GAO-15-102, Human Trafficking: Oversight of Contractors' Use of Foreign Wrokers in High-Risk Environments Needs to be Strengthened

HUMAN

TRAFFICKING

Oversight of

Contractors’ Use of

Foreign Workers in

High-Risk

Environments Needs

to Be Strengthened

Report to Congressional Committees

November 2014

GAO-15-102

United States Government Accountability Office

Highlights of GAO-15-102, a report to

congressional committees

November 2014

HUMAN TRAFFICKING

Oversight of Contractors’ Use of Foreign Workers in

High-Risk Environments Needs to Be Strengthened

Why GAO Did This Study

Since the 1990s, there have been

allegations of abuse of foreign workers

on U.S. government contracts

overseas, including allegations of TIP.

In 2002, the United States adopted a

zero tolerance policy on TIP regarding

U.S. government employees and

contractors abroad and began

requiring the inclusion of this policy in

all contracts in 2007. Such policy is

important because the government

relies on contractors that employ

foreign workers in countries where,

according to State, they may be

vulnerable to abuse.

GAO was mandated to report on the

use of foreign workers. This report

examines (1) policies and guidance

governing the recruitment of foreign

workers and the fees these workers

may pay to secure work on U.S.

government contracts overseas and (2)

agencies’ monitoring of contractor

efforts to combat TIP. GAO reviewed a

nongeneralizable sample of 11

contracts awarded by DOD, State, and

USAID, composing nearly one-third of

all reported foreign workers on

contracts awarded by these agencies

at the end of fiscal year 2013. GAO

interviewed agency officials and

contractors about labor practices and

oversight activities on these contracts.

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that agencies (1)

develop a more precise definition of

recruitment fees and (2) ensure that

contract monitoring specifically

includes TIP. DOD concurred with the

first recommendation, while State and

USAID noted that forthcoming

regulations would prohibit all

recruitment fees. Agencies concurred

with the second recommendation.

What GAO Found

Current policies and guidance governing the payment of recruitment fees by

foreign workers on certain U.S. government contracts do not provide clear

instructions to agencies or contractors regarding the components or amounts of

permissible fees related to recruitment. GAO found that some foreign workers—

individuals who are not citizens of the United States or the host country—had

reported paying for their jobs. Such recruitment fees can lead to various abuses

related to trafficking in persons (TIP), such as debt bondage. For example, on the

contract employing the largest number of foreign workers in its sample, GAO

found that more than 1,900 foreign workers reported paying fees for their jobs,

including to recruitment agencies used by a subcontractor. According to the

subcontractor, these fees were likely paid to a recruiter who assisted foreign

workers with transportation to and housing in Dubai before they were hired to

work on the contract in Afghanistan (see figure). Some Department of Defense

(DOD) contracting officials GAO interviewed said that such fees may be

reasonable. DOD, the Department of State (State), and the U.S. Agency for

International Development (USAID) have developed policy and guidance for

certain contracts addressing recruitment fees in different ways. However, these

agencies do not specify what components or amounts of recruitment fees are

considered permissible, limiting the ability of contracting officers and contractors

to implement agency policy and guidance.

Sample Recruitment Paths for Foreign Workers on a U.S. Government Contract in Afghanistan

GAO found that agency monitoring, called for by federal acquisition regulations

and agency guidance, did not always include processes to specifically monitor

contractor efforts to combat TIP. For 7 of the 11 contracts in GAO’s sample, DOD

and State had specific monitoring processes to combat TIP. On the 4 remaining

contracts, agencies did not specifically monitor for TIP, but rather focused on

contractor-provided goods and services, such as building construction. In

addition, some DOD and State contracting officials said they were unaware of

relevant acquisitions policy and guidance for combating TIP and did not clearly

understand their monitoring responsibilities. Both DOD and State have

developed additional training to help make contracting officials more aware of

their monitoring responsibilities to combat TIP. Without specific efforts to monitor

for TIP, agencies’ ability to implement the zero tolerance policy and detect

concerns about TIP is limited.

View GAO-15-102. For more information,

contact Thomas Melito at (202) 512-9601 or

melitot@gao.gov.

Page i GAO-15-102 Human Trafficking

Letter 1

Background 5

Current Agency Policy and Guidance on the Payment of

Recruitment Fees Do Not Provide Clear Instructions 10

Agencies’ Monitoring of Contractor Labor Practices in Our Sample

Varied, but Contractors’ Labor Practices Reflect Efforts to

Combat TIP 20

Conclusions 30

Recommendations for Executive Action 31

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 31

Appendix I Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 35

Appendix II International Definitions and Indicators of Trafficking in Persons 41

Appendix III Migrant Workers in Gulf Countries 42

Appendix IV Federal Acquisition Regulations and Agency Policy and Guidance

Related to Contractor Recruitment and Labor Practices 45

Appendix V Sample Defense Contract Management Agency Universal Examination

Record for Combating Trafficking in Persons, May 2011 49

Appendix VI Comments from the Department of Defense 51

Appendix VII Comments from the Department of State 53

Appendix VIII Comments from the U.S. Agency for International Development 57

Contents

Page ii GAO-15-102 Human Trafficking

Appendix IX GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 60

Related GAO Products 61

Tables

Table 1: GAO Sample of U.S. Government Contracts Employing

Foreign Workers Overseas 4

Table 2: Migrants in and Tier Placement of Gulf Countries,

Afghanistan, and Iraq in 2013 10

Table 3: Varying Levels of Specificity in the FAR and Agency

Policy on Recruitment Fees 12

Table 4: GAO Sample of U.S. Government Contracts Employing

Foreign Workers Overseas 37

Table 5: Number of Migrants in Gulf Countries from Each of the

Top Five Source Countries in 2013 42

Table 6: Agency Policy and Guidance Related to Recruitment and

Labor Practices on U.S. Government Contracts 46

Figures

Figure 1: Examples of Different Paths Foreign Workers Take from

Their Home Countries to Work on a U.S. Government

Contract Overseas 18

Figure 2: Examples of Subcontractor-Provided Housing for

Foreign Workers on a Base Operations Support Services

Contract in Qatar 27

Page iii GAO-15-102 Human Trafficking

Abbreviations

CENTCOM U.S. Central Command

C-JTSCC U.S. Central Command-Joint Theater Support Contracting

Command

DCMA Defense Contract Management Agency

DOD Department of Defense

FAR Federal Acquisition Regulation

ILO International Labour Organization

IRIS International Recruitment Integrity System

KSCR Kuwait-Specific Contract Requirement

SPOT Synchronized Pre-deployment and Operational Tracker

State Department of State

TIP Trafficking in Persons

TVPA Trafficking Victims Protection Act

USAID U.S. Agency for International Development

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Page 1 GAO-15-102 Human Trafficking

441 G St. N.W.

Washington, DC 20548

November 18, 2014

Congressional Committees

The U.S. government relies on contractors to provide services overseas,

such as construction, security, and facilities maintenance. In some

countries, such as the Gulf countries,

where the local labor force is small,

or in countries such as Iraq and Afghanistan, where the employment of

local labor poses security risks, these contractors rely on foreign

workers—individuals who are citizens of neither the United States nor the

host country—to perform this work.

According to the Commission on

Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan, the U.S. government’s

reliance on local nationals and foreign workers leads to considerable cost

savings compared with the employment of U.S. military personnel or

civilians.

Many foreign workers come from developing countries such as

India, Bangladesh, and the Philippines, where job opportunities and

wages compare poorly with those in destination countries. The disparities

in income levels and the methods used to recruit these workers often

make them vulnerable to a variety of labor abuses.

There have been allegations of abuse of foreign workers on government

contracts overseas since at least the 1990s. In 2000, Congress enacted

the Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000 (TVPA) to combat trafficking

in persons,

and in 2002, the United States adopted a zero tolerance

policy regarding government employees and contractors engaging in

trafficking in persons (TIP) abroad.

Since then, Congress and the

President have taken further steps to address the issue of trafficking in

For the purposes of this report, we use the term “Gulf countries” to refer to the six

member states of the Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf, also known as

the Gulf Cooperation Council. These states are Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi

Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates.

These workers are alternately referred to as third-country nationals or other-country

nationals.

Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan, Transforming Wartime

Contracting: Controlling Costs, Reducing Risks (Arlington, Va.: August 2011).

Pub. L. No. 106-386, Div. A, 114 Stat. 1464, 1466-1491, as amended.

The White House, National Security Presidential Directive-22, Combating Trafficking in

Persons (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 16, 2002).

Page 2 GAO-15-102 Human Trafficking

persons, including through amendments to the TVPA. In 2007, federal

acquisition regulations related to combating TIP were amended to require

the inclusion of the U.S. government’s zero tolerance policy in all

government contracts.

In the Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013, Congress

included a requirement for GAO to report on the use of foreign workers

both overseas and domestically—including those employed on U.S.

government contracts.

This report examines (1) policies and guidance

governing the recruitment of foreign workers and the fees these workers

may pay to secure work on U.S. government contracts overseas and (2)

agencies’ monitoring of contractor efforts to combat TIP.

This report focuses on Department of Defense (DOD), Department of

State (State), and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID)

contracts with performance in countries with large percentages of foreign

workers as compared with local nationals, and in Afghanistan and Iraq,

where U.S. government contractors employ significant numbers of foreign

workers. We focused on contractor practices related to the recruitment of

foreign workers, as well as labor practices such as housing, wages and

hours, access to identity documents, and return travel. We selected these

practices because they were mentioned explicitly in both recent

legislation and an executive order on combating trafficking in persons,

and because the International Labour Organization (ILO) has identified

potential indicators of TIP related to these practices.

To examine the recruitment of foreign workers and agencies’ monitoring

of contractor labor practices, we reviewed acquisition regulations,

policies, and guidance. We selected a sample of 11 contracts that were

Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) § 22.1705. See also FAR clause 52.222-50,

Combating Trafficking in Persons; 72 Fed. Reg. 46,431 (requiring the inclusion of the

policy in all contracts) (Aug. 17, 2007).

Pub. L. No. 113-4, § 1235, 127 Stat. 54, 146.

This report addresses the use of foreign workers for labor on U.S. government contracts

overseas. GAO is scheduled to issue a separate report in early 2015 focusing on the

recruitment and use of foreign workers within the United States.

The ILO is a tripartite United Nations agency with government, employer, and worker

representatives. The ILO’s mission includes promoting fundamental rights at work,

creating opportunities for decent employment and income, and enhancing social

protection.

Page 3 GAO-15-102 Human Trafficking

active at the end of fiscal year 2013, based on the contracts’ place of

performance, value, type of service provided, and the number of foreign

workers employed to reflect a range of agencies, countries, and services.

We conducted structured interviews with agency contracting officials,

contractors, and, in some cases, interviewed the subcontractors

responsible for these contracts.

The contracts in our sample represent

nearly one-third of all reported foreign workers employed on contracts

awarded by these three agencies as reported in the Synchronized Pre-

deployment and Operational Tracker (SPOT) database at the end of fiscal

year 2013.

The results of our structured interviews are not generalizable

but provided us with insights about contractor recruitment practices and

efforts to combat TIP, as well as agencies’ monitoring of these efforts.

Table 1 provides basic information on these contracts. In addition, we

conducted fieldwork in Afghanistan, Kuwait, and Qatar, where we spoke

with contracting officials, contractors, and subcontractors regarding

contracts in our sample, and in Jordan, where we spoke with State and

USAID officials to inform our research design and methodology. We also

spoke with other DOD, State, and USAID officials; host government

officials; and local nongovernmental organizations to obtain a broader

view about labor practices and efforts to combat TIP in these countries.

We chose these countries based on the range of U.S. government

activities in these countries, the prevalence of foreign workers, and

State’s assessment of the host government’s efforts to combat TIP.

Furthermore, we interviewed contracting officials, acquisition policy

For the purposes of this report, we use the term “agency contracting officials” to refer to

individuals involved in the award, administration, and monitoring of government contracts.

These officials include the contracting officer and the contracting officer’s representative,

among others. The contracting officer is a U.S. government employee who has the

authority to enter into, administer, or terminate contracts and make related determinations.

The contracting officer is responsible for ensuring performance of all necessary actions for

effective contracting, ensuring compliance with the terms of the contract, and

safeguarding the interests of the United States in its contractual relationships. The

contracting officer’s representative is designated in writing by the contracting officer to

perform specific technical or administrative functions. Unlike the contracting officer, a

contracting officer’s representative has no authority to make any commitments or changes

that affect price, quality, quantity, delivery, or other terms and conditions of the contract

and cannot direct the contractor or its subcontractors to operate in conflict with the

contract terms and conditions.

While our previous work has described data limitations related to SPOT, we found these

data sufficiently reliable for the purposes of identifying and selecting contracts employing

large numbers of foreign workers to review. App. I provides further information about our

methodology.

Page 4 GAO-15-102 Human Trafficking

officials, and officials responsible for coordinating agencies’ efforts to

combat TIP in the United States. The contract employing the largest

number of foreign workers in our sample included a requirement for the

contractor to report certain data related to alleged violations of the

government’s zero tolerance policy on TIP; we analyzed these data,

including reports of foreign workers paying for their jobs, to demonstrate

the prevalence and relative amounts of these payments. Appendix I

provides more information on our scope and methodology.

Table 1: GAO Sample of U.S. Government Contracts Employing Foreign Workers Overseas

Contract description

Contracting

agency

Place of

performance

Services

provided

Total

obligations as

of fiscal year

2014 (Dollars

in millions)

Peak

number of

foreign

workers

Logistics Civil Augmentation Program IV, Task Order 5

(Afghanistan)

DOD/Army Afghanistan Facilities

support

$8,714 9,807

Field and Installation Readiness Support Team DOD/Army Afghanistan Facilities

support

$1,417 3,658

Army Pre-positioned Stocks-5 DOD/Army Kuwait Facilities

support $1,022 2,570

Qatar - Base Operations Support Services DOD/Army Qatar Facilities

support $174 650

Logistics Civil Augmentation Program IV, Task Order 5

(Bahrain)

DOD/Army Bahrain Facilities

support $48 323

Coalition Compound Construction DOD/U.S.

Army Corps of

Engineers

Qatar Construction

$45 391

Full Line Food and Beverage Support DOD/Defense

Logistics

Agency

Kuwait/Iraq/

Jordan

Food

services

$1,092 1,889

Worldwide Protective Services-Baghdad State Iraq Security $608 1,410

Operations and Maintenance Support Services State Iraq Facilities

support $150 432

Embassy Doha Local Guard Force State Qatar Security $6 70

Kandahar-Helmand Power Project USAID Afghanistan Construction $227 41

Sources: Department of Defense (DOD), Department of State (State), and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). Data on peak number of foreign workers provided by contractors. |

GAO-15-102

Contract value at time of award.

We conducted this performance audit from June 2013 to November 2014

in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain

sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our

Page 5 GAO-15-102 Human Trafficking

findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that

the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and

conclusions based on our audit objectives.

Human trafficking—the worldwide criminal exploitation of men, women,

and children for others’ financial gain—is a violation of human rights.

Victims are often lured or abducted and forced to work in involuntary

servitude. Although the crime of human trafficking can take different forms

in different regions and countries around the world, most human

trafficking cases follow a similar pattern. Traffickers use acquaintances or

false advertisements to recruit men, women, and children in or near their

homes, and then transfer them to and exploit them in another city, region,

or country. The U.S. government defines severe forms of trafficking in

persons to include the recruitment, harboring, transportation, provision, or

obtaining of a person for labor or services, through the use of force, fraud,

or coercion for the purpose of subjection to involuntary servitude,

peonage, debt bondage, or slavery.

International organizations have

also defined trafficking in persons and developed a list of indicators of

trafficking for labor exploitation.

Appendix II describes these efforts in

more detail.

Congress and others have highlighted the role that deceptive recruitment

practices can play in contributing to trafficking in persons. Workers who

pay for their jobs are at an increased risk for human trafficking and other

The Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-386, codified as

amended at 22 U.S.C. §§ 7101-10. The TVPA defines the term ‘‘debt bondage’’ as the

status or condition of a debtor arising from a pledge by the debtor of his or her personal

services or of those of a person under his or her control as a security for debt, if the value

of those services as reasonably assessed is not applied toward the liquidation of the debt

or the length and nature of those services are not respectively limited and defined.

According to the TVPA, severe forms of trafficking also include sex trafficking in which a

commercial sex act is induced by force, fraud, or coercion, or in which the person induced

to perform such act has not attained 18 years of age.

For an example of a definition of trafficking in persons, see the United Nations’ Protocol

to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children,

Supplementing the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime,

2237 U.N.T.S. 319 (Vienna: Nov. 15, 2000). The United States became a party in 2005.

Background

Definition of Trafficking in

Persons

Page 6 GAO-15-102 Human Trafficking

labor abuses. State’s Inspector General has reported that such

recruitment fees, which can amount to many months’ salary, are a

possible indicator of coercive recruitment and may indicate an increased

risk of debt bondage, as some workers borrow large sums of money to

pay the recruiter.

A 2011 ILO survey of workers in Kuwait and the

United Arab Emirates found that the recruitment fees and interest on

loans may limit workers’ ability to negotiate the terms of their work

contracts.

This debt burden can result in involuntary servitude through

excessive work hours or virtually no pay for months to recover the

advance payments of fees and interest.

Since 2007, the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) has required all

U.S. government contracts to include a clause citing the U.S.

government’s zero tolerance policy regarding TIP. This clause prohibits

contractors from engaging in severe forms of trafficking, procuring

commercial sex acts, or using forced labor during the period of

performance of the contract.

In addition, this clause establishes several

contractor requirements to implement this policy, such as notifying the

contracting officer of any information that alleges a contractor employee,

subcontractor, or subcontractor employee has engaged in conduct that

violates this policy and adding this clause in all subcontracts.

In 2012, Congress and the President took further steps to reduce the risk

of trafficking on U.S. government contracts. The TVPA, as amended,

and an executive order

both address acts related to TIP, such as

denying foreign workers access to their identity documents and failing to

pay for return travel for foreign workers. In September 2013, amendments

United States Department of State and the Broadcasting Board of Governors Office of

the Inspector General, Performance Evaluation of Department of State Contracts to

Assess the Risk of Trafficking in Persons Violations in Four States in the Cooperation

Council for the Arab States of the Gulf, MERO-I-11-06 (Arlington, Va.: January 2011).

ILO, Kuwait Economic Society, University of Sharjah, Travels of Hope, Toils of Despair:

The Lives of Migrant Workers in the Gulf States (Geneva: December 2011).

FAR § 22.1705. See also FAR clause 52.222-50, Combating Trafficking in Persons.

National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013, Pub. L. No. 112-239, § 1702,

codified at 22 U.S.C. § 7104(g).

Strengthening Protections Against Trafficking in Persons in Federal Contracts, Exec.

Order 13627, 77 Fed. Reg. 60,029 (Oct. 2, 2012).

U.S. Government

Approach to Trafficking in

Persons in Acquisitions

Policy

Page 7 GAO-15-102 Human Trafficking

to the FAR were proposed to implement the requirements of the 2013

amendments to the TVPA and the executive order related to

strengthening protections against trafficking in persons.

As of October

2014, these proposed amendments to the FAR are still under review.

Agencies also have developed their own acquisition policies and

guidance to augment the FAR that aim to protect foreign workers on

specific contracts. Many of these policies and much of this guidance

include requirements related to recruitment and other labor practices,

including housing, wages, and access to identity documents.

• DOD policy is intended to deter activities of a variety of actors,

including contractor personnel, that would facilitate or support TIP.

region-specific DOD acquisition policy that addresses combating TIP

has evolved in recent years and has applied to different places of

performance at different times.

Currently, this policy requires the

insertion of a clause to combat TIP into certain service and

construction contracts that require performance in Iraq or Afghanistan.

• In 2011 and 2012, State issued acquisition guidance, applicable to all

domestic and overseas contracting activities, on how to monitor

contracts for TIP compliance and to provide a clause and procedures

to reduce the risk of abusive labor practices that contribute to the

potential for TIP. Among other things, this guidance requires

contracting officers to require offerors to include information related to

the recruitment and housing of foreign workers in their proposals for

certain contracts.

78 Fed. Reg. 59,317 (Sept. 26, 2013). See also proposed rule to amend Department of

Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement intended to supplement these

changes to the Federal Acquisition Regulations. 78 Fed. Reg. 59,325 (Sept. 26, 2013).

DOD, DOD Instruction 2200.01, Combating Trafficking in Persons (Arlington, Va.: Sept.

15, 2010).

For example, see U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM)-Joint Theater Support

Contracting Command (C-JTSCC) Acquisition Instruction (Sept. 1, 2011) and related C-

JTSCC Clause 952.222-0001, Prohibition Against Human Trafficking, Inhumane Living

Conditions, and Withholding of Employee Passports. Previously, similar clauses, such as

Kuwait-Specific Contract Requirement (KSCR) 1-2, Prohibition Against Human Trafficking,

Inhumane Living Conditions, and Withholding of Employee Passports, were to be included

in certain contracts whose place of performance was Iraq, Kuwait, or Pakistan.

Department of State, Procurement Information Bulletins No. 2011-09, Combating

Trafficking in Persons (Sept. 19, 2012), and No. 2012-10, Contractor Recruitment of Third-

Country Nationals (Arlington, Va.: Oct. 17, 2012).

Page 8 GAO-15-102 Human Trafficking

• In 2012, USAID issued guidance reminding contracting officials of

their responsibilities to implement TIP requirements and requiring

officials to, among other things, discuss issues such as access to

certain documents and understanding local labor laws with

contractors following contract award.

Subcontracting is an acquisition practice in which the vendor with the

direct responsibility to perform a contract, known as the prime contractor,

enters into direct contracts with other vendors, known as subcontractors,

to furnish supplies or services for the performance of the contract. This

practice can help contractors to consider core competencies and supplier

capabilities to achieve efficiencies from the marketplace. In some cases,

prime contractors use subcontractors to supply labor on government

contracts, and these subcontractors may use second-tier subcontractors

or recruitment agencies to identify prospective employees. Our prior work

has shown that government visibility into subcontracts is generally

limited.

Government agencies have a direct relationship only with the

prime contractor, and generally “privity of contract” limits the

government’s authority to direct subcontractors to perform tasks under

the contract.

As a result, agencies generally do not monitor

subcontractors directly, as they expect the prime contractor to monitor its

subcontractors. Further, the FAR notes the prime contractor’s

responsibility in managing its subcontractors, and officials have

underscored the limited role of the government in selecting and managing

subcontracts.

Contractors performing U.S. government contracts overseas operate

under local conditions and in accordance with local labor practices. In

Gulf countries, contractors employ large numbers of foreign workers, who

make up a significant portion of the local labor force. These workers

USAID, Procurement Executive’s Bulletin No. 2012-07, Combating Trafficking in

Persons (TIP).

GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Additional Guidance Needed to Improve Visibility into the

Structure and Management of Major Weapon System Subcontracts, GAO-11-61R

(Washington, D.C.: Oct. 28, 2010).

“Privity of contract” describes the legal relationship between parties to the same

contract. It is commonly understood to mean that the government’s contractual

relationship is with the prime contractor, not with subcontractors.

Use of Subcontractors

Foreign Workers on U.S.

Government Contracts

Overseas

Page 9 GAO-15-102 Human Trafficking

typically come from countries such as India, Bangladesh, and the

Philippines for economic reasons. According to State and the ILO, several

common and restrictive labor practices in Gulf countries stem from these

countries’ sponsorship system, which limits workers’ freedom of

movement. Appendix III provides further detail on the prevalence of

foreign workers in Gulf countries, as well as efforts to regulate this

migration of workers in home and destination countries. State’s 2014

Trafficking in Persons Report found that certain labor practices in the

Middle East, including Kuwait, Qatar, and Bahrain, can render foreign

workers susceptible to severe forms of trafficking in persons.

In addition, U.S. government contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan often

employ foreign workers for cost and security reasons. As of July 2014,

DOD reported nearly 17,000 foreign workers on contracts in Afghanistan,

approximately one-third of the department’s total contractor workforce in

that country. Although DOD reports that it no longer has foreign workers

in Iraq, it reported more than 40,000 foreign workers on DOD contracts in

Iraq—nearly 60 percent of its total contractor workforce in the country—as

of January 2011. State contractors currently employ foreign workers in

Iraq for security and operations and maintenance services. GAO and

others have reported that operating in insecure environments can hinder

agencies’ ability to monitor contracts, including efforts to combat TIP,

because of the general absence of security, among other factors.

Table

2 shows the prevalence of migrants in Gulf countries, Afghanistan, and

Iraq, as well as State’s Trafficking in Persons Report tier placement for

2014, which illustrates areas where the risk of TIP is high.

U.S. Department of State, Trafficking in Persons Report (Washington, D.C.: June 2014).

This annual report contains information on countries’ efforts to combat TIP, placing each

country on one of four tiers based on the extent of their governments’ efforts to comply

with the TVPA’s minimum standards for the elimination of human trafficking.

GAO, Contingency Contracting: State and USAID Made Progress Assessing and

Implementing Changes, but Further Actions Needed, GAO-14-229 (Washington, D.C.:

Feb. 14, 2014), and Congressional Research Service, Trafficking in Persons: International

Dimensions and Foreign Policy Issues for Congress, R42497 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 9,

2013).

Page 10 GAO-15-102 Human Trafficking

Table 2: Migrants in and Tier Placement of Gulf Countries, Afghanistan, and Iraq in

2013

Country

Migrants as a

percentage of total

population

Total number of

migrants

Trafficking in

Persons Report tier

placement (2014)

United Arab

Emirates

83.7% 7,826,981 2

Qatar 73.8% 1,600,955 2 Watch List

Kuwait 60.2% 2,028,053 3

Bahrain 54.7% 729,357 2 Watch List

Saudi Arabia 31.4% 9,060,433 3

Oman 30.6% 1,112,032 2

Afghanistan not available not available 2

Iraq not available not available 2

Sources: United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs. Trends in International Migrant Stock: the 2013 revision;

Department of State Trafficking in Persons Report, 2014. | GAO-15-102

These data do not include the number of foreign workers in each country but rather reflect the

number of overall migrants, including children, to each country.

In the report, Tier 1 countries fully comply with the Trafficking Victims Protection Act’s minimum

standards for the elimination of human trafficking; Tier 2 countries do not fully comply with the

minimum standards, but are making significant efforts to bring themselves into compliance; Tier 2

Watch List countries do not fully comply with the minimum standards, but are making significant

efforts to bring themselves into compliance, among other criteria; and Tier 3 refers to countries whose

governments do not fully comply with the minimum standards and are not making significant efforts to

do so.

Agency policy and guidance on combating trafficking in persons has

attempted to address the payment of recruitment fees by foreign workers

on certain U.S. government contracts. However, current policy and

guidance does not specifically define the components or amount of

permissible fees related to recruitment. Agency officials and contractors

said that without an explicit definition of what constitutes a recruitment

fee, they may not be able to effectively implement existing policy and

guidance on this issue. Despite efforts to prohibit or restrict the payment

of recruitment fees, we found that some foreign workers on U.S.

government contracts have reported paying for their jobs. Prime

contractor reliance on subcontractors for recruitment of foreign workers

further limits visibility into recruitment fees.

Current Agency

Policy and Guidance

on the Payment of

Recruitment Fees Do

Not Provide Clear

Instructions

Page 11 GAO-15-102 Human Trafficking

The FAR provides broad prohibitions against contractors engaging in

trafficking but does not explicitly address the payment of recruitment fees.

The FAR prohibits contractors from engaging in severe forms of

trafficking, including recruitment of a person for labor or services through

the use of force, fraud, or coercion for the purposes of subjection to debt

bondage, but it does not address more specific issues related to how

contractors recruit foreign workers, such as recruitment fees.

Some agencies have developed policy and guidance that address certain

recruitment issues more specifically. Although DOD’s department-wide

guidance on combating TIP does not explicitly address recruitment, its

current region-specific policy requires certain services and construction

contracts in Afghanistan to include a clause requiring contractors to avoid

using unlicensed recruitment firms or firms that charge illegal recruitment

fees.

However, this policy does not define “illegal” recruitment fees.

State’s 2012 guidance required certain contracts to include a clause

requiring contractors to submit, as part of their proposals, recruitment

plans that must state that employees will not be charged any recruitment

or similar fees and that contractors and subcontractors will use only bona

fide licensed recruitment companies.

USAID’s 2012 guidance on

combating trafficking in persons reminds officials of the FAR

requirements, but it provides no further guidance on the recruitment of

foreign workers for work on USAID contracts. Table 3 illustrates how the

FAR and agency policy and guidance address recruitment fees with

varying levels of specificity.

C-JTSCC Clauses 952.222-0001 and 5152.222-5900, Prohibition Against Human

Trafficking, Inhumane Living Conditions, and Withholding of Employee Passports. Officials

stated that a similar clause, KSCR1-2, was included in another contract in our sample

whose place of performance was Kuwait. Furthermore, on one contract in Qatar, the

contractor stated in its proposal that it would ensure compliance with C-JTSCC clause

952.222-0001, even though it was not required for contracts in Qatar.

Department of State, Procurement Information Bulletin No. 2012-10, Contractor

Recruitment of Third-Country Nationals (Arlington, Va.: Oct. 17, 2012).

The FAR and Agency

Policy and Guidance Lack

Specificity Regarding

Recruitment Fees

Page 12 GAO-15-102 Human Trafficking

Table 3: Varying Levels of Specificity in the FAR and Agency Policy on Recruitment

Fees

Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR): FAR § 22.1705(a) and Clause 52.222-50

No explicit discussion of recruitment fees.

Department of Defense policy: U.S. Central Command-Joint Theater Support

Contracting Command (C-JTSCC) Acquisition Instruction and Clauses 952.222-0001

and 5152.222-5900

Prohibits the use of unlicensed recruiting firms or firms that charge illegal recruiting fees.

State guidance: Procurement Information Bulletin No.2012-10

Offerors are to be required to submit a recruitment plan as part of the proposal that

states that the recruited employee will not be charged recruitment or any similar fees.

USAID guidance:

Procurement Executive’s Bulletin No. 2012-07

No explicit discussion of recruitment fees.

Source: GAO analysis of the FAR, C-JTSCC Acquisition Instruction, State Procurement Information Bulletin 2012-10, and U.S. Agency

for International Development (USAID) Procurement Executive’s Bulletin 2012-07. | GAO-15-102

In September 2013, amendments to the FAR were proposed to implement the requirements of the

2013 amendments to the Trafficking Victims Protection Act and the executive order related to

strengthening protections against trafficking in persons, including the issue of recruitment fees.

We found that some agency officials, both on contracts in our sample and

on others, and contractors in our sample did not have a common

understanding of what constitutes a permissible fee related to

recruitment—in terms of components or amount—or whether contractors

or subcontractors at any level were permitted to charge such fees to

recruited employees. According to GAO’s standards for internal control,

information should be recorded and communicated to management and

others in a form that enables them to carry out their internal control and

other responsibilities.

Currently, agency contracting officials lack policy

or guidance that specifies what components are considered to be

recruitment fees and may not be able to determine which fees are

permissible, hindering their ability to carry out their responsibilities. For

example, neither the FAR nor agency policy or guidance specifies what

components are considered to constitute recruitment fees, but these fees

could include air tickets, lodging, passport and visa fees, or medical

screening, among other expenses. One subcontractor who hires foreign

workers in Dubai for work in Afghanistan said that the definition of

recruitment fees is imprecise and varies widely within the contracting

community. He added that he believed every foreign worker hired in

GAO, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1

(Washington, D.C.: Nov. 1, 1999).

Page 13 GAO-15-102 Human Trafficking

Dubai for this contract had paid someone some type of fee for his or her

job, but the fee could have included airfare from the home country to

Dubai, housing and food in Dubai, or a commission for the recruiter, any

of which may be legal. In addition, the Qatari Under Secretary of Labor

noted that Qatari law prohibits recruitment fees, but he and State and

DOD officials in Qatar acknowledged that most foreign workers are

initially recruited in their home countries, where such fees may or may not

be allowed. Without explicit definitions of what, if anything, constitute

permissible fees related to recruitment, contractors said that they could

not ensure that they were in compliance with contractual requirements.

DOD contracting officials in Kuwait said that a definition of recruitment

fees would improve their ability to implement the government’s

antitrafficking policy.

The President and Congress have both directed that the FAR be

amended to address several issues related to trafficking, including the

payment of recruitment fees. The 2012 executive order directed

amendments to the FAR that would expressly prohibit federal contractors

from charging employees any recruitment fees,

while amendments to

the TVPA in 2013 allow the government to terminate a contract if

contractors, subcontractors, labor brokers, or other agents charge

unreasonable placement or recruitment fees.

Public comments on the

proposed FAR rule have noted that the FAR Council will have to reconcile

these prohibitions, deciding whether to prohibit all recruitment fees or only

unreasonable ones and defining what is considered unreasonable.

The TVPA states that unreasonable placement or recruitment fees

include fees equal to or greater than the employee’s monthly salary, or

recruitment fees that violate the laws of the country from which an

employee is recruited.

The Department of Labor and foreign

Strengthening Protections Against Trafficking in Persons in Federal Contracts, Exec.

Order 13627, 77 Fed. Reg. 60,029 (Oct. 2, 2012).

Pub. L. No. 112-239, §§ 1702, 1708(c).

The FAR Council assists in the direction and coordination of government-wide

procurement policy and government-wide procurement regulatory activities in the federal

government. 41 U.S.C. § 1302.

Pub. L. No. 112-239, § 1702.

Other Entities Provide

Definitions of Permissible

Recruitment Fees

Page 14 GAO-15-102 Human Trafficking

governments have also defined permissible fees paid by workers to their

employers.

• A Department of Labor regulation relating to assurances that

employers must provide in seeking to employ certain temporary

foreign workers in the United States allows for reimbursements from

workers for costs that are the responsibility and primarily for the

benefit of the worker, such as government-required passport fees.

• The government of India permits recruiting agents to recover service

charges from workers of up to the equivalent of 45 days’ wages,

subject to a maximum of 20,000 rupees (currently about $325),

according to India’s Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs.

• The government of the Philippines permits recruiters to charge its

hired workers a placement fee in an amount equivalent to 1 month’s

salary, excluding documentation costs such as expenses for

passports, birth certificates, and medical examinations, according to

the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration.

• The International Organization for Migration, with others, has

established the International Recruitment Integrity System (IRIS),

which is a voluntary consortium of stakeholders including recruitment

and employment agents. Members of IRIS are prohibited from

charging any recruitment fees to job seekers.

Senior acquisition officials expressed conflicting views regarding the

feasibility of prohibiting recruitment fees. Senior officials in State’s Office

of the Procurement Executive stated that they would prefer that all

recruitment fees be prohibited, in line with the executive order, to

eliminate any uncertainty or ambiguity among contracting officials. They

said that they had consulted State’s Office to Monitor and Combat

Trafficking in Persons, which took the same position of the Office of the

Procurement Executive given that such fees create vulnerability among

workers and often are the precursor to debt bondage. These officials

further stated that the term “reasonable recruitment fees” was difficult to

define and apply in practice. In public comments on the proposed FAR

rule, one nongovernmental organization noted that “the definition of

reasonableness is amorphous and is unduly burdensome on private

industry to enforce.” Other officials, including DOD contracting officials in

Kuwait, stated that it may be reasonable for employees to pay a fee for a

job in some cases, echoing the recent amendment to the TVPA. They

20 C.F.R. § 655.135(j).

Page 15 GAO-15-102 Human Trafficking

noted that eliminating these fees would be nearly impossible, and that

recruiters would pass these fees on to workers in some other form if

recruitment fees were explicitly banned. DOD Joint Staff officials added

that the elimination of recruitment fees will cause contractors to change

the name from recruitment fees to travel or per diem fees to cover air

travel, housing and food, thus a precise definition of these fees that

specifically addresses travel costs is needed. A subcontractor supplying

foreign workers on the largest contract in our sample said that its

recruitment agencies likely charge fees to recruits for services such as air

tickets, housing, and food, which the subcontractor deemed reasonable.

However, according to senior State, DOD, and contractor officials,

regardless of whether recruitment fees are banned in their entirety or only

when unreasonable, the ability of contracting officers and contractors to

implement this restriction will be limited until recruitment fees, including

what is considered permissible, are defined in regulation, guidance, or

policy.

On at least two contracts in our sample, including the one employing the

largest number of foreign workers, contractors reported that workers have

paid for their jobs. We found that, on the largest contract in our sample,

employing nearly 10,000 foreign workers in Afghanistan, recruitment

agencies have likely charged fees to some foreign workers. On this

contract, the prime contractor uses several subcontractors to supply

labor, including one that hires workers through more than 10 recruitment

agencies in Dubai. We found that from September 2012 through April

2014, more than 1,900 subcontractor employees reported to the prime

contractor that they had paid fees for their jobs, including to recruitment

agencies with which the subcontractor had a recruitment agreement. For

2012 and 2013, recruitment agencies used by this subcontractor signed

statements acknowledging that they would not charge any recruitment

fees to candidates facilitated as part of their agreements with the

subcontractor. In April 2014, the last month for which data were available,

82 workers reported having paid an average of approximately $3,000 to

get their jobs. The fees that these workers reported paying averaged

approximately 5 months’ salary and, in one case, amounted to more than

Some Foreign Workers

Employed on U.S.

Contracts Paid

Recruitment Fees to

Subcontractors or

Recruitment Agencies

Page 16 GAO-15-102 Human Trafficking

1 year’s salary.

According to the subcontractor who employed all 82 of

these workers, these fees were likely paid to an agent who assisted

foreign workers with transportation and housing prior to being hired for

work on the U.S. government contract. Although the prime contractor

provided DOD information about reported fees, neither DOD nor the

prime contractor took further action because the allegations did not

involve the prime contractor or its subcontractor.

On another DOD services contract in Afghanistan, we found that the

contractor modified its subcontract with a recruiter in January 2014 to

clarify that the contractor would pay recruitment fees previously charged

to foreign workers—$670 per worker. The contractor reported that this

modification to the subcontract was a result of its interpretation of the

FAR clause prohibiting TIP. According to the contractor, the contracting

agency had not directed it to make this modification; it made this change

on its own initiative to prevent potential TIP abuses in the performance of

the contract.

These practices may be long-standing and widespread in Gulf countries.

In January 2011, the State Inspector General reported in an evaluation of

efforts to combat TIP on contracts in four Gulf countries that a substantial

portion of the workers they interviewed had obtained their jobs by paying

a recruitment agency in their country of origin. Some of these workers

reported paying more than 1 year’s salary in such fees.

These 82 workers reported paying fees as early as October 2010. We compared the

fees reported in April 2014 with the workers’ April 2014 salaries, as reported by the prime

contractor. According to our analysis of these data provided by the prime contractor, these

fees ranged from $500 to $5,000, with a mean and median fee of about $3,000. In

comparison, the prime contractor reported that the average monthly base salary in April

2014 for these workers was about $650 and ranged from less than $400 to about $1,250.

United States Department of State and the Broadcasting Board of Governors Office of

the Inspector General, Performance Evaluation of Department of State Contracts to

Assess the Risk of Trafficking in Persons Violations in Four States in the Cooperation

Council for the Arab States of the Gulf, MERO-I-11-06 (Arlington, Va.: January 2011). For

this review, the Inspector General interviewed a nongeneralizable sample of workers in

Kuwait, Oman, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates.

Page 17 GAO-15-102 Human Trafficking

Nearly all prime contractors in our sample reported that they generally

used subcontractors or recruitment agencies to recruit foreign workers,

and some reported that their knowledge about the payment of recruitment

fees is limited. These subcontractors generally recruited foreign workers

either from their home countries or in host countries where they may have

lived and worked for an extended period of time. In other cases,

subcontractors recruited workers in a third country, neither their home

country nor the host country, and then transported them to the contract

location. Figure 1 illustrates a variety of potential paths a foreign worker

may take to be recruited for work on a U.S. government contract

overseas.

Prime Contractors Used

Subcontractors to Recruit

Foreign Workers, and

Some Did Not Know if

Recruitment Fees Were

Paid

Page 18 GAO-15-102 Human Trafficking

Figure 1: Examples of Different Paths Foreign Workers Take from Their Home Countries to Work on a U.S. Government

Contract Overseas

Page 19 GAO-15-102 Human Trafficking

For foreign workers recruited in their home countries, prime contractors in

our sample reported that they often used subcontractors who relied on

recruitment agencies to identify workers. Since prime contractors do not

have a direct relationship with these recruitment agencies, their visibility

into these agencies’ practices, including whether the agencies charged

workers recruitment fees, was limited. For foreign workers recruited in

host countries, prime contractors in our sample reported that they

typically also used subcontractors to identify workers. When foreign

workers are already living in the host country, prime contractors may not

know whether these workers paid recruitment fees when they first came

to the host country. For example, one subcontractor that employs more

than 2,500 foreign workers in Afghanistan said that it hired foreign

workers from the previous contractor and did not know whether these

workers had paid recruitment fees previously.

The following examples illustrate how contractors use subcontractors to

recruit foreign workers and their limited knowledge about recruitment

fees:

• On a DOD services contract in Kuwait, a local subcontractor recruited,

employed, and housed foreign workers supporting the prime contract.

According to the subcontractor, some employees were recruited from

an existing pool of foreign workers living in Kuwait. The prime

contractor reported that it did not monitor the subcontractor’s

recruitment practices, including if recruitment fees were paid by

foreign workers in this existing pool (see scenario 1, fig. 1).

• On a DOD services contract in Afghanistan, the prime contractor used

a subcontractor to supply labor. This subcontractor recruited workers

in Dubai using several recruitment agencies. In some instances, these

agencies identified workers in countries such as India and Nepal and

transported them to Dubai. As noted above, many workers on this

contract reported having paid for their jobs, but the prime contractor

did not investigate these reports because they did not involve the

prime contractor or its subcontractors (see scenario 2, fig. 1).

• On a DOD construction contract in Qatar, the prime contractor used a

subcontractor that maintained a pool of foreign workers in Qatar who

were originally identified by recruitment agencies in source countries

such as Sri Lanka, Nepal, India, and Jordan. The prime contractor

reported that it had no way of knowing how these workers had been

initially recruited, including if they had paid any recruitment fees (see

scenario 3, fig. 1).

• On a State services contract in Iraq, the prime contractor said that it

did not use subcontractors. Instead, it transferred workers from

Page 20 GAO-15-102 Human Trafficking

another contract it was supporting in Djibouti and also employed

several foreign workers from the contractor that had previously

performed this work for DOD. Consequently, most workers had

already been recruited before contract award.

• On a State security contract in Iraq, the prime contractor used

subcontractors in Kenya and Uganda to recruit foreign workers.

According to the prime contractor, subcontractors were paid a fixed

fee for each worker it hired and the prime contractor did not believe

workers paid a separate fee for these services.

The FAR and DOD, State, and USAID guidance outline requirements for

monitoring contractor labor practices, and DOD and State had processes

for monitoring these practices and efforts to combat TIP on some

contracts in our sample. However, we found that DOD, State, and USAID

did not specifically monitor these practices on other contracts, hindering

their ability to detect potential TIP abuses and implement the U.S.

government’s zero tolerance policy. For example, we found that agencies

did not specifically monitor for labor practices on some contracts, but

rather focused on contractor-provided goods and services, such as

building construction. The FAR and agency policy and guidance require

the use of contract clauses that outline contractor responsibilities related

to labor practices in areas such as wages and hours, housing, access to

identity documents, and return travel, which have been linked to TIP

abuses by the U.S. government and international organizations. All

contractors in our sample reported to us that their practices reflect efforts

to combat TIP.

The FAR and agency policy and guidance outline requirements for DOD,

State, and USAID to monitor contractor labor practices. For some

contracts in our sample, DOD and State had specific processes to

monitor efforts to combat TIP. On other contracts, however, neither DOD,

nor State, nor USAID had such specific processes and focused their

monitoring on contractor-provided goods and services. In addition, some

agency contracting officials indicated that they were unaware of their

monitoring responsibilities to combat TIP.

Agencies’ Monitoring

of Contractor Labor

Practices in Our

Sample Varied, but

Contractors’ Labor

Practices Reflect

Efforts to Combat TIP

Agencies Monitored

Contractor Labor Practices

on Some Contracts in Our

Sample but Not on Others

Page 21 GAO-15-102 Human Trafficking

Federal acquisition regulations and agency guidance provide instructions

for agencies to monitor contractor labor practices. The FAR requires that

agencies conduct contract quality assurance activities as necessary to

determine that supplies or services conform to contract requirements,

which would include requirements related to efforts to combat TIP.

addition, DOD guidance states that quality assurance surveillance plans

should describe how the government will monitor a contractor’s

performance regarding trafficking in persons.

State’s guidance requires

contracting officials to document a monitoring plan to combat TIP, obtain

information on employer-furnished housing and periodically visit to ensure

adequacy, and verify that the contractor does not hold employee

passports or visas. Finally, USAID guidance requires contracting officials

to monitor all awards to ensure compliance with TIP requirements.

Specifically, the guidance states that officials should conduct appropriate

site visits and employee interviews to verify that the contractor does not

hold employee passports, among other things.

DOD and State have developed specific processes for monitoring

contractor labor practices, including efforts to combat TIP, for some

contracts in our sample. Specifically, DOD developed a process for

monitoring efforts to combat TIP for five of the seven DOD contracts

included in our sample, all of which were awarded by the Army

Contracting Command, and State had a TIP-specific process for two of

the three State contracts in our sample. On the other four contracts in our

sample, DOD, State, and USAID did not monitor specifically for TIP

because of a focus on contractor provided goods and services, as

discussed in the next section.

For DOD, the Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA)

administered four contracts in Afghanistan, Kuwait, and Qatar and used a

checklist to help it conduct systematic audits of contractor compliance

with certain requirements related to labor practices and efforts to combat

FAR § 46.401.

DOD, Department of Defense Procedures, Guidance, and Information § 222.1703(4).

DCMA is responsible for providing contract administration services for DOD buying

activities, working directly with defense contractors to help ensure that goods and services

are delivered on time, at projected cost, and that they meet performance requirements. In

addition, as a designated combat support agency, DCMA is tasked with providing contract

administration and support to combatant commanders during contingency operations.

Federal Acquisition

Regulations and Agency

Guidance Include Instructions

on Monitoring Contrac

tor Labor

Practices

DOD and State Have

Developed Specific Processes

for Monitoring Contractor Labor

Practices on Some Contracts

Page 22 GAO-15-102 Human Trafficking

TIP.

(See app. V for a sample checklist used by DCMA in Afghanistan.)

DCMA’s checklist included questions about foreign worker housing,

employment contracts, and policies and procedures for reporting potential

TIP abuses. DCMA also interviewed a sample of foreign workers to

further validate contractor compliance with requirements related to

combating TIP. For example, in Kuwait, DCMA inspectors asked workers

about wages, hours, overtime, identity documents, and return travel. The

inspectors asked workers how the contractor paid their wages, if the

contractor held their passports, and if the contractor paid for their return

travel. DCMA documented contractor noncompliance with contract

requirements related to labor practices and efforts to combat TIP through

corrective action requests.

DCMA issued such requests related to

contractor labor practices—including housing, wage, and TIP issues—on

three out of the four contracts it was responsible for administering in our

sample. According to agency officials, none of these requests was issued

in response to a serious or unacceptable contract violation. For example,

on a facilities support contract in Afghanistan, the contractor was issued a

corrective action request in January 2012 for not providing foreign

workers an employment contract in their native language. This request

was closed in December 2012 after the contractor provided DCMA a

corrective action plan.

DCMA officials stated that it is transitioning its contract administration

responsibilities, including its process for monitoring efforts to combat TIP

in Iraq and Afghanistan, to the military services. In 2009, DOD directed

selected contract administration service tasks to be transferred from

DCMA to the military services. Although DCMA continued to administer

selected contracts until after the beginning of fiscal year 2014, DCMA

officials said that it is currently developing a plan to transition contract

administration responsibilities to the military services, including the

Army’s contracts in Kuwait, Qatar, and Afghanistan.

DCMA also administered a DOD contract in Bahrain, but did not use the same checklist

to help it conduct these audits. However, DCMA did not report any concerns related to

contractor compliance with certain requirements related to labor practices and efforts to

combat TIP.

DCMA used corrective action requests to document contractual non-compliance issues

ranging from minor to unacceptable. These requests are intended to bring deficiencies to

the contractor’s attention for appropriate action.

Page 23 GAO-15-102 Human Trafficking

State monitored contract requirements related to labor practices and

efforts to combat TIP for two contracts in our sample in Iraq. For a

security contract, State used an inspection checklist to help it monitor

contractor compliance with these requirements. This checklist included

verification of wages and access to identity documents, as well as other

labor practices. State officials responsible for monitoring this contract

conducted monthly foreign worker housing inspections and verified that

workers (1) willingly accepted their living and working conditions, (2) were

paid in accordance with the terms of their employment contracts, (3) had

access to their passports, (4) had access to their employment contracts

and fully understood them, and (5) were free to end their employment

contracts at any time, acknowledging that certain penalties may apply. On

another services contract, State’s Contract Management Office—a

regional office established in August 2013 to improve management and

oversight of contract performance of major contracts in Iraq—used in-

country interviews of foreign workers to monitor contractor labor

practices, including access to identify documents and return travel.

For 4 of the 11 contracts in our sample, agency officials stated that they

did not specifically monitor contractor labor practices or efforts to combat

TIP, as their monitoring processes were primarily focused on contractor-

provided goods and services. First, on a construction contract in Qatar,

DOD officials reported that they focused their monitoring on areas such

as building design and quality of materials and that they did not

specifically monitor for potential TIP abuses. As a result, according to an

agency official, they have no ability to monitor the treatment of foreign

workers once they step off the work site and thus might not be able to

detect potential abuses. Second, on a DOD food services contract in

Kuwait, agency officials said that they did not specifically monitor

recruitment practices or have an audit program or checklist designed to

combat TIP. Third, on a State security contract in Qatar, an official

responsible for contract monitoring reported that monitoring efforts were

focused on technical issues such as personnel qualifications and

performance of duties, not on contractor labor practices or efforts to

combat TIP. Finally, on a USAID construction contract in Afghanistan, an

agency official stated that the agency monitored only for quality

assurance and technical specifications and did not monitor specifically for

TIP abuses. In addition, the contractor on this contract said it did not

monitor subcontractors’ labor practices. Agency officials reported that

they had not documented any concerns regarding recruitment or labor

practices on any of these 4 contracts. However, without efforts to

specifically monitor labor practices or efforts to combat TIP, agencies’

ability to detect such concerns is limited, and they cannot ensure that

On Some Contracts, Agencies’

Monitoring Efforts Were

Limited to Contractor-Provided

Goods and Services

Page 24 GAO-15-102 Human Trafficking

foreign workers are being treated in accordance with the U.S.

government’s zero tolerance policy regarding trafficking in persons.

Some DOD and State contracting officials were unaware of relevant

acquisitions policy and guidance for combating TIP and did not clearly

understand their monitoring responsibilities. For example, DOD officials

responsible for monitoring a construction contract in Qatar expressed

uncertainty about their authorities for combating TIP. As a result, these

officials indicated that they conducted little monitoring of labor practices or

other efforts to combat potential TIP abuses. Furthermore, a State official

in Qatar responsible for contract monitoring stated that he had only

recently become aware of State’s 2012 acquisition guidance on

combating TIP and his monitoring activities did not specifically include

efforts to combat TIP. In addition, a State official in Afghanistan with

monitoring responsibilities for a services contract said that he was not

aware of State’s current guidance on combating TIP in contracts. This

official noted that some State officials responsible for contract monitoring

may need refresher training because their initial training occurred prior to

the issuance of this guidance. Finally, State’s Inspector General found, in

a recent inspection of the U.S. embassy in Afghanistan, that embassy

officials involved in contract administration were unaware of their

responsibilities for monitoring grants and contracts for TIP violations.

Agencies have developed training to help contracting officials become

more aware of their monitoring responsibilities. DOD has developed new

training for contracting officials that, according to a senior official, will help

ensure that these officials are knowledgeable, qualified, and authorized to

complete their TIP monitoring responsibilities. In October 2014, DOD

made this training mandatory for all DOD personnel with job

responsibilities that require daily contact with DOD contractors, foreign

national personnel, or both.

State officials noted that required training

for officials responsible for contract monitoring includes a module on

combating TIP, and State recently conducted a series of web-based

United States Department of State and the Broadcasting Board of Governors Office of

the Inspector General, Inspection of Embassy Kabul, Afghanistan, ISP-I-14-22A

(Arlington, Va.: August 2014).

We reviewed a draft of this training and found that it contained information on FAR

requirements and DOD policy and guidance, as well as information on how to monitor

contractor labor practices and efforts to combat TIP.

Some Contracting Officials

Were Unaware of Their

Monitoring Responsibilities to

Combat TIP

Page 25 GAO-15-102 Human Trafficking

seminars for acquisition personnel on how to monitor contracts for TIP

abuses.

The FAR and agency policy and guidance recognize that contractors

should follow various labor practices. For example, for certain contracts,

State requires the inclusion of a clause that prohibits contractors from

denying employees access to their passports, which helps to ensure that

workers have freedom of movement. In addition, both DOD and State

generally require the inclusion of clauses in certain contracts that speak

to a minimum of 50 square feet of space per employee in contractor-

provided housing. Contractors in our sample reported to us that their

practices related to wages and hours, housing, access to identity

documents, and the provision of return travel reflected efforts to combat

TIP. Appendix IV provides more detailed information about requirements

in the FAR and agency policy and guidance related to these practices.

In general, the FAR and DOD’s FAR supplement require the inclusion of

clauses in certain contracts that require contractors to comply with the

labor laws of the host country, which, according to officials, govern

practices related to wages, hours, leave, and overtime for the contracts in

our sample. State and USAID guidance directs contracting officials to

discuss the observance of local labor laws with contractors after awarding

the contract.

According to agency and contractor officials, local labor laws in Kuwait,

Qatar, Bahrain, and Iraq governed wages, hours, leave, and overtime for

foreign workers on U.S. government contracts in these countries.

All

eight of the contractors in our sample operating in Gulf countries or Iraq

reported that their practices for foreign workers’ hours, wages, leave, and

overtime were generally established in accordance with the labor laws of

Currently, for DOD contracts in Afghanistan, where contractors are performing work only

on U.S. military installations, contractors reported that Afghan labor laws do not apply to

their foreign workers. One contractor stated that the Afghan labor laws do not apply

because these workers fly directly into U.S. military installations and do not leave these

facilities for the duration of their employment contract, other than for periods of leave

where they can transit directly from the military base to an international airport and back

again. Another contractor stated that DOD contractor employees are protected by a

variety of U.S. laws and contract provisions, and consequently, the government of

Afghanistan has not expressed concern about the working conditions for foreign workers

that fly directly into and out of U.S. military installations.

Contractors Reported to

Us that Their Labor

Practices Reflect Efforts to

Combat TIP

Contractors Reported that

Practices Related to Wages,

Hours, Leave and Overtime

Generally Complied with Host

Country Labor Laws

Page 26 GAO-15-102 Human Trafficking

the country in which they were performing their U.S. contract. According

to agency officials and contractors, foreign workers employed on six

contracts in our sample in these countries worked 8 to12 hours per day

and 6 days per week. On the contracts for which overtime was permitted,

contractors reported that workers often earned overtime wage rates of

125 to 150 percent of their base pay for any hours worked in excess of

their regularly scheduled shifts. Furthermore, employers generally

provided these workers with 1 day off per week and 3 to 4 weeks of leave

per year.

Both DOD and State generally require the inclusion of clauses in certain

contracts that speak to a minimum of 50 square feet of space per

employee in contractor-provided housing. Contractors in our sample

reported to us that housing practices for contracts in our sample generally

fell into the following categories, which reflect efforts to combat TIP:

• Foreign workers were provided housing by the U.S. government on

U.S. installations. All of the DOD and State contractors in our sample

that were operating in Iraq or Afghanistan reported that their foreign

workers lived on-site at U.S. installations in U.S. government-provided

housing.

• Foreign workers lived in contractor-provided housing facilities that

included at least 50 square feet of living space per person, according

to the contractors. For example, on a DOD services contract in Qatar,

the contractor reported that its subcontractors provided housing for

foreign workers. See figure 2 for examples of subcontractor-provided

housing on this contract.

• Foreign workers were provided a housing stipend by the contractor,

which workers used to secure their own housing. For instance, on the

same DOD services contract in Qatar, the contractor reported that

foreign workers who did not live in subcontractor-provided housing

were given a housing stipend by the subcontractor and found their

own housing. According to a DOD official associated with this

contract, foreign workers who had families living in Qatar often choose

to take the stipend to find housing that would accommodate their

families.

• Foreign workers received no housing support from the contractor and

had to secure and pay for their housing themselves. For example, on

a DOD services contract in Bahrain, most foreign workers secured

their own housing at their own expense, according to the contractor.

Contractors Reported that

Housing Practices Reflect

Efforts to Combat TIP

Page 27 GAO-15-102 Human Trafficking

Figure 2: Examples of Subcontractor-Provided Housing for Foreign Workers on a Base Operations Support Services Contract

in Qatar

Page 28 GAO-15-102 Human Trafficking

DOD and State require the inclusion of clauses in certain contracts that

require contractors to provide workers with access to their identity

documents. DOD’s contract clause generally allows contractors to hold

employee passports only for the shortest time reasonable for

administrative processing, and State’s contract clause prohibits

contractors from destroying, concealing, confiscating, or otherwise

denying employees’ access to identity documents or passports.

Contractors reported that foreign workers on the 11 contracts in our

sample generally had access to their identity documents, such as

passports. In general, workers either maintained personal possession of

their documents or were guaranteed access to documents that they

voluntarily submitted to the contractor for safekeeping. For the majority of

contracts in our sample, the contractor reported that workers maintain

possession of their identity documents and therefore had access to them.

A DOD services contractor in Kuwait, for instance, reported that all of its

foreign workers kept possession of their identity documents, including

passports, work permits, driver’s licenses, and insurance cards. For other

contracts in our sample, contractors offered foreign workers the option to

voluntarily submit their identity documents to the contractor for

safekeeping and gave them access to their documents upon request. For

example, on a DOD services contract in Bahrain, the contractor reported

that it would hold foreign workers’ identity documents for safekeeping if

requested, but required them to sign a waiver that stated they had

voluntarily submitted the documents.

Contractors included in our sample did not report any instances of

withholding or restricting employees’ access to identity documents;

however, agency officials at two State posts we visited said that some

contractors performing smaller-scale contracts for the U.S. government

restricted access to identity documents. According to State’s 2014

Trafficking in Persons Report, withholding employees’ passports is a

common practice in these countries. State officials in Kuwait, for instance,

said that a Kuwaiti company providing janitorial services for the embassy

was found to have withheld employee passports against the employees’

will. These officials said that they removed the employees’ supervisor

from the contract when they learned of these allegations. State officials

we spoke to in Jordan reported similar allegations of passport withholding

Contractors Reported that

Foreign Workers Had Access

to Identity Documents

Page 29 GAO-15-102 Human Trafficking

against the embassy’s janitorial services contractor.

These officials

reported that they took corrective action against the contractor that

partially addressed this concern.

Under certain circumstances, DOD policy and State guidance require the

inclusion of contract clauses in certain contracts that require contractors

to provide workers with return travel upon completion of their employment

contract. Certain DOD contracts in Afghanistan are to include a clause

generally requiring contractors to return their employees to their point of

origin or home country within 30 days after the end of the contract’s

period of performance.

State’s contract clause notes that contractors are

generally responsible for repatriation of workers imported for contract

performance.

Contractors reported that they provide transportation to foreign workers to

their home countries at the conclusion of their employment on all 11

contracts in our sample. For example, on a USAID construction contract

in Afghanistan, the contractor provided return travel for all of the foreign

workers on its contract by purchasing one-way plane tickets for the

workers back to their home countries. In Bahrain, a DOD services

contractor provided each foreign worker with a range of return travel

options, including transportation to their home country, to a new

employment location, or to any other desired location, or allowed them to

stay in Bahrain and seek new employment arrangements.

On 6 of the contracts in our sample, officials stated that foreign worker

repatriation was explicitly addressed in the terms of the contract. For

example, State officials reported that a security contract in Iraq required

the contractor to provide return travel for its foreign workers and that this

requirement was discussed with the contractor at the end of the

contract.

On 5 of these 6 contracts, officials reported that the contract

also included provisions for repatriation expenses incurred by the

Although none of the contracts in our sample employed foreign workers in Jordan, we

conducted preliminary fieldwork there where we discussed embassy contracts with State

officials.

DOD, Director of Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy, DOD Class Deviation

2013-O0017, Contractor Demobilization (Aug. 30, 2013).

In 2010, DOD reported that it had discovered that some foreign workers on DOD

contracts had been left in Iraq by their previous employers.

Contractors Reported that

They Provided Foreign

Workers with Return Travel

Page 30 GAO-15-102 Human Trafficking

contractor to be reimbursable by the U.S. government. For instance,

State officials associated with a services contract in Iraq explained that

State reimbursed the contractor for repatriation expenses because Iraqi

law required all foreign workers to leave the country immediately following

the conclusion of their employment, and State wanted to ensure that

these workers returned to their home countries.

Human trafficking victimizes hundreds of thousands of men, women, and

children worldwide, including workers who move from their home

countries to seek employment overseas and improve their own and their

families’ well-being. The United States conducts diplomatic, defense, and

development activities throughout the world, including in countries with

restrictive labor practices and poor records related to trafficking in

persons. The United States has an obligation to prevent entities working

on its behalf from engaging in trafficking in persons, and when it uses

contractors to support its activities in such countries, it bears an even

greater responsibility to protect workers given the increased risk of abuse.

Accordingly, it has taken several steps to eliminate trafficking in persons

from government contracts and strengthened these efforts in 2007 with

amendments to a contract clause required on all contracts that prohibits

contractors from engaging in a variety of trafficking-related activities.

Recognizing the need for further guidance on how to implement these

regulations, agencies developed their own guidance and policy to

augment worker protections and to clarify agency and contractor

responsibilities.

The President and Congress both signaled the need for further clarity in

reducing the risk of TIP on government contracts by directing

amendments to existing regulations in 2012. While improving the

government’s ability to oversee its contractors’ labor practices is a step in

the right direction, ambiguity regarding the components and amounts of

permissible fees related to recruitment can limit the effectiveness of these

efforts. Many contractors acknowledge that their employees may have

been charged a fee for their jobs, a common practice in many countries,

but they do not know if these fees are acceptable, given the existing

guidance and policy. Some fees may appear reasonable, but others could

be exploitative or lead to debt bondage and other conditions that

contribute to trafficking. Without a more precise definition of what

constitutes a recruitment fee, agencies are hindered in effectively

determining which fees are allowed, and therefore developing effective

practices in this area.

Conclusions

Page 31 GAO-15-102 Human Trafficking

Some agencies have established systematic processes for monitoring

efforts to combat TIP on some contracts but do not monitor other

contracts for TIP, focusing rather on contractor-provided goods and

services. The lack of monitoring could inhibit agencies’ ability to detect

potential abuses of foreign workers and reflects the limited utility of

existing guidance on monitoring. Further, without consistent monitoring of

contractors’ labor practices, the U.S. government is unable to send a

clear signal to contractors, subcontractors, and foreign workers that the

U.S. government will follow through forcefully on its zero tolerance human

trafficking policy.

To help ensure agencies can more fully implement their monitoring policy

and guidance related to recruitment of foreign workers, the Secretaries of

Defense and State and the Administrator of the U.S. Agency for

International Development should each develop, as part of their agency

policy and guidance, a more precise definition of recruitment fees,

including permissible components and amounts.

To help improve agencies’ abilities to detect potential TIP abuses and

implement the U.S. government’s zero tolerance policy, the Secretaries of

Defense and State and the Administrator of the U.S. Agency for

International Development should each take actions to better ensure that

contracting officials specifically include TIP in monitoring plans and

processes, especially in areas where the risk of trafficking is high. Such

actions could include developing a process for auditing efforts to combat

TIP or ensuring that officials responsible for contract monitoring are

aware of all relevant acquisition policy and guidance on combating TIP.

We provided a draft of this product to DOD, State, and USAID for

comment. These agencies provided written comments, which are

reproduced in appendices VI through VIII.

Regarding our recommendation for agencies to develop a more precise

definition of recruitment fees as part of their policy and guidance, DOD

concurred, while State and USAID neither agreed nor disagreed. DOD

indicated that it would define recruitment fees during the next review of its

policy related to combating TIP and incorporate this requirement in

agency acquisition regulations as necessary. Such actions, if

implemented effectively, should address the intent of our

recommendation to DOD. State commented that it prohibits charging any

recruitment fees to foreign workers, and both State and USAID noted that

Recommendations for

Executive Action

Agency Comments

and Our Evaluation

Page 32 GAO-15-102 Human Trafficking

the proposed FAR rule on combating TIP would prohibit charging

employees any recruitment fees. However, even if the final FAR rule

prohibits all recruitment fees, it remains unclear whether the term

“recruitment fees” includes components such as air tickets, lodging,

passport and visa fees, and other fees that recruited individuals may be

charged before being hired. Contracting officers and agency officials with

monitoring responsibilities currently rely on policy and guidance that do

not define recruitment fees, resulting in ambiguity over what constitutes

such a fee. Without an explicit definition of what components constitute

recruitment fees, prohibited fees may be renamed and passed on to

foreign workers, increasing the risk of debt bondage and other conditions

that contribute to trafficking. State also commented that, to ensure

consistent treatment of recruitment fees across government, we should

recommend that the Office of Management and Budget draft a FAR

definition of recruitment fees. However, we believe that each agency

should have the flexibility to determine, within its implementing

regulations or policy, which components it considers to be included in the

term “recruitment fees” to address each agency’s contracting practices.

Thus we continue to believe our recommendation is valid and should be

fully implemented by State and USAID.

DOD and State concurred with our recommendation to better ensure that

contracting officials specifically include TIP in monitoring plans and

processes in areas where the risk of trafficking is high. DOD said that it

would update its FAR supplement following the publication of the final

FAR rule on combating TIP to improve the government’s oversight of

contractor compliance with TIP. State noted that it would add a

requirement to the process that contracting officer’s representatives use

to certify that they are familiar with requirements for TIP monitoring and

include verification of TIP monitoring in reviews of contracting operations.

USAID stated that all USAID staff would be required to take training in

TIP, which will be released by the end of 2014. Further, USAID said that it

will develop training for contracting officer’s representatives on how to

include combating TIP in monitoring plans, as well as training for

contracting officers to verify that efforts to combat TIP have been

appropriately included in the monitoring plans. These actions, if fully

implemented, may address the intent of our recommendation, but we

continue to believe that DOD, State, and USAID should ensure that

contracting officials specifically include TIP in monitoring plans and

processes, especially in areas where the risk of trafficking is high.

In addition, USAID stated that it would be useful to obtain further

guidance to help it and other agencies consistently determine what areas

Page 33 GAO-15-102 Human Trafficking

are considered high risk for TIP. One useful source of guidance is State’s

annual Trafficking in Persons Report, which places countries into tiers

based on the extent of their governments’ efforts to comply with the

TVPA’s minimum standards for the elimination of human trafficking. In

addition, in its written comments, State noted that it is developing a tool

for procurement and contracting officers and federal contractors to assess

the risk of TIP, expected to be completed in spring 2015.

We also received technical comments from DOD and State, which we

incorporated as appropriate.

We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional

committees, the Secretary of the Department of Defense, the Secretary of

the Department of State, the Administrator of the U.S. Agency for

International Development, and other interested parties. In addition, the

report is available at no charge on the GAO website at

http://www.gao.gov.

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact

me at (202) 512-9601 or [email protected]. Contact points for our Offices

of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last

page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this report

are listed in appendix IX.

Thomas Melito, Director

International Affairs and Trade

Page 34 GAO-15-102 Human Trafficking

List of Committees

The Honorable Tom Harkin

Chairman

The Honorable Lamar Alexander

Ranking Member

Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions

United States Senate

The Honorable Patrick Leahy

Chairman

The Honorable Chuck Grassley

Ranking Member

Committee on the Judiciary

United States Senate

The Honorable John Kline

Chairman

The Honorable George Miller

Ranking Member

Committee on Education and the Workforce

House of Representatives

The Honorable Bob Goodlatte

Chairman

The Honorable John Conyers, Jr.

Ranking Member

Committee on the Judiciary

House of Representatives

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and

Methodology

Page 35 GAO-15-102 Human Trafficking

This report responds to a requirement included in the Violence Against

Women Reauthorization Act of 2013 for GAO to report on the use of

foreign workers both overseas and domestically, including those

employed on U.S. government contracts.

Our objectives were to

examine (1) policies and guidance governing the recruitment of foreign

workers and the fees these workers may pay to secure work on U.S.

government contracts overseas and (2) agencies’ monitoring of contractor

efforts to combat TIP.

This report focuses on Department of Defense (DOD), Department of

State (State), and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID)

contracts with performance in countries with large percentages of

migrants as compared with local nationals,

and in Afghanistan and Iraq,

where U.S. government contractors employ significant numbers of foreign

workers. We selected a nongeneralizable sample of 11 contracts based

on the contracts’ place of performance, value, type of service provided,

and the number of foreign workers employed. Specifically, we obtained a

list of all contracts in the Federal Procurement Data System based on the

following criteria:

• The contract was awarded by DOD, State, or USAID.

• The contract’s completion date was on or after October 1, 2013.

• The contract’s place of performance was in a country with a large

portion of migrants, according to data from the United Nations, or was

in Afghanistan or Iraq.

• The contract’s product or service code indicated that the contract was

for services, construction, or security—areas that were likely to

include low-wage, low-skilled labor, because these types of jobs may

be associated with a higher risk of TIP.

We narrowed this list to reflect a range of agencies, countries, and

services. We compared this list with data provided by DOD, State, and

USAID through the Synchronized Pre-deployment and Operational

Tracker (SPOT) database at the end of fiscal year 2013 to identify

contracts that employed large numbers of foreign workers. On the basis

of this comparison, we selected 11 contracts that represent nearly one-

third of all reported foreign workers employed on contracts awarded by

Pub. L. No. 113-4, § 1235.

We used data on migrants as a proxy for the number of foreign workers, as data on

foreign workers were unavailable.

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and

Methodology

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and

Methodology

Page 36 GAO-15-102 Human Trafficking

these three agencies as reported in SPOT. Our previous work has

described several data limitations related to SPOT,

but we determined

that these data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of identifying

and selecting contracts employing large numbers of foreign workers for

in-depth review. Table 4 provides basic information on the selected

contracts.

In 2011, we reported that it is unclear when SPOT will serve as a reliable source of data

to meet statutory requirements and be used by agencies for management, oversight, and

coordination of contracts (GAO, Iraq and Afghanistan: DOD, State, and USAID Cannot

Fully Account for Contracts, Assistance Instruments, and Associated Personnel,

GAO-11-886 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 15, 2011)). In 2012, we reported that the agencies

had made improvements to their contractor personnel data and related systems that could

result in more reliable data, but data comparability across years and agencies was limited

(GAO, Iraq and Afghanistan: Agencies Are Taking Steps to Improve Data on Contracting

but Need to Standardize Reporting, GAO-12-977R (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 12, 2012)).

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and

Methodology

Page 37 GAO-15-102 Human Trafficking

Table 4: GAO Sample of U.S. Government Contracts Employing Foreign Workers Overseas

Contract name

Contracting

agency

Place of

performance

Services

provided

Total obligations

as of fiscal year

2014 (Dollars in

millions)

Peak

number of

foreign

workers

Logistics Civil Augmentation Program IV, Task

Order 5 (Afghanistan)

DOD/Army Afghanistan Facilities

support

$8,714 9,807

Field and Installation Readiness Support Team

DOD/Army Afghanistan Facilities

support

$1,417 3,658

Army Pre-positioned Stocks-5 DOD/Army Kuwait Facilities

support

$1,022 2,570

Qatar - Base Operations Support Services DOD/Army Qatar Facilities

support

$174 650

Logistics Civil Augmentation Program IV, Task

Order 5 (Bahrain)

DOD/Army Bahrain Facilities

support

$48 323

Coalition Compound Construction DOD/U.S. Army

Corps of

Engineers

Qatar Construction $45 391

Full Line Food and Beverage Support DOD/Defense

Logistics Agency

Kuwait/Iraq/

Jordan

Food

services

$1,092 1,889

Worldwide Protective Services-Baghdad State Iraq Security $608 1,410

Operations and Maintenance Support Services State Iraq Facilities

support

$150 432

Embassy Doha Local Guard Force State Qatar Security $6 70

Kandahar-Helmand Power Project USAID Afghanistan Construction $227 41

Sources: Department of Defense (DOD), Department of State (State), and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). Data on foreign workers provided by contractors. | GAO-15-102

Contract value at time of award.

To examine the recruitment of foreign workers and the fees they might

pay to secure work on U.S. government contracts overseas, we

conducted structured interviews with agency officials and contractors

responsible for the contracts in our sample to identify, among other

things, the relevant laws, regulations in the Federal Acquisition

Regulation (FAR), agency acquisition policies, and agency acquisition

guidance related to contractor recruitment practices. We reviewed these

laws, regulations, policies, and guidance, as well as the Trafficking

Victims Protection Act

and Executive Order 13627

—Strengthening

Pub. L. No. 106-386, Div. A, 114 Stat. 1464, 1466-1491, as amended.

77 Fed. Reg. 60,029 (Oct. 12, 2012).

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and

Methodology

Page 38 GAO-15-102 Human Trafficking

Protections Against Trafficking in Persons in Federal Contracts—which

include additional requirements related to the recruitment of workers on

U.S. government contracts. We also obtained detailed information from

contractors performing the contracts in our sample about their recruitment

practices through structured interviews, and, in some cases, we

interviewed subcontractors who recruited and employed foreign workers

regarding their practices. In addition, we reviewed DOD and State

Inspector General reports to identify instances where foreign workers

have reported paying recruitment fees. We conducted site visits in

Afghanistan, Kuwait, and Qatar to interview DOD, State, and USAID

officials, including personnel responsible for contract monitoring,

contractors, subcontractors, host government officials, and

nongovernmental organizations about the recruitment of foreign workers

in these countries. We chose these countries based on the range of U.S.

government activities in these countries, the prevalence of foreign

workers, and State’s assessment of the host government’s efforts to

combat TIP as indicated by State’s annual Trafficking in Persons Report

tier placement. We also spoke with State and USAID officials in Jordan

during preliminary fieldwork to inform our research design and

methodology.

On the contract employing the largest number of foreign workers in our

sample, we obtained data from the contractor detailing cases of workers

reporting that they had paid for their job. These data, collected from

September 2012 through April 2014, included 2,534 reports of workers

having paid for their jobs, and to whom, when, and where these reported

payments were made. We analyzed these data to determine the number

of unique individuals who had reported paying for their jobs. We then

compared the data on who received these payments with a list of

recruitment agencies provided by the subcontractor to determine if

workers reported paying fees to recruitment agencies with which the

subcontractor had agreements. We also obtained data from the

contractor listing the monthly salaries in April 2014 of workers who had

reported, in April 2014, having paid for their job at some point in the past.

We then compared these data with the amount these workers reported

having paid to determine the range and average number of months

required for workers to earn the amount they reported having paid for

We did not interview foreign workers as part of this review, because doing so in a

rigorous and systematic way would have been impractical and excessively labor-intensive.

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and

Methodology

Page 39 GAO-15-102 Human Trafficking

their job. We analyzed these data to calculate the mean, median, and

mode of the reported fees for April 2014. We assessed the reliability of

the survey data by interviewing knowledgeable officials, including the

contractor and subcontractor, and analyzing the data for outliers and

duplicate records. We found these data sufficiently reliable to show that

workers reported having paid for their jobs and that these payments were

made to several recruitment agencies that supplied workers for this

contract; and to calculate the number of months’ reported salary required

to pay for the reported fee.

To assess agencies’ monitoring of contractor labor practices affecting

foreign workers, we obtained information through our structured

interviews regarding housing, wages and hours, access to identity

documents, and return travel for foreign workers on contracts in our

sample. We selected these practices because they were mentioned

explicitly in either or both an amendment to the Trafficking Victims

Protection Act, contained in the National Defense Authorization Act for

Fiscal Year 2013,

and Executive Order 13627—Strengthening

Protections Against Trafficking in Persons in Federal Contracts—and

were included in a list of potential indicators of trafficking in persons (TIP)

by the International Labour Organization (ILO). We analyzed information

from DOD and State officials regarding their monitoring processes for

these practices, including monitoring checklists and audit procedures for

combating TIP provided by the Defense Contract Management Agency.

We conducted site visits to contractor-provided housing for foreign

workers on 2 contracts in our sample during our fieldwork in Kuwait and

Qatar. In these countries and in Afghanistan, we interviewed DOD and

State officials; contractors; and, in some cases, subcontractors about

labor practices related to foreign workers on the contracts in our sample.

We also met with DOD and State officials responsible for monitoring

contracts to discuss their efforts to monitor contracts in our sample for

potential TIP abuses. We reviewed relevant laws, regulations in the FAR,

agency acquisition policies, and agency acquisition guidance related to

contractor labor practices and agencies’ responsibilities for monitoring

these practices. We also reviewed training requirements for acquisition

personnel related to monitoring for TIP abuses and discussed existing

and planned training with DOD and State officials.

Pub. L. No. 112-239, § 1702.

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and

Methodology

Page 40 GAO-15-102 Human Trafficking

We also reviewed relevant studies and reports on TIP and foreign

workers, including reports by DOD’s and State’s Inspectors General, the

United Nations, the International Labour Organization, and

nongovernmental organizations. We reviewed the methodologies used to

conduct these studies and, for those that we used to corroborate our

findings, we determined that they were sufficiently reliable for that

purpose.

We conducted this performance audit from June 2013 to November 2014

in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain

sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our

findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that

the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and

conclusions based on our audit objectives.

Appendix II: International Definitions and

Indicators of Trafficking in Persons

Page 41 GAO-15-102 Human Trafficking

In the United Nations’ Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish

Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, Supplementing

the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime,

trafficking in persons is defined as the recruitment, transportation,

transfer, harboring, or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of

force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of

the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or

receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person

having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation.

In addition, the ILO has developed a list of indicators of trafficking for

labor exploitation.

These indicators specify several indicators of

deceptive or coercive recruitment, recruitment by abuse of vulnerability,

exploitation, and coercion or abuse of vulnerability at the destination. For

example, these indicators include

• deception about travel and recruitment conditions,

• confiscation of documents,

• debt bondage,

• excessive working days or hours, and

• no respect for labor laws or signed contracts.

This agreement, also known as the Palermo Protocol, seeks to prevent and combat

trafficking in persons, protect and assist victims of trafficking , and promote cooperation

among Parties in order to meet these objectives. The protocol supplements the U.N.

Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime. It was opened for signature in

Palermo, Italy, in December 2000. The United States became a party to this protocol in

December 2005.

The term “exploitation” in the protocol is further defined to include, at a minimum, the

exploitation of the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labor

or services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or removal of organs.

ILO, Operational Indicators of Trafficking in Human Beings (Geneva: March 2009,

revised September 2009).

Appendix II: International Definitions and

Indicators of Trafficking in Persons

Appendix III: Migrant Workers in Gulf

Countries

Page 42 GAO-15-102 Human Trafficking

Migrants, such as foreign workers, from many countries seek employment

in the Gulf region.

In 2013, the top five source countries of international

migrants to Gulf countries were India, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Egypt, and

the Philippines (see table 5). Growing labor forces in source countries

provide an increasing supply of low-cost workers for employers in the Gulf

and other host countries where, according to the International Labour

Organization (ILO), demand for foreign labor is high.

Table 5: Number of Migrants in Gulf Countries from Each of the Top Five Source Countries in 2013

Source country

Host country

Total Bahrain Kuwait Oman Qatar Saudi Arabia

United Arab

Emirates

India 262,855 730,558 644,704 576,776 1,761,857 2,852,207 6,828,957

Bangladesh 100,444 279,169 148,314 220,403 1,309,004 1,089,917 3,147,251

Pakistan 87,892 244,281 117,208 192,860 1,319,607 953,708 2,915,556

Egypt 65,607 182,342 41,365 143,960 1,298,388 711,894 2,443,556

Philippines 43,971 122,214 21,669 96,487 1,028,802 477,139 1,790,282

Rest of the world 168,588 469,489 138,772 370,469 2,342,775 1,742,116 5,232,209

Total 729,357 2,028,053 1,112,032 1,600,955 9,060,433 7,826,981 22,357,811

Source: United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs. Trends in International Migrant Stock: the 2013 revision. | GAO-15-102

Economic conditions and disparities in per capita income between source

and host countries encourage foreign workers to leave their countries to

seek employment. In 2012, average per capita income in the six Gulf

countries was nearly 25 times higher than average income per capita in

the top five source countries, and some differences between individual

countries were even more dramatic, according to the World Bank. For

example, in 2012, annual per capita income in Qatar was more than

$58,000, nearly 100 times higher than in Bangladesh, where per capita

income was almost $600. Foreign workers in Gulf countries send billions

of dollars in remittances to their home countries annually. For example, in

2012 the World Bank estimated that migrant workers from the top five

source countries sent home almost $60 billion from the Gulf countries,

For the purposes of this report, we use the term “Gulf countries” to refer to the six

member states of the Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf, also known as

the Gulf Cooperation Council. These states are Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi

Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates.

Appendix III: Migrant Workers in Gulf

Countries

Migrants from Source

Countries in Asia and

Africa Move to Gulf

Countries for Economic

Reasons

Appendix III: Migrant Workers in Gulf

Countries

Page 43 GAO-15-102 Human Trafficking

including nearly $33 billion to India, nearly $10 billion to Egypt, and nearly

$7 billion to Pakistan.

Source countries regulate the recruitment of their nationals for overseas

employment in a variety of ways. According to relevant regulatory

agencies in their countries, some source countries, such as India and the

Philippines, have a licensing process for recruitment agencies and require

potential overseas employers to use only licensed recruiters. According to

these agencies, these countries also permit recruiters to charge

prospective migrant workers a fee in specified circumstances but limit the

amount of this fee. For example, according to the Indian Ministry of

Overseas Indian Affairs, India’s Emigration Act and Rules detail

requirements for the registration of recruiters, prohibit the use of

subagents, prescribe the emigration clearance process, and permit

registered recruiters to charge migrant workers fees up to 20,000 rupees,

currently about $325, for their services. Similarly, according to the

Philippines Overseas Employment Administration, the government of the

Philippines facilitates the emigration of Filipino workers employed abroad

and provides standards and oversight through licensing, required contract

provisions, and placement fees. Filipino embassies in host countries also

provide services for its citizens in those countries, such as assistance

establishing bank accounts and wiring money home and information

regarding worker rights in the host country, according to the Filipino Labor

Attaché in Qatar. According to the Bangladeshi Ministry of Expatriates’

Welfare and Overseas Employment, the ministry was established in 2001

to ensure the overall welfare of migrant workers and has established a

process for licensing recruitment agents. Other countries, such as Egypt,

do not regulate overseas recruitment, lacking a licensing process for

recruiters and regulations on the amount of fees that these recruiters may

charge, according to the Egyptian Ministry of Manpower and Emigration.

The ILO has reported that in Gulf countries, several common and

restrictive labor practices stem from the Kafala sponsorship system of

foreign workers.

According to the ILO, the Kafala system is a

World Bank staff calculation based on data from the International Monetary Fund

Balance of Payments Statistics database and data releases from central banks, national

statistical agencies, and World Bank country desks.

ILO, Tricked and Trapped: Human Trafficking in the Middle East (Beirut: April 2013).

Source Country

Regulation of Overseas

Employment

Host Country Labor

Practices

Appendix III: Migrant Workers in Gulf

Countries

Page 44 GAO-15-102 Human Trafficking

sponsorship system whereby a foreign worker is employed in a Gulf

country by a specific employer that controls the worker’s residency,

immigration, and employment status. Under this system, employers meet

their demand for labor either by direct recruitment or through the use of

recruitment agents who find foreign workers. The system generally ties

workers’ residency and immigration status to the employer, which can

prevent workers from changing employers and limit their freedom of

movement, according to the ILO. The ILO further stated that sponsors

can also prohibit workers from leaving the country and have the right to

terminate workers’ employment contracts and have residency permits

canceled. According to State’s Qatar 2013 Human Rights Report,

international media and human rights organizations alleged numerous

abuses against foreign workers, including a sponsorship system that gave

employers an inordinate level of control over foreign workers.

In addition to the labor practices associated with the Kafala system, the

withholding of workers’ passports is an additional restrictive labor practice

common in many Gulf countries. For example, State reported that in

Qatar, despite laws prohibiting the withholding of foreign workers’ identity

documents, employers withheld the passports of a large portion of their

foreign workers in that country. According to State’s most recent

Trafficking in Persons Report, the withholding of foreign workers’

passports contributes to the potential for trafficking in persons (TIP).

Furthermore, the ILO has reported that employers in Gulf countries may

refuse to release workers or may charge high fees for release, withhold

wages as security to prevent workers from running away, and withhold

personal travel documents.

The ILO also found that workers in these

countries may be subjected to forced overtime, limited freedom of

movement, degrading living and working conditions, and physical

violence and threats. Overall, the ILO estimated that there were 600,000

victims of forced labor in the Middle East at any given point in time

between 2002 and 2011.

Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, Country Reports

on Human Rights Practices for 2013: Qatar (Washington, D.C.: 2013).

ILO, Tricked and Trapped.

ILO, Global Estimate of Forced Labour: Results and Methodology (Geneva: 2012).

Appendix IV: Federal Acquisition Regulations

and Agency Policy and Guidance Related to

Contractor Recruitment and Labor Practices

Page 45 GAO-15-102 Human Trafficking

The Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) requires all solicitations and

contracts to include Clause 52.222-50, Combating Trafficking in Persons

(TIP). This clause includes a prohibition on contractors engaging in

severe forms of TIP, which includes the recruitment, harboring,

transportation, provision or obtaining of a person for labor or services,

through the use of force, fraud, or coercion for the purpose of subjection

to involuntary servitude, peonage, debt bondage, or slavery. However,

the clause contains no further provisions related to recruitment or other

labor practices discussed in this report. The Department of Defense

(DOD), Department of State (State), and the U.S. Agency for International

Development (USAID) have developed policy and guidance that provides

more specificity on these practices, as outlined in table 6.

In September 2013, amendments to the FAR were proposed to implement the

requirements of the 2013 amendments to the Trafficking Victims Protection Act (TVPA)

and the executive order related to strengthening protections against TIP. 78 Fed. Reg.

59,317 (Sept. 26, 2013).

Appendix IV: Federal Acquisition Regulations

and Agency Policy and Guidance Related to

Contractor Recruitment and Labor Practices

Appendix IV: Federal Acquisition Regulations

and Agency Policy and Guidance Related to

Contractor Recruitment and Labor Practices

Page 46 GAO-15-102 Human Trafficking

Table 6: Agency Policy and Guidance Related to Recruitment and Labor Practices on U.S. Government Contracts

DOD State USAID

Citation U.S. Central Command-Joint

Theater Support Contracting

Command (C-JTSCC) Acquisition

Instruction

Procurement Information Bulletin No.

2012-10,

Contractor Recruitment of Third-Country

Nationals

Procurement Executive’s

Bulletin No. 2012-07, Combating

Trafficking in Persons

contract

clause

U.S. Central Command

(CENTCOM) contracts for services

or construction that require

performance in Afghanistan are to

include C-JTSCC Clause 5152.222-

5900, Prohibition Against Human

Trafficking, Inhumane Living

Conditions, and Withholding of

Employee Passports (August 2011).

All solicitations and contracts valued over

$150,000 requiring nonprofessional labor

where contract performance will require

recruitment of third-country national labor

specifically for contract performance must

include contract clause “Recruitment of Third

Country National for Performance on

Department of State Contracts” (October

2012).

Recruitment Contractors shall not utilize

unlicensed recruiting firms or firms

that charge illegal recruiting fees.

Requires offerors to submit a recruitment plan

as part of the proposal. This plan should

include, for example, the following elements:

State in the offer that the recruited employee

will not be charged recruitment or any similar

fees. The contractor or employer pays the

recruitment fees for the worker if recruited by

the contractor or subcontractor to work

specifically on Department of State jobs.

State in the offer that the contractor’s

recruitment practices comply with recruiting

nation and host country labor laws.

Contractor and subcontractors shall only use

bona fide licensed recruitment companies.

Recruitment companies shall only use bona

fide employees and not independent agents.

No specific provisions

Wages,

hours,

leave, and

overtime

Contractors shall provide

employees with a signed copy of

their employment contract, in

English and the employee’s native

language, that defines the terms of

their employment and

compensation.

Contractors shall provide employees with

signed copies of the/their employment

contracts, in English and the employee’s native

language, that define the terms of employment,

compensation including, for example, salary,

overtime rates, allowances, and salary

increases.

Contracting officers to tell

implementing partners that they

should explain to employees

when it must make deductions

from wages.

Appendix IV: Federal Acquisition Regulations

and Agency Policy and Guidance Related to

Contractor Recruitment and Labor Practices

Page 47 GAO-15-102 Human Trafficking

DOD State USAID

Housing Contractors shall be required to

provide adequate living conditions

(sanitation, health, safety, living

space) for their employees. Fifty

square feet is the minimum

acceptable square footage of

personal living space per employee.

The offeror will submit a housing plan if the

contractor intends to provide employer

furnished housing for third country nationals.

The housing plan must describe the location

and description of the proposed housing.

Contractors must state in their offer that

housing meets host country housing and safety

standards and local codes or explain any

variance. Contractor shall comply with any

temporary labor camp standards contained in

this contract. In contracts without a temporary

labor camp standard, 50 square feet is the

minimum amount of space per person without

a contracting officer waiver. Contractor shall

submit proposed changes to their housing plan

to the contracting officer for approval.

No specific provisions

Access to

identity

documents

Contractors shall only hold

employee passports and other

identification documents for the

shortest period of time reasonable

for administrative processing

purposes.

Contractor may not destroy, conceal,

confiscate, or otherwise deny access to an

employee’s identity documents or passports.

Contractors and subcontractors are reminded

of the prohibition contained in Title 18, United

States Code, Section 1592, against knowingly

destroying, concealing, removing, confiscating,

or possessing any actual or purported passport

or other immigration document to prevent or

restrict the person’s liberty to move or travel in

order to maintain the services of that person,

when the person is or has been a victim of a

severe form of trafficking in persons.

Contractor must be familiar with any local labor

law restrictions on withholding employee

identification documentation.

Contracting officers must tell the

contractor that it must not

withhold employee passports or

visas without employee

permission.

Return

travel

No specific provisions Contractor and subcontractors shall comply

with sending and receiving nation laws

regarding transit, entry, exit, visas, and work

permits. Contractors are responsible for

repatriation of workers imported for contract

performance except an employee legally

permitted to remain in the country of work and

who chooses to do so; or an employee who is

a victim of trafficking seeking victim services or

legal redress in the country of employment or a

witness in a trafficking-related enforcement

action.

No specific provisions

Source: GAO analysis of C-JTSCC Acquisition Instruction, State Procurement Information Bulletin 2012-10, and USAID Procurement Executive’s Bulletin 2012-07. | GAO-15-102

Certain non-CENTCOM contracts with performance in Afghanistan are also to include this clause.

See, e.g., Contracting Officer’s Guide for Theater Business Clearance Afghanistan (Aug. 31, 2013).

Contractors submit recruitment and housing plans as appropriate. Contracts shall only be awarded to

contractors submitting acceptable plans.

Once a contractor is chosen for award, and its offer is accepted by the government, the terms of the

offer generally become binding.

Appendix IV: Federal Acquisition Regulations

and Agency Policy and Guidance Related to

Contractor Recruitment and Labor Practices

Page 48 GAO-15-102 Human Trafficking

Another Department of Defense (DOD) policy requires certain DOD contracts in Afghanistan to

include a clause generally requiring contractors to return their employees to their point of origin or

home country within 30 days after the end of the contract’s period of performance. DOD Class

Deviation 2013-O0017, Contractor Demobilization (Aug. 30, 2013).

Appendix V: Sample Defense Contract

Management Agency Universal Examination

Record for Combating Trafficking in Persons,

May 2011

Page 49 GAO-15-102 Human Trafficking

Appendix V: Sample Defense Contract

Management Agency Universal Examination

Record for Combating Trafficking in Persons, May

2011

Appendix V: Sample Defense Contract

Management Agency Universal Examination

Record for Combating Trafficking in Persons,

May 2011

Page 50 GAO-15-102 Human Trafficking

Source: Defense Contract Management Agency, Afghanistan. | GAO-15-102

Appendix VI: Comments from the Department

of Defense

Page 51 GAO-15-102 Human Trafficking

Appendix VI: Comments from the

Department of Defense

Appendix VI: Comments from the Department

of Defense

Page 52 GAO-15-102 Human Trafficking

Appendix VII: Comments from the Department

of State

Page 53 GAO-15-102 Human Trafficking

Appendix VII: Comments from the

Department of State

Appendix VII: Comments from the Department

of State

Page 54 GAO-15-102 Human Trafficking

See comment 2.

See comment 1.

Appendix VII: Comments from the Department

of State

Page 55 GAO-15-102 Human Trafficking

Appendix VII: Comments from the Department

of State

Page 56 GAO-15-102 Human Trafficking

The following are GAO’s comments on the Department of State letter dated October

31, 2014.

1. State said that we should direct our recommendation to develop a more precise

definition of recruitment fees to the Office of Management and Budget. We

believe that each agency should have the flexibility to determine, within its

implementing regulations, which items it considers to be included in the term

“recruitment fees” to address each agency’s contracting practices.

2. State noted that the new regulations that will amend the Federal Acquisition

Regulation will prohibit charging employees recruitment fees. As our report

notes, even if the final FAR rule prohibits all recruitment fees, it remains unclear

whether the term “recruitment fees” includes items such as air tickets, lodging,

passport and visa fees, and other fees that recruited individuals may be charged

before being hired. Contracting officers and agency officials with monitoring

responsibilities currently rely on policy and guidance regarding recruitment fees

that are ambiguous. Without an explicit definition of the components of

recruitment fees, prohibited fees may be renamed and passed on to foreign

workers, increasing the risk of debt bondage and other conditions that contribute

to trafficking.

GAO Comments

Appendix VIII: Comments from the U.S.

Agency for International Development

Page 57 GAO-15-102 Human Trafficking

Appendix VIII: Comments from the U.S.

Agency for International Development

Appendix VIII: Comments from the U.S.

Agency for International Development

Page 58 GAO-15-102 Human Trafficking

See comment 2.

See comment 1.

Appendix VIII: Comments from the U.S. Agency for

International Development

Page 59 GAO-15-102 Human Trafficking

The following are GAO’s comments on the U.S. Agency for International

Development letter dated November 5, 2014.

1. USAID stated that the final draft Federal Acquisition Regulation rule contained

language that would prohibit charging contractor employees any recruitment fees

and therefore USAID did not see any need to establish any policy or guidance

that provides a "more precise definition of recruitment fees, including permissible

components and amounts." As our report notes, even if the final FAR rule

prohibits all recruitment fees, it remains unclear whether the term “recruitment

fees” includes items such as air tickets, lodging, passport and visa fees, and

other fees that recruited individuals may be charged before being hired.

Contracting officers and agency officials with monitoring responsibilities currently

rely on policy and guidance regarding recruitment fees that are ambiguous.

Without an explicit definition of the components of recruitment fees, prohibited

fees may be renamed and passed on to foreign workers, increasing the risk of

debt bondage and other conditions that contribute to trafficking.

2. USAID said that it would be useful to obtain further guidance on the

recommendation to take actions to better ensure that contracting officials

specifically include TIP in monitoring plans and processes in areas where the

"risk of trafficking is high." One useful source of guidance is State’s annual

Trafficking in Persons Report, which places countries into tiers based on the

extent of their governments’ efforts to comply with the TVPA’s minimum

standards for the elimination of human trafficking. In addition, in its written

comments, State noted that it is developing a tool for procurement and

contracting officers and federal contractors to assess the risk of TIP, expected to

be completed in the spring of 2015.

GAO Comments

Appendix IX: GAO Contact and Staff

Acknowledgments

Page 60 GAO-15-102 Human Trafficking

Thomas Melito, (202) 512-9601

In addition to the individual named above, Leslie Holen, Assistant

Director; J. Robert Ball; Gergana Danailova-Trainor; Brian Egger; Justine

Lazaro; Jillian Schofield; and Gwyneth Woolwine made key contributions

to this report. Lynn Cothern, Etana Finkler, Grace Lui, Walter Vance,

Shana Wallace, and Alyssa Weir provided technical assistance.

Appendix IX: GAO Contact and Staff

Acknowledgments

GAO Contact

Staff

Acknowledgments

Related GAO Products

Page 61 GAO-15-102 Human Trafficking

International Labor Grants: DOL’s Use of Financial and Performance

Monitoring Tools Needs to Be Strengthened. GAO-14-832. Washington,

D.C.: September 24, 2014.

International Labor Grants: Labor Should Improve Management of Key

Award Documentation. GAO-14-493. Washington, D.C.: May 15, 2014.

Human Rights: U.S. Government’s Efforts to Address Alleged Abuse of

Household Workers by Foreign Diplomats with Immunity Could Be

Strengthened. GAO-08-892. Washington, D.C.: July 29, 2008.

Human Trafficking: Monitoring and Evaluation of International Projects

Are Limited, but Experts Suggest Improvements. GAO-07-1034.

Washington, D.C.: July 26, 2007.

Human Trafficking: Better Data, Strategy, and Reporting Needed to

Enhance U.S. Antitrafficking Efforts Abroad. GAO-06-825. Washington,

D.C.: July 18, 2006.

Related GAO Products

(320985)

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