A Report of the CSIS International Security Program
e First Battle of the Next War
Wargaming a Chinese Invasion of Taiwan
AUTHORS
Mark F. Cancian
Matthew Cancian
Eric Heginbotham
JANUARY
e First Battle of the Next War
Wargaming a Chinese Invasion of Taiwan
AUTHORS
Mark F. Cancian
Matthew Cancian
Eric Heginbotham
JANUARY
A Report of the CSIS International Security Program
III | The First Battle of the Next War
About CSIS
e Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) is a bipartisan, nonprofit policy research
organization dedicated to advancing practical ideas to address the world’s greatest challenges.
omas J. Pritzker was named chairman of the CSIS Board of Trustees in 2015, succeeding former U.S.
senator Sam Nunn (D-GA). Founded in 1962, CSIS is led by John J. Hamre, who has served as president
and chief executive ocer since 2000.
CSIS’s purpose is to define the future of national security. We are guided by a distinct set of values—
nonpartisanship, independent thought, innovative thinking, cross-disciplinary scholarship, integrity
and professionalism, and talent development. CSIS’s values work in concert toward the goal of making
real-world impact.
CSIS scholars bring their policy expertise, judgment, and robust networks to their research, analysis,
and recommendations. We organize conferences, publish, lecture, and make media appearances that
aim to increase the knowledge, awareness, and salience of policy issues with relevant stakeholders and
the interested public.
CSIS has impact when our research helps to inform the decisionmaking of key policymakers and the
thinking of key influencers. We work toward a vision of a safer and more prosperous world.
CSIS does not take specific policy positions; accordingly, all views expressed herein should be
understood to be solely those of the author(s).
© 2023 by the Center for Strategic and International Studies. All rights reserved.
Center for Strategic & International Studies
1616 Rhode Island Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20036
202-887-0200 | www.csis.org
IV | Cancian, Cancian, and Heginbotham
Acknowledgments
is project was funded by a grant from the Smith Richardson Foundation.
e authors would like to thank Robert Maxwell, who did extensive research for the project and helped
coordinate the running of the wargame iterations, Meg Kurosawa, who helped with research and
drafting the final report, and Michael Lowrey, who provided excellent data for operations research on
U-boat losses.
e authors thank the many wargame players who took a day out of their busy schedules to participate
in a game iteration. ey not only played the game, thus providing the data on which this research
is based, but also provided constructive feedback to improve the game mechanics and to identify
strategic insights arising from game play. e project further thanks working group members and
reviewers—inside and outside CSIS—who answered questions, read the draft, and provided valuable
comments. e contributions of all these participants improved the research and final report, but the
content presented here, including any errors, remains solely the responsibility of the authors.
Note on Technical Data
is report contains extensive discussion of the wargame that constituted the foundation for this
research project. Nevertheless, length limitations prevented discussion of all the many technical
details behind the wargame. Readers interested in these details can contact the project’s principal
investigators.
Appendix A details the wargame scenarios.
Appendix B contains a lexicon of relevant wargaming terms.
Appendix C contains a list of acronyms and abbreviations used in this report.
V | The First Battle of the Next War
Contents
Executive Summary 1
The Challenge 1
The Results 2
Conditions for Success 2
Avoiding a Pyrrhic Victory 3
Chapter 1: Why This Project? The Need for Transparent Analysis of a Taiwan Contingency 6
China’s Economic and Military Rise 6
Taiwan Is the Most Dangerous U.S.-China Flashpoint 9
Increasing Worries about an Imminent Chinese Attack 12
Parallels and Dierences with the War in Ukraine 15
Limitations of Currently Available Models, Assessments, and Wargames 16
Chapter 2: Wargaming as a Method 23
Quantitative Models vs. Qualitative Judgments 23
Dierent Wargames for Dierent Purposes 26
Principles of Analytic Wargaming 28
Chapter 3: Building the Taiwan Operational Wargame 40
The Question of Classified Data 41
Philosophy of the Base Model 43
The Taiwan Operational Wargame 44
Sensitivity Analysis 51
Chapter 4: Assumptions―Base Cases and Excursion Cases 52
Grand Strategic Assumptions: Political Context and Decision 54
Strategic Assumptions: Orders of Battle, Mobilization, and Rules of Engagement 64
Operational and Tactical Assumptions: Competence, Weapons, and Infrastructure 73
Chapter 5: Results 83
Key Outcome: Taiwanese Autonomy 84
Base Scenario 85
Pessimistic Scenarios 89
Optimistic Scenarios 93
Taiwan Stands Alone 96
Ragnarok 98
Summary 101
VI | Cancian, Cancian, and Heginbotham
Why Are These Results Dierent from Classified DOD Games? 102
Chapter 6: How Does the War Play Out? 106
The Situation on Taiwan 106
The Bloody Air and Maritime Battle 111
Chapter 7: Recommendations 116
Politics and Strategy 116
Doctrine and Posture 125
Weapons and Platforms 132
Chapter 8: Conclusion—Victory Is Not Everything 142
Appendix A: Scenarios 146
Appendix B: Wargaming Lexicon 151
Appendix C: Abbreviations and Acronyms 153
About the Authors 157
1 | The First Battle of the Next War
W
hat would happen if China attempted an amphibious invasion of Taiwan? CSIS developed a
wargame for a Chinese amphibious invasion of Taiwan and ran it 24 times. In most scenarios,
the United States/Taiwan/Japan defeated a conventional amphibious invasion by China and
maintained an autonomous Taiwan. However, this defense came at high cost. e United States and
its allies lost dozens of ships, hundreds of aircraft, and tens of thousands of servicemembers. Taiwan
saw its economy devastated. Further, the high losses damaged the U.S. global position for many years.
China also lost heavily, and failure to occupy Taiwan might destabilize Chinese Communist Party rule.
Victory is therefore not enough. e United States needs to strengthen deterrence immediately.
The Challenge
China’s leaders have become increasingly strident about unifying Taiwan with the People’s Republic
of China (PRC).1 Senior U.S. ocials and civilian experts alike have expressed concern about Chinese
intentions and the possibility of conflict. Although Chinese plans are unclear, a military invasion is not
out of the question and would constitute China’s most dangerous solution to its “Taiwan problem”; it
has therefore justly become a focus of U.S. national security discourse.
Because “a Taiwan contingency is the pacing scenario” for the U.S. military, it is critical to have a
1 e project uses “China” to refer to the People’s Republic of China, recognizing that many on Taiwan consider
themselves Chinese also.
Executive Summary
2 | Cancian, Cancian, and Heginbotham
shared, rigorous, and transparent understanding of the operational dynamics of such an invasion.
2
Just
as such an understanding was developed concerning the Cold War’s Fulda Gap, so too must analysts
consider the Taiwan invasion scenario. is understanding is important because U.S. policy would be
radically dierent if the defense were hopeless than if successful defense were achievable. If Taiwan
can defend itself from China without U.S. assistance, then there is no reason to tailor U.S. strategy
to such a contingency. At the other extreme, if no amount of U.S. assistance can save Taiwan from
a Chinese invasion, then the United States should not mount a quixotic eort to defend the island.
However, if U.S. intervention can thwart an invasion under certain conditions and by relying on
certain key capabilities, then U.S. policy should be shaped accordingly. In this way, China would also
be more likely to be deterred from an invasion in the first place. However, such shaping of U.S. strategy
requires policymakers to have a shared understanding of the problem.
Yet, there is no rigorous, open-source analysis of the operational dynamics and outcomes of an
invasion despite its critical nature. Previous unclassified analyses either focus on one aspect of an
invasion, are not rigorously structured, or do not focus on military operations. Classified wargames are
not transparent to the public. Without a suitable analysis, public debate will remain unanchored.
erefore, this CSIS project designed a wargame using historical data and operations research to model
a Chinese amphibious invasion of Taiwan in 2026. Some rules were designed using analogies with
past military operations; for example, the Chinese amphibious lift was based on analysis of Normandy,
Okinawa, and the Falklands. Other rules were based on theoretical weapons performance data, such as
determining the number of ballistic missiles required to cover an airport. Most rules combined these
two methods. In this way, the results of combat in the wargame were determined by analytically based
rules instead of by personal judgment. e same set of rules applied to the first iteration and to the last
iteration, ensuring consistency.
Based on interviews and a literature review, the project posited a “base scenario” that incorporated the
most likely values for key assumptions. e project team ran that base scenario three times. A variety
of excursion cases then explored the eects of varying assumptions.
3
e impact of these varying
assumptions on the likely outcome is depicted in a Taiwan Invasion Scorecard (see Figure 8). In all, 24
iterations of the game mapped the contours of the conflict and produced a coherent and rigorously
derived picture of a major threat facing the United States.
The Results
e invasion always starts the same way: an opening bombardment destroys most of Taiwan’s navy
and air force in the first hours of hostilities. Augmented by a powerful rocket force, the Chinese navy
encircles Taiwan and interdicts any attempts to get ships and aircraft to the besieged island. Tens of
thousands of Chinese soldiers cross the strait in a mix of military amphibious craft and civilian roll-
on, roll-o ships, while air assault and airborne troops land behind the beachheads.
2 Ely Ratner, testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, “e Future of U.S. Policy on
Taiwan,” 117th Cong., 1st sess., 2021, https://www.foreign.senate.gov/hearings/the-future-of-us-policy-on-
taiwan120821.
3 Excursion cases include assumptions that are plausible although not considered the most likely.
3 | The First Battle of the Next War
However, in the most likely “base scenario,” the Chinese invasion quickly founders. Despite
massive Chinese bombardment, Taiwanese ground forces stream to the beachhead, where the
invaders struggle to build up supplies and move inland. Meanwhile U.S. submarines, bombers, and
fighter/attack aircraft, often reinforced by Japan Self-Defense Forces, rapidly cripple the Chinese
amphibious fleet. China’s strikes on Japanese bases and U.S. surface ships cannot change the result:
Taiwan remains autonomous.
ere is one major assumption here: Taiwan must resist and not capitulate. If Taiwan surrenders
before U.S. forces can be brought to bear, the rest is futile.
is defense comes at a high cost. e United States and Japan lose dozens of ships, hundreds of
aircraft, and thousands of servicemembers. Such losses would damage the U.S. global position
for many years. While Taiwan’s military is unbroken, it is severely degraded and left to defend a
damaged economy on an island without electricity and basic services. China also suers heavily. Its
navy is in shambles, the core of its amphibious forces is broken, and tens of thousands of soldiers
are prisoners of war.
Conditions for Success
Analysis of the 24 game iterations showed four necessary conditions to defeat a Chinese invasion.
1. Taiwanese forces must hold the line.
Recommendation: Strengthen Taiwanese ground forces. Because some Chinese forces will always
land on the island, Taiwanese ground forces must be able to contain any beachhead and then
counterattack forcefully as Chinese logistics weaken. However, the Taiwanese ground forces have
severe weaknesses. erefore, Taiwan must fill its ranks and conduct rigorous, combined arms training.
Ground forces must become the center of Taiwan’s defense eort.
2. ere is no “Ukraine model” for Taiwan.
Recommendation: In peacetime, the United States and Taiwan must work together to provide Taiwan
with the weapons it needs; in wartime, if the United States decides to defend Taiwan, U.S. forces
must quickly engage in direct combat. In the Ukraine war, the United States and the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO) have not sent troops directly into combat but have sent massive amounts of
equipment and supplies to Ukraine. Russia has been unable to interdict this overland flow. However, the
“Ukraine model” cannot be replicated in Taiwan because China can isolate the island for weeks or even
months. Taiwan must start the war with everything it needs. Further, delays and half measures by the
United States would make the defense harder, increase U.S. casualties, allow China to create a stronger
lodgment, and raise the risk of escalation.
3. e United States must be able to use its bases in Japan for combat operations.
Recommendation: Deepen diplomatic and military ties with Japan. While other allies (e.g., Australia
and South Korea) are important in the broader competition with China and may play some role in the
defense of Taiwan, Japan is the linchpin. Without the use of U.S. bases in Japan, U.S. fighter/attack
aircraft cannot eectively participate in the war.
4 | Cancian, Cancian, and Heginbotham
4. e United States must be able to strike the Chinese fleet rapidly and en masse from outside
the Chinese defensive zone.
Recommendation: Increase the arsenal of long-range anti-ship cruise missiles. Bombers capable
of launching stando, anti-ship ordnance oer the fastest way to defeat the invasion with the least
amount of U.S. losses. Procuring such missiles and upgrading existing missiles with this anti-ship
capability needs to be the top procurement priority.
Avoiding a Pyrrhic Victory
Victory is not everything. e United States might win a pyrrhic victory, suering more in the long run
than the “defeated” Chinese. Furthermore, the perception of high costs might undermine deterrence:
if China believes that the United States would be unwilling to bear the high costs of defending Taiwan,
then China might risk an invasion. e United States should therefore institute policies and programs
to make winning less costly in the event of conflict. Such measures would include:
POLITICS AND STRATEGY
▪ Clarify war plan assumptions. ere is a seeming gap between war plans, which assume prewar
deployments to Taiwan and neutral countries, and political realities.
▪ Do not plan on striking the mainland. e National Command Authority might withhold
permission because of the grave risks of escalation with a nuclear power.
▪ Recognize the need to continue operations in the face of heavy casualties. In three weeks,
the United States will suer about half as many casualties as it did in 20 years of war in Iraq
and Afghanistan.
▪ Move Taiwanese air and naval forces toward asymmetry. Despite rhetoric about adopting a
“porcupine strategy,” Taiwan still spends most of its defense budget on expensive ships and
aircraft that China will quickly destroy.
DOCTRINE AND POSTURE
▪ Fortify and expand air bases in Japan and Guam. Dispersion and hardening dilute the eects of
missile attacks.
▪ Revise U.S. Air Force doctrine and restructure procurement to increase aircraft survivability on
the ground. Ninety percent of aircraft losses occurred on the ground.
▪ Do not plan on overflying the Chinese mainland. Chinese air defense is too strong, the targets
take a long time to produce operational results, and the air missions around Taiwan take priority.
▪ Recognize the limitations of Marine Littoral Regiments and Army Multi-Domain Task Forces
and cap their numbers. ese units are designed to counter China and do provide some value, but
political and operational diculties put limits on their utility.
▪ Avoid crisis deployments that create vulnerabilities. Military doctrine calls for forward
deployments to enhance deterrence during a crisis, but these forces make tempting targets.
WEAPONS AND PLATFORMS
▪ Shift to smaller, more survivable ships and develop rescue mechanisms to deal with crippled
ships and multiple sinkings. Surface ships are extremely vulnerable, with the United States
5 | The First Battle of the Next War
typically losing two carriers and 10 to 20 large surface combatants in game iterations.
▪ Prioritize submarines and other undersea platforms. Submarines were able to enter the
Chinese defensive zone and wreak havoc with the Chinese fleet, but numbers were inadequate.
▪ Continue development and fielding of hypersonic weapons but recognize that they are niche
weapons. eir high cost limits inventories, so they lack the volume needed to counter the
immense numbers of Chinese air and naval platforms.
▪ Prioritize sustainment of the bomber fleet over fighters. e range, missile stando distance, and
high carrying capacity of bombers presented the People’s Liberation Army with daunting challenges.
▪ Produce more, cheaper fighters and balance the acquisition of stealth aircraft with production
of non-stealth aircraft. With so many aircraft lost early in the conflict, the Air Force risks running
out of fighter/attack aircraft and becoming a secondary player in the conflict unless it has a large
enough force to sustain the losses.
Finally, the project and its recommendations need some caveats. Modeling an invasion does not imply
that it is inevitable or even probable. e Chinese leadership might adopt a strategy of diplomatic
isolation, gray zone pressure, or economic coercion against Taiwan; even if China opts for military force,
this might take the form of a blockade rather than an outright invasion. However, the risk of invasion is
real enough and potentially so destructive that analysis is worthwhile.
e project does not take a position on whether the benefits of defending Taiwan outweigh the
prospective costs, or how to weigh those costs and benefits. Instead, the purpose is to enhance the
public debate and thus allow the nation to make better-informed decisions on this critical national
security challenge.
6 | Cancian, Cancian, and Heginbotham
1
Why is Project?
e Need for Transparent Analysis of a Taiwan
Contingency
W
hat was once unthinkable—direct conflict between the United States and China—has now
become a commonplace discussion in the national security community. e rise of China as
an economic and military power, Beijing’s coercive policies directed against Taiwan and other
U.S. regional partners in Asia, and growing U.S. bipartisan support for balancing Chinese economic
and military power have created an intensifying competition. A direct clash would constitute the first
between nuclear powers and also the first in which both sides possessed the full spectrum of modern
military capabilities, such as stealth aircraft, long-range precision munitions, and space surveillance.
Despite the high stakes involved, there is little publicly available material on how such a conflict might
play out. Much is classified and unavailable to the public. Unclassified material is either incomplete or
too narrow for policymaking. By investigating many scenarios with a wargame based on analysis and
running the wargame 24 times, this project fills a critical gap and furthers the public discussion of three
key questions: Would a Chinese invasion of Taiwan succeed in 2026? What variables most aect that
outcome? What would be the cost to both sides?
China’s Economic and Military Rise
International relations scholars have long highlighted the dangerous dynamics between a rising power
and an existing hegemon. In 1958, Abramo Organski first developed the notion that war becomes more
likely as the capabilities of weaker, dissatisfied states approach those of the established, advantaged
7 | The First Battle of the Next War
states.
4
is theory provides the basis for a natural cycle of the rise and fall of hegemonic powers as
unsatisfied and rising challengers defeat them.
5
Graham Allison’s 2018 book about the “ucydides
trap” popularized this notion.
6
e concern is that this theory applies to today, where a rising China
challenges the hegemonic status that the United States has enjoyed since the end of the Cold War.
e perception that China and the United States are strategic competitors, once debated, has gained
widespread currency in both Washington and Beijing. In the United States, the sentiment has become
bipartisan as hope has faded that China will become “a responsible member of the international
community.” China’s attitude is hardening also. e two highest-grossing movies in Chinese history
both featured the Chinese military taking on and defeating Americans (Wolf Warrior II and e Battle
of Lake Changjin).
is view has been building over time. Andrew Marshall, the legendary head of the Oce of Net
Assessment, began warning about China in the late 1980s.
7
Under President Barack Obama, the Pentagon
launched the ird Oset Strategy to counter China’s growing capabilities, and in 2016, Secretary of
Defense Ashton Carter observed a “return to great power competition” in Asia. e Trump administration’s
National Defense Strategy continued this view: “China is a strategic competitor using predatory economics
to intimidate its neighbors while militarizing features in the South China Sea.”
8
Most recently, the Biden
administration’s National Security Strategy identifies China as the primary global competitor to the United
States: “e PRC is the only competitor with both the intent to reshape the international order and,
increasingly, the economic, diplomatic, military, and technological power to do it. Beijing has ambitions to
create an enhanced sphere of influence in the Indo-Pacific and to become the world’s leading power.”
9
China has embarked on a concerted, long-term military modernization program. From its inception
until the late 1990s, China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) was mainly land-focused, filled with masses
of poorly trained conscripts, and unable to exert influence at a distance from its borders. Its poor
performance in the 1979 border war with Vietnam underscored its weakness, as did the 1996 transit of
the Taiwan Strait by U.S. naval forces. is has changed. As an annual assessment by the Department
of Defense (DOD) notes: “e PRC has marshaled the resources, technology, and political will over the
4 A.F.K. Organski, World Politics, 1st ed. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1958).
5 George Modelski, Long Cycles in World Politics (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1987).
6 Graham T. Allison, Destined for War: Can America and China Escape ucydides’ Trap? (Boston: Mariner Books,
2018). For a shorter discussion by Graham Allison about the ucydides trap, see Graham Allison, “e
ucydides Trap: Are the U.S. and China Headed for War?,” e Atlantic, September 24, 2015, http://www.
theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/09/united-states-china-war-thucydides-trap/406756/.
7 Former members of Marshall’s sta Andrew Krepinevich and Barry Watt describe Marshall’s early and growing
interest in China in Andrew Krepinevich and Barry Watts, e Last Warrior (New York: Basic Books, 2015).
8 Department of Defense, Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy: Sharpening the American Military’s
Competitive Edge (Washington, DC: January 2018), 1, 2, https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/
pubs/2018-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf.
9 e White House, National Security Strategy (Washington, DC: October 2022), 23, https://www.whitehouse.
gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/Biden-Harris-Administrations-National-Security-Strategy-10.2022.pdf.
8 | Cancian, Cancian, and Heginbotham
past two decades to strengthen and modernize the PLA in nearly every respect.”
10
ese capabilities have
focused on air, naval, and missile systems that can target China’s periphery in a so-called anti-access/area
denial (A2/AD) strategy.
11
China’s A2/AD capabilities are now formidable. China’s sizable and sophisticated force of ballistic and
cruise missiles challenges the U.S. ability to operate from its few air bases in the Western Pacific, and
China’s development of anti-ship ballistic missiles threatens to destroy U.S. surface ships. China began
launching series production of fourth-generation fighter aircraft in the 2000s and now has more than
1,000 such aircraft in service. Series production of large modern warships (e.g., destroyers and frigates)
did not begin until the mid-2010s, but progress since then has been even more striking. Between 2014
and mid-2020, China launched 25 Luyang III (Type 052Ds) destroyers and 8 Renhai cruisers.
12
It is
currently building its third aircraft carrier, which, at 80,000 tons, will be much larger than its first two.
13
China’s A2/AD capabilities are now formidable. China’s
sizable and sophisticated force of ballistic and cruise missiles
challenges the U.S. ability to operate from its few air bases
in the Western Pacific, and China’s development of anti-ship
ballistic missiles threatens to destroy U.S. surface ships.
e U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission’s 2021 annual report to Congress found
that decades of improvements by China’s armed forces “have fundamentally transformed the strategic
environment,” weakening military deterrence across the Taiwan Strait and diminishing the position of
the United States. e commission concluded, “Today, the [PLA] either has or is close to achieving an
initial capability to invade Taiwan—one that remains under development but that China’s leaders may
employ at high risk—while deterring, delaying, or defeating U.S. military intervention.”
14
Despite impressive gains, China’s air and naval capabilities still lag behind aggregate U.S. capabilities in
10 Oce of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the
People’s Republic of China 2020 (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2020), i–ii, https://media.defense.
gov/2020/Sep/01/2002488689/-1/-1/1/2020-DOD-CHINA-MILITARY-POWER-REPORT-FINAL.PDF.
11 CSBA developed the concept of A2/AD strategies. Andrew Krepinevich, Barry Watts, and Robert Work, Meeting
the Anti-Access and Area-Denial Challenge (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments
(CSBA), May 2003), https://csbaonline.org/research/publications/a2ad-anti-access-area-denial.
12 “Chapter Six: Asia,” in International Institute for Security Studies, e Military Balance, 121, no. 1 (London:
2021): 232, doi:10.1080/04597222.2021.1868795.
13 e Oce of Naval Intelligence estimates that by 2030, China will have 65 large surface combatants. “China:
Naval Construction Trends vis-à-vis U.S. Navy Shipbuilding Plans, 2020-2030,” Oce of Naval Intelligence,
February 6, 2020, https://irp.fas.org/agency/oni/plan-trends.pdf.
14 U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 2021 Report to Congress (Washington, DC: November
2021), https://www.uscc.gov/annual-report/2021-annual-report-congress.
9 | The First Battle of the Next War
quality and breadth of capability. e fifth-generation aircraft of the PLA Air Force (PLAAF) suer from
the lack of a suitable domestically produced engine and have, therefore, only been produced in limited
numbers. e PLA Navy (PLAN) lacks an adequate fighter for its carriers, and its submarine quieting
technology remains immature. Despite recent growth, the sustainability and support capabilities of
air-to-air refueling aircraft and amphibious warfare ships are limited. Perhaps most importantly, the
PLA’s “software” (e.g., training, joint operations, and other human elements) is only beginning to adapt
to the requirements of modern high-intensity warfare.
15
PLA leaders are aware of and addressing all
the organization’s weaknesses, and China watchers expect improvement in virtually all areas over
time. Indeed, President Xi Jinping called for improving military readiness in his speech to the National
Congress of the Chinese Communist Party in October 2022.
16
However, wars are not decided solely by aggregate or abstract capabilities. Geography generally
favors China in the relevant scenarios. Taiwan’s coast is about 160 km (100 miles) from the Chinese
mainland but more than 8,000 km from Honolulu and 11,000 km from San Diego. Flowing forces into
the immediate theater would take far longer for the United States than for China. China also enjoys
continental scale and strategic depth across which it can deploy or protect aircraft as battlefield needs
dictate. e United States would be limited to a handful of air bases in the Western Pacific.
On the other hand, the United States benefits from maritime strategic depth, with the ability to operate
from the more open spaces of the Western Pacific. Chinese naval forces would be more susceptible to
detection in the confined seas adjacent to its territory. Perhaps most important, conducting an opposed
amphibious assault is a hazardous and unforgiving undertaking under even the best of circumstances.
Taiwan Is the Most Dangerous U.S.-China Flashpoint
Taiwan is widely regarded as the most dangerous potential flashpoint for conflict between the United
States and China. In 1949, the nationalist government of China (under the Kuomintang party, or
KMT) established an autonomous government on the island after being pushed o the mainland. e
Chinese Communist Party (CCP) thus regards Taiwan as a breakaway province with no legitimate claim
to autonomy or independence.
Recognizing Beijing as the sole legitimate government of China and severing diplomatic relations with
Taipei is a precondition for any country to establish diplomatic relations with China. As leaders and
ocials in Beijing are fond of repeating, China has never foresworn the use of force against Taiwan.
To make the point, China’s 2005 Anti-Secession Law outlines the circumstances under which China
15 e transition to theater commands and other reforms adopted in 2015 were designed to improve jointness,
but the emphasis on joint operations is quite new and plagued by unresolved issues and cultural barriers.
For an assessment of Chinese views of this and other problems in the balance of military capabilities, see
Eric Heginbotham, “Chinese Views of the Military Balance in the Western Pacific,” China Maritime Studies
Institute, China Maritime Report No. 14, June 2021, https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.
cgi?article=1013&context=cmsi-maritime-reports. See also: Michael S. Chase et al., China’s Incomplete Military
Transformation: Assessing the Weaknesses of the People’s Liberation Army (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation,
2015), https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR800/RR893/RAND_RR893.pdf.
16 “Full Text of Xi Jinping’s Speech at China’s Party Congress,” Bloomberg, October 18, 2022, https://
www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-10-18/full-text-of-xi-jinping-s-speech-at-china-20th-party-
congress-2022.
10 | Cancian, Cancian, and Heginbotham
might employ force. A recent white paper by the Chinese Taiwan Aairs Oce of the State Council
laid out the policy: “We are one China, and Taiwan is part of China. . . . We will work with the greatest
sincerity and exert our utmost eorts to achieve peaceful reunification. But we will not renounce the
use of force, and we reserve the option of taking all necessary measures.”
17
Xi Jinping’s report to the 20th Party Congress reiterated this policy: “Taiwan is China’s Taiwan.
Resolving the Taiwan question is a matter that must be resolved by the Chinese. We will continue to
strive for peaceful reunification with the greatest sincerity and the utmost eort, but we will never
promise to renounce the use of force, and we reserve the option of taking all measures necessary.”
18
Underlining this increasingly assertive attitude has been a practice of provocative military exercises.
China increasingly flies masses of aircraft into the Taiwanese air defense identification zone.
19
While Chinese leaders have said they will not allow reunification to be postponed indefinitely, it is
unclear what that means in practice.Much clearer is China’s commitment to demonstrating resolve
when unwelcome events appear to move Taiwan further from unification—as China did with missile
tests o Taiwan after President Lee Teng-hui visited the United States in June 1995 and recently with
the military demonstrations during House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan in the summer of
2022. e linkage of both events to the United States indicates the degree of U.S. involvement.
Taiwan is China’s Taiwan. Resolving the Taiwan question
is a matter that must be resolved by the Chinese. . . . we
reserve the option of taking all measures necessary.
—Xi Jingping
17 “China releases white paper on Taiwan question, reunification in new era,” Xinhuanet, August 10, 2022,
https://english.www.gov.cn/archive/whitepaper/202208/10/content_WS62f34f46c6d02e533532f0ac.html.
18 For recent information related to China’s position on Taiwan, see “(CCP) Congress Full text of resolution
on Party Constitution amendment,” Xinhua, October 22, 2022, https://english.news.cn/20221022/
fea670f419d7426ab564a795d5737b52/c.html; and Xi Jinping, Report to the 20th National Congress of the
Communist Party of China (Beijing: Ministry of Foreign Aairs of the People’s Republic of China, October
2022), https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/zxxx_662805/202210/t20221025_10791908.html. For a recent
assessment of Xi Jinping’s policy toward China, as well as Taiwanese and U.S. responses, see Richard Bush,
Dicult Choices: Taiwan’s Quest for Security and the Good Life (Washington, DC: Brookings Institute, 2021).
19 For discussion on one such incident in 2021, see Chao Deng and Joyu Wang, “China Flies a Dozen Bombers
Near Taiwan, Prompting Protest From Taipei,” Wall Street Journal, October 5, 2021, https://www.wsj.com/
articles/china-flies-a-dozen-bombers-near-taiwan-prompting-protest-from-taipei-11633365182; Colm
Quinn, “Why Is China Sending So Many Warplanes Near Taiwan?,” Foreign Policy, October 5, 2021, https://
foreignpolicy.com/2021/10/05/china-planes-taiwan-adiz-air-zone/; and Bonny Lin et al., “Tracking the Fourth
Taiwan Strait Crisis,” CSIS, October 13, 2022, https://chinapower.csis.org/tracking-the-fourth-taiwan-strait-
crisis/.
11 | The First Battle of the Next War
e United States has maintained a policy of strategic ambiguity to discourage China from attacking
Taiwan while also discouraging Taipei from taking actions that might incentivize such an attack.
20
is
is also called dual deterrence, as it aims to deter China from invading Taiwan and deter Taiwan from
declaring independence. In accordance with the ree Communiqués with China, in 1972, 1979, and
1982, and the U.S. “One China” policy, the United States maintains formal diplomatic relations with
Beijing, not Taipei. Nevertheless, it nurtures historically deep cultural and economic ties with Taipei.
Under the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979, the United States provides weapons that Taiwan needs to
defend itself, although the United States has no formal obligation to defend Taiwan directly. A variety
of additional agreements, laws, and documents link the countries.
21
e historical relationship with Taiwan (now formally limited to economic and cultural engagement)
creates a perception of obligation among many, a perception enhanced by Taiwan’s transition to
vibrant democracy during the 1990s. Recently, President Joe Biden has sent clear deterrence signals
to China without formally changing policy. When asked whether the United States was “willing to
get involved militarily to defend Taiwan if it comes to that,” President Biden replied, “Yes, that’s the
commitment we made.”
22
President Biden has made such statements repeatedly.
Some members of Congress, wanting to strengthen U.S. support of Taiwan, have proposed the Taiwan
Policy Act, which would provide direct military aid and enhance Taiwan’s diplomatic status. Although the
act did not pass, it did show strong congressional support for Taiwan.
23
As evidence of a closer military
relationship, reports have emerged that the United States has military planning cells on Taiwan. Although
these appear to be limited, they constitute a direct military relationship that has not existed since 1973.
24
Balancing these leanings are ocial statements that U.S. policy has not changed. Indeed, the National
Security Strategy reiterated the “One China” policy, as did a State Department statement.
25
Further,
20 On the logic and continuity of strategic ambiguity, see Timothy W. Crawford, Pivotal Deterrence: ird
Party Statecraft and the Pursuit of Peace (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2003); and Hoo Tiang Boon
and Hannah Elyse Sworn, “Strategic Ambiguity and the Trumpian Approach to China-Taiwan Relations,”
International Aairs 96, no. 6 (June 2020), doi:10.1093/ia/iiaa160.
21 ese include the Six Assurances made to Taiwan in the wake of the ree Communiqués, as well as more
recent legislation, such as the Taiwan Travel Act of 2018.
22 Brett Samuels, “Biden: US Would Defend Taiwan Militarily If China Invaded,” e Hill, May 23, 2022, https://
thehill.com/homenews/administration/3497693-biden-us-would-defend-taiwan-militarily-if-china-invaded/.
23 Andrew Desiderio, “U.S.-Taiwan Bill Sails through Senate Panel despite White House Misgivings,” Politico,
September 14, 2022, https://www.politico.com/news/2022/09/14/taiwan-bill-clears-senate-panel-00056769.
24 For a timeline outlining U.S.-Taiwan relations, see “Milestones in Relations between the U.S., China and
Taiwan,” Reuters, August 2, 2022, https://www.reuters.com/world/milestones-relations-between-us-china-
taiwan-2022-08-02/; and “Timeline: U.S.-China Relations,” Council on Foreign Relations, accessed November
9, 2022, https://www.cfr.org/timeline/us-china-relations.
25 “U.S. Relations With Taiwan,” U.S. Department of State, May 28, 2022, https://www.state.gov/u-s-relations-
with-taiwan/.
12 | Cancian, Cancian, and Heginbotham
there is a range of opinions within the United States on the wisdom of defending Taiwan.
26
is project does not take a position about whether the United States would or should become involved
militarily in a conflict over Taiwan. It is enough to believe that, under certain conditions, the United
States might intervene. An assessment of the outcomes of such an intervention is therefore valuable.
Increasing Worries about an Imminent Chinese Attack
Senior military ocials have expressed concerns that China’s military might be preparing a military
solution to the “breakaway province” problem—or preparing that capability in case called upon to act.
Admiral Philip S. Davidson, commander of Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM) until April 2021,
testified that the Chinese threat to invade Taiwan “is manifest . . . in the next six years.”
27
Current
INDOPACOM commander Admiral John C. Aquilino, when asked for his opinion, stated that “this
problem is much closer to us than most think.”
28
Other military and civilian ocials—for example,
Secretary of State Anthony Blinken, Admiral Michael M. Gilday, chief of naval operations, and Admiral
Charles Richard, head of Strategic Command—have expressed similar concerns. is is a broad
narrative in the national security community.
29
Senior military oicials have expressed concerns that
China’s military might be preparing a military solution to the
26 Among those who would oppose direct U.S. intervention are core members of the restraint camp. See,
for example, Ted Galen Carpenter, “How Far is the U.S. Willing to Go to Defend Taiwan?,” Cato Institute,
Commentary, September 22, 2020, https://www.cato.org/commentary/how-far-us-willing-go-defend-taiwan.
Recently, more mainstream analysts have also joined the discussion. See, for example, Charles L. Glaser,
“Washington is Avoiding the Tough Questions on Taiwan and China: e Case for Reconsidering U.S.
Commitments in East Asia,” Foreign Aairs, April 28, 2021, https://www.foreignaairs.com/articles/asia/2021-
04-28/washington-avoiding-tough-questions-taiwan-and-china.
27 Mallory Shelbourne, “Davidson: China Could Try to Take Control of Taiwan In ‘Next Six Years’,” USNI News,
March 9, 2021, https://news.usni.org/2021/03/09/davidson-china-could-try-to-take-control-of-taiwan-in-
next-six-years.
28 David Vergun, “Defense of Taiwan Vital to Regional, National Security, Admiral Says,” DOD News, March
23, 2021, https://www.defense.gov/Explore/News/Article/Article/2547389/defense-of-taiwan-vital-to-
regional-national-security-admiral-says/. ese concerns were widely reported at the time, for example,
Brad Lebdon, “Chinese reat to Taiwan Closer an Most ink,” CNN, March 24, 2021, https://www.cnn.
com/2021/03/24/asia/indo-pacific-commander-aquilino-hearing-taiwan-intl-hnk-ml/index.html.
29 Ellen Francis, “China Speeding Up Plans to Seize Taiwan,” Washington Post, October 18, 2022, https://www.
washingtonpost.com/world/2022/10/18/china-seize-taiwan-plan-blinken/; Valerie Insinna, “Navy leader
‘can’t rule out’ Chinese invasion of Taiwan even earlier than 2027,” Breaking Defense, October 19, 2022,
https://breakingdefense.com/2022/10/navy-leader-cant-rule-out-chinese-invasion-of-taiwan-even-earlier-
than-2027/; and Oliver Parken and Tyler Rogoway, “Extremely Ominous Warning about China from US
Strategic Command Chief,” e War Zone, November 6, 2022, https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/
extremely-ominous-warning-about-china-from-us-strategic-command-chief.
13 | The First Battle of the Next War
“breakaway province” problem. . . . Others are more cautious
. . . The project does not take a position on the likelihood of
conflict but recognizes the possibility of conflict.
Civilian writers echo these concerns. Recent articles in the New York Times, Foreign Aairs, and the
defense trade press have highlighted Chinese assertiveness about Taiwan and the risks of a conflict.
30
Oriana Skylar Mastro, a Chinese specialist at Stanford University, observed, “In recent months
there have been disturbing signs that Beijing is reconsidering its peaceful approach [to Taiwan] and
contemplating armed unification. . . . Whereas Chinese leaders used to view a military campaign to
take the island as a fantasy, now they consider it a real possibility.”
31
Lonnie Henley, a retired defense
intelligence ocer for East Asia at the Defense Intelligence Agency, stated before Congress that, “if the
political leadership turned to the [PLA] today and said, can you invade right now, it’s my assessment
that the answer would be a firm yes.”
32
Robert Blackwill and Philip Zelikowgo further: “China is now
in a prewar tempo of political and military preparations. We do not mean that we know that China
is about to embark on a war. We simply observe that the Chinese government is taking actions that a
country would do if it were moving into a prewar mode.”
33
Taiwan itself has entered the debate, with
its defense minister saying that China would be able to launch a “full-scale invasion” by 2025.
34
Others are more cautious and stress that it is dicult to impute intentions from improving capabilities.
General Mark Milley, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Sta, addressed the statements made by other
military leaders: “What Davidson and Aquilino and others have said is that Chinese capability to invade
and seize the island of Taiwan is being accelerated to 2027, six years from now. I don’t dismiss that at all.
30 For example, Oriana Skylar Mastro, “e Taiwan Temptation: Why Beijing May Resort to Force,” Foreign Aairs,
July/August 2021, https://www.foreignaairs.com/articles/china/2021-06-03/china-taiwan-war-temptation;
Sarah A. Topol, “Is Taiwan Next?,” New York Times, August 4, 2021, https://www.nytimes.com/2021/08/04/
magazine/taiwan-china.html; Michael Mazza, “Shoot It Straight on Taiwan,” War on the Rocks, August 3,
2021, https://warontherocks.com/2021/08/shoot-it-straight-on-taiwan/; and Je Schogol, “Why the Next
War Is Likely to Start in Taiwan,” Task and Purpose, August 6, 2021, https://taskandpurpose.com/news/china-
taiwan-next-major-war/.
31 Mastro, “e Taiwan Temptation.”
32 Lonnie Henley, Hearing before the U.S. China Economic and Security Review Commission on “Deterring the
People’s Republic of China Aggression toward Taiwan,” February 18, 2021, https://www.uscc.gov/hearings/
deterring-prc-aggression-toward-taiwan.
33 Robert Blackwill and Philip Zelikow, e United States, China, and Taiwan: A Strategy to Prevent War (New York:
Council on Foreign Relations, February 2021), 31, https://www.cfr.org/report/united-states-china-and-
taiwan-strategy-prevent-war.
34 “Defense Minister Says China Could Launch ‘full-Scale Invasion’ of Taiwan by 2025,” Taiwan News, October 6,
2021, https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/en/news/4307745.
14 | Cancian, Cancian, and Heginbotham
. . but I don’t see it happening right out of the blue.”
35
Christopher Johnson, a China scholar at CSIS, was
more emphatic, saying that at the 2022 party congress Xi “held fast to the judgment that stability and
economic growth continued to be dominant global trends” and that portrayals of Xi as “itching for war”
were “overhyped.”
36
Lonnie Henley qualified his own congressional testimony, writing separately:
I do not think they [the Chinese] will attack Taiwan as long as they believe unification without
war remains a viable course of action. ey will attack, however, despite the enormous cost
and despite any doubts about their own military capabilities, if they judge that peaceful
unification is no longer possible, that military force is the only remaining option. at in turn
is driven by their assessment of political developments in Taipei and Washington.
37
Timothy Heath similarly argues that “ere is no evidence that the [Chinese] government is seriously
contemplating abandoning its peaceful unification strategy.”
38
e project does not take a position on the likelihood of conflict but recognizes the possibility of conflict.
A CSIS study on surprise in war concluded that “wars happen” despite the dangers, uncertainty, and
potential economic ruin.
39
Nations miscalculate the military balance, get swept along in a crisis, feel
that the balance of power is moving against them, or make national security choices based on domestic
politics. As Colin Kahl, DOD undersecretary for policy, said: “I don’t think in the next couple of years that
they’re likely to invade Taiwan, but you never know.”
40
Although there is an ongoing debate about both
Chinese capabilities and intentions, China’s determination to develop military options for use against
Taiwan is widely accepted.
41
A war over Taiwan is not certain, but it is not unimaginable either; for that
reason, wargaming such a conflict is important for developing U.S. policy.
35 Joseph Bosco, “Milley adds confusion to America’s ambiguity on defending Taiwan,” e Hill, June 29, 2021,
https://thehill.com/opinion/international/560623-milley-adds-confusion-to-americas-ambiguity-on-
defending-taiwan?rl=1; and Sam LeGrone, “Milley: China Wants Capability to Take Taiwan by 2027, Sees No
Near-term Intent to Invade,” USNI News, June 23, 2021, https://news.usni.org/2021/06/23/milley-china-
wants-capability-to-take-taiwan-by-2027-sees-no-near-term-intent-to-invade. ese concerns were widely
reported at the time, for example, Lebdon, “Chinese reat to Taiwan Closer an Most ink.”
36 Christopher Johnson, “Why China Will Play It Safe: XI Would Prefer Détente – Not War – with America,”
Foreign Aairs, November 14, 2022, https://www.foreignaairs.com/china/why-china-will-play-it-safe.
37 Email exchange between the authors and Lonnie Henley, November 22, 2022.
38 Timothy R. Heath, “Is China Planning to Attack Taiwan? A Careful Consideration of Available Evidence Says
No,” War on the Rocks, December 14, 2022, https://warontherocks.com/2022/12/is-china-planning-to-attack-
taiwan-a-careful-consideration-of-available-evidence-says-no/.
39 Mark Cancian, Coping with Surprise in Great Power Conflicts (Washington, DC: CSIS, 2018), 7, https://www.csis.
org/analysis/coping-surprise-great-power-conflicts.
40 “e 2022 National Defense Strategy: A Conversation with Colin Kahl,” (public event, Brookings Institution,
November 4, 2022), https://www.brookings.edu/events/the-2022-national-defense-strategy-a-conversation-
with-colin-kahl/.
41 For further examples of the debate over future conflict, see Rachel Eslien Odell and Eric Heginbotham,
Bonny Lin and David Sacks, Kharis Templeman, and Oriana Skylar Mastro, “Strait of Emergency? Debating
Beijing’s reat to Taiwan,” Foreign Aairs, September/October 2021, https://www.foreignaairs.com/articles/
china/2021-08-09/strait-emergency; and Bonny Lin and Joel Wuthnow, “e Weakness Behind China’s Strong
Façade,” Foreign Aairs, November 10, 2022, https://www.foreignaairs.com/china/weakness-behind-china-
strong-facade.
15 | The First Battle of the Next War
Parallels and Dierences with the War in Ukraine
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has sparked a renewed interest in international conflict. e focus for the
last generation has been on gray zone conflict and insurgency. e possibility of one country invading
another to acquire territory seemed antiquated. Russia’s attack on Ukraine has reminded the world that
cross-border invasions are possible. Speculation about a Chinese invasion of Taiwan was inevitable.
42
A war over Taiwan is not certain, but it is not unimaginable
either; for that reason, wargaming such a conflict is
important for developing U.S. policy.
ere are clear parallels between the Russian invasion of Ukraine and a possible Chinese attack on
Taiwan. Russia and China believe that the target is not a sovereign state but a part of their country and
should be reunited. Both are authoritarian (though of very dierent forms), and the target is democratic.
In both cases, the United States and many global partners would support the potential victim.
ere are also significant dierences, including two that pertain directly to military deterrence. First,
the United States has a longer and deeper history with Taiwan. It seems more committed to Taiwan’s
defense than to that of Ukraine and, as discussed earlier, more likely to intervene directly. Second, the
challenge to the Chinese military is much greater. It is harder to cross 160 km of water than to cross a
land border, as Russia has done. Moreover, once a landing has begun, there is no going back.
Views about how China sees the war in Ukraine have been highly speculative since China’s decisionmaking
process is so opaque. Early on, the concern was that Russia’s success in Ukraine would embolden
China. More recently, Russia’s military failure and the strong diplomatic reaction may discourage China.
Regardless, the invasion has reminded everyone that irredentist policies are dangerous, that U.S. deterrence
might fail, and that countries might do what they say they reserve the right to do.
43
42 For an example of such speculation, see Amy Qin and Amy Chang Chien, “As China Rattles Sabers, Taiwan
Asks: Are We Ready for War?,” New York Times, June 13, 2022, https://www.nytimes.com/2022/06/13/world/
asia/china-taiwan-ukraine-military.html.
43 “‘e Big One Is Coming’ and the U.S. Military Isn’t Ready,” Wall Street Journal, November 4, 2022, https://
www.wsj.com/articles/the-big-one-is-coming-china-russia-charles-richard-u-s-military-11667597291. For
an example of how the invasion of Ukraine might embolden China, see “Japan Calls for Tough Response on
Ukraine, Saying China Is Watching,” Wall Street Journal, February 15, 2022, https://www.wsj.com/articles/
japan-calls-for-tough-response-on-ukraine-saying-china-is-watching-11644923764. For an example of how
it might restrain China, see Grant Newsham, “Ukraine Invasion: Time for Beijing to Rethink Taiwan,” Japan
Forward, March 3, 2022, https://japan-forward.com/ukraine-invasion-time-for-beijing-to-rethink-taiwan/.
For a discussion on limitations of drawing parallels between Ukraine and Taiwan, see “China Is Not Russia;
Taiwan Is Not Ukraine,” e Diplomat, July 25, 2022, https://thediplomat.com/2022/07/china-is-not-russia-
taiwan-is-not-ukraine/.
16 | Cancian, Cancian, and Heginbotham
Limitations of Currently Available Models, Assessments, and
Wargames
Although there is a building sense of crisis about the Taiwan Strait, the ability of Chinese forces to
achieve operational objectives has not been adequately studied in the public domain. Previous analyses
largely include unclassified models focusing on one aspect of an invasion, seminar-type games that
educate players but do not provide an adequate analytic foundation for policy recommendations,
political-military games that primarily investigate diplomatic and political issues, or classified
wargames whose assumptions and even results are not transparent to the public. All of these analytical
eorts have value, but none can answer the central question of this project: can China conquer Taiwan
in a military invasion?
Views about how China sees the war in Ukraine have been
highly speculative since China’s decisionmaking process
is so opaque. . . . Regardless, the invasion has reminded
everyone that irredentist policies are dangerous, that U.S.
deterrence might fail, and that countries might do what
they say they reserve the right to do.
Existing Unclassified Analyses and Assessments
Scholars of military aairs and China have conducted several analyses and assessments that have
contributed to understanding the military balance. ese eorts have been invaluable resources for
developing the project’s wargame. However, they do not purport to convert the data or insights into a
wargame that would provide operational insights in a dynamic environment.
▪ Michael O’Hanlon of the Brookings Institution and a long-time military analyst produced an
assessment of China’s prospects for invasion in 2000. e assessment was detailed and analytical,
concluding that an invasion was not possible at that time. However, as detailed above, much has
changed in recent decades.
44
▪ Ian Easton’s 2019 book on the subject, e Chinese Invasion reat, contains detailed information
about geography and orders of battle but does not convert those into a model or wargame.
45
▪ Michael A. Glosny (2004), Bradley Martin et al. (2022), and O’Hanlon (2022) looked at a Chinese
44 Michael O’Hanlon, “Why China Cannot Conquer Taiwan,” International Security 25, no. 2 (2000): 51–86,
https://www.jstor.org/stable/2626753.
45 Ian Easton, e Chinese Invasion reat: Taiwan’s Defense and American Strategy in Asia (Eastbridge Books,
2019).
17 | The First Battle of the Next War
blockade of Taiwan rather than an amphibious invasion.
46
▪ Stephen Biddle and Ivan Oelrich (2016) argue that surface ships will not be able to survive within
400 to 600 km of hostile coasts due to advances in A2/AD, but they do not go on to model an
invasion of Taiwan.
47
▪ e U.S.-China Military Scorecard (2015), published by RAND, assessed many elements of a
potential invasion over time and in depth, though without aggregating them into a unified
analysis. One of its conclusions was the need for a wargame: “Perhaps the most direct follow-on to
this study would be the creation of a unified model to assess the interrelationships between the
dierent scorecards.”
48
WARGAMES
Several organizations have conducted wargames that examine a possible U.S.-China conflict over
Taiwan. However, their focus has been on escalation dynamics and politics rather than analysis of
military operational outcomes.
In May 2022, the Center for a New American Security (CNAS) worked with NBC’s Meet the Press
to broadcast a wargame on a notational 2027 Chinese invasion of Taiwan and, in June, published a
corresponding report, Dangerous Straits.
49
ese provided compelling and insightful examinations
of the political and military issues related to such a conflict, especially prewar deterrence, alliance
management, nuclear signaling, political messaging, and escalation management. However, these
games were not focused on operational outcomes. Furthermore, the structure of the CNAS game
restricted the exercise to a single iteration with a single set of assumptions and a single set of players.
CNAS conducted another game, described in a report, entitled e Poison Frog Strategy, developed
from an earlier game exploring a Chinese seizure of Pratas Island/Dongsha Atoll and its international
fallout.
50
A game sponsored by Germany’s Körber Foundation, in cooperation with the United
Kingdom’s Chatham House, examined the potential European response to a Chinese invasion of
46 Michael A. Glosny, “Strangulation from the Sea? A PRC Submarine Blockade of Taiwan,” International Security
28, no. 4 (April 2004): 125–60, doi:10.1162/0162288041588269; Bradley Martin et al., Implications of a
Coercive Quarantine of Taiwan by the People’s Republic of China (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, May
2022), https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA1279-1.html; and Michael E. O’Hanlon, Can China
Take Taiwan? Why No One Really Knows (Washington, DC: Brookings, August 2022), https://www.brookings.
edu/research/can-china-take-taiwan-why-no-one-really-knows/.
47 Discussion of Taiwan is in particular on pages 13–14. Stephen Biddle and Ivan Oelrich, “Future Warfare in the
Western Pacific: Chinese Antiaccess/Area Denial, U.S. AirSea Battle, and Command of the Commons in East
Asia,” International Security 41 (July 1, 2016): 7–48, particularly 13–14, doi:10.1162/ISEC_a_00249.
48 Eric Heginbotham et al., e U.S.-China Military Scorecard: Forces, Geography, and the Evolving Balance of Power,
1996–2017 (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2015), 354, https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/
RR392.html.
49 Stacie Pettyjohn, Becca Wasser, and Chris Doherty, Dangerous Straits: Wargaming a Future Conflict over Taiwan
(Washington, DC: Center for a New American Security, June 2022), https://www.cnas.org/publications/
reports/dangerous-straits-wargaming-a-future-conflict-over-taiwans; and “Wargames: e Battle for Taiwan,”
YouTube video, posted by NBC News, May 13, 2022, 26:54, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qYfvm-JLhPQ.
50 Chris Dougherty, Jennie Mutuschak, and Ripley Hunter, e Poison Frog Strategy (Washington, DC: Center For
New American Security, October 2021), https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/the-poison-frog-strategy.
18 | Cancian, Cancian, and Heginbotham
Taiwan. e two games—CNAS and Körber—were similar in that they were single-instance seminar
games that focused heavily on political issues.
Reuters published an investigative report that was termed a wargame. e report presented several
policy and governmental scenarios to describe possible escalatory paths for China and Taiwan.
51
While
this report was not a game in the customary sense, it did present several plausible scenarios based on
expert opinions and illustrated its findings with excellent graphics. e report was also a good example
of how broadly the term “wargame” is used.
All of these games provided useful policy insights. However, wargames specifically about military
operational outcomes are needed as a complement. Unfortunately, all such wargames hitherto have
been in the classified realm.
Lack of Transparency from Classified Wargames
e DOD has done much internal wargaming on a U.S.-China conflict, but the results are classified,
with only a few details leaking out. ese details hint at heavy casualties and unfavorable outcomes.
52
For example, in a widely cited commentary, David Ochmanek, a senior RAND analyst, noted, “In
our games, when we fight Russia and China, [the United States] gets its ass handed to it.”
53
Michele
Flournoy, former undersecretary of defense for policy, similarly stated, “e Pentagon’s own war games
reportedly show that current force plans would leave the military unable to deter and defeat Chinese
aggression in the future.”
54
Another report noted that a “secret wargame” showed that the United
States could prevail in the conflict with China, but at the risk of causing nuclear escalation.
55
51 David Legue and Maryanne Murray, “T-Day: e Battle for Taiwan,” Reuters, November 5, 2021, https://www.
reuters.com/investigates/special-report/taiwan-china-wargames/. is work also cited e Poison Frog Strategy.
52 Tara Copp, “‘It Failed Miserably’: After Wargaming Loss, Joint Chiefs Are Overhauling How the US Military
Will Fight,” Defense One, July 26, 2021, https://www.defenseone.com/policy/2021/07/it-failed-miserably-
after-wargaming-loss-joint-chiefs-are-overhauling-how-us-military-will-fight/184050/; Brett Tingley, “Joint
Chiefs Seek A New Warfighting Paradigm After Devastating Losses In Classified Wargames,” e Drive, July 27,
2021, https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/41712/joint-chiefs-seek-a-new-warfighting-paradigm-after-
devastating-losses-in-classified-wargames; and John Vandiver, “US Military Vulnerabilities Exposed During
Classified Wargame, Top General Says,” Stars and Stripes, July 27, 2021, https://www.stripes.com/theaters/
us/2021-07-27/US-China-military-war-game-hyten-2326077.html.
53 Sydney J. Freedberg. “US ‘Gets Its Ass Handed to It’ In Wargames: Here’s A $24 Billion Fix,” Breaking Defense,
March 7, 2019, https://breakingdefense.com/2019/03/us-gets-its-ass-handed-to-it-in-wargames-heres-a-24-
billion-fix/.
54 Michele Flournoy, “America’s Military Risks Losing Its Edge,” Foreign Aairs, April 20, 2021, https://www.
foreignaairs.com/articles/united-states/2021-04-20/flournoy-americas-military-risks-losing-its-edge.
55 Lauren ompson, “Why the Air Force’s Plan for Fighting China Could Make Nuclear War More Likely,” Forbes,
June 15, 2021, https://www.forbes.com/sites/lorenthompson/2021/06/15/why-the-air-forces-plan-for-
fighting-china-could-make-nuclear-war-more-likely. Other commentaries have touched on the same issue,
for example, Edward Geist, “Defeat Is Possible,” War on the Rocks, June 17, 2021, https://warontherocks.
com/2021/06/defeat-is-possible/. e 2018 National Defense Strategy Commission raised similar concerns.
Unclear is whether these commentaries are providing additional information about wargames or pointing
back to the handful of reports that have filtered out.
19 | The First Battle of the Next War
Regarding another wargame, General John E. Hyten, then-vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Sta,
said, “[e U.S. warfighting concept] failed miserably. An aggressive China team that had been studying
the United States for the last 20 years just ran rings around us.” is happened, at least in part, because
“the blue team lost access to its networks almost immediately.”
56
Unclear was what sort of cyberattack
caused this loss of capability or what the China team did to “run circles” around the U.S. team.
In March 2021, Lieutenant General S. Clinton Hinote, the deputy chief of sta, strategy, integration,
and requirements, headquarters, said that for over a decade, U.S. Air Force wargames had indicated
that the Chinese were investing in military capabilities that would make the Air Force’s preferred
model of expeditionary warfare “increasingly dicult.”
57
“e trend in our wargames was not just
that we were losing, but we were losing faster,” he said. He told reporters, “e definitive answer
if the U.S. military doesn’t change course is that we’re going to lose fast. In that case, an American
president would likely be presented with almost a fait accompli.”
58
As these examples indicate, these hints from the classified world do not specify the parameters of the
games, including basic information such as when the war occurs, or the conditions and assumptions
incorporated into the game. Many DOD wargames are set far in the future—not infrequently 20 years in
the future—to grapple with future acquisition questions that often play out over decades. References to
losses or challenges may not refer to operational outcomes, such as which side achieved its objectives.
is is not surprising since those wargames are classified, and the restrictions are intended to keep
sensitive data from potential adversaries. However, restrictions on describing game parameters make
it impossible for outsiders to judge why the outcomes occurred, whether the game assumptions were
reasonable, and whether alternative assumptions might produce dierent outcomes. Further, many
of the reported results appear self-serving, as they support programs favored by the wargaming
agency. Classified wargames also often focus on challenging cases, even if those cases are not
particularly likely, to test the limits of the U.S. military.
Without transparency and independent assessment of the assumptions, it is impossible to judge a
game’s credibility.
The Need for a Wargame Examining Operational Outcomes
is project fills a void in the literature by providing an unclassified analysis of operational outcomes if
China attempted to invade Taiwan. is is important for three reasons.
56 Copp, “‘It Failed Miserably’: After Wargaming Loss, Joint Chiefs Are Overhauling How the US Military Will
Fight.”
57 James Kitfield, “‘We’re Going to Lose Fast’: U.S. Air Force Held a Wargame at Started with a Chinese
Biological Attack,” Yahoo News, March 10, 2021, https://news.yahoo.com/were-going-to-lose-fast-us-air-
force-held-a-war-game-that-started-with-a-chinese-biological-attack-170003936.html. See also, John A.
Tirpak, “Wargame Ends Better with ‘Trans – Domain ‘Moves Plugged in, Hinote Says,” Air and Space Forces
Magazine, September 28, 2022, https://www.airandspaceforces.com/wargame-ends-better-with-trans-
domain-moves-plugged-in-hinote-says.
58 Kitfield, “‘We’re Going to Lose Fast’: U.S. Air Force Held a Wargame at Started with a Chinese Biological
Attack.”
20 | Cancian, Cancian, and Heginbotham
First, there is disagreement about whether a defense of Taiwan could be successful. Any policy
discussion must begin with baseline assumptions and resulting outcomes against which to measure
change. e nature of the policy discussion depends heavily on the baseline. If China can take Taiwan
in a day, that produces a dierent discussion than if Taiwan can hold out for weeks while the United
States and its partners deploy forces.
Second, by examining a wide variety of scenarios, the project can provide insights into the most
important conditions for success.
Finally, the project provides the necessary descriptions and data for the broader national security
community to discuss these critical issues of war and peace, deterrence, and national commitment.
e Pentagon’s classified wargames do not help this broader discussion. Decisions relating to the
defense of Taiwan are not just technical but involve judgments about values, priorities, and trade-os.
is project facilitates that discussion.
This project fills a void in the literature by providing an
unclassified analysis of operational outcomes if China
attempted to invade Taiwan.
What the Project Does Not Do
Because the project assesses the prospects of a Chinese military invasion of Taiwan, it does not
investigate other strategies that might be attractive. For example, China might blockade Taiwan and try
to achieve its goals without an amphibious assault and all the attendant risks.
59
Similarly, the United
States might avoid a direct military confrontation but instead blockade China, intending the long-term
pain to force the Chinese government to relinquish its gains. In some instances, the players might
want to use nuclear weapons.
China might bombard Taiwan for an extended period before launching an attack. is would allow
China to isolate Taiwan, grind down Taiwan’s air and naval forces, and assemble a fleet of merchant
ships to act as decoys and “missile sponges” in an attack. e historical analogy would be German air
attacks on Great Britain in the summer of 1940. Even though the ocean barrier was narrow, Germany
59 For an argument in favor of blockade as China’s preferred strategy, see, for example, Charles Hutzler, “China
Drills around Taiwan Give Hints about Its Strategy,” Wall Street Journal, August 4, 2022, https://www.wsj.com/
articles/chinas-drills-around-taiwan-give-hint-about-its-strategy-11659633265.
21 | The First Battle of the Next War
recognized that risks were great if opposing air and naval assets still operated.
60
Each alternative approach has strengths and weaknesses. All entail less military risk and might be
more attractive to a cautious Chinese leadership. e project does not take a position on what action is
most likely. Indeed, there is no certainty that China will undertake any military action at all. However,
invasion is the most dangerous threat to Taiwan and is thus the first course of action that needs to be
analyzed, hence the relevance and importance of the current project.
e teams play as military command authorities rather than civilian commanders in chief. us, there is
no political and nuclear decisionmaking within each game iteration by the teams. However, varying the
structure of scenarios allows analysis of some alternative approaches in these areas. (e variables are
discussed in detail in Chapter 5). For example, in some scenarios, concerns about nuclear escalation led
to rules of engagement prohibiting the United States from attacking the Chinese mainland.
Finally, the project does not make recommendations about U.S. Taiwan policy. is project assessed the
potential costs of maintaining Taiwan’s autonomy but does not examine the benefits. Many commentators
note the moral value of preserving a democracy of 23 million people and that a China-controlled Taiwan
would complicate the defense of regional allies, including Japan and South Korea. An evaluation of U.S.
policy requires an assessment of benefits and costs that is beyond the scope of this project.
60 In the Chinese literature on military campaigns, joint firepower strike campaigns (联合火力打击战役) can
be employed independently or as part of landing, blockade, or other type of campaign. e goal is to strike
key points (e.g., adversary air bases or C2) in order to isolate the battle area. See, for example, Ian Easton,
“China’s Top Five War Plans,” Project 2049 Institute, January 2019, https://project2049.net/wp-content/
uploads/2019/01/Chinas-Top-Five-War-Plans_Ian_Easton_Project2049.pdf; and Roger Cli et al., Shaking the
Heavens and Splitting the Earth: Chinese Air Force Employment Concepts in the 21st Century (Santa Monica, CA:
RAND Corporation, 2011), https://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG915.html.
22 | Cancian, Cancian, and Heginbotham
e graphic below shows how the current analysis fits into a broader assessment of U.S.-Chinese
relations. It is an important element but only one aspect of such an assessment.
The project does not make recommendations about U.S.
Taiwan policy. . . . [Such an] evaluation of U.S. policy
requires an assessment of benefits and costs that is beyond
the scope of this project.
Figure 1: How an Assessment of a Possible Invasion Fits into a Broader Net Assessment of
U.S.-Chinese Competition
Source: CSIS.
Net Assessment of U.S.-China Conflict
Demography Economics
Military
South China Sea
Senkaku Dispute
Taiwan
Military Elements of U.S.-China Conflict
Military Conflict over Taiwan
Blockade
Island Seizure
Invasion
23 | The First Battle of the Next War
2
Wargaming as a Method
T
he project sought to produce a wargame that was transparent and analytically sound, such
that decisionmakers and the public could use it to make decisions about policy. is chapter
discusses the design decisions intended to produce such a game. A list of relevant terms and
their definitions is in Appendix B, which details relevant wargaming lexicon.
When analyzing military aairs, there has been a historical tension between quantitative modeling and
qualitative judgments. Wargaming oers one tool to combine these two approaches. For a wargame
aimed at analysis (instead of participant education or other purposes), quantitative models provide
the best tools to base adjudications on because of their transparency and rigor. e decisionmaking of
players adds human judgment to the interaction of these quantitative models, allowing for plausible
sequences of events to be explored. To aggregate models and human decisionmaking in a structured
way that addresses uncertain assumptions, analytic wargames should be varied and iterated. e
results of a series of wargames thus constructed oer insights into the distribution of outcomes for a
future conflict and how key variables impact this distribution. While it is not predictive, it provides
data on plausible outcomes and facilitates informed analysis.
Quantitative Models vs. Qualitative Judgments
e first decision in beginning an assessment of a hypothetical future conflict is whether to
use quantitative models, qualitative judgments, or some combination of the two. To assess the
complex set of operations that would constitute an invasion of Taiwan, wargaming oers a good
mix of rigor and transparency.
24 | Cancian, Cancian, and Heginbotham
Any attempt to analyze the future relies on judgments about uncertainty. is is especially true
for warfare, which is chaotic and contingent on chance. For example, although there have been
amphibious landings before, they are too few to generate quantitative models allowing for statistical
confidence. Even issues of weapon performance, which should be the most amenable to analysis based
on testing and modeling, require some judgment because such testing is conducted under peacetime
conditions; there is, for example, no real-world data on the performance of a Chinese YJ-12 anti-ship
cruise missile against an Arleigh Burke-class destroyer. is uncertainty is only magnified when trying
to appraise key factors such as the relative morale and training of forces. Every analysis of future war
must therefore approach the problem with humility.
Uncertainty aside, there are more basic analytic faults or pitfalls to be avoided. First are physically
impossible faults: a prediction about a U.S.-China war that has 30 Ford-class carriers in the 2026 U.S.
order of battle (OOB) is not factual. Second are faults that are physically possible but that overlook
operational history, such as by having all 11 Ford-class carriers show up in a U.S.-China war without
factoring some of them being in deep maintenance. While it is physically possible for the United States
to have all 11 Ford-class carriers ready, such an analysis is less plausible than an analysis that accounts
for historical factors, such as maintenance cycles and operational readiness. Most reasonable analytic
disagreements occur in this space. ird is inflexibility about variation in assumptions: for example,
ignoring the amount of warning available to the United States would miss important variation in how
many carriers show up, where, and when. Any analysis based on one model or wargame would have
diculty addressing this problem. Fourth, analysis might restrict variables to quantifiable factors
without exploring human decisionmaking: a model that has all carriers charge into the fight without
concern for losses or changing tactics would ignore the human decisionmaking critical in warfare.
Finally, analysis that is not transparent is impossible to dissect and debate. When considering methods
of analysis and comparing them, all these factors must be considered.
One of the most basic ways in which future conflicts are analyzed involves unstructured or loosely
structured judgments. Unstructured judgments usually refer to sources about the relative strength
of the concerned militaries and postulate a course of events, possibly based on analogy to an episode
from military history. Loosely structured judgments may follow from simple quantitative comparisons
(e.g., the total size of the contending militaries or the number of combat aircraft) that lack a structured
assessment of how forces might interact dynamically over relevant time and space. While such
judgments are easy to make, they allow little basis for discussion and lack replicability. When one
person’s judgment conflicts with another’s, there is little ground for resolution. is leads to the
requirement for methods of structured judgment.
Methods of structured judgment, such as net assessment or the mission planning process, are helpful
because they ensure that critical variables are not overlooked, and they allow for debate and scrutiny.
For mission planning, junior ocers in the U.S. Army and Marine Corps are taught the METT-TC
mnemonic (Mission, Enemy, Terrain, Troops, Time, Civilians) to avoid forgetting critical factors. ere
are many similar and more complicated planning processes across the services that all aim to structure
judgment about a military situation. Net assessment, although usually used for strategic and longer-
term evaluations, represents another methodology that is less rigid than military mission planning
but still structured. For example, Eliot Cohen describes net assessment as “the appraisal of military
25 | The First Battle of the Next War
balances” that operates through examining five critical questions.
61
Cohen contrasts net assessment
with quantitatively oriented methods of analysis.
Military forces can also be analyzed with quantitative models. A model is “a mathematical or otherwise
logically rigorous representation of a system or a system’s behavior.”
62
While even loosely structured
judgments may use numbers to support their argument, modeling adds rigor and transparency to these
numbers and their interactions. Former secretary of defense Robert McNamara formalized the use of
systems analysis in the DOD, principally to better inform the acquisitions process.
63
During the Cold
War, unified models (e.g., TACWAR and CEM) were developed to assess entire theater campaigns.
64
ese employed representations of ground attrition and movement, supplemented by simple
calculations about the support provided by airpower.
65
Some current campaign models (for example,
JICM and STORM) incorporate sophisticated interactions and can employ imposing wills. However, all
their results are classified and only run once, thus rendering them unsuitable for public discussion and
sensitivity analysis.
While modeling of future conflicts can be done under the umbrella of systems analysis, in the
scholarly community it is usually conducted in the framework of campaign analysis. Campaign
analysis is “a method that involves the use of a model and techniques for managing uncertainty to
answer questions about military operations.”
66
While campaign analysis has been practiced by many
scholars over the last several decades, it has recently been formalized by Rachel Tecott and Andrew
Halterman.
67
e essence of campaign analysis is specifying a scenario, building a model based on
61 Eliot Cohen, “Net Assessment: An American Approach,” Jaee Center for Strategic Studies, April 1990, 4, 10,
https://www.inss.org.il/publication/net-assessment-an-american-approach/.
62 Paul K. Davis and Donald Blumenthal, e Base of Sand Problem: A White Paper on the State of Military Combat
Modeling (Arlington, VA: Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, 1991), 1, https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/
citations/ADA255880.
63 Stephen Rosen, “Systems Analysis and the Quest for Rational Defense,” Public Interest no. 76 (Summer
1984): 3, https://www.proquest.com/scholarly-journals/systems-analysis-quest-rational-defense/
docview/59916060/se-2.
64 TACWAR and CEM (Concepts Evaluation Model) were both theater-level combat simulation models
developed originally in the 1970s and used into the 1990s. TACWAR was developed by the Institute for
Defense Analyses, and CEM was developed by the Center for Army Analysis. ese were two-sided models
that used the Lanchester’s laws to calculate attrition.
65 See, for example, Barry Posen, “Measuring the European Conventional Balance: Coping with Complexity in
reat Assessment,” International Security 9, no. 3 (Winter 1984/85), 47–88, doi:10.2307/2538587; and Joshua
M. Epstein, Strategy and Force Planning: e Case of the Persian Gulf (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution,
1987).
66 Rachel Tecott and Andrew Halterman, “e Case for Campaign Analysis: A Method for Studying Military
Operations,” International Security 45, no. 4 (Spring 2021), 9, doi:10.1162/isec_a_00408.
67 John J. Mearsheimer, “Why the Soviets Can’t Win Quickly in Central Europe,” International Security 7, no.
1 (1982): 3–39, doi:10.2307/2538686; Joshua M. Epstein, Measuring Military Power: e Soviet Air reat
to Europe (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984); Barry R. Posen, “Measuring the European
Conventional Balance: Coping with Complexity in reat Assessment,” International Security 9, no. 3 (1984):
47–88, doi:10.2307/2538587; Joshua M. Epstein, “Dynamic Analysis and the Conventional Balance in
Europe,” International Security 12, no. 4 (1988): 154–165, doi:10.2307/2538999; and Barry R. Posen, “Is NATO
Decisively Outnumbered?,” International Security 12, no. 4 (1988): 186–202, doi:10.2307/2539002.
26 | Cancian, Cancian, and Heginbotham
historical data, running that model, and analyzing the model for sensitivity to variation. Campaign
analysis is particularly suited to studying questions of suciency, such as the adequacy of certain force
postures to succeed in a particular military operation.
68
More broadly, this diculty contributed to debate between Cohen, who supported a broader
framework of net assessment to address these and other uncertainties, and John Mearsheimer and
Barry Posen, who supported using campaign analysis to evaluate specific operations analysis.
69
Ideally, conflict analysis would combine the rigor and transparency of campaign analysis with human
decisionmaking. One way to do this is with wargaming.
Dierent Wargames for Dierent Purposes
While wargaming has a long history, its relationship to analysis and military decisionmaking is still
unsettled. Wargames are increasingly used as pedagogic and research tools at universities, think tanks,
and government agencies to examine security questions from crisis stability to regional conflicts.
70
Despite calls to increase the use of wargaming in policy analysis, it is often unclear what such usage
should look like and how it best aids the national security debate.
71
e current debate on the utility of wargames centers around their purpose. Experimental wargames
aim to better understand human decisionmaking in a specific context. Educational wargames aim to
foster decisionmaking simulations for military and political elites. Finally, analytic wargaming aims
to analyze a military problem to better inform policy. Each of these represents a path that this project
might have followed.
Experimental wargaming aims to aid political scientists in the study of decisionmaking processes,
particularly in international relations. Political science’s emphasis on experimentation and the desire
to understand the micro-level processes of international wargames have led to the exploration of
68 Charles L. Glaser and Chaim Kaufmann, “What Is the Oense-Defense Balance and Can We Measure It?,”
International Security 22, no. 4 (1998): 75, doi:10.2307/2539240.
69 For the debate, see Eliot A. Cohen, “Toward Better Net Assessment: Rethinking the European Conventional
Balance,” International Security 13, no. 1 (1988): 50–89, doi:10.2307/2538896; and the response by
Mearsheimer, Posen, and Cohen, John J. Mearsheimer, Barry R. Posen, and Eliot A. Cohen, “Reassessing Net
Assessment,” International Security 13, no. 4 (1989): 128–79, https://www.jstor.org/stable/2538782.
70 A host of new wargaming organizations have been established at universities, including: Georgetown
University Wargaming Society (established 2020); MIT Wargaming Working Group (established at the MIT
Center for International Studies, 2019); King’s College Wargaming Network (established within the School of
Security Studies, 2018); and the SAIS Wargaming Club.
71 War on the Rocks. “Revitalizing Wargaming Is Necessary to Be Prepared for Future Wars,” December 8, 2015.
https://warontherocks.com/2015/12/revitalizing-wargaming-is-necessary-to-be-prepared-for-future-wars/.;
Reddie, Andrew W., Bethany L. Goldblum, Kiran Lakkaraju, Jason Reinhardt, Michael Nacht, and Laura
Epifanovskaya. “Next-Generation Wargames.” Science 362, no. 6421 (December 21, 2018): 1362–64. https://
doi.org/10.1126/science.aav2135; Hirst, Aggie. “States of Play: Evaluating the Renaissance in US Military
Wargaming.” Critical Military Studies 0, no. 0 (January 9, 2020): 1–21. https://doi.org/10.1080/23337486.2019.
1707497.
27 | The First Battle of the Next War
experimental wargaming.
72
For example, Erik Lin-Greenberg conducted a series of wargames while
varying whether a drone or a manned aircraft were shot down and, if a manned aircraft were shot
down, what happened to the pilot.
73
By manipulating a key variable and recording the discussions that
ensued, the experimental wargame shed light on the ways that losses of drones might aect escalation
risk dierently than the losses of manned aircraft.
Educational wargaming aims to prepare leaders for decisionmaking in war. In the words of Peter Perla,
“e choice of the best weapons and the men who will skillfully employ them is a major concern for
the military and the nation. Wargames and wargaming are important tools for helping to sort through
such choices.”
74
In another formulation, Perla and McGrady write that wargaming’s strength is “its ability
to enable individual participants to transform themselves by making them more open to internalizing
their experiences in a game.”
75
Francis J. McHugh argued for a subdivision between wargames that
provide military commanders with decisionmaking experience and those that provide decisionmaking
information.
76
For example, playing a game about Napoleonic warfare might give contemporary military
commanders decisionmaking experience, without giving them decisionmaking information about the
war that they might have to fight in the future. Educational wargaming might therefore be subdivided
into “experiential,” focusing on providing decisionmaking experience, and “current operations-oriented”
games that focus on decisionmaking information.
77
Regardless, educational wargames broadly favor the
development of players over the use of wargames as analytic tools.
Finally, analytic wargames exist to provide data about a specific problem that can be analyzed. Jon
Compton has been the main proponent of this approach, calling for wargamers to take analytical
ownership of national security problems.
78
To do this, he argues for an analytic architecture that builds
models based on evidence, which then feed into a wargame design that is vetted by subject matter
experts; this game is then played iteratively by a small group of people to facilitate analysis.
79
e use
of quantitative models (in the sense of those used in campaign analysis) in wargames has not been a
72 e best definition and discussion of methodology for experimental wargaming appears in
Erik Lin-Greenberg, Reid B.C. Pauly, and Jacquelyn G. Schneider, “Wargaming for International
Relations Research,” European Journal of International Relations 28, no. 1 (March 1, 2022): 83–109,
doi:10.1177/13540661211064090.
73 Erik Lin-Greenberg, “Wargame of Drones: Remotely Piloted Aircraft and Crisis Escalation,” Journal of Conflict
Resolution 66, no. 10 (June 2022), doi:10.1177/00220027221106960.
74 Peter Perla, Peter Perla’s e Art of Wargaming: A Guide for Professionals and Hobbyists, Ed. John Curry (lulu.
comSecond Edition, 2012), 21.
75 Peter P. Perla, and ED McGrady, “Why Wargaming Works,” Naval War College Review 64, no. 3 (2011): 112.
76 Francis J. McHugh, U.S. Navy Fundamentals of Wargaming (New York: Skyhorse, 2013).
77 is distinction is also made in the U.S. Naval War College’s Wargaming Handbook. See: Shawn Burns ed.,
Wargamers’ Handbook: A Guide for Professional Wargamers (Newport, RI: United States Naval War College
Wargaming Department, 2022), 4, https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/AD1001766.pdf.
78 Jon Compton, “e Obstacles on the Road to Better Analytical Wargaming,” War on the Rocks, October 9,
2019, https://warontherocks.com/2019/10/the-obstacles-on-the-road-to-better-analytical-wargaming/.
79 “What Is Analytical Wargaming with Jon Compton,” YouTube video, posted by Georgetown University
Wargaming Society, September 25, 2020, 1:36:11, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=M-sENrcBPJY.
28 | Cancian, Cancian, and Heginbotham
feature of many DOD wargames, causing some debate within the DOD wargaming community.
80
e crux of contemporary debate on wargaming centers on whether educational wargames are
more helpful than analytic wargames for the national security enterprise. While both sides decry
wargames that are a “bunch of guys sitting around a table,” they disagree on how to move forward.
81
Perla advanced the idea of a “cycle of research” that integrates wargaming, analysis, and military
exercises to illuminate the decisions, data, and actions relevant to contemporary warfighting.
82
at is,
wargames raise questions which are then to be explored through military exercises and mathematical
analysis. Perla and co-authors reiterated the belief that wargaming could not take analytical ownership
of a problem but that it should be mutually constitutive with exercises and analysis in informing
policymakers, who would themselves own the problem.
83
In line with Perla, McGrady argues that
wargames function best as a storytelling device and not as a method of analysis.
84
In riposte, Compton
has written a fictional juxtaposition of his method with seminar-style educational wargaming.
85
In the view of this report’s authors, dierent wargame purposes are not better or worse than others;
the problem arises when a wargame is designed for one purpose but employed for another. When a
wargame is designed to educate participants but is used as a basis of analysis, it results in wasted eort
and faulty conclusions. e debate is not entirely a matter of misperception; some wargamers believe
that wargames cannot serve certain purposes. Despite these disagreements, all agree that aligning the
structure of a wargame to the purpose of a project is a key step in any wargaming eort.
Principles of Analytic Wargaming
e purpose of this project—to analyze the dynamics of a conventional invasion of Taiwan by China—led
CSIS’s eorts to follow Compton’s analytical wargaming approach. e project does not purport to predict
the future with certainty. However, the large number of game iterations, the variation of scenarios, and
the adjudication based on evidence-based rules mean that policymakers and the public can reasonably
use the range of outputs for making judgments about warfighting dynamics and policy choices.
80 For example, see Peter Pellegrino explaining that he uses models to refer to how he gets players to
interact with the wargame, rather than a quantitative representation of reality. “Pellegrino: Modeling and
Games,” YouTube video, posted by PAXsims, September 11, 2020, 2:03:50, https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=vNYPH0HBh3U. is is not to say that his approach is not correct or helpful, but as discussed below,
it does not suit the purpose of this project.
81 Peter Perla, “Now Hear is - Improving Wargaming Is Worthwhile—and Smart,” U.S. Naval Institute, January
1, 2016, https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2016/january/now-hear-improving-wargaming-
worthwhile-and-smart.
82 Perla, Peter Perla's e Art of Wargaming, 252
83 Peter Perla et al., “Rolling the Iron Dice: From Analytical Wargaming to the Cycle of Research,” War on
the Rocks, October 21, 2019, https://warontherocks.com/2019/10/rolling-the-iron-dice-from-analytical-
wargaming-to-the-cycle-of-research/.
84 Ed McGrady, “Getting the Story Right about Wargaming,” War on the Rocks, November 8, 2019, https://
warontherocks.com/2019/11/getting-the-story-right-about-wargaming/.
85 Jon Compton, “A Tale of Two Wargames: An Entirely Fictitious Tale of Wargaming Woe and Tragedy,” War on
the Rocks, September 22, 2022, https://warontherocks.com/2022/09/a-tale-of-two-wargames-an-entirely-
fictitious-tale-of-wargaming-woe-and-tragedy/.
29 | The First Battle of the Next War
Integrating methods of campaign analysis with Compton’s suggestions for analytic wargaming, this
wargame:
▪ Used a variety of methods to create evidence-based models that determined adjudication;
▪ Integrated several models across domains to examine a campaign;
▪ Conducted many iterations with varied strategies by both sides;
▪ Varied key assumptions to examine their impacts on the outcome;
▪ Used players to account for human decisionmaking, explore many plausible pathways, and to
inject variation into scenario outcomes; and
▪ Nested the wargame in broader analysis.
Using the Method of History and the Method of P
k
s to Create
Evidence-based Rules
e most important factor in making an analytic wargame generate plausible outcomes is for the rules
to be based on empirical data. e rules of educational wargames do not have to conform to reality in
order to teach students about strategy. However, rules are how analytic wargames model reality. As
mentioned above, it is impossible for the rules to be entirely certain because of the paucity of real-life
cases of twenty-first century warfare. However, wargames based on rigorous modeling that recognizes
physical constraints and operational realities will generate analytically valid insights.
ere are two broad approaches to creating models: the method of history and the method of P
k
s. is
project used both.
e method of history models the results of future military operations by making analogies with past
military operations at the appropriate level of analysis. For example, this may include using the sorties
per day of aircraft from Desert Storm to project the sortie rate per day of aircraft in a future conflict
or allowing players to move land forces based on historical advance rates. is approach is popular
both in campaign analysis and in commercial wargaming. Dunnigan, in a foreword to Perla, argues:
“Basically, you obtain good games by paying attention to past experience (history) and letting the chips
fall where they may.”
86
However, history is not self-explanatory, and analogies can be misleading. A
key question is one posed by Barry Posen: “What is this a case of?” For example, modeling the rate
of advance for an infantry unit in urban terrain during heavy combat on a historical breakthrough
operation by a mechanized force across plains would be inappropriate.
e P
k
s method models the results of future military operations by assigning probabilities and values to the
weapons systems and aggregating these capabilities up to the appropriate level. “P
k
s” means the probability
of kill, a common measure of theoretical weapon ecacy. Every military operation is the result of an
infinite number of micro-level interactions, such as the detection of enemies, the employment of weapons,
and the result of a hit. While every interaction cannot be modeled, the method of P
k
s tries to model the
likely eects of major weapons and their eects. is is more suited for air, naval, and missile combat than
for ground combat. Data about the probabilities of detection, weapon hits, and weapons eects can be
86 James F. Dunnigan, in foreword to Perla, Peter Perla’s e Art of Wargaming, 9.
30 | Cancian, Cancian, and Heginbotham
taken from historical data or weapons testing data. In the absence of better evidence, values can be taken
from subject matter experts. ese probabilities can be calculated separately or aggregated into a cumulative
“probability of kill,” or Pk. With these values in hand, researchers model individual interactions, then
aggregate the results of these interactions to the appropriate level for the analysis (e.g., individual dogfights,
meetings between two aircraft flights, or even squadron-on-squadron engagements). Games conducted
during the interwar period at the Naval War College addressed this problem by modeling “hit probabilities,”
derived from real-world tests with bomber aircraft and warship guns, and then embedding those models
into the larger operational wargames.
87
e method of history and the method of P
k
s both have strengths and weaknesses. e method of
history does a good job of ensuring that models account for operational realities: allowing a tank
battalion to advance according to the maximum speed of a tank, for example, ignores the operational
reality that it is much harder to organize and direct an armored force. e method of history deals
with problems of aggregation and unknown factors by getting plausible values at the appropriate level
of analysis. In contrast, the method of P
k
s struggles to deal with these operational factors and cannot
account for unquantifiable factors such as morale and friction. However, the method of history is not
as good at accounting for changes in weaponry and technology or situations that lack good analogies;
in contrast, the method of P
k
s excels here. For example, there is no historical precedent for mass
precision-guided tactical ballistic missile attacks against defended targets that would allow the method
of history to work. e method of P
k
s can be used to extrapolate upward from historical cases of single
ballistic missile launches and from testing data on interceptors. e mixed virtues and vices of these
methods means that researchers must be aware of and use each as appropriate.
88
Anti-ship Missile Interception
How frequently do anti-ship cruise missiles hit their targets? is project combines the methods of history
and Pks to generate rules that are rigorous and evidence based.
First, based on missile attacks in Desert Storm, the project team estimates that 15 percent of missiles either
fail to launch or otherwise malfunction.
89
e project team assumes that defenders will have sucient warning to launch interceptors. e curvature
of the earth restricts a radar on a 15-meter mast from seeing a missile skimming 5 meters above the
sea until the missile is 20 kilometers from the ship. Depending on the tactical situation, the defending
ships might also have airborne early warning (AEW) or organic helicopters to aid in initial detection. is
project judges that this initial detection is sucient to alert the crew, but that the defenders only have one
87 Norman Friedman, Winning a Future War: Wargaming and Victory in the Pacific War (Washington, DC:
Department of the Navy, 2019).
88 An excellent example of this is Brian McCue, U Boats in the Bay of Biscay: An Essay in Operations Analysis
(Bloomington, IL: Xlibris Publishing, 2008). While he does not use these terms, McCue constructs two models
of U-Boat search using what this project calls the method of history and the method of P
k
s, explains their
functions, and compares the results.
89 A GAO report (GAO/NSIAD-97-134, 140) states that 282 of 307 attempted Tomahawk launches achieved
flight. A separate report states that 35 of 39 (90 percent) of CALCMs achieved flight and proceeded to their
targets (GAO/NSIAD-95-116, 24).
31 | The First Battle of the Next War
engagement opportunity against a supersonic cruise missile traveling at approximately 2,400 km/hr.
90
ey
would launch two interceptors in a salvo against each incoming missile.
91
e project team further estimates that each interceptor launched by the defender has a 70 percent
chance of hitting an incoming anti-ship cruise missile.
92
While this number is supported in a variety of
sources, it does strike the authors as optimistic. One excursion case explores what would happen if missile
interception were not as eective. With two interceptors launched at each supersonic anti-ship cruise
missile, there is therefore a 91 percent chance that at least one interceptor will work.
93
Next, the project estimates that 10 percent of anti-ship missiles will experience terminal guidance failures.
is 10 percent miss rate is taken from the historical record showing that 8.7 percent of anti-ship cruise
missiles have missed undefended civilian targets.
94
Finally, terminal interception and electronic warfare will have a combined 70 percent eectiveness, based
on historic attacks against military ships without interceptors.
95
e project aggregates these probabilities into a table for game play. is combines the 15 percent failure to
90 is is also true against ballistic missiles. Against subsonic cruise missiles, the project assesses that defenders
would have enough time for two engagement opportunities, allowing for a ‘Shoot-Look-Shoot-Shoot’
doctrine.
91 e project created a “fat-tailed” distribution where there is a 5 percent chance of catastrophic failure leading
to no detection of incoming missiles. Smith gives a 10 percent chance for detection of incoming cruise
missiles in time for interception. See Roy M. Smith, “Using Kill-Chain Analysis to Develop Surface Ship
CONOPS to Defend against Anti-Ship Cruise Missiles,” Naval Postgraduate School, 2010, https://apps.dtic.mil/
sti/pdfs/ADA524758.pdf.
92 See 82 percent eectiveness for AEGIS, “Ballistic Missile Defense Intercept Flight Test Record,” Missile
Defense Agency, 2020, https://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Interactive/2018/11-2019-Missile-Defense-
Review/ballistic-missile-defense-intercept-flight-test-record-UPDATED.pdf; an estimate of .7 in a RAND
report, Walter L. Perry et al., Measures of Eectiveness for the Information-Age Navy: e Eects of Network-Centric
Operations on Combat Outcomes (Washington, DC: April 2002), 34, https://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_
reports/MR1449.html; a wide range of .5-1.0 provided by JHUAPL, William G. Bath, “Overview of Platforms
and Combat Systems,” Johns Hopkins APL Technical Digest 35, no. 2 (2020), 9, https://www.jhuapl.edu/Content/
techdigest/pdf/V35-N02/35-02-Bath.pdf; a Naval Postgraduate School thesis, Smith, “Using Kill-Chain
Analysis to Develop Surface Ship CONOPS to Defend against Anti-Ship Cruise Missiles”; and a .75 estimate
in a Canadian analysis, Dale E. Blodgett et al., “A Tabu Search Heuristic for Resource Management in Naval
Warfare,” Journal of Heuristics 9, no. 2 (March 2003): 158, doi:10.1023/A:1022525529778.
93 e calculation does not distinguish between Standard-Missile 2, Enhanced Sea Sparrow Missile, and Rolling
Airframe Missile.
94 John C. Schulte, “An Analysis of the Historical Eectiveness of Anti-Ship Cruise Missiles in Littoral Warfare,”
Naval Postgraduate School, September 1994, x, https://calhoun.nps.edu/handle/10945/27962.
95 While modern navies rely on interceptors to defend themselves, the record of successful combat use
seems minimal. An anti-ship missile targeting the USS Missouri was intercepted by a British destroyer, but
only after the missile had been defeated by cha: JWH1975, “Missile Attack on Battleship USS Missouri,”
Wwiiafterwwii, July 21, 2019, https://wwiiafterwwii.wordpress.com/2019/07/21/missile-attack-on-
battleship-uss-missouri/. e only successful interception of anti-ship cruise missiles with missiles seems
to have been the USS Mason. See: Sam LaGrone, “USS Mason Fired 3 Missiles to Defend from Yemen Cruise
Missiles Attack,” USNI News, October 11, 2016, https://news.usni.org/2016/10/11/uss-mason-fired-3-
missiles-to-defend-from-yemen-cruise-missiles-attack.
32 | Cancian, Cancian, and Heginbotham
launch, 91 percent chance of success with interceptors, 70 percent eectiveness of terminal defense and
electronic warfare, and 10 percent miss rate. e team further adds on two “fat-tails”: a 5 percent chance
that the attacker has made a catastrophic error (e.g., gross target location error) and a 5 percent chance that
the defender has made a catastrophic error (e.g., no AEW is overhead, or the crew does not react in time).
is generates the table below. For each salvo of 25 incoming supersonic cruise missiles, a 20-sided dice is
rolled against the table to determine the number of “leakers,” or missiles that hit ships.
Table 1: Interception of Supersonic Anti-ship Cruise Missiles
Probability 30% 35% 15% 10%
5%
Die Rolls (d20) 1-6 7-13 14-17 18-19
20
# of Hits on Task
Force
0 1 2 3 Destroyed
In a simple demonstration, 24 Chinese H-6 bombers launch a total of 96 YJ-12 supersonic anti-ship cruise
missiles (grouped into four missile “salvoes” of 25 missiles each) at a U.S. surface action group of two
Arleigh Burke-class destroyers and a Ticonderoga-class cruiser.
96
Rolling four 20-sided dice (one for each
salvo) shows: 13, 3, 15, and 2. Referencing the table, three missiles leak through and hit U.S. ships. e
project team assigns the hits randomly, this time getting that one missile hits each ship. is U.S. surface
action group is now combat ineective with all its ships either sunk or not mission capable. is serves as a
good illustration how, even using optimistic assumptions, it is very hard to defend surface ships.
Whether the method of P
k
s or history is used, these models can provide a grounding for plausible rules
about combat. For example, a model of the result of two squadrons of aircraft can be used to generate a
table of possible outcomes for such a combat in the game. A table of probable outcomes is preferable to a
deterministic result because of the fat-tailed nature of combat results throughout history. roughout this
paper are examples of models and how they determined rules in the wargame. Most models for campaign
analysis need only be aggregated (or disaggregated) to a level appropriate for a wargame. In that form, the
wargame can serve to interact these models in an appropriate way for analysis.
MODEL INTERACTIONS
e transparency of modeling enables observers to review and vet models but requires a certain degree
of simplification.
97
is is easier to achieve when modeling a single domain (e.g., a ground campaign or
air campaign) or when the variety of engagement types is limited (e.g., a submarine campaign involving
passage through an acoustic barrier followed by ship hunting). As the variety of engagement types
increases, the complexity of models may increase geometrically, and the diculty of clear exposition and
vetting will grow proportionately. is is true even when strategy, or the allocation of assets to particular
96 While an H-6K/J has six hardpoints, two of these would likely be used for electronic countermeasure pods.
See: H I Sutton, “China’s New Aircraft Carrier Killer Is World’s Largest Air-Launched Missile,” Naval News,
November 1, 2020, https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2020/11/chinas-new-aircraft-carrier-killer-is-
worlds-largest-air-launched-missile/.
97 As models become more complicated, they require more investment by readers to understand, making them
less transparent.
33 | The First Battle of the Next War
tasks, is held constant throughout the model “run.”
Not only does the number of sub-routines increase when modeling a menu of operations within a single
campaign, but decision rules also increase. When modeling a single type of interaction, there may be no
need for the model to reallocate resources to new tasks. When modeling an air superiority campaign, for
example, combat aircraft will remain allocated to the air superiority task (e.g., through oensive counter-
air) for the duration of the model “run.” In cases where two tasks might be possible, a model can apply
simple algorithms. So, in the preceding example, a model might assume that when a greater than 2:1
superiority is achieved in the number of aircraft “on station” in the air superiority fight, any additional
aircraft will be dedicated to another task, such as ground support. However, such algorithms can quickly
add complexity when they become numerous, which may ultimately undermine transparency.
98
Given these issues, most campaign analyses have addressed the critical portions of larger campaigns.
While it is possible to model operations down to the size of boots worn by each soldier, such a level of
complication would be unlikely to shed light on the course of the wider campaign. However, precision
is not the same as accuracy.
99
e modeler relies on their judgment and the literature to identify which
areas demand precision, and which can be treated abstractly. With these areas identified, they can be
modeled in turn. RAND’s U.S.-China Military Scorecard, for example, contains chapters that address 10
critical aspects of the larger U.S. China competition, but it does not attempt to knit them together into an
overarching whole. In the academic domain, too, there have been several attempts to model individual
aspects of conflict in Asia but no attempts to model an entire conflict, despite the fact that China is the
so-called “pacing threat” for the United States. Wargaming can help with this holistic modeling.
Of course, wargames do not inherently require dierent models. A basic wargame might have players
control only one type of force, such as aircraft. All aircraft need not be similar, but they need to operate
within the framework of the same model, which would specify an attrition rate that occurs when
dierent types of aircraft meet.
However, such a basic wargame is appropriate only if the chosen pieces are the only significant parts of
a conflict. Surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) are a critical element of contemporary air combat; a wargame
or model of air combat that failed to account for SAMs would be incomplete. e same is true of major
surface combatants, which largely function as floating SAMs. But if surface combatants are included, then
the major ways in which they can be attrited must also be included: other surface ships, submarines, and
anti-ship missiles. is produces a complex system wherein dozens of models must interact.
Analytic wargaming allows models to interact in an intelligent way. e models-based rules create
grounds for adjudicating the results of various interactions, from what happens when an aircraft
squadron flies into an SAM to the likelihood that a submarine sinks a surface ship. e specific events
that generate scenarios for adjudication come from intelligent decisionmaking from human players.
An attempt to simulate an entire war as an ensemble of models would likely see extreme results from
actions that humans would recognize as blunders. For example, one could model aircraft attacking
ships with the longest-range munition they have, while ships defend themselves with their longest-
98 Discussed by Tecott and Halterman, “e Case for Campaign Analysis.”
99 Peter P. Perla, “Peter Perla on Prediction,” (presentation, Connections 2017, Quantico, VA, 2017), https://
slideplayer.com/slide/14003660/.
34 | Cancian, Cancian, and Heginbotham
range munition. At some point, the aircraft run out of their longest-range missiles, while a significant
inventory of the ship’s longest-range missiles remains. e merciless logic of the model drives the
aircraft into the ships to be completely annihilated; an intelligent player on a wargame would redirect
the aircraft to a dierent target. A wargame allows for some check on these interactions. Furthermore,
analytic wargaming allows for flexibility with an inherently modular approach to modeling conflict.
Depending on the operations research that shapes the game rules, more models can be created for
elements that the literature finds to be important.
e results of these interactions between models provide data for analysts to form qualitative
judgments. For example, the air-to-air fight impacts anti-submarine warfare (ASW) by determining
what level of risk maritime patrol aircraft (MPA) face in various geographic areas. If the air-to-air fight
is going poorly for one side, their ASW eorts might suer accordingly because of less MPA coverage.
e quantitative results provide the basis for qualitative judgments about the eects of one domain
on another. By providing a way for rigorous and transparent models to interact in an intelligent way,
wargames provide a valuable aid to analysis.
Iteration to Examine a Variety of Strategies
Despite often being overlooked in modeling, no discussion of combat outcomes can ignore the strategies of
the respective commanders. For example, in 1939–40, the French outnumbered the Germans in troops and
equipment, including tanks. However, the best Anglo-French formations moved north as Germany struck
through the Ardennes to the south. e result was an encirclement of the French army and ultimately
French defeat. Generalship matters. Months after the fall of France, Germany’s own plans fell short during
the Battle of Britain. Although the Luftwae outnumbered the Royal Air Force, Luftwae leaders failed to
appreciate the significance of British radar stations and aerial command and control. As a result, they were
unable to translate their superiority in matériel into air superiority.
Nor are recent examples lacking. In the ongoing war between Russia and Ukraine, Russia enjoyed many
initial advantages, including larger and more modernized forces. Nevertheless, Russia’s initial plan for the
invasion, to include the occupation of Kiev, greatly exceeded the capacity of its forces.
While developing a comprehensive set of possible results is impossible, focusing on the most likely and
plausible interactions can produce an analytically sound and useful set of outcomes. With so many models
interacting, there is no way to exhaustively explore all the possible decision points short of a massive
computing eort. Even chess has a lower bound of 10120 possible games, despite only having 32 pieces and
64 legal positions.
100
e ability to exhaustively analyze a series of models by exploring all possible decisions
to see the distribution of possible outcomes likely lies in the distant future. Similarly, there are promising
eorts to train computers to play games through millions of iterations, such as AlphaStar.
101
While more
plausible in the near term, these eorts still require large teams of expert programmers. Short of a focused
government eort, this is not feasible for research.
However, iteration allows some of the most plausible lines of play to be explored. e project
100 Claude E. Shannon, “Programming a Computer for Playing Chess,” Philosophical Magazine 41, no. 314 (1950).
101 “AlphaStar: Mastering the Real-Time Strategy Game StarCraft II,” DeepMind, January 24, 2019, https://www.
deepmind.com/blog/alphastar-mastering-the-real-time-strategy-game-starcraft-ii.
35 | The First Battle of the Next War
generated these plausible lines of play by having many dierent players participate in game iterations.
To continue with the example of chess, there may be 10120 possible games, but most of those follow
nonsensical decisions, such as allowing a queen to be taken by a pawn. Moreover, while there are many
possible openings, almost all competitive openings follow the movement of the d- or e-pawn and eorts
to control the center. e goal of iterative wargaming should not be seen as an eort to exhaustively
explore all possible outcomes but rather as a way to assess the major lines of play that result from
intelligent decisionmaking.
Varying strategies over multiple iterations of a wargame generates data on the likely interactions between
plausible strategies. One wargame may not be illustrative of the overall contours of the problem due to an
a priori reasonable strategy being chosen that turns out to be suboptimal. For example, in one iteration of
this project’s wargame, the Chinese invasion fleet was destroyed in one turn after the Chinese player chose
a strategy of defending their coastline while simultaneously invading Taiwan. If that was the first and only
wargame that was played, a highly erroneous conclusion would be reached. Repeated play of the scenario
using dierent Chinese strategies showed that the Chinese invasion fleet being destroyed on the first turn
is an outlier. Many other strategies that China could choose would lead to outcomes much more favorable
to China. is case illustrated the importance of iteration to try multiple strategies, lest the insights from a
single scenario are misguidedly based on a particular strategy.
Another benefit of having outside players participate is that they will try novel strategies that did
not occur to the principal investigators. It is easy for the wargame creators to try a few strategies
and then settle into a local optimum that they believe represents best play of the scenario. Outside
players inject mutation into the play of the game with their own ideas about how to play. Like genetic
mutation, most of these new ideas are maladaptive. However, some are successful and represent
advances on best play. Some required additional research and the design of new scenarios to test (in
a way suggested by J. Peter Scoblic and Philip E. Tetlock).
102
is process of mutation, iteration, and
refinement helps to explore the seams of the possible and plausible outcomes of the wargame.
Variation of Key Assumptions to Explore Uncertainty
Analyses of the future must explore how sensitive results are to variations in assumptions. For example,
wars begin in dierent ways. While most wars are preceded by a state of crisis, if a defender is surprised
and has not mobilized their forces, this will have a dramatic eect on the subsequent campaign.
103
Political factors are often unclear before the clash of forces and could lead in multiple directions, such
as whether the British would intervene when the Germans invaded Belgium in World War I. Weapon
systems might perform far dierently in combat than expected, such as the Mark 14 torpedo in World
War II. An analysis that does not explore key uncertainties risks building a detailed argument on a
foundation of sand.
104
102 J. Peter Scoblic and Philip E. Tetlock, “A Better Crystal Ball,” Foreign Aairs, October 30, 2022, https://www.
foreignaairs.com/articles/united-states/2020-10-13/better-crystal-ball.
103 Cancian, Coping with Surprise in Great Power Conflicts.
104 For a detailed treatment of this issue, see: Paul K. Davis and Don Blumenthal., e Base of Sand Problem: A
White Paper on the State of Military Combat Modeling (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1991), https://
www.rand.org/pubs/notes/N3148.html.
36 | Cancian, Cancian, and Heginbotham
Iterating wargames in dierent scenarios with dierent assumptions for key variables allows for
sensitivity analysis. A variable is a condition likely to have an impact on the analysis about which
the analysis must make an informed assumption. In the same way that campaign analysis begins
by specifying a scenario, this study refers to each bundle of assumptions for each variable as a
scenario. For example, an invasion of Taiwan where China achieves operational surprise is one
scenario; an invasion wherein operational surprise is not achieved is another. A new scenario
is created when any assumption about a variable is changed: operational surprise with missile
defense working is a dierent scenario than operational surprise without missile defense working.
e selection of variables should reflect the purpose of the game. For example, in the services’
“Futures Wargame,” designed to test alternative force structures against one another, two iterations
of the same scenario, one incorporating force structure from the so-called DOD program of record
and one reflecting an alternative set of forces, were selected by experts and ocers over a period of
months.
105
us, in the “Futures Wargame,” all elements of the game that are not related to order of
battle should, to the extent possible, be kept equal.
106
However, analytic wargames exploring other
research questions require varying other assumptions between scenarios.
By running several iterations of the wargame with one scenario, then changing the scenario,
it is possible to draw inferences about the importance and impacts of each variable change.
e project team does not claim that this leads to a causally identified finding, which is the
goal of experimental wargamers. However, it is possible to observe the impact of changing the
assumptions about certain variables: for example, if Japan allows U.S. basing, then the outcome
is likely to be more favorable for the United States than if basing is denied. More importantly,
it allows for researchers to develop better judgments about the relative importance of these
uncertainties: is Japanese basing more or less impactful on the outcome than Philippine basing?
(Yes, as discussed in Chapter 8.)
By running several iterations of the wargame with one
scenario, then changing the scenario, it is possible to draw
inferences about the importance and impacts of each
variable change.
105 See, for example, “Air Force Plans Wargames, Tech Experiments to Flesh Out Arctic Strategy,” Breaking
Defense, July 27, 2021, https://breakingdefense.com/2021/07/air-force-plans-wargames-tech-experiments-
to-flesh-out-arctic-strategy/; and C. Todd Lopez, “Futures Wargame Exercise Prepares Army for 2030,” Military
News, September 27, 2013, https://www.militarynews.com/peninsula-warrior/news/around_the_army/
futures-wargame-exercise-prepares-army-for-2030/article_abb46b8f-0f72-58f1-a789-4da26323404b.html.
106 In wargaming, one set of factors that is impossible to hold equal is related to players. One may select like-
types of players (e.g., mid-grade ocers of a certain background) but may not be able to involve the same
players in each game. And if the same set of players is recruited to play a second game, learning from the
preceding experience will represent another factor or variable that may influence outcomes.
37 | The First Battle of the Next War
It is impossible to model all potential values of all variations. With 25 variables eventually identified
by the project team that could take on binary values, that leads to 225 possible combinations, or
approximately 33.5 million scenarios. Obviously, this is beyond the capability of human analysis.
e selection of variables can be informed by previous literature or from insights generated during
play. e question of which variables to include is the same problem that confronts eorts to make
historical analogies. While no historical case is ever 100 percent analogous to another, it is possible to
make inferences as long as they are similar enough in the most relevant variables.
107
e variables of
study must therefore both be uncertain and likely to have a high impact on the outcome. For example,
in this project it became clear that the eectiveness of the Joint Air-to-Surface Stando Missile
(JASSM) against moving ships was a critical factor in the outcome of the game after playing several
iterations. A close review of the literature showed that this eectiveness was unclear. e project team
therefore decided that the eectiveness of the JASSM was an important variable to test.
Additional variables came from players who participated in game iterations. ey surfaced some of
former secretary of defense Donald Rumsfeld’s “unknown unknowns,” factors that the game designers
had not anticipated.
108
Wargaming can help explore these “unknown unknowns” by facilitating
brainstorming about key variables among players who then help to shape future scenarios by including
important variables that the researchers did not think of themselves.
109
Human Participants Make Intelligent Decisions, Generate
Mutation, and Shape Assumptions
e primary benefit of having human participants is to focus on the most plausible lines of play. As
discussed above, the number of models, variables, and decisions in play make it impossible even for
the most powerful computers to examine all possible lines of play for a game. Players of a game must
choose the most promising courses of action. ey can choose these lines based on knowledge of the
actual countries’ doctrines, historically similar campaigns, and their own strategic intuition.
One approach is to have a core group of players who have been involved in the game design. First, they
are most familiar with the weapons systems and capabilities that go into the wargame, helping them
to avoid blunders. e actual participants in a real-life conflict would be similarly familiar with their
capabilities, so this allows for more plausible play. Second, the core group of players will know what
107 John Stuart Mill, A System of Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive: Being a Connected View of the Principles of
Evidence and the Methods of Scientific Investigation (London: Longmans, Green, and Company, 1882).
108 Rumsfeld’s distinction between “known knowns,” “known unknowns,” and “unknown unknowns” has its
roots in systems analysis, despite having been harshly criticized at the time. For a full discussion, see Donald
Rumsfeld, Known and Unknown: A Memoir (New York: Sentinel, 2012). For a discussion of this typology,
see U.S. Congress, House, “NASA Program Management and Procurement Procedures and Practices,”
Hearings before the Subcommittee on Space Science and Applications of the Committee on Science and
Technology, 97th Cong., 1st sess., June 24, 25, 1981, https://www.google.com/books/edition/NASA_Program_
Management_and_Procurement/dRMrAAAAMAAJ?hl=en&gbpv=1..
109 “Using Wargames to Battle Uncertainty by Peter Scoblic,” YouTube video, posted by Georgetown University
Wargaming Society, May 30, 2021, 1:05:47, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=95NsBUkf6DI.
38 | Cancian, Cancian, and Heginbotham
broad courses of action have been used before and how they interact. is allows iterations to focus
on lines of play that have been found to be more promising, rather than redoing earlier attempts at
lines that have been found lacking. Finally, a core group of players can cycle through iterations much
quicker than outside players.
However, outside participants are helpful in two ways. First, as discussed above, new players can inject
mutation into strategies used by the core team. After several iterations, it is common for the core team
to settle into a local optimum of strategies that they believe is best for both sides. New players can try
new strategies that the core team finds unintuitive, shaking the game from its local optimum toward
a global optimum. To integrate their intent with the game mechanics, the project provided each team
with an “operations ocer” from the sta. Second, outside participants can bring their knowledge into
the game to refine the models underlying the rules. is is particularly the case when the number of
outside participants in each game iteration is low (two to four). at allows each player to give in-
depth feedback on any subject in which they have expertise. Several participants with experience in
Pacific operations pointed out that current policy is to keep a continuous submarine presence in the
Philippine Sea. e project, therefore, adjusted its order of battle to reflect this insight. is feedback
means that there are slight changes that occur to the rules throughout the life of the project; however,
this is compensated for by the increased fidelity of the project’s models.
Nesting Wargame Results into Analysis
e numbers of missiles fired and aircraft destroyed in any iteration are descriptive data, not
analytic outcomes. e results of any of these runs are contingent on a multitude of factors beyond
the underlying models, including the makeup of players and previous decisions in that game. For
example, take two iterations whose scenarios were the same except for the assumption about
Taiwanese ground force competence. e players in one iteration decided to use their missile
inventory as quickly as possible, but the players in the other iteration decided to conserve their
inventory. is dierence had nothing to do with the changing assumption about the variable
of Taiwanese ground force competence: the dierence was produced solely by dierences in the
participants, or it could even have been the same participants wanting to try something dierent.
It would be a mistake to conclude that the variable of Taiwanese ground force competence has a
significant eect on the rate of missile expenditures. us, the quantitative data out of each iteration
should not be seen as statistically significant projections about the future but as illustrative of the
corpus of wargames that a project creates.
Analytic wargames produce qualitative insights among the investigators, which must then be
situated in an analytic framework. is framework should focus on not only the ebb and flow of
events generally but also a description of how diering assumptions about variables impact the
likely outcome of a conflict. Two factors make variables relatively more or less important: their
impact on the outcome and the degree of confidence in their values. e analysis thus comments
on the general impact of variables rather than the specific outcomes of games. To paraphrase
President Dwight D. Eisenhower, “Wargames are worthless, but wargaming is indispensable”—the
specific outcome of each iteration is not predictive of the future, but the process of wargaming is
indispensable to analyzing the conflict.
Source: CSIS.
39 | The First Battle of the Next War
However, analytic wargames must be careful not to make assertions outside of their scopes or to
confuse the insights of the wargame with the insights of their modelling. A wargame about the
outcome of an invasion of Taiwan cannot claim to grant insights about the operational impacts that
Chinese control over Taiwan would have on the defense of Japan; such speculation is outside of the
scope of analysis. Separately, an insight such as that China likely has enough ballistic missiles to cover
the tarmac of all the military airfields in Japan does not come from the wargame: it comes from the
modeling and the assumptions that went into the modelling. While the analytic insights of wargames
are valuable, they must be appropriately scoped.
40 | Cancian, Cancian, and Heginbotham
3
Building the Taiwan
Operational Wargame
W
ith the methodological principles developed in Chapter 2 in mind, the project set out to
develop a wargame to answer the questions: Would a Chinese invasion of Taiwan succeed in
2026? What variables most aect that outcome? What would be the cost to both sides?
e first decision was whether to adapt an existing system for this project. As mentioned earlier, CNAS
and the Körber Foundation have run similar wargames. Both games featured adversarial play between
two teams of experts in conflicts with China. However, their focus on escalation dynamics and political
decisionmaking made them unsuited for adaptation to this project’s methodology, which deals with
political decisionmaking by varying scenarios across iterations. e dierent purposes of the projects
meant that this study could not adapt their systems.
Several commercial wargames are more operationally focused and have either a Taiwan invasion at
the center of the game (Next War: Taiwan) or a Taiwan scenario as part of a larger conflict (Breaking
the Chains). Although designed primarily for entertainment, these games are often the product of
deep research and thoughtful mechanics. As a result, they have been used in professional military
education (PME).
110
Nevertheless, several elements inherent to commercial games rendered them unsuitable for this project.
First, commercial games, as a rule, balance playability and analytic rigor. is means that an important part
of commercial wargame design is ensuring that both sides of the game have a path to victory, even if the
balance of forces means that one side realistically does not have a way to win if both players are equally
110 Sebastian J. Bae and Ian T. Brown, “Promise Unfulfilled: A Brief History of Educational Wargaming in
the Marine Corps,” Journal of Advanced Military Studies 12, no. 2 (September 2021): 45–80, doi:10.21140/
mcuj.20211202002.
41 | The First Battle of the Next War
skilled (and lucky). e purpose of this project was to test outcomes of a notational invasion of Taiwan by
China using the project team’s best estimate of forces available, national policies, equipment capabilities,
and combat results. at may or may not produce a balanced result (in fact, it did not). For players, it can be
deeply unsatisfactory to participate in a game if the prospects for victory are remote. However, that might
be the correct analytic outcome.
Further, commercial wargames do not reveal the assumptions and calculations for their force lay down
and combat interactions. Although these are often sophisticated, the lack of transparency makes
relying on them problematic. Is a particular outcome the result of analysis or a desire to balance play?
Are calculations based on historical data, test data, or the developer’s judgment? At the same time, the
project team’s review of the available commercial games suggested that important elements, especially
air combat and attacks on air bases, were not represented rigorously. Next War: Taiwan focuses
primarily on the ground campaign on the island, and Breaking the Chains focuses primarily on naval
combat, generally between relatively small forces. Because of these issues, the project team needed a
game where it understood and could stand behind every one of the game elements and assumptions.
Similar diculties exist with adapting semi-ocial wargames, such as Assassin’s Mace, an operational-
level wargame designed to simulate future war in the Western Pacific between 2025 and 2050.
111
It
uses the sophisticated Operational Wargame System developed by Tim Barrick and Mark Gelston.
An invasion of Taiwan is one of the several scenarios available. e game integrates multiple warfare
domains, including those outside of traditional military operations such as cyber and satellite
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR). Assassin’s Mace is intended to provide PME
to field-grade ocers and, to this end, requires a significant amount of professional knowledge in
participants. Given the audience and purpose, this game is granular in design. It is very well designed
for its purpose, and it has entered wide use in U.S. War Colleges as a tool for teaching joint operations.
However, like commercial board games, Assassin’s Mace was unsuited to this project’s purposes because
of discrepancies between its rules and the project team’s modelling. For example, within the Assassin’s
Mace game rules, the F-35 and J-20 both attack at 12 and defend at 7, meaning that both aircraft roll
a 12-sided die to attack and must score a 7 or greater to destroy the other. is means that there is
a 50 percent chance that an attack will destroy the other, or a 50 percent attrition rate. Given that
the historical attrition rate per sortie in most conflicts is less than 1 percent, and only 2 percent for
the particularly intense Battle of Britain, the project team would use a lower attrition rate. is is not
to disparage the Operational Wargame System but to demonstrate how its rules produce dierent
operational outcomes than the project team’s research would suggest. However, given the ocial
nature of the Operational Wargame System, it might be reasonable to wonder if it (or any government
wargame) is inherently superior to civilian wargames due to the possession of non-public information.
The Question of Classified Data
is project used only unclassified data so that its results can inform public debate. Some observers,
particularly within the government, might argue that accurate modeling is impossible without access
111 “Wargame Design: e Marine Corps’ Operational Wargame System w/ Tim Barrick,” YouTube video,
posted by Georgetown University Wargaming Society, July 21, 2021, 1:59:06, https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=3A7JZ4MjIMM.
42 | Cancian, Cancian, and Heginbotham
to classified data. However, classified data is not necessary for the construction of a credible wargame.
Although classified data might help tweak certain parameters (e.g., missile ranges, intercept probabilities,
and submarine detection capabilities), they would not change the fundamental structure of the game or
the outcomes. e reasons are threefold.
First, much information that was previously classified is now available from open sources. For example,
e Military Balance by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) provides detailed
equipment numbers, while Jane’s databases provide detailed information about equipment capabilities.
Google Earth provides information about facilities that required U-2 flights during the Cold War. e
team used Google Earth to determine the number and location of Chinese underground airfields, the
size of parking ramps, and other parameters of air bases. Although classified imagery might refine this
information, unclassified information is more detailed and accurate than ever before.
112
Second, classified data is not necessarily correct data. It is vulnerable to a lack of probing and testing
because of restricted access. Indeed, bureaucratic and political forces may require government actors to
accept weapons testing data that does not account for the friction that can greatly diminish weapons
eectiveness in the real world. For example, classified Air Force testing projected a 92 percent hit
rate for the AIM-9J missile before its fielding in Vietnam; analysis after the war found that its actual
hit rate was 13 percent.
113
A similar result was obtained in the infamous U.S. torpedo scandal of
World War II.
114
ese mistakes were possible because projections of future conflicts require making
assumptions about events that have never happened and classification prevented the usual vetting of
these projections. No squadron of F-35s has ever engaged a squadron of J-20s; predicting the result of
such an engagement relies on assumptions, regardless of classification level. Most of the parameters
in the project’s wargame are based on historical data; classified information might help refine these
assumptions but would not replace the importance of historical data.
ird, the appropriate use of historical data can sometimes be more accurate in modeling future
conflicts than classified information about specific weapons systems. Before Desert Storm, classified
models using accurate weapons performance data predicted 20,000 to 30,000 casualties. However,
private commentators predicted fewer casualties, based on data from Israel’s Six-Day War.
115
Although
the classified models had more accurate weapons capability data, they modeled the Iraqis as fighting as
competently as the Soviets.
116
e open-source models accounted for the poorer operational competence
112 See, for example, International Institute for Security Studies, e Military Balance 2022 (London: Routledge,
2022), https://www.taylorfrancis.com/books/9781003294566; and Alex Pape, Janes Fighting Ships 2021-2022
(Coulsdon, Surrey: Jane’s Information Group, 2021).
113 John Siemann, Project Checo: Southeast Asia Report COMBAT SNAP (Washington, DC: Department of the Air
Force, 1974), https://apps-dtic-mil.libproxy.mit.edu/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a486826.pdf.
114 e failure of the U.S. submarine torpedo is a classic example of testing failures and the slowness of the
bureaucracy to recognize and fix the failures. See, for example, Frederick Milford, “US Navy Torpedoes: Part
Two: e Great Torpedo Scandal, 1941-1943,” e Submarine Review, October 1996, https://www.geocities.ws/
pentagon/1592/ustorp2.htm.
115 Netanel Lorch, “e Arab-Israeli Wars,” gov.il, November 23, 2017, https://www.gov.il/en/Departments/
General/the-arab-israeli-wars.
116 A competence that might now be called into question, given Russia’s performance in Ukraine.
43 | The First Battle of the Next War
of Arab militaries, which more than made up for their deficiencies in classified weapons performance
data. us, open-source models have value beyond their intrinsic transparency and public accessibility.
117
Philosophy of the Base Model
is section lays out the key design choices that the project made and explains the reasons for the choices.
Use rules rather than judgment. As discussed in Chapter 2, models for analytic wargaming must be built in
a rigorous manner on the best available open-source information. ese models can be based either on the
method of history or the method of P
k
s (see previous chapter). However, they must create a comprehensive
set of rules that minimizes the influence of judgment. Of course, sometimes players will create situations
that are plausible but unanticipated. In these cases, some judgment by the umpires is necessary.
118
Incorporate only demonstrated capabilities. e game is based on capabilities that the countries involved
have demonstrated or have concrete plans to field. Players often had imaginative initiatives for cyber,
special operations, and new systems, but the game did not include these unless the relevant country had
demonstrated those capabilities. e relatively near time horizon of the game (2026) limits how many new
capabilities might be fielded.
ere are classified programs that might produce relevant capabilities. Some details about these
programs have leaked out and have been incorporated into the game. Most elements would be
fielded and operationally significant numbers after 2026, if fielded it all. However, this uncertainty is
present in all discussions of national security issues.
Assume China has decided to invade. Because the purpose of the game is to assess the outcome of
a Chinese invasion of Taiwan, the game assumes that the CCP has made the decision to launch such
an attack. e Chinese government could reach such a decision for a variety of reasons related to
domestic politics, faulty intelligence, inaccurate military assessments, and international pressure that
would not align with an outsider’s military or political assessment. External factors might also drive
the decision. For example, Taiwan could move toward a declaration of independence, or the United
States might begin permanently stationing troops on the island. e premise that China decides to
invade is not a prediction but rather a tool that sets up the research question about whether such an
invasion might succeed. However, the scenario is plausible given the concerns about such a Chinese
course of action, as described in Chapter 1.
117 High pre-war ocial estimates were enumerated in Steven V. Roberts, “George Bush, Diplomat: e President
Is Hoping at a ‘New World Order’ Will Contain Hussein,” U.S. News & World Report 109, no. 10, 1990; and
“Potential War Casualties Put at 100,000: Fewer U.S. Troops Would Be Killed or Wounded than Iraq Soldiers,
Military Experts Predict,” Los Angeles Times, September 5, 1990, https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-
1990-09-05-mn-776-story.html. For more accurate predictions by outside analysts using unclassified data, see
John J. Mearsheimer, “A War the US Can Win – Decisively,” Chicago Tribune, January 15, 1991, https://www.
chicagotribune.com/news/ct-xpm-1991-01-15-9101040923-story.html; and Barry Posen, “Political Objectives
and Military Options in the Persian Gulf,” Defense and Arms Control Studies Working Paper, MIT, Cambridge,
MA, November 1990, https://css.ethz.ch/en/services/digital-library/publications/publication.html/19773.
118 All the data used by the project and all the models developed were unclassified. However, because one of the
authors possesses a security clearance, some models must remain private until a security review verifies that
they do not contain classified data.
44 | Cancian, Cancian, and Heginbotham
Use base and excursion scenarios. e project developed a base scenario wherein all variables took
their most likely values. Excursion scenarios explored key parameters about which there were plausible
alternative assumptions. For example, the base case for Joint Air-to-Surface Stando Missile-Extended
Range (JASSM-ER) employability was that it could target ships at sea. An excursion scenario restricted
JASSM-ER employability to stationary land targets. is approach allowed the project to explore the
sensitivity of wargame results to changes in assumptions. (e next chapter discusses the base scenario and
excursion cases in detail.)
Explore diplomatic and political conditions with excursion scenarios. Because the game play was
primarily concerned with operational factors that aect military outcomes, the project accounted
for political inputs as variables that were manipulated by control between iterations. It is possible to
either model the political behavior of states through expert discussions during game play or to employ
stochastic models (e.g., rolling a die to determine if a neutral country joins the conflict). However,
such modeling is problematic. More important from the perspective of the project was the need to
maintain a degree of control over game inputs so that a range of conditions could be examined. Rather
than integrating these factors into the rules, this project explores them with excursion scenarios.
For each of these political factors, the project identifies the most plausible outcomes, binned into a few
meaningful categories. For example, consider the Japanese decision to enter the war. Discussions with
experts led the project team to believe that the base case was that Japan would most likely enter the war
only if Japanese bases or U.S. bases in Japan were attacked. is base case assumption was therefore used
for most games. Certain excursion scenarios explored what would happen if Japan joined the United
States from the first day of China’s invasion or if Japan never joined the war. Although there are in
reality an infinite number of permutations on this critical factor, creating a few meaningfully dierent
categories for assumptions and playing iterations with dierent assumptions allows the project to
explore the eects of these highly uncertain yet important factors. Additionally, there are some plausible
political decisions—such as the decision to surrender—that are possible but that cannot be usefully
wargamed; those lie outside the scope of this project.
Focus on Taiwan. e game focuses on combat around Taiwan and in the Western Pacific region that
could aect such combat on the island. It abstracted operations in the South China Sea to maintain
focus on Taiwan. ese battles would unfold as the East Coast units of the U.S. Navy arrived in the
region, having traveled via the Suez Canal. Chinese forces would attempt to block these U.S. forces from
approaching Taiwan. Some Chinese forces are not available for the invasion of Taiwan, being stationed
in the south to guard against such actions. As U.S. forces arrive, China must withdraw forces from other
regions, including those attacking Taiwan, to maintain defense.
The Taiwan Operational Wargame
is section explains specific design parameters.
TIME SCALE
Each turn in the game is 3.5 days—the time increment needed to simulate enough real-world time to
produce an estimate of the result of the battle and be playable in a single day. Multi-day games would take
too long to run 24 iterations.
45 | The First Battle of the Next War
Considering that the invasion of Okinawa, a much smaller island than Taiwan, took two months and three
weeks, the time scale had to allow exploration of several weeks of combat. is also gave insights into how
depleting munition stockpiles aected the conflict: both sides had enough high-end missiles to launch
continuously for several days, but what happens when those are gone? e 3.5-day turns allowed the
project to get further into the battle than games with smaller time increments, which was critical for the
study’s purposes.
e time scale required trade-os to get through weeks of combat in a timely manner. First, it required
some amount of aggregation: instead of modeling every aircraft, the game modeled aircraft squadrons.
Second, it does not allow for as granular decisionmaking: players have to give general instructions
for half of a week and cannot adjust their orders for day two based on the results of day one. ird, it
required a specific sequencing in resolution for accuracy: for example, a surface ship traveling 30 knots
could cover the entire game board in 3.5 days, but an enemy would almost certainly detect and react
to such a charge within that time period. Sequencing combat resolution in a specific way allowed such
interactions. However, weighed against the analytic benefits of the longer time scale, these disadvantages
were judged to be acceptable.
OPERATIONAL MAP
Figure 2: Taiwan Operational WargameOperational Map
Source: CSIS.
46 | Cancian, Cancian, and Heginbotham
Air and naval combat in the Taiwan Operational Wargame (TOW) unfolds on an operational map of the
Western Pacific. Hexes on the map are approximately 600 km (roughly 370 miles) from side to side.
Each hex is colored according to its distance from Taiwan and numbered.
Each map hex lists the following information:
▪ e number of aircraft squadrons that can park on military and dual-use airport tarmac;
▪ e number of aircraft squadrons that can be housed in underground hangars and hardened
aircraft shelters (HASs); and
▪ e number of SAM battalions.
Placed on the map are counters representing the following:
1. Aircraft squadrons (representing 24 tactical aircraft and 12 large aircraft);
2. Ground forces that have been moved between hexes;
3. Surface ship task forces; and
4. Squadrons of four submarines.
Ground-Launched Missiles
China’s People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force (PLARF) is a formidable force. us, each game turn
begins with ground-based missile attacks. ese missiles primarily target U.S. and Japanese surface
ships and air bases. To speed up play, China’s war-opening joint fires strike on Taiwan was modeled
and pre-adjudicated in every iteration. is strike employs much of China’s short-range ballistic
47 | The First Battle of the Next War
missile inventory and would largely destroy Taiwan’s navy and cripple its air force.
119
Taiwan’s ground-launched anti-ship missiles are also a key element in the fight. Besides indigenous
Hsiung Feng II and III missiles, Taiwan is procuring 100 Harpoon launchers and 400 Harpoons.
ese have the potential to inflict significant attrition on China’s amphibious force. Rather than
having players specify an attack for these, the project models their likely use and eects on China’s
fleet in each turn.
Chinese Amphibious Li
One key output of the operational fight is the number of units that China can place on Taiwan in a 3.5-
day turn. Rather than modeling specific waves of landings, the project models lift as the thousands of
tons that China can transport across the strait over 3.5 days. Each battalion requires a certain number
of tons, depending on whether it is leg infantry, mechanized infantry, armor, artillery, or engineer.
Once China moves troops onto Taiwan, it must also keep them supplied, which progressively reduces
the number of new formations that can be transported.
ere are four ways China moves troops onto Taiwan: amphibious landing, air assault, airborne,
and via captured facilities. Amphibious landing over suitable beaches constitutes the primary way
that China moves forces in an initial assault. e amount of amphibious lift decreases as major
119 Taiwan’s navy consists of outdated ships that would be subjected to a wide array of Chinese coastal
defense cruise missiles, Houbei fast-attack boats, and bombing from attack aircraft. e ships possess only
rudimentary self-defenses that are unsuitable for the sophistication of Chinese attacks. China’s success in
destroying these ships would be even greater if China could catch them in port because Taiwan failed to
receive or react to warnings of China’s impending attack. While some Taiwanese ships would survive this
initial strike, they would be unable to operate in the strait or as an eective force. For an overview of Taiwan’s
navy, see: “Overview of Taiwanese Navy Warships,” YouTube video, posted by Eurasia Nabal Insight, August
13, 2022, 20:37, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ItW7f3_BVCo. Taiwan has done an admirable job of
hardening its air bases. By our measure, they possess around 250 HASs and over 300 million square feet of
tarmac space on which to disperse their aircraft. However, China has been building its rocket force in part to
counter these defenses. e sheer volume of Chinese missiles means that they could blanket all of Taiwan’s
air bases with the DF-11 family of close-range ballistic missiles (CRBMs) alone. Any surviving aircraft would
struggle to be maintained, fueled, and armed after this initial strike. e only Taiwanese aircraft that would
survive would be those based in the Chiashan and Shizishan underground facilities. e project team was
internally divided on whether China could destroy these underground facilities but ultimately decided that
they were probably survivable. Taiwan could probably store three operational squadrons there (75 functional
aircraft plus non-mission-capable aircraft). However, China could still destroy the runways outside of the
hangars. For game play, the project team committed enough Chinese CRBMs to suppress these runways for
the first two weeks of the conflict. After that point, China must commit bombers and ground-attack aircraft
to suppress these runways or the Taiwanese fighters in the underground shelters begin flying. For a detailed
discussion of a Chinese knockout strike, see Michael J. Lostumbo et al., Air Defense Options for Taiwan: An
Assessment of Relative Costs and Operational Benefits (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, April2016), 11,
https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1051.html.
48 | Cancian, Cancian, and Heginbotham
ships are sunk.
120
Air assault with helicopters is limited to the extreme west of Taiwan due to range
considerations, while airborne landings with paratroopers can occur anywhere on the island. Both
methods are slowly attrited by anti-air artillery and man-portable SAMs, but attrition increases greatly
if China’s air superiority is degraded. Ports and airfields enable the use of more varied ships and
aircraft to accelerate the transport of troops ashore. e United States may attack these facilities to
deny their use after Chinese capture.
Air and Naval Combat
Players issue orders for their air and naval forces. ese orders unfold over the course of the 3.5-day
turn. ese orders therefore must allow aircraft and ships to execute missions not only once but as
frequently as they can over the course of the turn. For example, orders to fly combat air patrol (CAP)
result in coverage as frequently as aircraft can sortie, ASW sweeps reflect the coverage of a hex that can
be achieved through constant searching over 3.5 days, and so on.
121
AIR FORCES
Aircraft are represented by counters. For fighter/attack aircraft, there are three categories: fourth generation
(non-stealthy, no Active Electronically Scanned Array [AESA] radar), 4.5 generation (non-stealthy, AESA
radar), and fifth generation (stealthy, AESA radar).
122
Fighter/attack counters represent standardized
squadrons of 24 aircraft. Most of Taiwan’s aircraft would be destroyed in the initial bombardment by
China, but some would survive in their underground hangars on the eastern side of the island. Bombers
are grouped into legacy and stealth bombers, and counters represent a standardized 12-aircraft squadron.
120 While the project team grants China great credit for using specially designed civilian Ro-Ro ships for
amphibious assaults, there is skepticism of their ability to use small civilian craft for amphibious assaults. For
an account of the ANZAC landing party in the ocial Australian history, see C.E.W. Bean, “Chapter XII – e
Landing at Gaba Tepe,” in Volume I – e Story of ANZAC from the Outbreak of War to the End of the First Phase
of the Gallipoli Campaign, May 4, 1915, 11th ed. (Australian War Memorial, 1939), https://www.awm.gov.au/
collection/C1416845. e slow rate of ooading meant that Ottoman counterattacks were able to contain
the ANZAC forces in the infamous ANZAC cove. On Y Beach, the landing actually failed, and the British were
forced to withdraw. On V beach, 2,500 British troops landed from 24 rowboats and the SS River Clyde (3,900
gross tons) on a 300-yard beach. ey suered 70 percent casualties, as there were defenders there and the
civilian ships were unsuited to disembarking in the face of resistance. See Julian Staord Corbett and Henry
John Newbolt, Naval Operations (London, New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1920), http://archive.org/
details/navaloperations00newbgoog.
121 e question of terminology arose during game play. e project used “combat air patrol” to refer to air
missions that contested the airspace in a particular region, as this term is used in campaign analyses. See
Heginbotham et al., e U.S.-China Military Scorecard, 73. However, some Air Force participants preferred “air
superiority” because that aligned more closely with Air Force doctrine, which linked activities with outcomes.
122 ese definitions are the project’s own but are generally in accordance with previous definitions, such as
found in Jeremiah J. Gertler, Tactical Aircraft Modernization: Issues for Congress, CRS Report No. RL33543
(Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, November 2009), 14, https://crsreports.congress.gov/
product/pdf/RL/RL33543/15; and Jerey Hood, “Defining the 5th Generation Fighter Jet,” Joint Base Langley-
Eustis, March 14, 2017, https://www.jble.af.mil/News/Commentaries/Display/Article/1112351/defining-the-
5th-generation-fighter-jet/.
49 | The First Battle of the Next War
Tankers and airlift are also tracked in squadrons of 12.
123
Testing showed that categorizing aircraft by
generation greatly facilitated game play at only slight cost in terms of fidelity.
124
Fighter/attack aircraft and bombers perform four missions in the game. First, they can try to establish
air superiority with CAP, patrolling over the battlefield 24/7. Proximity to the battlefield is critical to
establishing continuous CAP, as an hour spent flying to and from the battle area is an hour when an
aircraft is not on station conducting the mission. erefore, the distance between a squadron’s base
and its target hex (usually Taiwan) and the amount of tanking available are key determinants in the
time on station for fighter/attack squadrons performing CAP.
125
Second, aircraft can perform strike missions by attacking air bases, surface ships, ground units, and
critical infrastructure. If there is adversary CAP over the target, then escorts are needed to defend the
attackers. e choice of munitions for aircraft conducting these missions is critical. In the early stages
of the war, sophisticated and long-distance cruise missiles are available, but as these inventories are
depleted, aircraft must use shorter-range munitions and accept more risk.
ird, aircraft can perform ground support. is is divided between close air support near the front line
of troops and interdiction at a distance from the front line to slow enemy movement. Both missions
require flying over enemy ground troops and therefore involve risk from SAMs. ey also require
longer loiter times over the ground than strike missions, meaning that they can only be conducted
when there is friendly air superiority.
Finally, aircraft can rebase to dierent hexes. All reinforcements arriving in theater must initially
rebase. Units in theater can also rebase. Based on peacetime exercise reports, the game assumed that it
takes approximately a game turn to set up operations and maintenance facilities at new bases.
NAVAL SURFACE FORCES
Naval surface forces are represented in surface action groups (SAGs), carrier strike groups (CSGs),
lightning carrier groups (LCGs), and amphibious groups. e size and composition of these forces vary
by nation, as the United States, China, and Japan all have dierent fleet compositions (as mentioned
above, the Taiwanese surface fleet would be largely destroyed in the initial phases of a conflict).
SAGs can launch anti-ship missiles at enemy surface ships, launch cruise missiles at ground targets,
or conduct ASW; however, their primary value is in intercepting enemy missiles and aircraft. (China’s
large surface fleet has several potent SAMs, which pose a threat to U.S. and Japanese aircraft. U.S.
and Japanese SAGs can similarly threaten Chinese aircraft while also potentially intercepting some
123 e game standardized squadron size for simplicity. us, the squadrons align roughly with Air Force doctrine
but not with specific units, which vary greatly in size.
124 As approximately 90 percent of aircraft losses for the United States occur on the ground, attrition from air
combat is less frequent than observers might have thought. e results chapter discusses this in detail.
125 is dynamic is developed in Chapter 4 of “Scorecards,” in Heginbotham et al., e U.S.-China Military
Scorecard, 71–93.
50 | Cancian, Cancian, and Heginbotham
of China’s tactical ballistic missiles, or TBMs.) However, after their missiles are depleted, ships must
return to port and rearm, during which time they are vulnerable. All SAGs can also conduct ASW,
which is a particular specialty of the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Forces (JMSDF).
SUBMARINES
Submarines are grouped into squadrons of four submarines. Diesel submarines, due to their
shorter endurance compared with nuclear submarines, generally 30 to 45 days, must constantly
rotate back to port for refueling and resupplying. Both Chinese and Japanese diesel submarine
squadrons on the board therefore represent four submarines actively hunting and four submarines
transiting back and forth from the hunting ground.
126
Submarines can hunt other submarines. e United States and Japan begin with some submarines
forming a barrier on the first island chain, intercepting Chinese submarines and inflicting attrition
on them. ey are aided by U.S. and Japanese MPA. Conversely, China can assign some submarines
to intercept U.S. nuclear-powered submarines (SSNs) approaching the Taiwan Strait.
Submarines are potent threats to surface ships and can engage them with torpedoes and anti-
ship cruise missiles (ASCMs). e speed of SSNs makes them much more eective at searching
the open ocean. U.S. SSNs can hunt Chinese amphibious shipping in the Taiwan Strait (JMSDF
submarines would not be able to concurrently hunt in the strait due to battlespace management
issues). eir eectiveness there is diminished by Chinese corvettes and MPA actively conducting
ASW, as well as a barrier at the entrance/exits to the strait comprised of Chinese submarines and
minefields that China plants over the course of the opening weeks. Chinese submarines would not
enter the strait itself in order to make it a free fire zone for these ASW forces.
CYBER
e game included cyber at the operational level. Both sides have cyber exploits they can use
against the other. ese exploits are modeled as system penetrations that passively grant
intelligence while they are undetected. However, teams can activate these exploits to conduct
cyberattacks, thereby generating one-time eects. Once these active eects are used, the exploit is
assumed to be identified and patched. e previously discussed restriction of the game to proven
capabilities means that these eects, while potent, are not magic wands. For example, power can
be shut down at some ports to degrade Chinese amphibious lift, but there is no ability to destroy
all of China’s electrical grid.
e game did not include strategic cyber aects that might aect the U.S. homeland or military
command and control systems. ese eects might have operational impact in the Western Pacific
but lie beyond the scope of this project.
126 China has good reason to stagger its submarine deployments given uncertainty about the arrival times of U.S.
surface forces from other theaters and Japanese entry in the war. Similarly, Japan cannot surge all its diesel
submarines because of uncertainty about when China will begin hostilities. For a discussion of this dynamic,
see Heginbotham et al., e U.S.-China Military Scorecard, 196.
51 | The First Battle of the Next War
Ground Combat Map
Ground combat occurs on a dierent scale than the air
and missile combat that dominates the operational map.
While missiles fly at the speed of sound over thousands of
kilometers, ground combat unfolds at the speed of a tired
infantryman crawling forward under enemy fire. us, the
ground map of Taiwan uses hexes measuring 30 kilometers
(19 miles) across and uses the same 3.5-day turns. Within
each hex, there is movement of the forward edge of the battle
area. Ground forces include leg infantry, mechanized infantry,
armor, artillery, engineers, and attack helicopters, each of
which have dierent movement speeds and combat values.
ese combat values can be enhanced by combat air support
provided by friendly aircraft. A key element of ground combat
is the interdiction provided by Chinese aircraft, which slows
Taiwanese movement.
While missiles fly at the speed of sound over thousands of
kilometers, ground combat unfolds at the speed of a tired
infantryman crawling forward under enemy fire.
Players alternated between the operational map and the ground map, moving forces and initiating
combat on each map during a turn.
Sensitivity Analysis
Each iteration (run of the game) was set in a specific scenario with plausible assumptions about
each variable. A scenario refers to the specific combination of assumptions used for one iteration.
e scenario where all variables are set to their most plausible values is called the base scenario.
As discussed earlier, varying the assumptions from iteration to iteration allowed the investigators
to develop judgments about the eects of those variables on the likely outcome. e next chapter
explains these most likely base case assumptions and the excursion cases that the project tested.
Figure 3: Ground Combat Map
Source: CSIS.
52 | Cancian, Cancian, and Heginbotham
4
Assumptions—Base Cases
and Excursion Cases
E
very wargame requires assumptions about dozens of variables, from the grand strategic and
political context, through the strategic military situation, down to minute details about
operations and weapons. is chapter describes the assumptions underpinning the wargame’s
base scenario and the alternative assumptions (called “excursion cases”) that the project explored.
A “base case” in the project’s terminology is the most likely value of a given variable. “Most likely”
does not mean certain but simply more likely than other possibilities. e base scenario is a game
iteration wherein all the variables are set to their base case (so that no variables take on a less
likely value). e project ran three iterations of this base scenario.
An “excursion case” is a less likely but plausible value of a given variable. Given the limitations
of time and resources, the project selected excursion cases based on two criteria: (1) those
variables that might have the greatest impact on the outcome of a scenario, and (2) those base
case elements that were most uncertain. e project ran a total of 24 game iterations: three base
scenarios and 21 scenarios with alternative assumptions.
By playing iterations of the game with excursion cases, the project team was able to assess the
sensitivity of the findings to alternative assumptions. An “excursion scenario” is a game iteration
that used one or more excursion cases. Some excursion scenarios varied a single assumption. Most
varied several assumptions; as noted above, varying assumptions one by one would have required
playing over 33.5 million games.
e table below summarizes the major assumptions, their base case, and the excursion cases explored.
53 | The First Battle of the Next War
Table 2: Major Assumptions in Base Case and Excursion Cases
Assumption Base Case Excursion Case
Grand Strategic: Political Decisionmaking
China
China invades, decides D-Day ------
Taiwan
Taiwanese resistance Strong ------
United States
U.S. entry into war Automatic Taiwan stands alone;
U.S. bombers delayed to D plus 4
127
;
U.S. combat starts at D plus 14
U.S. troops on Taiwan None U.S. MLR pre-deployed
Japan
Japan basing rights Granted Japan neutral
JSDF entry In response to attack JSDF engages on D-Day
JSDF operations All allowed aer entry JSDF remains defensive
Others
Philippines Out Philippines allows basing
Other allies/partners Australia only ------
Opportunistic aggression None U.S. holdout for simultaneous crisis
Strategic: Order of Battle, Mobilization, and Rules of Engagement
Order of Battle
China Base Increased Chinese IRBMs;
Chinese TBM holdout
Taiwan Base Fewer Taiwanese Harpoons
United States Base U.S. submarines withheld
Japan Base ------
Mobilization
Chinese mobilization D minus 30 ------
U.S. mobilization D minus 14 U.S. mobilizes on D-day;
no U.S. “show of force”
127 With the day that China’s invasion begins being “D-Day,” D plus 1 is the day after the invasion, and D minus 1
is the day before the invasion.
54 | Cancian, Cancian, and Heginbotham
Taiwanese reaction Immediate Taiwanese forces paralyzed to D
plus 4
Rules of Engagement
Chinese strikes on U.S./Japanese
territory
Authorized ------
U.S. strikes on mainland Authorized U.S. strikes on mainland forbidden
Operational and Tactical: Competence, Weapons, and Infrastructure
Competence
PLA amphibious Same as United States in World
War II
Reduced PLA amphibious
competence
Taiwan ground Same as China Reduced Taiwanese ground force
competence
PLAAF Same as United States Reduced PLAAF air-to-air
competence
Weapons
Maritime strike for JASSM Works No maritime strike JASSM
Ship defenses Works Ship defenses poor
ASAT and cyber Moderately eective ------------------------
Fih-generation aircra U.S. and China equivalent Superior U.S. fih-generation
fighters
Infrastructure
HASs in Japan As programmed Increased HASs in Japan
Use of Japanese civilian airports Only one regional airport per
military base used
United States, Japan can use large
Japanese airports
Source: CSIS.
Grand Strategic Assumptions: Political Context and Decision
is section discusses the base case assumptions about the grand strategic context of the conflict,
particularly the conditions under which each state decides to join the conflict.
THE PRINCIPAL COMBATANTS: CHINA, TAIWAN, THE UNITED STATES, AND JAPAN
China: As discussed earlier, the project assumes that China has decided to launch an invasion. ey
have the advantage of deciding when the war starts and use that flexibility to attack preemptively
taking advantage of tactical surprise. ey will have created uncertainty about the timing of the attack
by gradually expanding military exercises in the preceding years, making it dicult for other countries
to know that this time is the real attack.
Taiwan: e project assumes that Taiwan resists vigorously. According to the Stockholm International Peace
Research Institute, Taiwan’s military spending as a percentage of GDP is 4.4 percent, China’s is 1.7 percent,
55 | The First Battle of the Next War
and U.S. spending is 2.3 percent.
128
Taiwan’s relatively high level of peacetime spending represents serious
social commitment. Further, Taiwanese ocials have repeatedly stated their intention to defend the island.
However, morale is hard to predict. While many countries have fought fiercely despite long odds (e.g.,
Finland in the Winter War and contemporary Ukraine), others have surrendered soon after invasions
(e.g., ailand and Denmark in World War II). When faced with a Chinese assault, Taiwan might
capitulate rather than fight. ere have been worrying reports about CCP penetration of the Taiwanese
military.
129
e base case assumes that Taiwan resists to the maximum extent of its capabilities.
However, the project recognizes that this is an assumption. As immediate Taiwanese capitulation
would mean that there is no war, it is impossible to analytically wargame. Taiwanese morale is
therefore outside the scope conditions of the project.
U.S. Entry into the War: e base case assumes immediate U.S. intervention. For reasons discussed
at the outset of this report, such intervention seems more likely than not despite the lack of a formal
treaty. e United States has deep historical ties to Taiwan, and U.S. policy opposes unilateral changes
to the status quo across the Taiwan Strait. e United States defended Kuwait’s autonomy in 1991 and
defended Ukraine in 2022, albeit with weapons only in Ukraine’s case. e United States has never
foresworn the possibility of using force to defend Taiwan, and the Taiwan Relations Act stipulates that
the United States will “consider any eort to determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful
means . . . a threat to the peace and security of the Western Pacific area and of grave concern to the
United States.”
130
is language has been regularly echoed by administrations from both parties,
including the present one, for decades.
Excursion: Taiwan stands alone.
Although the base case assumes immediate U.S. intervention, there may be circumstances
under which the United States does not engage.
131
Each time President Biden states that the
United States would respond to Chinese attack, other administration stipulate that U.S. policy
has not changed.
132
Moreover, Biden may not be president in 2026. Actual decisions would
depend heavily on the personality of the president and on the domestic and international
circumstances of the conflict.
128 “SIPRI Military Expenditure Database,” Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), n.d.,
https://www.sipri.org/databases/milex. For an explanation of the data, which includes, for the Chinese side,
a number of categories not counted in China’s ocial defense budget, see “Sources and Methods,” SIPRI, n.d.,
https://www.sipri.org/databases/milex/sources-and-methods.
129 For example, see Huang Chia-lin and Jake Chung, “Colonel Accused of Allying with China,” Taipei Times,
November 23, 2021, https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2022/11/23/2003789444.
130 Taiwan Relations Act, Public Law, 96-8, April 10, 1979, https://www.congress.gov/96/statute/STATUTE-93/
STATUTE-93-Pg14.pdf.
131 “What Is America’s Policy of ‘Strategic Ambiguity’ Over Taiwan?,” e Economist, May 23, 2022, https://www.
economist.com/the-economist-explains/2022/05/23/what-is-americas-policy-of-strategic-ambiguity-over-
taiwan.
132 Amy B. Wang, “Biden Says U.S. Troops Would Defend Taiwan in Event of Attack by China,” Washington Post,
September 19, 2022, https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2022/09/18/biden-taiwan-military-china-
attack/.
56 | Cancian, Cancian, and Heginbotham
Important international circumstances would include whether actions by Taiwan were seen
as contributing to crisis (e.g., passing a referendum on formal independence); the reaction of
other important actors (not least Japan); and the existence (or absence) of concurrent crises
or events. Domestic circumstances in the United States (e.g., war weariness or economic
downturn) might also act against U.S. involvement.
133
e “Taiwan stands alone” excursion case assumes no direct U.S. intervention. e United
States commits no U.S. combat units of any kind to the conflict. Furthermore, without the
direct involvement of the United States, Tokyo and other regional governments would view
their own intervention as excessively risky and would therefore remain neutral. e United
States and possibly other partners might allow weapons and ammunition resupply. However,
unlike the situation in Ukraine, the Chinese defensive zone makes this essentially impossible
(described below in Chapter 6).
Excursion: e United States delays authorization for combat operations one or two days.
is excursion case assumes the possibility of a minor delay of one or two days before the
commencement of U.S. combat operations. Even when attacked, nations sometimes hesitate
to respond militarily as they seek to understand what has happened. Sometimes this produces
devastating results (for example, Clark Airfield in the Philippines at the beginning of World
War II).
134
Given that the initial Chinese landing force unloads over several days, such a delay
would aect the conflict by precluding U.S. bomber strikes (originating from Alaska and
Hawaii) on the first turn.
Excursion: e United States delays combat operations for 14 days.
ere might be a more substantial, two-week delay. In this excursion case, the U.S. national
command authority attempts to preserve Taiwanese autonomy without paying the price of direct
conflict by engaging Beijing through diplomacy to halt the invasion. is eort lasts for a week
while the invasion unfolds. When diplomacy fails, the United States declares a no-fly zone over
Taiwan, which China vigorously opposes. e United States gets drawn into direct conflict when
this “low-cost” approach fails.
U.S. Troops on Taiwan: e base case has no substantial U.S. presence on Taiwan when the conflict
begins. e United States has not stationed significant forces on Taiwan since the 1970s. A recent
increase in 2021 raised the U.S. troop level on the island from 20 to 39; however, this force could do little
133 Daniel W. Drezner, Ronald R. Krebs, and Randall Schweller, “e End of Grand Strategy: America Must ink
Small,” Foreign Aairs, May/June 2020, https://www.foreignaairs.com/articles/world/2020-04-13/end-grand-
strategy.
134 Despite being warned about the imminence of war and then about the attack on Pearl Harbor, the U.S.
command in the Philippines allowed aircraft to be caught on the ground, with many destroyed. See Walter D.
Edmonds, “What Happened at Clark Field,” e Atlantic, July 1, 1951, https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/
archive/1951/07/what-happened-at-clark-field/639484/.
57 | The First Battle of the Next War
beyond liaise.
135
Although stationing more U.S. troops would be military advantageous, it would provide
a clear cassus belli for China. If the United States deployed troops to Taiwan in response to every Chinese
exercise that could be serving as cover for an invasion, then the United States would quickly shut down
many roads to peaceful resolution. Even if the United States knew when the invasion was coming and
deployed troops to Taiwan only then, China could still seize on that deployment to justify their already
planned invasion.
Excursion: U.S. forces deploy to Taiwan before conflict begins.
Although unlikely, it is theoretically possible that the United States would station forces on
Taiwan before conflict begins. is could happen in two ways. First, concerns about Taiwanese
security might drive the United States to position some forces there in peacetime despite
vehement Chinese opposition. Second, Chinese mobilization might generate enough U.S.
concern that it is willing to risk provocation by putting U.S. forces on Taiwan. In this excursion
case, a Marine Littoral Regiment (MLR) deploys from Okinawa to Taiwan with its load of
missiles and one reload, augmenting the shore-based fires of Taiwanese ASCMs.
Japan: Japan can influence the conflict in two major ways: (1) by allowing the United States to operate
its forces from bases in Japan, and (2) with the direct intervention of the Japan Self-Defense Forces
(JSDF). Japan hosts more U.S. bases and servicemembers than any other state in the world.
136
e
United States operates these bases despite their being on sovereign Japanese territory. e proximity of
these bases to Taiwan and the lack of nearby alternatives means that a major part of the U.S. response
to a Chinese invasion operates out of Japanese bases.
Although Japan and China are not on friendly diplomatic terms and the United States and Japan are
allied, Japanese intervention against China is not assured. e Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and
Security between Japan and the United States binds the two countries in a limited defensive alliance.
Article V states that, “Each Party recognizes that an armed attack against either Party in the territories
under the administration of Japan would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares
that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional provisions and
processes.”
137
As Japan analyst Jerey Hornung observes, none of the critical decisions about Japanese
assistance to U.S. operations are “legally automatic. . . . All these decisions are political, resting with
the prime minister at any given moment.”
138
Despite these caveats, recent activities point to mutually
coordinated action in the event of a war with China.
135 Erin Hale, “US Nearly Doubled Military Personnel Stationed in Taiwan is Year,” VOA, December 2, 2021,
https://www.voanews.com/a/pentagon-us-nearly-doubled-military-personnel-stationed-in-taiwan-this-
year-/6337695.html.
136 According to the Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC), Japan hosts 55,000 U.S. military personnel. e
next-largest concentration is Germany, with 36,000. “Military and Civilian Personnel by Service/Agency by
State/Country,” Defense Manpower Data Center, June 2022, https://dwp.dmdc.osd.mil/dwp/app/dod-data-
reports/workforce-reports.
137 “Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan and the United States of America,” Ministry of
Foreign Aairs of Japan, signed January 19, 1960, https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/q&a/ref/1.
html.
138 Jerey W. Hornung, Japan’s Potential Contributions in an East China Sea Contingency (Santa Monica, CA: RAND
Corporation, 2020), xvi, https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA314-1.html.
58 | Cancian, Cancian, and Heginbotham
ere are recent suggestions that Japan would participate to some degree in the defense of Taiwan.
Japan has built a formidable military. Japanese military spending is significantly greater than that of
any other Asian state other than China or South Korea. e JSDF began deploying overseas for disaster
relief and humanitarian relief early in the Heisei era.
139
Japan’snew Defense White Paperwarns that
China’s growing military muscle, overflights, and naval incursions “have become a matter of grave
concern to the region including Japan and the international community.”
140
A commission from Japan’s
ruling Liberal Democratic Party proposed increasing Japan’s “counterattack capability.”
141
e 2015
update to the “Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation” outlined an expanded set of roles for
Japan in the event of “an armed attack against a country other than Japan” that “threatens Japan’s
survival.”
142
However, it would be a mistake to read these movements as definitive proof of whole-
hearted and immediate Japanese participation in the defense of Taiwan.
143
Given the U.S.-Japanese treaty and these recent (admittedly non-definitive) political developments
in Japan, the base case assumes that Tokyo: (1) allows the United States access to U.S. bases in Japan
freely from the outset; (2) directs the JSDF to engage Chinese forces only in response to a Chinese
attack on Japanese territory (to include U.S. military bases in Japan); and (3) allows the JSDF, after
entering the war, to conduct oensive operations away from Japanese territory.
144
is is also Japan’s path of least resistance because it avoids a dicult internal decision and a
potential confrontation with the United States. Furthermore, refusing the United States use of the
bases would risk undoing the long-standing U.S.-Japanese alliance, which has underpinned Japanese
security policy for 70 years.
Excursion: Japan participates from the beginning.
One excursion case assumes that Japanese forces participated actively from the beginning
of the conflict. e events leading up to war could involve explicit threats to Japan or some
other form of sharply exacerbated tensions between Beijing and Tokyo. Japanese ocials have
stipulated that preemptive attacks on adversary systems are constitutionally permissible if it
139 “Two Decades of International Cooperation: A Look Back on 20 Years of SDF Activities Abroad,” Japan
Ministry of Defense, Japan Defense Focus, no. 24, 2011, https://warp.da.ndl.go.jp/info:ndljp/pid/11591426/
www.mod.go.jp/e/jdf/no24/specialfeature01.html.
140 Ministry of Defense, Defense of Japan 2021 (Tokyo: 2021), https://www.mod.go.jp/en/publ/w_paper/wp2021/
DOJ2021_Digest_EN.pdf.
141 Naoki Matsuyama and Ryo Aibara, “LDP Panel Hands Kishida Proposal for Counterattack Capability,” Asahi
Shimbun, April 28, 2022, https://www.asahi.com/ajw/articles/14609609.
142 “e Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation,” Japan Ministry of Foreign Aairs, April 27, 2015,
https://www.mofa.go.jp/files/000078188.pdf.
143 Adam P. Li, “e U.S.-Japan Alliance and Taiwan,” Asia Policy 29, no. 3 (July 2022): 125–60, doi:10.1353/
asp.2022.0038.
144 “Furthermore, a PLA attack on, or occupation of, the nearby Senkakus—which Beijing considers part of
Taiwan (and thus PRC-claimed territory)—or strikes against U.S. facilities or forces within Japanese territory
seem likely to quickly render thorny constitutional questions about collective self-defense moot.” Ibid., 156.
59 | The First Battle of the Next War
appears that preparations are under way for attacks against Japan.
145
A brewing Taiwan war
might provide the circumstances that would justify preemptive action.
146
While obtaining the approval to enter the war could be cumbersome, the specific nature of the
evidence of a triggering attack is not stipulated by law. It is plausible that a government might,
under emergency conditions and with the advantage of a majority in the Diet, obtain such a
declaration and begin to operate against Chinese forces. Having obtained a Diet declaration,
the JSDF or civilian defense ocials would likely be empowered to determine what adversary
assets constituted a threat to Japan. is might result in Japan joining the war at the outset
alongside the United States.
Excursion: Japan is completely neutral.
On the other hand, Japan might seek to prevent all U.S. military activities from its soil.
Although mutual defense treaties give the United States the right to use its bases, the
Japanese might balk. ere is often a disconnect between peacetime expectations of military
access and what is given in a crisis. In a study of historical patterns in the granting or
withholding of access during U.S. military operations, Stacie Pettyjohn and Jennifer Kavanagh
write, “peacetime and contingency access decisions are driven by fundamentally dierent
dynamics.”
147
And despite strong public support for the U.S.-Japan alliance, public discussions
of concrete issues, such as a Taiwan conflict, often lack clear or realistic appraisals of potential
consequences—topics that would become acute when facing large-scale violence by China.
Excursion: e JSDF is limited to defensive operations.
Finally, the JSDF might be limited to defensive operations over Japanese territory even
after entering the war. In this scenario, legal or political constraints prevent the JSDF from
conducting operations away from Japanese territory. e only extraterritorial operation this
excursion case allows Japan to conduct is ASW on its eastern approaches.
Other Allies, Partners, and Adversaries
A U.S.-China conflict would not happen in a vacuum. e stakes involved would be so great and the
economic disruption so widespread that every country on the planet would react. is section lays out
the base case and excursion cases for other countries.
Regional Allies and Partners: A Chinese invasion of Taiwan would put all countries in the region in a
dilemma. On the one hand, they are more likely to fear the close power of Beijing than the distant power
145 See, for example, “「敵基地攻撃」65年前から論点、政府「自衛の範囲内」” [’Base Attacks’ Debated Prior to 1965,
Government Rules ‘within Scope of Self-Defense’], Nikkei Shimbun, November 25, 2021.
146 James Kraska and Yusuke Saito, “e Law of Military Operations and Self-Defense in the U.S.-Japan Alliance,”
Naval War College Review 73, no. 3 (Summer 2020), 9, https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol73/
iss3/8/.
147 Stacie L. Pettyjohn and Jennifer Kavanagh, Access Granted: Political Challenges to the U.S. Overseas Presence,
1945-2014 (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2016), https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/AD1021746.pdf.
60 | Cancian, Cancian, and Heginbotham
of Washington.
148
All have reasons to be wary of the strengthening of China’s position that might result
from a conquest of Taiwan; furthermore, all have reasons to be friendly to the United States, which would
be clamoring for access, basing, and overflight rights.
149
On the other hand are the dangers that would
result from participation, either active (e.g., directing forces against China) or passive (e.g., granting the
United States basing rights). e safest course of action for most countries would be to remain neutral.
Asian scholars are relatively unified in assessing that most countries would remain neutral. In
congressional testimony, Bonny Lin, an Asia scholar at CSIS, argued that “India, the Philippines,
Singapore, South Korea, ailand, and Vietnam . . . may try to stay neutral or provide limited, less
conspicuous forms of assistance.”
150
John Culver was more forthright:
I think you’d get a chilling set of answers if you approached authoritative people in our treaty
allies—Australia, Japan, ailand, the Philippines, South Korea and our partners like Singapore
and important other countries in the region like Vietnam—and ask them in the event that
China attacks Taiwan, will you back our military alliance? Will you assist in preventing Chinese
conquest? With maybe one or two exceptions, I think the answer we would get is no.
151
A more optimistic assessment by Zack Cooper and Sheena Chestnut Greitens posits some basing access
granted by the Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, and ailand, although this would only happen
under “certain circumstances” and “would likely come with severe limitations.”
152
Based on these analyses, the project decided on the following as the base case for particular countries:
▪ India, Singapore, ailand, and Vietnam: All would be concerned about Chinese encroachment
but also fear Chinese power. ey would be sympathetic to the United States and Taiwan but
reluctant to expose themselves to Chinese attack. us, they would take a passive approach,
allowing U.S. overflight and transit but not participating themselves or allowing operations from
their territory.
▪ South Korea: South Korea would not only fear Chinese power but would also worry about hostile
actions by North Korea, whether driven by the North Korean leadership or incentivized by China
to distract the United States and Japan. Indeed, South Korean president Yoon Suk Yeol has said
148 e famous “stopping power of water” was first explicated in: John J. Mearsheimer, e Tragedy of Great Power
Politics (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2001).
149 For a detailed assessment of the relative diplomatic, political, economic, and military influence of China
and the United States in each country in the region, see: Bonny Lin et al., Regional Responses to U.S.-China
Competition in the Indo-Pacific: Study Overview and Conclusions (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation,
November 2020), https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR4412.html.
150 Bonny Lin, “U.S. Allied and Partner Support for Taiwan: Responses to a Chinese Attack on Taiwan and
Potential U.S. Taiwan Policy Changes,” RAND Corporation, February 18, 2021, https://www.rand.org/pubs/
testimonies/CTA1194-1.html.
151 David Wertime, “Former Intel Ocers: U.S. Must Update Its inking on Taiwan,” Politico, October 8, 2020,
https://politi.co/36LgfuS.
152 Zack Cooper and Sheena Chestnut Greitensm “Asian Allies and Partners in a Taiwan Contingency: What
Should the United States Expect?,” In Defending Taiwan, edited by Kori Schake and Allison Schwartz
(Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute, 2022), https://www.defendingtaiwan.com/wp-content/
uploads/2022/06/BK-Defending-Taiwan-online-final.pdf.
61 | The First Battle of the Next War
that in the event of a conflict over Taiwan, North Korea would likely stage a provocation that
would draw South Korea’s focus.
153
e project assumed that because of the pressing nature of
the conflict with China the United States would release two of its four squadrons in South Korea.
However, because of the continuing threat from North Korea, the other two squadrons would
remain in South Korea for deterrence.
▪ Australia: Because of its close relationship with the United States and the stationing of U.S. forces
there in peacetime, Australia would give access, basing, and overflight. Australian forces would
participate in the South China Sea fight but be unavailable as a result for operations around
Taiwan.
▪ e Philippines: e base case assumes that the Philippines remains neutral. is assumption
was driven first by the relative weakness of the Philippine military compared with the Chinese
military. For example, whereas China has a large and modern navy, the Philippines has a small
coastal navy with only four ships over 1,000 tons. Its air force focuses on counterinsurgency, with
only a small number of modern jet aircraft. is imbalance in relative strength was illustrated by
the Philippines reaction when a Chinese vessel rammed and sank a Filipino fishing vessel in the
vicinity of Recto Bank in the West Philippine Sea. President Rodrigo Duterte refused to take a
strong stand against the Chinese incursion, later stating in public “I am powerless there.”
154
e assumption of Philippine neutrality was also based on Duterte’s general diplomatic shift away
from being a close partner of the United States and attempting to balance between U.S. and Chinese
interests in the region.
155
is move was driven by both personal animus toward the United States and
the promise of Chinese investment into the Philippines.
156
As part of this shift, there was a move away
from security cooperation with the United States, with the notice of cancellation of the Visiting Forces
Agreement (VFA), which allows the United States to temporarily station forces on Philippine bases.
157
153 Jung H. Pak, Trying to Loosen the Linchpin: China’s Approach to South Korea (Washington, DC: Brookings
Institute, July 2020), https://www.brookings.edu/research/trying-to-loosen-the-linchpin-chinas-approach-to-
south-korea/.
154 Rambo Telabong, “Chinese Vessel Sinks Philippine Boat in West PH Sea ‘Collision’,” e Rappler, June 12,
2019, https://www.rappler.com/nation/232892-chinese-vessel-sinks-filipino-boat-collision-west-philippine-
sea-june-9-2019/; Isabel Guarco, “Filipinos Don’t Trust Duterte to Handle China,” Foreign Policy, July 12,
2019, https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/07/12/filipinos-dont-trust-duterte-to-handle-china/; and Aie Belagtas
See, Basilio Sepe, and Luis Liwanag, “Duterte Says Philippines Powerless over South China Sea Rights,” Benar
News, July 27, 2020, https://www.benarnews.org/english/news/philippine/annual-address-07272020153033.
html.
155 omas Lum, Ben Dolven, and Christina L. Arabia, e Philippines: Background and U.S. Relations, CRS Report
No. R47055 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, March 2022), 1, https://sgp.fas.org/crs/row/
R47055.pdf.
156 Michael Sullivan, “Why Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte Distrusts e U.S.,” NPR, October 11, 2016,
https://www.npr.org/sections/parallels/2016/10/11/497487363/why-philippine-president-rodrigo-duterte-
distrusts-the-u-s.
157 John Shaus, “What Is the Philippines-United States Visiting Forces Agreement, and Why Does It Matter?,”
CSIS, Critical Questions, February 12, 2020, https://www.csis.org/analysis/what-philippines-united-states-
visiting-forces-agreement-and-why-does-it-matter.
62 | Cancian, Cancian, and Heginbotham
Excursion: e Philippines allows U.S. basing.
An excursion case allows the United States to base aircraft out of Philippine military airports.
What seemed like a sharp rupture with the United States during the Duterte era is now
less clear. Between the failure of Chinese investment to materialize and Chinese actions
in the South China Sea, the Philippines have had a partial reproachment with the United
States.
158
e Philippines withdrawal from the VFA was postponed, then replaced by a
recommitment to the VFA and other defense pacts.
159
Further, there is no clear assessment of
what Ferdinand Marcos Jr.’s position is, despite the overall favorability of the United States
in the Philippines.
160
Since being elected, Marcos Jr. has made statements strongly arming
Philippine rights in disputed areas of the South China Sea while simultaneously insisting that
Philippine-China relations are “set to shift into higher gear,” indicating a continued desire for
closer ties with China.
161
With these mixed signals, it is possible that the Philippines would
allow U.S. basing and overflight during a war against China.
e North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and Europe: Europe has been wary about becoming
involved in the U.S.-China competition. China’s immense economic power and the Europeans’ lack of
territory in the Pacific drives Europe to maintain good relations with China.
162
None of these countries
are so closely involved in Pacific aairs that they regard China as a direct threat that would warrant
automatic participation in what could be World War III with potential nuclear consequences.
163
However, Europe is also wary of Chinese authoritarianism and desires to maintain the liberal
international order.
164
e United States has engaged NATO and the European Union in its eorts to
contain China and has had some success.
165
Despite these engagements, it is likely that most European
countries would limit themselves to economic sanctions on China.
158 Derek Grossman, “Duterte’s Dalliance with China Is Over,” RAND Corporation, November 2, 2021, https://
www.rand.org/blog/2021/11/dutertes-dalliance-with-china-is-over.html.
159 Ibid.
160 Lum, Dolven, and Arabia, e Philippines, 6.
161 Cli Venzon, “Marcos Says Philippine-China Ties ‘Set to Shift to Higher Gear’,” Nikkei Asia, May 18, 2022,
https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/Philippine-elections/Marcos-says-Philippine-China-ties-set-to-shift-to-
higher-gear; and Raissa Robles, “No Compromise on ‘Sacred’ Sovereignty, Says Philippines’ President-Elect,”
South China Morning Post, June 1, 2022, https://www.aa.com.tr/en/asia-pacific/no-compromise-on-sacred-
sovereignty-says-philippines-president-elect/2598142.
162 Philippe Le Corre, “Europe’s Tightrope Diplomacy on China,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,
March 24, 2022, https://carnegieendowment.org/2021/03/24/europe-s-tightrope-diplomacy-on-china-
pub-84159; and Tom McTague, “e West’s World War II Moment,” e Atlantic, April 4, 2022, https://www.
theatlantic.com/international/archive/2022/04/western-response-to-china-russia-invasion/629465/.
163 e United States would certainly be calling for greater participation from the Europeans and would likely
invoke Article V of the NATO treaty in the event of a Chinese strike on Guam.
164 Stewart Lau, “EU Slams China’s ‘Authoritarian Shift’ and Broken Economic Promises,” Politico, April 25, 2021,
https://www.politico.eu/article/eu-china-biden-economy-climate-europe/.
165 For example, NATO has expressed concern about ”China’s growing influence and international policies.”
“Brussels Summit Communiqué Issued by NATO Heads of State and Government (2021),” NATO, June 14,
2021, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_185000.htm.
63 | The First Battle of the Next War
e United Kingdom and France might be exceptions since they have sent military forces to the Pacific
in the past and possess expeditionary forces.
166
However, those forces are not permanently stationed
in the Pacific and would take a long time to arrive. e governments would likely take longer than
the United States to decide about intervention, and the forces would not have used the warning time
to increase readiness for deployment. When they do get there, the arrival of one or two small aircraft
carriers and nuclear attack submarines would be useful but not decisive. e ability of other European
countries to provide military aid to the United States in the Pacific is extremely limited even if these
countries wanted to help. erefore, the project assumed that Europe would not be a factor in the
initial stages of the conflict that the wargame simulates.
Opportunistic Aggressors: Russia, North Korea, Iran, or others might take advantage of U.S. distraction
to launch aggressive action in their own spheres and attempt to settle long-standing territorial claims.
Opportunistic aggression would still be risky for the aggressor if its local opponents are powerful. For
example, if North Korea stages a provocation, that might bring other combatants into the conflict
against China, such as South Korea, NATO, or the Gulf states, if it looked like the military operations
were connected.
167
To have an eect during the short timelines of the game, opportunist aggression
would require close coordination between China and the other state before the conflict breaks out
so that the opportunistic aggression takes place simultaneously or nearly simultaneously with the
Chinese attack. ese preparations would likely be detected ahead of time.
Further, there is historical experience. During the 2000s, when the United States was deeply involved
in conflicts in the Middle East, other nations did not take advantage of U.S. distraction, nor was
there opportunistic aggression during the period of the Korean or Vietnam Wars. us, the base case
assumes that other adversaries would not launch their own military operations and that the United
States could focus on the conflict in the Western Pacific.
Excursion: ere are simultaneous crises.
On the other hand, China itself might launch the invasion in response to U.S. distraction by
a crisis elsewhere or might itself instigate others, particularly North Korea, to take advantage
of the situation despite the risks. erefore, an excursion case considers what might happen
if the United States faced simultaneous crises. is excursion case reduces the U.S. order of
battle and delays the reinforcement schedule.
166 For more on the United Kingdom and France in the Pacific, see Bruce Vaughn, Derek E. Mix, and Paul
Belkin, “e United Kingdom, France and the Indo-Pacific,” Congressional Research Service, August 5, 2021,
IF11052, https://sgp.fas.org/crs/row/IF11052.pdf; and Ben Berry and Hugo Decis, “Posturing and Presence:
e United Kingdom and France in the Indo-Pacific,” IISS, June 11, 2021, https://www.iiss.org/blogs/military-
balance/2021/06/france-uk-indo-pacific.
167 Josh Smith, “Home to 28,000 US troops, South Korea is unlikely to avoid a Taiwan conflict,” Reuters,
September 26, 2022, https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/home-28000-us-troops-skorea-unlikely-
avoid-taiwan-conflict-2022-09-26/.
64 | Cancian, Cancian, and Heginbotham
Strategic Assumptions: Orders of Battle, Mobilization, and
Rules of Engagement
e next set of assumptions covers the strategic context, namely the force structure, mobilization, and
doctrine of combatants.
ORDER OF BATTLE
Orders of battle (OOBs) are “the identification, strength, command structure, and disposition of the
personnel, units, and equipment of any military force.”
168
OOBs are critical for designing wargames
because they specify what units participate, their location, and their strength. However, OOBs are
often not published in detail for security reasons, and the project therefore had to deduce them from
publicly available documents.
China: e Chinese OOB is derived from best estimates in open-source intelligence, principally from
IISS, Jane’s weapons descriptions, and the annual report by DOD to Congress about the Chinese
military.
169
e lack of documents corresponding to the U.S. Future Years Defense Program and
reports on Programs of Record means that some educated guesswork about Chinese aircraft and ship
production is required. However, there is less uncertainty in projecting a 2026 scenario than one in the
2030s or later.
e Chinese missile inventory is particularly important. In the base case, all Chinese conventional
ballistic missiles are available within the timescale of the game (generally three to four weeks) and
have warheads that are appropriately matched to whatever land-attack mission they are tasked
to perform. For example, warheads used against aircraft parked on U.S. and Japanese air bases are
optimized for such attacks by using 3-pound bomblet submunitions.
However, Chinese missile inventories, their warhead types, and their availability are highly uncertain
because of the lack of Chinese published material. Because missiles account for so many of the U.S. air
and naval losses across all scenarios, the project explored two Chinese missile-related excursion cases.
Excursion: China has increased TBM inventory.
is excursion case explores the eect of additional TBMs (beyond the base case) in China’s
inventory by 2026.
170
China has stopped adding short-range ballistic missiles to its ballistic
missile inventory (and may be reducing such inventories) in favor of other forms of firepower
for short-range missions (particularly strike aircraft and long-range Multiple Launch Rocket
168 U.S. Department of Defense, DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (Washington, DC: November
2021), 162, https://irp.fas.org/doddir/dod/dictionary.pdf.
169 See “Chapter Six: Asia,” in International Institute for Security Studies, e Military Balance, 218–313; Jane’s
Group UK, “Janes: China”; and Oce of the Secretary of Defense, Military and Security Developments Involving
the People’s Republic of China, 2020.
170 Oce of the Secretary of Defense, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic
of China 2021 (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2021), https://media.defense.gov/2021/
Nov/03/2002885874/-1/-1/0/2021-CMPR-FINAL.PDF. SRBM numbers have remained relatively constant,
while the report highlights growth in the number of DF-26s deployed.
65 | The First Battle of the Next War
Systems) and longer-range missile systems, particularly the DF-26. China could shift
additional force structure toward longer-range TBMs, particularly those with boost-glide
hypersonic missiles. In this excursion case, the Chinese inventory of intermediate-range
ballistic missiles (IRBMs) and boost-glide missiles is 50 percent larger than that stipulated in
the base case, both for land-attack and anti-ship missiles.
Excursion: China has reduced TBM inventory.
Conversely, China’s TBM inventory might be reduced if more TBMs are withheld for nuclear
missions or as a hedge against other conflicts. Despite the PLA’s new emphasis on joint
operations and jointness, PLARF assets have only partially been integrated into the eater
Command (TC) structures, which are designed to facilitate joint operations. Unlike the
other services, there is, for example, no PLARF deputy commander within the TC stas.
171
e PLA or its political overseers might opt to withhold some DF-26 launchers, with their
interchangeable nuclear and conventional warheads, for an enhanced nuclear deterrent.
172
Furthermore, China’s TBMs may not have an optimal warhead to target match. e base case
assumes that China has analyzed and built the ratio of unitary to submunition warheads that
maximizes their impact in each iteration played. However, it is possible that China’s targeting
plans are either wrong or that they are forced to change them in the war. is would force
China to use less-ecient unitary warheads against aircraft in the open.
Given possible missile holdouts and a less than ideal mix of warhead types, an excursion
case reduces the number of Chinese medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs) and IRBMs
by 25 percent.
Taiwan: As mentioned above, the sheer volume of Chinese missiles makes Taiwan’s air and naval
forces almost irrelevant; besides a few squadrons that are isolated in Taiwan’s underground shelter
until they are dug out, these forces are destroyed in the first few days of an invasion. However, the
same is not true of Taiwan’s ground forces, which become critical to the outcome of the operation.
e OOB for active units of the Taiwanese military comes from Ian Easton and the IISS 2022 Military
Balance.
173
For the ground forces, two tweaks were required. First, Easton provides very specific brigade
and battalion numbers for the whole force, and the ostensible force structure has remained relatively
stable since his book was published. However, the botched transition to an all-volunteer force has caused
personnel numbers to drop significantly and units to be undermanned.
174
To an extent, this could be
171 David C. Logan, “Making Sense of China’s Missile Forces,” in Phillip C. Saunders et al., Chairman Xi Remakes
the PLA: Assessing Chinese Military Reforms (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 2019),
410–417, https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Publications/Books/Chairman-Xi-Remakes-the-PLA/.
172 Sky Lo, “Could China’s ‘Hot-Swappable’ Missile Systems Start an Accidental Nuclear War?,” Bulletin of the
Atomic Scientists, April 8, 2022, https://thebulletin.org/2022/04/could-chinas-hot-swappable-missile-
system-start-an-accidental-nuclear-war.
173 See Appendix III in Easton, e Chinese Invasion reat; and “Chapter Six: Asia,” in International Institute for
Security Studies, e Military Balance, 308.
174 Paul Huang, “Taiwan’s Military Is a Hollow Shell,” Foreign Policy, February 15, 2022, https://foreignpolicy.
com/2020/02/15/china-threat-invasion-conscription-taiwans-military-is-a-hollow-shell/.
66 | Cancian, Cancian, and Heginbotham
oset by having reservists backfill into active units, but Easton’s numbers are still inflated. e base
scenario therefore reduced the number of maneuver battalions in each brigade by one. ese resulting
notional battalions are still small by U.S. standards but comparable to their Chinese counterparts.
Second, the division between heavy and light mechanized infantry in the table is somewhat arbitrary.
On the one hand, Taiwan’s M-60 tanks (and M-1 tanks, if they arrive by 2026) are much heavier than the
light armored vehicles associated with Chinese marine and airborne units.
175
On the other hand, Taiwan’s
mechanized infantry is mounted in old M-113s with 20-mm guns, and Taiwan still has many M-41
and M-48 tanks, which date from the 1950s and early 1960s. Furthermore, China’s ZTL-05 amphibious
assault gun is a derivative of the British 105-mm L7 gun that is likely able to penetrate Taiwan’s M-60s.
176
Major sources for the Taiwanese reserves were Easton et al., IISS’s 2021 Military Balance, and
GlobalSecurity.org.
177
Information on Taiwan’s reserve brigades is thin, but a few things are known.
ey are large but not well prepared. ere is, however, some variation in quality and readiness. ere
are several levels. A-level brigades are the best prepared and reportedly include one battalion of active
cadre per brigade as well as an artillery battalion. Other levels are less well defined. Some sources
suggest a second level includes military personnel aliated with military educational institutions
and that the brigades include artillery. Beyond 21 or 24 “first-line” reserve brigades, there are coastal
defense units and a very large but even less well-equipped force of local reserves or militia. e project
models the “first-line” reserve battalion as having half the lethality of an active-duty battalion. For
artillery, IISS lists 2,093 artillery pieces in the inventory.
178
Most are probably old, and many may not
be serviceable but could be used to field 60 artillery battalions in the active and reserve forces.
179
Excursion: Taiwan has not received ground-launched Harpoons.
Because the PLA must come to Taiwan and land on one of a few suitable beaches, the invasion
is vulnerable to short-range ASCMs. Indeed, the original article prescribing a “porcupine
strategy” for Taiwan described mobile coastal-defense cruise missiles as “at the top of this
list” of systems for Taiwan to acquire.
180
ere is currently a deal for the United States to sell
175 100 M-1A2T tanks are scheduled to be delivered between 2024 and 2026. Inder Singh Bisht, “Taiwan to
Receive First Two Abrams Tanks in June,” Defense Post, March 17, 2022, https://www.thedefensepost.
com/2022/03/17/taiwan-to-receive-abrams-tanks/.
176 Massimo Annati, “Wheels of Fortune: Armoured Vehicle Evolution,” Military Technology 44, no. 6 (2020),
https://monch.com/ebooks/military-technology/2020/06tdc3qkm/12/.
177 Ian Easton et al., Transformation of Taiwan’s Reserve Forces (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2017),
https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1757.html; “Chapter SIx: Asia,” in International Institute for
Security Studies, e Military Balance, 308; and “Republic of China Army- Reserve Forces,” Global Security,
n.d., https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/taiwan/rf.htm.
178 “Chapter Six: Asia,” in International Institute for Security Studies, e Military Balance, 308.
179 is assumes that 33 artillery pieces are used to generate 18-gun battalions.
180 William Murray, “Revisiting Taiwan’s Defense Strategy,” Naval War College Review, vol. 61, no. 3, March 29,
2018, 27, https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol61/iss3/3.
67 | The First Battle of the Next War
100 ground-based Harpoon launchers and 400 missiles to Taiwan.
181
If that sale goes through,
those missiles would have a large impact on a Chinese invasion. However, there have been
reports of a possible delay.
182
Furthermore, the United States sent some Harpoons to Ukraine,
which may delay the Harpoon delivery to Taiwan.
183
erefore, an excursion case assumes that
these Harpoons are not on Taiwan at the start of the invasion.
e United States: Many budget documents and ocial statements fed into the U.S. OOB, with some
extrapolations to 2026 required. ese included the Department of Defense’s FY 2023 budget overview,
the service budget highlight books, the Navy’s 30-year shipbuilding plan, and, for the Army and Air Force,
force structure projections contained in their operations and maintenance budget justification books.
Location of individual units, where needed, came from the websites of individual military bases.
184
e reinforcement schedule assumes global sourcing: U.S. forces from around the world would be sent
to the Pacific. Some U.S. forces head to Taiwan from the north and east. ese appear on the game’s
operational map. Other forces would head there via the Indian Ocean. As noted in Chapter 3, these
latter forces engage the Chinese in abstracted battles around the South China Sea.
As has been seen during the conflict in Ukraine, modern militaries expend munitions at a high rate.
e game, therefore, tracks the most important munitions, especially those with limited inventories.
185
181 Mallory Shelbourne, “State Department Authorizes $2.37B Harpoon Missile Sale to Taiwan,” USNI News,
October 26, 2020, https://news.usni.org/2020/10/26/state-department-authorizes-2-37b-harpoon-missile-
sale-to-taiwan.
182 Zhu Ming, “[Insider] e U.S. Is Delaying the Delivery of the Shore-Mounted Harpoon Missile System and
Calling for a Price Increase. e Department of Defense Is Jumping – Report/Investigation,” Up Media, March
6, 2021, https://www.upmedia.mg/news_info.php?Type=1&SerialNo=107839.
183 Lee Ferran, “US Sends Another $1 Billion in Weapons for Ukraine, Including Truck-Mounted Harpoon
Systems,” Breaking Defense, June 15, 2022, https://breakingdefense.sites.breakingmedia.com/2022/06/us-
sends-another-1-billion-in-weapons-for-ukraine-including-truck-mounted-harpoon-systems/.
184 For specific citations, see Oce of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Ocer,
Department of Defense Budget Overview for FY2023 (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, April
2022), https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/deudget/FY2023/FY2023_Budget_
Request_Overview_Book.pdf; Assistant Secretary of the Army, FY 2023 Budget Highlights (Washington,
DC: U.S. Department of the Army, April 2022), https://www.asafm.army.mil/Portals/72/Documents/
BudgetMaterial/2023/pbr/Army%20FY%202023%20Budget%20Highlights.pdf; Deputy Assistant Secretary
of the Navy, Highlights of the Department of the Navy FY 2023 Budget (Washington, DC: U.S. Department
of the Navy, 2022), https://www.secnav.navy.mil/fmc/fmb/Documents/23pres/Highlights_Book.pdf;
and Department of the Air Force, FY 2023 Budget Overview (Washington, DC: Department of Defense,
2022, https://www.sam.hq.af.mil/Portals/84/documents/FY23/SUPPORT_/BOB_28Mar_1125_LoRes.
pdf?ver=5nrA8bBWoUSrvZ09CeHA%3d%3d. One of the authors does an annual analysis of military
forces which feeds into the U.S. OOB: Mark Cancian, U.S. Military Forces in FY 2022: Peering into the Abyss
(Washington, DC: CSIS, January 2022), https://www.csis.org/programs/international-security-program/us-
military-forces e FY 2023 analysis will come out in the spring of 2023 with the FY 2024 budget.
185 ese include a wide variety of systems. On the Chinese side, they include all variants of conventionally
armed ballistic missiles, such as the DF-11, DF-15, DF-16, DF-21, DF-26, and DF-17, as well as long-range
air- and ground-launched land-attack cruise missiles and ASCMs. On the U.S. and partner side, they include
the LRASM, JASSM-ER, JASSM-XR, Tomahawk and Maritime Strike Tomahawk, JSM, SLAM, Harpoon, ARRW,
Hsiung Feng variants (Taiwan), and Type-12 (Japan).
68 | Cancian, Cancian, and Heginbotham
U.S. munitions inventories were estimated from budget documents and allowed for production lead
times, generally two years. Some munitions, such as the Army’s Precision Strike Missile (PrSM) and
the Navy’s JASSM, are not expected to be available in large numbers in 2026 and were therefore not
included.
186
Other munitions not specifically tracked, such as air-to-air, were assumed to be available
in sucient numbers.
is inventory is distributed globally. Although large elements are in the Pacific already and in the
United States, available for shipment overseas, other elements are in Europe and the Middle East. e
base case assumes that all these munitions would be available for the conflict against China. e OOB
has a decrement to strategic airlift to redistribute these munitions and other supplies.
is approach accepts risk in other theaters, particularly in Europe and the Middle East. However, this
would likely be the U.S. approach, given the immediacy of the conflict against China. Other regions
would still have access to alternative munitions such as the Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM) or
the Small Diameter Bomb (SDB) I and II, which are available in large numbers. Using these short-
range munitions would increase risk to U.S. forces if conflict occurred, but given the lower capability
of regional air defenses, this risk would likely be judged acceptable. Further, allies and partners could
provide some stando capabilities in these other theaters.
Excursion: Submarines are withheld for other missions.
Although they would likely be eective hunters of a Chinese amphibious force, U.S. SSNs have
several other missions with which they are tasked. Most notably, they trail adversary ballistic
missile submarines (SSBNs) to hold at risk the nuclear capability of hostile countries.
187
e
base case assumed that all available SSNs are reassigned to either defeating the invasion of
Taiwan or clearing the South China Sea since a conflict with China is an immediate and grave
demand. However, some SSNs might be withheld for these other missions and therefore not
be available for operations near Taiwan. erefore, an excursion case assumes that two fewer
submarine squadrons (eight SSNs total) are available to the U.S. player.
Japan: As in the U.S. case, Japanese defense holdings and deployments are relatively transparent,
allowing the game OOB to be built from a variety of documents. e baseline for 2022 was established
using IISS’s Military Balance and cross-checked with information in Japan’s annual Defense of Japan
white paper.
188
186 Because PrSM full-rate production does not begin until 2025, the potential inventory in 2026 is under 100.
Department of the Army, Precision Strike Missile Selected Acquisition Report (Washington, DC: April 2021),
https://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/FOID/Reading%20Room/Selected_Acquisition_Reports/
FY_2021_SARS/22-F-0762_PrSM_SAR_2021.pdf. Navy JASSM is unavailable because the Navy does not begin
procurement until late in the five year planning period, many years after the Air Force. Air Force JASSM is
available.
187 Sherry Sontag, Christopher Drew, and Annette Lawrence Drew, Blind Man’s Blu: e Untold Story of American
Submarine Espionage (New York: PublicAairs, 2016).
188 See, for example, Japan Ministry of Defense, Defense of Japan (Tokyo: 2022), https://www.mod.go.jp/en/
publ/w_paper/wp2022/DOJ2022_EN_Full_02.pdf.
69 | The First Battle of the Next War
A Medium-Term Defense Program outlines broad future plans every five years.
189
For production and
acquisition rates and other specifics, the OOB used data from annual military budgets, published in
English in abbreviated detail and in full detail in Japanese.
190
Japanese defense spending has been
trending upward since 2013, increasing 26 percent through 2021, with the declared intention of
increasing spending further in the future. Within Japan’s proposed 2023 budget, the acquisition of
additional stando strike capability is listed as the number one priority for strengthening defense
capability, and this project assumes that it will have acquired a small inventory of Joint Strike Missiles
(JSMs), among others, by 2026.
WARNING AND MOBILIZATION
Although in all scenarios conflict was assumed to occur after a period of crisis, China’s attack was still
able to achieve tactical surprise. (See next section for discussion of mobilization.) e reason is the
precedent of Ukraine, where adversary forces freely relocated without triggering conflict, though the
other side made precautionary moves.
In the base case, China takes measures to minimize warning time by, for example, using a large
exercise to mask its preparation and delaying measures that would provide unambiguous warning,
such as requisitioning large numbers of civilian lift ships, until late in the process. e project team
postulates that these unambiguous signals would begin at D minus 30. Although the United States and
Taiwan would see these preparations, there would likely be considerable uncertainty about Chinese
motivation and intentions. us, the base case assumes that Taiwan and the United States would have
unambiguous warning at D minus 14.
With this warning, the United States alerts its forces and moves some forward in an eort to deter
China. e United States frequently moves forces forward to signal its resolve during periods of crisis
in accordance with doctrine about “Phase 0.” If deterrence fails, then under this concept forward-based
forces would strengthen the US military response. In the base case, these deployments consist of a
CSG sent to the Ryukyus (in addition to the CSG in Japan) and two bomber squadrons sent to Guam.
Excursion: ere is no U.S. “show of force.”
Although forward deployed forces might strengthen deterrence, they become highly
vulnerable when inside the Chinese defensive bubble. us, if the United States were
reasonably certain that China could not be deterred, it would be prudent to keep forces far
from the Chinese mainland before D-Day. In this excursion case, the CSG stays outside of the
second island chain, while the bomber squadrons stay in the contiguous United States until
D-day. e eect is that China cannot destroy them in a surprise attack with TBMs.
189 See, for example, “Medium Term Defense Program (FY 2019 – FY 2023),” Japan Ministry of Defense,
December 18, 2018, https://warp.da.ndl.go.jp/info:ndljp/pid/11591426/www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/agenda/
guideline/2019/pdf/chuki_seibi31-35_e.pdf. A new program is due shortly after this document goes to press
and has been discussed in the media.
190 For the full 2022 Ministry of Defense budget, see “一般会計歳予算各目明細書、令和４年度防衛省所管”
[General Appropriations Budget Statement under the Jurisdiction of the Ministry of Defense in FY2022],
Japanese Ministry of Defense, August 31, 2021,https://www.mod.go.jp/j/yosan/kakumoku/2022/kakumoku-
ippan.pdf.
70 | Cancian, Cancian, and Heginbotham
Nevertheless, even after unambiguous strategic warning from the intelligence community, there
would be some hesitation. Residual uncertainty about Chinese intentions, fears of escalating the crisis,
and concerns about alarming the public would mitigate against aggressive action. us, the base case
assumes that the United States surges some but not all its forces. However, the alert allows forces to
move more quickly once the conflict begins.
John Culver, a former national intelligence ocer for East Asia and now an Asia expert at the Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace, argues that Chinese preparations to invade Taiwan would be
seen months or even years ahead of time.
191
It is certainly true that China would need to prepare, and
many of these actions would be visible. However, it is not clear how quickly these preparations would
be interpreted as signaling an invasion and how quickly military action would be taken in response.
Leaders in target or allied states may also fear that defensive preparations would prompt or provoke
attacks that might not otherwise occur or, alternatively, might cause self-inflicted harm from damage
to economic markets or panic buying.
192
Excursion: e United States mobilizes late.
In a Taiwan crisis, U.S. leaders might misinterpret Chinese preparations, wish to avoid
exacerbating tensions, or be ambivalent about accepting the risks of direct conflict with a
nuclear-armed power. e “late U.S. reaction” excursion case eliminates the two-week reaction
period prior to hostilities and delays the arrival of U.S. forces by two weeks relative to the base
case. us, no U.S. air elements reinforce peacetime presence in Japan or Guam, and U.S. naval
forces arrive later than in the base case.
e base case assumes that Taiwan responds quickly to invasion. is means that there is no hesitation
or delay caused by political indecision or Chinese actions such as propaganda, sabotage, or special
forces attacks. Furthermore, Taiwanese command and control has dispersed or taken cover, so they are
not vulnerable to a decapitating Chinese first strike.
Excursion: Taiwan has a delayed reaction.
An excursion case examines what might happen if the Taiwanese response were delayed because
of Chinese action or Taiwanese political hesitation. In this excursion case, military forces in the
threatened zone an operate, but other forces are frozen for one turn (one half week).
RULES OF ENGAGEMENT
Rules of engagement are “directives issued by competent military authority that delineate the
circumstances and limitations under which United States forces will initiate and/or continue combat
191 John Culver, “How We Would Know When China Is Preparing to Invade Taiwan,” Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, Commentary, October 3, 2022, https://carnegieendowment.org/2022/10/03/how-we-
would-know-when-china-is-preparing-to-invade-taiwan-pub-88053.
192 Jake omas, “Zelensky Reveals Why He Didn’t Warn His Citizens of Russian Invasion,” Newsweek,
August 16, 2022, https://www.newsweek.com/zelensky-reveals-why-he-didnt-warn-his-citizens-russian-
invasion-1734268; and Amy Mackinnon and Mary Yang, “Ukraine Urges the West to Chill Out,” Foreign Policy,
January 28, 2022, https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/01/28/ukraine-urges-the-west-to-chill-out/.
71 | The First Battle of the Next War
engagement with other forces encountered.”
193
ey are important for wargames because they govern
the actions that players can take.
Chinese Strikes against the United States: Because the United States will be striking the Chinese
homeland, the base case assumes that the U.S. homeland is not a sanctuary. However, the ability
of the Chinese to conduct strikes against the U.S. homeland and thereby aect operations in
the Western Pacific is extremely limited. A few special forces might infiltrate and attack a small
number of high-value targets but not enough to materially aect military operations in the
Western Pacific.
In theory, the Chinese might send a submarine to the U.S. West Coast to attack cities and maritime
facilities. In the play of the game, the Chinese submarine fleet was fully occupied fending o U.S.
and Japanese warships in the Western Pacific. Even if the Chinese decided to divert a few submarines
to such attacks, their eect on military operations would be small. eir psychological eect on the
U.S. population might be large, but this would take time to aect military operations. Some game
participants hypothesized that the Chinese would mine U.S. ports, thereby preventing the exit of Navy
ships.
194
Such an attack might, in theory, be done stealthily. However, prewar surveillance during a
time of heightened crisis would identify any Chinese military forces operating near the West Coast,
and the Chinese have not demonstrated an ability to do such operations from merchant ships.
195
e Chinese might launch economic, information, and diplomatic initiatives to isolate the United
States and undermine popular support for the conflict. However, the eects of such eorts would not
be manifest in the short time duration of this game.
U.S. Strikes against Mainland China: ere is ongoing debate about whether the United States would
strike targets on mainland China during a conflict. On the one hand, striking a nuclear power’s
territory threatens nuclear escalation. State adversaries have been extremely careful about attacking
the homeland of a nuclear power.
196
In providing HIMARS to Ukraine, for example, the United States
193 U.S. Department of Defense, DOD Dictionary, 188.
194 For discussions in the popular press, see Lyle J. Goldstein, “Chinese Sea Mines Are reatening the U.S.
Navy,” National Interest, September 13, 2019, https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/chinese-sea-mines-are-
threatening-us-navy-80251. For a more general guide on Chinese naval mining, see Andrew S. Erickson, Lyle
Goldstein, and William S. Murray, Chinese Mine Warfare: A PLA Navy “Assassin’s Mace” Capability (Newport, RI:
China Maritime Studies Institute, U.S. Naval War College, 2009), https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cmsi-
red-books/7/.
195 Such an attack is not impossible. An earlier CSIS study looked at ways that the United States might be
surprised in the opening moves of a great power conflict. One of the surprise vignettes involved cruise
missile strikes against West Coast cities. However, the probability of such an attack is low, and its ability
to significantly delay deployments, as opposed to terrorizing the civilian population, is unclear. e United
States does have defenses, though these are not robust. See Cancian, Coping with Surprise in Great Power
Conflict, especially vignette #11 “Cruise missile strike against the U.S. homeland,” 109–110.
196 Ukrainian attacks during the Russo-Ukrainian war mostly target Russian-claimed territory in Ukraine
although there have been a few attacks on military facilities in the Russian homeland. For a good summary
of the debate regarding Chinese nuclear policy up to 2017, see Caitlin Talmadge, “Would China Go Nuclear?
Assessing the Risk of Chinese Nuclear Escalation in a Conventional War with the United States,” International
Security 41, no. 4 (April 2017): 50–92, doi:10.1162/ISEC_a_00274.
72 | Cancian, Cancian, and Heginbotham
reportedly attached the condition that no attacks on undisputed Russian territory be conducted with
them.
197
Similarly, the United States has refused to supply Ukraine with ATACMS because it could
strike deep into Russian territory. In the case of the Korean War, which occurred before China had
acquired nuclear weapons but after the Soviet Union had, the United States refrained from striking
bases in both China and the Soviet Union.
198
On the other hand, military advantage would come from attacks on the Chinese mainland. U.S.
airpower could attack Chinese aircraft on the ground when they are most vulnerable and sink Chinese
amphibious ships in port. e United States has built a large inventory of JASSM-ERs for this purpose.
Additionally, there will be a desire for revenge against China: China will have killed thousands of
Americans and, if it strikes Guam, attacked U.S. territory. In World War II, the United States struck the
Japanese homeland through the Doolittle raid as soon as it was able, not for military advantage but to
achieve propaganda value for striking back at an aggressor.
Some experts have speculated about the United States striking the first blow and attacking the
Chinese fleet in port when unambiguous warning has been received.
199
is would inhibit or even
prevent the Chinese from establishing a beachhead in the first place. However, it would initiate
a war with the United States as the aggressor, provoking all the adverse political consequences
related to such an action. Further, arguments for striking on unambiguous warning would run into
the memories of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction in 2003, when unambiguous strategic warning
turned out to be erroneous.
e base case assumes limited, non-preemptive attacks on the Chinese mainland. e United States
can attack Chinese air bases and ports that are directly involved in Chinese strikes on Taiwanese
and U.S. forces. It rules out a broader air campaign aimed at destroying Chinese infrastructure,
industry, leadership, and command and control as being too provocative. is appears to be a middle
course between a preemptive strike or broad attack on Chinese society and a prohibition against any
homeland strikes at all.
Excursion: U.S. National Command Authority rules out strikes on mainland China.
Regardless of what U.S. military planners may assume during peacetime about the most ecient
application of U.S. military force in a Taiwan scenario, major rules of engagement and especially
questions related to mainland strikes will ultimately be decided by the president, who will weigh
a wide variety of military, political, and diplomatic considerations. e president may judge that
the risk of escalation is too high given the potential benefits. e president might also believe
that the United States could prevail without strikes against the mainland. us, this excursion
case assumes a presidential prohibition against any mainland strikes.
197 Leo Sands and Robert Greenall, “Ukraine War: Russia Says US ‘Adding Fuel to Fire’ by Sending Longer-Range
Rockets,” BBC, June 1, 2022, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-61655577.
198 William Stueck, Rethinking the Korean War: A New Diplomatic and Strategic History (Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 2002), 118–141.
199 For example, Karl P. Mueller et al., Striking First: Preemptive and Preventive Attack in U.S. National Security Policy
(Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2006), 100–101, https://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG403.
html.
73 | The First Battle of the Next War
Operational and Tactical Assumptions: Competence, Weapons,
and Infrastructure
e base case assumes that U.S., Chinese, and Taiwanese forces have equivalent levels of operational
competence. Unless there was strong evidence to the contrary, the project assumed that they would
maintain operational competence. For capabilities where some doubt existed, excursion scenarios
investigated what would happen if forces were not able to match their announced capabilities.
In the case of conflicts between the United States and potential opponents (including China), this
assumption tends to bias against the United States since its training standards are higher than most.
Taking all sides’ capabilities at face value may give a modest boost to China since it has more unproven
capabilities than the United States—from the ability to execute an anti-ship ballistic missile strike to
simply moving troops from ship to shore in an amphibious landing.
e decision to assess capabilities at face value also recognizes the great uncertainty in such
judgments, given the dynamic condition of China’s military capabilities. Chris Dougherty, a wargaming
expert at CNAS, made this argument in cautioning against downgrading estimates about the PLA
because of overestimates about the Russian military. He noted that “Chinese military reforms over the
last 20 years, combined with President Xi Jinping’s counter-corruption policies, had created a more
professional and accountable force” and “built advanced weaponry at a scale far exceeding that of
Russia.”
200
Equivalency also incorporates continued Chinese advances in operational competence over
the next four years, particularly as they conduct exercises of increasing size.
OPERATIONAL COMPETENCE
As highlighted by the recent Russo-Ukrainian war, dierent militaries conduct operations with varying
degrees of competence. ese variations are often unclear a priori.
PLA Amphibious Competence: e base case assumes a high level of Chinese amphibious competence.
is requires that the Chinese military increases the scale, intensity, and realism of landing exercises
between now and 2026, that they are astute in evaluating and codifying lessons learned and in
formulating and diusing doctrine, and that they can execute doctrine in combat.
201
In calculating the
ability of a Chinese amphibious fleet to get troops and materials ashore, the base case employs ooad
rates similar to those associated with late-World War II U.S. operations, including Operation Neptune
200 Christopher Dougherty, “Strange Debacle: Misadventures in Assessing Russian Military Power,” War on the
Rocks, June 16, 2022, https://warontherocks.com/2022/06/strange-debacle-misadventures-in-assessing-
russian-military-power/.
201 is would require exercises of increased size beyond the current battalion and lower landings. For an
assessment of current PLA amphibious capabilities, see: Dennis Blasko, “China Maritime Report No. 20: e
PLA Army Amphibious Force,” China Maritime Studies Institute, April 1, 2022, https://digital-commons.
usnwc.edu/cmsi-maritime-reports/20.
74 | Cancian, Cancian, and Heginbotham
(for the D-Day landings) and Operation Iceberg (the invasion of Okinawa).
202
ese rates reflect hard
won wartime experience that the Chinese do not have. On the other hand, modern technologies like
helicopters and widely available amphibious infantry fighting vehicles facilitate more rapid ooad.
Excursion: China has reduced amphibious ooad rates.
While high competence is possible and useful to assume as the base case, it is entirely
plausible that China’s actual performance may be less skillful. Even if China continues to
expand its amphibious training and exercises, it will lack the practical combat experience of
the United States in World War II. e U.S. Marine Corps focused on amphibious attack prior
to the war, conducting annual landing exercises of increasing scale between 1932 and 1941
and systematically developing procedures. Many of the operations conducted earlier in the
war, such as Operation Watchtower (Guadalcanal) and the Torch landings in North Africa,
were less smooth but provided valuable experience. Only after addressing those issues were
the high ooad rates (from D-Day and Okinawa) achieved.
203
Although China may benefit
from and build upon the documented lessons learned by the historical experiences of others,
only large-scale experimentation and the codification of lessons learned from exercises can
create practical capabilities.
In the Falklands War of 1982, for example, the lack of recent experience with amphibious
operations and the impact of Argentine air and missile attack produced lower British ooad
rates than those achieved by Allied forces almost four decades earlier.
204
is excursion case reduces Chinese amphibious lift by 30 percent to match the ooad rate of
the British in the Falklands instead of the Americans in World War II.
Taiwanese Army Training: e project assumed the Taiwanese units were as eective as similarly sized
and equipped Chinese units. e project team recognizes that there is a vigorous debate about the quality
of the Taiwanese armed forces. Some argue that its training is stylized and unimaginative, the readiness
of units is poor, and conscripts acquire few useful military skills. On the other hand, the Taiwanese
would be defending their homeland and might show the tenacity and ingenuity that the Ukrainians have
shown in their struggle against Russia. Nevertheless, even with high morale, the lack of training and top-
tier equipment means that Taiwanese reserve forces operate at half strength in the base case.
202 e project’s definition of “ooad” rates represents the percentage of theoretical lift capacity (in personnel
and tons of equipment) of the total invasion fleet that is put on shore during a day of operations. Although
LSTs, both then and now, are theoretically capable of disgorging their entire cargos in a matter of several
hours, the historical historical average is far slower, with many LSTs left waiting oshore for days.
203 On the pre-war marine experience, see Jetek A. Isely et al., e U.S. Marines and Amphibious War: Its eory,
And Its Practice In e Pacific (Marine Corps Association Bookstore, 1998). On World War II operations, see
Historical Division, Headquarters, Western Pacific Operations: History of U.S. Marine Corps Operations in World
War II (Washington, DC: U.S. Marine Corps, 1971).
204 e lack of air superiority and the threat of air attack caused the British to unload at night and remove their
transport ships from the San Carlos area during the day. Kenneth L. Privratsky, Logistics in the Falklands War: A
Case Study in Expeditionary Warfare (Barnsley, United Kingdom: Pen and Sword Books, 2014).
75 | The First Battle of the Next War
Excursion: Taiwanese ground units are understrength.
Taiwan’s ground forces may not be as ready and competent, unit-for-unit and type-for-type, as
China’s. Taiwan’s military, and especially its army, was identified with the authoritarian politics of
KMT rule, and the transition to democracy during the late 1980s and early 1990s brought suspicion
of the institution. e attempted transition to an all-volunteer force, which originally aimed to
phase out all conscription by 2013, has failed to produce the intended results. Recruiting shortfalls
have required the continued use of conscription but with terms of service reduced from one year
to four months.
205
Moreover, even with continued conscription, the army has been unable to fill its
ranks, with just 81 percent of its positions filled in 2020 (and personnel levels of between 60 and
80 percent in many combat arms units).
206
Potentially disruptive reductions in force structure have
also been undertaken, and the combination of those reductions and the failure to fully sta units
has reduced the army’s size from 200,000 in 2011 to 94,000 in 2022.
207
Reserve personnel may fill vacancies in active-duty units during wartime, and Taiwan is exploring
a variety of ways to increase numbers and improve the realism of its training.
208
Nevertheless, 2026
is just a few years away, so Taiwan is running out of time to overcome these shortfalls.
is excursion case sets the combat power of Taiwan’s active-duty army units at 75 percent
that of similar Chinese units (i.e., the combat power of a Taiwanese light mechanized battalion
is set at 75 percent that of a Chinese light mechanized unit).
Taiwan’s reserve forces, already set at 50 percent of the combat power of corresponding active-
duty units, are reduced to 75 percent of that strength, giving them combat power equal to 38
percent (0.5 x 0.75 = 0.38) of a corresponding Chinese active-duty unit.
PLAAF Parity: e base case assumes that each “generation” of aircraft has equal capability, regardless
of nationality. While the U.S. Air Force has hitherto undoubtedly been superior to the PLAAF, Air Force
leaders and defense scholars warn that this superiority is eroding.
209
e Air Force’s greater experience
with large air campaigns and stealth aircraft is counterbalanced by Chinese superiority in air-to-air
missiles and their geographic advantage.
While U.S. air planners have run large air campaigns in recent decades, their Chinese counterparts
205 Vanessa Molter, “Taiwan’s All-Volunteer Force Transition Still a Challenge,” e Diplomat, August 31, 2019,
https://thediplomat.com/2019/08/taiwans-all-volunteer-force-transition-still-a-challenge.
206 Paul Huang, “Taiwan’s Military is a Hollow Shell: e End of Conscription Has Left the Army Critically
Undermannned,” Foreign Aairs, February 15, 2020, https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/02/15/china-threat-
invasion-conscription-taiwans-military-is-a-hollow-shell/.
207 Personnel numbers are drawn from “Chapter Six: Asia,” in International Institute for Security Studies, e
Military Balance; and “Chapter Four: Europe,” in International Institute for Security Studies, e Military
Balance 111, no. 1 (London: 2011):73–172,doi:10.1080/04597222.2011.559835.
208 “Taiwan Weighs Extending Compulsory Military Service beyond 4 Months,” Reuters, March 23, 2022,
https://www.reuters.com/world/china/taiwan-weighs-extending-compulsory-military-service-beyond-4-
months-2022-03-23/; and Qin and Chien, “As China Rattles Sabers, Taiwan Asks: Are We Ready for War?”
209 John Xie, “Will China Surpass the US in Military Air Superiority?,” VOA News, October 13, 2021, https://www.
voanews.com/a/when-will-china-surpass-the-us-in-military-air-superiority-/6270069.html.
76 | Cancian, Cancian, and Heginbotham
lack such experience.
210
e last wartime employment of large formations of Chinese aircraft was
during the Korean War, and the last time that a Chinese combat aircraft shot down a manned
aircraft of any type was in 1967, when a U.S. Navy F-4 was downed in southern China.
211
During
China’s incursion into Vietnam in 1979, Central Military Commission directives prevented PLAAF
combat missions beyond the border, and air units operating within Chinese airspace achieved sortie
rates averaging only one flight every five days.
212
Doctrinally, Chinese air practice has historically
placed heavy emphasis on centralized control in both planning and execution and a heavy degree of
ground control over flying units.
China has been working to address this shortfall in aerial planning and execution. In recent years,
as new airframes have been brought into service, the PLAAF and People’s Liberation Army Naval Air
Force (PLANAF) have sought to adopt more flexible Western methods, such as giving authority to flight
leaders, conducting unscripted and competitive exercises, and holding “golden helmet” competitions
in air-to-air combat.
213
However, given the magnitude of the cultural adjustments required, doctrinal
change is very much a work in progress.
214
Moreover, flight training continues to have stovepiped
career progression with little movement of pilots between training and combat billets. Perhaps most
importantly, there is no Chinese equivalent of the U.S. Air Force Air Weapons School (“Red Flag”) or
U.S. Navy’s Strike Fighter Tactics Instructor program (“Top Gun”), schools designed to train selected
pilots who then return to line units to become training planners and instructors.
215
Balancing the United States’ superiority in doctrine and training are the advantages brought by China’s
long-range air-to-air missiles and geographic advantage. e Chinese PL-15 air-to-air missile outranges
most Air Force Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missile (AMRAAM) variants, meaning that the Chinese
will often get the first shot in combat beyond visual range.
216
Furthermore, the proximity of Taiwan to
210 For example, during a single day during the Gulf War (January 24, 1991), the US-led coalition flew 2,570
attack sorties, with additional sorties in support. “e Gulf War: A Chronology,” Air & Space Forces Magazine,
January 1, 2001, https://www.airandspaceforces.com/article/0101chrono/.
211 Kenneth Allen and Cristina Garafola, 70 Years of the People’s Liberation Army Air Force (Montgomery, AL: China
Aerospace Studies Institute, April 2021), https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/CASI/Display/Article/2564684/70-
years-of-the-peoples-liberation-army-air-force/https percent3A percent2F percent2Fwww.airuniversity.af.edu
percent2FCASI percent2FArticles percent2FArticle-Display percent2FArticle percent2F2564684 percent2F70-
years-of-the-peoples-liberation-army-air-force percent2F.
212 Andreas Rupprecht, Chinese Air Power in the 20th Century: Rise of the Red Dragon (Harpia Publishing, 2019),
124–125.
213 Michael S. Chase, Kenneth W. Allen, and Benjamin S. Purser III, Overview of People’s Liberation Army Air Force
“Elite Pilots” (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2016), https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/
RR1416.html.
214 Derek Solen, “PLA Air Force Remedies Self-Defeating Training Culture,” Jamestown Foundation, China Brief,
vol. 22, no. 13, July 15, 2022, https://jamestown.org/program/pla-air-force-remedies-self-defeating-training-
culture/.
215 Lyle J. Morris and Eric Heginbotham, From eory to Practice: People’s Liberation Army Air Force Aviation Training
at the Operational Unit (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2016), 20–23, https://www.rand.org/content/
dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR1400/RR1415/RAND_RR1415.pdf.
216 Douglas Barrie, “Air-to-Air Warfare: Speed Kills,” IISS, September 9, 2022, https://www.iiss.org/blogs/military-
balance/2022/09/analysis-air-to-air-warfare-speed-kills.
77 | The First Battle of the Next War
Chinese bases on the mainland will give China several advantages. First, Chinese pilots will be fresher
during air combat than U.S. pilots, who will often have had to fly long distances from bases in Japan.
Second, although Chinese SAMs could not eectively target U.S. fighter/attack aircraft over Taiwan, these
SAMs give Chinese pilots a sanctuary from U.S. pursuit while ensuring that U.S. pilots must keep one eye
on the ground during air combat. U.S. pilots will also need to watch for Chinese surface ships that push east
of Taiwan. ird, Chinese AEW platforms will be more survivable because they can quickly retreat under the
SAM umbrella of the mainland.
217
Excursion: e U.S. Air Force is more competent than the PLAAF.
It is possible that the United States’ superiority in training and planning outweighs the
technology and basing advantages that China has. As Baron von Richthofen, the World War I
ace, observed, “the quality of the box matters little. Success depends upon the man who sits
in it.”
218
erefore, an excursion case explores the impact of U.S. air-to-air lethality that is 30
percent greater than that of the Chinese.
Beyond the general strengths and weaknesses of the PLAAF and Air Force is the specific question about
the relative quality of both sides’ fifth-generation fighters. As a result of the U.S. aviation industry’s
more established and competitive position, the United States has operated stealth aircraft for longer
and has more mature fifth-generation designs.
219
U.S. combat experience with stealth dates back to
1989 when two stealthy F-117As delivered ordinance against an airfield in Panama. Desert Storm
in 1991 saw widespread stealth use. After thorough vetting, the F-22 achieved initial operational
capability as the world’s first fifth-generation aircraft in December 2005. It remains the only aircraft to
have supercruise capability (i.e., the ability to maintain flight at supersonic speeds without the use of
afterburners).
220
e Air Force declared the F-35A combat capable in 2016 after prolonged development
problems. It was designed without supercruise but has an extremely low radar cross-section and
unparalleled sensor fusion, providing pilots with excellent situational awareness.
221
217 For a more in-depth discussion, see Biddle and Oelrich, “Future Warfare in the Western Pacific.”
218 Manfred von Richthofen, e Red Baron (Norderstedt, Germany: Books on Demand, 2009), 160.
219 According to a 2018 estimate, U.S. firms accounted for 49 percent of the global aerospace market. According
to a separate 2022 source, five of the top seven firms were American, while AVIC, China’s leading aerospace
company, was ranked twelfth. “e Global Aerospace Industry: Size & Country Rankings,” Teal Group
Corporation, July 16, 2018, https://aerodynamicadvisory.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/AeroDynamic-
Teal_Global-Aerospace-Industry_16July2018.pdf; and “Top Aerospace Companies ranked by Revenue,”
FlightGlobal, August 19, 2022, https://www.flightglobal.com/aerospace/top-100-aerospace-companies-
ranked-by-revenue/149900.article.
220 John Haire, “F-22A Took Long Road to Initial Operational Capability,” Air Force, December 27, 2005, https://
www.af.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/132369/f-22a-took-long-road-to-initial-operational-capability/; and
“Air Force Declares F-35A Lightning II ‘Combat Ready’,” U.S. Department of Defense, August 3, 2016, https://
www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/900930/air-force-declares-f-35a-lightning-ii-combat-
ready/.
221 Kris Osborn, “Sensor Fusion: e Secret Sauce at Makes the F-35 Revolutionary,” e National Interest,
September 1, 2021, https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/sensor-fusion-secret-sauce-makes-f-35-
revolutionary-192873.
78 | Cancian, Cancian, and Heginbotham
Far less is known about the Chinese J-20 than U.S. stealth aircraft.
222
However, although the J-20 first flew
in 2011, China’s defense industry has not yet been able to produce the WS-15 engines that were intended
to provide the J-20 with supercruise.
223
It is equipped with canards and, with the latest WS-10C engines,
thrust vectoring, which will give it high maneuverability, perhaps similar to the F-22. However, most
analysts believe that it will also have a higher radar cross-section (i.e., less stealth) than either the F-22 or
F-35.
224
Little is known of the J-20’s electronics. While the sensors will certainly have range and electronic
warfare capability, the system is unlikely to incorporate the same degree of sensor fusion as the F-35.
Excursion: U.S. fifth-generation aircraft are superior to Chinese counterparts.
An excursion case explores the possibility that U.S. fifth-generation aircraft are more capable
than Chinese fifth-generation aircraft. Although the J-20 will likely evolve into a fully capable
fifth-generation fighter, it may not reach that stage within the 2026 timeframe of the game
and thus may not be equal to the F-22 or F-35 in direct combat. is excursion case reduces
the lethality of the J-20 to 4.5-generation standards while maintaining benefits that accrue to
stealthy aircraft (e.g., reduced vulnerability to naval or ground-based SAMs).
WEAPONS EFFECTIVENESS
As noted above, the project generally accepted weapons eectiveness at face value. However, two
particularly consequential cases vary this assumption.
JASSM-ER vs. Ships: e JASSM, a conventional, stealthy, air-launched ground-attack cruise missile,
is a special case. Its long-range precision guidance and stealthy characteristics make it an important
munition for the United States. e basic version is designed for ground attack. A critical judgment is
whether the extended-range version, the JASSM-ER can strike naval targets. Although there is an anti-
ship variant, the Long-Range Anti-Ship Missile (LRASM), relatively few of the latter will be available in
2026 (roughly 450 LRASMs vs. 3,650 JASSM-ERs).
225
222 Even some superficial aspects of the aircraft have been misunderstood, as its length was initially reported at
two meters longer than it actually is, and aspects of other Chinese aircraft have, in some cases, also proven
wildly incorrect (and generally exaggerated).
223 Mark Episkopos, “China’s Air Force Is Massively . . . As in Massively Flawed for One Reason,” e National
Interest, July 18, 2021, https://nationalinterest.org/blog/reboot/chinas-air-force-massivelyas-massively-
flawed-one-reason-189870. China continues to report progress with the WS-15, as it has done for a decade.
224 Mark B. Schneider, “Professional Notes: e U.S. F-35 versus the PRC J-20,” U.S. Naval Institute, Proceedings,
October 2017, https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2017/october/professional-notes-us-f-35-versus-
prc-j-20.
225 LRASM inventory includes both Navy and Air Force projected for 2026, allowing for the long production lead
time and some congressional additions. Data from U.S. Department of the Navy, Department of Defense Fiscal
Year (FY) 2023 Budget Estimates, Weapons Procurement, Navy (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense,
April 2022), https://www.secnav.navy.mil/fmc/fmb/Documents/23pres/WPN_Book.pdf; Air Force JASSM
inventory from U.S. Department of the Air Force, Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2023 Budget Estimates,
Missiles Procurement, Air Force (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, April 2022), https://www.sam.
hq.af.mil/Portals/84/documents/FY23/PROCUREMENT_/FY23%20Air%20Force%20Missile%20Procurement.
pdf?ver=QeRLpOSY7vcLmsKbr3C-Qw%3D%3D. Navy inventory of its JASSM version (AGM-158C) in 2026
will be only 31.
79 | The First Battle of the Next War
Publicly available information about the capabilities of the JASSM-ER is unclear. ere are hints that
it could have some anti-ship capability. In its FY 2022 budget request, the Navy introduced the AGM-
158B JASSM-ER to “enhance long range strike and existing OASuW [oensive anti-surface warfare]
capability.”
226
e document suggests that it will be possible to “convert JASSM-ER software to a C++
software baseline, similar to LRASM, and focus on combining JASSM-ER strike capability and LRASM
OASuW capability into a merged Navy JASSM baseline. Future eorts will expand both Navy strike
and OASuW capabilities within Navy JASSM.”
227
e Air Force also continues to upgrade variants
of the JASSM-ER. Depending on the adjustments required to make the missile capable of anti-ship
operations, it is possible that the capability could be retrofitted onto existing systems.
If the JASSM-ER’s infrared target recognition seeker has even modest capability against moving ships at
sea, the impact would be enormous. By mixing JASSM-ERs with salvos of LRASMs, Chinese ships would
have to expend interceptors engaging incoming salvos of JASSM-ERs, allowing more LRASMs to survive.
e base case assumes that the JASSM-ER has some limited capability to strike ships at sea. High
numbers of these munitions allows a much greater volume of fire against the Chinese fleet.
228
Excursion: No Maritime Strike JASSM.
ere is a high degree of uncertainty about whether the JASSM-ER will have anti-ship
capability by 2026. Because the United States will have many JASSM-ERs, and the ability
of the Chinese amphibious ships to survive is central to the success of an invasion, this
assumption would make a large dierence in the game outcome. Hence, this excursion case
assumes that the JASSM-ER does not have anti-ship capability.
Ship Defenses: e base case assumes that the missile defenses of both sides work as described in
publicly available documents. is produces a single-shot probability of intercept of 0.70 and, with a
shot doctrine of two interceptors per incoming missile, a combined intercept probability of 0.91.
ere are few publicly available Pk figures for interceptors against missiles, but the 0.70 figure is
roughly consistent with modeling work in the public domain. A 2017 thesis for the Naval War College,
for example, cites a Pk of between 0.60 and 0.80 for the Standard Missile-2. e author of that study
stipulates that the values given are not “actual figures” but “are within reasonable magnitude of the
actual to produce valid and applicable results.”
229
In the context of national missile defense, longtime
analyst Dean Wilkening writes that “BMD designers apparently expect interceptor SSPKs around 0.80
to 0.85,” though he suggests that such probabilities “may be dicult to achieve in the presence of
226 U.S. Department of the Navy, Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2022 Budget Estimates, Weapons
Procurement, Navy, Vol. 1 (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 107), https://www.secnav.navy.mil/fmc/
fmb/Documents/22pres/WPN_Book.pdf#search=JASSM percent2DER.
227 Ibid.
228 An unpublished background paper examines in detail why this capability is uncertain and why the project
made the judgment that it did. is paper is available on request.
229 Justin K. Davis, “Development of System Architecture to Investigate the Impact of Integrated Air and Missile
Defense in a Distributed Lethality Environment,” (Master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2017), 33,
https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/AD1053193.pdf. e probability of hit for the SM-3 missile is placed somewhat
higher, while that for the ESSM is lower.
80 | Cancian, Cancian, and Heginbotham
countermeasures.”
230
e Missile Defense Advisory Alliance reports that 79 of 97 hit-to-kill intercept
attempts have been successful across all programs since 2001, a rate of 0.81.
231
Similar figures recur
throughout the literature.
232
Excursion: Chinese and U.S. ship defenses do not work as well as expected.
e history of modern warfare is replete with examples of systems, particularly missile
systems, that underperform in combat.
233
Missile tests are frequently conducted under ideal
conditions that begin with checks to ensure that all systems are in working order. ere are
many points where the fog and friction of combat could dramatically degrade a weapon’s
eectiveness.
234
Even after combat, the eectiveness of systems is unclear. ere was a lengthy
(and still unresolved) debate about the eectiveness of missile defense against Scud missiles
in Desert Storm.
235
is dierence between peacetime testing and wartime employment
could mean that ship-based cruise missile defense is much less eective than assumed in the
project’s base case.
By how much could ship-based cruise missile defense be degraded? A 2020 study of all cruise missile
attacks on warships since 1967 concluded that 60 of the 162 missiles launched (or 37 percent)
230 Dean A. Wilkening, “A Simple Model for Calculating Ballistic Missile Defense Eectiveness,” Science & Global
Security 8, no. 2 (1998): 183–215, https://scienceandglobalsecurity.org/archive/sgs08wilkening.pdf.
231 “U.S. Missile Defense Test Record – Missile Defense Advocacy Alliance,” Missile Defense Advocacy Alliance,
December 2018, https://missiledefenseadvocacy.org/missile-defense-systems-2/missile-defense-intercept-
test-record/u-s-missile-defense-intercept-test-record/.
232 For example, 0.7 in Perry et al., Measures of Eectiveness for the Information-Age Navy: e Eects of Network-
Centric Operations on Combat Outcomes, 34; 0.75 in Blodgett et al., “A Tabu Search Heuristic for Resource
Management in Naval Warfare,”158; and 0.5–1.0 in Bath, “Overview of Platforms and Combat Systems,” 9.
233 Before the Vietnam War, operational tests indicated that the AIM-7 air-to-air missile would hit 71 percent of
the time and the AIM-9 would hit 65 percent of the time. Based on these expectations, the F-4 was designed
without guns. In fact, the kill rates for the two missiles were 9 percent and 15 percent, respectively, and
gun pods were retrofitted to the F-4. Robert G. Angevine, “Adapting to Disruption: Aerial Combat over North
Vietnam,” Joint Forces Quarterly 96, February 10, 2022, https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Media/News/News-Article-
View/Article/2076617/adapting-to-disruption-aerial-combat-over-north-vietnam/.
234 For example, many of the hits by ASCMs were against ships that, although in an active war zone, did
not employ their defensive systems. See Cmde BR Prakash VSM, “Analysis of Missile Eectiveness – A
Historical Perspective,” Defense Research and Studies, August 8, 2020, https://dras.in/analysis-of-missile-
eectiveness-a-historical-perspective/. Prakash’s work builds on earlier work by John C. Schulte, “An Analysis
of the Historical Eectiveness of Anti-Ship Cruise Missiles in Littoral Warfare,” Naval Postgraduate School,
September 1994, https://calhoun.nps.edu/handle/10945/27962.
235 eodore Postol, “Optical Evidence Indicating Patriot High Miss Rates during the Gulf War,” Statement
before the House Committee on Government Operations, April 7, 1992, http://ee162.caltech.edu/notes/
postol.pdf. e Israelis concurred with Reuven Pedatzur, “1992e Israeli Experience Operating Patriot in
the Gulf War,” Statement before the House Committee on Government Operations, April 7, 1992, https://
web.archive.org/web/20141209235250/http://www.fas.org/spp/starwars/congress/1992_h/h920407r.
htm. ey were contested by Peter D. Zimmerman, Testimony before the House Government Operations
Committee, Legislation and National Security Subcommittee, April 7, 1992, https://web.archive.org/
web/20100520002222/http://www.fas.org/spp/starwars/congress/1992_h/h920407z.htm.
81 | The First Battle of the Next War
struck the target.
236
Of the 63 percent that did not, some fell victim to missile failures or soft kill,
which are handled separately within this project’s model. Against ships that were on high alert and
defended against the attack, 124 missiles scored 34 hits (or 27 percent). is contrasts with the base
case, wherein multiple independently adjudicated intercept attempts result in an average of only 5.6
percent of subsonic and 7.4 percent of supersonic cruise missiles hitting their target.
237
e excursion case increases the eectiveness of anti-ship missiles by postulating that 25 percent of
missiles fired hit their target. Although this higher Pk is applied against both sides’ ships, this change
aects the Chinese more because they have far more ships exposed to missile attack.
Cyber and ASAT: Given the lack of historical evidence on the eectiveness of cyber and ASAT tools in
operational warfare, the project credited each with being moderately eective. As discussed in Chapter
3, each side possesses cyber exploits that give passive benefits and could be used for one-time active
eects. ese eects are significant but not magical. For example, the United States can shut down
power to some Chinese ports and reduce their lift by 20 percent that turn but cannot shut down all
power in eastern China.
For ASAT warfare, the project assumes (1) that both sides possess moderately eective dazzling and
electronic warfare capabilities, (2) that they use these immediately and consistently to degrade each
other’s ISR, (3) that co-orbital interference will take longer than the length of a game iteration (i.e., a
month), (4) that both China and the United States possess some direct-ascent capabilities, and (5) that
the United States is politically constrained from being the first to use direct-ascent weapons, but also
(6) that if China uses its direct-ascent ASAT weapons, the United States can respond in kind, and (7)
that ASAT use would greatly degrade adversary ISR capabilities.
INFRASTRUCTURE
Hardened Aircraft Shelters: e base case assumes that neither the United States nor Japan
builds additional HASs prior to war. During the 1980s, the United States and its allies constructed
roughly 1,000 HASs in Europe, South Korea, and northern Japan. Against Chinese ballistic missiles,
HASs would reduce aircraft losses by forcing China to target individual shelters with unitary
warheads and deny it the ability to destroy multiple aircraft with a single missile equipped with
submunitions (cluster munitions). Analysts have, therefore, long encouraged the construction of
additional shelters in areas under Chinese missile threat today, though little has happened since
the end of the Cold War.
238
236 Prakash, “Analysis of Missile Eectiveness – A Historical Perspective.”
237 ese numbers include a 5 percent chance of a critical failure for defending systems. See inset in Chapter
2,”Anti-Ship Missile Interception.”
238 Alan J. Vick, Air Base Attacks and Defensive Counters: Historical Lessons and Future Challenges (Santa Monica,
CA: RAND Corporation, 2015), https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR968.html; John Stillion,
“Fighting Under Missile Attack,” Air Force Magazine, August 2009, https://www.airandspaceforces.com/PDF/
MagazineArchive/Documents/2009/August%202009/0809missile.pdf; and Carl Rehberg and Mark Gunzinger,
Air and Missile Defense at a Crossroads: New Concepts and Technologies to Defend America’s Overseas Bases
(Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2018), https://csbaonline.org/research/
publications/air-and-missile-defense-at-a-crossroads-new-concepts-and-technologies-to-de.
82 | Cancian, Cancian, and Heginbotham
Excursion: Japan has more HASs.
ere are signs that both the United States and Japan are recommitting to hardening as part
of an eort to improve operational resilience.
239
is excursion case assumes that the United
States and Japan build 400 additional shelters, for an estimated cost of $2.4 billion.
240
Access to Civilian Airfields: Attacks against aircraft parked in the open is eectively a density problem,
with the probability of kill for each aircraft in target areas being determined by total missile coverage
(the numerator) divided by the total potential parking area (the denominator).
241
e base case
assumes minimal dispersion to civilian airfields.
Excursion: Japan grants increased access to civilian airports.
Dispersing Air Force aircraft to civilian airports could greatly expand the parking area that
China must attack and thereby reduce US and Japanese losses. ere is likely a decrease in
operational eciency that comes from stretching maintenance and support personnel across
multiple sites. However, with the alternative being operating from damaged military fields,
this eciency loss is probably acceptable. Each Japan Air Self-Defense Force (JASDF) base
seems to be paired with a regional civilian airfield.
An excursion case therefore expands access to civilian airports. If the United States and Japan
can space aircraft on the ground farther apart than the submunitions of a Chinese missile can
cover, then China would have to expend one missile per aircraft. is would quickly deplete
China’s inventory.
239 Measures to strengthen resilience, in part through hardening, is one of the seven priorities listed under
Japan’s commitment to “fundamentally strengthen defense capabilities” in the Japanese Ministry of Defense’s
2023 budget request. Japan Ministry of Defense, “我が国の防衛と予算：令和５年度概算要求の概要” [Defense
Programs and Budget of Japan: 2023 Defense Budget Request] (Tokyo: 2022), 3, https://www.mod.go.jp/j/yosan/
yosan_gaiyo/2023/yosan_20220831.pdf. Separately, “host nation support” has been redefined to cover support
for alliance resilience (with correspondingly less focus on base recreation activities).
240 South Korea recently funded the construction of 20 HASs on the U.S. Kunsan Air Base for $125 million, or
a little more than $6 million per shelter. Will Bracy, “Hardened Aircraft Shelters Constructed at Kunsan,”
Kunsan Air Base, August 4, 2020, https://www.kunsan.af.mil/News/Article/2301980/hardened-aircraft-
shelters-constructed-at-kunsan/. e Indian Air Force has built 108 HASs for roughly the same unit cost.
“Indian Air Force Plans Building 108 Hardened Aircraft Shelters,” DefenseWorld.net, July 3, 2017.
241 ere are, of course, other aspects relevant to actual results of missile attacks, including the accuracy and
reliability of missile and warhead, construction of the HASs, and the energy and eectiveness with which on-
base dispersion is pursued.
83 | The First Battle of the Next War
5
Results
T
his chapter describes the results of the iterations. ey are grouped in five categories of scenarios:
base, pessimistic, optimistic, “Taiwan stands alone,” and “Ragnarok” (highly pessimistic).
e overall finding is that China is unlikely to succeed in an invasion of Taiwan in 2026 if four
conditions hold.
1. Taiwan must vigorously resist. If it does not, the rest is futile.
2. e United States must join hostilities within days and with the full range of its capabilities.
Delays and half measures make the defense harder, increase U.S. casualties, and raise the risk
of the Chinese creating an irreducible lodgment on Taiwan.
3. e United States must have use of its bases in Japan. Without them, the United States cannot
use its numerous fighter/attack aircraft.
4. Finally, the United States must possess enough air-launched, long-range ASCMs.
However, even a successful defense of Taiwan comes at great cost. e United States and its allies
lose dozens of ships, hundreds of aircraft, and thousands of personnel. e high losses would damage
the United States’ global position for many years. While Taiwan’s military is unbroken, it is severely
degraded and left to defend a badly damaged economy on an island without electricity and basic
services. China’s navy is in shambles, the core of its amphibious forces is broken, and thousands of
soldiers are taken as prisoners or war.
84 | Cancian, Cancian, and Heginbotham
Key Outcome: Taiwanese Autonomy
e key condition for judging outcomes was the continued autonomy of Taiwan as a political entity. is
condition excludes consideration of damage to the Taiwanese economy or the extent of U.S. losses. While
these factors remain relevant and the concluding chapter of this report considers them in the context of the
military outcome, the stated U.S. and Taiwanese policy goal is autonomy, without a discussion of cost.
Most iterations lasted around six turns, representing three weeks of combat, though some iterations
went longer. If results were uncertain when game play ended for outside players, the project sta
would sometimes play a few more turns to clarify the outcome. e project sta made a judgment at
the end about how to score the outcome. It is important to note that the full campaign, taken to its
conclusion, would generally take months. e game investigates the first three or four weeks, which
are the most intense for air and maritime operations. e most intense ground operations would
happen later, as ground forces sought a conclusion.
Chinese amphibious, airborne, and air assault capabilities gradually deteriorate under U.S., Japanese,
and Taiwanese attack, so China cannot rely on them indefinitely. If China can secure ports and
airfields and keep them operational, they will ultimately win. If they cannot, Chinese forces will
eventually crumble. In optimistic scenarios, Chinese amphibious capabilities would be destroyed in a
week. In pessimistic scenarios, the Chinese amphibious fleet might survive to the end of a month. e
status of Chinese-held ports and airfields on Taiwan was therefore the critical factor in determining
the outcome of the operation.
e outcome of each iteration was scored as follows:
1. Chinese Victory: Chinese ground forces outnumber Taiwanese forces on the island. Once that
happens, and the Chinese control enough airports and ports to bring the bulk of their ground
forces over, they will eventually prevail, though the complete conquest of an island the size of
Taiwan would take many months, barring a capitulation. Two iterations continued until total
conquest; most iterations were ended when Chinese victory appeared inevitable.
2. Stalemate: Chinese forces have a significant lodgment ashore, and neither side can make
rapid gains. Chinese forces have captured a handful of ports and airports. e United States
is striking those facilities to make or keep them fully unusable, while China is attempting to
repair them and make them fully functional. is outcome typically occurred when China was
able to secure the southern part of the island and the facilities there.
a. Stalemate, trending toward China: China has a solid beachhead that is not in danger of
being eliminated. ey have more than three ports or airports on Taiwan, although these
may be damaged. To defeat the invasion, the United States and its allies would have to
keep these ports and airports suppressed, resupply Taiwan, and, possibly, commit ground
forces to rescue the Taiwanese position. China would have to clear ports or airports with
the engineers landed, possibly while under attack.
b. Stalemate, indeterminate: An ambiguous situation, often involving the loss of the entire
Chinese amphibious fleet, but with Chinese forces securely ashore and having occupied
several damaged port or airport facilities. Resolution depends on whether China can
restore the captured facilities to supply and expand its forces before Taiwanese forces
counterattack in strength. e campaign would take an extended period.
85 | The First Battle of the Next War
c. Stalemate, trending against China: Although the Chinese have a significant
beachhead, they do not possess a favorable enough force ratio to make quick gains
against opposing Taiwanese ground forces. e Chinese amphibious fleet has suered
high attrition, and they have no working ports and airports on Taiwan. China is trying
to substitute small civilian craft for the large amphibious carriers that it has lost, but as
the British found at Gallipoli, this results in a dramatically lower supply throughput.
242
An important question on the Taiwan side would include the state of its ammunition
stocks and the ability to resupply. Whatever the eventual outcome, it is not where the
Chinese would want to be.
3. Chinese Defeat: e Chinese amphibious fleet is mostly destroyed, and the Chinese have not
taken sucient ports or airports such that major landing operations can continue. Relatively
small Chinese forces are confined to a small landing area, and they are only receiving small
amounts of supplies from airdrops and small civilian boats. At this point, it would be a matter
of time for the Taiwanese forces to mop up Chinese survivors. e main challenge for the
United States would not be in eliminating the remaining invaders but finding an acceptable o-
ramp for hostilities.
Teams played five types of scenarios: base scenarios, pessimistic scenarios, optimistic scenarios,
the “Taiwan stands alone” scenario, and “Ragnarok” scenarios. e latter four examined the
impact of adjusting critical assumptions from their most likely base case to less likely excursion
cases (discussed above in Chapter 4). is section summarizes the design of the scenarios run,
the operational outcomes, the losses incurred, and which variables appeared to be critical.
243
e
discussion provides specific numbers and detailed descriptions. However, these are not intended
to imply that these are precise predictions but rather to share the raw data on which the authors
formed their judgments.
BASE SCENARIO
Design: e project team conducted three iterations of the base scenario (using only base case
assumptions without any of the excursion cases described in Chapter 4).
Operational Outcomes: Two out of three of these iterations were decided quickly, with the Chinese
forces ashore unable to capture major cities and out of supplies within 10 days. In one iteration, PLA
forces landed in the south and captured the port at Tainan. However, U.S. air strikes prevented its use,
and the Chinese position was untenable by D plus 21. is was the only iteration of the base scenario
that was not judged to be a decisive Chinese defeat, instead scoring as “Stalemate, trending against
China.” In all cases, at least 90 percent of the Chinese amphibious fleet was destroyed, leaving the
forces ashore supported only by air drops and heliborne supplies.
242 At Gallipoli, the British were only able to deliver 300 to 400 tons of supplies daily to the peninsula. at
is approximately 1/50th of the speed of China’s initial ooad capacity in this project’s model. A primary
limiting factor was the speed of ooading at the beach, rather than the number of craft; China’s larger fleet
of civilian craft would therefore be of limited use until a port was captured. See James Eling, “Firepower 11:
Artillery Logistics over the Shore at Gallipoli,” e Principles of War Podcast, September 11, 2019, https://
theprinciplesofwar.com/firepower/firepower-11-artillery-logistics-over-the-shore-at-gallipoli/.
243 ese do not include speculation about losses from a simultaneous operation in the South China Sea, for
which sizable forces were withheld in game design on both sides. See “Abstracting Battles Elsewhere” in
Chapter 3.
86 | Cancian, Cancian, and Heginbotham
Figure 4: Operational Results: Base Case Scenario, Range, and Average
Source: CSIS tabulation of iteration results.
Chinese teams attempted dierent strategies that aected outcomes in all scenarios, including
the base scenario. However, even with a sound Chinese strategy, the combination of challenges
facing PLA invasion forces was too great to overcome. Despite the base cases assumption about a
large but plausible number of civilian ships incorporated into the Chinese amphibious fleet, the
buildup of PLA forces ashore is slow. roughout the duration of the buildup and until ports and
airports are captured and repaired, amphibious ships will be anchored o the invasion beaches,
with ships shuttling between Taiwan and the Chinese ports as they empty. is is particularly true
after the initial supply of amphibious assault vehicles is expended. In every iteration of the base
scenario, U.S., allied, and partner forces were able to destroy shipping before the forces ashore
were large enough to conduct sustained oensive action against defending forces flowing toward
the beachhead. Anti-ship missiles delivered by Taiwanese shore batteries, U.S. aircraft, and U.S.
and Japanese submarines all took a heavy and rapid toll.
Sound Chinese strategy could mitigate, but not stop, this attrition of the amphibious fleet. China
has a substantial fleet of modern warships, and most Chinese teams placed SAGs, comprised
of cruisers, destroyers, and frigates, to the east of Taiwan to serve as air and missile defense
pickets. ey also dispatched submarines further into the Western Pacific to keep U.S. surface
forces at bay. ese slowed attrition to the amphibious fleet while making the surface combatants
themselves more vulnerable to attack. At the same time, Chinese missile forces were capable of
suppressing Taiwanese air power and severely limiting (and attriting) the buildup of U.S. land-
based tactical air capabilities in Japan. During the initial stage of the conflict, China’s air forces
enjoyed substantial air superiority over Taiwan and were able to employ ground-attack aircraft
and bombers to obstruct the movement of Taiwanese reinforcements to the battle area. ese
strengths, however, were unable to oset the challenges of getting Chinese ground forces ashore
in Taiwan and keeping them supplied once there.
In the base case iterations, China was able to land a total of 37 battalions. With losses deducted,
China’s strength at the end of the iteration averaged 30 battalions, or 30,000 personnel (including
non-combat elements). On average, the size of the Chinese beachhead ashore measured roughly
2,600 km2 (or 7 percent) of the total Taiwanese territory of roughly 36,000 km2 by the end of
game play.
Chinese Victory
Stalemate Leaning
China
Stalemate
Indeterminate
Stalemate Leaning United
States/Coalition
U.S./Coalition
Victory
Base
Scenario
87 | The First Battle of the Next War
Table 3: PLA Situation Ashore at End of Iteration, Base Case Average
PLA End Strength
Ashore (in
thousands)
Controlled by PLA
(km
2
)
Duration of
Campaign
Supply Capacity
at End
Base Scenario 30 2,600 14 days Air dropped only
Source: CSIS tabulation of iteration results.
Losses: Balanced against Chinese failure to achieve operational objectives in the base scenario were
the large losses suered by all the combatants. Considering the short period of time, U.S. air losses
were greater than any witnessed since the Vietnam War. Naval losses were greater than anything
experienced since World War II. Japan also suered heavily: two out of the three base iterations
saw strikes against airfields across the length of the archipelago. Taiwanese losses in personnel and
infrastructural damage were great. China’s losses were also staggering and included large numbers of
aircraft, virtually its entire fleet, and thousands of personnel. Although losses were high for both sides,
the speed with which the base scenario ends (often decided by the sinking of China’s amphibious fleet
after 10 days) limits losses in the ground campaign for both sides.
Table 4: U.S., Japanese, and Chinese Air and Naval Losses, Base Scenario
Combat Aircra Losses Ship Losses
United
States
Total
(USAF)
Japan
United
States/Japan
Total
China
United
States
Japan
United
States/Japan
Total
China
Base
Scenario
270
(206 USAF)
112 449 155 17 26 43 138
Source: CSIS tabulation of iteration results.
e relative strength of U.S. and Chinese air-to-air capability was unimportant because most aircraft
were destroyed on the ground. e lack of U.S. and allied air bases within practical range of Taiwan led to
crowding at the few bases available. Furthermore, most of those bases lack any HASs to mitigate damage.
us, Chinese missiles destroyed many aircraft—about 90 percent of total U.S., Japanese, and Taiwanese
losses—on the ground, despite the large number of U.S. and Japanese air and missile defenses on Okinawa.
e United States lost between 168 and 372 aircraft in the three base scenario iterations. Subtracting
the 96 Navy fighter/attack aircraft lost on U.S. aircraft carriers in all base scenario iterations, the Air
Force suered losses between 70 and 274 aircraft, mostly on the ground. In one of the base scenario
iterations, the Chinese team did not attack bases in Japan, but China did strike Andersen Air Force
Base in Guam in every iteration, producing losses there. Japanese air losses were also high in two out
of three iterations, averaging 122 aircraft, and were also largely incurred on the ground.
88 | Cancian, Cancian, and Heginbotham
In all iterations of the base scenario, U.S. Navy losses included two U.S. aircraft carriers as well as
between 7 and 20 other major surface warships (e.g., destroyers and cruisers). ese losses were
partly an artifact of U.S. forward deployment aimed at deterring China, as the scenario begins with
two carriers and an additional SAG positioned in vulnerable positions o Okinawa. It also reflects the
vulnerability of surface ships to large salvos of modern anti-ship missiles. ese salvos exhausted the
ships’ magazines of interceptors; even with the base case assumption that shipborne missile defense
works very well, there are simply too many attacking missiles to intercept. e JMSDF suered even
more heavily, as all its assets fall within the range of Chinese anti-ship missile systems, which include
anti-ship ballistic missiles and long-range ASCMs as well as submarines and shorter-range munitions.
In all iterations of the base scenario, U.S. Navy losses included
two U.S. aircra carriers as well as between 7 and 20 other
major surface warships (e.g., destroyers and cruisers).
Taiwan’s air losses included roughly half of its operational air force, the majority lost on the ground to
missile strikes. Even within the scope of the these relatively short iterations, the 26 ships of Taiwan’s
navy (22 frigates and 4 destroyers) were destroyed by a combination of China’s joint fire strikes and
aggressive hunting by China’s second-tier naval ships. e land battles were fierce but limited in scale,
with Taiwanese army casualties averaging about 3,500, with about a third of those killed.
China’s losses in the base scenario were also high. In all iterations, PLAN ships around Taiwan were
the primary focus of attack, and China’s naval losses averaged 138 major ships in the three iterations
of the base scenario. On average, these included 86 amphibious ships (90 percent of the total) and
52 other major surface warships.
244
Chinese aircraft losses, averaging 161 fixed-wing combat aircraft
per iteration, were smaller than those for the United States. But in the base iterations, the United
States never attacked Chinese bases (though they were permitted to do so according to the scenario
assumptions), so all of China’s air losses were suered in the air. erefore, China would have lost
many aircrews but had no losses to ground crews.
China’s overall personnel losses were high. In ground combat, China suered an average of 7 battalion-
equivalents destroyed, equal to Taiwan’s ground losses. is would translate to about 7,000 casualties,
roughly a third of whom are assumed killed. Another roughly 15,000 soldiers were lost at sea, with half
assumed killed. Finally, many (and probably an overwhelming majority) of the 30,000-plus Chinese
survivors on Taiwan would likely become prisoners at the end of combat.
Critical Variables: e LRASM was particularly useful because of its ability to strike Chinese naval
forces and directly reduce Chinese invasion capabilities. In every iteration, the United States expended
its entire global inventory of LRASMs (about 450 missiles) within the first week of the conflict.
244 Note: “Amphibious ship” losses refer only to losses of larger amphibious ships (e.g., civilian RO-ROs, LSTs,
LPDs, and LHDs), not to smaller lighterage.
89 | The First Battle of the Next War
Because LRASM inventories were so limited, the base case assumption about the eectiveness of the
JASSM-ER against ships played a critical role in the speed and eectiveness of that attrition campaign.
In the base scenario, the inventory of several hundred LRASMs, with a range of 600 km, combined
with thousands of JASSM-ERs, with even greater range and modest anti-ship capability, allowing U.S.
bombers and tactical aircraft to rapidly attrite the Chinese fleet from beyond the range of its anti-
aircraft defenses. us, the large inventory of JASSM-ERs provided the numbers necessary to conduct
the anti-ship campaign quickly and at stando distances (the implications of this are discussed in
Chapter 6).
Because of the large JASSM-ER inventory and the uncertainty of its ability to strike ships, varying that
assumption became a critical part of the research agenda. Long-range missiles were critical because
Chinese air defenses were initially so formidable that no aircraft could get close enough to drop short-
range munitions. Even stealth aircraft were at risk.
Pessimistic Scenarios
Nineteen iterations were run with pessimistic scenarios that incorporated excursion cases more
favorable to China. e extreme “Taiwan stands alone” or “Ragnarok” scenarios are discussed
separately. e large number of pessimistic iterations was driven by the operational results of the base
scenario and the desire to examine how robust the base scenario outcomes would be in the face of
plausible changes to assumptions.
Design: All 19 pessimistic iterations included the assumption that the JASSM-ER missile possesses
no capability against ships at sea. As noted in the discussion of the base scenario, the JASSM had a
decisive impact on outcomes, but its actual anti-ship capabilities are not well established. e first
four pessimistic iterations used only the “No maritime strike JASSM” excursion case. e remaining 15
iterations included at least three additional pessimistic excursion case assumptions.
Twelve of the iterations included delayed U.S. mobilization, late engagement, or larger U.S. holdouts
for other ongoing contingencies. Twelve of the iterations included pessimistic assumptions about
Taiwanese operational competence or ability to react to the invasion quickly. ree included U.S. rules
of engagement that prohibited strikes on mainland China. One iteration included an increased number
of Chinese IRBMs, and one included Japanese prohibition of JSDF oensive action outside of Japanese
water or airspace, even after attacks on Japan.
Operational Outcomes: e results of the pessimistic scenarios were significantly better for China than
the base scenarios. Nevertheless, none resulted in a clear Chinese success (i.e., a Chinese occupation of
Taipei or even more than a quarter of the island). ree of the 18 iterations resulted in a clear and decisive
Chinese defeat, and the remainder had not produced decisive results at end of play, some 14 to 35 days into
the campaign. Of those 13 cases of stalemate, 3 were judged to end “stalemate, trending toward China,” 7
were judged to end “stalemate, trending against China,” and 2 were “stalemate, indeterminate.”
90 | Cancian, Cancian, and Heginbotham
Figure 5: Operational Results: Average and Range by Scenario Type
Source: CSIS tabulation of iteration results.
In stalemates judged to be trending toward China, the PLA controlled (or were soon to complete
occupation of) Kaoshiung, Tainan, and much of the southern third of the island. In those cases, areas
under Chinese control included several ports and airports; the United States had to devote many
airstrikes against these facilities, while the Chinese raced to repair them.
Had the stalemated iterations been continued, the result would have been decided by the relative ability of
the two sides to supply themselves from existing stocks or from new shipments to the island. For Taiwan,
the United States, and its partners, this would have required running convoys to the island under air and
missile attack. In China’s case, it would have required repairing logistical infrastructure while under air
and missile attack. e United States was attempting to flow whatever tactical aircraft remained into the
theater, while the PLA had used all of its ground-launched conventional ballistic missiles and had only a
third of the long-range cruise missile inventory remaining to counter these final U.S. squadrons.
e more pessimistic assumptions used in a scenario, the worse the outcome for the United States e
three iterations run with only one pessimistic assumption (the “no maritime strike JASSM” excursion case)
produced one decisive Chinese defeat and two that were trending against China. ose scenarios with
additional pessimistic assumptions produced a wider range of results—with an average result significantly
worse for the United States and its partners than the three more moderately pessimistic scenarios.
In all the pessimistic iterations, the PLA was able to land an average of 60 battalions. e final strength
of PLA forces ashore, after losses, averaged 43 battalions, or 43,000 combat soldiers and accompanying
support personnel. At the end of game play, the PLA controlled an average of 6,240 km2 (or 17
percent) of Taiwan’s 36,000 km2, though, as noted, there was considerable variation between games.
Finally, it should be noted that the games lasted an average of six turns (or 21 days of campaign time).
Although the result was often clear at that point, getting to final resolution would require many
additional weeks of combat. In the case of stalemate, the war might have continued for many months.
Table 5: PLA Situation Ashore at End of Game Play, Pessimistic Case Average
PLA End Strength
Ashore
Territory Controlled
by PLA (km
2
)
Duration of
Campaign
Supply Capacity at End
Base Scenario 30,000 2,600 14 days Air dropped only
Pessimistic
Scenarios
43,000 6,240 21 days
Damaged ports and
airports; air; sometimes
a few ships
Source: CSIS tabulation of iteration results.
Chinese Victory Stalemate Leaning
China
Stalemate
Indeterminate
Stalemate Leaning United
States/Coalition
U.S./Coalition
Victory
Base
Scenario
Pessimistic
Scenario
91 | The First Battle of the Next War
Losses: Losses in the pessimistic scenarios (i.e., those more favorable to China) were again heavy, with
average air and ground force losses higher for the United States, Japan, and China than in the base
scenario and ship losses that were roughly comparable.
Table 6: U.S., Japanese, and Chinese Air and Naval Losses, Pessimistic Case Scenario
Combat Aircra Losses Ship Losses
United
States
Japan
United
States/Japan
Total
China
United
States
Japan
United
States/Japan
Total
China
Base
Scenarios
270(206
USAF)
112 454 155 17 26 43 138
Pessimistic
Scenarios
(Favors China)
484
(412
USAF)
161 646 327 14 14 28 113
Source: CSIS tabulation of iteration results.
e United States lost an average of 484 aircraft, roughly 70 percent higher than in the base iterations,
with the Air Force losing almost twice as many as it did in the base iterations. Greater U.S. air losses
were primarily a function of campaigns that were generally longer than the relatively quick Chinese
defeats experienced in the base scenario iterations. e longer time horizons allowed the United States
to bring more aircraft into theater—and to lose a significant portion of them on the ground.
In addition, with the “no maritime strike JASSM” assumption in eect, the United States relied
relatively more on tactical aircraft to launch shorter-range munitions (JSMs and Joint Stando
Weapons, or JSOWs) against the Chinese fleet. is resulted in additional losses in the air as well as
higher incentives for the Chinese to seek their destruction on the ground—often entirely exhausting
the Chinese inventory of air- and ground-launched stando missiles in the process.
U.S. air losses varied greatly from game to game, from a low of 90 to a high of 774 in these iterations.
Variation was primarily a function of U.S. strategy, with some particularly aggressive teams bringing
in reinforcements as quickly as possible, basing them close to Taiwan, and losing them in enormous
numbers; other teams took a more cautious approach. Japanese losses averaged a third higher than
in the base scenario iterations and were relatively consistent across iterations. China struck bases in
Japan in every one of the pessimistic iterations.
China lost an average of 327 aircraft per iteration, ranging from a low of 48 to a high of 826. ese
air losses were roughly twice as high as in the base scenario. In half of the iterations, the U.S. team
attacked Chinese air bases with JASSM-ERs. ese attacks destroyed between 66 and 748 aircraft,
depending on the extent, scale, and target of attacks. Losses in the air were fewer than ground losses
but similarly varied according to whether the U.S. team challenged the Chinese CAP over Taiwan and
how aggressively the Chinese team sought to extend air operations beyond Taiwan.
Ship losses for the United States and Japan were similar to the base scenario. e pessimistic scenarios
often provided fewer naval reinforcements during the first several weeks of the conflict. e greater
surviving Chinese capabilities tended to make the U.S./Japanese player more cautious with the use
92 | Cancian, Cancian, and Heginbotham
of surface forces. Any surface ship that approached Taiwan was destroyed in both scenarios, and
the remainder were often not a high priority for China since they posed only a limited threat to the
Chinese operation.
Chinese naval losses (120 ships) were 14 percent lower than in the base scenario, despite
iterations that often lasted more than twice as long. Several of the assumptions in these scenarios,
particularly the lack of open-ocean maritime capability for the JASSM-ER and slower or reduced U.S.
reinforcements, pushed the U.S. teams to concepts of operation that required more time to bring to
fruition. Nevertheless, Chinese ship losses were severe. In most of those cases where the amphibious
fleet had not been destroyed outright by the end of the iteration, picket ships east of Taiwan were
suciently attrited that the final destruction of the amphibious fleet would have occurred within days
or a week thereafter.
Losses from ground combat—an average of 17,000 PLA casualties and 22,000 Taiwanese—were
significantly higher in pessimistic scenarios than in the base scenario because more Chinese units got
onto Taiwan and could fight more intensively.
Critical Variables: Some variables had greater impacts than others. As mentioned above, the “no
maritime strike JASSM” excursion case was especially dicult for the United States. In all scenarios,
the clearest, fastest, and most direct way to defeat the invasion is to attack the amphibious fleet o
Taiwan using stando munitions. Without JASSM-ER’s anti-ship capability, the ability of the United
States to pursue this strategy is limited by a shortage of appropriate missiles. However, even without
the ability to attack ships at sea, the JASSM-ER can contribute to defeating invasion. In the pessimistic
scenarios, U.S. teams used the JASSM-ER to attack Chinese air bases and ports. e former can attrite
Chinese combat aircraft and disrupt Chinese air support for operations on Taiwan, while the latter can
disrupt the loading of amphibious ships or destroy them at the pier.
However, when the U.S. rules of engagement prohibit strikes on China’s mainland, perhaps because
of concerns over escalation, the assumption about the JASSM’s lack of open-ocean anti-ship capability
becomes more consequential. e missile still has a role, but a much-circumscribed role. e JASSM
can be used to attack captured ports and air bases on Taiwan to prevent their use by the PLA. It can
also be used for strikes against Chinese ground forces on Taiwan, though it is not well suited for that
role because of its unitary warhead.
Another impactful excursion case was delayed U.S. mobilization until D-Day. In scenarios wherein
the United States only begins mobilization after the start of the war and does not engage in combat
operations until after the first week, China’s amphibious fleet suered less early attrition and was,
therefore, able to get far more forces ashore, putting China in a better position to make rapid gains.
A second condition with a large impact was diminished Taiwanese ground force eectiveness and,
especially, diminished reaction speed. Under conditions in which Taiwan was delayed in transferring
forces from one army area to another, China was better able to make gains on the ground and
consolidate its position. at was especially significant when China made its primary landing in the
southern Taiwan, where the defending forces are relatively sparse.
Finally, two conditions produced a larger impact when incorporated into the scenario together than
they did separately.
93 | The First Battle of the Next War
Optimistic Scenarios
e base case assumptions could just as plausibly prove incorrect in ways that might advantage the
United States and its coalition. Running iterations with optimistic assumptions illustrated under what
circumstances U.S., Japanese, and Taiwanese losses might be lower than the base scenario. Two such
iterations were conducted.
Design: One of the iterations run with optimistic assumptions incorporated four optimistic
assumptions, including expanded U.S. access to dual-use facilities in Japan, Chinese missile holdbacks,
reduced ship defense eectiveness, and a resilient force posture on Turn 1 (i.e., no bombers on Guam
or aircraft carriers forward of Guam). e second iteration incorporated seven optimistic assumptions,
including: additional HASs, expanded access to Japanese dual-use facilities, Japanese authorization
to use force from Turn 1, lower Chinese amphibious operational competence, superior U.S. fifth-
generation aircraft, superior U.S. pilot training, and less eective ship defenses for all combatants.
Operational Outcomes: Both optimistic iterations produced decisive Chinese defeats (or U.S.,
Taiwanese, and Japanese victories). e Chinese fleet was heavily damaged in the first three days and
was unable to land more than three amphibious brigades ashore during the critical first three days,
supplemented by one to two brigades of airborne and air assault forces. Follow-on waves consisted of
individual battalions.
Figure 6: Operational Results: Average and Range by Scenario Type
Source: CSIS tabulation of iteration results.
On average, the PLA was able to land a total of 25 battalions, with a final strength of 22 battalions
after losses. e force was unable to gain more than a small foothold ashore, amounting to less
than a single game hex (780 km2). With the amphibious fleet eectively destroyed after the first
two turns, the game was declared finished, though some combat might have sputtered along for a
few weeks.
Although escalation decisions were not part of the game, participants in the optimistic scenarios
suggested that escalation might have been least likely in these scenarios since defeat was quick
and there were relatively few forces ashore to rescue or support.
Chinese Victory Stalemate Leaning
China
Stalemate
Indeterminate
Stalemate Leaning
United States/Coalition
U.S./Coalition
Victory
Base
Scenario
Optimistic
Scenario
Pessimistic
Scenario
94 | Cancian, Cancian, and Heginbotham
Table 7: PLA Situation Ashore at End of Game Play, Optimistic Case Average
PLA End Strength
Ashore
Territory
Controlled by PLA
(km
2
)
Duration of
Campaign
Supply
Capacity at
End
Base Scenario 30,000 2,600 14 days
Air dropped
only
Pessimistic
Scenarios
43,000 6,240 21 days
Damaged
ports and
airports; air;
sometimes a
few ships
Optimistic
Scenarios
22,000 780 7 days
Air resupply
only
Source: CSIS tabulation of iteration results.
Losses: Due to the brevity of combat operations, the optimistic scenarios produced lower losses
for all combatants than other scenarios. Nevertheless, losses to the Chinese fleet were crippling,
and China was still able to inflict significant losses on coalition air and naval forces.
Table 8: U.S., Japanese, and Chinese Air and Naval Losses, Optimistic Case Scenarios
Combat Aircra Losses Ship Losses
United
States
Japan
United
States/
Japan
Total
China
United
States
Japan
United
States/
Japan
Total
China
Base Scenario
270
(206
USAF)
112 449 155 17 26 43 138
Pessimistic
Scenarios
(Favors China)
484
(412
USAF)
161 646 327 14 14 28 113
Optimistic
Scenarios
(Favors United
States/Japan/
Taiwan)
200
(151
USAF)
90 290 18 8 16 24 129
Source: CSIS tabulation of iteration results.
95 | The First Battle of the Next War
All Chinese amphibious ships at sea and most of the picket force were sunk. Missiles from shore
batteries on Taiwan, U.S. submarines, bombers, and tactical aircraft all contributed to these sinkings.
e excursion case of reduced ship-based defenses greatly accelerated the rate at which Chinese ships
were sunk. With Chinese forces ashore not posing a pressing threat to Taiwanese cities or ports, the
United States did not feel pressured to attack Chinese aircraft on the mainland: the relatively light
Chinese aircraft losses were therefore mostly due to ground fire over Taiwan itself.
e China team, confronted with the prospect of extremely high and rapid losses to its amphibious
fleet, sought to mitigate those losses by attacking air bases in Japan and Guam from the first days
of the conflict. Despite the brevity of the campaign, China exhausted all of its long-range missile
inventories against those targets, destroying many of the aircraft in Japan. However, because the
United States did not have the time to flow as many aircraft into theater as in other scenarios, there
were fewer aircraft for China to destroy. US air losses were only 74 percent of what they were in the
base scenario and 54 percent what they were in the pessimistic scenarios. Japanese air losses were 80
percent and 70 percent of the base and pessimistic cases, respectively.
With limited ground combat, casualties to ground forces on Taiwan were similarly light. On the
Chinese side, these amounted to 3 battalions rendered combat ineective, with perhaps 3,000 Chinese
casualties (including 1,000 fatalities). Casualties on the Taiwanese side were roughly twice as high,
many of which were caused by Chinese aircraft conducting ground support operations. Barring a
ceasefire to allow the evacuation of stranded Chinese soldiers, roughly 24,000 Chinese soldiers
associated with units ashore would have been taken prisoner, in addition to the survivors from sunken
ships who might have been taken prisoner after swimming to shore.
Critical Variables: To the extent that Chinese losses were lighter in this set of scenarios than
in others, the outcome was a function of the shorter scenario combined with U.S. and partner
priorities that were aected by the conditions of the scenario, as described above. If no o-ramp
to peace were found, Chinese naval and air losses would continue to climb (in the former case
limited by the size of the fleet and in the latter probably more dramatically as the United States
turned its attention to attacking aircraft).
ree factors significantly reduced U.S. losses in both iterations: dispersion across more locations
(including civilian airports), reduced missile coverage on the part of China (due to missile
holdouts and less-well-optimized warheads), and early attacks on Japanese air bases. e latter
was motivated by the increased danger to the Chinese fleet posed by tactical aircraft and resulted
in fewer aircraft being at the bases when attacked since fewer reinforcements had flowed in from
other U.S. bases around the world. Additionally, the building of new HASs reduced aircraft losses
in one of the iterations, while not placing bombers in Guam or aircraft carriers forward deployed
reduced aircraft losses in the other.
Two optimistic assumptions had little impact: superior U.S. pilot training and superior fifth-
generation aircraft. ere was little air-to-air combat in the optimistic scenarios, largely because
of the employment of long-range stando munitions. Had a mix of pessimistic and optimistic
assumptions been in play, it is possible that superiority of U.S. air-to-air combat capability might
have been more significant. However, it probably would not have factored among the most
important variables due to most U.S. air losses occurring on the ground.
96 | Cancian, Cancian, and Heginbotham
Taiwan Stands Alone
Design: e “Taiwan stands alone” scenario was designed to examine how Taiwan might fare
with no direct material assistance from the United States. is provides a baseline against
which to measure the U.S. and partner contribution to the defense of Taiwan. e project team
conducted one iteration of this scenario. Because the United States remained on the sidelines, the
assumption was that no other country would intervene because the risks would be too high for
any second-tier power. None of the excursion cases run in the other scenarios were incorporated
into this scenario, but this scenario did have two unique assumptions.
First, Taiwan’s operations would be weakened by a long-term shortage in ammunition. e
scenario assumed that after two months of operations, ammunition shortages would force Taiwan
to fire half as frequently, with a corresponding reduction in eectiveness. After three months,
ammunition exhaustion forces artillery crews to be reformed into infantry units.
Second, China would need to withhold some aircraft to deter U.S. and Japanese intervention, even
if that intervention was ultimately not forthcoming. is had the eect of limiting the number of
aircraft supporting Chinese ground forces on Taiwan. After withholding squadrons for deterrence,
China was left with 14 squadrons for ground support, with 6 additional squadrons to replace
losses as they occurred.
Figure 7: Operational Results: Average and Range by Scenario Type
Chinese Victory
Stalemate Leaning
China
Stalemate
Indeterminate
Stalemate Leaning
United States/Coalition
U.S./Coalition
Victory
Base
Scenario
Optimistic
Scenario
Taiwan
Alone
Pessimistic
Scenario
Source: CSIS tabulation of iteration results.
Operational Outcomes: e “Taiwan stands alone” scenario resulted in a PLA victory. e outcome
was never in doubt, with the PLA making slow but steady progress throughout the operation.
PLA commanders landed forces in the south, took Tainan and Gaoshiung after three weeks, and
occupied Taichung (halfway up the coast) by the end of the sixth week. Frustrated with slow
progress up the west side of the island and with ground forces to spare, PLA commanders then
opened a second front at Hualian. PLA armor occupied the president’s palace in Taipei after 10
weeks. In the actual event of a Chinese invasion without third-party intervention, the Taiwanese
government might capitulate before the bitter end.
During the iteration, Taiwan’s commander flowed forces to meet the attack and defended
successive river lines. To dislodge those positions, China brought up heavy armor, engineering
support, and artillery. However, transporting these units to the island required substantial time.
To dislodge particularly stubborn positions, the PLA also dispatched light infantry forces to work
97 | The First Battle of the Next War
around the flanks in the foothills of Taiwan’s steep mountains. Once defenses were broken or
flanks were turned, Taiwanese forces retreated to the next river line and continued the fight. A
close parallel to the scenario is the Allied campaign in Italy in World War II, where the Germans
withdrew slowly, defending each river and mountain ridge.
During the two-and-a-half-month campaign, the PLA landed a total of 230 battalions on Taiwan.
Despite Taiwanese shore-based ASCMs, the amphibious fleet remained viable throughout the
campaign. PLA commanders were able to transport the engineers necessary to repair damage to
ports and airports as they were captured. When Taipei fell, 165 Chinese battalions were on the
island (another 65 battalions having been rendered combat ineective). is force was more
than four times the number present at the end of the base scenario iterations involving U.S.
intervention. Including personnel not associated with combat battalions, this force might number
300,000, a number comparable to the invasion force considered for Operation Causeway, the
planned U.S. 1945 invasion of Taiwan that was never launched.
Table 9: PLA Situation Ashore at End of Game Play, “Taiwan Stands Alone”
PLA End Strength
Ashore
Territory
Controlled by
PLA (km
2
)
Duration of
Campaign
Supply Capacity at
End
Base Scenario 30,000 2,600 14 days Air dropped only
Pessimistic
Scenarios
43,000 6,240 21 days
Damaged ports and
airports; air; sometimes
a few ships
Optimistic
Scenarios
22,000 780 7 days Air resupply only
Taiwan Stands
Alone
165,000 36,000 70 days
Ports and airports;
civilian li; amphibs; air
Source: CSIS tabulation of iteration results.
Although the results are sobering, the campaign was also enlightening in other ways. If Taiwanese
forces are willing to fight, Chinese forces would require a prolonged period of combat before occupying
Taiwan’s major cities. is buys time for a delayed U.S. intervention or international diplomacy.
Regardless, the results show how much damage resilient Taiwanese armed forces can inflict. Increasing
their lethality and survivability would also likely enhance deterrence.
Losses: Casualties were high in this campaign because of the protracted and intensive nature of ground
combat. However, the composition of losses was very dierent from other scenarios. PLA ground
forces suered roughly 70,000 casualties in ground combat, including 23,100 killed.
Over the first 10 days of combat, Taiwanese anti-ship shore batteries sank 17 amphibious ships
and the same number of escort ships (roughly 16 percent of PLA totals in both categories) before
being destroyed or running out of missiles. With Taiwan’s navy having been defeated by missile, air,
submarine, and surface attack, and the surviving elements of Taiwan’s air force struggling to survive,
no additional losses were inflicted on China’s fleet. However, the PLAAF suered attrition from ground
fire and SAMs throughout the campaign, losing a total of 240 aircraft.
98 | Cancian, Cancian, and Heginbotham
As with every scenario, Taiwan lost its entire navy. e Taiwanese air force squadrons that survived China’s
joint fires strike were eventually destroyed in air-to-air combat. Its army suered 85,000 casualties, with
perhaps 28,000 killed. Casualties amounted to roughly half of its total mobilized army strength.
Ragnarok
Design: e “Ragnarok” scenario was designed to ascertain what conditions would be necessary for
China to be victorious in the face of Taiwanese resistance and U.S. intervention. e need for a special
scenario became clear after China failed to secure a total victory in a range of pessimistic scenarios.
is scenario should therefore not be taken as a likely future but rather as a tool to illustrate what
would be necessary to invalidate the project’s main result (that China is unlikely to succeed if Taiwan
resists and the United States intervenes).
To be victorious, China must negate U.S. airpower, both fighter attack and bombers.
U.S. fighter/attack aircraft could not eectively participate in operations if Tokyo remained strictly
neutral and did not allow the United States to operate from its bases in Japan. While it is possible
to use tankers with aircraft based on Guam, this would (1) be vulnerable on the ground to Chinese
ballistic missiles, (2) be vulnerable in the air if tankers were intercepted, and (3) be unable to generate
enough sorties over Taiwan to significantly aect the battle.
Second, China would need to negate U.S. bombers. is is hard to do because bombers can be based
beyond the range of most Chinese ground-attack missiles, approach the theater from several angles,
and launch stando missiles beyond the range of defending SAMs. If China attempted to interdict
U.S. bombers with its surface ships, then the United States could attrite these ships down until it had
created a path to the amphibious fleet (not unlike most other scenarios, wherein the United States
must attrite the pickets east of Taiwan). An extreme-range SAM would be limited by the curvature
of the Earth and therefore be unable to intercept U.S. bombers before they fired their missiles.
245
However, without U.S. fighters based in Japan for escorts, U.S. bombers would be vulnerable to Chinese
fighters armed with extreme-range air-to-air missiles.
246
Alternatively, if China either did not have
these missiles or could not complete a kill chain with them, the United States could negate its own
bombers by failing to procure sucient long-range, air-launched ASCMs.
247
Operational Outcomes: As expected, Ragnarok ended in a PLA victory.
248
Without having to worry
about U.S. forces in Japan, the PLA was able to focus its land-attack missiles on Guam, negating it as
245 It would hypothetically be possible to surmount this problem with an active seeking missile supplemented by
targeting data from a forward-deployed AEW aircraft, satellite, of over-the-horizon radar.
246 It is possible that such a missile is already operational. See “Chinese and Russian Air-Launched Weapons: A
Test for Western Air Dominance,” in International Institute for Security Studies, e Military Balance (London:
February 2018), doi:10.1080/04597222.2018.1416966; and Tyler Rogoway, “Shadowy New Missile Appears
Under e Wings Of Chinese J-16 Fighter,” e Drive, November 21, 2016, https://www.thedrive.com/the-
war-zone/6108/shadowy-new-missile-appears-under-the-wing-of-chinese-j-16-fighter.
247 Relying on bombers creates a single point of failure, highlighting the criticality of the U.S.-Japan alliance
248 Ragnarok, as enthusiasts of crossword puzzles know, is the great battle at the end of the world in Norse
mythology.
99 | The First Battle of the Next War
a base. Despite the absence of U.S. bombers, the Chinese amphibious fleet still took a large number
of casualties from ASCMs on Taiwan and U.S. SSNs infiltrating into the straits. By the time these
attackers were out of ammunition or attrited, they had reduced the amphibious fleet to one-third of its
beginning strength. However, the absence of U.S. fighter/attack aircraft allowed the Chinese to focus
their aircraft on supporting the ground invasion. is allowed the PLA to make steady progress ashore
and eventually compensate for destroyed amphibious ships with captured ports and airports.
e last serious challenge to the invasion came from an unsuccessful attack by the massed U.S. fleet.
After three weeks of conflict, a U.S. fleet of 29 cruisers and destroyers, two carriers, and 10 SSNs
approached Taiwan. Under withering fire from Chinese submarines, air-launched ASCMs, and surface
ships, the US fleet was largely destroyed without relieving Taiwan. At this point, the game was called.
Losses: Casualties in this scenario were very dierent from other scenarios. e only U.S. aircraft that
were destroyed were either on Guam initially or flew from carriers. e reliance on SSNs meant that 10
SSNs were lost even before the climactic naval showdown. In total, the United States lost four carriers,
43 cruisers and destroyers, and 15 SSNs. If Taiwan continued to fight to the end, their casualties would
be similar to those in the “Taiwan stands alone” scenario.
Critical Variables: is scenario demonstrated the centrality of two variables: basing in Japan and the
ability of the United States to deliver ASCMs en masse. Without the ability of U.S. aircraft to operate
out of Japan, the PLAAF can concentrate against targets in Taiwan while the PLA delivers more troops
ashore. While U.S. bombers could hypothetically still deliver a decisive amount of ordnance, the
outcome would rest on their eectiveness. is could be neutralized either by PLA advances in anti-air
missiles or by insucient stockpiles of stando anti-ship missiles. Without U.S. airpower, Taiwanese
ground-launched ASCMs and U.S. SSNs are insucient to defeat a Chinese invasion; furthermore,
the vulnerability of surface ships prevents the U.S. surface fleet from being eective. While it must be
emphasized that this was an unlikely scenario, it is analytically helpful.
All the excursion assumptions noted in Chapter 4 (“Assumptions and Excursions”) were included
in some subset of the scenarios. Based on outcomes and analysis of game play, it is apparent that
some of these had a larger impact than others (see Figure 8 below).
Among those that worked to China’s advantage, two had a particularly pronounced impact. First
was “Taiwan stands alone,” in which Taiwan had no support from the United States or other allies
and fell to China’s inexorable advance. Second was “Japan neutral,” in which Japan does not permit
U.S. basing, limiting U.S. operations to those that could be sustained from Guam, Hawaii, Alaska,
or at-sea naval forces. ree others had significant and notable eects. e “U.S. combat starts D
plus 14” excursion case saw late intervention by the United States and allowed China to establish
more forces ashore before suering major attrition to its amphibious fleet. e “no maritime strike
JASSM” excursion case slowed attrition of the Chinese fleet. e “Taiwanese forces paralyzed to
D plus 4” excursion case prevented Taiwan from rapidly reinforcing the beachhead and enabled
Chinese forces ashore to expand the beachhead during the first days after landing.
Among those excursion assumptions that favored the United States and its partners, two were
particularly important in aecting operational outcomes. First, the “ship defenses poor” excursion case
resulted in the rapid sinking of amphibious ships and their escorts and further diminished China’s
prospects. Second, the “reduced PLA amphibious competence” excursion case similarly diminished the
100 | Cancian, Cancian, and Heginbotham
already limited number of troops that China can land on beaches during a given period.
Two excursion cases diminished U.S. losses during the campaign while maintaining Taiwanese
autonomy. e “U.S., Japan can use large Japanese airports” excursion case permits the dispersion
of U.S. and Japanese aircraft over more facilities and reduces the impact of Chinese missile attacks
against allied airpower. e “no U.S. show of force” excursion case allows the U.S. team to start its
carriers, bombers, and tankers outside of China’s primary threat rings.
Figure 8 summarizes in graphic form the impact of changing assumptions. e direction of arrows
indicates whether the change benefits the Chinese invasion (to the left) or the Taiwanese defense
(to the right). e significance of the assumption is denoted by the length of the arrow and its color.
Figure 8: Evaluation of Variant ImpactTaiwan Invasion Scorecard
Benefits PRC Invasion Benefits Taiwan Defense
Taiwan Stands Alone
U.S. Bombers Delayed to D Plus 4
U.S. Combat Starts D Plus 14
U.S. MLR Pre-deployed in Taiwan
Japan Neutral
SDF Engages from D-Day
JSDF Remains Defensive
Philippines Allows Basing
U.S. Holdout for Simultaneous Crisis
Increased Chinese IRBMs
Chinese TBM Holdout
Fewer Taiwanese Harpoons
U.S. Submarines Withheld
U.S. Mobilizes on D-Day
No U.S. “Show of Force”
Taiwanese Forces Paralyzed to D
Plus 4
U.S. Strikes on Mainland Forbidden
Grand
Strategic
Strategic
101 | The First Battle of the Next War
Source: CSIS.
Summary
e base scenario produced relatively rapid and clear Chinese defeat, a result produced largely by the ability
of U.S., Taiwanese, and Japanese anti-ship missiles to destroy the Chinese amphibius fleet before the PLA
forces ashore can capture ports and airports to increase the force flow across the strait. Optimistic scenarios
(favoring the United States and its partners) produced the same results but more quickly and with lower
casualties. Pessimistic scenarios (favoring China) produced more protracted fighting and a wider range
of operational outcomes, ranging from decisive Chinese defeat to stalemates in which China controlled
damaged ports and airports. e “Taiwan stands alone” scenario produced inexorable Chinese advance,
concluding with the Chinese occupation of the entire island—an unambiguous PLA victory.
Reduced PLA Amphibious
Competence
Reduced TW Ground Force
Competence
Reduced PLAAF Air-to-Air
Competence
No Maritime Strike JASSM
Ship Defenses Poor
Superior U.S. 5th Gen Fighter
Aircra
Increased HASs in Japan
United States, Japan Can Use Large
Japanese Airports
Key
Decisive or fundamental change:
changes the nature of the battle
Major change: greatly changes prospects
for success or casualties
Significant: provides a clear benefit
Marginal: provides a benefit but washes
out in the scale of the operation
Operational
and Tactical
102 | Cancian, Cancian, and Heginbotham
Losses in all iterations were high and sobering for both sides. In all but the “Taiwan stands alone”
scenario, China lost the large preponderance of its surface fleet, including amphibious ships, surface
combatants, and carriers as well as a portion of its submarine fleet. In most iterations, the U.S. Navy
lost two carriers and more than a dozen surface ships as well as four submarines. It was only able to
avoid that outcome in optimistic scenarios because the United States did not push its fleet forward as
a deterrent signal prior to the start of conflict.
Air losses varied greatly for both sides. On the U.S. side, they numbered in the hundreds under all scenarios
and averaged 283 in the base scenario, 484 in pessimistic scenarios, and 200 in optimistic scenarios. Across
all iterations, U.S. aircraft losses ranged from a low of 90 to a high of 774. Japan also lost more than 100
aircraft in most iterations, and Taiwan lost its entire air force. Chinese aircraft losses varied greatly, as the
United States only attacked Chinese air bases in iterations run under pessimistic assumptions—and in only
half of those. Chinese air losses averaged 161 under the base scenario, 327 under pessimistic assumptions,
and 290 under optimistic scenarios. Chinese air losses varied from a low of dozens to a high of 748.
Ground losses varied primarily according to the duration of the campaign and the number of forces
landed on Taiwan.
Why Are These Results Dierent from Classified DOD Games?
Why does this project find that a Chinese invasion of Taiwan would be dicult and fail under most
conditions when the purported results of classified wargames indicate much higher chances of Chinese
success, as do the intuitive views of many commentators who see the large disparity of forces in the
Western Pacific between China and Taiwan?
As noted in Chapter 2, publicly available information on the results of classified wargames indicates
high U.S. casualties and unfavorable outcomes. e amount of information is limited, however, because
of the restrictions regarding classified information. Nevertheless, examination of public descriptions of
classified wargames and what is known about the conduct of wargames in general allows the project to
make informed guesses about why results dier between the classified games and this project.
249
Invasions Are Dicult to Model with the Method of P
k
s: Classified models tend to prioritize the
method of P
k
s over the method of history because of the richness of data on individual systems that
is available at the classified level. However, this might lead classified wargames to overestimate the
quickness at which amphibious invasions would proceed.
e task of loading and transporting troops, landing on a hostile shore, building up forces, and then
moving inland is inherently dicult. In 1944, the United States considered an invasion of Taiwan as the
next step in the Pacific campaign. e move was rejected because of the diculty. As Ben Jensen, a CSIS
expert on wargaming, noted: “Crossing a contested sea only to fight on complex, canalized terrain against
249 Lauren ompson, “Why the Air Force’s Plan for Fighting China Could Make Nuclear War More Likely,”
Forbes, June 15, 2021, https://www.forbes.com/sites/lorenthompson/2021/06/15/why-the-air-forces-plan-
for-fighting-china-could-make-nuclear-war-more-likely/?sh=787c8e3d24b1. Other commentaries have
touched on the same issue, for example, Geist, “Defeat Is Possible.” e 2018 National Defense Strategy
Commission raised similar concerns. Unclear is whether these commentaries are providing additional
information about wargames or pointing back to the handful of reports that have filtered out.
103 | The First Battle of the Next War
a deliberate defense-in-depth makes amphibious assault in Taiwan a more complex operation than
even the famed 1944 Operation Overlord—the D-Day landings.”
250
Taiwan is a particularly dicult target
because it has only about a dozen suitable landing beaches and the terrain inland is highly defensible.
Another insight comes from the naval author and historian C.S. Forrester in his thought piece “If
Hitler Had Invaded England.” In it, he considered how a German invasion of Britain in the summer of
1940 might have played out. Germany faced a problem like that of China—a powerful army facing a
contested air and naval environment that made crossing even a narrow strip of water dicult. ere
was an invasion plan, called Operation Sealion, which the Germans prepared for but ultimately did
not execute because it lacked the air and naval supremacy needed. In his counterfactual history,
Forrester gives the Germans every advantage. e Germans can land successfully with paratroopers
and amphibious forces, but the British response in the air and on the sea throttled sustainment and
reinforcement. British army counterattacks defeated the now isolated German troops on the ground.
251
e many successful Allied amphibious operations of World War II made opposed landings look easy.
ey are not. e allies were successful because of many years spent refining doctrine and building
specialized capabilities. Learning steps such as the catastrophic raid on Dieppe in 1943 were part of
that learning process. e Chinese will not have those opportunities.
Dierent Purposes: As noted in Chapter 2, wargames have dierent purposes, not all of which are
intended to simulate the most likely course of events. For example, some games test concepts and are
not intended to represent likely futures. Such a game might assume that Chinese forces land in the
Philippines to see whether U.S. forces could use mobility, anti-air capabilities, and anti-ship missiles
to contest the invasion. Other games might hypothesize U.S. forces being on islands in the South
China Sea or the Philippines and attempting to prevent the breakout of Chinese naval forces from the
first island chain. (ese are actual scenarios for the game, Littoral Commander: e Indo-Pacific.
252
)
ese games are useful to test concepts about weapons capabilities and force structure. Because the
scenarios are improbable, however, they are not particularly helpful in trying to ascertain the course
of future events. To use the Philippines example, it is hard to imagine a set of circumstances where
Chinese amphibious forces would land on the main islands of the Philippines.
Many U.S.-China wargames have short time increments, which allows detailed assessment of forces
and weapons but means that game play covers only the first few days of a conflict. is is the time of
greatest U.S. and partner weakness, after initial Chinese attacks but before substantial reinforcements
begin to flow. us, results can give a skewed sense of what the whole campaign might look like.
250 Ben Jensen, “Not so Fast: Insights from a 1944 War Plan Help Explain Why Invading Taiwan Is a Costly
Gamble,” War on the Rocks, September 8, 2022, https://warontherocks.com/2022/09/not-so-fast-insights-
from-a-1944-war-help-explain-why-invading-taiwan-is-a-costly-gamble/.
251 C.S. Forrester, “If Hitler Had Invaded England,” in Gold from Crete: Ten Stories (Boston, MA: Little, Brown and
Company, 1973).
252 Littoral Commander: e Indo-Pacific is a battalion-level wargame published by the Dietz Foundation and
designed by Sebastian Bae, a civilian employee of the U.S. Marine Corps. Marine Corps schools use it for
education about future conflict, though the game is commercially available. “Interview with Sebastian Bae
of the Littoral Commander: e Indo Pacific from the Dietz Foundation,” e Players Aid, February 7, 2022,
https://theplayersaid.com/2022/02/07/interview-with-sebastian-bae-designer-of-littoral-commander-the-
indo-pacific-from-the-dietz-foundation/.
104 | Cancian, Cancian, and Heginbotham
Related to the notion of testing concepts is the notion that wargames can be designed to “stress
test” for potential weaknesses in new operational concepts.
253
David Ochmanek, a senior analyst at
RAND and experienced wargamer, noted this purpose: “Even the games that the United States loses
are not necessarily reflective of how a war would unfold in real life; the main purpose is to evaluate
American vulnerabilities. We learn a lot from these.”
254
is is a reasonable approach when evaluating
risk or exploring policy boundaries. However, the results of particularly pessimistic scenarios do not
constitute the most likely results.
Many games are intended primarily to educate the players. Game designers often want to challenge
the players and counteract complacency. is is a reasonable approach for educating an ocer corps
about what future conflict might entail, especially since the ocer corps has been accustomed
to having military superiority for generations. However, the outcomes of these games do not
necessarily represent a full spectrum of possibilities.
255
Adjudication by Judgment vs. Analysis: Another dierence might be the adjudication mechanism.
Many classified wargames are conducted as seminars, where two sides discuss a scenario and a
“white team” adjudicates the results of moves by the two teams. Results, therefore, are heavily
dependent on the personal perspectives of the white team members. To combat this source
of possible bias, the project developed explicit adjudication mechanisms based on historical
experience. (is is described in detail in Chapter 2.)
Asymmetric Assumptions about Capabilities: Another possibility is attributing a high level of
capabilities and abilities to the Chinese while decrementing U.S. capabilities because of known
limitations. is might be done as a hedging mechanism to avoid underestimating a potential adversary.
Some analyses, reflected in the fictional speculation of 2034 and Ghost Fleet, hypothesize powerful and
previously unknown Chinese capabilities, such as cyber in one case and space weapons in the other.
256
Attribution of high capabilities to adversaries has a long history. A classic example occurred before
the Persian Gulf War of 1991. ere was an intensive period of wargaming prior to the war, with the
gaming of scenarios related to an attack on Kuwait occurring more than a year before the actual attack
and the first planning scenarios for the counterattack commencing the same day as the Iraqi invasion.
Gaming was also used to develop several aspects of the final operations plan.
257
However, results
depended heavily on whether Iraq’s military was viewed as “war hardened” or “war weary” as a result
of its recently concluded eight-year war with Iran. A war-hardened military would fight fiercely and
skillfully. Comparison was often made to the North Vietnamese. A war-weary military might collapse
253 Elizabeth Bartels, Building Better Games for National Security Policy Analysis: Towards a Social Scientific Approach
(Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2020), 11, doi:10.7249/RGSD437; and Copp, “‘It Failed Miserably’.”
254 Dexter Filkins, “A Dangerous Game over Taiwan,” New Yorker, November 14, 2022, https://www.newyorker.
com/magazine/2022/11/21/a-dangerous-game-over-taiwan.
255 Recent examples of wargames designed for PME include Littoral Commander and Assassin’s Mace.
256 Elliot Ackerman and James Stavridis, 2034: A Novel of the Next World War (New York: Penguin Press, 2021); and
P.W. Songer and August Cole, Ghost Fleet: A Story of the Next War (Boston, MA: Houghton Miin Harcourt,
2015).
257 Matthew Carey, “On Wargaming,” e Newport Papers 43 (January 1, 2019): 130–34, https://digital-commons.
usnwc.edu/usnwc-newport-papers/43.
105 | The First Battle of the Next War
quickly. Modeling took Iraqi forces at face value. is was a reasonable hedge, but models produced
predictions for U.S. casualties several orders of magnitude higher than the actual casualty figures.
258
e invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 provides a more recent example. At the beginning of the
conflict, many commentators suggested that the campaign would result in a decisive Russian victory.
259
is analysis was founded on the perceived increase in military eectiveness following what was
purported to be an extensive modernization of the Russian military.
260
However, this modernization
did not translate to battlefield eectiveness, with warfighting shortcomings becoming apparent
following the invasion, new systems not performing as assessed, and forces not fighting as expected.
261
ere was an expectation of technical and tactical competency built into assessments that have not
been in evidence following the invasion.
Deception: During the Soviet period, the United States routinely overestimated Soviet strategic
nuclear capabilities. is occurred in part because the Soviets were actively trying to deceive Western
intelligence agencies and in part because of Western concerns about avoiding complacency and
surprise. us, the United States hypothesized a “bomber gap” when the Soviets flew the same
bombers repeatedly over reviewing stands during a May Day celebration, thus giving the impression
of having more long-range strike aircraft than they in fact had. Looking back on this incident, John
Pardos concluded in his study of U.S. intelligence estimates of the Soviet strategic forces, “where
organizational interests impinge or turn upon certain conclusions, objective analysis of intelligence is
likely to suer.”
262
258 “Potential War Casualties Put at 100,000: Gulf Crisis: Fewer U.S. Troops Would Be Killed or Wounded
an Iraq Soldiers, Military Experts Predict,” Los Angeles Times, September 5, 1990, https://www.latimes.
com/archives/la-xpm-1990-09-05-mn-776-story.html; and Shawn Woodford, “Assessing the 1990-1991
Gulf War Forecasts,” Dupuy Institute, Mystics & Statistics, May 18, 2016, http://www.dupuyinstitute.org/
blog/2016/05/17/assessing-the-1990-1991-gulf-war-forecasts/.
259 To provide a few examples of such expectations, Michael Kofman and Jerey Edmonds, “Russia’s Shock
and Awe,” Foreign Aairs, March 22, 2022, https://www.foreignaairs.com/articles/ukraine/2022-02-21/
russias-shock-and-awe; Anatol Lievan, “Ending the reat of War in Ukraine: A Negotiated Solution to the
Donbas Conflict and the Crimean Dispute,” Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft, January 4, 2022,
https://quincyinst.org/report/ending-the-threat-of-war-in-ukraine/; and “What Are Vladimir Putin’s Military
Intentions in Ukraine?,” e Economist, January 29, 2022, https://www.economist.com/briefing/2022/01/29/
what-are-vladimir-putins-military-intentions-in-ukraine.
260 Steven Pifer, “Pay Attention, America: Russia Is Upgrading Its Military,” Brookings Institute, February 5, 2016,
https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/pay-attention-america-russia-is-upgrading-its-military/; and Anton
Troianovski, Michael Schwirtz, and Andrew E. Kramer, “Russia’s Military, Once Creaky, Is Modern and Lethal,”
New York Times, January 27, 2022, https://www.nytimes.com/2022/01/27/world/europe/russia-military-putin-
ukraine.html.
261 “Russia’s Military: Failure on an Awesome Scale,” Center for European Policy Analysis, April 15, 2022, https://
cepa.org/russias-military-failure-on-an-awesome-scale/; and Andrew S. Bowen, Russia’s War in Ukraine:
Military and Intelligence Aspects, CRS Report No. R47068 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service,
April 2022), 5–6, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R47068.
262 John Prados, e Soviet Estimate: US Intelligence Analysis and Soviet Strategic Forces (Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 1986). e story of the flyover and bomber gap is on page 43, the conclusion about the
bomber gap is on page 49–50.
106 | Cancian, Cancian, and Heginbotham
6
How Does the War Play
Out?
T
his chapter lays out the broad features of the conflict, as it played out over the 24 game
iterations. It also discusses some of the strategies pursued before moving, in Chapter 7, to the
conclusions and recommendations derived from the course of these games.
The Situation on Taiwan
Once the conflict starts, Chinese air and naval units surrounded the island. e resulting Chinese
defensive zone was so dense that no cargo ships could get through, and the danger to airlift aircraft
was extreme. In one iteration, an attempt to insert a U.S. Army brigade onto Taiwan by air resulted
in two of the three battalions (roughly 2,000 soldiers) being destroyed in the air. e U.S. Maritime
Prepositioning Ships (MPS) squadron, which is designed to rapidly deploy large ground formations,
could not get through.
263
Taiwan as isolated. e United States could not move any significant forces
onto Taiwan within the month that the game covers.
263 A maritime pre-positioning squadron is a group of cargo ships permanently loaded with equipment and
supplies for military units. e largest component is for a Marine amphibious brigade. Currently, there are
two such squadrons, one based at Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean and another on Guam. Because troops are
much easier to move than equipment, the concept is that the ships would bring equipment while the troops
would fly in. e capability was used in a major way during Desert Storm and the 2003 invasion of Iraq.
Elements of the pre-positioned stocks have been used in many smaller contingencies. “Prepositioning (PM3),”
Ocial U.S. Navy Website, U.S. Navy’s Military Sealift Command, n.d., https://www.msc.us.navy.mil/Ships/
Prepositioning-PM3/.
107 | The First Battle of the Next War
e Chinese were always able to get troops onto Taiwan. e Taiwan Strait is so narrow, the Chinese forces
so numerous, and Taiwanese defenses so limited that defeating the invasion at sea was not possible.
264
e
Chinese challenge is sustaining the forces landed on the island while bringing in new forces before the
Taiwanese can contain the beachhead and counterattack in strength. e steady attrition inflicted by U.S.
attacks on China’s amphibious shipping imposes a time constraint on the Chinese invasion. However, once
China captures an operational port or airfield, it can use civilian merchant ships and cargo planes to supply
its invasion, easing demands on the amphibious fleet. e central question is whether Chinese forces can
capture airfields and ports—and keep them operating—before U.S., Japanese, and Taiwanese attacks sink
their amphibious ships. In the base scenario and most others, this was not achieved.
e Chinese supplemented the beach assault with airborne forces. When these attempted to seize
airfields, they generally failed because of the weak combat power that airborne forces possess. is
record is consistent with the mixed results of German attempts to employ airborne troops in seizing
airfields during the invasion of Crete and Russians in Hostomel. When airborne forces attempted
to isolate the battle area, they were more successful and assisted Chinese amphibious forces in
establishing a significant beachhead ashore.
With limited ability to land substantial firepower during the early days of conflict, China’s ability to
advance o the beaches and establish a larger lodgment depended heavily on airpower. One role was
to provide close air support to attacking forces.
265
More important was the interdiction role, destroying
bridges and overpasses that might be used by Taiwanese reinforcements moving to reinforce defenses
around the beachhead.
The central question is whether Chinese forces can capture
airfields and ports—and keep them operating—before U.S.,
Japanese, and Taiwanese attacks sink their amphibious
ships. In the base scenario and most others, this was not
achieved.
U.S. airpower, for its part, had a limited ability to influence ground combat directly. China’s naval and
air forces restricted U.S. strikes to stando weapons, such as the JASSM-ER. eir unitary warheads
were eective against ports and airfields but not against troops in the field because of their dispersion.
Chinese players considered attacking the northern part of the island where Taipei, the capital, is
located. In this, they sought to replay Germany’s amphibious and airborne assault on Norway’s
264 A future U.S. force with a myriad of air-launched ASCMs combined with asymmetric Taiwanese anti-ship
defenses might be able to prevent even an initial lodgment; however, such a massive shift in both countries’
force structures is not possible by 2026.
265 e project’s analysis indicated that China would largely dedicate its CRBM force to destroying strategic
targets (e.g., government headquarters) and the Taiwanese navy and air force.
108 | Cancian, Cancian, and Heginbotham
capital of Oslo in 1940 or Russia’s attack on Kyiv in 2022. However, the Chinese players were
generally dissuaded by the strength of defending Taiwanese forces deployed in the north around
Taipei. About 46 percent of Taiwan’s total battalions are in the northern third of the island,
including half of Taiwan’s mechanized forces.
us, in 21 of 24 iterations, the Chinese invasion force landed in the south, where Taiwanese defenses
were lighter. is made it easier to get ashore and establish a beachhead or airhead but meant that the
Chinese forces had to fight their way up the entire island to capture the capital and achieve a decisive
result. e nature of the terrain is not, however, propitious for such an advance. e central parts of
Taiwan are mountainous and dicult to traverse. e coastal plains are narrow, with rivers and cities
that provide good defensive positions. Even capturing the large southern city of Kaohsiung was often
a dicult and time-consuming task. Nevertheless, the southern landings met with greater success
than did the few attempts at direct attack on the north. Interestingly, when U.S. planners considered
invading Taiwan in 1944, they also planned to land in the south.
266
In 21 of 24 iterations, the Chinese invasion force landed in
the south, where Taiwanese defenses were lighter.
us, this campaign would not be a close parallel to that confronting German commanders at
Normandy on the so-called “longest day.” en, Field Marshal Erwin Rommel believed that the coming
Allied invasion of France had to be defeated on the beaches during the first 24 hours. If the invasion
became established ashore, Allied air and naval power could sustain it. In 1944, that proved correct,
but it does not apply to the challenge facing Taiwan today.
267
A Chinese invasion of Taiwan would be dierent because the Chinese invasion fleet, though
numerous, is not nearly as large as the fleet that supported the D-Day invasion. For that operation, the
Allies had 229 amphibious ships (LSTs) and 345 troop ships and cargo ships for a total of 547 ships,
serviced by more than 3,000 smaller landing craft (LCIs, LCMs, LCTs, and LCVs).
268
e anticipated
Chinese amphibious fleet of 2026 includes 28 LSTs, 18 LHD/LPDs, 20 LSMs, and 30 large civilian RO-
ROs, for a total of 96 ships, serviced by 305 landing craft. At Normandy, the Allies put 90,000 troops
266 For a discussion of these plans, see: Ben Jensen, “Not so Fast: Insights from a 1944 War Plan Help Explain
Why Invading Taiwan Is a Costly Gamble,” War on the Rocks, September 8, 2022, https://warontherocks.
com/2022/09/not-so-fast-insights-from-a-1944-war-help-explain-why-invading-taiwan-is-a-costly-gamble/.
267 Rommel’s comment is cited in Cornelius Ryan, e Longest Day (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1959), 8.
268 For naval ships, see Samuel J. Cox, “H-031-1: Operation Neptune—the Amphibious Assault on Normandy,
6 June 1944,” Naval History and Heritage Command, June 2019, https://www.history.navy.mil/about-us/
leadership/director/directors-corner/h-grams/h-gram-031/h-031-1.html. For a list of APAs and AKAs, see
“American Merchant Marine Ships at Normandy in June 1944,” U.S. Merchant Marine, n.d., http://www.
usmm.org/normandyships.html#anchor1064501. See also S.E. Morison, e Invasion of France and Germany:
1944-1945, History of United States Naval Operations in World War II (Castle Books, 2001), https://books.google.
com/books?id=CBiJPQAACAAJ; and Kenneth Edwards, Operation Neptune: e Normandy Landings, 1944
(Gloucestershire, United Kingdom: Fonthill Media LLC, 2013).
109 | The First Battle of the Next War
ashore on the first day, whereas the Chinese can put about 8,000 ashore on D-day/Taiwan (or 16,000 in
3.5 days). us, Chinese capabilities are much less than Allied capabilities on D-Day, and a successful
initial lodgment does not guarantee eventual success.
Further, Allied forces had a virtual air and naval monopoly in 1944. e Luftwae had been diverted
to operations over the homeland and in the east. e U-boat fleet, the only significant remaining
German naval force, could not penetrate Allied screens. e Allies could build up forces ashore
without serious opposition. If Taiwan faced China alone, the Chinese would have the same air and
naval dominance. U.S. participation means that the airspace and seas around Taiwan would be
vigorously contested, and the proliferation of long-range precision strike assets means that U.S.
airpower could inflict steady losses on the Chinese fleet from long distances. us, establishing a
beachhead is not enough to ensure a Chinese victory.
In World War II, the Japanese faced this same choice: defend on the beach or inland. Initially, they
tried to defeat amphibious assaults on the beaches but found that impossible. ey then shifted to
a defense in depth, forcing the invader to take heavy casualties by attacking prepared fortifications
inland. us, the capture of Iwo Jima and Okinawa involved prolonged and bloody campaigns ashore.
For Taiwan, a prolonged campaign would allow time for U.S. intervention or a diplomatic solution.
In three iterations, the Chinese captured the island of Penghu o the west coast of Taiwan,
planning to use the island as a staging base for an attack on the main island. Although they defeated
Taiwanese forces there, their dwindling amphibious capabilities prevented a successful invasion
of the main island. us, occupying Penghu during a campaign to invade Taiwan proper was an
operational dead end.
e project did not examine whether capturing Penghu would succeed as a limited attack for
intimidation and bargaining or as part of a longer-term strategy in which Penghu was used as a
base of operations to stage forces for an attack on mainland Taiwan several years later. Penghu is
politically important because, unlike the other oshore islands closer to the Chinese coast, it was
explicitly included in the Sino-American Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States and
Republic of China (Taiwan).
269
e islands were also included in the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979.
270
us, the fallout from a limited Chinese operation to seize Penghu bears separate investigation.
e U.S. and Taiwanese success in frustrating the Chinese invasion is tempered by the extensive
damage done to the Taiwanese infrastructure and economy. Almost all Chinese players launched
massive interdiction strikes against transportation infrastructure to prevent Taiwanese forces from
moving to the beachhead invasion sites.
269 e islands are also known as the Pescadores, by which they are noted in the treaty. “Mutual Defense Treaty
between the United States and the Republic of China; December 2, 1954,” e Avalon Project, Yale Law
School, https://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/chin001.asp.
270 Taiwan Relations Act.
110 | Cancian, Cancian, and Heginbotham
Figure 9: Penghu Province
Source: CSIS.
e U.S. and Taiwanese success in frustrating the Chinese invasion is tempered by the extensive
damage done to the Taiwanese infrastructure and economy. Almost all Chinese players launched
massive interdiction strikes against transportation infrastructure to prevent Taiwanese forces from
moving to the beachhead invasion sites.
Another element was the major battles in port cities and around airfields as the Chinese sought
to capture a facility to increase the flow of forces and supplies. e Taiwanese player sometimes
sabotaged civilian airfields and ports to prevent them from falling into Chinese hands. Indeed, a few
players employed a “scorched earth” strategy that preemptively destroyed the most vulnerable ports
and airfields. In these cases, the Taiwanese player judged that the existential threat to Taiwan justified
such destruction. As a military tactic, it was highly successful. However, because a port or airfield that
is unusable for military purposes is also unusable for civilian purposes, this strategy did immense
damage to the transportation hubs on which the Taiwanese economy depends.
The U.S. and Taiwanese success in frustrating the Chinese
invasion is tempered by the extensive damage done to the
Taiwanese infrastructure and economy.
TAIWAN
PEOPLE’S
REPUBLIC OF CHINA
Penghu Province
111 | The First Battle of the Next War
e battles for cities near invasion beaches would inevitably cause heavy damage and loss of life in
residential or commercial areas. Several players also argued that destroying Taiwanese industry and
infrastructure would disrupt global supply chains and have eects far beyond the region. Taiwanese
manufacturers account for 61 percent of global revenue in semiconductor manufacturing for 16-
nm or smaller chips, and it is even more dominant in the manufacturing of the most advanced
semiconductors. As a result, every nation on the planet would feel the eects of the war.
271
THE BLOODY AIR AND MARITIME BATTLE
On the wargame’s larger operational map, air and sea missions are plotted over hundreds and
often thousands of kilometers. Despite the distances involved, proximity matters, especially when
persistence around the battle area is required. For example, U.S. bases on Okinawa are the closest U.S.
bases to Taiwan, and air units flying air superiority missions from Okinawa can remain “on station”
around Taiwan for longer periods of time than aircraft flying from more distant bases. However,
proximity puts assets deep inside adversary threat rings and increases vulnerability.
To reduce exposure, players often exploited the full range of their systems. ey launched air strikes,
which require less persistence than air superiority missions, from extreme ranges. U.S. aircraft sortied
from bases in northern Japan or even Guam and, with the assistance of tankers, struck targets in the
Taiwan Strait or on mainland China. China, for its part, husbanded bombers in its inland bases and
launched strikes from those deep bastions.
Despite the geographic scope of the “outer” air and naval battle, these operations nevertheless had a
strategic center, revolving around the centrality of tasks on or near Taiwan. e focus of most teams
remained squarely on the primary tasks at hand. For U.S. teams, this was the destruction of China’s
amphibious fleet, without which China cannot achieve victory. For China, this involved protecting the
amphibious fleet, landing as many troops ashore as possible and supporting them, to the maximum
extent possible, with airpower.
Opposing Strategies to Attack and Defend the Invasion Fleet: China’s success or failure hinges
largely on its ability to defend the amphibious fleet long enough to achieve its objectives ashore.
Much of the maritime and air battle therefore revolves around the U.S. eort to sink that fleet, and
China’s eort to defend it.
U.S. and partner forces have many potent assets they can bring to bear in this fight. Taiwan’s ground-
based anti-ship missiles can engage from the outset and impose modest attrition on the fleet until
those that are not destroyed by Chinese air and missile strikes are expended, which generally occurs
in the second week of the conflict. Submarines are inherently stealthy and can also reliably inflict
attrition on the Chinese fleet. However, submarines carry a limited number of munitions, so while
they can impose steady attrition, submarines must periodically return to port to rearm, and their eect
therefore plays out over an extended period of time. Given the high carrying capacity and rapid rearm
times of aircraft, bombers and fighters equipped with long-range anti-ship missiles provide the most
potent threat to Chinese shipping.
271 Laura Dobberstein, “Taiwan to Dominate Chip Biz for Foreseeable Future,” e Register, April 26, 2022,
https://www.theregister.com/2022/04/26/trendforce_foundry_capacity/.
112 | Cancian, Cancian, and Heginbotham
In general, Chinese players adopted a two-pronged strategy to blunt these attacks. Defensively, the
Chinese teams established a layered presence between the amphibious fleet and threats to it. ey
deployed some SAGs around the immediate perimeter of the amphibious fleet. Most sent SAGs to
serve as air- and missile-defense pickets east of Taiwan and, beyond that, dispatched submarines
into the Philippine Sea and Western Pacific to intercept and attack U.S. surface fleets. At the same
time, Chinese teams employed oensive operations to strike U.S. (and often Japanese) naval forces
whenever they could be located, and most teams attacked U.S. air bases throughout Japan.
China’s more strictly defensive activities followed a predictable path. e Chinese picket forces,
when deployed, successfully blunted U.S. attacks on the amphibious fleet for a while. However, in
most iterations, the United States eventually overwhelmed the picket force with massive air and
missile strikes of their own because the Chinese did not have enough combat aircraft and tankers
both to provide CAP for these ships and conduct other high-priority operations (strikes and
ground support over Taiwan). e use of the PLAN as a kind of “ablative” armor for the amphibious
ships, while eective, resulted in heavy Chinese casualties.
While the approach outlined above represents a sound Chinese approach, the results were mixed.
Chinese submarines inflicted some attrition on U.S. naval forces, though the large expanse to be
patrolled, the prevalence of diesel boats in the Chinese fleet, and anti-submarine operations by the
United States and Japan generally limited damage. More potent were Chinese long-range missile
strikes and massed missiles strikes, which almost always succeeded in overcoming U.S. naval defenses.
Typically, the United States lost both forward-deployed carriers within the first turn or two.
272
However, China’s high-end anti-ship missiles were often exhausted relatively early. If the games had
continued for additional weeks, it is likely that subsequent attacks (if they had taken place) would
have been less lethal. By then, however, the battle on Taiwan might have been largely decided.
China Devastates U.S. Air Bases: As noted in previous chapters, the base case assumes that Japan
remains neutral but allows U.S. forces to conduct combat operations from U.S. bases in Japan,
including from Kadena, Iwakuni, Yokota, and Misawa. ese bases are of tremendous value for the
United States. Aircraft based in Japan can strike Chinese ships around Taiwan and escort bombers
coming from Alaska or Hawaii. Aircraft flying from Kadena or southern Japan can also spend more
time over Taiwan conducting air superiority operations and do not need as much aerial refueling.
However, the PLARF has many TBMs and ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCMs) that can range Japan.
ese highly accurate missiles, many of whose warheads are equipped with submunitions, could blanket
all of the military air bases in Japan. e PLAAF’s air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs) supplement these
ground-launched systems. us, China can conduct devastating attacks on air bases in Japan, sometimes
including the element of surprise, despite the risk that such an attack would draw the JSDF into the war.
Whether to attack Japan was a critical decision for the Chinese player. As the chart below shows, the
Chinese player usually did so.
272 “Losing” a carrier means that it was unavailable for the remainder of the conflict. “Loss” might mean actual
sinking but could also mean damage so severe that the ship required many months of repairs to return to
operations. “Loss” for nuclear ships might also mean that radioactivity had so contaminated the ship that it
became unusable, even if still afloat.
113 | The First Battle of the Next War
Figure 10: Chinese Attacks against Japan
Source: CSIS
Frequently, the Chinese player did not attack immediately, being cautious about bringing Japan into the
conflict and wanting to conserve the large but still finite inventory of missiles until they might have
maximum eect. However, as the United States built up forces on Japanese bases and used these as
sanctuaries to attack Chinese air and naval forces, the Chinese player then decided to attack. is delayed
attack was highly eective, destroying hundreds of massed U.S. and Japanese aircraft on the ground.
273
When Chinese players attacked U.S. forces in Japan, they attacked Japanese forces also, destroying
many Japanese aircraft and surface ships. Surviving JSDF fought back, despite the initial losses
caused by Chinese TBMs. Most valuable were the Japanese submarines, which could strike Chinese
amphibious ships and the Chinese picket line around Taiwan. Also valuable were surviving Japanese
aircraft and the country’s significant ASW capabilities. JASDF aircraft added to the CAP over Taiwan
and strikes on the Chinese amphibious fleet. Japan’s extensive fleet of MPA and its network of
undersea sensors played an important role in attriting China’s fleet of submarines. Like the U.S.
surface fleet, the Japanese surface fleet had to maintain a cautious distance from Taiwan until the
Chinese missile threat eased.
In those situations where Japan entered the war, its submarines stayed east or north of Taiwan to avoid
fratricide with U.S. submarines. East of Taiwan, JMSDF submarines attacked the Chinese picket line
to allow U.S. and Japanese airpower to strike more easily at the amphibious ships; north of Taiwan,
273 e devastating nature of the Chinese first strike on Japan has the paradoxical eect of softening the
negative eects of a delayed U.S. mobilization because fewer aircraft were deployed and thus exposed. If the
United States had months of mobilization and used this to deploy large numbers of aircraft to Japan, then
a Chinese first strike would simply destroy more aircraft. e section on “Avoiding deployments that create
vulnerabilities” in the next chapter discusses this phenomenon in depth.
0 5 10 15 20 25
Number of Iterations
Did Not Attack Japan
Attacked Japan on Turn 1
Attacked Japan aer Turn 1
114 | Cancian, Cancian, and Heginbotham
they attacked Chinese amphibious ships departing ports outside of the Taiwan Strait. One caution
in assessing these results is that these Japanese actions reflect the preferences of U.S. players. ey
may not reflect the actions of the Japanese government, which might hold substantial forces back for
defense of the homeland or put other restrictions on the use of forces.
274
e strategy of attacking Japan worked for China in an operational sense. e benefit of eliminating air
bases near Taiwan exceeded the negative eects of having the JSDF join the United States. e results
of those games in which China did not attack were poorer for China than those in which it did. is
judgment, however, does not consider long-term political and diplomatic costs.
Strategies for Resource Constraints, Priorities, and Risk
A final observation about the course of conflict was that both sides often had to make trade-os and
balance risks.
A major area of trade-os was that both sides wanted to undertake more activities than they had
the forces to execute. For example, many China teams discussed placing air patrols east of Taiwan to
protect the fleet or even over the Ryukyu Islands to disrupt U.S. and Japanese air strikes. However,
the distances involved and the lack of Chinese tankers would have made the missions unwise in
view of the other heavy demands on airpower. Most China teams therefore focused the air eort on
maintaining air superiority over Taiwan itself and providing air support to ground forces ashore on
Taiwan. Chinese players who tried to pursue multiple goals, such as protecting the homeland while
invading Taiwan, quickly failed.
275
U.S. and Japanese teams were confronted with similar dilemmas. While most saw value in contesting
China’s air presence over Taiwan with fighter sweeps and CAP, the top priority was conducting strikes
against the amphibious fleet. Periodic Chinese missile against U.S. and Japanese air bases often left
the U.S.-Japan alliance with insucient aircraft to conduct both air superiority operations and strikes
simultaneously. In cases where Chinese ground forces took ports and airports, the need to strike and
damage those facilities lest they be used to facilitate additional lift heightened the U.S. dilemma. Similar
choices confronted players on those infrequent occasions when U.S. players sought to escort transport
aircraft into Taiwan, as forming escort groups would reduce commitments to other forms of missions.
In addition to dilemmas driven by having more tasks than resources, the teams confronted choices about
how to balance the risk of suering unsustainable casualties against the risk of applying insucient
force to achieve objectives. is was especially true of the U.S. team, which begins the conflict on its back
foot and in possession of a brittle force posture. Initial Chinese missile strikes destroy much of the U.S.
forward-deployed aircraft and naval strength. Although the United States receives a steady stream of air
and naval reinforcements, it takes time to build up powerful capabilities in theater.
If the United States takes a defensive stance until these reinforcements arrive, China can seize ports
274 e project team is separately running a set of game iterations in Japan that will illuminate Japanese
decisionmaking. ese game iterations constitute a separately funded project.
275 In one iteration (#16), the Chinese players withheld substantial forces to protect the homeland, resulting in
a catastrophic defeat on Taiwan because of the insucient forces available.
115 | The First Battle of the Next War
and airports and establish a secure position on the island. Delay cedes the opportunity to attack
Chinese forces before they can build forces ashore on Taiwan. On the other hand, massing forward
too aggressively to maximize striking power leads to crippling losses from Chinese missile attacks. e
game records suggest that extreme answers to this dilemma are punished.e two iterations in which
airpower was thrust forward most aggressively (#12 and #13) resulted in very high U.S. air losses
(774 and 750 aircraft, respectively) and stalemated outcomes, while the most cautious strategy (#18)
produced lower aircraft losses (392 aircraft) but also failed to produce a favorable operational outcome.
Iterations in which players adopted more mixed strategies (#4 and #16) appeared to fare relatively
better. is dilemma was most severe in pessimistic scenarios, and all the examples mentioned here
are drawn from those cases.
The teams confronted choices about how to balance the
risk of suering unsustainable casualties against the risk of
applying insuicient force to achieve objectives.
New Domains Are Important but not Decisive: No playersused direct-ascent weapons against
adversary satellite constellations because of concerns about losing their own capabilities. It was a
classic case of mutual deterrence. In counterspace operations, both sides contented themselves with
electronic warfare and dazzling. ey also launched co-orbital attacks that would only unfold beyond
the time scale of a Taiwan operation. While space is a critical warfighting domain, it was relatively
static in these scenarios.
Both sides employed oensive cyber actions, but again without decisive eect. One excursion case
explored a delayed Taiwanese reaction to invasion, partially based on posited cyber disruptions.
is delay had a serious impact on Taiwan’s ability to contain Chinese forces on their initial
beachhead.However, while cyber operations were useful for gaining temporary advantage, they were
not by themselves war-winning tools. is is consistent with recent experience in the Ukraine war
but not with the more imaginative eects proposed by some advocates and futurists.
276
An important
caution is that the game did not explore either of these domains with classified information. ese are
two domains where classified information might have an impact. A broader and more nuanced set of
capabilities in both domains might produce dierent results, at least at the strategic or national level if
not at the operational level.
276 For example, Ackerman and Stavridismake cyber capabilities decisive in their fictional story about a future
U.S.-China conflict, depicting cyberattacks as incapacitating U.S. fleet capabilities for months and allowing
adversaries to take control ofanF-35 aircraft,Ackerman and Stavridis, 2034.
116 | Cancian, Cancian, and Heginbotham
7
Recommendations
T
his chapter lays out recommendations arising from analysis of the results and the picture
of the war developed above. e purpose is to help policymakers as they consider how the
United States should respond to China’s increasing ability to invade Taiwan. Whether the
decision is made to defend Taiwan or not, following these recommendations would provide flexibility
to decisionmakers. Although these recommendations do not address every aspect of U.S.-China
competition (which involves many other factors), these recommendations are worth pursuing because
invasion is the most dangerous scenario. Further, many of the recommendations would apply to other
scenarios, for example, a blockade of Taiwan or a conflict in the South China Sea.
ese recommendations are organized in three categories: (1) politics and strategy, (2) doctrine and
posture, and (3) weapons and platforms.
Politics and Strategy
Although the game revolves around military operations, several political and strategic insights
emerged with clear policy implications.
Prioritize deepening diplomatic and military ties with Japan.
e ability to operate from U.S. bases in Japan is so critical to U.S. success that it should be considered
a sine qua non for intervention. Without Japanese basing, U.S. fighter/attack aircraft had to come from
Andersen Air Force Base on Guam, which was then generally crippled by Chinese missile strikes. is
enables China to mass its airpower forward and concentrate on support of ground forces on Taiwan.
Furthermore, the non-participation of the JSDF improves the balance of forces in China’s favor. e
117 | The First Battle of the Next War
United States in Japan has had close security ties for 70 years. ese linkages need to be maintained
and enhanced.
Several game participants who had experience with the Japanese military recommended closer
operational coordination between the U.S. and Japanese military establishments. Although the
two militaries conduct many peacetime exercises together, the current interpretation of Japan’s
constitution prohibits the establishment of a combined (or joint) command with the United States.
Moreover, the lack of a standing joint command within the JSDF and the existence of inconsistent
geographic command boundaries among the dierent Japanese services inhibit eective alliance
coordination at the operational level.
277
In researching U.S.-Japanese wartime coordination, it became apparent that there may be a disconnect
in the interpretation of bilateral treaties. e Status of Forces Agreement between the United States
and Japan refers to a requirement for “consultation” between Japan and the United States, but both
it and the original defensive alliance are vague about what this requires.
278
Many Japanese ocials
interpret this as requiring the United States to obtain permission before flying combat missions from
Japanese soil for any purpose other than the defense of Japan. However, U.S. ocials tended to view
“consultation” as notifying Japan of U.S. intentions. is disconnect must be remedied immediately,
lest it leads to delays or disruption of war plans during a crisis.
Clarify war plan assumptions.
Military planning appears to assume that U.S. forces will be able to deploy onto the sovereign territory
of other countries during a crisis. In particular, the Army and Marine Corps seem to assume that the
MLRs and Army MDTFs will be pre-positioned in the Philippines, Taiwan, or on forward Japanese
islands before conflict begins.
279
is is militarily desirable because it allows the units to get close
enough to Chinese naval forces to engage with anti-ship missiles. China’s ability to interdict U.S. force
movement after D-Day makes prewar deployments critical to the functioning of many U.S. capabilities.
Nor would a simple one-time crisis deployment be sucient. Any U.S. forces on the island would
277 See Eric Chan and Wallace “Chip” Gregson, “e Future of Taiwan-Japan Defense Cooperation,” Global
Taiwan Institute, October 7, 2022, https://globaltaiwan.org/2022/10/the-future-of-taiwan-japan-defense-
cooperation/; Grant Newsham, “Japan’s Self-Defense Force Goes ‘Joint’ – Kind Of,” Asia Times, November 9,
2022, https://asiatimes.com/2022/11/japans-self-defense-force-goes-joint-kind-of/; and Ryo Nemoto, “Lack
of NATO-Style Command in Focus as Japan Reviews Security Strategy,” Nikkei Asia, September 29, 2022,
https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/International-relations/Lack-of-NATO-style-command-in-focus-as-Japan-
reviews-security-strategy.
278 For the original treaty, see: ”Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan and the United States
of America,” Ministry of Foreign Aairs of Japan, https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/q&a/ref/1.
html. For the original Status of Forces Agreement, see: ”Agreement under Article VI of the Treaty of Mutual
Cooperation and Security between Japan and the United States of America, Regarding Facilities and Areas
and the Status of United States Armed Forces in Japan,” Ministry of Foreign Aairs of Japan, https://www.
mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/q&a/ref/2.html. A full list of updates to these can be found at the Japanese
Ministry of Foreign Aairs’ website: https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/scc/index.html
279 e Marine Corps’ A Concept for Stand-In Forces, November 2021, implies such prewar movement with its
notion of “persistence presence” on the ground with allies and partners. Articles by senor Marine planners are
more explicit.
118 | Cancian, Cancian, and Heginbotham
need to have all their logistical sustainment in place before conflict begins because it is so hard to get
shipments through once China establishes its defensive zone over the island. is sustainment would
need to include hundreds of missiles. A single strike by a squadron of 12 bombers launches over 200
missiles. To be a significant factor in a conflict, forward-deployed ground forces would need to provide
comparable levels of missile strikes repeatedly over the course of a conflict.
However, such permissions for forward deployments en masse do not seem likely. As noted in the
chapter on assumptions, most countries in the region (with the exceptions of Australia and Japan)
are cool to the idea of becoming involved in a U.S.-China war due to the immense destruction it
would cause.
While Taiwan would welcome forward deployments, they would be politically fraught.
280
e base case
of this project did not allow such deployments because of current U.S. Taiwan policy, which follows
from agreements made with China under the ree Communiqués and has historically prohibited the
presence of uniformed U.S. military personnel on Taiwan. As noted in Chapter 4, stationing forces
on Taiwan either in peacetime or during a crisis would elicit a strong, possibly even violent reaction
from China. Many experts argue that such moves would trigger the conflict it was intended to deter.
In 2020, Taiwanese authorities revealed the presence of elements of a rotational training detachment
from the Marine Raider Regiment on Taiwan, but the stationing of combat elements would constitute
a significant change to established U.S. policy.
ere is therefore the potential for a fundamental disconnect between U.S. war plans and political
realities. e Army and Marine Corps could assume they can move forward in a crisis to threaten the
Chinese fleet, while the State Department might oppose the moves as provocative, and the White
House prohibits deployment. e U.S. government needs to reach a clear internal consensus before a
crisis occurs.
It is therefore imperative to clarify assumptions about war plans during peacetime and not as the crisis
unfolds. e National Security Council would be the natural place to work the issue out because it can
integrate perspectives from across the government. Senior civilian decisionmakers do not want to be
in the position of Bethmann Hollweg, German chancellor who had to justify Germany violating Belgian
neutrality in 1914 because that is what the war plans (over which he had no control) called for.
281
There is therefore the potential for a fundamental
disconnect between U.S. war plans and political realities.
Even if stationing ground forces on Taiwan is not politically practical, it is important to improve
280 e project does not make a judgment about whether the military benefits of stationing forces on Taiwan
outweigh the political risks.
281 Hollweg knew that his justifications were not credible but had to make them anyway. See Barbara Tuchman,
e Guns of August (New York: McMillan and Company, 1962), 83.
119 | The First Battle of the Next War
inter-military coordination. is might include creating liaison groups to develop joint procedures,
practicing procedures in joint tabletop exercises, expanding Taiwanese participation in U.S. military
PME programs, and forming cross-national planning groups to develop concepts for joint defensive
operations. All these peacetime activities would smooth wartime operations. Such activities are
particularly urgent in the case of Taiwan if the United States believes that conflict is possible in
the near or medium term. e United States might also consider pre-positioning equipment and
munitions on Taiwan without stationing troops.
Furthermore, the United States cannot take too long deciding what to do in a crisis. e longer the
United States delays entering the war, the more dicult the fight. Although the United States has
enough advantages that it can still prevail in most scenarios, delay means more Chinese forces ashore
on Taiwan, higher casualties, and more infrastructure destruction for all parties. Hence, it not only
makes the U.S. task more dicult, it may also make o-ramps more dicult to find at the end of
conflict. War plans for a Taiwan contingency will have to envision a quick U.S. response; civilian
leaders must recognize this need for speed when the time for decision comes.
Furthermore, the United States cannot take too long
deciding what to do in a crisis. The longer the United States
delays entering the war, the more diicult the fight.
Recognize the need to continue operations in the face of heavy casualties.
Civilian decisionmakers must recognize that the decision to defend Taiwan during an invasion would
result in heavy casualties. If civilian leaders decided to begin the defense, then change their mind
after initial casualties, it would incur the worst consequences of intervention and non-intervention:
the United States would eectively be at war with China without the benefit of having maintained
Taiwan’s autonomy. Again, this project does not argue whether these costs are worth the benefits, but
that such an evaluation must be made with open eyes.
A conflict with China would be fundamentally unlike the regional conflicts and counterinsurgencies
that the United States has experienced since World War II, with casualties exceeding anything in
recent memory. Further, the casualty calculations shown in this report, as high as they are, do not
encompass the full scope of the war. ey cover only the first three or four weeks of the conflict and
exclude casualties arising from the battles in the South China Sea, which the wargame abstracted.
us, numbers presented here represent a floor, not a ceiling.
282
Although the game mechanics did not track personnel losses directly, these could be estimated from
equipment losses (e.g., ships and aircraft). e level of personnel losses is fortunately relatively low
relative to the losses in equipment. Nevertheless, personnel casualties averaged 6,960, of which about
282 A RAND study similarly found high losses, though provided fewer specifics because of classification. David
Gompert, et al., War with China: inking rough the Unthinkable, (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2016), https://
www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1140.html
120 | Cancian, Cancian, and Heginbotham
3,200 would be killed in action, in the base case even without adding losses from combat in the South
China Sea, which the project did not model.
Figure 11: Total U.S. Personnel Casualties, Killed, and Total (killed, wounded, or missing)
Note: Calculations of losses excluded two iterations (#5 and #6) because they were so short.
Source: CSIS.
During the height of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the United States sustained about three killed
per day. At the height of the Vietnam War, in 1968, the United States lost 30 killed per day. e loss rate
here, about 140 per day in the base case, approaches that of World War II, 300 killed per day. Deaths (vs.
casualties, which includes wounded) in three weeks of combat around Taiwan (about 3,200) are about half
the total from 20 years of combat in Iraq and Afghanistan (5,474).
283
In addition to shocking the U.S. public, the scale of casualties and equipment loss would stagger a U.S.
military that has dominated battlefields for a generation. ese losses would be particularly dicult for the
Air Force and Navy, which have essentially operated in sanctuary since the end of World War II.
To give an Air Force illustration, late-deploying units to Kadena Air Force Base on Okinawa will land
at a base that has entire squadrons of wrecked U.S. and Japanese aircraft bulldozed to the side of the
runway, hundreds of wounded in the base hospital, and temporary cemeteries to handle the many
dead. Missile attacks and air combat will have wiped out squadrons that arrived only a few days earlier.
Newly arriving personnel will be required to immediately conduct operations against the powerful
Chinese forces that have caused so many casualties.
e Air Force understands this at an abstract level. e Air Force chief of sta, General Charles Brown,
noted this challenge explicitly in his initial guidance: “Tomorrow’s Airmen are more likely to fight in
highly contested environments and must be prepared to fight through combat attrition rates and risks
283 Iraq and Afghanistan deaths from “Casualty Status,” Department of Defense, November 14, 2022, https://
www.defense.gov/casualty.pdf.
0 2000 4000 6000 8000 10000 12000
Pessimistic
Base
Optimistic
121 | The First Battle of the Next War
to the Nation that are more akin to the World War II era than the uncontested environment to which
we have since become accustomed.”
284
However, the challenge will be incorporating this into training
and culture.
Figure 12: Depiction of Japanese Attack on Henderson Field on Guadalcanal, 1942
Japanese aircra and naval gunfire wrecked many U.S. aircra on the ground, but the airfield kept operating.
Source: "Fogerty's Fate" by LtCol A. Michael Leahy, USMCR available at the National Museum of the Marine Corps, Triangle, Virginia.
e Navy and Air Force will need to reject the notion that the next war will be long distance and “push-
button,” not requiring personnel to face personal danger or operate under conditions of extreme hardship.
Although such notions have been attractive since the end of World War II, they do not describe a twenty-
first century conflict between great powers.
285
e Air Force’s recent “multi-capable airmen” concept is a
pragmatic acknowledgment of this grim reality. Under this concept, airmen will learn to do basic tasks
outside their usual specialty, thus allowing easier adjustments to combat conditions.
286
A broader question about leadership arises from the discussion about casualties and operational
results: commanders will need to continue operations and move forward despite a high level of
casualties not seen in living memory. It is easy to tell modern ocers to emulate the tenacity in the
face of adversity shown by their predecessors, such as Vice Admiral William Frederick “Bull” Halsey
284 C.Q. Brown and United States Department of the Air Force Chief of Sta, Accelerate Change or Lose
(Washington, DC: Department of the Air Force, 2020), https://books.google.com/books?id=KYzwzQEACAAJ.
285 For a critique of technological and antiseptic notions of modern war, see H. R. McMaster, “Discussing the
Continuities of War and the Future of Warfare: e Defense Entrepreneurs Forum,” Small Wars Journal,
October 14, 2014, https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/discussing-the-continuities-of-war-and-the-future-
of-warfare-the-defense-entrepreneurs-foru. For discussion about why military personnel need military skills
and discipline, see Mark Cancian, “Blue-Haired Soldiers? Just Say No,” War on the Rocks, January 18, 2018,
https://warontherocks.com/2018/01/blue-haired-soldiers-just-say-no/.
286 “Air Force Doctrine Note 1-21 - Agile Combat Employment,” U.S. Air Force, August 23, 2022, 3, https://www.
doctrine.af.mil/Operational-Level-Doctrine/AFDN-1-21-Agile-Combat-Employment/.
122 | Cancian, Cancian, and Heginbotham
during the naval battles of the Solomon Islands, Major General Alexander Vandegrift on Guadalcanal,
Lieutenant Colonel James Doolittle raiding Tokyo, or General George Patton at Kasserine Pass.
However, the current generation of military ocers has been trained on “force protection,” whereby
the minimization of casualties is of paramount importance. at makes sense in a counterinsurgency
operation where maintaining long-term political support is vital. It is counterproductive in a
conventional conflict with clear geographic and political goals.
Commanders will need to continue operations and move
forward despite a high level of casualties not seen in living
memory.
All military services should incorporate the recognition of casualties into their training programs and
emphasize that there will be no safe rear areas in a great power conflict. e combat forces already
do this, but such expectations need to be expanded. For example, many Army support units such as
air defense have not suered significant casualties since 1945, but now they will be a prime target for
Chinese missiles. Similarly, aviation organizations should be restructured to cope with wartime losses
to aircraft, maintenance facilities, and support personnel.
Do not plan on striking the mainland.
Strikes on the Chinese mainland create grave risks of escalation. ese risks are discussed in depth
above in the justification for the “U.S. National Command Authority rules out strikes on Chinese
mainland” excursion case. Even if the war plan developed in peacetime calls for mainland strikes,
the National Command Authority might withhold permission in the actual event of war. It would
therefore be wise to hedge planning on the question of striking the Chinese mainland. If permissions
are granted, then military leaders should be ready with plans for strikes on high-value targets such as
over-the-horizon radar, satellite uplink stations, and high-value aircraft that aect the fight on Taiwan.
Strengthen Taiwanese ground forces.
e United States will not be able to insert ground forces onto Taiwan in a timely manner. In some
iterations, the U.S. player attrited the PLAN suciently that some U.S. ground forces might get
through after four or more weeks of conflict, though with some risk from remaining Chinese air and
naval power. By that time, however, the battle for Taiwan will likely be decided.
Once conflict begins, Taiwan’s isolation means that there can be no “Ukraine model.” In the Ukraine
war, the United States and NATO have sent massive amounts of equipment and supplies directly to
Ukraine during the conflict. Although Russia has made some eorts to interdict this flow by striking
railroads with missiles, shutting down or even seriously impeding the flow has been beyond Russia’s
military capability. However, China does have that capability. erefore, all the equipment and
munitions must arrive before China begins combat operations.
123 | The First Battle of the Next War
Once conflict begins, Taiwan’s isolation means that
there can be no “Ukraine model.” . . . Therefore, all the
equipment and munitions must arrive before China begins
combat operations.
e United States should therefore encourage Taiwan to acquire sucient munitions and weapons to
fight the local battle against invading forces without any direct assistance for a prolonged period. For
many munitions, Taiwan may be capable of producing its own stockpiles. For U.S.-supplied systems,
foreign military sales provide a mechanism to get weapons to Taiwan before conflict begins. Taiwan
has ordered billions of dollars of weapons, but deliveries have been slow. e United States should
speed up the Foreign Military Sales process on its side and urge the Taiwanese to speed up on their
side. ere needs to be a sense of urgency.
287
Furthermore, Taiwanese ground forces must immediately shift toward becoming more eective and
survivable. Because defeating Chinese forces before they land is likely impossible, eective resistance
ashore is critical. is requires an army that is ready, well-trained, well-led, and highly motivated.
Without such a ground force, the rest will be in vain. Yet, it is not clear that the Taiwanese army has
the necessary qualities. Taiwan needs to give its army a higher priority than it has received in the past.
e island of Taiwan contains many geographic features such as mountains and rivers that the
Taiwanese forces should use to their advantage. is includes cities and urban sprawl. Although the
defense of cities would result in severe damage, failing to defend them makes Chinese operations
on the island much easier. e longer Taiwan can lengthen the war, the greater the attrition of the
Chinese fleet and the possibility of external aid.
Move Taiwanese air and naval forces toward asymmetry.
Historically, Taiwan has built a military with broad capabilities, paralleling those of major
powers such as the United States. Thus, it has sought large surface ships and advanced aircraft
in addition to submarines and ground forces. Currently, it has an air force with 534 combat
aircraft (474 fighter/attack, 60 support) and a navy with 38 major vessels (4 submarines, 26
surface combatants, and 8 amphibious ships).
288
Such a structure made sense when Chinese
air and naval forces were relatively weak. Taiwan’s ability to contest China in the air and at
sea meant it could defeat an invasion before ground forces landed in strength. That minimized
damage to Taiwanese infrastructure and its economy. Further, such a structure provided visible
reminders of Taiwan’s power and status in peacetime and could counter peacetime Chinese
efforts to test Taiwanese sovereignty.
287 Such a plea is made in Michael Spirtas, “Ukraine’s Dream Could Beat Taiwan’s Nightmare,” War on the Rocks,
October 28, 2022, https://warontherocks.com/2022/10/ukraines-dream-could-be-taiwans-nightmare/. Many
other experts make similar pleas.
288 International Institute for Security Studies, Military Balance 2022, 308–310
124 | Cancian, Cancian, and Heginbotham
Maintaining a broad set of symmetrical capabilities today is inappropriate given the increasing
strength of Chinese rocket, air, and naval forces. e Taiwanese surface navy would be quickly
destroyed without inflicting significant damage on the Chinese fleet. Submarines are more survivable
than surface ships but still vulnerable if China achieves surprise. Having a continuous at-sea
submarine presence would mitigate this problem; however, such a presence is currently infeasible
due to lack of numbers. e Taiwanese air force is similarly vulnerable. Chinese short-range ballistic
missiles can cover all of Taiwan’s military tarmac and HASs, destroying all Taiwanese aircraft not in
underground shelters. e surviving aircraft would contribute only marginally to the air battle over the
island before being destroyed.
e value of the “porcupine strategy” was demonstrated by the project’s modeling and wargames.
Because Taiwan cannot match China ship-for-ship or aircraft-for-aircraft, the “porcupine strategy”
proposes that Taiwan invest more heavily in “agile and concealable weapons such as the portable
Javelin and Stinger missiles” rather than expensive and vulnerable conventional weapons.
289
e
project’s findings are consistent with many other studies of Taiwan and reflect the current debate
within Taiwan.
290
ese asymmetric capabilities (e.g., coastal defense cruise missiles, mobile SAMs,
and mines) could also play a role in counter-blockade strategies if China pursued such a strategy with
strikes on Taiwan itself. e Taiwanese navy’s budget would better contribute with coastal defense
cruise missiles, missile boats, and mining rather than large surface combatants. Taiwanese ground-
based ASCMs can survive a Chinese air and missile strike because of their mobility and were highly
eective against Chinese surface ships. Mobile SAMs were more eective for air defense than fighters
because of their greater survivability. ey are also less expensive.
289 For a detailed discussion of a “porcupine strategy” for Taiwan, see Murray, “Revisiting Taiwan’s Defense
Strategy”; and “What is Taiwan’s porcupine defence strategy?,” e Economist, May 10, 2022, https://www.
economist.com/the-economist-explains/2022/05/10/what-is-taiwans-porcupine-defence-strategy; James
Timbie and James O. Ellis, Jr., “A Large Number of Small ings: A Porcupine Strategy for Taiwan,” Texas
National Security Review 5, no. 1 (Winter 2021/2022), https://texasnsr.wpenginepowered.com/wp-content/
uploads/2021/12/TNSR-Vol-5-Issue-1-Timbie-and-Ellis.pdf.
290 For a selection of publications with recommendations on shifting Taiwan’s capabilities, see, for example,
Jim omas, John Stillion, and Iskander Rehman, Hard ROC 2.0: Taiwan and Deterrence rough Protraction
(Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, December 2014), https://csbaonline.org/
research/publications/hard-roc-2-0-taiwan-and-deterrence-through-protraction; CNAS, Rising to the China
Challenge (Washington, DC: January 2020), https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/rising-to-the-china-
challenge; Pettyjohn, Wasser, and Dougherty, Dangerous Straits; and Terrence Kelly et al., Employing Land-
Based Anti-Ship Missiles in the Western Pacific (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, November 2013), https://www.rand.
org/pubs/technical_reports/TR1321.html. For a discussion on building Taiwan’s own area denial capabilities,
see “Building Taiwan’s Own Area Denial Capabilities,” e Diplomat, September 21, 2022, https://thediplomat.
com/2022/09/building-taiwans-own-area-denial-capabilities/. Recently, Admiral Lee Hsi-ming, former chief
of the Taiwanese general sta, has engendered significant debate by advocating for a defense in depth with
more asymmetric capabilities. He describes this alternate approach in his book, Overall Defense Concept: An
Asymmetric Approach to Taiwan’s Defense, and in a short paper published by the Hoover Institution: Lee His-
ming, “Taiwan’s Overall Defense Concept: eory and the Practice,” Hoover Institution, September 27, 2021,
https://www.hoover.org/sites/default/files/210927_adm_lee_hoover_remarks_draft4.pdf.
125 | The First Battle of the Next War
Because Taiwan cannot match China ship-for-ship or
aircra-for-aircra, the “porcupine strategy” proposes
that Taiwan invest more heavily in “agile and concealable
weapons such as the portable Javelin and Stinger missiles”
rather than expensive and vulnerable conventional
weapons.
Particularly important is the fulfillment of a current deal to supply Taiwan with ground-launched
Harpoon missiles. In the game, the 400 missiles already programmed (but not yet delivered) had a
large eect on weakening the initial Chinese invasion. Two hundred additional missiles would have as
much impact on the naval battle as an MLR or MDTF but without the political risks of basing and the
operational challenges of transportation and resupply.
Taiwanese progress toward such an asymmetric strategy has been halting. e United States has
consistently urged the government of Taiwan to move away from boutique, vulnerable systems.
291
Progress toward a “porcupine strategy” seemed to be made with a 2017 strategy by the then-chief of
the Taiwanese military forces, Lee Hsi-Min.
292
However, subsequent military chiefs have vacillated.
Determining the correct combination of carrots and sticks to change Taiwanese attitudes is imperative
for building an eective deterrent on today’s threat environment.
Doctrine and Posture
Next are recommendations for how the U.S. military plans to operate (doctrine) and how it
positions its forces in the theater (posture).
Fortify and expand air base capacity in Japan and Guam.
e United States and Japan lose hundreds of aircraft in every iteration, from an average of 290 in
optimistic cases to 646 in pessimistic cases. For the U.S. Air Force, this represents 12 to 32 percent
291 For the U.S. government discussions with Taiwan, se Air & Space Forces Magazine, e Lara Seligman, Alexander
Ward, and Nahal Toosi, “In Letters, US Tries to Reshape Taiwan’s Weapons Requests,” Politico, May 10, 2022,
https://www.politico.com/news/2022/05/10/u-s-taiwan-weapons-request-00031507; Edward Wong and John
Ismay, “U.S. Aims to Turn Taiwan into Giant Weapons Depot,” New York Times, October 5, 2022, https://www.
nytimes.com/2022/10/05/us/politics/taiwan-biden-weapons-china.html.
292 For more explanation of Taiwan’s asymmetric defense policy from Lee Hsi-Min, see Lee Hsi-Min and Eric
Lee, “Taiwan’s Overall Defense Concept, Explained,” e Diplomat, November 3, 2020, https://thediplomat.
com/2020/11/taiwans-overall-defense-concept-explained/.
126 | Cancian, Cancian, and Heginbotham
of its operational fighter/attack strength after three to four weeks of conflict.
293
e picture below shows U.S., Taiwanese, and Japanese losses (over 900) from one game iteration (#13),
a pessimistic and intense encounter that ended in stalemate.
294
e losses represent about 40 percent of
the Air Force’s fighter/attack operational inventory. is would degrade U.S. power for decades.
e dilemma for aircraft is that
they are vulnerable if based
close to Taiwan but less useful if
based farther away. e United
States must aggressively attack
the Chinese amphibious ships
to prevent the Chinese from
establishing a foothold in Taiwan.
However, this means moving many
aircraft forward before the Chinese
missile threat diminishes. As bases
closer to Taiwan can be struck by
more Chinese missiles, moving U.S.
aircraft closer to Taiwan increases
aircrafts’ vulnerability to being
destroyed on the ground.
Andersen Air Force Base on Guam
cannot substitute for bases in Japan.
e distance from Guam to Taiwan
(roughly 2,800 km) makes it impossi-
ble to generate many sorties from Andersen Air Force Base. Despite the high casualties suered by air-
craft based in Japan, most U.S. players preferred Japanese basing to Guam. However, in those iterations
where Japan was strictly neutral, Andersen Air Force Base became the principal U.S. base. is gave the
Chinese powerful reasons to attack it repeatedly. Aircraft on Andersen Air Force Base are particularly
vulnerable because, as of 2022, the base has no HASs.
Because there is no viable substitute for using air bases in Japan, the United States needs to work with
Tokyo to harden Japanese bases with shelters and expand their tarmacs for dispersing aircraft.
Concrete (hardening) lacks influential constituencies within military bureaucracies, but the large benefit
justifies a strong eort. Although HASs do not provide complete protection, they require China to expend
more missiles to destroy each aircraft. If every aircraft were in a shelter, China would be unable to use
293 Operational strength = aircraft in combat units. is excludes aircraft in maintenance, training units,
testing, and development. It also excludes unmanned aircraft. Operational strength is about 60 percent of
total strength, about 1,250 fighter/attack aircraft in 2022. “2022 USAF & USSF Almanac: Equipment,” Air &
Space Forces Magazine, July 1, 2022, https://www.airandspaceforces.com/article/2022-usaf-ussf-almanac-
equipment/.
294 e counters in white on the left of the photograph are Japanese losses. ose in blue, whether in outline or
as background, are U.S. losses. Green are Taiwanese losses. Note that aircraft losses are in large stacks.
Figure 13: U.S., Taiwanese, and Japanese Losses from
Game Iteration #13
Source: CSIS.
127 | The First Battle of the Next War
missiles with submunitions that destroy several
aircraft each. In conjunction with deception and
active defenses, the United States could shift the
cost-exchange ratio of Chinese attacks on U.S.
aircraft in Japan.
While active defenses are helpful, they cannot be
thought of as the primary means of mitigating
Chinese missile attacks. On the one hand, local
commanders want active defenses because
they oer a tangible counter against adversary
aircraft, cruise missiles, and ballistic missiles.
Investing in passive defenses such as hardening
and dispersion that simply mitigate the eects
of enemy attacks represents a tacit acceptance
of losses. On the other hand, China’s inventory
of missiles means that even if active defenses
are highly eective (as assumed in the project’s
modeling), then the sheer volume of fire will
overwhelm U.S. active defenses. Active defense
therefore must be used with a robust system of
passive defenses.
Besides hardening, the United States and Japan
should also work to secure access to civilian
international airports. e base case assumed that
the Air Force used one civilian regional airfield
per military airfield. is could be augmented
with access to a broader set of civilian airfields,
particularly large international ones. As Chinese missile attacks constitute an area attack problem,
increasing the area those missiles must cover is an eective countermeasure. Although local political
opposition may obstruct peacetime and possibly wartime access to Japanese civilian airports, the
significant payo justifies a strong eort.
Restructure U.S. Air Force doctrine and procurement to address vulnerability on the ground.
Faced with large losses on the ground, U.S. players often dispersed aircraft to regional civilian airfields
in Japan. By spreading aircraft out and thus diluting the eect of any single Chinese missile attack,
dispersion eectively reduced losses. Dispersion is a major element in contemporary discussions about
Figure 14: U.S. Bases in the Western Pacific
JAPAN
GUAM
SOUTH
KOREA
Sea of Japan
Misawa
Air Base
Fleet
Activities
Sasebo
MCAS
Iwakuni
Fleet
Activities
Chinhae
USAG Daegu
USAG Japan
(Camp Zama)
USAG Humphreys
Yokota Air Base
Fleet Activities
Yokosuka
Naval Air
Facility Atsugi
Kunsan Air Base
Osan Air Base
USAG Yongsan
Okinawa, Japan
USAG Okinawa (Torii Station)
Kadena Air Base
Marine Corps Base Camp Smedley D. Butler
Naval Base Guam
Andersen Air Force Base
Philippine Sea
Pacific Ocean
Source: CSIS.
128 | Cancian, Cancian, and Heginbotham
operational concepts in the Western Pacific.
295
However, unprepared civilian airfields have drawbacks; there will always be a need for well-equipped
military airfields. First, there is a logistical cost for dispersing and time lost in making the move to
civilian airfields. Second, the United States needs basing for hundreds of aircraft, which is far beyond
what regional airfields can handle. ird, as activities on a dispersion airfield expand, the airfield
becomes functionally like a main operating base but without the hardened infrastructure, specialized
logistics, and air defenses. Large, well-equipped—and fully hardened—bases remain indispensable for
sortie generation.
Air Force doctrine is beginning to address this trade-o between preparation and dispersion through
the agile combat employment (ACE) concept. ACE allows operations from a network of smaller,
dispersed locations through a hub-and-spokes model that can complicate adversary planning while
maintaining high sortie generation. ese dispersed locations would be “defensible, sustainable, and
relocatable.” is doctrinal adjustment will reduce the drawbacks of using civilian airfields. e Air
Force is practicing the skills needed for ACE in a variety of exercises.
296
However, these eorts do not go far enough. Rather than attempting to tack dispersion onto a
predetermined force structure and doctrine, the Air Force needs to engineer survivability into its
structure from the ground up. Sweden’s Flygbassystem 60/90 provides an example of hardening
and dispersion to protect forces on the ground. Having observed the vulnerability of aircraft on the
ground during World War II and the increasing power of nuclear weapons, the Swedish air force
adopted Flygbassystem 60, a system of concrete command bunkers, mobile maintenance teams, and
multiple dispersed runways designed to improve aircraft survivability in a potential war against the
Soviet Union.
297
is system was updated to Flygbassystem 90 after witnessing the eectiveness of
air base attacks and runway cratering munitions in the Arab-Israeli wars.
298
ACE is a sound first step,
but it must be expanded into a more holistic doctrine such as with the Flygbassystem.
Do not plan on overflying the Chinese mainland.
In every iteration, the Air Force was never able to begin operations within Chinese airspace by the
end of game play (typically after three to four weeks of conflict). Instead, U.S. Air Force had to focus
295 For a few examples, see Arash Heydarian Pashakhanlou, “e Underdog’s Model: A eory of Asymmetric
Airpower,” Air & Space Power Journal 35, no. 4 (2021), 16, https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/ASPJ/
journals/Volume-35_Issue-4/F-Pashakhanlou.pdf; Michael E. Canfield, “Contingency Basing for Great Powers
Competition,” Air University, March 5, 2021, https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Wild-Blue-Yonder/Article-
Display/Article/2526242/contingency-basing-for-great-powers-competition/; Patrick Mills et al., Building
Agile Combat Support Competencies to Enable Evolving Adaptive Basing Concepts (Santa Monica, CA: RAND
Corporation, 2020), https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR4200.html; and “Air Force Doctrine
Publication 3-01 - Counterair Operations,” U.S. Air Force, September 2019, 38, https://www.doctrine.af.mil/
Doctrine-Publications/AFDP-3-01-Counterair-Ops/.
296 “Air Force Doctrine Note 1-21 Agile Combat Employment,” U.S. Air Force.
297 Jörgen Rystedt, “Flygbassystemet Bas 60,” Förvarets Historiska Telesamlingar, 2005, http://www.t.nu/
Dokument/Flygvapnet/flyg_publ_dok_flygbassystemet_bas_60.pdf.
298 “Bas 90 - Air Base System 90, Swedish Air Force (1986) [English Subtitles Available],” YouTube video, posted
by HR, June 4, 2017, 10:46, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MNak9lB_q00.
129 | The First Battle of the Next War
on the ground, air, and sea battles on and immediately around Taiwan and had little leeway to employ
airpower over the mainland. Attrition was high enough without contending with China’s integrated air
defense system (IADS) on the mainland.
Strikes against military and civilian infrastructure on the mainland were counterproductive
distractions. ey require a massive and sustained air campaign that takes a long time to have
operational eects and diverted attention from immediate battlefield needs. Bombers equipped with
stando munitions were eective against the mainland but employed solely against ports and airfields
because these targets directly aected the situation on Taiwan.
Players were reluctant to risk B-2 bombers, the only long-range assets possibly capable of penetrating
Chinese airspace, because of their limited numbers.
Nor will this problem become better in the 2030s. When the B-21 bomber becomes widely available
and the B-2 is retired in the 2030s, China’s IADS will have also progressed. Nevertheless, the B-21
program remains important, as it might be the only bomber capable of launching medium-range
munitions (e.g., the JSOW) and surviving in the expanding Chinese air defense bubble.
e U.S. Air Force must therefore avoid force structure and doctrinal decisions that are geared toward
overflying China’s robust IADS on the mainland. is does not mean that stealth is unimportant: it
is still necessary to destroy targets away from the coast that are protected by long-range air defenses.
However, any program that envisions overflight of the Chinese mainland is unrealistic.
The U.S. Air Force must therefore avoid force structure
and doctrinal decisions that are geared toward overflying
China’s robust IADS on the mainland.
Recognize the limitations of Marine Littoral Regiments and Army Multi-Domain Task Forces and cap
their numbers.
e Marine Corps is building Marine Littoral Regiments (MLRs) to operate inside the Chinese
defensive zone (which the Marine Corps calls the “weapons engagement zone”) and contest Chinese
air and naval assets. e Army envisions its Multi-Domain Task Forces (MDTFs) as having a similar
function. Although these units could contribute to the fight, neither played heavily in most scenarios.
e problems of operating inside the Chinese defensive zone were insurmountable.
e game assumed that by 2026, the Marine Corps had an MLR on Okinawa and another on Hawaii.
299
299 Andrew Feickert, “New U.S. Marine Corps Force Design Initiative: Force Design 2030,” Congressional Research
Service, March 7, 2022, IN11281, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/details?prodcode=IN11281. e
Marine Corps Force Design 2030 Annual Update in May 2022 cited Okinawa and Hawaii as potential locations
for the MLRs. See U.S. Marine Corps, Force Design 2030 Annual Update (Washington, DC: Department of the
Navy, May 2022), https://www.marines.mil/Portals/1/Docs/Force_Design_2030_Annual_Update_May_2022.
pdf?ver=7ul-eyF6RcSq_gHU2aKYNQ percent3d percent3d.
130 | Cancian, Cancian, and Heginbotham
e MLR on Okinawa was able to exert local influence, destroying two Chinese ships in one iteration
(#19). However, its Naval Strike Missiles (NSMs) have a range of only 100 nautical miles, and Chinese
fleets rarely came that close Okinawa, being focused on the waters around Taiwan.
300
Although these units [MLRs and MDTFs] could contribute
to the fight, neither played heavily in most scenarios. The
problems of operating inside the Chinese defensive zone
were insurmountable.
In several games, the U.S. player tried to move an MLR onto Taiwan by air or sea, but in all cases the unit
and transportation assets were destroyed while trying to transit the extensive Chinese defensive zones.
301
In most scenarios, political assumptions prevented any U.S. forces from being pre-positioned on
Taiwanese or Philippine territory before the conflict begins. (See Chapter 4 for a description of the
base case assumptions and above for a recommendation on verifying war plan assumptions.) However,
one scenario assumed that that the United States was willing to risk provocation by putting U.S. forces
onto Taiwan, whether because Chinese mobilization generated sucient concern, or the U.S.-China
relationship had changed.
In this scenario, before hostilities began, an MLR deployed from Okinawa with its load of missiles and
one reload, augmenting the shore-based fires of Taiwanese Harpoons. e NSM’s 100-nautical-mile
range could easily enable attacks on Chinese amphibious ships from Taiwan. Assuming that the MLR
deployed with a load of 72 NSMs on 18 launchers, modeling showed that the MLRs would sink an
average of five major Chinese amphibious ships. Because of the MLR’s ability to conduct distributed
operations, it was assumed to be survivable in the face of Chinese counteraction.
However, resupply proved impossible. A resupply mission of C-17s escorted by fighters attempted
to break through the Chinese CAP but was shot down. After that, no further attempts were made at
resupply. e MLR became a ground infantry battalion, augmenting the 114 combat battalions of the
Taiwanese ground forces.
300 e Marine Corps is also buying longer-range Tactical Tomahawk missiles for the MLRs, but the number
delivered by 2026 will be under 100 because of the two-year production lead times. Department of the Navy,
Department Of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2023 Budget Estimates April 2022, Budget Justification Books, Procurement
Marine Corps (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, April 2022), 1-53—1-61, https://www.secnav.navy.
mil/fmc/fmb/Documents/23pres/PMC_Book.pdf.
301 In iteration #13, the MLR and two squadrons of transports were destroyed during a contested insertion to
Taiwan. In iteration #18, there was an attempt to move the MLR on an Amphibious Ready Group, which
was destroyed. Because few light amphibious warships (LAWs) would be delivered by 2026, all amphibious
movement was assumed to be by regular amphibious ships. In any case, the MLR needed to deploy as an
entire unit to have a significant operational impact, and this was far beyond the capability of LAWs to
support.
131 | The First Battle of the Next War
Ground units will not provide a significant volume of fire. A squadron of bombers armed with long-
range cruise missiles has a greater volume of fire than an entire MLR but without the challenges of
transportation and logistics. Ground-based anti-ship units must either deploy with a large number of
missiles before the conflict begins or act as forward sensors for long-range air and naval power.
Similar stories emerged from MLR deployments to the western Ryukyus and Philippines. In one
scenario, the MLR was prepositioned in the western Ryukyus. In that location, it could attack Chinese
naval forces that moved north of Taiwan, but resupply was deemed too risky.
In another scenario, an MLR moved onto the Philippine islands north of Luzon. ere, it could attack
Chinese forces that moved south of Taiwan, but again resupply was impossible, limiting its value.
302
All game iterations had an MLR and Army MDTF on Hawaii available for deployment by airlift, but no
U.S. player called them forward. Instead, the U.S. player gave priority to Patriot battalions, which could
add to the air defense of threatened airfields. ese were needed because of repeated Chinese air and
missile attacks.
erefore, the project team recommends continuing to develop land-based forces to counter Chinese
air and naval capabilities but also the need to recognize their employment challenges. While these
new formations were more useful than traditional ground forces, multiplying these specialized units
has limited value because only the first few can be deployed successfully. Others will sit unused. e
maximum number is probably two or three.
e acquisition of long-range ground-launched missiles might overcome this limitation. If ground-
launched Tomahawks have a similar range to their Vertical Launch System (VLS) counterparts, they
could be employed from peacetime bases on Okinawa without moving in the Chinese defensive zone.
Avoid crisis deployments that create vulnerabilities.
U.S. warfighting doctrine includes a pre-hostility phase designed to strengthen deterrence and
enhance U.S. warfighting capabilities should conflict occur. As a result, the United States routinely
makes forward deployments in crises.
303
erefore, in a major confrontation with China, the United
States might load up Japan and Guam with aircraft and move CSGs into the region to signal U.S.
resolve. Unfortunately, as omas Schelling, the great strategist, observed, “A fine deterrent can make
a superb target.”
304
In early 1941, the United States transferred the home base of the Pacific Fleet from
San Diego to Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, to deter Japanese aggression and station the fleet closer to the
potential fight. However, this move put the fleet within range of Japanese striking forces, with results
302 Note: e situation would be very dierent for a conflict in the South China Sea, where Philippine
participation would be critical. In that situation, the Philippines would play the role of an indispensable
forward base that Japan plays in a conflict over Taiwan.
303 See flexible deterrent options in Joint Chiefs of Sta, JP 5-0, Joint Planning (Washington, DC: Department
of Defense, December 2020), E-1, https://irp.fas.org/doddir/dod/jp5_0.pdf. For a discussion of the value of
forward presence, see Department of Defense, Deterrence Operations Joint Operating Concept (Washington,
DC: December 2006), 33–35, https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/concepts/joc_deterrence.
pdf?ver=2017-12-28-162015-337.
304 omas Schelling’s introduction to Roberta Wohlstetter, Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decisions (Stanford, CA:
Stanford University Press, 1962).
132 | Cancian, Cancian, and Heginbotham
as tragic as they are well known. Similarly, U.S. deployments during a confrontation with China might
tempt China to attack preemptively.
Thomas Schelling, the great strategist, observed, “A fine
deterrent can make a superb target.”
In theory, the United States might be able to keep air and naval forces forward for deterrence but
pull them back or disperse them to less vulnerable sites when deterrence was on the verge of failing.
However, this cannot be relied on in practice. First, partners and allies will push hard to keep forces
forward as long as possible. ey would regard withdrawal as a sign of abandonment, not prudence.
Further, it requires precise knowledge about when China intends to strike; however, China decides
D-Day. e United States had such knowledge before the war in Ukraine, but warning may not always
be as clear. Furthermore, China could plan on one D-Day, then reset it if the U.S. withdraws forward-
deployed forces. Finally, it would take several days for all the vulnerable forces to get out of range, so
withdrawal must begin with enough lead time before hostilities start.
e United States needs to develop mechanisms to enhance deterrence that do not also create
a tempting target. As commentators have noted, the withdrawal of U.S. squadrons from Kadena
probably enhances deterrence by reducing the temptation to strike a vulnerable target.
305
Deploying
defensive systems within the Chinese defensive zone would increase capabilities without increasing
vulnerability. Deploying oensive systems to locations outside Chinese missile ranges, such as sending
bombers to Hawaii or Australia, would indicate resolve without increasing vulnerability. Assuming
enough warning to withdraw vulnerable assets prior to conflict breaking out is highly risky.
Weapons and Platforms
Finally, analysis of the game results generated recommendations about the procurement of specific
weapons and platforms.
Shift to smaller, more survivable ships.
As with aircraft, the United States lost many surface ships in almost every iteration because of forward
deployment within the Chinese defensive zone. U.S. losses of large surface ships typically totaled two
carriers and 15 to 25 cruisers/destroyers. Although this represented only about 15 to 25 percent of total
U.S. Navy surface combatants, losses typically included nearly all large surface ships in the Western
Pacific. In the most intense iterations, the U.S. Navy was losing a major ship every day of the war.
306
305 Stacie Pettyjohn, Andrew Metrick, and Becca Wasser, “e Kadena Conundrum: Developing a Resilient
Indo-Pacific Posture,” War on the Rocks, December 1, 2022, https://warontherocks.com/2022/12/the-kadena-
conundrum-developing-a-resilient-indo-pacific-posture/.
306 e wargame tracked major surface combatants—carriers, cruisers, destroyers—and attack submarines. It did not
track other classes of ships, which collectively comprise over half the fleet and would also have taken losses in a
U.S.-China conflict.
133 | The First Battle of the Next War
Until the Chinese ground-launched missile inventory was exhausted, it was too dangerous for U.S. or
Japanese surface ships to approach Taiwan. Amphibious ships were particularly vulnerable because of
their lack of defensive systems.
In some iterations, surface ships could approach Taiwan in week three or four when the Chinese anti-
ship missile inventory had declined. Even then, the ALCMs of the PLAAF and PLANAF, the torpedoes
and cruise missiles of PLAN submarines, and the ship-based anti-ship missiles of the PLAN meant that
the survivability of U.S. surface ships was low. U.S. ships were rarely able to get within Harpoon or
SM-6 range of Chinese ships.
Until the Chinese ground-launched missile inventory was
exhausted, it was too dangerous for U.S. or Japanese
surface ships to approach Taiwan.
Even after Chinese ASBMs (Anti-Ship Ballistic Missiles) had been expended, the utility of U.S. surface
ships had limits. Although the range of the Maritime Strike Tomahawk (MST) allowed U.S. surface
ships to attack Chinese ships from a distance, every MST in a ship’s inventory meant one fewer
interceptor or anti-submarine missile that the ship had for defense. A ship with enough MSTs to
destroy multiple Chinese warships was a glass cannon, very vulnerable in turn to Chinese attack.
Just as there will be too many incoming missiles for active defense to adequately protect airfields, there
will be too many anti-ship missiles for active defense to adequately protect surface ships. erefore,
active defense with interceptors must be paired with soft kill measures (e.g., reduced radar cross-
section and electronic warfare) that complicate enemy targeting. To this end, the budget of the Surface
Warfare Division of the Operational Test and Evaluation Force, which tests ship defenses, should be
increased.
307
Even with improved electronic warfare, many ships will be lost in a conflict with China
because electronic warfare advantages are transitory. Procurement decisions must therefore consider
the vulnerability of surface ships.
is all points to benefits in shifting toward a fleet of smaller, stealthier ships integrated with
unmanned decoys. Such ships would be better disposed to the soft kill of incoming missiles. In
addition, it will not be as devastating to lose smaller, cheaper, less-capable ships. e Navy should also
have expendable or unmanned ships accompany CSGs to act as decoys.
Develop rescue mechanisms to deal with crippled ships and multiple sinkings.
Just because a ship is sunk does not mean that its problems are over. Hundreds or even thousands
of U.S. sailors would be thrown into the water each time a ship sinks. Currently, the U.S. Navy has
no way of rescuing these sailors except by diverting a warship, with all the associated risks and
opportunity costs. Game participants with a naval background recalled the experience of the USS
Juneau in World War II. e ship was torpedoed and sunk on November 13, 1942, leaving 100 sailors
307 “Surface Warfare,” Operational Test and Evaluation Force, n.d., https://www.cotf.navy.mil/surface-warfare/.
134 | Cancian, Cancian, and Heginbotham
in the water. However, the local commander judged it too risky to stop and look for survivors. Only 10
survivors were left when finally picked up eight days later.
308
World War II convoys routinely included
a rescue ship to pick up survivors so that warships did not have to be diverted. In addition to their
humanitarian function, rescuing 4,200 shipwrecked crew during the war, rescue ships boosted morale
by reassuring sailors about their chances of survival.
309
Further, many mission kills would not result in
the ship being sunk but rather incapacitated.
Without appropriate assets to tow disabled
ships to port, they would have to be scuttled,
depriving the Navy of an irreplaceable asset.
For example, in World War II, all five U.S. fleet
carriers lost in action were scuttled to keep
them from falling into enemy hands after
receiving severe damage.
310
e U.S. Navy needs to develop rescue ships
that can accompany CSGs and SAGs. Such
ships could both rescue shipwrecked sailors
and tow disabled ships. Some version of the
existing oceangoing tugs (Navy classification:
“ATS”) might be suitable. Although this is a lower-priority requirement in peacetime, the wartime
need is clear. e nation would be unforgiving if the Navy left sailors to drown because it was
too risky to save them. Unlike in 1943, ubiquitous social media would prevent suppression of
information about the event. Further, the tugs might save some damaged ships that would otherwise
be lost. e Navy will need every ship it has because of the long time required for new construction.
The U.S. Navy needs to develop rescue ships that can
accompany CSGs and SAGs. Such ships could both rescue
shipwrecked sailors and tow disabled ships.
e Navy might also consider acquiring an amphibious patrol aircraft that could help rescue sailors
from sunken ships and aircrew from downed aircraft. In a situation where the United States and Japan
308 e sinking of the Juneau received particular attention because five Sullivan brothers were lost onboard. See
the description in James D. Hornfischer, Neptune’s Inferno: e U.S. Navy at Guadalcanal (New York: Bantam
Books, 2011), 330–332, 370–374. e loss of so many members from a single family became a national
sensation. e abandonment of survivors in the water was not mentioned either in ocial descriptions at the
time or in Hollywood’s later depiction of the event (e Fighting Sullivans, 1944).
309 John Winton, Convoy: e Defence of Sea Trade, 1890-1990 (London: M. Joseph, 1983), 197–198.
310 Princeton and Yorktown were scuttled but probably too damaged to be saved in any case. Lexington, Wasp, and
Hornet might have been saved if towed to port.
Figure 15: Japanese Shin-Maywa US-2
Source: CSIS.
135 | The First Battle of the Next War
lose dozens of aircrew a week, each of whom requires millions of dollars and many years to train, such
rescues make military sense aside from the humanitarian imperative. e picture shows the Japanese
Shin-Maywa US-2, an amphibious aircraft designed for maritime rescue missions.
Prioritize submarines and other undersea platforms.
In every iteration, the U.S. player moved submarines into the Taiwan Strait, where they could attack
Chinese amphibious ships directly. Indeed, in the base case, one U.S. submarine squadron begins in
the strait because that likely constitutes current deployment practice.
Inside the straits, U.S. submarines wreaked havoc on Chinese shipping. Based on the agent-based
modeling found in RAND’s U.S.-China Military Scorecard and historical evidence from World War II,
each submarine would sink two large amphibious vessels (and an equal number of decoys and escorts)
over the course of a 3.5-day turn. Every submarine squadron (four submarines) in the strait sank eight
Chinese amphibious ships and eight escorts or decoys, but at a price of roughly 20 percent attrition per
3.5 days.
311
U.S. submarines operated on a “conveyor belt,” whereby they hunted, moved back to port
(Guam, Yokosuka, or Wake Island), reloaded, then moved forward again and hunted. Doing this cycle
as quickly as possible was important because the number of submarine squadrons was limited during
the early phases of the conflict and their contribution was so significant. Submarines were also needed
to screen against Chinese submarines exiting the first island chain.
U.S. submarines wreaked havoc on Chinese shipping.
Given the value of submarines, acquiring more is an obvious recommendation. Most analyses of
future naval force structure agree that the United States should build more attack submarines than
are currently programmed.
312
However, it is unlikely that the United States could build more than the
current rate of two a year during the 2020s and early 2030s when it is also building the Columbia-
class SSBN. Indeed, even achieving two per year may be a stretch.
313
However, the U.S. Navy should
commit to funding those two per year even if shipbuilding funds get tight. e Navy should also
311 Although that attrition increased as Chinese ships emplaced more ASW minefields over the course of the
game.
312 Navy force structure goals for attack submarines across both the Trump and Biden administrations have
been in the range of 66 to 78 even though the current level hovers around 54. Ronald O’Rourke, Navy Force
Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress, CRS Report No. RL32665 (Washington, DC:
Congressional Research Service, October 2022), 8, https://sgp.fas.org/crs/weapons/RL32665.pdf.
313 e Navy has noted this production constraint in Oce of the Chief of Naval Operations, Report to Congress on
the Annual Long-Range Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels for Fiscal Year 2023 (Washington, DC: Department
of the Navy, April 2022), 4, https://media.defense.gov/2022/Apr/20/2002980535/-1/-1/0/PB23%20
SHIPBUILDING%20PLAN%2018%20APR%202022%20FINAL.PDF. Similarly, the Congressional Budget Oce
stated in its analysis of the 2022 shipbuilding plan that while attack submarines are currently constructed
at a rate of two per year, “the 2022 plan indicates that the Navy would like to increase the attack submarine
force sooner than that rate would allow,” “An Analysis of the Navy’s Fiscal Year 2022 Shipbuilding Plan,”
Congressional Budget Oce, September 16, 2021, https://www.cbo.gov/publication/57472.
136 | Cancian, Cancian, and Heginbotham
consider keeping submarines in service longer, as it has proposed by extending the service life of some
688-class boats.
314
e Navy should also ensure that it has reloading facilities in Yokosuka, Guam, and Wake Island. Forcing
submarines to go back to Pearl Harbor to reload wastes valuable hunting time. Because China will likely
target fixed facilities, mobile reloading from civilian ports should be practiced. e Navy also needs to
ensure that it has enough torpedoes. Although the game did not model this munition, there is reason for
concern. e historical record is that many torpedoes will miss or malfunction, some will be lost when
the submarine carrying them is sunk, and others will be destroyed when shore facilities are attacked.
Finally, investment in unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs) should be prioritized. ere is
guaranteed to be some submarine attrition in a fight against China, particularly in the constrained
waters of the Taiwan Strait. Each loss would be a painful blow. A Virginia-class submarine has a crew of
135 and costs roughly $3 billion.
315
While UUVs are not as capable as attack submarines, they could be
programmed to fulfill some relatively straightforward missions (e.g., minelaying).
Procure sucient stockpiles of stando anti-ship weapons.
Munitions usage was high. In the three to four weeks of conflict, U.S. forces usually expended about
5,000 long-range precision missiles, primarily JASSMs and LRASMs. e United States expended its
global LRASM inventory within the first few days in all scenarios. JASSM inventories were large enough
that they did not run low until the third or fourth week of the war.
In games where the JASSM-ER has maritime strike capabilities, the abundance of U.S. munitions made
U.S. strategy an almost uncomplicated exercise. With each squadron of 12 bombers carrying around
200 stealthy, stando ASCMs, the United States could rapidly cripple the Chinese fleet and leave the
invasion force stranded. For this reason, many studies that look at this problem recommend expanding
the arsenal of anti-ship weapons.
316
However, as discussed in the assumptions chapter, the JASSM-ER
might not have this capability.
314 In 2021, the Navy assessed each one of its Los Angeles 688-class submarines to ascertain if its service life
could be extended for an additional two or three years, which would result in a “20 percent improvement in
force projections.” Justin Katz, ”Navy assessing LA sub fleet for possible life extensions,” Breaking Defense,
November 18, 2021, https://breakingdefense.com/2021/11/navy-assessing-la-sub-fleet-for-possible-life-
extensions/.
315 is costs only increases with the SSN(X), which is projected to costs $5.5 billion. Megan Eckstein, “CBO:
Navy’s Next Nuclear Attack Submarine Could Cost $5.5B a Hull,” USNI News, October 10, 2019, https://news.
usni.org/2019/10/10/cbo-navys-next-nuclear-attack-submarine-could-cost-5-5b-a-hull.
316 To cite a few examples: Elbridge Colby, “America Must Prepare for War over Taiwan,” Foreign Aairs, August
10, 2022, https://www.foreignaairs.com/united-states/america-must-prepare-war-over-taiwan, in which
he criticizes the DOD for not buying enough key munitions and especially criticizes the Navy for its slow
acquisition of long-range antiship missiles. Also see, Je Schogol, “e US Military Needs a Lot More Artillery
Shells, Rockets, and Missiles for the next War,” Task & Purpose, September 5, 2022, https://taskandpurpose.
com/news/military-artillery-shells-rockets-missiles-war-russia-china/; and Tom Shugart, “Trends, Timelines,
and Uncertainty: An Assessment of the State of Cross-Strait Deterrence,” Written Testimony before the U.S.-
China Economic and Security Review Commission, February 18, 2021, https://www.cnas.org/publications/
congressional-testimony/trends-timelines-and-uncertainty-an-assessment-of-the-state-of-cross-strait-
deterrence.
137 | The First Battle of the Next War
The United States expended its global LRASM inventory
within the first few days in all scenarios.
JASSM-ERs were still somewhat useful in excursion scenarios where they could not strike ships at sea.
In this case, JASSM-ERs could strike Chinese ports and airfields. However, these attacks against the
homeland of a nuclear power raised questions about escalation. Attacks against ships at sea do not
raise that concern to the same degree.
Furthermore, without a deep magazine of stando anti-ship weapons, the Air Force had to use shorter-
range JSMs and JSOWs to attack Chinese ships once the LRASMs were gone. e limited range of JSMs
and JSOWs meant that aircraft had to get within range of Chinese SAMs and CAP for strikes, which
resulted in higher attrition and aborted missions. With a deeper magazine of LRASMs instead of
JASSM-ERs, this problem would not have arisen.
Missile inventories reflect service priorities. e Air Force prefers to strike land targets as part of an
air superiority campaign, while naval targets have lower priority. us, in 2026, the available Air Force
inventory of JASSM (all variants) will number about 6,500, while its LRASM inventory will be only
about 100.
317
Although the Navy has more LRASMs, it does not have the ability to launch them en
masse in the way that only Air Force bombers can.
e Air Force needs to embrace and implement the anti-ship mission. e need to attack Chinese
amphibious forces makes this mission critical. Maritime strike has a long history with the Air Force,
dating from its earliest days, with the sinking of the Ostfreisland in 1921 and the interception of
the Rex in 1938.
318
General George C. Kenney’s World War II operations in the Southwest Pacific also
constitute a pertinent precedent, as his 5th Air Force supported ground and naval operations.
319
317 Navy LRASM inventory will be about 350. LRASM inventory includes both Navy and Air Force projected for
2026, allowing for the long production lead time and congressional additions. Data from Department of the
Navy, Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2023 Budget Estimates, Weapons Procurement Justification Book,
Weapons Procurement, Navy (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, April 2022), 1-227–1-236, https://www.
secnav.navy.mil/fmc/fmb/Documents/23pres/WPN_Book.pdf. Navy inventory of its JASSM version (AGM-
158C) in 2026 will be only 31.
318 e Air Force, under the flamboyant Billy Mitchell, sank the captured German battleship Ostfriesland,
demonstrating the ability of aircraft to sink warships. In a 1938 exercise, Air Force long-range aircraft
located the high-speed passenger liner Rex, 630 nautical miles from New York City, demonstrating the
ability of aircraft to intercept ships far at sea. For additional details, see John T. Correll, “Rendezvous
with the Rex,” Air and Space Forces Magazine, Air and Space Force Association, December 1, 2008, https://
www.airandspaceforces.com/article/1208rex/ Air Force Magazine; John T. Correll, “Billy Mitchell and the
Battleships,” Air and Space Forces Magazine, Air and Space Forces Association, July 21, 2021, https://www.
airandspaceforces.com/article/billy-mitchell-ostfriesland/.
319 For further reading on the history and significance of the maritime strike mission, see David Deptula,
“Bombers for Maritime Strike: An Asymmetric Counter to China’s Navy,” Mitchell Institute Policy Papers
(Arlington, VA: Mitchell Institute, February 2019), https://mitchellaerospacepower.org/wp-content/
uploads/2021/02/a2dd91_546d5ed9b4424fd780887be1146f9ac2.pdf. For further reading on the Southwest
Pacific air campaign, see: George C Kenney, General Kenney Reports; A Personal History of the Pacific War (New
York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1949).
138 | Cancian, Cancian, and Heginbotham
One way to implement such an eort would be to shift JASSM production to the LRASM. e missiles
are built on the same production line and are 70 percent common. e LRASM can strike the greatest
threat, the Chinese amphibious fleet, with less risk of escalation. Yet the JASSM inventory is far larger
than that of LRASMs, and production plans in FY 2023 continue that imbalance, consisting of 581
JASSMs and 88 LRASMs. is is backward.
320
Powered naval mines are another option that might be highly eective. Mines have the advantage
of obviating the requirement for precise targeting of the Chinese fleet; once the Chinese select an
invasion beach, any mine dropped there will eventually hit a ship. While current extended-range
mines require aircraft to get within 40 km of the target, a powered version of these mines could reach
farther and reduce attrition.
321
Accelerating CLEAVER, a program to put palletized missiles into the cargo bay of a C-17 or C-130 cargo
aircraft, would expand the number of launch platforms. is may sound unnecessary, as the United
States has bombers that are specifically designed to deliver such payloads. However, there are not
enough bombers to sustain attrition and launch all the strikes that are needed. Being able to include
some of the 225 C-17s in these long-range strikes would add flexibility to mission planning and hedge
against unexpectedly high losses to the bomber force.
322
Finally, the project tracked a few key munitions and assumed that the United States had sucient
stockpiles of the rest. is may not be true. e DOD should review the inventories of all relevant
munitions.
Continue development and fielding of hypersonic weapons but recognize that they are a niche capability.
Hypersonic weapons, defined as missiles able to travel more than five times the speed of sound, have
received considerable attention in recent years. eir high speed makes defense dicult and allows
them to strike fleeting targets. e base case includes Chinese DF- 17s with hypersonic maneuverable
re-entry vehicles.
323
It is logical for China to pursue hypersonic technologies to defeat the well-
developed U.S. missile defense system.
By 2026, the United States will have few equivalent hypersonic systems. e game included 50
U.S. hypersonic weapons (the Air-Launched Rapid Response Weapon, or ARRW), although this was
speculative. In 2022, no U.S. hypersonic weapons are yet programs of record although several systems
320 e procurement in the FY 2023 budget proposal, Oce of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/
Chief Financial Ocer, FY 2023 Program Acquisition Cost by Weapon System (Washington, DC: Department
of Defense, April 2022), 5–11, https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/deudget/FY2023/
FY2023_Weapons.pdf.
321 Tyler Rogoway, “B-52 Tested 2,000lb Quickstrike-ER Winged Stando Naval Mines During Valiant Shield,” e
Drive, September 20, 2018, https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/23705/b-52-tested-2000lb-quickstrike-
er-winged-stando-naval-mines-during-valiant-shield.
322 eresa Hitchens, “Air Force Weaponizing Cargo Planes For All-Domain Ops: ‘Bomb Bay In A Box’,” Breaking
Defense, May 27, 2020, https://breakingdefense.sites.breakingmedia.com/2020/05/air-force-weaponizing-
cargo-planes-for-all-domain-ops-bomb-bay-in-a-box/.
323 It is likely that other Chinese TBMs have MaRVs that maneuver at more than five times the speed of sound,
making them also “hypersonic.”
139 | The First Battle of the Next War
are emerging from development. Most U.S. hypersonic programs would likely be in testing or initial
fielding in 2026 and thus not available in large numbers.
324
Hypersonic weapons would be useful for attacking highly defended and deep targets such as China’s
over-the-horizon-backscatter radars or satellite uplink stations. Modeling indicated that Chinese
defenses could typical shoot down about 25 percent of U.S. land-attack cruise missiles targeting the
mainland. is blunted the eect of U.S. attacks. Hypersonic weapons would not suer this attrition.
However, hypersonic weapons are expensive and no substitute for large numbers of long-range cruise
missiles. Picking o a few high-value targets does not solve the central problem of countering a massed
invasion. at requires sinking enough amphibious ships such that Chinese forces cannot sustain a
lodgment on Taiwan. e strategist Hal Brands made this point in an assessment of contemporary
arms races, “e United States doesn’t need to emulate every Chinese breakthrough in hypersonic
weapons. ese weapons can’t provide, at a reasonable cost, the volume of fire power Washington
would need in the Western Pacific.”
325
Prioritize sustainment of the bomber fleet over fighters.
Both bombers and fighter/attack aircraft played important roles. However, the range and high
ordnance throughput of bombers presented the Chinese with a particularly daunting challenge. e
range of bombers meant that they could be based beyond the range of Chinese ballistic missiles, while
their ordnance throughput meant that they could rapidly attrite Chinese forces. When paired with
stando munitions, even unstealthy “bomb trucks” are extremely useful against targets at the edge of
the Chinese air defense zone.
The range and high ordnance throughput of bombers
presented the Chinese with a particularly daunting
challenge. The range of bombers meant that they could be
based beyond the range of Chinese ballistic missiles, while
their ordnance throughput meant that they could rapidly
attrite Chinese forces.
is combination of platforms with long-range precision munitions is viable because this air campaign
focuses on a few hundred aiming points comprising ships, air bases, and ports and airfields. It is not a
324 For a general description of U.S. hypersonic weapons programs, see Kelly Sayler, Hypersonic Weapons:
Background and Issues for Congress, CRS Report No. R45811 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service,
October 2022), https://sgp.fas.org/crs/weapons/R45811.pdf. In the game, ARRW is a placeholder for whatever
hypersonic weapons the United States fields by 2026.
325 Hal Brands, “e Art of the Arms Race,” Foreign Policy, Summer 2022, 39–43, https://foreignpolicy.
com/2022/07/01/arms-control-race-cold-war-geopolitical-rivalry/
140 | Cancian, Cancian, and Heginbotham
strategic bombing campaign involving tens of thousands of aim points on the Chinese mainland and
designed to paralyze the economy, military command structure, and political operations. Long-range
precision missiles are too expensive to be procured in the numbers necessary to prosecute such a
campaign, as the Russians are finding out in Ukraine. Further, as noted earlier, such a campaign raises
questions about escalation.
326
e value of bombers leads to several recommendations for Air Force acquisitions.
1. Stop retiring bombers. e Air Force has been retiring legacy bombers in expectation of fielding
the B-21 and as part of its “divest to invest” strategy.
327
is creates a gap in capability because
the B-21s will not be available in large numbers until the 2030s. If the United States believes
there is a significant chance of conflict with China in the 2020s, then the size of the bomber
force should be maintained. us, the Air Force might retain its B-1 and B-52 fleets even as the
B-21 enters the inventory.
328
2. Re-engine the B-52 fleet. e program, called the Commercial Engine Replacement Program, is
already in Air Force plans. e Air Force will need as many bombers as it can get even when the
B-21 has been fielded.
3. Ensure that all bombers can carry the full range of munitions. For example, the LRASM is
currently certified only for the B-1 bomber and the F/A-18E/F.
329
Given the LRASM’s centrality
in destroying Chinese surface forces, it needs to be employable from all aircraft for maximum
flexibility.
4. Consider the implications for aircraft type and mix if most are lost on the ground. Fifth-
generation aircraft were just as vulnerable on the ground as 4.5-generation aircraft.
5. ink ahead to the next stage of bomber vulnerability. China likely also appreciates the
significance of the threat that the U.S. bomber force poses. China might develop longer-range
SAMs or deploy long-range air-to-air missiles on fighters that would fly deep into the Philippine
Sea. e United States must develop countermeasures in the same way it thinks about
disrupting the anti-ship-missile kill chains.
6. Harden bomber bases in Australia, Hawaii, and Alaska. In this game (set in 2026), China had
few options for striking these critical bases. Chinese submarines might theoretically operate that
326 One analysis cites the need to hit 100,000 aiming points and therefore recommends a variety of munitions,
many of which require aircraft to penetrate deep into adversary airspace. See Mark A. Gunzinger, Aordable
Mass: e Need for a Cost-Eective PGM Mix for Great Power Conflict (Arlington, VA: Mitchell Institute for
Aerospace Studies, November 2021), https://mitchellaerospacepower.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/
Aordable_Mass_Policy_Paper_31-FINAL.pdf.
327 John Tirpak, “Air Force May Divest 1,468 Aircraft over Five Years,” Air & Space Forces Magazine, April 7, 2022,
https://www.airandspaceforces.com/air-force-may-divest-1468-aircraft-over-five-years/.
328 A recent MITRE study made a similar recommendation, that no bombers be retired until at least 50 B-21s
have entered the inventory. “MITRE U.S. Air Force Aircraft Inventory Study,“ MITRE Corporation, n.d., https://
aerospace.csis.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/MITRE-AF-Summary.pdf.
329 Oce of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Ocer, Program Acquisition Costs by
Weapons System (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, April 2022), 5–11, https://comptroller.defense.gov/
Portals/45/Documents/deudget/FY2023/FY2023_Weapons.pdf.
141 | The First Battle of the Next War
far from port but were generally fully engaged in the Western Pacific. However, future Chinese
missiles might have the range to destroy aircraft based there. e DOD should examine the
defenses of Alaska and Hawaii since they will increasingly be within the scope of Chinese strikes.
Procure more, cheaper fighters.
With so many aircraft lost early in the conflict, the Air Force risks running out of aircraft and becoming
irrelevant to the conflict unless it has a large enough force to sustain the losses. erefore, the Air
Force should be cautious about taking its “divest to invest” strategy too far.
330
Numbers matter. roughout the campaign, even fourth-generation fighter/attack aircraft had value.
For many missions (such as launching stando weapons), the stealth of fifth-generation aircraft is not
needed. is was particularly true later in the conflict when Chinese air defenses weakened. At the
same time, losing all fifth-generation aircraft early was a problem. After the long-range LRASMs were
gone, fifth-generation aircraft were particularly valuable because they could press in to deliver shorter-
range JSMs or JSOWs. ere is therefore a strong argument for keeping a balanced mix throughout by
withholding fifth-generation aircraft until the Chinese missile inventory is depleted.
Ninety percent of aircra losses occurred on the ground.
e vulnerability of aircraft on the ground raises questions about U.S. plans to procure relatively
small numbers of extremely capable but expensive aircraft. If most are lost on the ground before they
can bring their advanced capabilities to bear, then cheaper airframes might be worthwhile. Plans to
procure the Next Generation Air Dominance fighter, with a cost per airframe of “‘multiple’ hundreds
of millions” of dollars, do not make sense if 90 percent of U.S. and Japanese aircraft losses occurred on
the ground.
331
330 For a discussion of how the “divest to invest” strategy reduces Air Force structure, see Mark Cancian,
“Force Structure in the New National Defense Strategy: More Capable but Smaller and Less Global,”
CSIS, Commentary, October 31, 2022, https://www.csis.org/analysis/force-structure-national-defense-
strategy-highly-capable-smaller-and-less-global. For a discussion of the Air Force’s general problem with
maintaining inventories and increasing aircraft age, see Mark Cancian, U.S. Military Forces in FY 2022: Air Force
(Washington, DC: CSIS, November 2021), https://www.csis.org/analysis/us-military-forces-fy-2022-air-force.
331 Stephen Losey, “Future NGAD fighter jets could cost ‘hundreds of millions’ apiece,” Defense News, April
28, 2022, https://www.defensenews.com/air/2022/04/28/future-ngad-fighter-jets-could-cost-hundreds-of-
millions-apiece/.
142 | Cancian, Cancian, and Heginbotham
8
Conclusion—Victory Is
Not Everything
T
he game results showed that the United States and Taiwan could successfully defend the
island even under relatively pessimistic assumptions. is is dierent from many observers’
impressions and constitutes an important insight. e analysis also indicates that there is no
need for the United States to consider highly risky strategies such as preemptive attacks on Chinese
amphibious shipping or the early use of nuclear weapons.
China would take enormous risks in launching such an operation. Chapter 5 describes the heavy
losses to Chinese air and naval forces that even a successful invasion would entail. ese losses would
take many years to replace. Invasion forces on Taiwan would risk destruction if, as happened in many
iterations, the Chinese were unable to sustain these forces in the face of heavy maritime losses. is
failure would produce tens of thousands of prisoners of war, a highly visible and emotional symbol
of defeat. Although the project did not explore what eects these losses might have on the Chinese
political system, the CCP would be risking its hold on power.
332
However, there is no cause for complacency by the United States or Taiwan. First, China could choose
other coercive paths, whether it be the seizure of oshore Taiwanese islands, a bombardment without
ensuing invasion, or a blockade. ese contingencies also warrant consideration. Second, the morale
of Taiwan’s military and leadership must be strong enough to resist a Chinese attack in the face of high
losses. Without the will to resist, the rest is irrelevant.
332 Richard Haass and David Sacks, “American Support for Taiwan Must Be Unambiguous,” Foreign Aairs,
October 30, 2022, https://www.foreignaairs.com/articles/united-states/american-support-taiwan-must-be-
unambiguous.
143 | The First Battle of the Next War
Finally, the human, economic, military, and political costs loom over even a successful defense. ese
would be enormous. e discussion below lays out a few of these.
▪ Taiwan’s Economy Debilitated: Chinese forces, even if defeated, would inflict massive damage on
Taiwanese infrastructure and cripple its economy for many years.
▪ Cyber Damage: Although the game included cyber aects at the operational level, it did not
examine economic and social impacts. Both Taiwan and the United States might suer damage to
civilian and economic infrastructure.
▪ Lost Military Capabilities: e United States would suer tremendous damage to its military
forces. Rebuilding these capabilities would take many years and would occur at a slower rate than
China’s rebuild, given the rapid pace of Chinese military modernization.
333
With only two U.S.
shipyards currently building large surface combatants, it would take decades to replace the dozen
or more such ships lost while continuing the Navy’s build program. Lost carriers could not be
replaced because the current shipyard capacity is sucient only to maintain the current carrier
force. Aircraft would be a bit easier to replace. For example, the United States lost an average of
200 to 500 aircraft across the scenarios. At current procurement rates of about 120 such aircraft
per year, it would take two to four years to replace those aircraft, assuming no further attrition
and no retirement of aging aircraft in the force.
334
Ships and aircraft would take longer to replace
if the war went beyond the three or four weeks of game play or if losses from engagements in the
South China Sea were calculated and included.
▪ Loss of Global Position: e world would not be standing still during and after a U.S.-China
conflict. Other countries—for example, Russia, North Korea, or Iran—might take advantage of U.S.
distraction to pursue their agendas. After the war, a weakened U.S. military might not be able to
sustain the balance of power in Europe or the Middle East.
▪ Risk of Escalation: Although this project focused on conventional conflict, many analyses of an
invasion have nuclear play. e recent novel 2034 concludes with nuclear strikes.
335
e CNAS
wargame, Dangerous Straits, similarly ends with the use of nuclear weapons. No one knows what
those escalation dynamics would be. ey depend on an unprecedented event, conventional
war between nuclear powers, as well as the opaque decisionmaking process of the CCP. e
333 For example, the Chinese are building enough ships that they are expected to expand their fleet from the
current 340 ships to 440 ships by 2030. In contrast, the U.S. Navy builds only enough ships to maintain its
current size of 290 ships. Department of Defense, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s
Republic of China 2022 (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2022), 50–52, https://media.defense.
gov/2022/Nov/29/2003122279/-1/-1/1/2022-MILITARY-AND-SECURITY-DEVELOPMENTS-INVOLVING-THE-
PEOPLES-REPUBLIC-OF-CHINA.PDF.
334 For discussion of past industrial mobilization and current capabilities, see Mark Cancian and Adam Saxton,
Industrial Mobilization: Assessing Surge Capabilities, System Brittleness, and Wartime Risk (Washington, DC: CSIS,
January 2021), https://www.csis.org/analysis/industrial-mobilization-assessing-surge-capabilities-wartime-
risk-and-system-brittleness. e analysis shows that for most categories of weapons, replacement of current
inventories would take many years. Ships take an especially long time to replace. Conversion of civilian
industry to wartime use, though possible, is a long process. In World War II, the industrial mobilization
process took about six years, from 1938 to 1944. In World War I, the war ended before U.S. industry fully
mobilized, so U.S. forces fought the war with large amounts of French and British equipment.
335 Ackerman and Stavridis, 2034.
144 | Cancian, Cancian, and Heginbotham
recommendations above to focus on anti-ship attacks instead of mainland strikes could reduce
the risk of escalation, but that risk will never go away.
▪ Protracted or Episodic Conflict: Finally, the war might not end after this initial phase but drag on
for months or even years. Conflict might be episodic, with periodic ceasefires. is project is called
e First Battle of the Next War for a reason. Opening battles, even if seemingly decisive, generally
do not end a conflict. Cathal Nolan makes this argument in his monumental study, e Allure of
Battle. After looking at the long history of wars, he concludes, “How to win decisively in war is the
aspiration of all professional military, and a main subject of concern to those who study war. Yet
it is the single hardest thing to do, to translate combat into achievement of an important strategic
and political goal that the other side is forced to recognize and accept when the war is over.”
336
ese losses might cause strategic disillusionment. e United States would sustain as many personnel
casualties in a month of such conflict as in 20 years of wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. e scale and
suddenness of such losses would shock a U.S. population unaccustomed to significant military losses.
e eect might be like the attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941, where the combination of surprise,
betrayal, and loss solidified public opinion and created a determination to press the conflict to its
conclusion. On the other hand, the eect might be like the 1983 bombing of the U.S. barracks in
Beirut, where the U.S. population and political establishment decided that the cost was not worth the
foreign policy benefit. e result was withdrawal.
Even if the United States prosecuted the war to a successful conclusion, a narrative of disillusionment
might emerge. U.S. policymakers and Americans might question whether the sacrifice had been worth
preserving Taiwanese independence and democracy. at kind of disillusionment occurred after World
War I. Even though the United States was successful, with relatively low casualties (at least compared to
the other combatants), there was profound disillusionment after the war. Many argued that “merchants
of death” had manipulated the United States into the war.
337
is produced a turn toward isolationism.
338
Even if the United States prosecuted the war to a successful
conclusion, a narrative of disillusionment might emerge.
336 Cathal J. Nolan, e Allure of Battle: A History of How Wars Have Been Won and Lost (New York: Oxford University
Press, 2019), 572.
337 e term “merchants of death” was first used in an article about Greek arms dealer Basil Zaharo in 1932. See
Xavier De Hauteclocque, “Zaharo Merchant of Death: Translated from Le Crapouillot Paris Topical Monthly,”
e Living Age (1897-1941) 342, no. 4388 (1932): 204. e term was later picked up as a title for a book on the
arms industry: Helmuth Carol Engelbrecht and Frank Cleary Hanighen, Merchants of Death (Garden City, NY:
1937). It was also a popular term in discussions about the arms industry after World War I. See, for example,
“U.S. Senate: ‘Merchants of Death’,” U.S. Senate, n.d., https://www.senate.gov/about/powers-procedures/
investigations/merchants-of-death.htm.
338 For a description of this shift, see “American Isolationism in the 1930s,” Oce of the Historian, n.d., https://
history.state.gov/milestones/1937-1945/american-isolationism.
145 | The First Battle of the Next War
e project does not take a position on whether the United States should defend Taiwan. at requires
a political and foreign policy assessment of benefits, costs, and values that goes beyond the scope of
the current eort. e project does rigorously document the likely outcomes of defending Taiwan in
a variety of scenarios and how dierent assumptions about conditions and capabilities aect those
outcomes. e intention is that this analysis will help the public and policy discussion about how the
United States should move forward.
Nevertheless, the project recognizes that a succession of Democratic and Republican administrations,
a bipartisan consensus in Congress, and a near uniformity of views among strategists identify
China as the “pacing” U.S. competitor. U.S. policy needs to be broadly aimed at succeeding in this
competition.
339
In the military sphere, it is imperative to deter China from starting any conflict. To be
deterred, China must doubt their ability to prevail through force of arms. is requires U.S. military
capability to be manifestly sucient for the task.
Developing that capability will have additional costs but does not require across-the-board increases in
U.S. defense spending. e recommendations in the previous chapter target specific capabilities that
would be most useful for conflict in the Western Pacific.
340
To oset these investments, less eective
capabilities might be cut.
To be deterred, China must doubt their ability to prevail
through force of arms. This requires U.S. military capability
to be manifestly suicient for the task.
e bottom line from the analysis is that a successful defense is possible, and deterrence is achievable,
but it will require planning, some resources, and political will.
339 CSIS outlined such a policy for successful competition in a 2016 study, Michael Green et al., Asia-Pacific
Rebalance 2025 (Washington, DC: CSIS, January 2016), https://www.csis.org/analysis/asia-pacific-
rebalance-2025.
340 Such a focus does not make a judgment about whether U.S. defense policy should downplay other
requirements and regions in favor of a Pacific strategy. Strategists argue both ways, and such a discussion is
beyond the scope of this project. One of the authors (Mark Cancian) has argued strongly for a global strategy
that builds enough forces to meet global commitments even while still countering China as the pacing
threat. Cancian, U.S. Military Forces in FY 2022, vi; also, Cancian, “Building Military Forces for the 2020s:
Implementing Strategy and Exercising Global Leadership in an Era of Reduced Resources,” CSIS, Transition
46 Series, February 10, 2021, https://www.csis.org/analysis/building-military-forces-2020s-implementing-
strategy-and-exercising-global-leadership-era.
146 | Cancian, Cancian, and Heginbotham
Appendix A
Scenarios
is appendix gives an overview of the 24 game iterations.
Iteration # Scenario Description Characterization
1 Base case Base
2 Base case Base
3 Base case Base
4 No maritime strike JASSM Pessimistic
5 No maritime strike JASSM Pessimistic
6 No maritime strike JASSM Pessimistic
7 No maritime strike JASSM Pessimistic
8 ▪ No maritime strike JASSM
▪ Delayed U.S. entry into conflict because of extended
decisionmaking process
° U.S. active duty forces delayed two turns
° U.S. reserve forces delayed four turns
▪ No mainland strike because of escalation concerns
Pessimistic
147 | The First Battle of the Next War
9 ▪ No maritime strike JASSM
▪ Delayed U.S. entry into conflict because of extended
decisionmaking process
o U.S. active-duty forces delayed two turns
o U.S. reserve forces delayed four turns
▪ SSN withhold for SSBN trailing and Russia hedge
▪ Taiwan response slowed by sabotage or Chinese information
operations; no troop movement outside invaded zone
Pessimistic
10 ▪ No maritime strike JASSM
▪ SSN withhold for SSBN trailing and Russia hedge
▪ Taiwanese ground forces operate at reduced capability because
of low prewar readiness
▪ Taiwan response slowed by sabotage or Chinese information
operations; no troop movement outside invaded zone in first turn
▪ Taiwan tries to defend its air space day one, is annihilated
▪ No U.S. bomber attacks on Turn 1 as a result of a short delay in
U.S. decisionmaking.
Pessimistic
11
▪ No maritime strike JASSM
▪ SSN withhold for SSBN trailing and Russia hedge
▪ Taiwan response slowed by sabotage or Chinese information
operations; no troop movement outside invaded zone in first
turn
▪ Taiwanese SAMs try to defend its air space day one, are
annihilated
▪ No U.S. bomber attacks on Turn 1 as a result of a short delay in
U.S. decisionmaking.
▪ Taiwanese ground forces operate at reduced capability because
of low prewar readiness
▪ Long run:
o Taiwan starts with 12 turns of supplies
They have 30 days total at high-intensity
operations, one-third of units are not
engaged (guarding alternate beaches); and
their supplies can be moved away
o Each SAG arriving at Taiwan brings a load equivalent
to Chinese amphibious flotilla (10 points)
o Non-leg infantry out of supply fight at one-half
strength
o China has 82 Houbei missile boats
o U.S. forces to Singapore go around South China Sea,
arrive on map two turns later
Pessimistic
148 | Cancian, Cancian, and Heginbotham
12 ▪ No maritime strike JASSM
▪ United States distracted by another global crisis, for example, in
Europe; no prewar deployment; slower U.S. response; greater
withhold of U.S. forces
▪ Taiwan response slowed by sabotage or Chinese information
operations, no troop movement outside invaded zone in first turn
▪ Taiwanese ground forces operate at reduced capability because
of low prewar readiness
Pessimistic
13 ▪ No maritime strike JASSM
▪ United States distracted by another global crisis, for example, in
Europe; no prewar deployment; slower U.S. response; greater
withhold of U.S. forces
▪ Taiwan response slowed by sabotage or Chinese information
operations; no troop movement outside invaded zone in first turn
▪ Taiwanese ground forces operate with reduced
capability because of low prewar readiness
Pessimistic
14 ▪ No maritime strike JASSM
▪ The Philippines allows U.S. access but its forces do not
participate; MLR to northern Luzon islands
Pessimistic
15 ▪ No maritime strike JASSM
▪ United States distracted by another global crisis, for example, in
Europe; no prewar deployment; slower U.S. response; Greater
withhold of U.S. forces
▪ Taiwan response slowed by sabotage or Chinese information
operations; no troop movement outside invaded zone in first turn
▪ Taiwanese ground forces operate at reduced capability because
of low prewar readiness
Pessimistic
16 ▪ No maritime strike JASSM
▪ United States distracted by another global crisis, for example, in
Europe; no prewar deployment; slower U.S. response; greater
withhold of U.S. forces
▪ Taiwan response slowed by Chinese information operations and
sabotage; no troop movement outside invaded zone in first turn
▪ Taiwanese ground forces operate at reduced capability because
of low prewar readiness
▪ Prewar deployment of one MLR to Taiwan; desire to enhance
deterrence and defense overcome concerns about escalation
Pessimistic
149 | The First Battle of the Next War
17 ▪ No maritime strike JASSM
▪ United States distracted by another global crisis, for example, in
Europe; no prewar deployment; slower U.S. response; greater
withhold of U.S. forces
▪ Taiwan response slowed by sabotage or Chinese information
operations; no troop movement outside invaded zone in first turn
▪ Taiwanese ground forces operate at reduced capability because
of low prewar readiness
▪ Prewar deployment of one MLR to Taiwan; desire to enhance
deterrence and defense overcome concerns about escalation
Pessimistic
18 ▪ No maritime strike JASSM
▪ United States distracted by another global crisis, for example, in
Europe; no prewar deployment; slower U.S. response; greater
withhold of U.S. forces
▪ Taiwan reaction slowed by sabotage or Chinese information
operations; no troop movement outside invaded zone in first turn
▪ Additional HASs in Japan and Guam
Pessimistic
19 ▪ No maritime strike JASSM
▪ United States distracted by another global crisis, for example, in
Europe; no prewar deployment; slower U.S. response; greater
withhold of U.S. forces
▪ Taiwan response slowed by sabotage or Chinese information
operations; no troop movement outside invaded zone in first turn
▪ Philippines allows basing but Philippine forces do not participate
▪ MLR deploys prewar to end of the Ryukyus island chain
Pessimistic
20 ▪ No maritime strike JASSM
▪ Taiwan response slowed by Chinese information operations and
sabotage; no troop movement outside invaded zone in first turn
▪ Taiwanese ground forces operate at reduced capability because
of low prewar readiness
▪ SSN withhold for SSBN trailing and Russia hedge
Pessimistic
21
Taiwan stands alone
▪ No delayed Taiwan response
▪ Taiwan combat power on par—all same as in the base case
except no United States. Average losses for amphibious ships
from Taiwanese ASCMs used
▪ China has 14 ground support air points; other aircra are held
back to deter United States and Japan
Taiwan Alone
150 | Cancian, Cancian, and Heginbotham
22 ▪ No maritime strike JASSM
▪ 50 percent increase in Chinese DF-17 and DF-26 inventory
because of uncertainty about production rates
▪ Taiwan response slowed by Chinese information operations and
sabotage; no troop movement outside invaded zone in first turn
▪ No U.S. strikes on Chinese mainland because of escalation
concerns
▪ If the Chinese strike U.S. territory, including Guam, the United
States can strike Chinese homeland
Pessimistic
23 ▪ Chinese suboptimum TBM warhead types
▪ JSDF fully committed from start
▪ Shipborne missile defense less eective: 0.25 total Pk per ASM
▪ PLA lower amphibious competence: minus 30 percent
amphibious li
▪ Poor PLA pilot training: United States inflicts 50 percent more
attrition on similarly capable Chinese airframes
▪ United States able to use large civilian airfields in Japan
▪ Extra HASs in Japan
Optimistic
24 ▪ No maritime strike JASSM
▪ Japan neutral, United States cannot use bases in Japan
Ragnarök
151 | The First Battle of the Next War
Appendix B
Wargaming Lexicon
is appendix lays out the specific lexicon used in the project.
Base case: e most likely assumption about each individual variable.
Base scenario: e scenario in which all assumptions are set to the base case.
Campaign analysis: A method involving the use of a model and techniques for managing uncertainty to
answer questions about military operations.
Descriptive data: Data on the occurrences of a given iteration, for example, who won and how many
missiles were fired.
Excursion case: Any alternate assumption wherein one or more of the variables is set to be dierent
than the base case.
Excursion scenario: Any scenario wherein one or more variables are set to an excursion case
Iteration: One specific play through of the game under any scenario.
Game: e overall project rather than a particular iteration or playthrough.
Model: A mathematical or otherwise logically rigorous representation of a system or a system’s
behavior.
Net assessment: e comparative analysis of military, technological, political, economic, and other
factors governing the relative military capability of nations.
152 | Cancian, Cancian, and Heginbotham
Operations research: e analytical study of military problems undertaken to providea scientific basis
for decision on actionto improve military operations.
Simulation: A method for implementing a model over time.
Structured judgment: Any analysis that lays out assumptions in a logical, evidence-based argument
that leads to a clear conclusion.
Scenario: A set of assumptions about each variable that provides the basis for playing one iteration of
the game.
Systems analysis: e process of studying a procedure or businessto identify its goal and purposes and
createsystemsand procedures that will eciently achieve them.
Unstructured judgment: Any analysis that lacks evidence, logical structure, or transparency.
Variable: A condition likely to have an impact on the analysis about which the project team must make
an informed assumption.
Wargame: A simulation, by whatever means, of military operations involving two or more opposing
forces, using rules, data, and procedures designed to depict an actual or assumed real life situation.
153 | The First Battle of the Next War
Appendix C
Abbreviations and Acronyms
A2/AD – Anti-access/area denial
ACE – Agile Combat Employment
AESA – Active Electronically Scanned Array radar
AEW – Airborne early warning
AKA – Amphibious cargo ship
ALCM – Air-launched cruise missile
AMRAAM – Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missile
APA – Amphibious attack transport
ARG – Amphibious ready group
ARRW – Air-Launched Rapid Response Weapon
ASAT – Anti-satellite
ASCM – Anti-ship cruise missile
ASBM – Anti-ship ballistic missile
ASW- Anti-submarine warfare
154 | Cancian, Cancian, and Heginbotham
ATACMS – Army Tactical Missile System
ATF – Amphibious task force
ATS – Auxiliary towing and salvage ship
CAP – Combat air patrol
CCD – Camouflage, concealment, and deception
CCP – Chinese Communist Party
CNAS – Center for a New American Security
CSG – Carrier strike group
CSIS – Center for Strategic and International Studies
DOD – U.S. Department of Defense
GLCM – Ground-launched cruise missile
HAS – Hardened aircraft shelter
IADS – Integrated air defense system
IISS – International Institute for Strategic Studies
INDOPACOM – U.S. Indo-Pacific Command
IRBM – Intermediate-range ballistic missile
ISR – Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
JASSM – Joint Air-to-Surface Stando Missile
JASSM-ER – Joint Air-to-Surface Stando Missile-Extended Range
JDAM – Joint Direct Attack Munition
JASDF – Japan Air Self-Defense Force
JDAM – Joint Direct Attack Munition
JMSDF – Japan Maritime Self-Defense Forces
JSDF – Japan Self-Defense Forces
JSM – Joint Strike Missile
JSOW – Joint Stando Weapon
KMT – Kuomintang Party
LCG – Lightning carrier group
155 | The First Battle of the Next War
LCI – Landing Craft, Infantry
LCM – Landing Craft, Mechanized
LCT – Landing Craft, Tank
LCV – Landing Craft, Vehicle
LHD – Landing Helicopter Dock
LSM – Landing Ship, Medium
LST – Landing Ship, Tank
LRASM – Long-Range Anti-Ship Missile
MDTF – Multi-Domain Task Force
MLR – Marine Littoral Regiments
MPA – Maritime patrol aircraft
MPS – Maritimes Prepositioning Ships
MRBM – Medium-range ballistic missile
MST – Maritime Strike Tomahawk
MDTF – Multi-domain task force
NSM – Naval Strike Missile
OASuW – Oensive Anti-Surface Warfare
OOB – Order(s) of battle
P
k
s – Probability of kill
PLA – People’s Liberation Army
PLAAF – People’s Liberation Army Air Force
PLAN – People’s Liberation Army Navy
PLANAF – People’s Liberation Army Naval Air Force
PLARF – People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force
PME – Professional military education
PRC – People’s Republic of China
PrSM – Precision Strike Missile
ROE – Rules of engagement
156 | Cancian, Cancian, and Heginbotham
SAG – Surface action group
SAM – Surface-to-air missile
SDB – Small Diameter Bomb
SSBN – Ballistic missile submarine
SSN – Nuclear-powered submarine
SUBRON – Submarine squadron
STUFT – Ships taken up from trade
TBM – Tactical ballistic missile
TC – eater Command
TOW – Taiwan Operational Wargame
USAF – U.S. Air Force
UUV – Unmanned underwater vehicle
VFA – Visiting Forces Agreement
157 | The First Battle of the Next War
About the Authors
Mark Cancian (Colonel, USMCR, ret.) is a senior adviser with the International Security Program at the
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C. He joined CSIS in April 2015
from the Oce of Management and Budget, where he spent more than seven years as chief of the Force
Structure and Investment Division, working on issues such as Department of Defense budget strategy,
war funding, and procurement programs, as well as nuclear weapons development and nonproliferation
activities in the Department of Energy. Previously, he worked on force structure and acquisition issues in
the Oce of the Secretary of Defense and ran research and executive programs at Harvard University’s
Kennedy School of Government. In the military, Colonel Cancian spent over three decades in the U.S.
Marine Corps, active and reserve, serving as an infantry, artillery, and civil aairs ocer and on overseas
tours in Vietnam, Desert Storm, and Iraq (twice). Since 2000, he has been an adjunct faculty member
at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, where he teaches a course on the
connection between policy and analysis. A prolific author, he has published over 40 articles on military
operations, acquisition, budgets, and strategy and received numerous writing awards. He graduated with
high honors (magna cum laude) from Harvard College and with highest honors (Baker scholar) from
Harvard Business School.
Matthew Cancian currently conducts classified wargaming at the U.S. Naval War College as a senior
researcher for Saalex Solutions. He holds a PhD in political science from MIT, where he concentrated in
security studies and comparative politics. His thesis was about the motivations of combatants and the
eects of training, based on a survey of 2,301 Kurdish fighters (Peshmerga) during their war against the
Islamic State. Before attending MIT, he earned an MA in law and diplomacy from the Fletcher School
and a BA in history from the University of Virginia. Between those educational experiences, he served
as a captain in the U.S. Marine Corps, deploying to Sangin, Afghanistan, as a forward observer in 2011 in
158 | Cancian, Cancian, and Heginbotham
support of Operation Enduring Freedom.
Eric Heginbotham is a principal research scientist at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology’s
Center for International Studies and a specialist in Asian security issues. Before joining MIT, he was
a senior political scientist at the RAND Corporation, where he was the lead author of the RAND US-
China Military Scorecard and a RAND study on China’s Evolving Nuclear Deterrent. He is the co-author
(with George Gilboy) of Chinese and Indian Strategic Behavior: Growing Power and Alarm, published
by Cambridge University Press in 2012, and is an editor of China Steps Out: Beijing’s Major Power
Engagement with the Developing World (Routledge, 2018). Prior to that, he was a senior fellow of Asian
studies at the Council on Foreign Relations. After graduating from Swarthmore College, Heginbotham
earned his PhD in political science from MIT. He is fluent in Chinese and Japanese and was a captain in
the U.S. Army Reserve.
COVER PHOTO: SAM YEH/AFP/GETTY IMAGES
1616 Rhode Island Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20036
202 887 0200 | www.csis.org
