Congressional Research Service 11
CRS TESTIMONY
Prepared for Congress —————————————————————————————————
will likely prove unavailing in certain circumstances. For example, when the President directs or endorses
the non-compliance of the official, such as when the official refuses to disclose information pursuant to
the President’s decision that the information is protected by executive privilege, past practice suggests
that the DOJ is unlikely to pursue a prosecution for criminal contempt.
As a result, it would appear
arguable that there is not currently a credible threat of prosecution for violating 2 U.S.C. § 192 when an
executive branch official refuses to comply with a congressional subpoena at the direction of the
President.
Even when the official is not acting at the clear direction of the President, as in the Lerner controversy, the
executive branch has contended that it retains the authority to make an independent assessment of
whether the official (or former official) has in fact violated the criminal contempt statute.
If the
executive branch determines either that the statute has not been violated or that a defense is available that
would bar the prosecution, then it may—in an exercise of discretion—leave a congressional citation
unenforced. The criminal contempt statute, therefore, may have limited utility as a deterrent to non-
compliance with congressional subpoenas by executive branch officials faced with similar
circumstances.
Second, seeking enforcement of congressional subpoenas in the courts, even when successful, may lead to
significant delays in Congress obtaining the sought-after information.
This shortcoming was apparent
in Miers, the Fast and Furious litigation, and McGahn. Miers, which never reached a decision on the
merits by the D.C. Circuit, was dismissed at the request of the parties after about 19 months;
the Fast
and Furious litigation was settled after approximately seven years;
and the McGahn litigation, which
appears to be on the verge of being dismissed, has taken over two years.
Though each case ended in the
House obtaining much of the information it sought, the passage of time, together with the intervening
congressional and presidential elections in each case, could be said to have diminished both the value of
the disclosure and the committee’s ability to engage in timely oversight.
Relying on civil enforcement also involves the risk that a court will reach a decision that will make it
harder for committees to obtain information in the future. For example, while the Miers decision rejected
See Letter from James M. Cole, Deputy Attorney General, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to John A. Boehner, Speaker, U.S. House of
Representatives (June 28, 2012); Olson Opinion, supra note 13, at 102.
See Josh Chafetz, Executive Branch Contempt of Congress, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 1083, 1146 (2009) (“As the president is
unlikely to authorize one of his subordinates (the United States Attorney) to file charges against another of his subordinates who
was acting according to his orders, it is safe to assume that the executive branch will generally decline to prosecute an executive
branch official for criminal contempt of Congress.”).
See Letter from Ronald C. Machen Jr., U.S. Attorney, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to John A. Boehner, Speaker, U.S. House of
Representatives (Mar. 31, 2015).
But see Fisher, supra note 21, at 347–59 (describing instances from 1975–2000 in which committee action on a criminal
contempt citation was effective in obtaining compliance with a congressional subpoena).
The Senate recently had a rather different experience in enforcing a subpoena against a private citizen. After authorizing civil
enforcement of a Senate committee subpoena issued to Carl Ferrer, the Chief Executive Officer of Backpage.com, the Senate was
able to obtain a district court decision directing compliance in less than five months. See Senate Perm. Subcomm. on
Investigations v. Ferrer, 199 F. Supp. 3d 125, 128 (D.D.C. 2016). Mr. Ferrer’s subsequent appeal was dismissed as moot. Senate
Perm. Subcomm. on Investigations v. Ferrer, 856 F.3d 1080, 1083 (D.C. Cir. 2017). See also S. REP. NO. 114-214 (2016). This
could suggest that subpoenas to members of the general public can be enforced more expeditiously through the courts.
Comm. on the Judiciary v. Miers, No. 08-5357, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 29374, at *1 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 14, 2009) (granting
appellants’ motion for voluntary dismissal).
Complaint, Comm. on Oversight & Gov. Reform v. Holder, No. 1:12-cv-1332 (D.D.C. Aug. 13, 2012).
See Agreement Concerning Accommodation, Comm. on the Judiciary v. McGahn, No. 19-5331 (D.C. Cir. May 12, 2021).
See ROSENBERG, supra note 64, at 3 (arguing that civil enforcement “has been shown to cause intolerable delays that
undermine the effectiveness of timely committee oversight”).