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proprietor, to manage its internal operations,” United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 725 (1990). Accordingly,
the government is permitted to regulate the conduct of individuals on public property, even if those regulations
infringe on First Amendment rights. The type of regulation permitted in a given context is based on a
determination of “when the Government's interest in limiting the use of its property to its intended purpose
outweighs the interest of those wishing to use the property for other purposes,” which depends on the type of
public property at issue. Id. at 726.
When a forum is considered to be nonpublic, “the state may reserve the forum for its intended purposes,
communicative or otherwise, as long as the regulation on speech is reasonable and not an effort to suppress
expression merely because public officials oppose the speaker's view.” Perry, 460 US at 46. Similarly, the
Court has permitted the reasonable prohibition of solicitation on postal service property because “the intrusion
[of solicitation] create[ed] significant interference with Congress’ mandate to ensure the most effective and
efficient distribution of the mails.” Kokinda, 497 U.S. at 721.
A waiting area in a health department is almost certainly a nonpublic forum, even if the service is provided in
an otherwise public building. For instance, in Make the Road by Walking (MRBW), Inc. v. Turner, 378 F3d 133,
140 (2nd Cir. 2004), a job center run by New York City’s Human Resources Administration where people apply
for welfare benefits can exclude from its waiting room, pursuant to job-center policy, a welfare-benefits
advocacy organization seeking to observe welfare agency staff. MRBW “claimed that [the Human Resources
Administration’s] access policy violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution because
it…abridged MRBW's speech, press, petition, and associational rights.” In rejecting these arguments, the court
noted that the waiting rooms in the job centers belong to the “nonpublic forum” class because “governmental
intent and access policy, as well as the purpose of a forum, are the touchstones for differentiating between
designated public fora and nonpublic fora.”
A policy that prohibits First Amendment Auditors in such a nonpublic forum must therefore be “reasonable” and
“not an effort to suppress the speaker's activity due to disagreement with the speaker’s view.” Cornelius v.
NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 800 (1985). As long as the health department
does not single out First Amendment Auditors or other specific groups/individuals because of their viewpoint
and has a valid reason to exclude filming, prohibiting filming in waiting areas should be permissible. Examples
of valid reasons to prohibit an activity in a nonpublic forum include: (1) the activity is disruptive, see Int’l Soc’y
for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 683 (1992); (2) the activity distracts employees from
their work by demanding “considerable time and energy” to manage it, Kokinda, 497 U.S. at 735; (3) the
activity takes up space needed to efficiently accomplish government business, id.; or the agency wishes to
“restrict use to those who participate in the . . . official business,” Perry, 460 US at 53. See also People v.
Bedwell, No 344820, 2019 WL 2439333 at *3 (Mich Ct App June 11, 2019); Make the Road by Walking, 378
F3d 133.
Michigan case law supports this analysis. In People v. Bedwell, No 344820, 2019 WL 2439333 at *3, the
Michigan Court of Appeals stated of a courthouse lobby that, “although [it] is a public place, its principal
purpose is not the free exchange of ideas,” so it is not a public forum. “Rather, a courthouse is a government-
owned property established for the purpose of administering justice, and the government has an interest in
preserving a decorous environment there in order to achieve that interest.” Thus, because the “state had a
valid, viewpoint-neutral interest in restricting noise levels and maintaining a calm atmosphere inside the
courthouse, the conduct that led to defendant's arrest [“being loud and using swear words”] was not protected
by the First Amendment.” Id.