Chapter 1 / General Principles of Insurance
1-52
2011 Edition
As explained in §1.2-3(b)(1), the Oregon Court of Appeals has
explicitly stated that extrinsic evidence is inadmissible to resolve or
create ambiguities in insurance cases.
Prior to Hoffman Constr. Co. v. Fred S. James & Co., 313 Or
464, 469, 836 P2d 703 (1992), Oregon courts were more lenient with
admissibility of extrinsic evidence, in line with the majority rule. See,
e.g., Timberline Equipment Co. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 281
Or 639, 643, 576 P2d 1244 (1978) (when insurance contract is
ambiguous, ―the question becomes one of fact‖); Botts v. Hartford Acci.
& Indem. Co., 284 Or 95, 98, 585 P2d 657 (1978) (general contracts and
insurance policies interpreted the same); Busto v. Manufacturers Life
Ins. Co., 276 Or 707, 712, 556 P2d 96 (1976) (―when the agreement is
ambiguous the actual intention of the parties becomes a question of fact,
and, unless the meaning of the writing is clear from the surrounding
circumstances and usages, the issues should be submitted to the jury‖);
May v. Chicago Ins. Co., 260 Or 285, 292–294, 490 P2d 150 (1971)
(jury may be called upon to interpret insurance contract); Zerba v. Ideal
Mut. Ins. Co., 96 Or App 607, 610, 773 P2d 1333 (1989) (intent of
parties is fact question); McGaughey v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co.,
88 Or App 181, 184, 744 P2d 598 (1987) (―If an insurance contract is
ambiguous, the meaning of the ambiguous term is a question of fact‖);
Horizon Aviation Inc. v. Cam, 80 Or App 577, 580, 722 P2d 1291
(1986) (―Generally, the interpretation of a contract is a question of law
for the court, but if its provisions are ambiguous and there is extrinsic
evidence introduced, its meaning becomes a question of fact for the
jury‖); A-1 Sandblasting v. Baiden, 53 Or App 890, 893, 632 P2d 1377