed to load and unload military supplies, such as
eld mechanized railway platforms, multipurpose pontoons, oating jetties,
heavy equipment, roll-on/roll-o regulating platforms, and tying and fasten-
ing devices for ships. Some coastal ports may be asked to install loading/un-
loading equipment to handle heavy containers.
86
Complementing the increase in “hard” infrastructure, PLA logistics forc-
es will also continue to build more robust information systems. Compared
with traditional models, recent PLA discussions of “informatized joint logis-
tics” place more emphasis on integrated logistics for whole area, precision,
and active distribution support.
87
e PLA plans to further upgrade the ability
of its joint logistics information-handling centers to automatically generate
268 Chung
logistics support proposals according to operational missions, support mis-
sions, support resources, and other support-related information for theater
units. Similarly, PLA researchers argue that the PLA should learn from the
United States and utilize information technologies such as radio frequency
identication technology, global positioning technology, satellite communi-
cations, big data, and cloud computing to build an advanced national defense
mobilization command information system.
88
During wartime, more capa-
ble and reliable information systems will permit mobilization authorities to
transmit orders, exchange real-time data, and share mobilization status.
89
Enhanced Force Capability
In the coming years, the PLA will continue to build up active, reserve, and
militia logistics forces. For instance, one PLA article describes the need for a
reserve logistics force that can facilitate the integration of civilian and mili-
tary resources during wartime. e authors recommend establishing logistics
reserve troops at two levels: strategic and campaign.
90
rough infrastructure
improvements and a more mature logistics force, the PLA hopes that by 2025
it will be able to execute the loading of outbound standard material for group
armies within 24 hours and for brigades and regiments within 4 hours, thus
supporting a quicker tempo for an island landing.
91
Further improvements will also likely be made to militia units responsi-
ble for logistics. In a Taiwan scenario, their duties would include helping with
production, mobilization, and other frontline support missions and providing
materiel and personnel support to active units in such areas as information,
electronic warfare, air defense, transportation, engineering, and mainte-
nance.
92
To increase capacity, mainland China has sped the incorporation of
“newly developed districts, economic development zones, state enterprises,
and high and new technology industries” into the militia system.
93
Moreover,
the CMC National Defense Mobilization Department has described “compa-
nies joining the militia system” as a positive factor in the evaluation of provin-
cial military districts’ party-building eorts.
94
Communication, cyberspace,
and information technology industries have also been asked to organize em-
ployees categorized as “new types of militia” into “regular type, reservist type,
and specialist type.”
95
ere will likely be additional eorts in the future to
strengthen and integrate these supporting forces into the mobilization system.
PLA Logistics and Mobilization Capacity in a Taiwan Invasion 269
Increased Transportation and Delivery Capacity
To overcome insucient transportation and delivery capacity, the PLA
has begun taking several measures and will continue to build on them in
the coming years. First, the introduction of large military transport aircraft
such as the Y-20 has strengthened the air force’s airlift capability—and this
eet is poised to continue growing.
96
Second, eorts have been made to
increase strategic- and campaign-level helicopter forces with the aim of
increasing medium- and long-range strategic delivery capability. ird,
ocean-going comprehensive supply ships, amphibious transport docks,
and amphibious assault ships have been or are being built to satisfy troops’
needs for seaborne strategic delivery, transport, and supply. Fourth, the
maritime strategic delivery reserve force has been expanded. Chinese
sources note that marine transportation groups will be established in each
coastal province to form a maritime strategic delivery reserve force that can
be readily deployed on demand.
97
Fifth, Chinese researchers have explored
the development of specialized transportation vehicles and supporting
equipment most suitable for beachhead loading/unloading operations to
provide sea-crossing and logistics support in large-scale joint operations
against Taiwan. Such vehicles are adaptable to all types of terrain in Tai-
wan, are highly maneuverable, have good armor protection, and can satis-
fy the needs of troops landing on the island.
98
Given the PLA’s need to quickly evacuate wounded personnel in a cross-
strait campaign, further reforms will likely increase the PLA’s medical support
capacity. After reviewing its performance in the ght against the 2020 pandem-
ic, for instance, PLA authors have proposed a shift from the model of evacuat-
ing personnel by symptom level to a “three-dimensional” model using various
platforms, such as medical service trains, cars, planes, rescue helicopters, and
hospital ships. e intent of these and other reforms would be to improve the
eciency of treatment and evacuation for seriously wounded personnel.
99
Conclusion
To achieve the goal of ghting a quick battle for a quick result in an inva-
sion of Taiwan, the PLA must prepare hundreds of thousands of soldiers and
vast amounts of materiel in the shortest time possible. It must then project
those forces by ship and plane to medium- to long-range destinations. In the
270 Chung
meantime, the PLA must ensure that the delivery process is agile and resil-
ient enough to handle interference by China’s opponents. roughout the
process, the PLA’s joint logistics and national defense mobilization systems
will play key roles. e PLA has made signicant eorts in recent reforms to
enhance these systems’ capabilities to support large-scale joint operations.
Given perceptions of continuing weaknesses in these areas, the PLA likely
will continue to improve these systems to lay the basis for a large-scale oper-
ation across the Taiwan Strait.
e PLA’s acquisition of a stronger logistics mobilization capability
means that it will not only greatly reduce the time it needs to send troops and
materials mobilized from around China to sea and land areas around Taiwan
but also lower the chance of having its combat rhythm interrupted by delays
or mistakes happening in the process of transporting reinforcements and de-
livering materials. is places the Taiwan military at a disadvantage in two
respects. First, reduced warning time will diminish Taiwan’s ability to tran-
sition its armed forces from a peacetime to wartime footing and to mobilize
reserve troops. Second, it will be increasingly dicult for the military to take
the initiative and get the time it needs to turn the tide.
Considering these diculties, the Taiwan military should promote sev-
eral measures. First is improving its ability to transition from a peacetime
footing to wartime operations. Second is strengthening intelligence-gath-
ering and intelligence-analysis capabilities, thereby increasing early-warn-
ing time by grasping vital clues about the PLA’s mobilization of materials
and transportation forces. ird is integrating long-range precision attack
weapons systems to enhance Taiwan’s “joint suppression warfare” [lianhe
zhiya zuozhan, 联合制压作战] capabilities based on the Overall Defense
Concept. ese strike systems should be combined with cyber and infor-
mation warfare to launch attacks on the PLA’s logistics mobilization nodes
to disrupt its combat rhythm and strive for strategic space and time. ese
measures can exploit existing weaknesses in PLA logistics support and mo-
bilization and help oset future improvements in PLA capabilities. After all,
if the PLA wants to gain a quick victory in a Taiwan invasion, it must rely on
smooth operations of its logistics support and mobilization plan. erefore,
it will be critical for the Taiwan military to sabotage PLA logistics and mobi-
lization systems at the start of the war.
PLA Logistics and Mobilization Capacity in a Taiwan Invasion 271
Notes
1
Cao Zhengrong [曹正荣], Sun Longhai [孙龙海], and Yang Ying [杨颖], eds., Army’s
Information Warfare [信息化陆军作战] (Beijing: National Defense University Press, 2015), 113.
2
Joel Wuthnow, “Responding to the Epidemic in Wuhan: Insights into Chinese Military
Logistics,” China Brief 20, no. 7 (April 13, 2020), available at <https://jamestown.org/program/
responding-to-the-epidemic-in-wuhan-insights-into-chinese-military-logistics/>.
3
PLA General Political Department [解放军总政治部], A Selection of Xi Jinping’s Remarks
on National Defense and Military Building [习近平关于国防和军队建设重要论述选编] (Beijing:
PLA Press, 2014), 61.
4
“Central Military Commission Opinions on Deepening National Defense and Military
Reforms” [中央军委关于深化国防和军队改革的意见], Xinhua [新华网], January 1, 2016,
available at <http://www.xinhuanet.com//mil/2016-01/01/c_1117646695.htm>.
5
See LeighAnn Luce and Erin Richter, “Handling Logistics in a Reformed PLA: e Long
March Toward Joint Logistics,” in Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA: Assessing Chinese Military
Reforms, ed. Phillip C. Saunders et al. (Washington, DC: NDU Press, 2019), 257–292.
6
Nong Qinghua [农清华], “Reform of the PLA Logistic Support System in the Past 40
Years” [人民解放军后勤保障体制改革攻坚40年], Military History [军事历史], no. 1 (2019), 15.
7
Ibid.
8
PRC Ministry of National Defense, “MND Press Conference on Joint Logistics Support
System Reform” [国防部举行联勤保障体制改革专题新闻发布会], September 13, 2016; Zan
Wang [昝旺], Niu Yongjie [牛永界], and Xi Zhaoming [席兆明], “Evaluation of Support Capability
of Joint Logistic Support Center Based on Fuzzy AHP” [基于模糊层次评价法的联勤保障中心保
障能力评估], Command, Control, and Simulations [指挥控制与仿真] 21, no. 2 (2019), 73.
9
Deng Zeqin [郑泽钦], Li Yuanyuan [李媛媛], and Guo Jianke [郭健科], “Reection on
the Construction of the Network Chain of Flexible Logistics Support in the Battleeld Under the
New System” [新体制下战场柔性后勤保障网链建设], National Defense Science and Technology
[国防科技] 40, no. 3 (2019), 85.
10
Nong, “Reform of the PLA Logistic Support System,” 15.
11
Ibid., 16.
12
Liu Xue [刘学] and Gao Fei [高飞], “Research on Military Material Supply Chain Model
Under the New System” [新体制下军用物资供应链模型研究], Military Operations Research and
Systems Engineering [军事运筹与系统工程] 31, no. 2 (2017), 36.
13
Zan, Niu, and Xi, “Evaluation of Support Capability,” 73.
14
Nong, “Reform of the PLA Logistic Support System,” 16.
15
Zan Wang [昝旺] et al., “Essential Issues to Be Considered During Wartime Employment
of the Joint Logistic Support Center” [联勤保障中心战时运用应把握的关键问题], Journal of
Military Transportation University [军事交通学院学报] 20, no. 12 (2018), 55.
16
Ibid.
17
Nong, “Reform of the PLA Logistic Support System,” 15–16.
18
Ibid., 17.
19
Ibid.
20
Ibid., 16.
21
Huang Tianxin [黄天信], “Reections on How to Improve the Building of the Joint
Logistic Support Force’s Organization System Under the New Institutions” [对新体制下加强联
勤保障部队组织体系建设的思考], National Defense [国防], no. 1 (2019), 44.
272 Chung
22
Yang Xueming [杨学铭], Xun Ye [荀烨], and Li Xidong [李锡栋], “Study on eater
Ground Force Supplies Distribution and Support Mode Under the New System” [新体制下战区
陆军物资配送保障模式研究], Logistics Technology [物流技术] 21, no. 2 (2018), 126–127.
23
Ibid.
24
Ibid.
25
Liu and Gao, “Research on Military Material Supply Chain Model,” 35–36.
26
PLA Logistics Academic Research Center [全军后勤学术研究中心], Combat Logistics
Support [作战后勤保障] (Beijing: PLA Logistics Academic Research Center, 2015), 1.
27
Ibid., 28.
28
Ibid.
29
Cao, Sun, and Yang, Army’s Information Warfare, 113.
30
Ibid., 2.
31
Tang Shengpeng [唐胜鹏] and Long Peng [龙鹏], “Some oughts on Advancing the
Building of the Joint National Defense Mobilization System” [对推进联合动员体系建设的几点
思考], National Defense [国防], no. 4 (2019), 37.
32
PLA Logistics Academic Research Center, Combat Logistics Support, 29.
33
Wan Haiou [万海鸥] et al., “Analysis of the Landing Operation POL Sea-Crossing
Transport Consumption and Demand Based on MS” [基于MS的登岛作战油料跨海输送消耗
与需求分析], Journal of Ordnance Equipment Engineering [兵器装备工程学报] 39, no. 7 (2018),
144.
34
PLA Logistics Academic Research Center, Combat Logistics Support, 58.
35
Ibid.
36
Ibid., 59.
37
Ibid.
38
Ibid., 30.
39
Ibid.
40
Yang Zhuotie [杨卓铁], “Looking at the Future Battleeld Graded Treatment from the
Perspective of Epidemic Prevention and Control” [从疫情防控看未来战场分级救治], PLA Daily
[解放军报], March 31, 2020, 7.
41
PLA Logistics Academic Research Center, Combat Logistics Support, 79.
42
Ibid.
43
Ibid., 80.
44
Ibid.
45
Huang Bingliang [黄炳亮] and Lu Liyang [吕立阳], “Discussion on Medical Support in
eater Joint Operations Under the Large Joint Logistics System” [大联勤体制下战区联合作战卫
勤保障问题探讨], Practical Journal of Medicine & Pharmacy [实用医药] 25, no. 11 (2008), 1400.
46
Ibid.
47
Mao Zhenglu [毛正禄] et al., “Medical Service Based on Airborne Operation of Island
Airborne Troops” [基于岛屿空降作战的卫勤保障], Military Medical Journal of South China [华
南国防医学] 33, no. 5 (2019), 354.
48
Wang Jingtao [王景涛], Hai Jun [海军], and Ding Zhanfeng [丁展锋], “A SWOT-Analysis-
Based Study of the Counter-Measures for the Construction and Development of Aviation Strategic
Delivery Equipment” [基于SWOT分析的航空战略投送装备建设发展对策研究], National
Defense Transportation Engineering and Technology [国防交通工程与技术], no. 4 (2018), 10.
49
PLA Logistics Academic Research Center, Combat Logistics Support, 48, 126.
50
Ibid.
51
Ibid., 48.
PLA Logistics and Mobilization Capacity in a Taiwan Invasion 273
52
Ibid., 30.
53
Wei Yaocong [魏耀聪], Long Mianwei [龙绵伟], and Yin Linxuan [尹林暄], “Military
Logistics Capability Construction Under New System” [新体制下军事物流能力建设研究],
Journal of Military Transportation University [军事交通学院学报] 20, no. 5 (2018), 53.
54
Wang, Hai, and Ding, “A SWOT-Analysis-Based Study,” 11.
55
Hu Haijun [胡海军] and Yao Yuan [姚远], “Transformation and Construction of Army
Transportation Delivery Support Capability in eater” [战区陆军运输投送保障能力转型建设],
Journal of Military Transportation University [军事交通学院学报] 22, no. 4 (2020), 2.
56
Xu Duo [许多], Yao Qingkai [姚庆锴], and Song Hongchao [宋宏超], “Accelerate the
Deep Development of Civil-Military Integration in Aviation Strategic Delivery System” [加快推
进航空战略投送体系军民融合深度发展], China Storage & Transport [中国储运], no. 11 (2017),
118.
57
Zhang Jian [张健] and Wu Juan [吴娟], “Mobilization and Application of Oshore Civil
Transport Ship in Large-Scale Combat” [大规模作战海上民用运输船舶动员与运用], Journal of
Military Transportation University [军事交通学院学报] 19, no. 11 (2017), 3.
58
is is an estimate based on data made public by the Republic of China Ministry of
National Defense with the exclusion of gures related to air-delivered personnel and materiel.
See ROC Ministry of National Defense, 2018 China Military Power Report (Taipei: Ministry of
National Defense, 2018), 38.
59
Ibid.
60
Xu Jinzhang and Shen Peixin Ru Xiaolong, “Chinese Military’s Logistics Development
Moves Toward Realistic Training” [中国军队后勤向实战化聚力], Red Flag [红旗], March 6, 2014,
available at <http://www.hongqi.tv/wwjz/2014-03-06/5471.html>.
61
Liu Jiasheng［刘嘉生], Sun Datong [孙大同], and Peng Fubing [彭富兵], “Development
of Carriers for Strategic Projection in Response to National Security Needs” [基于国家安全需求
的战略投送载运工具建设], Journal of Military Transportation University [军事交通学院学报]
21, no. 2 (February 2019), 12.
62
Cao Yang [曹杨], “oughts on Construction of Maritime Strategic Projection System
in the New Era” [新时代海上战略投送体系建设的思考], Journal of Military Transportation
University [军事交通学院学报] 21, no. 2 (2019), 3.
63
Hu and Yao, “Transformation and Construction of Army Transportation Delivery
Support Capability,” 2.
64
Han Qinggui [韩庆贵] and Liu Ning [刘宁], “A Preliminary Study on the Logistics
Mobilization of Large-Scale Joint Operations” [大规模联合作战后勤动员初探], National Defense
[国防], no. 12 (2016), 29.
65
Ibid.
66
Ibid.
67
Yue Shengjun [岳胜军] and Yu Chao [于超], “Analysis on the Operation Mechanism of
National Defense Mobilization in eaters” [战区国防动员运行机理探析], National Defense [国
防], no. 3 (March 2017), 17.
68
Ibid.
69
Yu Zhonghai [于中海], “Focusing on the Main Duty and Main Business to Push Forward
the National Defense Mobilization Preparation by the System of Provincial Military Commands”
[聚焦主责主业, 推进省军区系统国防动员准备], National Defense [国防], no. 10 (2019), 36.
274 Chung
70
Ibid.; Zhoukoudian Prefectural Military Command [周口店军分区], “A Preliminary
Inquiry into the Issue of the Provincial Military Commands System Supporting Cross-eater
Maneuvering by Operational Forces” [省军区系统保障作战部队跨区机动问题初探], National
Defense [国防], no. 2 (2019), 31.
71
Han and Liu, “A Preliminary Study on the Logistics Mobilization of Large-Scale Joint
Operations,” 29–31.
72
Wang Fang [王芳], Guo Jing [郭静], and Wang Jizhen [王纪震], “Construction of a Smart
Defense Mobilization Information System” [智能国防动员信息系统构建], National Defense
Technology [国防科技], no. 321 (2020), 51.
73
Han and Liu, “A Preliminary Study on the Logistics Mobilization of Large-Scale Joint
Operations,” 29–31.
74
Zhoukoudian Prefectural Military Command, “A Preliminary Inquiry into the Issue of
the Provincial Military Commands System,” 32.
75
Han and Liu, “A Preliminary Study on the Logistics Mobilization of Large-Scale Joint
Operations,” 29–31.
76
“Eastern eater Command Joins Hands with Seven Provinces and Cities to Promote
Inclusion of ‘Promoting the Military and Providing Frontline Support’ Mechanism in Joint
Operations System” [东部战区与七省市携手推动拥军支前融入联合作战体系], China Military
Online [中国军网], December 19, 2017.
77
Ibid.
78
Han and Liu, “A Preliminary Study on the Logistics Mobilization of Large-Scale Joint
Operations,” 29–30.
79
Linghu Yajun [令狐亚军], “Reections on Building a Command System for ‘Intelligent
Mobilization’” [关于构建 “智慧动员” 指挥体系的思考], National Defense [国防], no. 10 (2019),
39.
80
Xia Junyou [夏俊友], “Taking Multiple Measures Simultaneously and Making
Innovations in Work to Concentrate Eorts on Improving the Development of National Defense
Mobilization Potential in the New Era” [聚力提升新时代国防动员潜力建设水平], National
Defense [国防], no. 12 (2019), 42.
81
Ibid.
82
For details, see Chung Chieh and Andrew N.D. Yang, “Crossing the Strait: Recent
Trends in PLA ‘Strategic Delivery’ Capabilities,” in e PLA Beyond Borders: Chinese Military
Operations in Regional and Global Context, ed. Joel Wuthnow et al. (Washington, DC: NDU
Press, 2021), 51–72.
83
Ibid.
84
Xia, “Taking Multiple Measures Simultaneously and Making Innovations in Work,” 43.
85
Wei, Long, and Yin, “Military Logistics Capability Construction,” 54.
86
Ibid., 53.
87
Xiong Biao [熊彪] et al., “Evaluation Model and Simulation for Command and Decision
of Joint Logistics Support” [联勤保障指挥决策评估模型构建与仿真分析], Journal of Academy of
Armored Forces Engineering [装甲兵工程学院学报] 32, no. 3 (2018), 8.
88
Tang and Long, “Some oughts on Advancing the Building of the Joint National
Defense Mobilization System,” 39.
89
Sun Xinjian [孙新建] et al., “Design Research on Platform of eater National Defense
Mobilization Commanding and Coordination” [战区国防动员指挥协调平台设计研究], paper
presented at the 6
th
China Command and Control Conference [第六届中国指挥控制大会],
Beijing, July 2, 2018, 126.
PLA Logistics and Mobilization Capacity in a Taiwan Invasion 275
90
Wei, Long, and Yin, “Military Logistics Capability Construction,” 53.
91
Ibid.
92
Pan Jinkuan [潘金宽], “Mobilization of People’s War Under Modern Conditions
According to Law” [现代条件下人民战争依法动员], China Defense Conversion [中国军转民],
no. 10 (2019), 81–82.
93
Yang Qinggan [杨清淦] and Liu Haixuan [浏海轩], “Some oughts on Strengthening
the Work on People’s Armed Forces in State-Owned Enterprises in the New Era” [加强新时代国
有企业武装工作的几点思考], National Defense [国防], no. 9 (2019), 49.
94
Ibid., 50.
95
Zhong Fu [钟孚] and Zhang Renlong [章仁龙], “Issues to Be Considered in Developing
Militia Cyber Elements” [民兵网络分队建设需关注的问题], National Defense [国防], no. 11
(2019), 64.
96
Chen Yu [陈瑜], Li Jiansi [李剑肆], and Zeng Yu [曾宇], “Research on Development
of Overseas Strategic Airlift Capability” [境外空中战略投送能力建设研究], Journal of Military
Transportation University [军事交通学院学报] 21, no. 2 (2019), 6.
97
Liu Ming [刘铭], “Maritime Strategic Projection Requirement and Force Construction
of Our Armed Forces” [我军海上战略投送需求与力量建设], Journal of Military Transportation
University [军事交通学院学报] 21, no. 4 (2019), 4.
98
Wei, Long, and Yin, “Military Logistics Capability Construction,” 53.
99
Yang, “Looking at the Future Battleeld Graded Treatment from the Perspective of
Epidemic Prevention and Control.”
277
S
timulated by the lack of progress on the “core interest” of unication,
combat operations against Taiwan have been among primary plan-
ning scenarios of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) since the early
1990s.
1
Chinese planning has centered on joint campaigns either to persuade
Taipei to capitulate, as would be the goal in a repower strike or blockade,
or to seize and occupy the island through a joint island landing campaign.
e PLA has thus articulated doctrine for cross-strait campaigns, increased
multidomain training, and sought to build forces that could execute the war
plans. Signicant attention was also given to constraining the U.S. ability to
intervene on Taiwan’s behalf. For two decades, however, the PLA lacked a
modern joint command structure to take charge of those operations. China’s
Soviet-inspired military regions had limited ability to command naval and air
forces, which weakened its ability to plan and train for joint operations, while
a temporary realignment of authority in wartime would have created delays
and provided a valuable warning for China’s opponents.
Reforms led by Xi Jinping have reduced those weaknesses. Command ar-
rangements for a Taiwan contingency are nested within the PLA’s new joint
command structure, consisting of key decisionmaking nodes at the national
CHAPTER 10
Who Does What? Chinese Command and
Control in a Taiwan Scenario
Joel Wuthnow
278 Wuthnow
and theater levels. As a result, the PLA now has the system in place to prose-
cute the war, reducing delays and enabling stronger coordination among the
services and support forces in peacetime. Yet several important constraints
remain, including Leninist structures that reduce a commander’s authority to
execute decisions (these have been strengthened under Xi’s desire to promote
the role of the Chinese Communist Party in the army), an emphasis on cen-
tralization that increases the possibility of micromanagement and buck-pass-
ing, theater commanders’ lack of direct authority over key support forces, and
a risk-averse organizational culture aggravated by lack of experience.
e implications of a maturing PLA command structure for China’s adver-
saries are mixed. On one hand, Taiwan and the United States must prepare for
a PLA that could act more cohesively and expeditiously in a conict and that is
more condent in its own ability to command forces and thus more willing to
ramp up coercion in peacetime. On the other hand, U.S. planners should con-
sider how the apparent fragilities and tensions in the command structure can
be exploited to strengthen Taiwan’s defenses and buy time for U.S. intervention.
Eorts should be made to complicate Chinese decisionmaking through rap-
id, intense, and hard-to-predict operations, including ones that aim to reduce
the cohesion of China’s fragmented joint operations system. Such operations
would depend in part on conventional precision strikes in multiple domains,
but the need to manage escalation risks would place greater emphasis on
nonkinetic capabilities, such as cyber, electronic, and psychological warfare.
is chapter develops these arguments in three sections. e rst de-
scribes current command arrangements for a Taiwan contingency and ad-
dresses the eects of recent reforms. e second section speculates about
some of the potential weaknesses of these arrangements, focusing on issues
of centralization and lack of experience. e third derives implications for
the United States and Taiwan and develops principles for weakening Chi-
na’s ability to control its forces in a conict. e chapter is based on a mix
of Chinese doctrinal publications, authoritative Chinese media reports, and
secondary works assessing the reforms. Nevertheless, much about the cur-
rent system remains unknown or ambiguous, including the precise division
of responsibilities between echelons, operational structures below the the-
ater level, and how support forces are integrated into the theater commands
(TCs). As a result, some of the judgments remain circumstantial or tentative.
Chinese C2 in a Taiwan Scenario 279
An Improving Command System
China’s previous command structure was poorly suited for joint campaigns
across the Taiwan Strait. e military regions (MRs) lacked peacetime au-
thority over naval and air forces, and Chinese doctrine suggested that hastily
improvised joint commands would have been created to take charge of op-
erations in a war zone. Under recent reforms, the PLA can now prepare for a
conict using the same command arrangement that would lead the war, con-
sisting of the Joint Sta Department (JSD) and the Eastern eater Command
(ETC). is system not only facilitates better joint planning and training but
also reduces delays associated with the transition from peacetime to wartime
operations. ere is also now stronger integration of the forces that would
execute the war plans at the theater level, though the reforms stopped short
of giving the ETC control over all relevant forces: Some are assigned to inde-
pendent support forces or are “national assets” directly led by the services or
the Central Military Commission (CMC).
A New Joint Command Structure
Prior to the recent reforms, PLA doctrinal writings suggested that an ad hoc
joint headquarters would have been established to oversee joint campaigns.
Chinese authors described various potential arrangements, with the nal
choice determined by the scope of the conict. e most straightforward
option involved converting the Nanjing MR into a joint “war zone” [zhanqu,
战区], with the MR commander appointed war zone commander. is plan
would have followed existing MR boundaries but granted additional author-
ity over air force, naval, and Second Artillery Corps forces, which reported
to their respective service headquarters rather than the MR in peacetime.
Another option, which would have been more likely in a large-scale contin-
gency, envisioned establishing a new headquarters with boundaries beyond
those of a single MR. PLA writings suggested that some of the commanders
and sta, instead of relying on the Nanjing MR, would have been seconded
from the General Sta Department in Beijing.
2
A major aw in this approach was that it was not optimized for a rap-
id transition to wartime operations.
3
First, MR responsibilities for adminis-
tering land forces and lack of authority over naval and air forces meant less
attention to joint training and operations, thus reducing combat readiness.
280 Wuthnow
Second, the process of revising lines of authority could have created fric-
tion if those roles and responsibilities were unclear or disputed. Moreover,
if ocers from the General Sta Department took charge, they would have
needed to quickly become familiar with subordinate commanders and forces
not typically under their command. ird, the process of setting up ad hoc
headquarters and accelerating joint training to promote combat readiness
in the weeks and months prior to a conict would have provided warning
of a conict to Taiwan and the United States. Recognizing these problems,
the 2013 Science of Strategy called for building a command system “adapted
to the needs and requirements of joint operations,” including “a consistent
peacetime-wartime joint command institution.”
4
is vision reected a de-
sire to follow other foreign models more closely, such as the U.S. combatant
command system, but was perhaps even more ambitious. For example, in the
U.S. system, operational forces are typically retained by the Services and then
transferred to a joint task force in wartime; Chinese planners advocated an
organizational design that would eliminate such steps.
5
Although these problems were discussed well before the recent re-
forms, bureaucratic resistance meant that previous CMC chairmen Jiang
Zemin and Hu Jintao were unable to institute fundamental structural
changes.
6
e 2015–2016 reform aimed to complete that unnished busi-
ness given Xi’s better control over the bureaucracy. e pivotal contribu-
tion was establishing a permanent two-tiered joint command structure.
7
At
the national level, the General Sta Department evolved into a JSD under
direct CMC oversight and fully focused on joint command, with responsi-
bilities for ground forces delegated to a new army headquarters. e JSD
also manages a new joint operations command center (JOCC) whose nom-
inal “commander in chief” is Xi himself (who appeared there in a camou-
age uniform in April 2016).
8
At the theater level, ve TCs were established
to replace the MRs; the ETC now takes charge of cross-strait operations as
well as those in the East China Sea. Similar to the national level, theater
army components were established to free the theater headquarters to fo-
cus on joint operations, and theater JOCCs were created to facilitate op-
erational planning and coordination.
9
In short, rather than standing up a
command structure, the command system that would direct the war would
already be in place.
Chinese C2 in a Taiwan Scenario 281
In the context of a Taiwan campaign, the creation of a two-tiered struc-
ture conicted with the emphasis of some PLA writings on collapsing com-
mand arrangements into a single overarching joint headquarters; however,
it reected the complex responsibilities that would have to be managed in a
war.
10
First, a joint headquarters at the national level was needed to handle
contingencies not conned to a single TC. Preparing for such contingencies
appeared to be part of a national exercise in the summer of 2019 when the
JSD reportedly directed all ve theaters and multiple services.
11
Given its po-
sition above the theaters and services, other JSD-level responsibilities also
likely include allocating resources that the CMC chooses to hold onto due to
scarcity or political sensitivity (such as space and cyber units) and managing
operations outside the geographic boundaries of the theater system (such as
counterintervention operations beyond the First Island Chain).
12
Second, creating joint headquarters at the theater level reected an op-
erational imperative to devolve authority to those most familiar with specic
regional contingencies. One Academy of Military Science (AMS) author favor-
ably compared the U.S. system, based on geographic combatant commands,
with the Russian system, in which the concentration of power within the gen-
eral sta creates a situation “which is not conducive to the deepening of joint-
ness.”
13
He stated more directly that systems with “a lower center of command
have greater joint depth than those with a higher center of command.”
14
Au-
thoritative sources thus describe the theaters as the “highest joint operations
command within their strategic direction,” with responsibilities to organize
joint training, develop operational plans, and coordinate across services.
15
Giv-
en this peacetime focus, it is logical that the ETC would lead the primary cam-
paigns in wartime, with the JSD focusing on national-level and cross-theater
issues. Nevertheless, the delineation of national and theater responsibilities re-
mains somewhat ambiguous, and as discussed below, there are circumstances
in which the division of labor could break down in practice.
16
Below the theater level, the peacetime chain of command runs through
the theater service components to operational units (see gure). However,
the wartime command structure at lower levels has not been claried. Pre-
vious PLA writings suggested that task-oriented operations groups would be
established under the joint campaign command, organized either by func-
tion, such as intelligence, information, and repower, or by domain.
17
Under
282 Wuthnow
the new structure, some of these functions may be carried out by the theater
JOCC, and the theater service components might be placed in charge of cer-
tain domain-specic activities (for example, the ETC navy may be appoint-
ed as the lead for a maritime operations group). Yet the complexity of joint
operations might also require the PLA to establish joint commands at lower
levels. For instance, recent amphibious exercises have involved the use of
frontline joint command posts to organize troops and process tactical in-
telligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance data.
18
China has also revealed
new mobile truck-based joint command posts.
19
Nevertheless, it is presently
unclear whether the ETC has standing joint command organs below the the-
ater; however, more consistent joint training and planning would likely re-
duce delays if such arrangements needed to be set up on a temporary basis.
Stronger Horizontal Integration
One consequence of the lack of a permanent joint command structure was
poor horizontal integration of forces that would participate in the primary
cross-strait campaigns. e reforms corrected this problem, in part by trans-
ferring peacetime operational control over MR air and naval forces from their
respective service headquarters to the theaters. is change was accompa-
nied by greater “jointness” within the theaters. For example, there is now a
Figure. Notional C2 Construct for a Taiwan Campaign
Key: CMC: Central Military Commission; EW: electronic warfare; ETC: Eastern Theater Command; HQ:
headquarters; JSD: Joint Staff Department; PLAAF: PLA Air Force; TC: theater command.
Note: Straight lines = direct authority. Dashed lines = supporting/coordinating relationships.
CMC
PLAAF HQ
(Airborne/Bombers/Transport)
Strategic Support Force
(Space/Cyber/EW/Psy Ops)
Other TCs
Rocket Force
Southern TC
People’s Armed Police
Joint Logistics
Support Force
JSD/Joint Ops Command Center
Eastern TC
ETC Joint Ops Command Center
Domain Specific Ops Groups
Tactical Units
Chinese C2 in a Taiwan Scenario 283
higher concentration of non–ground force senior ocers in the ETC head-
quarters compared to the Nanjing MR, promoting more eective interservice
coordination and planning. As of 2019, four of ve ETC deputy commanders
and two of ve senior leaders in the ETC joint sta department were from the
navy and air force. By contrast, in 2014, the last full year before the reforms,
only two of ve Nanjing MR deputy commanders and none of its headquar-
ters department senior leaders were from outside the ground forces.
20
A less obvious benet of the reforms has been better integration of support
forces into the theater construct. Forces that might have to support the ETC
commander in wartime include conventional missile forces under the PLA
Rocket Force (PLARF), the airborne corps under PLA Air Force headquarters,
space and cyber troops under the Strategic Support Force (SSF), logistics re-
sources managed by the Joint Logistic Support Force (JLSF), rear-area support
provided by the People’s Armed Police (PAP), and forces assigned to other TCs.
21
Chinese writings emphasize the need to ensure smooth coordination of these
forces into theater operations. AMS scholar Zhang Peigao notes that counterin-
tervention operations would seek to merge theater forces with “elite units” [jin-
grui budui, 精锐部队] outside the theater structure, including those responsible
for the electromagnetic and “socio-psychological” domains.
22
Han Guangsong,
a professor at the PLA National Defense University (NDU) Joint Operations Col-
lege, writes that joint commands must coordinate with “neighboring troops in
accordance with a clear coordination and support relationship.”
23
While the ETC commander does not possess de facto control over these
capabilities, the theater’s mandate to supervise joint campaigns implies the
need for stronger coordination. Nevertheless, the degree to which forces
outside the theater commander’s direct control have been integrated into
theater training, planning, and operations has varied. e discussion that fol-
lows categorizes forces into three tiers based on level of integration with the
ETC (see table 1). Key variables include whether the ETC JOCC has ocers
seconded from those forces, participation in recent ETC exercises, inclusion
in the ETC’s annual joint training plans, and whether units from those forces
are based within the ETC’s geographic boundaries. ese are, of course, ten-
tative judgments given limited open-source reporting.
e rst tier currently consists only of the conventional PLARF brigades. e
PLARF, unlike the other services, has neither a service component command
284 Wuthnow
within the theater nor a commander who serves concurrently as theater deputy
commander. ere is, however, evidence of a strong coordinating relationship
between the PLARF and the ETC. Short-range ballistic missiles under Base 61,
which commands the PLARF brigades within the ETC region, would be central
to a joint repower campaign. As the lead organizer for theater joint campaigns,
the ETC commander would likely be able to incorporate short-range missile
systems into theater campaign plans and direct their use during a war.
By contrast, a dierentiation of responsibilities within the command
structure, and the desire by the center to retain control of “strategic” systems,
make it likely that long-range missiles designed for counterintervention
purposes would be handled at the JSD or CMC level.
24
In March 2016, ETC
commander Liu Yuejun suggested as much by including rocket forces among
those that “conduct joint operations and non-war military operations” in
his theater.
25
More specic signs of close coordination include PLARF o-
cers assigned to the ETC JOCC,
26
inclusion of a PLARF base in the 2018 ETC
joint training plan [zhanqu lianhe xunlian jihua, 战区联合训练计划],
27
and
Table 1. Integration of Supporting Units with the Eastern Theater Command
Officers in
ETC JOCC
Participation
in ETC
Exercises
Coordinated
in ETC Joint
Training Plan
Units Based
in ETC AOR
Tier 1
PLARF
(Conventional)
X X X X
Tier 2
SSF X X
JLSF X X X
PAP X X
Tier 3
Other TCs
Airborne Corps
Key: AOR: area of responsibility; ETC: Eastern Theater Command; JLSF: Joint Logistic Support Force; PAP:
People’s Armed Police; PLARF: PLA Rocket Force; SSF: Strategic Support Force; TCs: theater commands.
Chinese C2 in a Taiwan Scenario 285
participation of PLARF units in ETC exercises.
28
Moreover, Roderick Lee ob-
serves that joint duty oces within PLARF bases have been designated as
“theater conventional missile sub-command centers,” indicating closer col-
laboration with the theater compared with other supporting forces.
29
e second tier includes three support forces that would participate in a
cross-strait campaign but appear somewhat less well integrated with the TCs
than the PLARF: the SSF, JLSF, and PAP.
30
Strategic Support Force. e SSF was created in 2016 to consolidate
control over space, cyber, electronic warfare, and psychological warfare ca-
pabilities. Within the ETC region, the SSF operates Base 311, which has long
been responsible for carrying out psychological operations against Taiwan,
and various cyber units (including Unit 61398, which has targeted Taiwan).
31
PLA theoretical discussions suggest that the technical reconnaissance bas-
es, which are responsible for cyber operations, could be attached to the-
ater JOCCs in wartime. However, there does not yet appear to be conclusive
open-source evidence that those bases report to the theaters in peacetime.
32
Evidence that SSF units are coordinating with the theaters includes their re-
ported role in an August 2020 ETC island-landing exercise intended to “fur-
ther test and improve the joint combat capabilities of multiple services,”
33
as
well as their inclusion in exercises in adjacent theaters.
34
Joint Logistic Support Force. Established in September 2016, the JLSF
is organized into ve joint logistic support centers (JLSCs), which in turn
supervise a network of supply bases and mobile logistics units.
35
During
peacetime, the JLSCs fall under the JLSF headquarters but, according to
one JLSF ocer, could be placed under theater control in wartime.
36
Within
the ETC region, the Wuxi JLSC is the prime element of the JLSF. Evidence
of fairly strong coordination between joint logistics forces and the ETC in-
cludes the Wuxi JLSC’s inclusion in the 2018 ETC joint training plan and di-
rect support from JLSC units to ETC air force and army units during routine
operations.
37
e Wuxi JLSC also oversees the assembly of civilian aviation
and maritime support eets, which have supported naval operations in the
“near seas” and could be mobilized for strategic sealift and other purposes
during a Taiwan contingency (see the chapter by Conor Kennedy in this
volume for details).
38
is capability almost certainly requires the JLSC to
coordinate with theater planners.
286 Wuthnow
People’s Armed Police. While primarily responsible for maintaining
social control in restive regions within China, the PAP has certain wartime
functions, such as guarding facilities and maintaining infrastructure, and has
been involved in previous joint exercises.
39
Recent reforms rmly placed the
PAP within the military command structure by eliminating the previous sys-
tem that granted deployment powers to provincial leaders.
40
Within the ETC
region, the PAP presence includes provincial contingents and a new mobile
contingent [jidong zongdui, 机动总队] based in Fuzhou.
41
is unit, which
possesses a mix of capabilities (including engineering, transportation, and
special operations), is well placed to support rear-area operations in a Tai-
wan scenario. Whether the PAP has been formally integrated into ETC joint
training plans is unclear; however, PAP units have taken part in some ETC
exercises,
42
and the second mobile contingent was temporarily placed under
ETC authority during 2020 ood relief operations.
43
e third tier consists of forces with the lowest level of integration into
ETC training and operations. One is the airborne corps, which continues to
be a “national asset” under the direct authority of air force headquarters (for a
discussion, see the chapter by Roderick Lee in this volume).
44
Airborne units
are based in the Central eater Command, and there is no open-source
evidence of their participation in ETC-sponsored exercises.
45
e other TCs
also t into this category. In theory, forces in other TCs might be mobilized to
augment the ETC: for instance, the Central TC functions as a strategic reserve
for all the theaters while the Southern TC has a variety of naval and air force
capabilities that could be integrated into a joint campaign. e PLA has con-
ducted transregional exercises since 2006, suggesting a desire to improve the
ability of troops to support contingencies in other theaters. However, it is un-
clear whether any of those troops were placed under the Nanjing MR or ETC
commander.
46
In sum, command for a cross-strait campaign has beneted
from a new command structure that would reduce the transition to a wartime
footing and has, despite some variation, strengthened the integration of dis-
parate units into theater joint training and planning.
Persistent Weaknesses
Despite these improvements, several continuing problems could reduce the PLA
command system’s eectiveness in wartime by complicating decisionmaking
Chinese C2 in a Taiwan Scenario 287
and slowing operations. ese include a Leninist organizational culture that
retains consensus decisionmaking through Party committees and values con-
trol at the highest possible level, which could limit the ETC commander’s abil-
ity to quickly execute the war plan and make adjustments; lead to continued
fragmentation between the ETC and the national, service, and external theater
forces needed to support it; and create a lack of prociency in joint operations
among the commanders and sta ocers charged with enabling the system to
function smoothly at both the theater and the national levels.
Decisions by Consensus
Chinese strategists struggle to reconcile the military imperative of concen-
trating authority in the hands of a single commander given the Leninist pre-
scription that decisions be reached collectively through Party committees
and the dual leadership system (commanders and political commissars).
Zhang Peigao writes that neither individual nor collective leadership should
be “overemphasized at the expense of the other.” Referencing PLA political
work regulations, Zhang states that in “critical situations,” joint campaigns
can be handled ad hoc by “senior ocers,” who must then “promptly report
to the party committee and receive an inspection.”
47
A PLA treatise states
that one must “correctly handle the relationship between the Party commit-
tee’s decisions and the commander’s resolutions.” e distinction between
the two is vague, with the former responsible for decisions on operational
concepts, policies, and principles, and the latter assuming “concentrated
power” over “joint campaign activities,” albeit “under the Party committee’s
unied leadership.”
48
Recent reforms did not resolve this tension; instead,
reforms have emphasized the role of Party committees to retain unied
control over operations.
49
e political pressures of a Taiwan contingency could intensify the con-
tradiction between individual and collective leadership. Any war against Tai-
wan would implicate the Party’s “core interests,” and political ocers would
be expected to monitor the commander to ensure that operational decisions
do not damage those interests.
50
ose tendencies could be exacerbated by the
character of modern conicts, in which tactical actions (for example, a strike
on a specic U.S. platform) could have profound strategic eects. Whether
political scrutiny would lead to interference or even sanctions, though, would
288 Wuthnow
depend on idiosyncratic variables, including the ways in which individual
services and units have interpreted the dual leadership system,
51
the nature
of relationships between individual ocers, and dierences in judgment
about the likely consequences of a course of action.
52
ere is also a chance
that theater or lower commanders, wary of reprimand either during or after
the conict, could seek a consensus prior to acting (which could range from
a simple conversation to a decision punted to the Party committee, which
also includes deputy commanders and political commissars). ose dynam-
ics could slow decisionmaking, especially in circumstances in which the per-
ceived risks of failure or escalation are high.
Micromanagement and Buck-Passing
A division of labor in which the ETC assumes primary responsibility for execut-
ing an island-landing or other cross-strait operation would require the CMC
to delegate signicant authority to the theater and provide national assets that
typically reside outside theater control. is situation rests uneasily and may
be dicult to reconcile given the countervailing tendency in Leninist systems
to centralize authority among the smallest group of leaders at the highest pos-
sible level. Reecting this tradition, Zhang writes that, in joint commands, cen-
tralization should be primary and supplemented by decentralized command
(not the other way around); joint campaigns should therefore not “blindly fol-
low” the dictum that “whoever is in charge of operations is in command” [shei
zhuzhan, shei zhihui, 谁主战, 谁指挥].
53
e emphasis on centralizing—rather
than distributing—control is also evident in recent decisions to break up the
former general departments and place their remnants within the CMC, the in-
creasing power of central supervisory organs within the PLA, and Xi’s apparent
interventions in personnel decisions down to the level of corps commander.
54
Centralization could complicate eorts to achieve an eective balance
of responsibilities between the JSD and theater levels in two ways. First is
micromanagement: the CMC chairman and his associates may decide that
theater operations require close personal oversight. Unlike contemporary
gray zone operations, in which the risks of a strategic disaster are low, the
direct connection between the outcome of a Taiwan campaign and the re-
gime’s (and Xi’s or his successor’s personal political) survival may height-
en the temptation to keep a tight rein on activities at the theater level. (is
Chinese C2 in a Taiwan Scenario 289
tendency would be greatest in the “imploding China” scenario discussed
in Andrew Scobell’s chapter in this volume.) Xi, with little military expe-
rience of his own, would task his key lieutenants, including the CMC vice
chairman responsible for operations and the JSD chief of sta, to scrutinize
decisions made by the ETC commander or even override them in cases of
dierences in judgment. ose ocials may in turn task ocers in the na-
tional JOCC to liaise with the ETC.
Several factors, however, could push against the tendency to microman-
age and support a delegation of power back to the theaters. e dominant
countervailing factor would be widespread acceptance of the principle that
power should be devolved; that acceptance could be higher among younger
ocers more attuned to the imperatives of modern operations. But other fac-
tors could also be instrumental. JSD ocials with service in the Nanjing MR
or ETC might be more condent in their ability to issue operational guidance,
but those without such experience might be more comfortable yielding de-
cisionmaking authority to the theaters (where, in any case, the theater com-
manders could be blamed for errors in judgment). As table 2 demonstrates,
in recent years only a few JSD ocials had operational experience in the ETC,
potentially mitigating the impetus to micromanage. Another factor would be
the nature of the relationship between ocials at both levels. For example,
good working relationships would facilitate more rapid and eective transfer
of responsibility back to the theaters compared with situations in which o-
cials did not know each other well or had conicting personalities.
55
Table 2. Backgrounds of Senior Joint Staff Department Officials, 2016–2019
Name Position Service Years Previous Positions
Group Army
(Home)
GSD/
GD
ETC/
Nanjing
Other
MR/TC
Service
HQ
GEN Fang
Fenghui
COS GF 16–17 21
st
(Lanzhou) X X
ADM Sun
Jianguo
DCOS Navy 16–17 N/A X
GEN Wang
Jianping
DCOS GF 16 40
th
(Shen-
yang)
X (PAP)
GEN Xu Fenlin DCOS GF 16– 17
th
(Lanzhou) X
GEN Wang
Guanzhong
DCOS GF 16–17 X
290 Wuthnow
e second way in which centralization could aect decisionmaking is
buck-passing—hesitance by theater commanders to implement decisions
without explicit approval. Risk aversion among commanders remains a per-
sistent theme of PLA self-critiques, and regulations have attempted to clarify
that ocers’ promotions and assignments will not be aected by mistakes
due to a willingness to take initiative.
56
Yet the political stakes for a cross-strait
campaign, including the possibility that Party leaders would x the blame for
any failures on the mistakes of those charged with carrying out the war plans,
Name Position Service Years Previous Positions
Group Army
(Home)
GSD/
GD
ETC/
Nanjing
Other
MR/TC
Service
HQ
GEN Qi Jianguo* DCOS GF 16–17 1
st
(Nanjing) X
LTG Yi
Xiaoguang*
DCOS AF 16–17 N/A X X X X
LTG Ma Yiming DCOS GF 16– 20
th
(Jinan) X X
GEN Li Zuocheng COS GF 17– 41
st
(Guang-
zhou)
X X
LTG Shao
Yuanming
DCOS RF 17– N/A X
LTG Chang
Dingqiu
DCOS AF 17– N/A X X
RADM Jiang
Guoping
Asst. to
COS
Navy 17–19 N/A
MG Chen
Guangjun
Asst. to
COS
RF 17– N/A
MG Han
Xiaodong
Asst. to
COS
GF 18– Unknown X
MG Jia
Jiancheng
Dir., Ops.
Bureau
GF 18– Unknown X
MG Zhang Jian* Dir., Ops.
Bureau
GF 17–18 42
nd
(Guang-
zhou)
X
Key: AF: Air Force; COS: chief of staff; DCOS: deputy chief of staff; ETC: Eastern Theater Command; GD:
General Department; GF: Ground Force; GSD: General Service Department; HQ: headquarters; MR: military
region; PAP: People’s Armed Police; RF: Rocket Force; TC: theater command.
Sources: 2016–2019 PRC Directories of Military Personalities and various People's Republic of China Web sites.
Notes:
*
Signifies operational experience in the Nanjing MR or ETC.
†
MG Zhang spent 1 year (February 2016–March 2017) as Eastern Theater Command army chief of staff.
He was later promoted to ETC army commander.
Chinese C2 in a Taiwan Scenario 291
could lead ETC ocials to err on the side of seeking higher authorization for
even minor decisions. For instance, the ETC Party committee could collec-
tively decide to transfer a decision to the next-highest Party committee, at
the CMC level. In decisions with high risks of failure or embarrassment, it is
also possible to imagine an amalgamation of two tendencies: the JSD putting
o decisions to theater leaders, who could be more easily blamed, combined
with bottom-up pressures to send decisions up to the center, leading to de-
lays or paralysis with no one willing to take responsibility.
Stovepiping
While reforms have produced a higher level of jointness within the theaters,
integration of support forces and other capabilities into the theater joint com-
mand system remains incomplete due to a combination of political, opera-
tional, and bureaucratic factors. One impediment is the conict between the
political imperative to centralize control over sensitive capabilities and the
operational goal to devolve authority to the theater commanders who may
need to employ those assets. Indeed, the merging of forces previously un-
der MR control into the SSF and JLSF has in fact increased the Central Mil-
itary Commission’s ability to manage assets at the expense of the theaters.
57
e center also consolidated authority over the PAP as well as the provin-
cial military districts, responsible for reserve and militia forces, which were
transferred from the MRs to a new national defense mobilization department
under the CMC. ese changes reveal a preference for prioritizing central
control over the empowerment of theater commanders.
China’s complex security environment also creates an operational logic
to distribute forces away from a single theater. Because the PLA must prepare
for a variety of contingencies other than Taiwan, it makes sense for the center
to directly manage scarce resources such as space, cyber, and logistics forc-
es that may need to be employed elsewhere. e theaters themselves must
address diverse threats, reducing their ability to act as a supporting actor for
the ETC. Even in a cross-strait campaign, the other theaters would need to
deter other rivals and thus prevent what Chinese strategists call “chain reac-
tion warfare” [liansuo fanying zhanzheng, 连锁反应战争] while also dealing
with U.S. intervention threats across China’s littorals.
58
For instance, former
Nanjing MR deputy commander Lieutenant General Wang Hongguang states
292 Wuthnow
that a key role of the Southern TC would be to serve as a “blocker,” preventing
U.S. intervention along China’s southern ank.
59
ese conicting missions
reduce the availability of forces from other theaters to assist the ETC either in
joint training or wartime operations.
In other cases, a conux of bureaucratic and operational reasons reduces
the potential for theater-level integration of forces. A prime example is the
consolidation of authority by air force headquarters over the airborne corps
as well as select transport divisions and special mission aircraft.
60
Bureau-
cratically, control over these assets reects a tacit concession to the air force
headquarters, which otherwise has ceded operational authority to the the-
aters and is thus a source of leverage that the air force is likely to argue should
remain in its purview. Operationally, these capabilities constitute scarce re-
sources that may need to support not only cross-strait operations but also
a range of other combat and nontraditional security missions domestically,
regionally, and farther aeld, thus strengthening the argument for centraliza-
tion.
61
e combination of these factors creates a ceiling on the ETC’s ability
to integrate other forces into its training and operational planning processes.
Inadequate Joint Expertise
e eectiveness of both tiers of the joint command structure in a Taiwan
contingency would also depend on the quality of the ocers assigned to the
ETC and JSD. Improving the ability of PLA ocers to plan and execute joint
operations has been a goal of PLA training and military education reforms for
more than two decades.
62
However, recognizing the insuciency of earlier
reforms, Xi-era changes have focused on improving joint skills through a new
CMC Training and Administration Department, which establishes standards
and dispatches teams to evaluate theater joint training programs,
63
and by
expanding education on joint operations to focus on younger ocers, most
notably through a new NDU Joint Operations College.
64
Moreover, the ETC,
along with the other theaters, has instituted training programs for command-
ers and sta ocers aimed at improving their ability to operate JOCCs and
plan theater-specic campaigns.
65
Nevertheless, several factors could weaken the PLA’s ability to improve
human capital. First is the lack of experience in conducting real-world joint
operations.
66
e PLA has gained some recent combat experience at a very
Chinese C2 in a Taiwan Scenario 293
small scale in the 2020 border clash with Indian forces and has practiced
higher end joint operations in wargames and simulations. However, no one
serving in the PLA has experience executing any of the primary cross-strait
campaigns. Second is the lack of a rotational assignment system. e PLA, un-
like the post–Goldwater-Nichols system in the United States, does not require
ocers to rotate through joint assignments, nor does it require commanders
to attain education in this area until reaching the corps commander level.
67
e
limited ow of ocers between joint organizations at the national and theater
levels is also a problem to the extent that it reduces mutual understanding of
roles and responsibilities at both levels. ird, as suggested above, the Leninist
tendency toward centralization limits the PLA’s ability to develop a culture of
empowering lower level commanders.
68
Taken together, these weaknesses in
the new joint command structure could reduce the system’s eectiveness in a
Taiwan campaign and provide opportunities for China’s opponents.
Implications for the United States and Taiwan
From a U.S. and Taiwan perspective, China’s evolving command and con-
trol system has mixed implications. On one hand, the new system has sev-
eral advantages for China that are likely to promote more eective control
of PLA operations:
■
a stronger ability to manage and redistribute scarce resources through
the JSD, SSF, and JLSF
■
quicker transitions to war since most of the system that would take
charge of operations (except for ad hoc structures below the theater
level) is already in place
■
consolidated theater authority over land, air, and naval forces in
peacetime
■
stronger integration of conventional missile and, to a lesser degree,
other support forces into the ETC
■
greater prociency in joint operations as training and educational re-
forms begin to take hold.
Given those advantages, U.S. and Taiwan defense planners must update
operational concepts to account for reduced warning times and a stronger
294 Wuthnow
PLA ability to execute joint campaigns. Moreover, both Washington and Tai-
pei should anticipate that greater cohesion in the command structure would
give Beijing a higher degree of condence in the PLA’s ability to manage risks
and thus pursue a wider range of coercive activities in peacetime.
69
On the other hand, the foregoing analysis identied several potential weak-
nesses that may be exploited to gain operational advantages or at least buy ad-
ditional time to allow U.S. forces to arrive. PLA decisionmaking would likely be
slower and more convoluted than that of its opponents due to several factors:
■
tensions between individual and collective decisionmaking and po-
tential interference from political ocers and Party committees
■
temptations by the center to micromanage conicts
■
impulses at lower levels to pass decisions back up the chain of com-
mand, reducing the ETC commander’s ability or willingness to exe-
cute timely decisions
■
the PLA’s lack of experience conducting joint operations and a risk-
averse organizational culture that the PLA has been slow to correct.
e best way to leverage these weaknesses is, according to the 2018 National
Defense Strategy, to “expand the competitive space” by conducting intense,
rapid, and unpredictable operations, including those in multiple domains
and from multiple directions.
70
Conventional strikes launched from submarines, long-range bomb-
ers, mobile ground-based missiles, and other strike platforms constitute
one way to achieve these eects.
71
Chinese strategy, of course, aims to deny
those forces the ability to operate within the Western Pacic. However,
doctrine being developed by the U.S. Services is focused on enabling those
platforms to operate more eectively inside China’s antiaccess/area-denial
envelope.
72
e problem is that such kinetic actions incur signicant risks
of escalation, especially when used against targets inside China, and thus
might be harder for U.S. political leaders to consent to in the rst place.
Moreover, Taiwan’s defense planners should consider how long-range
strike assets such as the Hsiung Feng IIE might also be used in such opera-
tions (for more information, see Drew ompson’s chapter in this volume).
As an alternative, U.S. planners might consider expanding operations
in the information domain (for example, deception, misinformation, false
Chinese C2 in a Taiwan Scenario 295
signals), utilizing cyber, special operations/psychological warfare, and
electronic warfare capabilities. Such operations, whether unilateral or in
coordination with Taiwan’s armed forces, should aim to reduce the con-
dence of Chinese civilian leaders and PLA senior ocers in the likely ef-
fectiveness of operational units, inducing caution prior to a decision to use
force or, barring that, disrupting the PLA’s ability to execute its war plans.
Attention to these solutions, however, may require greater investments and
coordination between U.S. combatant commands.
73
U.S. operations might also exploit the fragmentation of the PLA joint
operations system. e system that has developed in practice is not the sin-
gular joint campaign command envisioned in conceptual PLA writings, but
rather a complex system involving various actors segregated by geography
and function. Key nodes include the national JOCC (Beijing), SSF head-
quarters (Beijing), ETC JOCC and ETC air force headquarters (Nanjing),
Base 61 (Huangshan), naval headquarters (Ningbo), army headquarters
(Fuzhou), and JLSC headquarters (Wuxi), along with potential tactical joint
command posts in variable locations.
74
For the system to operate eective-
ly, reliable communications need to be maintained throughout the chain
of command and across the supporting-supported relationships. Whereas
U.S. forces have strengths in operating in a communications-degraded en-
vironment, in part due to comfort with a “mission command” philosophy,
it is doubtful the PLA would be able to operate with similar ecacy if, say,
mobile command posts were cut o from the ETC headquarters or if theater
commanders faced complications in communicating with the center.
Degrading the links between these organizations would create a specic
dilemma that the PLA would have to resolve, thus complicating its decision-
making and denying it the ability to coordinate eectively across echelons.
Anticipating such threats, the PLA has instituted “robust, redundant commu-
nications networks to improve commanders’ situational awareness.”
75
us,
U.S. and Taiwan defense planners need to think through the range of potential
vulnerabilities and response options. Again, a basic choice is between kinetic
strikes against key nodes in the communications infrastructure and nonki-
netic means. To reduce the risks of escalation, oensive cyber tools might be
used to reduce the reliability of key networks or inject false information, cre-
ating confusion at dierent points in the chain of command. Consideration
296 Wuthnow
should also be given to targeting weaknesses in logistics information systems,
which may be more widely accessible and thus less well defended than com-
mand and control systems.
U.S. operations could also reduce the cohesiveness of China’s joint op-
erations systems by creating dilemmas beyond the Taiwan Strait. Horizontal
escalation, in this context, would aim to stress the JSD’s ability to manage
a war on multiple fronts, divert resources from the main theater, and ulti-
mately force the PLA to deviate from its timelines and improvise responses
to unexpected U.S. actions. While attractive in concept, this approach may
prove dicult to execute in practice due to a high level of Chinese resolve
once a decision to use force against Taiwan has been made (the Party would
not back down lightly), scarce U.S. resources, limited U.S. political will to
get into a broader conict with China, the unwillingness of third parties to
allow U.S. forces to operate from their territory, and a theater command
system that would be in a heightened state of readiness. As a matter of
planning, though, consideration should be given to whether strikes against
Chinese naval targets beyond the Taiwan Strait,
76
blockades of Chinese oil
imports,
77
or information operations that point to an incipient crisis else-
where would be sucient to disorient Chinese decisionmaking and have
enough eect in the main theater to justify the risk.
Conclusion
U.S. and Taiwan planners need to consider not only how to defeat specic
PLA platforms and operate within an increasingly dicult antiaccess/ar-
ea-denial environment but also how to leverage weaknesses in the broader
PLA structure to complicate the ability of PLA commanders to utilize those
systems eectively. Chinese strategists are aware of faults in their own sys-
tem and have advocated for structural changes designed to increase the
cohesiveness of joint operations. Recent reforms have put some of their
suggestions into practice. Yet changes to the organizational culture of the
PLA that would help produce more ecient decisionmaking and opera-
tions, such as eliminating Party committees or clearly delegating author-
ity over sensitive capabilities to the theaters, have eluded reformers and
may not even be possible in a Leninist system. Lack of combat experience
would also continue to pose problems until the PLA actually nds itself in
Chinese C2 in a Taiwan Scenario 297
a war. is situation creates opportunities for exploitation by China’s ad-
versaries. Prudent planning and investments, especially in nontraditional
domains, are necessary if those continuing weaknesses are to be converted
to operational advantage.
For helpful comments on previous drafts, the author thanks David Chen,
Fiona Cunningham, Scott W. Harold, Colonel Rafael Lopez, USA, and Phillip
C. Saunders.
Notes
1
M. Taylor Fravel, Active Defense: Chinese Military Strategy Since 1949 (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 2019), 182–216. See also David M. Finkelstein, “China’s National
Military Strategy: An Overview of the ‘Military Strategic Guidelines,’” in Right Sizing the People’s
Liberation Army: Exploring the Contours of China’s Military, ed. Roy Kamphausen and Andrew
Scobell (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2007), 69–140.
2
For depictions of alternative models, see Xue Yanxu [薛彦绪] and Fan Jiabin [范嘉宾],
Joint Operations Command and Coordination Under High-Tech Conditions [高技术条件下联
合作战指挥与协同] (Beijing: National Defense University Press, 2003), 88–97. In the context
of an island-landing campaign, see Zhang Peigao, Lectures on Joint Campaign Command [联
合战役指挥教程] (Beijing: Academy of Military Science [AMS], 2012), 192–193. For analyses,
see Dean Cheng, “e PLA’s Wartime Structure,” in e PLA as Organization v2.0, ed. Kevin
Pollpeter and Kenneth Allen (Vienna, VA: Defense Group, Inc., 2015), 458–461; Mark A. Stokes,
“Employment of National-Level PLA Assets in a Contingency: A Cross-Strait Conict as Case
Study,” in e People’s Liberation Army and Contingency Planning in China, ed. Andrew Scobell
et al. (Washington, DC: NDU Press, 2015), 140–141.
3
For PLA self-assessments, see Dang Chongmin [党崇民] and Zhang Yu [张羽], Science
of Joint Operations [联合作战学] (Beijing: PLA Press, 2009), 249; Wang Xiaohui [王晓辉], “What
Strategic Preparations Should China’s Military Make in a Transition Era?” [转型期中国军队要做
哪些战略准备], National Defense Reference [国防参考], October 27, 2015; Fang Yongzhi [房永智],
“When Will the Chinese Military Set Up Its Joint Operations Command?” [中国军队何时设立联
合作战司令部?], China Youth Daily [中国青年报], March 28, 2014, available at <http://zqb.cyol.
com/html/2014-03/28/nw.D110000zgqnb_20140328_1-10.htm>.
4
AMS Military Strategy Studies Department, Science of Strategy [战略学] (Beijing: Military
Science Press, 2013), 201.
5
anks to Rafael Lopez for this observation.
6
Concerns about parochialism hobbling reforms have been longstanding for the PLA.
See Kenneth W. Allen et al., Institutional Reforms of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army:
Overview and Challenges (Arlington, VA: CNA, 2002), 67–69.
7
For a general overview, see Joel Wuthnow, “A Brave New World for Chinese Joint
Operations,” Journal of Strategic Studies 40, no. 1–2 (2017), 169–195; Edmund J. Burke and Arthur
Chan, “Coming to a (New) eater Near You: Command, Control, and Forces,” in Chairman Xi
Remakes the PLA, ed. Phillip C. Saunders et al. (Washington, DC: NDU Press, 2019), 227–255.
298 Wuthnow
8
“President Xi Visits CMC Joint Operations Command Center,” China Military Online,
April 21, 2016.
9
For a description of the Eastern eater Command Joint Operations Command Center
(JOCC), see “‘Gunpowder Smoke’ Is Strong in the Eastern TC Joint Operations Command
Center” [东部战区联合作战指挥中心 “硝烟味” 浓烈], Jiefangjun Bao [解放军报], February 16,
2016, available at <http://military.people.com.cn/n1/2016/0216/c1011-28126703.html>.
10
On reducing command layers, see Dong and Zhang, Science of Joint Operations, 248.
11
“Hong Kong Media: e Five eater Commands Are Moving Together, the Central
Military Commission Takes the Lead, Taiwan-Focused Drill Is Just One Part of the Large
Exercise” [港媒: 大陆五大战区齐动中央军委牵头对台军演仅为大军演一部分], Zao Bao
(Singapore), August 2, 2019, available at <https://www.zaobao.com.sg/realtime/china/
story20190802-977728>; “e Five Major Branches of the People’s Liberation Army May
Participate in Military Exercises in the Southeast Coast” [解放军五大军种或将悉数参加在东南
沿海军演], Huanqiu Shibao [环球时报], July 15, 2019, available at <https://mil.news.sina.com.
cn/china/2019-07-15/doc-ihytcerm3686362.shtml>.
12
Joel Wuthnow, System Overload: Can China’s Military Be Distracted in a War over
Taiwan? China Strategic Perspectives No. 15 (Washington, DC: NDU Press, 2020), 19–22; Phillip
C. Saunders, Beyond Borders: PLA Command and Control of Overseas Operations, INSS Strategic
Forum No. 306 (Washington, DC: NDU Press, 2020).
13
Xu Xuesong [许雪松], “Historic Development and Fundamental Rules of Joint
Operation Command System of Foreign Military Forces” [外军联合作战指挥体制的历史发展及
其基本规律], Military History [军事历史], no. 3 (2019), 104–105.
14
Ibid.
15
Liang Liqiang [梁力强] and Sun Bingxiang [孙炳祥], “How to Develop Joint Operations
Command Talent? e Southern TC Has Developed a Blueprint” [联战指挥人才如何培养? 南
部战区绘制人才成长蓝图], Jiefangjun Bao [解放军报], November 12, 2018, available at <http://
www.mod.gov.cn/power/2018-11/12/content_4829238.htm>; “Military Media: Each eater
Can Fight Independently and Support Each Other at Any Time” [军媒: 每一个战区都可以独立
作战, 相互间又能随时支援], e Paper [澎湃新闻], February 4, 2018, available at <https://www.
thepaper.cn/newsDetail_forward_1982789>.
16
Sorting out respective roles and responsibilities was an initial focus of the reforms,
even if few authoritative details have been released on the results of these eorts. During an
inspection of the Center Military Committee (CMC) JOCC in February 2017, Xi enjoined the
PLA to “quickly straighten out relevant major relationships and to improve the joint operations
command mechanism” and to standardize “command powers and responsibilities.” A Joint Sta
Department commentary similarly observed the need to “improve the organization, optimize
procedures, clarify responsibilities, and improve the joint operation command and operational
modes.” See Lin Qiang [林强], “Strive to Build a Strong Joint Operations Command Structure”
[努力建设过硬联合作战指挥机构], People’s Daily [人民日报], February 28, 2017, available
at <http://theory.gmw.cn/2017-02/28/content_23857525.htm>; “is Article Signed ‘CMC
Joint Sta Department’ Is Worth a Read” [这篇署名 “中央军委联合参谋部” 的文章值得一读],
Ministry of National Defense, August 20, 2016.
17
Jerey Engstrom, Systems Confrontation and System Destruction Warfare (Santa
Monica, CA: RAND, 2018), 28–36.
Chinese C2 in a Taiwan Scenario 299
18
For instance, an October 2020 Eastern eater Command landing exercise included
a forward command post synthesizing tactical intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
and directing repower strikes. See “e Eastern TC Discloses a Complete Landing Exercise,
Taiwan Media Calls It a ‘Warning’” [东部战区披露的这次完整登陆演练, 台媒直呼有 “警告” 意
味], Beijing Youth Daily [北京青年报], October 11, 2020, available at <https://m.us.sina.com/gb/
china/sinacn/2020-10-11/detail-ihaauwts5940528.shtml>.
19
“Ocial Media Reveals State-Produced New-Type Joint Operations Mobile Command
Truck ‘Foresight’” [官媒揭秘国产新型联合作战机动指挥车 “远谋”], available at <https://mil.
news.sina.com.cn/china/2021-09-30/doc-iktzscyx7136684.shtml>.
20
Information provided in the Directory of PRC Military Personalities (Washington, DC:
Department of Defense, 2014 and 2019).
21
Stokes, “Employment of National-Level PLA Assets in a Contingency,” 143–145.
22
Zhang, Lectures on Joint Campaign Command, 212–213.
23
Han Guangsong [韩光松], “Joint Operation Command and Control Based on Modern
Control eory” [基于现代控制理论的联合作战指挥控制], Fire Control & Command Control [火
力与指挥控制], no. 5 (2020), 18.
24
Longer range systems used for operations beyond the Taiwan Strait might be centralized
within the Joint Sta Department or CMC; this would preserve political control and accord with
a notional division of labor between the two echelons.
25
“Eastern TC Commander Liu Yuejun Speaks About Construction of Joint Operations
Command Capabilities” [东部战区司令员刘粤军谈联合作战指挥能力建设], Caixin [财新],
March 3, 2016, available at <http://china.caixin.com/2016-03-03/100915681.html>.
26
Zhang Hui, “PLA Rocket Force Names 100 Ocers to Commands,” Global Times,
April 12, 2016, available at <https://www.globaltimes.cn/content/978291.shtml>; “How to
Build a Joint Operations Command Platform? Look Here” [联合作战指挥平台咋搭建? 到这
里看看], China Military Online [中国军网], September 21, 2017, available at <http://www.81.
cn/2017jj90/2017-09/21/content_7765599.htm>.
27
“e Eastern eater Command: Joint Training Proceeds Under Legal Routes” [东部战
区: 联合训练, 在法治轨道运行], Jiefangjun Bao [解放军报], January 2, 2018, available at <http://
www.mod.gov.cn/power/2018-01/02/content_4801252.htm>.
28
“e ‘Rim of Taiwan’ Military Exercise in the Eastern eater Command’s New Weapon
Will Deter ‘Taiwan ‘Independence’” [东部战区 “环台湾” 军演 这款新列装武器将震慑 “台独”],
Ordnance Technology [兵工科技], August 18, 2020, available at <https://mil.news.sina.com.cn/
zhengming/2020-08-18/doc-iivhvpwy1653868.shtml>. See also David C. Logan, “Making Sense
of China’s Missile Forces,” in Saunders et al., Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA, 393–435.
29
Roderick Lee, “Integrating the PLA Rocket Force into Conventional eater
Operations,” China Brief 20, no. 14 (August 14, 2020), available at <https://jamestown.org/
program/integrating-the-pla-rocket-force-into-conventional-theater-operations/>.
30
is category may also include provincial military districts, which report to the CMC
National Defense Mobilization Department.
31
Nevertheless, cyber units are less tied to geography; presumably, the Eastern eater
Command could assume control over Strategic Support Force cyber units physically based in
other regions.
32
John Chen, Joe McReynolds, and Kieran Green, “e PLA Strategic Support Force: A
‘Joint’ Force for Information Operations,” in e PLA Beyond Borders, ed. Joel Wuthnow et al.
(Washington, DC: NDU Press, 2021), 151–179.
300 Wuthnow
33
“e ‘Rim of Taiwan’ Military Exercise in the Eastern eater Command’s New Weapon
Will Deter ‘Taiwan Independence’”; “News of an Eastern TC Exercise Contains ree ‘Rares’”
[东部战区演训消息包含三个 “罕见”], Global Times [环球时报], August 13, 2020, available at
<https://news.sina.com.cn/c/2020-08-14/doc-iivhuipn8528837.shtml>.
34
See, for example, “A Certain Brigade of the Central TC Army and a Certain Base of the
Strategic Support Force Conduct Confrontation Exercises to Explore the Cross-Service Joint
Training Mechanism” [中部战区陆军某旅与战略支援部队某基地开展对抗演练 探索跨军种
联合训练机制], Jiefangjun Bao [解放军报], October 14, 2018, 2; and “Treading the Waves and
Fortifying the Soldiers” [踏浪砺精兵 大洋战歌飞], Jiefangjun Bao [解放军报], February 19, 2019,
9.
35
For background, see Statement of Kevin McCauley, Modernization of PLA Logistics:
Joint Logistic Support Force, Testimony Before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review
Commission, February 15, 2018; LeighAnn Luce and Erin Richter, “Handling Logistics in a
Reformed PLA: e Long March Toward Joint Logistics,” in Saunders et al., Chairman Xi Remakes
the PLA, 257–292.
36
“Expert Explains the Relationship Between the CMC Logistic Support Department and
the CMC Joint Logistic Support Force” [专家详解军委联勤保障部队与军委后勤保障部是何种关
系], e Paper [澎湃], November 27, 2016, available at <https://www.thepaper.cn/newsDetail_
forward_1569162>.
37
“When ‘Old Joint Logistics’ Meets ‘New Joint Logistics’” [当 “老联勤” 遇到 “新联勤”],
Jiefangjun Bao [解放军报], April 18, 2017, 5; “Demystifying the Newly Established Central
Military Commission Joint Logistic Support Force” [揭秘新成立的中央军委联勤保障部队],
China Youth Daily [中国青年报], January 19, 2017, available at <http://military.people.com.cn/
n1/2017/0119/c1011-29035648.html>.
38
On the civil transport eets, see Conor M. Kennedy, Civil Transport in PLA Power
Projection, China Maritime Report No. 4 (Newport, RI: U.S. Naval War College, 2019), 4–17.
39
See Joel Wuthnow, China’s Other Army: e People’s Armed Police in an Era of Reform,
China Strategic Perspectives No. 14 (Washington, DC: NDU Press, 2019), 22.
40
Ibid., 9–16.
41
is is the second mobile contingent. e rst is based in Shijiazhuang. See ibid., 13.
42
“e Eastern TC Commanded More than 10,000 PLA and PAP Troops Around Chaohu
Lake” [东部战区指挥万余名解放军, 武警部队官兵沿环巢湖大堤奋战排险], Anhui News
Network [安徽新闻网], July 31, 2020, available at <http://www.hf365.com/2020/0731/1305206.
shtml>.
43
“e PLA and PAP Scientically Deploy Rescue Forces to Fight Floods and Conduct
Disaster Relief” [解放军和武警部队科学调配救援力量, 全力抗洪救灾], China National Radio
Military Channel [央广军事], July 23, 2020, available at <http://www.taihainet.com/news/
military/zgjq/2020-07-23/2408594.html>.
44
Strategic transport aircraft also remain under PLA Air Force headquarters. See
PLA Aerospace Power: A Primer on Trends in China’s Military Air, Space, and Missile Forces
(Washington, DC: China Aerospace Studies Institute, 2019), 11.
45
However, airborne troops were involved in a seminar on joint operations held in
Beijing. See Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2020
(Washington, DC: Oce of the Secretary of Defense, 2020), 53.
46
On transregional exercises, see Dennis J. Blasko, “e Biggest Loser in Chinese Military
Reforms: e PLA Army,” in Saunders et al., Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA, 366–370.
Chinese C2 in a Taiwan Scenario 301
47
Zhang Peigao [张培高], Science of Joint Campaign Command [联合战役指挥学]
(Beijing: Military Science Press, 2009), 104. Zhang quotes nearly verbatim from the 2003 PLA
Political Work Regulations [中国人民解放军政治工作条例].
48
Xu Guxian [徐国咸] et al., Study of Joint Campaigns [联合战役研究] (Beijing: Yellow
River Press, 2004), 5.
49
Instead, a consistent theme has been strengthening Party-building in the PLA. For
instance, a Xuexi Shibao article describing new regulations on Party-building within the PLA
enjoined Party committees to “strengthen political leadership and eectively control the troops,
organize and command major tasks and operations, and hold onto major issues related to
combat readiness.” See Donghe Weidong [东何卫东] and He Ping [何平], “Scientic Guidelines
for Comprehensively Strengthening Party Building of the Army in the New Era” [全面加强新时
代军队党的建设的科学指引], Xuexi Shibao [学习时报], October 16, 2020, available at <http://
www.qstheory.cn/llwx/2020-10/16/c_1126618351.htm>.
50
e exact role of the political commissar is not clear, but Zhang writes that that ocer
would be expected to conduct political work and “coordinate with the commander.” See Zhang,
Lessons on Joint Campaign Command, 39.
51
On the PLA Navy, see Je Benson and Zi Yang, Party on the Bridge: Political Commissars
in the Chinese Navy (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2020). e
authors report that on certain ships there is evidence of Party committees, rather than ship
captains, making tactical decisions.
52
It is worth noting that political commissars receive similar education in military arts as
commanders. For instance, both commanders and political ocers attend the senior-level joint
operations course at the PLA National Defense University.
53
Zhang, Lectures on Joint Campaign Command, 2–3.
54
Phillip C. Saunders and Joel Wuthnow, “Large and In Charge: Civil-Military Relations
Under Xi Jinping,” in Saunders et al., Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA, 519–555.
55
Notably, the reforms appeared to promote a system in which commanders and political
commissars, both within the same level and up and down the chain of command, do not know
each other well, ostensibly to reduce the prevalence of patronage networks and corruption.
is system was achieved by rotating ocers out of one of those positions, but not both. For a
discussion, see Saunders and Wuthnow, “Large and In Charge,” 536–537.
56
Statement of Dennis J. Blasko, PLA Weaknesses and Xi’s Concerns About PLA
Capabilities, Testimony Before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission,
February 7, 2019, 9.
57
As John Costello and Joe McReynolds write in the context of the SSF, “is new
centralization of information power may be more a function of persistent paranoia and the need
for control than a desire to explore innovative means of warghting.” See John Costello and Joe
McReynolds, China’s Strategic Support Force: A Force for a New Era, China Strategic Perspectives
No. 13 (Washington, DC: NDU Press, 2018), 55.
58
Ibid. On chain reaction warfare, see Wuthnow, System Overload, 10–11; M. Taylor
Fravel, “Securing Borders: China’s Doctrine and Force Structure for Frontier Defense,” Journal of
Strategic Studies 30, no. 4–5 (2007), 716.
59
“Lieutenant General Wang Hongguang: After the Eastern TC Exercise, the Southern
TC Conducted a Big Maneuver!” [王洪光中将: 东部战区军演之后, 南部战区又一大动作!], Daily
Headline [今日头条], February 21, 2020.
60
PLA Aerospace Power, 11.
302 Wuthnow
61
In the context of expeditionary operations, see Cristina L. Garafola and Timothy R.
Heath, e Chinese Air Force’s First Steps Toward Becoming an Expeditionary Air Force (Santa
Monica, CA: RAND, 2017). On the broad range of missions for the PLA Air Force, see Michael
S. Chase and Cristina L. Garafola, “China’s Search for a ‘Strategic Air Force,’” Journal of Strategic
Studies 39, no. 1 (2016), 4–28.
62
See, for example, Kevin Pollpeter, “Towards an Integrative C4ISR System:
Informationization and Joint Operations in the People’s Liberation Army,” in e PLA at Home
and Abroad: Assessing the Operational Capabilities of China’s Military, ed. Roy Kamphausen,
David Lai, and Andrew Scobell (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2010), 212–220.
63
“CMC Training and Management Department Organizes Joint eater Training and
Service and Branch Training Supervision” [军委训练管理部组织开展战区联合训练和军兵
种战役训练监察], Jiefangjun Bao [解放军报], November 16, 2017, available at <http://www.
xinhuanet.com/mil/2017-11/16/c_129742096.htm>.
64
“NDU’s ‘Elimination System’ Cultivates Military Joint Operations Sta Talents” [国防大
学全程 “淘汰制” 培养军队联合作战参谋人才], Xinhua, April 3, 2019, available at <http://www.
xinhuanet.com/2019-04/03/c_1124322788.htm>. For a discussion of joint education at the PLA
National Defense University and other military universities, see Joel Wuthnow and Phillip C.
Saunders, “A Modern Major General: Building Joint Commanders in the PLA,” in Saunders et al.,
Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA, 304–306.
65
“Reshaping the System, Forging a Winning Division” [体系重塑, 锻造胜战之师],
Jiefangjun Bao [解放军报], September 21, 2017.
66
For a broader discussion of PLA human capital problems, see Michael S. Chase et al.,
eds., China’s Incomplete Military Transformation (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2015), 43–68.
67
Wuthnow and Saunders, “A Modern Major General,” 293–323.
68
Notably, the U.S. military itself continues to struggle with implementing decentralized
decisionmaking. See, for example, Andrew Hill and Heath Niemi, “e Trouble with Mission
Command: Flexive Command and the Future of Command and Control,” Joint Force Quarterly
86 (3
rd
Quarter 2017), 94–100.
69
e increase in Chinese provocations toward Taiwan in 2020 could reect, among
other things, greater condence in the PLA’s command and control system. For a description
of events, see Joel Wuthnow, Projecting Strength in a Time of Uncertainty: China’s Military in
2020, Testimony Before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, September
9, 2020.
70
Such themes are already present in a variety of recent U.S. doctrinal expositions. See,
for example, David G. Perkins, “Multi-Domain Battle: Joint Combined Arms Concept for the 21
st
Century,” Association of the United States Army, November 14, 2016, available at <https://www.
ausa.org/articles/multi-domain-battle-joint-combined-arms>; Robert B. Brown, “e Indo-
Pacic and the Multi-Domain Battle Concept,” U.S. Indo-Pacic Command, March 21, 2017,
available at <https://www.pacom.mil/Media/News/News-Article-View/Article/1125682/the-
indo-asia-pacic-and-the-multi-domain-battle-concept/>; Terrence J. O’Shaugnessy, Matthew
D. Strohmeyer, and Christopher D. Forrest, “Strategic Shaping: Expanding the Competitive
Space,” Joint Force Quarterly 90 (3
rd
Quarter 2018), 10–15.
71
omas G. Mahnken et al., Tightening the Chain: Implementing a Strategy of Maritime
Pressure in the Western Pacic (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments,
2019).
Chinese C2 in a Taiwan Scenario 303
72
Examples include the navy’s concept of distributed lethality, air force concepts
of distributed operations, army multidomain operations, and marine corps expeditionary
advanced base operations.
73
One sign that these approaches are gaining traction is comments from former Pacic
Air Forces Commander General Charles Q. Brown, Jr., who noted that deception is “something
we’ve done in the past. . . . What I really believe [is] it’s something we, as a department, probably
need to start paying more attention to.” See Marcus Weisgerber, “U.S. Military Should Deepen Its
Use of Deception, Pacic Air Forces General Says,” Defense One, December 18, 2019, available
at <https://www.defenseone.com/threats/2019/12/us-military-should-add-deception-its-
playbook-pacic-air-forces-general-says/161982/>. See also Kyle Rempfer, “SOCOM Needs
to Step Up Its Propaganda Game, Pentagon Deputy Says,” Military Times, February 6, 2019,
available at <https://www.militarytimes.com/news/your-military/2019/02/06/socom-needs-
to-step-up-its-propaganda-game-pentagon-deputy-says/>.
74
For a description, see Peter Wood, “Snapshot: China’s Eastern eater Command,”
e Jamestown Foundation, March 14, 2017, available at <https://jamestown.org/program/
snapshot-chinas-eastern-theater-command/>.
75
China Military Power: Modernizing a Force to Fight and Win (Washington, DC: Defense
Intelligence Agency, 2019), 27.
76
For instance, former Department of Defense ocial Michèle Flournoy has argued that,
at least for deterrence purposes, the U.S. Navy should have the ability to sink all of China’s surface
combatants as a counter to PLA aggression toward Taiwan. See Joe Gould, “Congress Wrestles
with Deterring China—Beyond Nukes,” Defense News, January 16, 2020, available at <https://
www.defensenews.com/congress/2020/01/16/congress-wrestles-with-deterring-chinabeyond-
nukes/>.
77
See T.X. Hammes, Oshore Control: A Proposed Strategy for an Unlikely Conict, INSS
Strategic Forum No. 278 (Washington, DC: NDU Press, June 2012); Gabriel Collins, “A Maritime
Oil Blockade Against China—Tactically Tempting but Strategically Flawed,” Naval War College
Review 71, no. 2 (2018), 1–30.
IV
Strengthening Taiwan’s Defenses
CHAPTER 11
A Net Assessment of Taiwan’s Overall
Defense Concept
Alexander Chieh-cheng Huang
307
P
eace has been generally maintained across the Taiwan Strait since the
Second Taiwan Strait Crisis in 1958. However, relative peace has be-
come more fragile than ever as the military balance between Taiwan
and the mainland has incrementally shifted in favor of the People’s Liberation
Army (PLA). is has resulted from China’s rapid economic development
and defense modernization over the past 40 years, including the ambitious
program of “deepening defense and military reform” introduced by General
Secretary Xi Jinping at the end of 2015.
To cope with the possibility that China may attempt to achieve unication
by force, Taiwan’s military has spent the past decade debating the tradeos
between retaining a conventional legacy force and building a more asymmet-
rical military capability. e combination of an expanded Chinese military
threat and Taiwan’s limited military and budgetary resources has contribut-
ed to the gradual realization that an eective and aordable defense should
prioritize balanced investments and force-building plans. In this context, the
Overall Defense Concept (ODC) [zhengti fangwei gouxiang, 整體防衛構想]
has emerged as the leading thought in developing Taiwan’s force-building
and operational guidelines.
308 Huang
is chapter examines the key contents, challenges, and future possibil-
ities of the ODC (which continues to be elaborated and enriched) through
an assessment of Taiwan’s national security environment, the timeline of a
possible armed conict, available nancial and human resources that may
be committed to implementing the concept, and, most important, the ODC’s
operational utility and implications. is chapter is divided into three parts:
the rst section briey reviews the evolution of Taiwan’s military strategy
since 1949. e second section discusses the ODC’s emergence as a new
concept in Taiwan defense policy and military strategy. e third section an-
alyzes challenges that could complicate the ODC’s implementation and pro-
vides suggestions for further developing the concept.
The Evolution of Taiwan’s Military Strategies
Securing Taiwan’s democratic institutions and way of life in the face of a
Chinese invasion threat has been a constant challenge since the Nationalist
government retreated to Taiwan after losing the Chinese Civil War in 1949.
Recognizing changes in the international power structure, military balance
across the Taiwan Strait, military technology, and operational concepts,
one should not write o the devotion, sacrice, defense strategy, and ac-
quisitions policy of previous governments when discussing a new defense
strategy for Taiwan today.
Over the past 70 years, Taiwan’s defense has closely depended on the
United States for weapons systems procurement, doctrinal development,
training and exercises, and organizational innovation. More broadly, both
Taiwan’s defense policy and military strategy have generally adhered to larg-
er U.S. regional strategy and interests.
1
At the outset, China’s intervention
in the Korean War in 1950 changed the seemingly neutral U.S. position on
the Chinese Civil War and led Washington to provide Taiwan with critically
needed military assistance. e U.S.–Republic of China (ROC) Mutual De-
fense Treaty, signed in 1954, frustrated President Chiang Kai-shek’s intention
of retaking the mainland by force and altered his “oensive” military strategy.
However, it also played a signicant role in the relative success of Taiwan’s o-
shore islands operations, for example by enabling the successful withdrawal
of Taiwan’s forces from the Tachen archipelago o the Zhejiang coast in 1955
and by providing military support during the Jinmen campaign in 1958.
A Net Assessment of Taiwan’s Overall Defense Concept 309
e normalization of U.S.-China relations in 1971 and the switch of U.S.
diplomatic recognition from Taipei to Beijing in 1979 led Taiwan to gradually
abandon the oensive element of its military strategy. e termination of the
Mutual Defense Treaty and the U.S. Military Assistance and Advisory Group,
along with the subsequent withdrawal of U.S. military personnel from the is-
land, left Taiwan in a long period of self-reliant defense planning. After sever-
al years of study, Taiwan started the annual series of Han Kuang joint military
exercises in 1984, based initially on war scenarios that did not assume U.S.
intervention in a Taiwan contingency.
Another pivot in Taiwan’s military strategy occurred during and after the
1995–1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis. Between July 1995 and March 1996, China
lobbed missiles into the waters near Taiwan and conducted joint exercises
along the Fujian coast to protest Washington granting a visa to Taiwan Pres-
ident Lee Teng-hui and his high-prole visit to Cornell University, his alma
mater. e missile crisis sounded an alarm to both Taipei and Washington
that the defensive military strategy of an isolated Taiwan was inappropriate
and risked endangering the interests of both Taiwan and the United States.
e United States, acknowledging the lack of understanding of Taiwan’s de-
fense planning and capability and the commitment codied in the Taiwan
Relations Act, began a series of proactive eorts to promote closer military
ties and reengage Taipei with gradually increased exchanges and assistance
in defense reorganization and modernization. (Resolute defense and eective
deterrence were two key terms used for Taiwan’s military strategy to address a
possible armed conict in the Taiwan Strait.)
A nal shift has taken place over the past decade. When Xi assumed the
chairmanship of the Central Military Commission (CMC) in 2012, the PLA
had already undergone several military doctrinal changes, from ghting and
winning a “war under modern conditions” to “local wars under high-tech
conditions” and “informatized conditions.” Xi further transformed China’s
military strategy to a new doctrine of “winning informatized local wars.”
2
In
association with his articulation of the “great rejuvenation of the Chinese na-
tion” by 2049, Xi initiated an ambitious military reform plan at the end of 2015
that included reforming the CMC, reorganizing seven military regions into
ve theater commands emphasizing integrated joint operations, and mod-
ernizing key naval and air systems with greatly improved force projection
310 Huang
capability.
3
Since then, the PLA has conducted more provocative military
activities beyond China’s coastline (for a discussion of Chinese coercive ac-
tivities across the Taiwan Strait, see the chapter by Mathieu Duchâtel in this
volume). As the military balance has tilted decisively in China’s favor, many
hawkish elements on the mainland, from retired military ocers to netizens,
have in recent years advocated “unication by force.”
In response to growing and urgent military pressure and intimidations,
Taiwan has again modied its military strategy to focus on resolute defense
and multidomain deterrence. e shift is a tacit recognition that Taiwan can
no longer compete against the PLA and eectively defend Taiwan based on
the previous symmetrical approach of force-building and operational plan-
ning. Defense planners, including those on the joint sta, nally must look
seriously into asymmetric operational concepts that have been proposed
and debated for years.
Development of Asymmetrical Concepts for Taiwan’s Defense
e ODC is a campaign- and theater-level operational concept based on input
from defense professionals in Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense (MND)
and the Pentagon over the past decade. Even before the Xi era, the concept of
a more asymmetrical defense approach was mentioned by then–Assistant Sec-
retary of Defense for Asia-Pacic Aairs Wallace Gregson in a keynote speech
delivered in October 2009 at the U.S.-Taiwan Defense Industry Conference in
Charlottesville, Virginia:
As a result of the PRC [People’s Republic of China]’s rapid economic growth
and military modernization, Taiwan will never again have the luxury of
relying on quantitative advantages over the PRC. Instead Taiwan must look
to its qualitative advantages through focusing on innovation and asymme-
try. I realize that words like “innovation” and “asymmetry” are often thrown
around, but these concepts are much more than just popular military buzz
words. ey are essential components of a modern security strategy.
4
e words innovation and asymmetry were then adopted widely and appeared
in the MND’s public statements, strategic documents, and white papers, but
without clearly dened conceptualization and authoritative consensus by Tai-
wan’s senior political and military leaders.
5
Between 2010 and 2012, the MND
A Net Assessment of Taiwan’s Overall Defense Concept 3 11
set up an ad hoc task force to study and esh out the two concepts; however,
no information about these eorts was made available to the public.
Cross-strait relations took a sharp downturn after the pro-indepen-
dence Democratic Progressive Party regained power in May 2016. As the
threat of the Chinese military taking Taiwan by force becomes more likely,
the asymmetric and innovative approaches to Taiwan’s defense modern-
ization and operational plans proposed by the U.S. Department of Defense
have emerged as Taiwan’s ocial operational concept, as detailed in the
2019 ROC National Defense Report:
In accordance with the military strategy of “resolute defense and multi-
domain deterrence,” the MND has developed an ODC of “force protection,
decisive battle in the littoral zone, and destruction of enemy at the landing
beach” to make use of natural trenches and geographic advantages, apply
“innovative/asymmetric” operational thinking, integrate capabilities of
the three services, take battleeld initiatives, deal a deadly blow to the
enemies, and ultimately “frustrate enemies’ invasion mission.”
6
In an interview with United Daily News on November 15, 2020, Taiwan’s
former Chief of the General Sta Lee Hsi-ming stated that the ODC is a “joint
operations outline” [lianhe zuozhan gangyao, 聯合作戰綱要] developed
through numerous meetings with the joint sta in the MND.
7
is statement
demonstrates that the ODC resulted from nearly a decade-long exploration
of asymmetrical and innovative operational concepts based on collaborative
work by stakeholders in both Taiwan and the United States.
For Taiwan’s defense leaders, the ODC is an operational concept that sup-
ports the military strategy of resolute defense and multidomain deterrence. Like
the U.S. military’s joint doctrine, the ODC promotes asymmetrical principles that
guide the employment of Taiwan’s armed forces in integrated actions against an
invasion. It also provides a common perspective from which the MND can plan,
train for, and conduct joint operations. e operational concept is not designed
to cover full-spectrum military scenarios. Its original concept, as illustrated in
the 2019 ROC National Defense Report, does not deal with such areas as military
responsibilities and requirements before or after an all-out invasion.
According to the 2019 ROC National Defense Report, the ODC centers on
three major elements: force protection, decisive battle in the littoral zone, and
312 Huang
destruction of the enemy on the landing beaches. It is primarily designed for
active-duty ghting forces to counter an all-out Chinese invasion through the
application of asymmetric operational concepts. Key principles informing
the concept include mobility [jidong, 機動], camouage [weizhuang, 偽裝],
concealment [yinbi, 隱蔽], deception [qidi, 欺敵], lethality [zhiming, 致命],
precision [jingzhun, 精準], inexpensive systems [pianyi, 便宜], operational
redundancy [daliang, 大量], and dispersion [fensan, 分散].
8
ese principles
will help ensure that Taiwan’s armed forces are not severely damaged in the
initial stages of a war, thus preserving their strength and maintaining the ex-
ibility required to conduct a counterattack against the invading enemy.
Strengthening the ODC
In examining the functions and utilities of the new asymmetric-minded
ODC, several key problems must be identied and incorporated into the
future development of the concept. ese include estimating the Chinese
Communist Party (CCP)’s timeline for unication, addressing the problem
of a Taiwanese public perhaps not ready for war, clarifying the deterrent and
other peacetime roles the ODC can play, supporting capability development
through budgetary increases, and strengthening U.S.-Taiwan defense coop-
eration to avoid the prospect of an isolated Taiwan. Fortunately, the ODC is
framed as an “overall” concept, especially when articulated in the original
Chinese connotation—zheng ti [整體]—that gives it the exibility and poten-
tial for enrichment. is section analyzes both the problems inherent in the
ODC and potential ways to mitigate those concerns.
Estimating China’s Timeline
In a meeting with President Bill Clinton in Beijing in late 1998, after the 1995–
1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis and the resumption of cross-strait dialogue in 1998,
Chinese leader Jiang Zemin stated that “the cross-strait problem should not
be postponed indenitely and there is a need of a timetable.”
9
Jiang’s remarks
generated anxiety and wide discussion in Taiwan, but his successors have nev-
er repeated such calls for a formal timeline. However, when Xi suggested that
“national unication is an integral part of achieving the great rejuvenation of
the Chinese nation,” observers naturally pointed to the timetable he set for the
fulllment of the Chinese dream: to achieve “basic prosperity in all sectors”
A Net Assessment of Taiwan’s Overall Defense Concept 313
in 2020; to realize “a modernized socialist country” in 2035; and to reach the
status of a “prosperous, powerful, democratic, harmonious, and beautiful so-
cialist modern country” by 2049.
10
is proposal implied that Xi intended for
unication to be completed, by force if necessary, by midcentury.
More alarmingly, in his address to the fth plenary session of the 19
th
Party Congress in October 2020, Xi set a new goal for the centennial of
the PLA in 2027, albeit without further elaboration.
11
e year 2027 is also
when Xi is expected to complete his third term as general secretary of the
CCP and chairman of the CMC. Because the ODC emerged as an ocial
joint operations outline only in 2019, it is crucial to assess whether there
is a CCP timetable for national unication. e answer has important im-
plications for how much time Taiwan has for the ODC’s implementation of
changes in force planning and buildup, doctrinal formulation, and valida-
tion through joint military exercises.
Enhancing Social Endurance
Taiwan has not needed to mobilize for war since the 1958 Jinmen campaign.
Expert views on growing Chinese military threats are not widely shared by the
public. e MND’s public relations eorts, such as the opening of army bar-
racks, naval stations, and air bases, while extremely popular, did not translate
into a strong recruitment record for volunteer military service. Civil and air
defense drills have been too short and small in scale to raise awareness of
tensions across the Taiwan Strait.
Increased PLA air and naval intimidation around Taiwan’s Air Defense
Identication Zone and waters, and the occasional incursion of PLA ghter
jets past the median line of the Taiwan Strait, have prompted hatred toward
the Chinese Communist regime but have rarely created real anxiety among
Taiwan’s civilian population. War scenarios in general fall outside the bounds
of citizens’ daily lives. e possible disruption of electricity, water, gas, food,
health care, Internet, and other daily public services during wartime is gen-
erally dismissed by politicians and the public, and the denite impact on
military maneuvering and the psychological eect on ghting forces on the
frontlines are largely ignored.
Under the assumption of failure in both littoral and beachhead battles, in
an article coauthored with Democratic Progressive Party think tank executive
314 Huang
Enoch Wu, Admiral Lee advocated the establishment of a “territorial defense
force” through the mobilization and reorganization of the existing reserve
force.
12
e idea is to “capitalize on all available military and civilian assets to
muster a whole-of-society eort” to conduct guerrilla-type urban warfare.
13
In other words, initial discussions have already been held in Taiwan about
expanding the ODC, both outward and inward, in a way that is much larger
than the original operational concept and that extends beyond the responsi-
bility of the active-duty ghting force.
Expanding the Aims Supported by the ODC
Maintaining peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait is the objective of Tai-
wan’s defense. To meet this goal, the defense policy is to build military ca-
pability and capacity to prevent war and deter Chinese aggression. Should
deterrence fail, the Taiwan military will aim to ght and win at the operation-
al level and achieve a lasting peace. In this prevent-deter-ght-win equation,
the ODC, as a joint operations outline, is designed to address the “warght-
ing” stage. However, in building a Taiwan military with asymmetric capabili-
ties and capacity for sustainment, a successful force buildup adhering to the
ODC can also help complicate Chinese invasion plans and lower the proba-
bility of a Beijing decision to wage a war. For instance, the ODC’s deterrence
function could be presented in Taiwan’s investment priorities on improved
command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance,
and reconnaissance capabilities; better protection of critical infrastructure;
and highly mobile and long-range strike systems. e extended functions of
the ODC in deterrence and prevention should be elaborated and supported
within the military ranks and by the people.
e ODC also needs to clarify the role of Taiwan’s armed forces be-
yond wartime missions. While building the capability and capacity to
ght against a Chinese invasion is the main mission of Taiwan’s military,
peacetime responsibilities and responding to “gray zone” coercion have
also been frequent and costly military missions. Indeed, these activities
help maintain peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait. For example, regular
Taiwan naval and air force patrols have made signicant contributions to
the freedom and safety of navigation in the Taiwan Strait and between the
Miyako Strait and Bashi Channel.
A Net Assessment of Taiwan’s Overall Defense Concept 315
Asymmetric operational concepts and related investment requirements
have little connection to these peacetime responsibilities. Responding to
scenarios such as China’s encirclement of oshore islands without attacks,
intimidation against the Taiwan-held Dongsha Island (Pratas) and Taiping
Island (Itu Aba) in the South China Sea, interdiction or quarantine of mari-
time shipping en route to Taiwan, announcement of a partial naval blockade,
notication to foreigners living in Taiwan to leave or recommendation of a
noncombatant evacuation operation, and many other gray zone tactics are
all beyond the ODC’s original emphasis on force protection, decisive battle in
the littoral zone, and destruction of the enemy on the landing beaches.
In an article published in e Diplomat, Admiral Lee Hsi-ming writes,
“e ODC’s three tenets for force buildup are force preservation, conven-
tional capabilities, and asymmetric capabilities.”
14
e conceptualization
and interpretation of the ODC have already begun to expand to address mil-
itary responsibilities and scenarios short of all-out invasion, as evidenced by
sources ranging from the 2019 ROC National Defense Report, which explained
that the ODC focuses on operations in the littoral area and beachhead, to Ad-
miral Lee’s 2020 article that addresses additional requirements for gray zone
and peacetime missions.
Resourcing the ODC
e search for innovative ways of dealing with China’s looming military
threat is necessary due to the PLA’s rapid modernization and the changing
cross-strait military balance. Taiwan’s limited nancial resources cannot cov-
er all requirements in building both conventional and asymmetric capabili-
ties. e ODC faces the same dilemma, which is why a rebalance of defense
investments, involving fewer high-end conventional legacy weapons systems
and more asymmetric capabilities, is required.
However, given the scheduled payments for committed arms procure-
ment items from the United States and the estimated cost of developing in-
digenous systems such as submarines, it is extremely dicult to locate new
funding to procure asymmetric systems. One should also keep in mind that
smaller, survivable, mobile systems have command, control, communica-
tions, and logistics requirements that also cost a great amount. erefore,
continued and reasonable defense budget increases will be essential to the
316 Huang
success of the ODC. Since Tsai Ing-wen assumed the presidency in 2016,
Taiwan has averaged a 2 percent annual defense budget increase, with ex-
penditures rising to USD $15 billion in scal year 2021, partly to meet the
requirement for increased U.S. arms sales to Taiwan in the latter half of the
Donald Trump administration. Among the arms sales items, a few are already
in line with asymmetrical operational concepts (for details, see the chapter
by Drew ompson in this volume).
Even a limited budget increase, however, cannot solve the problem of
funding requirements to fully implement the ODC. Possible solutions in-
clude exploiting operational concepts that enable asymmetrical applications
of traditional weapons and equipment and focusing future defense acquisi-
tion on weapons systems that could better execute the ODC.
Strengthening U.S.-Taiwan Defense Cooperation
In the 20
th
century, the oshore islands of Jinmen and Matzu served as the
frontline for Taiwan’s defense. However, these islands were too close to the
Chinese coast and thus had an extremely low probability for resupply, rein-
forcement, or maritime and air cover from the main island of Taiwan during
wartime. erefore, the guidance for oshore islands defense operations was
always “independent resolute defense” [duli gushou, 獨立固守], meaning that
Taiwan forces on these outposts would ght as an isolated fortress with no ex-
ternal support. It was expected that those forces could deplete the enemy and
delay its actions, possibly altering their operational tempo to protect Taiwan.
Similarly, from a U.S. perspective, Taiwan itself could be viewed as an
isolated oshore island too close to the Chinese mainland that needs to be
built as a hardened fortress and that must conduct military operations in-
dependently without the expectation of immediate external reinforcement.
Taiwan is surrounded by water and heavily depends on open sea lines of
communication for critical energy and food supply. e ODC is an ideal and
necessary operational concept to defend against a PLA invasion, but a for-
tress can hardly be sustained if its external logistics support is cut o.
To mitigate the probability of Taiwan becoming an isolated fortress be-
cause of a Chinese air and naval blockade, U.S. forces must play a proactive
role in preventing China from disrupting Taiwan’s shipping lanes and provid-
ing maritime escort beyond Taiwan’s territorial sea and contiguous zones or
A Net Assessment of Taiwan’s Overall Defense Concept 317
areas of operation. e asymmetric capability built on the basis of the ODC
could be better employed with advanced situational awareness derived not
only from Taiwan military units but also from data shared through the U.S. in-
telligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance network in the U.S. Indo-Pacic
Command area of responsibility.
More broadly, support from the United States will be crucial in further
developing the ODC. As one potential step, Admiral Lee suggests that Wash-
ington and Taipei establish a joint working group to augment the existing
bilateral security dialogues and promote better understanding, implemen-
tation, and institution of the ODC.
15
In my keynote speech delivered at the
2018 U.S.-Taiwan Defense Industry Conference, I also suggested the idea of
extending the ODC into a “unied defense concept” shared by both militar-
ies at the theater level—creating better synchronized communication and
courses of action.
16
e shared interests of Taiwan and the United States are
peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait. With limited national power, Taiwan
cannot “shape” an environment conducive to peace in the region without ex-
ternal assistance, especially from Washington.
Conclusion
Although most senior military ocers recognize that joint operations in-
volving asymmetric capabilities are key to Taiwan’s defense, the term ODC
disappeared in the 2021 Quadrennial Defense Review. is reects an inher-
ited Chinese bureaucratic culture in Taiwan that discourages leaders from
adopting the signature policies of their predecessors but does not symbolize
a drop in support for the principles embraced by the ODC. It is my view that
we should not be too cynical about the future development of the ODC, nor
should we associate the concept with specic individuals.
e ODC meets the two most important components of the defense of
Taiwan: prevention and sustainability. Its focus on asymmetric systems and
capabilities, and innovative concepts of force buildup and force employment,
could complicate China’s calculations and operational plans, preventing and
detering a war in the Taiwan Strait. An expanded ODC could also address the
requirements of peacetime missions and the challenges of dealing with gray
zone threats prior to a possible PLA invasion. Additionally, it could guide joint
civil-military territorial defense should the war not be won in the littoral and
318 Huang
beach areas. Over the course of 10 years of debate and deliberation, with the
gradual evolution of asymmetrical operational concepts, the ODC was ocially
presented to the public in the 2019 ROC National Defense Report. As this chapter
discusses, the ODC is like a joint venture between the United States and Taiwan
in the creation of an innovative theater-level operational concept for the island’s
defense along with the potential to advance bilateral military cooperation.
Even with the welcome support of interlocutors in the Pentagon and
the broader U.S. defense community, the ODC must expand the numbers of
domestic stakeholders who have the resolve and mindset to embrace new
thinking about Taiwan’s defense policy, military strategy, and operational
concepts. Taiwan’s leaders’ ability to communicate and persuade audienc-
es about the ODC’s necessity will be critical for public support. After all, the
ODC is a product with many stakeholders within Taiwan’s joint sta and
among defense policymakers who contributed to its formulation.
e form and characteristics of the ODC will continue to be shaped by an
evolving security threat; the state of the relationships among the United States,
China, and Taiwan; the legacy of traditional force structure; the availability of -
nancial resources; the acquisition of desired weapons systems; successive gov-
ernments; and the ever-shifting makeup of Taiwan’s defense leadership in the
coming years. Ultimately, the ODC is not a total or permanent solution for Tai-
wan’s defense and security, but it is a useful operational concept or joint doc-
trine that can help guide, build, and employ asymmetrical capabilities more
eectively to deter, defend against, and defeat a Chinese invasion. Given the
ODC’s utility and exibility, defense leaders should continue to enrich and re-
ne its elements without falling into the trap of making changes in name only.
Notes
1
Another timeline categorization of the evolution can be seen in Alexander Chieh-cheng
Huang, “Homeland Defense with Taiwanese Characteristics: President Chen Shui-bian’s New
Defense Concept,” in e Costs of Conict: e Impact on China of a Future War, ed. Andrew
Scobell (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2001), 129–161.
2
Sergio Miracola, “e Evolution of China’s Army and Military Strategy,” Italian Institute
for International Political Studies, September 27, 2019, available at <https://www.ispionline.it/
en/pubblicazione/evolution-chinas-army-and-military-strategy-24040>.
3
For an overview, see Phillip C. Saunders et al., eds., Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA:
Assessing Chinese Military Reforms (Washington, DC: NDU Press, 2019).
A Net Assessment of Taiwan’s Overall Defense Concept 319
4
Wallace C. Gregson, “Remarks to the U.S.-Taiwan Business Council Defense Industry
Conference,” U.S.-Taiwan Business Council, September 28, 2009.
5
Ministry of National Defense, National Defense Report Compilation Committee [國防
部 “國防報告書” 編纂委員會], 2011 ROC National Defense Report [中華民國壹百年國防報告書]
(Taipei: Northern Print Shop, Armaments Bureau, Ministry of National Defense, 2011), 71.
6
2019 National Defense Report Compilation Committee [中華民國108年國防報告書編
纂委員會], 2019 ROC National Defense Report [中華民國108年國防報告書] (Taipei: Northern
Print Shop, Armaments Bureau, Ministry of National Defense, 2019), 58.
7
Cheng Chia-wen, “Former Chief of Sta Li Hsi-ming Pushed for the ‘Overall Defense
Concept,’” United Daily News, November 15, 2020, available at <https://vip.udn.com/vip/
story/121160/5016849>.
8
Lee Hsi-ming, “Exclusive: First Interview with Former Chief of Sta Lee Hsi-ming,”
Formosa TV, video, 53:13, November 1, 2020, available at <https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=9xOBVpCbT6w&ab_channel=民視讚夯FormosaTVumbsUp>.
9
Jiang Zemin [江泽民], Volume II Selected Works of Jiang Zemin [江泽民文选 第二卷]
(Beijing: People’s Press, 2006), 152.
10
State Council of the People’s Republic of China, “CPC Central Committee’s Proposals
for China’s 14
th
Five-Year Plan for National Economic and Social Development and the Long-Term
Goals rough 2035” [中共中央关于制定国民经济和社会发展第十四个五年规划和二〇三五年
远景目标的建议], November 3, 2020, available at <http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/2020-11/03/
content_5556991.htm>.
11
Ibid.
12
Lee Hsi-ming [李喜明] and Enoch Y. Wu [吳怡農], “e Transformation of Backup:
Establishment of the Territorial Defense Force” [後備的轉型：建立國土防衛部隊], Apple
Daily [蘋果日報], October 8, 2020, available at <https://tw.appledaily.com/forum/20201008/
COZCM6LDPJF3DGPN2W3JDHGEQE/>.
13
Lee Hsi-ming and Eric Lee, “Taiwan’s Overall Defense Concept, Explained,” e
Diplomat, November 3, 2020, available at <https://thediplomat.com/2020/11/taiwans-overall-
defense-concept-explained/>.
14
Ibid.
15
Ibid.
16
U.S.-Taiwan Business Council Defense Industry Conference archive.
CHAPTER 12
Winning the Fight Taiwan Cannot
Afford to Lose
Drew Thompson
321
T
aiwan’s defense approach has long relied on purchases of U.S.
equipment and attempts to emulate U.S. doctrine. e U.S. mili-
tary, however, has focused on projecting power to ght smaller ad-
versaries around the world, while Taiwan faces the prospect of defending
its homeland from China’s increasingly capable People’s Liberation Army
(PLA). e United States is deeply committed to defending Taiwan, partic-
ularly as it becomes increasingly clear that Taiwan’s military needs to adapt
to the rising threat posed by the PLA and the risk that Xi Jinping might
seek to use force to compel unication. China has long had the ability to
blockade or to launch missiles or air strikes against Taiwan, but a deant
Taipei could resist such coercion and refuse to surrender. Beijing can only
be certain that it can compel unication if it can mount an invasion. De-
terring invasion is, therefore, the ultimate objective for the United States
and Taiwan. Maintaining cross-strait stability in the face of an increasingly
well-resourced and modernizing PLA requires continual innovation and
adaptation, including the updating of defense concepts.
While casual observers of the U.S.-Taiwan defense relationship focus
on highly visible arms sales announcements, the extent of deep, substantive
322 Thompson
engagement between the two militaries is arguably even more valuable to en-
suring cross-strait deterrence. Military-to-military exchanges take place from
the highest political-security levels to operational exchanges, to the level of
units and individual soldiers, and all the way down to the midshipmen and
cadets from Taiwan studying at each of the U.S. Service academies. In each of
these engagements, ideas are exchanged, trust is developed, and friendships
are forged by the common bond of two democracies seeking to deter aggres-
sion and preserve peace and stability in the Western Pacic.
Beginning in 2007, U.S. experts from the Department of Defense began
collaborating with senior Taiwan military ocials to jointly analyze the prog-
ress and implications of Chinese military modernization. Senior and mid-lev-
el civilian ocials and military ocers, experienced veterans, and defense
planners all worked together to assess how Taiwan could transform its mili-
tary to adapt to growing PLA power-projection capabilities.
1
A generation of
Taiwan defense policymakers and planners spent years, both independently
and collaboratively with U.S. colleagues, studying cases, challenging assump-
tions, and developing, simulating, modeling, and testing concepts. Everyone
involved recognized the signicance of this intellectual endeavor in deterring
Beijing from using force to unify Taiwan and, if that failed, preventing a PLA
invasion from succeeding. ey called a PLA invasion “the ght Taiwan can-
not aord to lose.” Failure to deter China or stop an invasion would imperil
Taiwan’s survival and raise the specter of nuclear war between the U.S. and
China. Taiwan’s defense planners ultimately determined that avoiding this
outcome depended on Taiwan transforming its military to address the grow-
ing PLA threat by adopting an asymmetric strategy.
Origins of the Overall Defense Concept
In 2017, Taiwan’s then Chief of the General Sta, Admiral Lee Hsi-ming, qui-
etly proposed a revolutionary new approach to Taiwan’s defense called the
Overall Defense Concept (ODC).
2
e ODC is at its core an asymmetric strat-
egy that, if eectively implemented, could increase the chance of preventing
China from being able to take Taiwan by force.
Mainland China considers Taiwan a rogue province—an unresolved
remnant of the Chinese Civil War that otherwise ended in 1949 when Chiang
Kai-shek’s defeated forces retreated to Taiwan under the protection of the U.S.
Winning the Fight Taiwan Cannot Afford to Lose 323
Navy. Afterward, the U.S. military maintained a presence in Taiwan until the
normalization of U.S. diplomatic relations with China in 1979. China has stated
its intent to reunify Taiwan by force, if necessary, with Xi Jinping threatening in
2013 that the Taiwan issue “should not be passed down generation after gener-
ation.”
3
To that end, China has built its military to be able to invade Taiwan and
prevent the U.S. military from coming to the island’s defense in time, a strategy
the U.S. Defense Department labeled antiaccess/area denial (A2/AD).
Taiwan has historically depended on the United States to help deter Chi-
na through both the threat of U.S. intervention and the provision of arms. e
Taiwan Relations Act requires the United States to maintain the ability to de-
fend Taiwan and to provide it with “arms of a defensive character.”
4
Taiwan’s
military has closely mirrored its U.S. counterpart in miniature for years, send-
ing its ocers to U.S. military schools, training together, acquiring new and
used military platforms sold by the U.S. Government, and basing Taiwan’s
own doctrine on concepts that originated in the United States. Taiwan’s mili-
tary capabilities are a hodgepodge of U.S. and indigenously built systems. Its
U.S.-sourced systems range from antique to cutting edge. Taiwan’s arsenal in-
cludes Vietnam-era U.S. systems, such as M-60 tanks, Knox-class frigates, and
F-5 ghters, though many are slated for replacement under a much-needed
recapitalization program. At the higher end, Taiwan’s AH-64E Apache attack
helicopter is newer than the model elded by the U.S. Army in the U.S. In-
do-Pacic Command’s area of responsibility. Taiwan’s F-16s are being retro-
tted to include new capabilities that make U.S. Air Force pilots jealous.
e problem with copying the American approach to warfare is that the
U.S. military’s doctrine is to project power over great distances and to maxi-
mize mobility and networks to take the ght to the enemy with overwhelm-
ing superiority. Taiwan, on the other hand, needs the opposite: short-range
and defensive systems that can survive an initial bombardment from a larger
adversary and that are suitable for deployment close to home in defense of
the island should it come under blockade or attack. Despite emulating the
U.S. military in its doctrine, training, and capabilities for decades, Taiwan has
begun to chart its own course.
Taiwan’s defense planners have long expressed a willingness to employ
innovative and asymmetric strategies, but implementation has been slow and
challenging. Taiwan’s Quadrennial Defense Reviews, published in 2009, 2013,
324 Thompson
2017, and 2021, endorsed the concept of asymmetric and innovative methods.
e 2017 review, for example, reiterated Taiwan’s intent to adopt asymmetric
and innovative approaches “to present multiple dilemmas to the enemy and
deter aggression” before describing its strategy of a war of attrition, where Tai-
wan would “resist the enemy on the other shore, attack the enemy on the sea,
destroy the enemy in the littoral area, and annihilate the enemy on the beach-
head.”
5
While the rhetoric used by Taiwan’s defense planners supported a new
approach to defense, Taiwan’s services and some politicians continued to fa-
vor the acquisition of large, expensive, conventional systems from the United
States, along with U.S. doctrine and training to support Taiwan’s long-estab-
lished “defense-in-depth” strategy by ghting the PLA from the mainland,
across the Taiwan Strait, to the beaches of Taiwan itself.
Contours of a New Defense Approach
e ODC describes an asymmetric defense approach where Taiwan maximiz-
es its defense advantages and targets an invading force when it is at its weak-
est: in Taiwan’s littoral. While Taiwan’s previous strategy focused on ghting
across the entire Taiwan Strait and defeating the enemy through attrition, the
new concept divides Taiwan’s defense operations into three phases: force
preservation, decisive battle in the littoral zone, and destruction of the enemy
at the landing beach. Each phase takes place closer to Taiwan’s shores where
the lines of communication are short and Taiwan’s forces can benet from
land-based air denial and more eective surveillance and reconnaissance. As
Admiral Lee explains, “e ODC redenes winning the war as foiling the PLA’s
mission of successfully invading and exerting political control over Taiwan.
Taiwan must abandon notions of a traditional war of attrition with the PLA.”
6
e following sections describe each of the ODC’s phases and then highlight
the specic role played by sea mines and antiship missiles.
Force Preservation. Force preservation is the rst phase of the ODC.
Defense planners presume that a PLA campaign would begin with a block-
ade, followed by missile strikes intended to destroy Taiwan’s military and
demoralize its public. e ODC calls for large numbers of aordable, small,
mobile systems that can sortie out from bases; employ deception, camou-
age, and decoys to make targeting dicult; and ensure that sucient ca-
pabilities survive initial strikes. e survival and continued eectiveness of
Winning the Fight Taiwan Cannot Afford to Lose 325
Taiwan’s military following initial PLA strikes has taken on greater urgency
considering China’s larger and more accurate ballistic and cruise missile
forces, while PLA A2/AD capabilities are anticipated to slow a U.S. military
response. Taiwan is already experienced in hardening its military infrastruc-
ture to withstand attacks, but the ODC calls for additional investments in key
capabilities, including mobility, deception, camouage, concealment, jam-
ming, redundancy, rapid repair, and reconstitution. While these attributes
are often neglected by militaries because they are not visible or prestigious,
the new defense concept recognizes that they are critical to Taiwan’s credible
deterrence and prioritizes them in the competition for scarce defense dollars.
Decisive Battle in the Littoral. e second phase is the decisive battle
in the littoral, which extends up to 100 kilometers from the island. Key capa-
bilities at this phase include sea mines and large surface vessels equipped
with Taiwan’s capable, domestically manufactured antiship cruise missiles,
the Hsiung Feng 2 and 3. Taiwan’s surface eet includes larger vessels from
the legacy force, such as French-built Lafayette-class frigates, Kidd-class de-
stroyers, and U.S.-designed Perry-class frigates armed with both Hsiung Feng
and Harpoon missiles, and a new class of domestically built, fast attack Tuoji-
ang-class catamarans that carry 16 Hsiung Feng missiles. ese large surface
combatants and the aluminum-hulled Tuojiang catamarans will likely suer
severe losses in the opening phases of a cross-strait conict as they seek to
counter Chinese surface vessels in a symmetrical contest that favors the PLA
Navy (PLAN)’s larger number of ships armed with longer range antiship mis-
siles, which can also be launched by the PLA’s land-based ghters.
e heart of Taiwan’s asymmetric strategy is the use of mobility, low ob-
servability, camouage, swarm tactics, and innovative approaches to com-
plicate the PLA’s ability to nd and destroy Taiwan’s platforms, particularly in
the opening phases of a conict. Taiwan currently elds truck-mounted Hsi-
ung Feng antiship missiles, which can disperse to survive initial strikes, then
set up later when PLAN ships, particularly the high-value amphibious vessels
carrying an invasion force, are crossing the strait. ese land-based mobile
antiship systems are expected to survive after Taiwan’s capital ships have
been destroyed and may be able to further extend their survivability by mov-
ing after ring to avoid counter-re strikes. On October 26, 2020, the U.S. Gov-
ernment notied Congress of its intent to sell Taiwan 100 Harpoon Coastal
326 Thompson
Defense Systems and 400 RGM-84L-4 Harpoon Block II Surface Launched
Missiles in a deal valued at $2.37 billion, giving Taiwan greater depth and ca-
pacity to hold a Chinese invasion eet at risk from the sanctuary of Taiwan’s
urban and mountainous terrain.
7
Most recently, in August 2021, the Joseph R.
Biden administration notied Congress of its intent to sell Taiwan $750 mil-
lion worth of new and upgraded M109A6 Paladin self-propelled howitzers,
giving the Taiwan army the improved capability to attack enemy forces in the
littoral and on the beach.
8
is capability to survive an initial bombardment,
then “shoot-and-scoot” from concealment, is the hallmark of an asymmetric
strategy and a key component of the ODC.
Destruction of the Enemy at the Landing Beach. e third phase of the
ODC seeks to annihilate the enemy at the “beach area,” which extends approx-
imately 40 kilometers out from the anticipated invasion beaches.
9
is phase
calls for Taiwan’s navy to lay mines in both the deep and shallow waters o
suspected landing beaches. A new eet of automated, fast minelaying ships
are being built for that mission, with the rst vessel of the class launched in
August 2020.
10
Mine-launching rails can be installed on several classes of sur-
face vessels and will be incorporated into the design of future corvettes. While
invading ships are slowed by mine elds, swarms of small fast attack boats and
truck-launched antiship cruise missiles will target key PLA ships, particularly
amphibious landing ships carrying the initial assault wave and roll-on/roll-o
vessels carrying follow-on vehicles and armor.
11
e Taiwan army comes into play during this phase, laying beach mines
and targeting PLAN ships, including minesweepers, with precision res. Joint
precision res artillery will target any vessels and troops reaching shore, using
area-eects weapons that have large blast and fragmentation radii to destroy
all personnel and lightly armored vehicles or vessels in a target zone. Exam-
ples of area-eects weapons include indigenously built multiple launch rock-
et systems with cluster munitions and the U.S.-built High Mobility Artillery
Rocket System (HIMARS), the sale of which was also notied to Congress in
October 2020.
12
Attack helicopters, including AH-1W Super Cobras and AH-6E
Apaches, are also key army systems that may be used during these operations.
According to the ODC, the Taiwan air force will seek to deny Chinese
ghters, bombers, and drones the ability to operate eectively within Tai-
wan’s battlespace by deploying integrated air defenses, including Patriot
Winning the Fight Taiwan Cannot Afford to Lose 327
PAC-3 batteries and domestically manufactured Tian Kung-2 surface-to-air
missiles designed to defend air bases and critical infrastructure. Smaller mo-
bile air defense systems operated by the army and navy, such as U.S.-pro-
vided Stinger man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS) and Avenger
systems, aim to prevent the PLA Air Force from providing close-in air support
to their invading forces.
Mines and Missiles. Sea mines and antiship cruise missiles are critical
capabilities at the heart of the ODC and thus warrant a more detailed dis-
cussion. Because the ODC prioritizes countering an amphibious invasion
force in Taiwan’s littoral and beach zones, these two inherently asymmetric
systems favor the smaller defender against the larger aggressor, taking advan-
tage of short lines of communication and Taiwan’s complex terrain.
Coastal defense mines are a key component of Taiwan’s defense strategy
and a bellwether of institutional support for the ODC. Historically, sea mines
have proved dicult to counter by an invasion force. In the Korean War, for
instance, the U.S. invasion force at Incheon landed before North Koreans
could deploy sea mines. U.S. forces landed quickly, met heavy resistance
ashore, and found warehouses full of mines after they cleared the beach. At
the attack on Wonson a month later, sea mines were deployed oshore before
the planned invasion. Two minesweepers were destroyed by mines while un-
der re from shore-based artillery and clearing operations took two weeks.
U.S. Marine and Army units embarked on transports had to wait oshore for
5 days for lanes to be cleared, which only happened after North Korean forces
abandoned their positions.
13
Taiwan has asked the United States to provide Quickstrike MK-64 air-de-
livered sea mines to supplement its inventory and give it a rapid-deployment
capability at the outset of a conict, but that system has not been notied to
the U.S. Congress to date.
14
Taiwan possesses World War II–era MK-6 mines
acquired from the United States, which have been periodically refurbished.
Modern mines were produced by the government-led National Chung Shan
Institute for Science and Technology (NCSIST), Taiwan’s main designer and
manufacturer of defense articles, around 2002, and the navy actively practic-
es deploying them, but little is known about their quantity.
President Tsai Ing-wen brought considerable attention to mine war-
fare, however, when she visited the shipyard building Taiwan’s new fast
328 Thompson
mine-laying vessel and the new missile corvette, which will be tted with
mine-rails on the stern, demonstrating a political intersection between the
asymmetric strategy and Taiwan’s policy objective of building its defense in-
dustrial base.
15
Following President Tsai’s visit in 2019, the rst fast mine-lay-
ing vessel was launched in August 2020.
16
NCSIST is currently developing two new types of shallow- and deep-wa-
ter inuence mines that they plan to deploy by 2021, but little progress has
been reported and the program is believed to be well behind schedule.
17
ey
are also developing a self-propelled mine with a planned deployment date
around 2025.
18
Until then, Taiwan has been refurbishing its current mine in-
ventory, which includes domestically manufactured Wan Xiang mines and
U.S.-made MK-6 mines.
e Hsiung Feng 2 and 3 antiship missiles are the other weapons at the
heart of the ODC. ese missiles are elded by surface ships or red ashore
from a handful of vulnerable xed batteries and batteries of vehicle-mounted
launchers. Mobile vehicle-mounted antiship missiles are inherently surviv-
able, making them eective at the critical moments when a PLA amphibious
force is approaching Taiwan and preparing to ooad troops and armor.
History has proved how dicult it is for an adversary to nd and destroy
mobile transporter-erector-launchers (TELs) in a conict. During the 1991 Gulf
War, U.S. and British special forces, along with coalition aircraft, hunted in vain
for Scud TELs in the at and featureless western Iraqi desert. Despite coalition
air superiority and multiple special operations units on the ground assigned to
hunt TELs, Iraq red a total of 88 extended-range Scuds against targets in Isra-
el, Saudi Arabia, and Bahrain. Furthermore, Iraqi forces used decoys and de-
ception, as well as shoot-and-scoot tactics, to enhance those missile systems’
survivability and add to the uncertainty of coalition forces, leading a postwar
Pentagon assessment to conclude, “[T]here is no indisputable proof that Scud
mobile launchers—as opposed to high-delity decoys, trucks, or other objects
with Scud-like signatures—were destroyed by xed-wing aircraft.”
19
Taiwan’s shoreline, which is innitely more complex than the Iraqi desert,
is particularly well suited for concealing mobile missile launchers. Comprised
of agricultural areas interspersed with suburban areas, coastal zones in Tai-
wan feature a complex infrastructure that supports the defender, including sea
walls, paddy elds, bridges, tunnels, and overpasses, as well as mountainous
Winning the Fight Taiwan Cannot Afford to Lose 329
zones not far from the coast where TELs and their supporting vehicles can hide.
Taiwan has reportedly camouaged cruise missile battery support vehicles to
look like commercial trucks.
20
Taiwan’s NCSIST, the maker of Hsiung Feng mis-
siles and launchers, is aware of the possibilities of mounting missiles in struc-
tures congured like shipping containers, as Russia does.
21
Using advanced
camouage techniques, the existence of both camouaged and convention-
al launchers, and the use of high-tech decoys complicates targeting Taiwan’s
TELs. It also greatly increases PLA uncertainty about whether they have de-
stroyed Taiwan’s antiship capabilities before launching an amphibious attack.
Expecting that Taiwan’s large surface ships will be primary initial tar-
gets for the PLA, the ODC also relies on small fast attack vessels, such as the
170-ton displacement, 112-foot long Kuang Hwa fast attack craft. at ves-
sel mounts four Hsiung Feng missiles and can be quickly reloaded in aus-
tere locations, such as the small shing ports that dot Taiwan’s coastline. e
Taiwan navy is reportedly acquiring another small, 50-ton vessel based on
a catamaran hull, with the rst test-bed platform called Glorious Star [光榮
之星], carrying four missiles.
22
NCSIST is upgrading missiles and increasing
production of antiship cruise missiles, land attack cruise missiles, and sur-
face-to-air missiles to arm new ships and launchers, deepen magazines, and
ensure that Taiwan’s armed forces have sucient munitions to hold out for
an extended period. While the ODC does not prescribe that the Taiwan mil-
itary retire its large conventional weapon systems or neglect peacetime mis-
sions, it highlights the importance of investments in asymmetric, survivable
capabilities and doctrine that directly target an invasion.
Orphans of the Overall Defense Concept. e ODC is animated by the
most critical mission of the Taiwan military: denying China the ability to land
and resupply an invasion force. Beijing can use blockades, coercion, hybrid
warfare, or gray zone pressure, but the only thing that guarantees that Beijing
can achieve its political objective of Taiwan’s surrender is putting PLA boots
on the ground and physically seizing control of the island. Preventing that
outcome is, therefore, the most fundamental mission of Taiwan’s military,
but it is not the only one.
Taiwan’s military also has a multitude of peacetime missions and oth-
er potential contingencies for which it must prepare. Taiwan will therefore
continue to invest in platforms that do not directly support the asymmetric
330 Thompson
warghting concept, or which are unlikely to survive the initial waves of re
strikes prior to an invasion. Unpublished Taiwan Ministry of National De-
fense (MND) depictions of the ODC include icons of Taiwan’s xed-wing air-
craft, capital ships, large unmanned aerial vehicles, large submarines, and
xed sites such as the powerful Pave Paws surveillance radar atop Leshan
Mountain that are unlikely to survive initial air and missile strikes, denoting
that they are an integral part of the ODC in the military’s eyes, despite their
lack of an asymmetric pedigree. e published depiction of the ODC in Tai-
wan MND’s 2019 National Defense Report emphasizes the ODC’s focus on
the littoral zone and landing beach, as well as the role of coastal defense mis-
siles, area-eects weapons, mines, and small attack craft (see gure).
23
Taiwan’s vulnerable runways and the inability to disperse outside the
range of Chinese air and missile strikes make it unlikely that the Taiwan air
force’s xed-wing assets will survive initial bombardments. Patriot and Tian
Kong surface-to-air missile batteries, runway repair capabilities, and the un-
derground facility at Jiashan Air Base that is intended to shelter a portion of
the air force are insucient to protect or reconstitute xed-wing capabilities
in the face of the PLA Rocket Force’s numerical advantage in ballistic missiles
or air-to-surface munitions delivered by the PLA Air Force. As a conict pro-
gresses, the Taiwan air force will eventually be forced to make its warghting
contributions without functioning runways destroyed by repeated strikes,
resorting to mobile air defenses, small drones, and maintaining critical com-
mand, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance infrastructure to enable a joint defense.
e Taiwan navy is building large amphibious transport vessels and a
future large air defense destroyer, which are also likely to be targeted and
sunk in the early phases of a conict. It is unclear what role Taiwan’s fu-
ture Indigenous Defense Submarine will play in targeting the surface ships
of an invasion force since it is expected to be a large, conventional diesel
electric design similar to Taiwan’s existing two Hai Lung–class submarines,
which are optimized for deep, open water, rather than the shallows found
in the Taiwan Strait. Taiwan’s submarines could present a threat to PLA sur-
face combatants outside the strait, particularly if they seek to operate on
the east side of Taiwan, but U.S. Navy submarines are expected to be oper-
ating in those areas in defense of U.S. surface action groups and carriers,
Winning the Fight Taiwan Cannot Afford to Lose 331
necessitating a robust water space management regime to ensure Taiwan
submarines are not eliminated by friendly forces.
Investments in submarines, large surface vessels, and ghter aircraft are
necessary for Taiwan to recapitalize its aging legacy force so the air force and
navy can continue to provide peacetime deterrence and resist PLA gray-zone
pressure. e challenge for Taiwan is ensuring that there is adequate defense
funding for these large, prestige-enhancing platforms that are the darlings of
their service chiefs, while also funding the small, maneuverable, and surviv-
able asymmetric systems that are critical to Taiwan’s survival.
Obstacles to Implementation
While Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense has embraced the ODC, sup-
port for it is not unconditional and implementation has been uneven. e
ODC was mentioned for the rst time in Taiwan MND’s biennial defense re-
port in 2019. Its presence in the widely coordinated document indicates that
a consensus has been reached about its centrality to the “resolute defense
and multi-domain deterrence” strategy that MND has employed since 2017.
Figure. Diagram of the Overall Defense Concept
Source: 2019 National Defense Report (Taipei: Ministry of National Defense, 2019), 69, available at
<https://www.ustaiwandefense.com/tdnswp/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/Taiwan-National-Defense-
Report-2019.pdf>.
332 Thompson
e annual 2019 Han Kuang exercises, which focused on littoral combat and
beach defense, were described by the MND’s spokesperson as an exercise to
implement the ODC, indicating that it is evolving past the concept stage and
already informing training and potentially doctrinal development.
24
e ODC has also received President Tsai’s public endorsement several
times. Speaking to a Washington, DC, audience in 2019, she said, “Already we
have increased our defense budget over the past 2 years in a row. ese funds
will go into strategies, techniques, and capabilities that make our ghting force
more nimble, agile, and survivable. ese ideas are encompassed by the Over-
all Defense Concept, which has my support 100 percent.”
25
She reiterated her
support again in August 2020, speaking to another conference organized by a
Washington, DC, think tank, by stating, “I am committed to accelerating the
development of asymmetric capabilities under the overall defense concept.”
26
e ODC is particularly well aligned with President Tsai’s industrial strategy
to develop Taiwan’s indigenous defense industry. e numerous small, ma-
neuverable, aordable platforms called for in the ODC can generally be made
by domestic rms or NCSIST. In addition to supporting the ODC, increasing
spending on domestic defense contractors benets Taiwan’s economy and
increases domestic support for more defense spending, while also reducing
reliance on the United States as Taiwan’s sole supplier of weapons.
However, support for the ODC within the Ministry of National Defense is
mixed. Service chiefs generally feel that the ODC constrains their acquisition
prerogatives, forcing them to work harder to justify acquiring expensive, large
platforms as part of the recapitalization of Taiwan’s legacy force. According to
serving and recently retired ocers, the most-senior ocers in MND rarely,
if ever, mention the ODC. One- and two-star general and ag ocers likewise
keep their personal preferences to themselves as they navigate service poli-
tics. e Chief of the General Sta from January 2020 until June 2021, Admi-
ral Huang Shu-kuang, was personally opposed to the ODC and succeeded in
preventing it from being mentioned in Taiwan’s 2021 Quadrennial Defense
Review (QDR). ough the QDR recognizes the importance of asymmetric
forces for Taiwan’s defense, it also embraces the conventional defense-in-
depth principle, calling for larger, conventional systems which would be able
to strike the mainland during the early stages of an invasion, even though
those conventional systems are assessed to be less survivable and vulnerable
Winning the Fight Taiwan Cannot Afford to Lose 333
to PLA initial re strikes. e current Chief of the General Sta, General Chen
Pao-yu, is believed to be supportive of the asymmetric and innovative princi-
ples embedded in the ODC concept, but internal debate within the ministry
about the role of mainland strikes and oensive cyber is ongoing. Some are
referring to this debate somewhat glibly as “ODC 2.0,” while others assert that
thinking in MND has evolved “beyond ODC” in response to developments
in PLA capabilities. At the time of writing, the ODC term is not expected to
appear in the MND’s 2021 annual defense report, and it is doubtful that the
concept will resurface in the future as the ministry continues to explore con-
ventional defense-in-depth concepts.
27
e majority of mid-level sta ocers are openly enthusiastic about
the ODC because they recognize the intrinsic value of adopting an asym-
metric strategy against the PLA, but they too have little incentive to chal-
lenge senior ocers.
28
e unwillingness of the senior-most ocers in
Taiwan’s MND and services to openly support an asymmetric strategy re-
veals Admiral Lee’s sponsorship of the ODC during his tenure as Chief of
the General Sta as a courageous decision, which was noted by President
Tsai at his retirement ceremony.
29
Acquisitions are at the heart of contentions over the ODC’s asymmetric
focus, with services championing their preference for large, expensive sys-
tems, including the Taiwan air force’s F-16Vs and Indigenous Defense Fighter
and the navy’s Indigenous Defense Submarine, future destroyer, and landing
platform dock ship. Proponents of the ODC argue that these expensive sys-
tems are unlikely to survive initial PLA re strikes or to be eective at attrit-
ting invasion forces as they approach Taiwan’s littoral zone, while their big
price tags squeeze a small defense budget that is growing ever-so-slowly un-
der President Tsai. To their credit, the services have invested in some asym-
metric systems, such as small unmanned aerial vehicles, MANPAD missiles,
coastal defense cruise missiles, a fast mine-laying vessel, and fast missile
corvettes. Budget pressures, however, have caused the delay of some small,
mobile, asymmetric systems, such as the “micro-class missile assault boat.”
30
e ODC does not specically designate some weapon systems as asym-
metric and others as conventional, giving military leaders and lobbyists con-
siderable latitude to associate their preferred platform with the ODC strategy
or to argue that a particular system is necessary for the defense of Taiwan. It
334 Thompson
is therefore very dicult to judge whether a particular system being acquired
is “good” or “bad” for Taiwan’s total defense, since one could argue the need
for expensive platforms for peacetime deterrence, and for smaller, numer-
ous, asymmetric capabilities that can survive to counter an invasion force.
With limited acquisition resources, however, Taiwan’s defense planners face
a challenging situation. ere is strong political support to prioritize expen-
sive, imported U.S.-made systems, which have considerable value as a polit-
ical deterrent to PLA aggression. However, the ODC favors cheaper, smaller,
locally made systems whose larger numbers and mobility are more likely to
survive initial re strikes and be waiting on the beaches for the PLA to arrive.
What Is Missing from the ODC?
Most discussion about the ODC in Taiwan revolves around procurement
of weapon systems. Proponents of large, conventional legacy systems ar-
gue that the Taiwan military faces other critical missions besides littoral
and beach defense (such as disaster relief), while forward-looking thinkers
argue that the ODC’s asymmetric capabilities must be fullled rst to pro-
tect the homeland and win “the ght Taiwan cannot aord to lose” before
spending on conventional capabilities for peacetime missions. What has
been noticeably absent from ODC discussions, however, are two critical
issues: personnel and logistics.
Personnel. Taiwan’s decision to transition to an all-volunteer force af-
fects all aspects of the armed forces and necessitates a thorough review to
understand how it will aect Taiwan’s defense planning processes. e ODC
must take those personnel issues into account. e transition to a volunteer
force has already increased personnel costs and resulted in a downsized
force.
31
Taiwan’s low birth rate—the second lowest in the world—puts ad-
ditional pressure on the volunteer force structure, as the military will need
to compete even harder with the private sector for recruits from a shrinking
pool of candidates every year.
Taiwan’s military recruitment targets range between 18,000 and 28,000
per year, but the total annual number of births is between 180,000–200,000
per year (and declining steadily). Taking low gures of each, Taiwan’s mili-
tary must attempt to recruit roughly 10 percent of the 18-year-olds entering
the workforce each year to maintain its current force size.
32
By comparison,
Winning the Fight Taiwan Cannot Afford to Lose 335
the U.S. military sought to recruit 171,000 enlisted soldiers for the Active-du-
ty force in 2019 from a population of four million live births in 2002, or ap-
proximately 4 percent of the total.
33
e personnel challenges that Taiwan’s
military faces, ranging from recruiting, training, sustaining, and retaining sol-
diers, have not been addressed by senior political or military leaders despite
their centrality to ODC and to Taiwan’s future defense capability.
One area where personnel issues have been raised in the context of the
ODC is Taiwan’s reserves. e decision to transition to an all-volunteer force
during the Ma Ying-jeou administration from 2009 to 2011 was not accom-
panied by a robust discussion within the military about how it would aect
the force, including Taiwan’s reserves. Historically, Taiwan maintained a stra-
tegic reserve made up of able-bodied adult males who had all completed 2
years of military service under the conscription system. e end of mean-
ingful conscription undermines the all-out mobilization system and necessi-
tates the need for a professional reserve force to support and complement the
professional Active-duty force.
34
How that reserve force supports the ODC strategy is undetermined at
this point, but several analysts, including the now-retired Admiral Lee, have
proposed that Taiwan form a territorial force of reservists who are “trained
for localized operations with decentralized command, as the nature of war-
fare will be urban and guerrilla. . . . During peacetime, the territorial defense
force would be responsible for localized disaster relief, and during war, pro-
tection of critical infrastructure and defense of secondary enemy landing
sites.”
35
e concept of a territorial force was proposed directly to President
Tsai by a visiting high-level delegation of U.S. Government ocials in 2020,
potentially stimulating discussion of the future role of Taiwan’s reserves at
the highest levels of government and MND.
36
Logistics. Dwight Eisenhower once said, “You will not nd it dicult to
prove that battles, campaigns, and even wars have been won or lost primarily
because of logistics.”
37
Unfortunately, like personnel, logistics has not been
raised in the context of the ODC. e ODC’s premise of taking advantage of
short lines of communication and ghting close to Taiwan’s shores can be
seen as an advantage, but its emphasis on force preservation at the outset of
a conict means that forces will be dispersing, relying on mobility to survive.
is requires the ODC to consider a dynamic approach to supporting those
336 Thompson
forces on the move. Because the Taiwan army and navy will need to sortie out
from their bases at the outset of a conict to survive the expected initial PLA
missile strikes, Taiwan’s military logistics system also will need to disperse to
survive. How Taiwan supports forces, including the delivery of war reserve
munitions to functioning units in the eld in the later stages of a conict, will
strongly inuence the eectiveness of the ODC.
Managing war reserve munitions is also a critical challenge for Taiwan’s
military. Determining what levels of stocks are adequate, acquiring them
from a perceived ckle United States that has often deliberated over arms
sales for long periods, and then maintaining those stocks as they age is a mas-
sive, expensive undertaking. Taiwan’s defense planners and decisionmakers
have historically taken a conservative view of munitions requirements and
refrained from “over-ordering” munitions. is conservatism is due to tight
budgets and resource competition in each service, a military training culture
that limits live-re training activities, the high cost of sustaining stored mu-
nitions, and a belief that stored munitions do not play a meaningful role in
deterrence compared to highly visible platforms, such as tanks, planes, and
ships. Congressional notications for both the Patriot and Harpoon Coastal
Defense Systems indicate that Taiwan ordered only enough missiles to sup-
port purchased batteries without ordering “reloads.”
38
Taiwan cannot rely on the United States to resupply munitions at the
outset of a conict for two key reasons. First, the area around Taiwan would
be contested by PLA air and surface units, which undoubtedly will consider
the vulnerable planes or ships supplying Taiwan priority targets. Second,
U.S. war reserve stocks in the Pacic would be earmarked for U.S. forces
that would be coming to Taiwan’s defense. Producing new munitions in
the United States or nding and supplying them from Department of De-
fense global stockpiles would probably not arrive in Taiwan until the air
and sea space around Taiwan were secure. Taiwan’s logistics experts will
need to develop strategies to preserve war reserve munitions stocks so they
are not destroyed in their bunkers and storage depots. Ensuring that the
right stocks are available at the right place and time would require dispers-
ing them quickly to highly mobile units employing asymmetric, shoot-and-
scoot tactics, in addition to anticipating ring and reloading locations in
advance of units arriving.
Winning the Fight Taiwan Cannot Afford to Lose 337
U.S. Interests in the ODC
U.S. national interests in sustaining Taiwan as a free and open society in the
Asia-Pacic, as well as the commitment in the Taiwan Relations Act to pro-
vide Taiwan with defensive arms and maintain the U.S. capacity to resist the
use of force or coercion, make Taiwan a crucial credibility test for U.S. secu-
rity assurances to other states in the region. e United States is, therefore, a
critical stakeholder in Taiwan’s defense planning process and a key partner
incentivized to help Taiwan eectively implement the ODC.
DOD broadly supports the ODC because it is Taiwan’s own defense con-
cept and aims to maximize Taiwan’s comparative advantages. Various U.S. of-
cials have publicly voiced their support for the ODC, while also reecting a
recognition that the concept promises to be an eective plan against a much
larger adversary.
39
at said, U.S. ocials have also consistently approved
the sale of high-prole, expensive U.S.-made arms. ese systems have key
benets that are consistent with the ODC’s strategic objective of deterring ag-
gression, even if they are less survivable than asymmetric ones. Conventional
U.S.-made systems are a tangible measure of U.S. commitment to Taiwan’s
defense, which boosts morale in Taiwan and increases uncertainty in Beijing.
Possession of these U.S.-made systems also helps MND in recruiting eorts,
capturing the imagination of Taiwan youth who want to join a cutting-edge
military, operating advanced weapon systems.
Taiwan’s acquisition of U.S. and indigenous long-range strike weapons
with ranges beyond 300 kilometers provides an added dimension to the
ODC. Taipei’s top China-watchers will need to determine for themselves
whether the prospect of missile strikes on major Chinese cities will achieve
the most important strategic objective of deterring an attack on Taiwan,
while defense planners are focused on the operational impact of mainland
strikes on the PLA. Systems such as the indigenous Hsiung Feng 2E land-at-
tack cruise missiles and the air-launched Wan Chien air-to-ground cruise
missile have been in Taiwan’s inventory for over 10 years, while the super-
sonic, long-range Yun Feng cruise missile is reportedly being modied to
launch small satellites.
40
ese capabilities are joined by recent acquisi-
tions from the United States—a marked departure from Washington’s pre-
vious practice of avoiding selling long-range weapons to Taiwan. U.S. sales
338 Thompson
include the AGM-84H Stando Land Attack Missile Expanded Response,
notied in October 2020, and the AGM-154C Joint Stand-O Weapon, no-
tied in June 2017, to give the Taiwan air force additional options to strike
mainland targets.
41
e U.S. decision in October 2020 to sell HIMARS gives
the Taiwan army a defensive long-range strike capability that can reach
portions of China’s coastline, potentially placing embarkation points for a
PLA invasion force at risk.
After China has initiated attacks on Taiwan, long-range counter-strike
options give Taiwan considerable exibility in determining how to respond.
e most strategic objective for initiating mainland strikes is boosting the
morale of the Taiwan people, giving them the will to resist, even in the face of
strikes on Taiwan. e military eects of those initial counterstrikes need not
be large to be powerful, much as the Doolittle Raiders boosted U.S. morale
in the early days of World War II. Taiwan defense strategists can consider the
relative benets of striking military or economic centers to achieve specic
eects to disrupt society, the economy, or military capabilities and then de-
termine the optimal capability to deploy at the optimal time. For example, the
300 kilometer–range HIMARS artillery might be well suited to attack main-
land command and control targets or coastal embarkation points to disrupt
an invasion force or degrade coastal integrated air defense systems, while
Taiwan’s ground and air-launched land attack cruise missiles might target
urban areas to demoralize China’s population, cause economic eects, or
complicate war-mobilization eorts.
In addition to mainland strikes, Taiwan may also carry out cyber at-
tacks to deter China or degrade its ability to carry out an invasion as part of
an expanded ODC. It is unclear whether the threat of cyber attacks would
deter Beijing due to the diculty of signaling in this domain, or whether cy-
ber attacks on critical infrastructure and defense networks in China would
support Taiwan’s defense eort by hampering Chinese mobilization eorts.
e threat of U.S. intervention remains the most critical factor, but as the PLA
continues to modernize and expand, including with A2/AD capabilities de-
signed to challenge a U.S. intervention, Taiwan’s own defense capabilities to
counter a PLA invasion become an increasingly important deterrent.
One challenge for the United States supporting Taiwan is that Taiwan’s
defense needs are diverging from the expertise and systems the U.S. military
Winning the Fight Taiwan Cannot Afford to Lose 339
can readily provide. For example, the U.S. Marine Corps does not have a
dedicated opposing force that Taiwan could train with to hone their skills
in defending beaches. Nowhere in the U.S. Marine Corps is there a center of
excellence or red team that specializes in beach defenses; opposed beach
landings are long gone from U.S. Marine Corps doctrine. Commanders of Tai-
wan’s squadrons of small fast attack boats can nd no counterpart in the U.S.
Navy with whom to train. e U.S. Navy mine warfare community is underre-
sourced, unappreciated, and mines are generally considered a problem, not
a solution, by the Navy’s legions of surface warfare ocers.
Nevertheless, with every challenge comes opportunity. As the U.S. Army
develops its multidomain battle concept and applies it to the Indo-Pacic, it
will increasingly realize that China is the challenge, the battlespace is Taiwan,
and cooperation with Taiwan is a laboratory for developing innovative future
warfare concepts. When Admiral Harry Harris, then commanding U.S. Pacic
Command, spoke at the Association of the United States Army conference in
2016, he reduced the U.S. Army’s key task to a quip, “Army’s got to be able to
sink ships.”
42
e U.S. Army should nd solutions and opportunities for ex-
panding their reach into the maritime domain by studying and innovating
alongside their counterparts in Taiwan.
Reliance on U.S. systems may also increase Taiwan’s interoperability with
the U.S. military and possibly other countries in the region. Taiwan’s proximity
to China is an advantage which could benet networked U.S. forces operating
at greater stand-o distances if those forces are networked with their Taiwan
counterparts. For example, a sensor operated by Taiwan could feed data to
networked U.S. planes and ships operating at safe distances to increase their
awareness of threats and improve targeting. While not explicit in the ODC, the
notion of a Taiwan sensor linked to a U.S. “shooter” is exactly the sort of inno-
vation the concept advocates. Furthermore, the recent notication of new U.S.
weapon systems, such as unmanned aerial vehicles and the Harpoon Coastal
Defense System, with its integrated radars and sensors, increases the feasi-
bility of linking U.S. and Taiwan forces. Interoperability makes Taiwan a po-
tentially signicant oset capability for U.S. platforms, which could leverage
Taiwan’s proximity to an invading adversary. Taiwan’s sensors feeding target-
ing data to U.S. weapon systems operating at greater stand-o distances would
make those U.S. forces more accurate and eective against the invader.
340 Thompson
Underscoring the signicance of the cooperative aspects of the U.S.-Tai-
wan defense relationship, Admiral Lee has suggested establishing a joint
U.S.-Taiwan working group to support implementation of the ODC, along
similar lines to the joint working group established in 2007 to assess the
threat and consider Taiwan’s options. Admiral Lee proposed, “rough con-
ducting contingency simulations and exercises, U.S. ocials could oer their
operational experience and expertise to guide Taiwan’s force restructuring
and doctrinal reforms, with an emphasis on military doctrine, force planning,
and logistical support, as well as operational tactics.”
43
As the ODC becomes
central to Taiwan’s defense planning, coordination and cooperation between
the two sides is critical to help ensure that Taiwan is able to maximize the
benets of their own strategy and nd innovative ideas and synergies from
joint planning with the United States.
Conclusion
e beauty of Admiral Lee’s Overall Defense Concept is that it embraces an
asymmetric strategy, does not seek to compete with China’s larger military
head on, and focuses Taiwan’s resources on targeting the greatest threat
while ensuring Taiwan’s military survives long enough as an eective ght-
ing force to enable third-party intervention. It eschews traditional symmet-
rical warghting of surface action groups, ghter planes, or tanks slugging
it out head-to-head with corresponding PLA forces. Instead, it takes a page
from guerrilla warfare and envisions large numbers of small, aordable,
highly mobile units taking advantage of Taiwan’s complex terrain to defeat
a larger enemy. Like all good strategies, this concept has both strategic and
operational objectives that are clearly set out.
e coalition eort to destroy TELs in the Iraqi desert in 1990 failed in its
operational objective to destroy Iraq’s missile launchers, but it did achieve its
strategic objective of reassuring Israel that all possible measures were being
taken to hunt Scuds, which kept Israel from attacking Iraq and undermin-
ing the U.S.-led coalition. Likewise, the ODC is not only intended to achieve
an operational objective of ensuring the survival of the Taiwan armed forces
in a high-intensity conict with China; its strategic objective is to deter Chi-
na from using force in the rst place by creating uncertainty about the PLA’s
prospects of launching a successful invasion.
Winning the Fight Taiwan Cannot Afford to Lose 341
e ODC will undoubtedly continue to be debated internally within Tai-
wan’s defense planning community and at the highest levels of the MND.
Deliberation will likely evolve beyond the binary choices of symmetrical and
asymmetrical capabilities, expanding to a broader focus on capabilities that
will aect China’s political and military calculations. Advocates for greater
investments in conventional long-range strike capabilities observe that they
buy time for Taiwan to mobilize its forces, including its reserves, who are ex-
pected to play a role defending beaches and invasion routes. Once the strat-
egy for littoral and beachhead operations is well-developed and capabilities
for ghting in those zones have been acquired, planners can expand the ODC
to incorporate new concepts, or expend remaining resources for capabilities
that support other missions, such as disaster relief, and the conventional ca-
pabilities that oer defense-in-depth options, such as long-range strike. e
major unresolved challenge, however, is Taiwan’s stagnant defense budget,
which is unable to support sucient investment in both asymmetric littoral
defense and conventional long-range strike capabilities.
While approaches to implementing the ODC may dier among com-
peting stakeholders, there is no debate that in 2017, Admiral Lee made a
courageous proposal to set Taiwan on this crucial course that contributes
to cross-strait stability and ensures Taiwan’s survival despite an existential
threat from a larger, increasingly capable adversary.
Notes
1
NIDS China Security Report 2017: Change in Continuity: e Dynamics of the China-
Taiwan Relationship (Tokyo: National Institute for Defense Studies, 2017), 55.
2
is section of the paper draws on Drew ompson, “Hope on the Horizon: Taiwan’s Radical
New Defense Concept,” War on the Rocks, October 2, 2018, available at <https://warontherocks.
com/2018/10/hope-on-the-horizon-taiwans-radical-new-defense-concept/>.
3
Richard C. Bush, “8 Key ings to Notice from Xi Jinping’s New Year Speech on Taiwan,”
Brookings Order from Chaos blog, January 7, 2019, available at <https://www.brookings.edu/
blog/order-from-chaos/2019/01/07/8-key-things-to-notice-from-xi-jinpings-new-year-speech-
on-taiwan/>. See also Article 8 of China’s 2005 Anti-Secession Law, available at <http://www.
china-embassy.org/eng/zt/999999999/t187406.htm>.
4
U.S. Congress, Taiwan Relations Act, Public Law 96-8, 22 U.S.C. 3301 et seq., 96
th
Cong.,
1
st
sess., January 1, 1979, available at <https://www.ait.org.tw/our-relationship/policy-history/
key-u-s-foreign-policy-documents-region/taiwan-relations-act/>.
5
2017 Quadrennial Defense Review (Taipei: Ministry of National Defense, 2017), 38–39.
342 Thompson
6
Lee Hsi-ming and Eric Lee, “Taiwan’s Overall Defense Concept, Explained,” e
Diplomat, November 3, 2020, available at <https://thediplomat.com/2020/11/taiwans-overall-
defense-concept-explained/>.
7
Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Oce in the United States (TECRO),
“RGM-84l-4 Harpoon Surface Launched Block II Missiles,” news release, U.S. Defense Security
Cooperation Agency, October 26, 2020, available at <https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-
arms-sales/taipei-economic-and-cultural-representative-oce-united-states-17>.
8
Mike Yeo, “U.S. Government Clears $750 Million Artillery Sale to Taiwan,” Defense News,
August 6, 2021, available at <https://www.defensenews.com/global/asia-pacic/2021/08/06/
us-government-clears-750-million-artillery-sale-to-taiwan/>.
9
For more information about potential invasion beaches on Taiwan, see Ian Easton, e
Chinese Invasion reat: Taiwan’s Defense and American Strategy in Asia (North Charleston, SC:
CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform, 2017).
10
Xavier Vavasseur, “Taiwan Starts Construction on Improved Catamaran Corvette
and Minelayers,” Naval News, May 26, 2019, available at <https://www.navalnews.com/naval-
news/2019/05/taiwan-starts-construction-on-improved-catamaran-corvette-minelayers/>.
11
Robert Beckhusen, “China Now Using a Cruise Ship to Haul Troops and Tanks,” Wired,
August 31, 2012, available at <https://www.wired.com/2012/08/chinacruise/>.
12
TECRO, “HIMARS, Support, and Equipment,” U.S. Defense Security Cooperation
Agency, October 21, 2020, available at <https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales/
taipei-economic-and-cultural-representative-oce-united-states-15>.
13
eodore L. Gatchel, At the Water’s Edge: Defending Against the Modern Amphibious
Assault (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2013), 173–185.
14
Scott Morgan, “Taiwan Military Mulls Purchase of U.S. Autonomous Helicopters,
Mines,” Taiwan News, November 5, 2018, available at <https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/en/
news/3568309>.
15
Matthew Strong, “Taiwan Starts Building Missile Corvettes and Minelayers,” Taiwan
News, May 24, 2019, available at <https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/en/news/3709758>. See
also Joseph Trevithick, “Taiwan’s Next Batch of Stealthy Catamarans Will Have Serious Mine-
Laying Capabilities,” e Drive, May 24, 2019, available at <https://www.thedrive.com/the-
war-zone/28201/taiwans-next-batch-of-stealthy-catarmans-will-have-serious-mine-laying-
capabilities>.
16
“1
st
Locally Built Fast Minelayer Launched in Taiwan,” Taiwan Today, August 5, 2020,
available at <https://taiwantoday.tw/news.php?unit=2&post=182648>.
17
Author interviews with a Taiwan defense analyst, October 2020. See also “Navy
Counters the CCP’s Military Disturbance to Taiwan, Deploys State-Made Wan Xiang Sea Mines in
192 Naval Exercise” [海軍反制共軍擾台 192艦隊操演施放國造萬象水雷], Central News Agency,
June 23, 2020, available at <https://www.cna.com.tw/news/rstnews/202006230195.aspx>;
and “1 Piece, 100 Million [Yuan] but of No Use: Navy Refuses Chinese Academy of Sciences Sea
Mine” (1顆1億卻不管用 海軍婉拒中科院水雷), Liberty Times Net (自由時報), October 20, 2015,
available at <https://news.ltn.com.tw/news/politics/breakingnews/1481053>.
18
“1 Piece, 100 Million [Yuan] but of No Use; see also “Mine,” National Chung-Shan
Institute of Science and Technology, available at <http://www.ncsist.org.tw/ENG/csistdup/
products/product.aspx?product_id=255&catalog=38>.
19
William Rosenau, Special Operations Forces and Elusive Enemy Ground Targets: Lessons
from Vietnam and the Persian Gulf War (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2001), 29–44.
Winning the Fight Taiwan Cannot Afford to Lose 343
20
John Reed, “Taiwanese Cruise Missile Batteries Are Disguised as Delivery Trucks,”
Foreign Policy, February 27, 2013, available at <https://foreignpolicy.com/2013/02/27/
taiwanese-cruise-missile-batteries-are-disguised-as-delivery-trucks/>.
21
Robert Beckhusen, “Missiles in a Box and More at Russia’s Bizarro Arms Show,” War
Is Boring, September 11, 2013, available at <https://medium.com/war-is-boring/missiles-in-a-
box-and-more-at-russias-bizarro-arms-show-ef345d4cf39c>.
22
Wang Jionghua [王烱華], “Counter-CCP Warship, We’ve Built a Missile Assault Boat”
[抗中共戰艦 我造飛彈突擊艇], Taipei Times [台北報導], January 8, 2018, available at <https://
tw.appledaily.com/headline/20180108/PW6YEEU7UQ4JIZDN6NVN2IZQNY/>.
23
2019 National Defense Report (Taipei: Ministry of National Defense, 2019), 68–69,
available at <https://www.ustaiwandefense.com/tdnswp/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/
Taiwan-National-Defense-Report-2019.pdf>.
24
“National Army’s 108 ‘Hanguang 35 Exercise Plan,’” Taiwan Ministry of National
Defense, press conference, February 27, 2019, available at <https://www.mnd.gov.tw/Publish.
aspx?p=76033>.
25
“e Taiwan Relations Act at Forty and U.S.-Taiwan Relations,” remarks by Taiwan
President Tsai Ing-wen, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, DC (via
video), April 9, 2019, available at <https://www.csis.org/analysis/taiwan-relations-act-forty-
and-us-taiwan-relations>.
26
See “President Tsai Ing-wen Discusses the Diplomatic, Security, and Economic
Challenges Facing Taiwan,” remarks by Taiwan President Tsai Ing-wen, Hudson Institute,
Washington, DC (via video), August 12, 2020, available at <https://www.hudson.org/
research/16300-transcript-president-tsai-ing-wen-discusses-the-diplomatic-security-and-
economic-challenges-facing-taiwan>.
27
Author interviews with a senior Taiwan Ministry of National Defense ocial and a
senior military ocer in a service branch, September 2021.
28
is is true both in my personal experience engaging with mid-level ocers and in my
interviews with senior military leaders conducted in fall 2020.
29
Teng Pei-ju, “Taiwan Chief of the General Sta Conferred Highest Military Award
Ahead of Retirement,” Taiwan News, June 26, 2019, available at <https://www.taiwannews.com.
tw/en/news/3732486>.
30
“Explaining and Clarifying the Matter Regarding the Media Coverage of ‘60 Micro-
Class Missile Assault Boats Reduced from the Initially Recorded $1.67 Billion to Merely $1.04
Million,’” Ministry of National Defense, press release, September 2, 2019, available at <https://
www.mnd.gov.tw/English/Publish.aspx?title=News%20Channel&SelectStyle=Defense%20
News&p=76674>.
31
Steven Lee Myers and Javier C. Hernández, “With a Wary Eye on China, Taiwan Moves
to Revamp Its Military,” New York Times, August 30, 2020, available at <https://www.nytimes.
com/2020/08/30/world/asia/taiwan-china-military.html>. See also Yimou Lee, “For Taiwan
Youth, Military Service Is a Hard Sell Despite China Tension,” Reuters, October 29, 2018, available
at <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-taiwan-military-idUSKCN1N20U3>.
32
“Population Policy Data Collection,” Department of Household Registration, Taiwan
Ministry of the Interior, available at <https://www.ris.gov.tw/documents/data/en/4/Population-
Policy-Data-Collection.pdf>.
344 Thompson
33
Lawrence Kapp, Defense Primer: Active Duty Enlisted Recruiting, IF11147 (Washington,
DC: Congressional Research Service, January 28, 2021), available at <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/
natsec/IF11147.pdf>. See also Joyce A. Martin et al., “Births: Final Data for 2002,” National Vital
Statistics Reports 52, no. 10 (December 17, 2003), 1–113.
34
Ian Easton, Mark Stokes, Cortez A. Cooper III, and Arthur Chan, Transformation of
Taiwan’s Reserve Force (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2017), available at <https://www.rand.org/
pubs/research_reports/RR1757.html>.
35
Lee and Lee, “Taiwan’s Overall Defense Concept, Explained.”
36
Interviews with a senior U.S. Government ocial, in Washington, DC, and a Taiwan
government ocial, October 2020.
37
Major General Charles R. Hamilton and Lieutenant Colonel Edward K. Woo, “e Road
to Predictive Logistics: Perspectives from the 8
th
eater Sustainment Command,” Indo-Pacic
Command, October 2, 2019, available at <https://www.pacom.mil/Media/News/News-Article-
View/Article/1977957/the-road-to-predictive-logistics-perspectives-from-the-8
th
-theater-
sustainment/>.
38
Taiwan: Major U.S. Arms Sales Since 1990, RL30957 (Washington, DC: Congressional
Research Service, January 5, 2015, available at <https://www.everycrsreport.com/les/20150105_
RL30957_222a5c3ccea779f9e46979c29e185f3858cf8bd3.pdf>.
39
Rebeccah L. Heinrichs, “Interview with Assistant Secretary of Defense Randall Schriver
on Security in the Indo-Pacic,” transcript, Hudson Institute, December 19, 2019, available at
<https://www.hudson.org/research/15578-interview-with-assistant-secretary-of-defense-
randall-schriver-on-security-in-the-indo-pacic>. See also David Helvey, Keynote Remarks,
U.S. Taiwan Business Council Defense Industry Conference, October 28, 2018, available
at <https://www.us-taiwan.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/2018_october29_david_
helvey_dod_keynote.pdf>; and “Taiwan Must Focus on Cost-Eective Defense: U.S. Ocial,”
Taipei Times, October 10, 2019, available at <https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/
archives/2019/10/10/2003723717>.
40
Keoni Everington, “Taiwan’s Upgraded ‘Cloud Peak’ Missiles Could Reach
Beijing,” Taiwan News, January 25, 2018, available at <https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/en/
news/3349525>.
41
TECRO, “AGM-84H Stando Land Attack Missile-Expanded Response (SLAM-ER)
Missiles,” news release, U.S. Defense Security Cooperation Agency, October 21, 2020, available
at <https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales/taipei-economic-and-cultural-
representative-oce-united-states-16>. See also TECRO, “AGM-154C Joint Stando Weapon
(JSOW) Missiles,” news release, U.S. Defense Security Cooperation Agency, June 29, 2017,
available at <https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales/taipei-economic-and-
cultural-representative-oce-tecro-united-1>.
42
Admiral Harry Harris, Commander, U.S. Pacic Command, speech, Association of
the United States Army conference, October 4, 2016, available at <https://www.pacom.mil/
Media/Speeches-Testimony/Article/963703/association-of-the-united-states-army-ausa-
conference/>.
43
Lee and Lee, “Taiwan’s Overall Defense Concept, Explained.”
Joel Wuthnow is a senior research fellow in the Center for the Study of Chi-
nese Military Aairs (CSCMA), Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS),
at the National Defense University. He also serves as an adjunct professor in
the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University.
Dr. Wuthnow has worked as a China analyst at CNA, a postdoctoral fellow in
the China and the World Program at Princeton University, and a predoctoral
fellow at the Brookings Institution. Dr. Wuthnow holds degrees from Princ-
eton University (AB, summa cum laude, in public and international aairs),
Oxford University (M.Phil. in modern Chinese studies), and Columbia Uni-
versity (Ph.D. in political science).
Arthur S. Ding is a professor emeritus at the National Chengchi University
(NCCU), Taipei. He is now an adjunct professor at both the NCCU and Tai-
wan’s National Defense University. His research focuses on China security,
including China’s security policy and defense, party-military relations, and
China’s defense industry. He holds degrees from National Taiwan Univer-
sity (AB in anthropology) and the University of Notre Dame (MA and Ph.D.
in political science).
Phillip C. Saunders is director of the Center for the Study of Chinese Mili-
tary Aairs and a distinguished research fellow in the Institute for National
Strategic Studies at the National Defense University. Dr. Saunders previously
worked at the Monterey Institute of International Studies from 1999 to 2003,
CONTRIBUTORS
345
346 Contributors
where he directed the East Asia Nonproliferation Program at the James Mar-
tin Center for Nonproliferation Studies. He served as an ocer in the Air
Force from 1989 to 1994. Dr. Saunders is coauthor, with David Gompert, of
e Paradox of Power: Sino-American Strategic Restraint in an Era of Vulner-
ability (NDU Press, 2011) and editor of eight books on Chinese military and
security issues. Dr. Saunders attended Harvard College and received his MPA
and Ph.D. in international relations from the School of Public and Interna-
tional Aairs at Princeton University.
Andrew Scobell is a distinguished fellow for China at the United States In-
stitute of Peace. Previously, he was a senior political scientist at RAND. His
recent publications include China’s Grand Strategy: Trends, Trajectories,
Long-Term Competition (RAND, 2020), Command and Control in U.S. Naval
Competition with China (RAND, 2020), and Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA:
Assessing Chinese Military Reforms (NDU Press, 2019). He was born in Hong
Kong and earned a Ph.D. in political science from Columbia University.
Andrew N.D. Yang is the secretary general of the Chinese Council of Ad-
vanced Policy Studies (CAPS). He is a leading international authority on the
dynamic relations among Taiwan, the United States, and China. CAPS pri-
marily focuses on studying and analyzing the strategic and security aspects of
the People’s Republic of China (PRC)’s domestic and international situation,
particularly its cross-strait relations. Since 1987, Mr. Yang has been in charge
of organizing a series of international conferences on the People’s Liberation
Army that have earned international acclaim and recognition in the academ-
ic eld of security and defense studies.
Joshua Arostegui is a Department of the Army senior intelligence analyst who
has specialized in Chinese military capabilities for the past 10 years. He has also
served for more than 25 years in the Navy as a Chinese interpreter and a cryp-
tologic warfare ocer in both Active and Reserve capacities. He is a graduate of
the Marine Corps Command and Sta College and holds an MA in international
relations from Salve Regina University and a MA in history from the University
of Nebraska at Kearney. He is also a graduate of the Defense Language Institute’s
Basic and Intermediate Chinese courses and completed an executive Chinese
language program at the Beijing Institute of Economic Management.
Contributors 347
Michael Casey is a military analyst with the Department of Defense, where
he looks at security developments in the Indo-Pacic region—particularly
the growth and evolution of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and
China’s growing threat to Taiwan. His work focuses on how the PLA’s new-
found capabilities shape its military planning and how it may apply those
capabilities in real-world combat. He previously received a master’s degree
from the George Washington University with a focus on security studies, and
a Bachelor of Arts from the University of Michigan, where he focused on East
Asian security issues.
Chung Chieh is an assistant research fellow at the National Policy Founda-
tion in the Republic of China (ROC). Earlier, he served as the chief of sta in
a congressional oce from 1997 to 2015, with a specic focus on the Foreign
Aairs and National Defense Committee, formerly known as the National
Defense Committee, from 2001 to 2015. His expertise includes People’s Lib-
eration Army military reform, the ROC’s national defense policy, the ROC’s
South China Sea policy, and coercive diplomacy.
Mathieu Duchâtel is director of the Asia Program at Institut Montaigne, Paris.
He was previously senior policy fellow and deputy director of the Asia and
China Programme at the European Council of Foreign Relations (2015–2018),
senior researcher and the representative in Beijing of the Stockholm Inter-
national Peace Research Institute (2011–2015), research fellow with the Asia
Centre in Paris (2007–2011), and associate researcher based in Taipei with
the Asia Centre (2004–2007). He holds a Ph.D. in political science from the In-
stitute of Political Studies (Sciences Po, Paris). He has spent 9 years in Shang-
hai (Fudan University), Taipei (National Chengchi University), and Beijing,
and has been visiting scholar at the School of International Studies of Peking
University (2011–2012), the Japan Institute of International Aairs (2015),
and the Institute for National Defense and Security Research, Taiwan (2020).
Alexander Chieh-cheng Huang is a professor in the Institute of Strategic
Studies at Tamkang University and founder and chairman of the Council on
Strategic and Wargaming Studies in Taiwan. Dr. Huang previously served in
the Republic of China (Taiwan) government as Deputy Minister of the Main-
land Aairs Council and has worked closely with consecutive governments
348 Contributors
on foreign and security policy matters. Dr. Huang did his graduate work in the
School of Foreign Service (MS in foreign service) at Georgetown University,
and in the Department of Political Science at George Washington University,
where he received his doctoral degree. Dr. Huang specializes in Asian and
Chinese foreign and security aairs and has been frequently interviewed by
international news agencies and local media. He has also been a syndicated
columnist for the United Daily, the China Times, and many newspapers and
online media in Taiwan since 2011.
Conor Kennedy is a research associate at the China Maritime Studies In-
stitute of the Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island. He received his
MA from the Johns Hopkins University–Nanjing University Center for Chi-
nese and American Studies. His research focuses on Chinese maritime and
military aairs, including work on maritime militia and amphibious warfare
development.
Roderick Lee is director of research at the Air University’s China Aerospace
Studies Institute (CASI), where he oversees research on Chinese military
aerospace forces and the Chinese civilian aerospace sector as it relates to the
military. Prior to joining CASI, he served as an analyst with the Navy, covering
Chinese naval forces. He earned his MA from the George Washington Univer-
sity’s Elliott School of International Aairs.
Sale Lilly is a senior policy analyst at RAND, focusing on Chinese military and
economic analysis and wargame design. Sale previously served as an ocer
in the Navy and as a management consultant in the nancial service industry.
He holds degrees from the Naval Academy (BA in economics) and dual de-
grees from Oxford University (M.Sc. in modern Chinese studies and a M.Phil.
in economic and social history).
Drew ompson is a visiting senior research fellow in the Lee Kuan Yew
School of Public Policy at the National University of Singapore and a senior
research scientist at CNA. From 2011 to 2018, he was director for China, Tai-
wan, and Mongolia in the Oce of the Secretary of Defense. He previously
worked at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and the Center
for the National Interest and held management roles in U.S. companies based
Contributors 349
in China, where he lived for 10 years. He has a master’s degree in govern-
ment from the Johns Hopkins University, a certicate from the Johns Hop-
kins–Nanjing University Center for Chinese and American Studies, and a BA
in Asian studies from Hobart College.
Academy of Military Science textbooks, 117,
118
Antiaccess/area-denial (A2/AD) systems, 6,
9, 11, 323
Aerial ports of embarkation for a joint island
landing campaign, 205–208, 210–211
Air assault brigades, 203–204, 205
Air Defense Identication Zone (ADIZ),
China’s violation of Taiwan’s, 87, 95–101,
313
Airborne campaign, limiting factors for,
209–215, 216
available airlift, 209–210, 216
available ports of embarkation, 210–211
ground operations constrained by
deliverable forces, 214–215
inadequate combined arms and joint
training, 211–214, 216
Aircraft
An-2, 205
antisubmarine warfare, 96–97, 98
bombers, 96
civilian, 262
early warning, 96
electronic warfare, 96
ghters, 96
xed-wing, 204–205, 209–210
Il-76, 205, 209, 210–211, 262
load capacity as a limitation of airborne
operations, 209
rotary wing, 205, 208, 210
tactical reconnaissance, 97
transport, 204–206, 207, 209, 210, 215,
216, 269
Y-7, 204
Y-8, 204, 205–206, 207, 262
Y-9, 204, 205–206, 207, 209, 210, 215, 216
Y-12, 205
Y-20, 204, 205–206, 209, 210–211, 215,
216, 262, 269
Airelds
capable of supporting airborne
campaigns, 205–208, 210–211, 215
civilian, 206–207, 208, 211, 215
military, 207–208, 210–211, 215
Aleppo, Syria, 142, 151
Amphibious armored vehicles, 170–171
Amphibious assault vehicles, 225, 228,
229–230
INDEX
351
352 Index
Amphibious invasion of Taiwan. See also
Cross-strait military campaign; Joint
island landing campaign.
assessments of the likelihood of, 12–13,
14
CCP assessment of the risks of, 14
estimates of time required for PLA to
develop necessary capabilities for, 13
logistics support for, 258–263
transportation support for, 261–263
U.S. as a factor in China’s
decisionmaking regarding, 16
Antisatellite weapons, Chinese development
of, 10
Anti-Secession Law, 2005, 2, 40, 49–50, 93
Aquilino, Admiral John, 13
Army Combined Arms Tactics Under
Informationized Conditions, PLA
textbook, 173, 175
Articial islands, construction of military
facilities on, 90
Association for Relations Across the Taiwan
Strait (ARATS), 36, 49
Austin, Lloyd, III, 11–12
Azar, Alex, 96
Baghdad, Iraq, 142, 144–145, 146, 151
Bashi Channel, 96, 99
Biden, Joseph, 93, 106
Biden administration, 99, 326
Bohai Cuizhu, 235
Bohai Ferry Group, 234–235, 236, 237
Bosco, Joseph, 94
Central Military Commission (CMC), 134
Joint Operations Command Center,
255–256, 257–258, 280, 289
Joint Sta Department, 258, 279, 280,
281, 284, 288–289, 292, 296
Logistic Support Department, 255–257,
258, 264
National Defense Mobilization
Department, 264, 266, 268, 291
and restructuring of the logistics
system, 255
role in a cross-strait military campaign,
288–291
role in joint blockade campaigns, 128
role in joint repower strike campaigns,
122
Training and Administration
Department, 292
Central eater Command
Air Force, 204–205
logistics support for, 256
responsibility for PLAAF Airborne
Corps, 196, 286
Century of humiliation, 35
Chang Yen-ting, Air Force Lieutenant
General (Ret.), 97
Chechnya, 139–140
Chen Pao-yu, General, 333
Chen Shui-bian, 49–50
Chen Yi, Field Army Commander, 141
Cheung, Alexander, 103
Chiang, Johnny, 56
Chiang Kai-shek, 308
China Coast Guard, 126
activities in the East China Sea, 91–92
role in a joint island landing campaign,
224, 241–243
China maritime militia, 126
role in a joint island landing campaign,
224, 241–243
Index 353
transport for in a joint island landing
campaign, 225
transport units, 241–243
China Reunication Forum, 98
Chinese Civil War, 2, 4, 35, 89, 241–242, 309
Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
2021 Taiwan work conference, 101
assessment of risks of an invasion of
Taiwan, 13–14, 15, 69–72
commitment to policy of peaceful
unication, 57–58
and concern about regime reputation,
67, 72–73
and cost-benet calculus for a cross-
strait military campaign, 74–80
credibility of pledge to respect one
country, two systems model, 44–45
denition of cross-strait relations as
the continuation of the Chinese Civil
War, 89
dissatisfaction with the political status
quo in Taiwan, 57–58
factors in decisionmaking regarding
Taiwan, 24–25
grand strategy for China, 73
limitations on persuasion to promote
Taiwan unication with China, 44
and linkage of Taiwan unication
to “the great rejuvenation of the
Chinese people,” 2, 38, 58
National Party Congress, 2022, 58
nationalist pressures on, 58
problems analyzing the views and
concerns of leaders, 36–37
refusal to rule out use of force to
achieve unication, 2, 5–6, 65
and timeline for unication, 38, 312,
313
unication with Taiwan as a central
objective, 2, 38, 65–66, 67
united front against Japan, 42–43, 50
United Front Work Department, 41
use of united front tactics, 42–43, 56, 57
view of Taiwan as an integral part of
China, 2, 35, 36
Xi’s promotion of role in the PLA, 278
Chiu Kuo-cheng, 13
Chu, Eric, 56
Civilian merchant eet, 224, 230–241, 242,
263
Clinton, Bill, 6, 312
Command and control
advantages of the new system for
China, 293
contradiction between individual and
collective leadership, 287
for a joint island landing campaign,
279–286
new structure for, 277–278, 279–286
in peacetime, 280, 281–282
weaknesses in the PLA system’s
eectiveness, 286–293, 294–296
COSCO Shipping Specialized Carriers
Company, Ltd., 240
Counterinsurgency, 140
multinational training events focused
on, 147–148
operations, 150–151
COVID-19 pandemic, 98, 204, 253, 260, 261,
266
Cross-strait military campaigns. See also
Amphibious invasion of Taiwan; Joint
island landing campaign.
China’s calculus of the costs and
benets of, 69, 74–80
Chinese interest in a quick result,
253–254, 258–259
horizontal integration of forces for,
282–285
354 Index
joint logistics support system for,
253–254
materiel supply support for, 259–260
medical service support for, 260–261
mobilization system for, 263–266
national defense mobilization system
for, 253–254
PLAA focus on, 162
and preparations for urban warfare,
153–154
risk management by China, 69–72
transportation requirements for,
261–263
Cross-strait relations, 5, 36
Cross-Strait Service Trade Agreement,
50
use of three logics framework in
historical analysis of, 2–6, 48–54
CSC RORO Logistics Co., Ltd., 234, 235
Cyber attacks, 104–105, 285
Davidson, Admiral Philip, 11, 13
Defense White Paper, PRC, 2019, 67, 196
Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), 4–5,
40–41, 42, 49–50, 54–57, 58, 98–99, 311
Deng Xiaoping, 36, 43–44, 45, 48, 54
Diaoyu Islands, 42–43, 50, 53, 89, 90. See also
Senkaku Islands.
Diplomat, e, 315
Djibouti, 168, 182, 184
Doklam, 90–91, 92
Donghaidao, 239
Dongsha Island, 103–104, 106, 315
East China Sea, 89–92
Eastern eater Command, 99
and amphibious combined arms
brigades, 163–164
and CCP micromanagement in military
operations, 288–291
and command and control of a cross-
strait military campaign, 288–291
defense mobilization system, 264–269
integration of support forces into the
theater construct, 283–286, 291–292
Joint Operations Command Center,
116, 123, 264, 280, 281–282, 283,
284–285, 292
Joint Sta Department, 264, 283, 284
lack of joint experience of ocers,
292–293
live-re exercises, 100
logistics support for a cross-strait
military campaign, 256, 264, 285
military forces available in the, 6–7
missile tests, 100
Navy landing-ship units, 225
relationship with PLARF forces,
284–285
responsibility for operations in the East
China Sea, 280
responsibility for Taiwan campaigns,
116–117, 120, 128, 130, 264–265, 279,
280, 281
training exercises, 239, 283, 284–285,
286, 292
Economic Cooperation Framework
Agreement, 50
Economic policy used by the PRC to increase
Taiwan’s dependence on China, 44, 46–47
Eisenhower, Dwight, 335
Fallujah, Iraq, 142, 144–145, 146, 151
Foreign Aairs, 13, 14
Fravel, M. Taylor, 73
Index 355
Fujian Province, 223, 264
Global Times, 99–100, 102, 181
Gray zone operations, 87, 181
“Great rejuvenation of the Chinese people,”
2, 38, 58
Gregson, Wallace, 310
Guam, 127
Guangdong Province, 223, 265
Guidelines for National Unication, Taiwan,
1991, 49
Gulf War, 328
Hainan Strait Shipping Co., Ltd., 234, 236,
237
Han Guangsong, 283
Harris, Admiral Harry, 339
Heginbotham, Eric, 14
Helicopters, 201, 205
attack, 201, 326
landing zones for, 237
transport, 201, 262, 269
transported by ship, 230
utility, 201
Hong Kong, 15, 36, 37, 44–45, 51, 56, 150
Hu Jintao, 48, 89, 280
Hu Xijin, 102
Huang Shu-kuang, Admiral, 332
Hui’an Air Base, 208
“If War Broke Out Today” (video), 100
India, border disputes with China, 89, 90–91,
92–93
International Radar Conference, 152–153
Iraq, 139–140, 142, 144–147, 151, 154
Jane’s Information Group, 163, 164, 170
Japan, 2, 35, 42–43, 50, 53, 90, 92, 127
Japan Air Self-Defense Force, 97
Jiang Zemin, 48, 49, 280, 312
Jinmen (Kinmen), 92, 172, 180–181, 308, 316
Joint anti–air raid campaign, 116, 126, 128,
132, 134
Joint Base Lewis-McChord, 11
Joint blockade campaign, 8–9, 116, 123–128,
171–173
Joint repower strike campaign, 8, 116,
118–123
campaign phasing, 120–122
military calculus for the use of against
Taiwan, 119–120
role of PLAA amphibious brigades in,
172, 173–174
role of PLANMC amphibious brigades
in, 172
Joint island landing campaign, 9–10, 116,
128–132
advance operations for, 173–174, 199
air support during, 174, 178
airborne ground operations is limited
by deliverable forces, 214–215
ambiguity of delineation of national
and theater responsibilities for, 281
available aerial ports of embarkation
for, 205–208
campaign phasing, 129–131
China Coast Guard role in, 241–243
command and control structure for,
277–297
and creation of articial harbors,
237–238
debarkation operations, 177–179, 224,
233–240
embarkation and sea-crossing for, 174
356 Index
establishment of a landing base,
237–238, 239
lack of sucient numbers of landing
ships for, 223–224
landing sections and points for,
174–175
limitations on the ability to execute a
supporting airborne campaign, 195
logistics requirements, 131–132
Maritime Militia role in, 241–243
military calculus for, 129
military requirements for, 131–132
and national defense transportation
support forces, 231–232
and ooading from merchant ships,
233–240
PLA amphibious unit role in, 171
PLA brigades available to conduct
amphibious operations, 161–162
role of airborne campaign in, 195–217
role of CCP in operational decisions,
287–288
role of PLAA amphibious units in, 171,
173–179
role of PLANMC amphibious units in,
171, 173–179
role of sealift, 223–244
troop allocation and deployment for,
175
use of civilian ships to transport forces,
185
Joint Logistic Support Centers, 256–257, 285
Joint Logistic Support Force, 255–256, 285,
291
Joint Operations Headquarters Work, 2004,
116, 122, 126, 127, 132, 134
Journal of Military Transportation
University, 254
Kai He, 71
Korean War, 36, 308, 327
Krach, Keith, 96
Kuomintang (KMT)/Chinese Nationalist
Party, 2, 4, 35, 42, 49, 50, 51, 53, 54–55,
56–57
Lai Ching-te, William, 55–56
Lee Hsi-ming, Admiral, 311, 313–314, 315,
317, 322, 324, 333, 335, 340, 341
Lee Kuan-cheng, 100
Lee Teng-hui, 6, 48–49, 53–54, 309
Leninist tendency toward centralization, role
in command and control structures, 278,
281, 287, 288, 293, 296
Li Daguang, Major General (Ret.), 103
Lin, Bonny, 14
Liu Yuejun, 284
Logistics
basic structure of the PLA system,
255–257
joint logistics information-handling
centers, 267–268
military warehousing capacity, 259–260
militia units responsible for, 268
mobilization system, 263–266, 267–269
need for a reserve logistics force, 268
support for a cross-strait invasion,
253–254, 258–263
support for PLAA amphibious units,
184
theater service logistics support
departments, 257
transportation needs for a cross-strait
military campaign, 262–263, 267–269
Ma Xiaoguang, 99
Ma Ying-jeou, 40, 50, 335
Index 357
Macao, 36
Mao Zedong, 92
Mastro, Oriana Skylar, 13–14
Matsu (Mazu), 92, 172, 180–181, 316
Medical services, 98, 204, 253, 260–261, 269
Merchant marine, 231
Military and Security Developments
Involving the People’s Republic of China
2020, 131, 132, 133, 161–162, 180–181
Military facilities, construction of on articial
islands, 90
Military Operations on Urban Terrain
(MOUT) facility, 141, 147–149, 151–152
Mines
beach, 326
mine-laying ships, 326, 327–329
sea mines, 326, 327
Missile tests in the South China Sea, 100
Missiles
antiship, 100, 327, 328–329, 330
truck-launched antiship cruise, 326,
327, 328–329
Modi, Narendra, 93
Mosul, Iraq, 142
Nanjing Twin Rivers Shipping Co., Ltd., 242
National Chengchi University Election Study
Center, 54–55
National Chung Shan Institute for Science
and Technology, 327, 328, 329, 332
National Defense, 254
National defense mobilization commissions,
264–265
National Defense Mobilization Committee,
128
National Defense Mobilization Law, 128, 231
National defense mobilization systems
improvements needed, 266–269
weaknesses in, 266
National Defense Report, Taiwan, 2019, 8, 10,
311–312, 315, 318, 330
National Defense Strategy, U.S., 2018, 11, 294
National Defense Strategy, U.S., 2022, 12
National Defense Transportation Law, 2016,
231–232
National Defense Transportation Support
Forces, 231–233, 234, 239–240
National Defense University (China), 254
Joint Operations College, 292
textbooks, 118
National People’s Congress, work report of
the Chinese government to, 101
National Transportation War Readiness
Oce, 232, 233, 244
Naval Research Institute, 244
New Power Party (NPP), 42
Night-vision equipment, 201, 202–203
1992 Consensus, 40–41, 56
Northern Jiangsu, training base in, 147, 148,
151–152
Northern eater Command, 225, 256
Obama, Barack, administration, and China’s
seizure of Scarborough Shoal, 93
Odell, Rachel Esplin, 14
Oce of the Secretary of Defense, 2021
report on the PLA, 12–13
“One China principle,” 35
“One country, two systems” model, 35–37,
43–45
358 Index
“Outline for Training and Evaluation
of National Defense Transportation
Specialized Support Forces,” 232–233
“Outline of Joint Operations for the People’s
Liberation Army,” 134
Overall Defense Concept (ODC), Taiwan, 10,
307–318
and air defenses, 326–327, 330
and antiship missiles, 327, 328–329, 330
asymmetric approach to defense,
324–331
and the decisive battle in the littoral,
325–326, 327, 332
and destruction of the enemy at the
landing beach, 326–327, 332
development of, 322–324
and enhancement of social endurance,
313–314
expanding the aims of to include
deterrence and prevention of an
invasion, 314–315, 322–323
and force preservation, 324–325
implications of the PRC’s timeline for
unication on implementation of,
312–313
and mine-laying operations, 326–329
obstacles to implementation of,
331–334
opinions of military leaders regarding,
332–333
and peacetime military missions,
329–330, 341
personnel issues related to the all-
volunteer force, 334–335
and procurement of weapons systems,
315–316, 321–322, 323, 325–326,
327–328, 333–334
resourcing of, 315–316
role in training, 332, 338–339
role of logistics in eectiveness of,
335–336
and strengthening U.S.-Taiwan
cooperation, 316–318, 337–340
U.S. interests in, 337–340
Pakistan, 182
Paracel Islands, 163
Peaceful unication
as PRC policy, 36, 37, 41, 44
prospects for, 15–16
Penghu Islands, 103
People First Party (PFP), 42
People’s Armed Police (PAP), 140, 150–151,
286, 291
People’s Liberation Army (PLA)
absence of urban warfare in literature
of, 140
advantages of the new command and
control structure, 293
airlift available to support an airborne
campaign against Taiwan, 204–205
amphibious training and exercises,
179–182, 183
belief in the suciency of decapitation
strikes to prevail in Taiwan, 139, 140,
144–147, 150, 151–152
capability to ght a quick battle in the
Taiwan Strait, 253–254
concepts of urban warfare, 140,
141–144
development of military campaigns
for Taiwan-related contingencies,
115–118, 133–134
doctrinal writings, 279, 281, 287, 288
emphasis in war plans on achieving
information superiority, 117
enhanced role in territorial disputes,
90–91
failure to provide combined arms
and joint training for airborne
campaigns, 211–214
Index 359
and the attened chain of command,
162, 178–179
“Four Seas” exercises, 103
horizontal integration of forces for
a cross-strait military campaign,
282–285
and joint command posts, 282
Joint Logistic Support Force, 184
joint logistics structure, 254–258
lack of available PLAN transport for
amphibious units, 185
lessons drawn from foreign urban
warfare examples, 140–141, 144–147
Logistic Support Department, 256
Logistics Academy, 234
Logistics Academy Research Center,
254, 259, 260, 261, 262
logistics mobilization capabilities,
253–254
logistics requirements for a cross-strait
invasion, 254, 258–263
mobilization system, 254, 264–266
National Defense University, 118, 254,
292
new joint command structure, 277–278,
279–286
options to apply military capabilities
against Taiwan, 7–10, 23–24
publication of videos of training events,
147, 180, 182, 200, 223
publications relating to Airborne Corps
units, 200, 204
publications relating to amphibious
operations, 180–181, 182, 223
publications relating to logistics and
national defense mobilization, 254,
258
publications relating to urban warfare,
141–142, 145–146, 147, 150–151
reorganization under Xi Jinping, 17–18,
19, 71–72
role of the Chinese Communist Party in
the command and control of military
operations, 278, 287–288
sealift capabilities, 223–230
Taiwan invasion as focus of
modernization, 6, 113–115, 277–278
Taiwan Strait as the central warghting
scenario, 65, 277
training and military education
reforms, 292
and transition to wartime operations,
278, 279–280
and urban warfare, 139–154
urban warfare doctrine, 141
urban warfare training, 141, 147–151,
152
urban warfare training bases, 140–141,
151–152
use of civilian ships in a joint island
landing campaign, 185
weaknesses in the joint command
structure, 278
People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF)
air campaign against Taiwan, 95–101,
105–106
coordinating relationship with the
Eastern eater Command, 284–285
and joint blockade campaigns, 126
and joint repower strike campaigns,
120, 122–123
and joint island landing campaign,
178, 179
logistic support department, 256
nighttime training missions, 99
service campaigns, 115
transport of air defense units, 236–237
transport units, 204–205
People’s Liberation Army Air Force Airborne
Corps, 195–217
and 2017 reorganization, 197, 215–216
360 Index
and advance operations in a joint
island landing campaign, 199
air assault brigade, 201
basic structure, 196–202
command and control of, 196–197
equipment for units of, 198–199, 200,
201–202, 215
ground operations limited by
deliverable forces, 214–215
lack of combined arms and joint
training, 211–214
light motorized combined arms
brigades, 200
mechanized brigades, 201–202
reserve personnel, 197–198
tables of organization and equipment,
197–200
training, 202–203, 204, 209
People’s Liberation Army Army (PLAA)
2017 reorganization of amphibious
units, 161, 163–165, 174, 180,
182–183, 185–187, 229
air assault brigades, 203–204, 205
amphibious armored vehicles, 170–171
amphibious combined arms brigades,
161–162, 164–167, 170–172, 174, 175,
177–179, 182–183, 186
amphibious ships, 223, 225–230
coastal defense brigades, 228, 229
command and control of amphibious
units, 182–183
and the attened chain of command,
178–179
landing craft, 223, 225, 228, 229, 230
logistics support for amphibious units,
184
Military Transportation University, 229
missions, 162, 171, 185–186
and near-shore island oensive
operations, 173
reconnaissance and engineering
capabilities of amphibious units, 177
reliance of amphibious brigades on
naval transport, 162
role in joint blockade campaigns,
171–173
role of amphibious brigades in joint
blockade campaigns, 171–173
role of amphibious brigades in joint
island landing campaigns, 171,
173–179
training for amphibious units, 179–181,
183
use of civilian merchant RO-RO ships
to deliver units to Taiwan, 233–237
watercraft units, 228–229
People’s Liberation Army Army (PLAA) units
1
st
Amphibious Mechanized Infantry
Division, 163, 164
124
th
Amphibious Mechanical Infantry
Division, 163
14
th
Armor Brigade, 163
71
st
Group Army, 239
72
nd
Group Army, 225
73
rd
Group Army, 223, 225
74
th
Group Army, 225
People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN)
amphibious assault ships, 229
amphibious ships, 223–230
and joint blockade campaigns, 126–127
and joint repower strike campaigns,
120
and joint island landing campaigns,
130, 131–132, 171
logistic support department, 256
service campaigns, 115
People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) units
72
nd
Group Army, 172
73
rd
Group Army, 172, 180
1
st
Marine Brigade, 163
164
th
Marine Brigade, 163
People’s Liberation Army Navy Marine Corps
(PLANMC)
Index 361
2017 reorganization of amphibious
units, 161, 167–171, 182, 185–187
amphibious heavy combined arms
battalions, 62
aviation or air assault brigades, 205
chain of command, 168
equipment for amphibious brigades,
168–170, 174, 175, 178, 182, 184, 186
focused on joint island landing
campaigns, 161–162
lack of transport for amphibious units,
185
location of amphibious brigades, 174
missions, 185–186
reconnaissance and engineering
capabilities of amphibious units, 177
role of amphibious brigades in island
landing operations, 168, 170, 171,
173–179
role of amphibious brigades in joint
blockade campaigns, 171–173
role of units in an amphibious assault,
223
sealift transport for in a joint island
landing campaign, 225, 230, 240
structure of amphibious brigades,
167–168, 170
support provided by maritime militia,
242–243
training for airborne operations,
203–204
training for amphibious units, 179–180,
181–182, 184
People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force
and joint repower strike campaigns,
120–121, 122–123
Logistic Support Department, 256
missile launchers operated by, 6
missile tests in the South China Sea,
100
People’s Republic of China (PRC)
and the Anti-Secession Law of 2002,
49–50
assessment of risk factors in an
invasion of Taiwan, 13–14, 69–72,
74–75, 94–95
and border dispute with India, 89,
90–91, 92–93
calculus on the use of force against
Taiwan, 65–81
capability to use leverage to deter
Taiwan from moving toward
independence, 39–41
Coast Guard Law, 91–92
cognitive domain warfare, 99–100
and construction of militarized
articial islands, 90, 91
core principles of policy toward
Taiwan, 35–48
costs of using leverage against Taiwan,
41
defense modernization under Xi
Jinping, 113
and deterrence of U.S. activity in the
South China Sea, 90, 91
domestic political gains as motivation
for coercion against Taiwan, 94, 102
drivers of policy toward Taiwan, 48,
53–54
eects of Taiwan preference for status
quo on policy development, 56
eorts to acquire foreign technologies,
152–153
eorts to get Taiwan’s government to
accept the 1992 Consensus, 58
expanding administrative control over
territory it claims as a motivation
for coercion against Taiwan, 91–92,
103–104
force deployments in the South China
Sea, 90
362 Index
gains in competitive military advantage
as a motive for coercion against
Taiwan, 90–91
and goal of preventing United States
from coming to the aid of Taiwan,
5–6, 90, 91, 323
grand strategy for China, 72–73, 75
and increased assertiveness in
territorial disputes, 90
intelligence collection as motivation for
cyber attacks, 104
and law enforcement operations in the
South and East China seas, 91–92
limitations of use of united front tactics
in the Taiwan context, 43
military balance with Taiwan, 5–12, 307
military balance with the United States,
5–6, 90–91, 323
motivations for use of coercion against
Taiwan, 88–94
national military strategy, 113–115
and national rejuvenation, 73–74, 76,
113
negative trend facing unication
prospects, 98–99
and objective of achieving unication
of China and Taiwan, 35–37, 38,
43–45, 322–323
and objective of preventing Taiwan
independence, 38
and the “one China principle,” 35
and the “one country, two systems”
model, 35–37, 43–45
options for military coercion of Taiwan,
87–107
options for military intimidation and
warfare, 16–17
and policy of “peaceful unication,”
15–16, 36, 37, 41, 44
potential cyber attacks on Taiwan,
104–105
potential military operations inside
Taiwan’s airspace and/or territorial
waters, 102
problems analyzing the contents and
context of policy decisions, 36–37
punishment and deterrence as
motivation for coercion against
Taiwan, 92–93, 98, 102, 105, 106
rationality of leaders, 67–68
reaction to Tsai Ing-wen’s refusal to
accept the 1992 Consensus, 50–51
refusal to recognize the Republic of
China government, 36
response to Lee Teng-hui’s visit to the
United States, 40, 49, 93, 113, 309
role of U.S.-Taiwan relations in policy
decisionmaking, 57, 93–94, 98, 99,
106
signals to the United States that they
should not take risks, 99
testing U.S. resolve as a motivation for
coercion of Taiwan, 93–94, 98, 99,
106
and the three logics of policy toward
Taiwan. See ree logics of Chinese
policy toward Taiwan.
U.S. diplomatic recognition of, 2, 4, 309
use of coercion against Taiwan, 7–8,
87–107
use of coercion in territorial disputes,
89, 90–91
use of leverage and united front tactics
targeting the KMT, 49, 50, 51, 53
use of prospect theory in the analysis
of PRC calculus of coercion against
Taiwan, 67–72
value of economic ties with Taiwan,
65–66
willingness to ght to prevent Taiwan
independence, 38, 57–65, 68–69,
113–115
PLA Daily, 141, 183, 186
Index 363
Pratas Island, 102
Prospect theory
and risk management, 69–72
use of to analyze China’s calculus of
the use of coercion against Taiwan,
66–72
Provincial military districts, role in military
mobilization, 264, 266, 267, 268, 291
Psychological warfare, 99–100, 181, 285
Public opinion
anti-China sentiment in Taiwan after
2018 Hong Kong protests, 51
decreasing interest in unication on the
part of Taiwan, 54–55, 56
preference in Taiwan for cross-strait
status quo, 54–55, 56
sense of Taiwan identity, 54–55, 56
in Taiwan on relationship with China,
5, 43
and the Tsai administration, 98
use of training videos to shape, 180
Quadrennial Defense Review, Taiwan, 8, 10,
317, 322–324
Qinggu, Han, 263
Qionglai Air Base, 206
Radar, use in urban warfare, 152–153
RAND Corporation, 10, 73, 181
Regulations on National Defense
Mobilization of Civil Transport Resources,
2003, 231
Regulations on National Defense
Transportation, 1995, 231
Republic of China (ROC). See Taiwan.
Risk assessment and a cross-strait military
campaign, 73–81
Russia, 139–140, 182
Sacks, David, 14
Scarborough Shoal, 89, 93
Schelling, omas, 39
Science of Army Operations, 2009, PLA
textbook, 171–172, 173
Science of Campaigns, 2006, PLA textbook,
121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 130, 131,
134, 173, 205
Science of Joint Operations, PLA textbook,
118, 121
Science of Military Strategy, 2001, AMS
textbook, 132
Science of Second Artillery Campaigns, 2004,
PLA textbook, 121, 126
Science of Strategy, 2013, AMS textbook, 117,
118, 134, 171, 280
Science of Strategy, 2015, NDU textbook, 118,
124
Sealift, role in a cross-strait invasion,
223–244, 262–263, 269
Senkaku Islands, 42–43, 50, 53, 89, 90, 93. See
also Diaou Islands.
Shanghai, 141, 264
Shanghai Cooperation Organization Peace
Mission exercises, 147–148
Shanghai Zhenhua Heavy Industries
Company, Ltd., 240
Shen Ming-shih, 100
Ships
amphibious transport docks, 225, 269
capabilities of, 228–230, 235, 237–240
capacity of, 225, 228, 235, 240, 262–263
China Coast Guard, 241
dock landing, 185
ferries, 234, 235–236, 240, 243
364 Index
helicopter assault, 185
landing helicopter dock, 229–230
landing ship, medium, 225, 229
landing ship, tank, 225, 229
maritime militia, 243, 269
mine-laying, 326, 327–328
ooading from merchant ships,
233–240
possible refurbishing of mothballed
PLAN transport ships, 229
roll on/roll o (RO-RO), 233–237, 238,
239, 240–241, 243, 263
semi-submersible, 239
small fast attack vessels, 329
Taiwan eet, 325–326
tank landing, 185
watercraft landing, 225
Sino-Japanese War, 35
South China Sea, 43, 89, 90, 91
Southern eater Command, 6–7, 163–164,
225, 240, 256, 265, 286, 292
Spratly Islands, 53, 89, 90, 91, 94, 238
Strait Exchange Foundation (SEF), 36, 49
Strategic Support Force, 122, 133, 256, 285,
291
Stride exercises, 147
Syria, 142, 153
Taipei, 146–147, 150, 151–152, 154
Taiwan (Republic of China)
ability to reduce Chinese leverage
against, 41
air defenses, 326–327
capabilities for repelling Chinese attack
across the strait, 325–326
China’s ability to use leverage to deter
from moving toward independence,
39
and China’s testing of cyber defenses,
104–105
Chinese operation inside the Air
Defense Identication Zone of, 87,
95–101, 313
and defense of oshore islands, 4–5,
314
Department of Cyber Security, 104
dependence on the United States for
defense, 308, 316–318
deterrence of Chinese aggression
and prevention of war as military
responsibilities, 314–315, 317, 322,
324–325
development of a whole-of-society
approach to guerrilla-type urban
warfare, 314
development of asymmetrical concepts
for defense, 310–312, 323–331
development of indigenous defense
industry, 328, 330, 332
and the Diaoyu Islands, 42–43
eect of political trends in on China’s
cost-benet calculus regarding an
invasion, 15–16
evolution of military strategies of,
308–310
Foreign Ministry, cyber attacks on, 104
Han Kuang joint military exercises, 309
implications of China’s timeline for
unication on implementation of the
Overall Defense Concept, 312–313
implications of the maturing PLA
command structure for defense, 278,
293–297
Investigation Bureau, Cyber Security
Investigation Oce, 104
investment in asymmetric systems,
333–334
maintaining peace and stability in
the Taiwan Strait as the defense
objective, 314–315
Index 365
military balance with PRC, 5–12, 307
military logistics system, 335–336
military-to-military exchanges with the
United States, 322, 323
Ministry of National Defense, 96–99,
141, 310–311, 313, 330, 331–333, 337,
341
need for increase in defense budget,
315–316, 332, 333–334
need to raise public awareness of
tensions with the PRC, 313–314
need to rebalance defense investments,
315
need to strengthen ties with the United
States, 316–318
and the “one country, two systems”
model, 4, 36
Overall Defense Concept: 10, 307–318.
See also Overall Defense Concept.
PLAAF air campaign against, 95–101
potential coercive campaigns against,
101–105
potential eorts to reduce likelihood of
CCP leaders deciding to use force,
58–59
potential preparations for urban
warfare, 154, 314
psychological warfare against, 99–100
public opinion regarding relationship
with China, 5, 43, 54–56
and purchase of arms from the United
States, 308, 315–316, 321–322, 323,
325–326, 327–328, 333–334, 337–338
recommendations for responding to
PLA improvements in transportation
and mobilization systems, 270
risks associated with declaring
independence or of foreclosing the
possibility of unication with China,
25
role in the regional balance of power, 4
rules of engagement, 102
and the Senkaku Islands, 42–43
support in for unication with China,
15–16
Taiwan as a haven for the Republic of
China forces in 1949, 2, 35
territorial claims in the South China
Sea, 43
transition to an all-volunteer force,
334–335
willingness of the CCP to ght to
prevent independence of, 2
withdrawal of U.S. military personnel
from, 309
Taiwan Air Force, and scrambling for
intruding PLAAF aircraft, 97
Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), 1979, 2–4, 309,
323, 337
Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU), 42
Taiwan Strait
China’s crossing of the median line of,
95, 96, 97–98
dierences from other Chinese
territorial disputes, 89–90
Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1995–1996, 40, 49, 93,
113, 309
Taiwan Travel Act (2018), 98
Technical Standards for New Civilian
Ships to Implement National Defense
Requirements, 232
ailand, training exercises with, 182
ree logics of Chinese policy toward Taiwan
and building domestic coalitions on
Taiwan policy within the PRC, 46
leverage, 37, 38–41, 49, 50, 51, 53
persuasion, 37, 43–45, 53–54, 56, 57
united front, 37, 41–43, 49, 50, 51, 53,
56–57
366 Index
use of analysis of competing policy
logics to assess the PRC policy
process, 47–48
use of analysis of to reveal patterns of
continuity and change in PRC policy,
45–48
use of in historical analysis of cross-
strait relations, 48–54
Training
for airborne campaign ground
operations activities, 202–203, 216
Airborne Corps, 209, 211–214
amphibious units, 179–182, 183, 184,
223, 228, 240
CMC role in national exercises in 2019,
281
for civilian merchant shipping
companies, 232–233, 234, 236–237,
240
combined arms, 211–214
Eastern eater Command, 283,
284–285
Han Kuang exercises (2019), Taiwan,
332
for joint island landing campaign
transport operations, 225, 234
for joint operations, 211–214, 216,
284–285
for maritime militia forces, 242
for navy landing ship units, 225
opposing force exercises, 183, 203
People’s Armed Police participation,
286
PLANMC participation in international
exercises, 182
for Taiwan forces, 338–339
for urban warfare, 141, 147–151, 152
and use of frontline joint command
posts, 282
Trump, Donald, 93–94
Trump administration, 93–94, 98, 99, 316
Tsai administration, public opinion of, 98
Tsai Ing-wen, 40–41, 50–51, 56, 87, 96–97,
315–316, 327–328, 332, 335
Uighurs, repression against, 15
Ukraine, 153
United Daily News, 311
United Nations, 14, 35
United States
arms sales to Taiwan, 2–3, 308, 315–316,
321–322, 323, 325–326, 327–328,
333–334, 337–338
China’s use of air campaign against
Taiwan to test the resolve of, 95–96
commitment to peaceful determination
of Taiwan’s future, 2–3
and diplomatic recognition of the PRC,
2, 4, 309
implications of the maturing PLA
command structure for defense of
Taiwan, 278, 293–297
legal basis for unocial relations with
Taiwan, 2–4
military balance with PRC, 5–6, 323
military-to-military exchanges with
Taiwan, 322, 323
misjudgments in Iraq, 139–140
need to strengthen ties with Taiwan,
316–318
PRC eorts to deter or delay
intervention of in Taiwan invasion,
5–6, 9–10, 90, 91, 323
potential eorts to reduce the
likelihood of CCP leaders deciding to
use force, 58–59
role in development of Taiwan’s Overall
Defense Concept, 310, 311
scientic and technological
cooperation with China, 152–153
Index 367
Taiwan and the credibility of alliance
commitments, 4, 93, 337
withdrawal of military personnel from
Taiwan, 309
U.S. Air Force, and response to A2/AD
threats, 11
U.S. Army
Armored Brigade Combat Team, 164
and response to A2/AD threats, 11
urban combat training, 150
U.S. Army Pacic, 11
U.S.-China Economic and Security Review
Commission, 12, 13
U.S. Congress, 4, 11
U.S. Department of Defense, 11, 131, 322, 337
U.S. Department of State, 94
U.S.-Japan Mutual Defense Treaty, 93
U.S. Marine Corps, 11
U.S. Navy, and response to A2/AD threats, 11
U.S.-Republic of China Mutual Defense
Treaty, 308–309
Urban warfare, 139–154, 314
Wang Bin, Division Commander, 141
Wang Hongguang, Lieutenant General
(Ret.), 103, 105, 291–292
Wang Xiangsui, Senior Colonel, 99
Western eater Command, 204, 256
Wu, Enoch, 313–314
Wuhan, China, 260, 261
Wuhan Joint Logistics Support Base, 255–257
Wuxi Joint Logistics Support Center, 240
Xi Jinping, 48
appetite for risk in managing territorial
disputes, 88, 89–90
assessment of risks of an invasion of
Taiwan, 13–14
and building of a modern logistics
system, 254–255
as commander-in-chief of the Joint
Operations Command Center, 280
commitment to policy of peaceful
unication, 57–58
emphasis on building the military, 90
interventions in PLA personnel
decisions, 288
and military reorganization, 17, 71–72,
307, 309–310
and military training, 150
motivations for coercion against
Taiwan, 92–93
nationalist pressures on to invade
Taiwan, 13
and reform of the command
arrangements for a Taiwan
contingency, 277–278, 280
and timeline for unication, 38,
312–313, 323
willingness to use force to prevent
Taiwan independence, 113
Xinjiang, 15, 140, 150, 151, 152
Xu Qiliang, General, 150
Yanshan, training base at, 147
Zhang Peigao, 283, 287, 288
Zhang Zhaoying, Rear Admiral, 91
Zhenhua-28, 239
Zhenhua-33, 240
Zhonghua Fuxing, 235
Zhoushan Strait Ferry Group Co., Ltd., 234
368 Index
Zhu Rongji, 93
Zhurihe Training Base, 147, 148, 150, 151–152, 183
Zussman Urban Combat Training Center, Fort Knox, Kentucky, 150
B
oth the U.S. and Chinese militaries are increasingly focused on a possible
confrontation over Taiwan. China regards the island as an integral part of its territory
and is building military capabilities to deter Taiwan independence and to compel
Taiwan to accept unification. These efforts have shifted the military balance in China’s favor
and heightened the risk of war. At the same time, the United States insists that China and
Taiwan resolve their dispute peacefully and is strengthening its military capabilities in the
Western Pacific to deter a possible Chinese attack.
Crossing the Strait: China’s Military Prepares for War with Taiwan explores the political
and military context of cross-strait relations, with a focus on understanding the Chinese
decision calculus about using force, the capabilities the People’s Liberation Army would
bring to the fight, and what Taiwan can do to defend itself. Based on original research by
leading international experts, Crossing the Strait explores China’s military options and the
PLA’s ability to execute them. The authors use a range of Chinese sources to assess the
PLA’s improved amphibious, airborne, logistics, sealift, command and control, and urban
warfare capabilities and how they might be employed in a military conflict. The authors
conclude that the PLA has made significant improvements and can already execute several
military campaigns, but still lacks critical airlift, sealift, logistics, and other capabilities
necessary to invade and occupy Taiwan. Under the guidance of current Central Military
Commission Chairman Xi Jinping, the PLA is working hard to address these shortcomings.
Crossing the Strait also considers what Taiwan, the United States, and other parties can
do to prepare a more effective defense. Taiwan has increasingly focused on acquiring
asymmetric and innovative military systems to blunt Chinese aggression. Yet contributors
to the volume suggest that current efforts are insufficient: Taiwan needs to do more to
prepare for the full range of contingencies it might face from the People’s Liberation Army.
A Taiwan with the right strategy, training, and force investments can pose a formidable
wartime challenge and thus improve deterrence. Given the high stakes, the volume should
be of interest to policymakers and practitioners alike.
