Department of Defense
DIRECTIVE
NUMBER 5230.11
June 16, 1992
USD(P)
SUBJECT: Disclosure of Classified Military Information to Foreign Governments and
International Organizations
References: (a) DoD Directive 5230.11, "Disclosure of Classified Military Information
to Foreign Governments and International Organizations," December 31,
1984 (hereby canceled)
(b) DoD Instruction 5230.17, "Procedures for Disclosure of Classified
Military Information to Foreign Governments and International
Organizations," February 17, 1985 (hereby canceled)
(c) National Disclosure Policy-1, "National Policy and Procedures for the
Disclosure of Classified Military Information to Foreign Governments
and International Organizations," (short title: National Disclosure Policy
(NDP-1)), October 1, 1988
1
(d) through (t), see enclosure 1
1. REISSUANCE AND PURPOSE
This Directive reissues reference (a), replaces reference (b), implements reference (c),
and updates policy, responsibilities, and procedures governing proposed disclosures of
classified military information to foreign governments and international organizations
(hereafter referred to as "foreign governments").
2. APPLICABILITY AND SCOPE
This Directive applies to:
_________________
1
Provided to designated disclosure authorities on a need-to-know basis from the Office of the Director for
International Security Programs, Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Security Policy
(ODUSD(SP)).
DoDD 5230.11, June 16, 1992
2
2.1. The Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Military Departments, the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Joint Staff, the Unified and Specified
Commands, the Defense Agencies, and the DoD Field Activities (hereafter referred to
collectively as "the DoD Components").
2.2. All disclosures of classified military information defined in enclosure 2.
Disclosures of military intelligence information, however, also must be in compliance
with DoD Directive C-5230.23 (reference (d)).
2.3. Classified information involved in munitions license applications processed
under DoD Directive 2040.2 and the ITAR (references (e) and (f)).
3. DEFINITIONS
Terms used in this Directive are defined in enclosure 2.
4. POLICY
It is U.S. national and DoD policy under NDP-1 (reference (c)) that:
4.1. Classified military information is a national security asset that shall be
protected and shall be shared with foreign governments only when there is a clearly
defined benefit to the United States. Disclosures of such information shall be made only
when authorized by officials designated under this Directive and then only when all
requirements of this Directive are met.
4.2. An official who has been specifically delegated disclosure authority under
section 5., below, may authorize disclosures of classified military information to foreign
governments in support of a lawful and authorized U.S. Government purpose if the:
4.2.1. Official represents the DoD Component that originated the information.
4.2.2. Level of classified information to be disclosed does not exceed the
classification level delegated by Annex A of reference (c).
4.2.3. Criteria and conditions in enclosure 3 are satisfied.
4.3. The Secretary of Defense and the Deputy Secretary of Defense are the only
DoD officials who have original authority to grant exceptions to the policy contained in
this Directive. The Secretary of Defense has delegated authority to the National Military
Information Disclosure Policy Committee (NDPC) to consider and grant requests for
exceptions to policy in compliance with reference (c).
DoDD 5230.11, June 16, 1992
3
4.4. Classified military information shall not be disclosed to foreign nationals until
the appropriate designated disclosure authority receives a security assurance from the
recipient foreign government on the individuals who are to receive the information.
4.5. In accordance with reference (c), it is U.S. policy to avoid creating false
impressions of U.S. readiness to make available classified military information, materiel,
or technology. Accordingly, designated disclosure authorities of the originating DoD
Component, or, when an exception to policy is required, the Secretary of Defense, the
Deputy Secretary of Defense or the NDPC must authorize, in advance, proposals to be
made to foreign governments that could lead to the eventual disclosure of classified
military materiel, technology, or information. Commitments shall not be expressed or
implied, and no disclosures shall be made pending the required disclosure decision.
4.6. Disclosure planning shall include the following:
4.6.1. Planning for possible foreign involvement should start at the beginning
of the weapon system acquisition process and other programs, to facilitate decisions on
the disclosure of classified and controlled unclassified information in support of
cooperative programs, foreign participation in the DoD procurement activities, and
foreign sales. The planning shall include consideration of the requirements set forth in
DoD Instruction 5000.2, Part 5, Section F (reference (g)).
4.6.2. The DoD Components shall use the Technology Assessment/Control
Plan in DoD Directive 5530.3 (reference (h)) as the basis for making the stated disclosure
decisions in subparagraph 4.6.1., above, on weapon system programs.
4.6.3. A delegation of disclosure authority lefter (DDL) similar to that in
enclosure 4 shall be used to provide disclosure guidance to subordinate commands and
Agencies and, when applicable, to the DoD contractors.
4.7. All disclosures and denials of classified military information shall be reported
in the Foreign Disclosure and Technical Information System (FORDTIS), in accordance
with DoD Instruction 5230.18 (reference (i)). For denials, disclosure authorities must
take special care to record a concise summary of the analysis that led to the denial.
4.8. Under conditions of actual or imminent hostilities, any Unified or Specified
Commander may disclose classified military information through TOP SECRET to an
actively participating allied force when support of combined combat operations requires
the disclosure of that information. The appropriate U.S. Commander shall notify the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of such disclosures. The Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, in turn, shall notify the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for
Policy, ATTN: Chairman, NDPC, who shall determine any limitations that should be
imposed on continuing disclosure of the information. The U.S. Commander shall be
informed of any limitations through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
DoDD 5230.11, June 16, 1992
4
4.9. The classified military information that is approved for foreign disclosure shall
be transmitted to the intended foreign recipient through government-to-government
channels, in accordance with DoD 5200.1-R, chapter 8 (reference (j)).
5. RESPONSIBILITIES
5.1. The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy shall:
5.1.1. Ensure effective implementation of the National Disclosure Policy and
operation of the NDPC under NDP-1 (reference (c)).
5.1.2. Designate the Chair of the NDPC, who shall represent the Secretary of
Defense on the NDPC.
5.1.3. Advise the DoD Components and the NDPC about security matters on
disclosures.
5.1.4. Draft and negotiate with foreign governments, in coordination with the
other applicable DoD Components and Federal Departments and Agencies, security
agreements governing the safeguarding of classified military information and equipment.
5.1.5. Coordinate on all international agreements negotiated under DoD
Directive 5530.3 (reference (h)) that involve the disclosure of classified military
information.
5.1.6. Review and approve, when justified, requests for disclosure authority
from Heads of the OSD organizational elements and the DoD Components not covered in
paragraph 5.2., below.
5.1.7. Issue policy governing international visits, the assignment of liaison
officers and exchange officers, and other assignments of foreign representatives to the
DoD Components and defense contractors.
5.1.8. Maintain effective liaison with security officials of allied and friendly
governments with which the U.S. Government has entered into security agreements.
5.1.9. Direct, manage, and control the FORDTIS, in accordance with DoD
Instruction 5230.18 (reference (i)).
5.1.10. Issue necessary supplemental publications for the effective
implementation of this Directive.
5.1.11. Publish an annual schedule to keep the DoD Components informed of
security survey support requirements.
DoDD 5230.11, June 16, 1992
5
5.1.12. Record decisions rendered on requests for exception to reference (c) in
the FORDTIS, in accordance with reference (i).
5.2. The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
, in addition to the responsibilities in
paragraph 5.1., above, and the Secretaries of the Military Departments, the Under
Secretary of Defense (Acquisition), the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence),
the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, and the Director, National Security
Agency/Central Security Service, shall:
5.2.1. Authorize disclosures or denials of the U.S. classified military
information for which they are the originating DoD Component in accordance with this
Directive.
5.2.2. Designate a senior official to be the principal disclosure authority for
their DoD Component. Such designations shall be in writing, with a copy provided to the
Chair of the NDPC.
5.2.3. Provide disclosure authority, in writing, to the Heads of Commands and
Agencies and major staff elements under their direction, control, or authority, as
necessary, to ensure efficient operation of those Commands, Agencies, and staff
elements.
5.2.4. Require that the Heads of Commands, Agencies, and staff elements to
whom disclosure authority has been provided appoint a designated disclosure authority.
5.2.5. Coordinate with the Chair of the NDPC all proposed disclosure
decisions to be referred directly to the Secretary of Defense or the Deputy Secretary of
Defense.
5.2.6. Provide the necessary support to the Chair of the NDPC to do security
surveys of foreign government security programs. (See subparagraph 6.9.3.2., below.)
5.2.7. Forward any inquiries concerning this Directive to the Office of the
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Attn: Deputy Under Secretary of Defense
(Security Policy).
5.2.8. Ensure that the principal disclosure authorities shall:
5.2.8.1. Control disclosures for their respective DoD Component.
5.2.8.2. Ensure the competency of subordinate officials appointed as
designated disclosure authorities.
DoDD 5230.11, June 16, 1992
6
5.2.8.3. Ensure that all proposed disclosure actions originating in their
DoD Component are coordinated with the other DoD Components that have a joint or
shared interest in the information involved.
5.2.8.4. Designate a member and an alternate to represent their DoD
Component on the NDPC and ensure that the persons designated:
5.2.8.4.1. Are thoroughly familiar with the daily administration of
disclosure activities in their respective DoD Component.
5.2.8.4.2. Are qualified to provide broad professional guidance on
matters brought before the NDPC.
5.2.8.4.3. Have direct access to the DoD Component's principal
disclosure authority as well as to other members of the NDPC.
5.2.8.5. Ensure that their DoD Component's disclosure decisions are
reported to the FORDTIS in accordance with DoD Instruction 5230.18 (reference (i)).
5.2.8.6. Coordinate requests for disclosures of classified military
information involved in litigation with the General Counsel of the Department of Defense
or the General Counsel of the DoD Component concerned, as appropriate, before
determining whether to disclose the requested information.
5.2.8.7. Ensure that DoD Component personnel traveling overseas are
provided disclosure guidance and are informed of and comply with the policy for
overseas travel described in DoD 5200.1-R, chapter 8 (reference (j)).
5.3. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff shall represent the Commanders of
the Unified and Specified Commands on the NDPC.
5.4. The General Counsel of the Department of Defense
shall:
5.4.1. Ensure the legal adequacy of security agreements between the United
States and foreign governments that establish procedures for the protection of the
classified military information.
5.4.2. Advise the DoD Components and the NDPC on the legal aspects of
applying the NDP-1 (reference (c)) to individual disclosure decisions.
5.5. The Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Atomic Energy)
shall inform the
other NDPC members on the current implementation of international agreements made
under the Atomic Energy Act (reference (k)). That includes any statutory determinations
and requirements placed on recipient foreign governments and international organizations
for safeguarding atomic information released to them.
DoDD 5230.11, June 16, 1992
7
5.6. The Secretary of the Air Force shall provide resources for the operation,
maintenance, and administration of the FORDTIS, and comply with DoD 7110.1-M
(reference (l)) on requests for funds to carry out that FORDTIS responsibility.
6. PROCEDURES
6.1. International Agreements
6.1.1. Early Disclosure Determination. Before any discussions with foreign
representatives on the negotiation of an international agreement that is governed by DoD
Directive 5530.3 (reference (h)), the DoD Components shall determine the extent to
which classified military information will be required for release, and obtain disclosure
authorization for the information. (See paragraph 4.6., above.)
6.1.2. Security Requirements. International agreements that involve the
disclosure of classified military information shall contain, at a minimum, the security
requirements in paragraph E3.1.2. of enclosure 3. If a general security agreement exists
with the foreign government concerned, this requirement may be satisfied by referencing
that agreement. Such agreements shall be coordinated with the Office of the Under
Secretary of Defense for Policy, ATTN: Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Security
Policy), who may specify other requirements during coordination.
6.1.3. Cooperative Programs. Disclosure authorities shall review carefully any
request for classified military information made in accordance with a cooperative
agreement with both the goals of the program and the interests of national security in
mind.
6.2. Meetings, Symposia, and Conferences. The conduct and organization of
meetings, symposia, and conferences where classified military information is to be
disclosed shall be in accordance with DoD Directive 5200.12 and DoD 5200.1-R
(references (m) and (j)).
6.2.1. Foreign Participation
. Foreign nationals may participate in such
gatherings when their participation is in accordance with this Directive and U.S. export
control policies, the appropriate designated disclosure authorities have approved any
classified or controlled unclassified information for disclosure to the proposed foreign
attendees, the foreign attendees actively participate in the proceedings, and there is
reciprocity for the U.S. Government and industry representatives.
6.2.2. Disclosure Levels
. The classification levels and categories of
information authorized for disclosure vary among nations. The DoD Components shall
limit the level of classified information to be disclosed at meetings attended by foreign
representatives to the lowest level that is common to all nations represented.
DoDD 5230.11, June 16, 1992
8
6.3. Foreign Visitors, Liaison Officers, and Exchange Personnel. Procedures on
such individuals shall be in accordance with DoD Directive 5230.20 (reference (n)).
Disclosures of classified information shall be in accordance with this Directive.
6.4. Sales, Leases, Loans, or Grants of Classified Items
. In implementing the policy
in paragraph 4.5., above, the DoD Components shall comply with the following standards
when authorizing the disclosure or commercial export of any information, classified or
unclassified, relating to sales, leases, loans, or grants of military equipment:
6.4.1. Release Authorization
. Before approval of initiatives that could lead to
a sale, lease, loan, or grant of military equipment, obtain authorization from the
appropriate designated disclosure authority for disclosure of all necessary classified
equipment and information required for system operation, employment, maintenance, and
training, including system software.
6.4.2. Initial Disclosures. Limit initial disclosures to general information,
usually no higher than CONFIDENTIAL, on system characteristics, capabilities, and
price and availability until a sale, lease, loan, or grant is consummated.
6.4.3. System Countermeasures. Withhold specific information on system
countermeasures susceptibilities or vulnerabilities and counter-countermeasures
capabilities, until the sale, lease, loan, or grant is consummated.
6.4.4. Operation, Employment, Maintenance, and Training. After
consummation of a sale, lease, loan, or grant, classified military information may be
disclosed up to the level necessary for operation, employment, maintenance, and training.
6.4.5. Data Packages. Edit or rewrite data packages to exclude information
that is beyond that which has been authorized for disclosure.
6.4.5.1. The disclosure of technical data for production purposes shall be
limited to data that is necessary to produce a specific item that is approved for release to
the country that is to receive the data.
6.4.5.2. The disclosure of technical data for maintenance purposes shall
be limited to data that is necessary to perform the level of maintenance that has been
authorized for the country that is to receive the data.
6.5. Foreign Test and Evaluation
6.5.1. Foreign test and evaluation of the U.S. classified equipment may be
authorized when the tests:
6.5.1.1. Are on an item approved for foreign disclosure by the appropriate
disclosure authority.
DoDD 5230.11, June 16, 1992
9
6.5.1.2. Can be performed at a U.S. installation or under other strict U.S.
control that guarantees appropriate safeguards for classified information and classified or
unclassified critical technology.
6.5.2. Exceptions to subparagraph 6.5.1.2., above, such as the transfer of a
single classified military item for test and evaluation under foreign security control, may
be authorized only when all of the following conditions are fulfilled:
6.5.2.1. There is no transfer of, and the test will not reveal, technology
that the United States would not license for manufacture in the foreign country.
6.5.2.2. There is no release of equipment that would not be approved for
foreign sale or export to the foreign country, if requested.
6.5.2.3. The release will result in a clearly defined advantage to the
United States; for example:
6.5.2.3.1. Specifically defined avoidance of significant costs or
acceleration of programs in development efforts by the United States and its allies.
6.5.2.3.2. Advance the objectives of standardization with and among
U.S. allies by promoting cooperation in research and development.
6.5.2.3.3. Exchange technical and scientific information of common
interest on a mutually beneficial basis.
6.5.2.4. The Secretary of the Military Department concerned, in
coordination with the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition), approves
the exception as meeting the described conditions in subparagraph 6.5.2., above. The
Chair of the NDPC shall be informed of each exception; the Chair shall notify the NDPC
members.
6.5.2.5. The test is performed under a test and evaluation agreement
negotiated under DoD Directive 5530.3 (reference (h)), or a lease arrangement or sales
contract containing requisite security controls.
6.5.2.6. The releases are reported to the FORDTIS.
6.6. Foreign Participation in DoD Component Classified Training Activities
6.6.1. Receiving Training on U.S. Equipment
. A foreign national may receive
training on U.S. equipment that is classified or involves classified information, if the
equipment is in the inventory of or is to be acquired by the trainee's government after the
following:
DoDD 5230.11, June 16, 1992
10
6.6.1.1. The prospective trainee's government has concluded an
international agreement or signed a purchase agreement with the United States to acquire
the equipment and training; or
6.6.1.2. The Defense Security Assistance Agency has issued an
International Military Education and Training (IMET) order for the training.
6.6.2. Conducting Training on U.S. Equipment. A foreign national may
conduct training on U.S. equipment that is classified or involves classified information, if
the item has been sold or otherwise provided to the foreign national's government and the
U.S. Government has specifically approved the provisions of such training to any third
party that is involved.
6.6.3. Third-Country Equipment. Foreign nationals may receive or conduct
training on equipment provided by a third-country that is classified or involves third-
country classified information only with the prior written consent of the government that
provided the equipment.
6.7. Requests for Classified Documents
6.7.1. Disclosure Review. Requests for classified documents by a foreign
representative shall be forwarded to the applicable designated disclosure authority of the
originating DoD Component for review and approval or denial. The requests shall be
processed using the FORDTIS, when practicable.
6.7.2. Report to the FORDTIS. The designated disclosure authority that
renders the decision shall report it to the FORDTIS under DoD Instruction 5230.18
(reference (i)).
6.7.3. Reference Lists and Bibliographic Material. To avoid false impressions
and to avoid proliferation of requests for classified military information that is not
releasable to the requestor, the DoD Components shall:
6.7.3.1. When practical, excise references to nonreleasable documents and
information from material that may be otherwise released.
6.7.3.2. Discourage release of documents that are reference lists or are
bibliographic. To react favorably to justified foreign requests for information, identify
the requestor's specific requirements and provide only the U.S. information that satisfies
that requirement and is determined to be releasable.
6.8. Foreign Access to Information When Participating in U.S. Procurement
Programs. Participation consistent with applicable U.S. laws, regulations, and security
requirements in DoD procurement initiatives by contractors from countries with which
the Department of Defense has agreements that encourage reciprocal participation in
DoDD 5230.11, June 16, 1992
11
defense procurement may include access to classified information consistent with this
Directive as follows:
6.8.1. Access to Technical Data
. Qualified government and industry
representatives from those countries shall be given appropriate access to technical data,
consistent with this Directive and the ITAR (reference (f)), necessary to bid on the DoD
contracts.
6.8.2. Disclosure Decisions
. Disclosure decisions involving those countries
shall be made before the announcement of the procurement (see paragraph 4.6., above),
and the announcement shall describe any restrictions on foreign participation.
6.8.3. Participation as Subcontractor. When it is determined that foreign
contractors are not authorized to participate in the classified or other sensitive aspects of a
potential contract, consideration should be given to their requests for participation in
unclassified or less sensitive aspects of the contract as a subcontractor.
6.8.4. Requests for Documentation. Requests by foreign entities for classified
or controlled unclassified documentation must be submitted through Government
channels.
6.9. NDPC Operations. The following procedures apply to the activities below:
6.9.1. Exceptions to NDP-1
6.9.1.1. Exceptions to NDP-1 (reference (c)), other than those granted by
the Secretary of Defense or the Deputy Secretary of Defense, shall be granted only by the
NDPC.
6.9.1.2. All proposed disclosure actions that require decisions by the
Secretary of Defense or the Deputy Secretary of Defense shall contain the views of the
originating DoD Component or Agency and shall be coordinated with the Chair of the
NDPC.
6.9.1.3. When the Secretary of Defense or the Deputy Secretary of
Defense grants an exception to policy, the DoD Component originating or participating in
the determination shall notify the Chair of the NDPC so that the exception may be
recorded properly and reported promptly to the NDPC members and the National
Security Council and recorded in the FORDTIS.
6.9.1.4. All other requests for exception to policy shall:
6.9.1.4.1. Be forwarded through channels to the designated
disclosure authority who represents the requestor's organization on the NDPC.
DoDD 5230.11, June 16, 1992
12
6.9.1.4.2. At a minimum, include the information in enclosure 5.
6.9.2. Reporting to the NDPC of Compromises of U.S. Classified Military
Information Furnished to Foreign Governments. The DoD Components having
knowledge of compromises of U.S. classified information by foreign governments
promptly shall inform the originating DoD Component. The originating DoD
Component shall conduct a damage assessment and shall provide copies of the completed
case report and damage assessment to the Chair of the NDPC. If the originating DoD
Component is not known, the Chair of the NDPC shall conduct the damage assessment
and prepare the case report. In either situation, the Chair of the NDPC shall provide the
NDPC with an evaluation to serve as a basis for determining whether the nature of the
compromise requires a change in reference (c).
6.9.3. Operation of the NDPC
6.9.3.1. NDP-1, NDPC Record of Action 001.7/70 (references (c) and
(o)), and this Directive govern the DoD Component participation in the NDPC
operations.
6.9.3.2. The DoD Components shall provide qualified personnel to
participate on the NDPC security survey teams, when requested. The parent DoD
Component shall bear travel and per diem expenses for participants.
6.9.3.3. The DoD members of NDPC security survey teams shall
participate in pre-departure briefings, all scheduled team activities, and the preparation of
all reports and briefings resulting from the security survey.
6.9.4. Cooperation with the NDPC. Under the NDP-1 (reference (c)), the
Chair of the NDPC acts for and in the name of the Secretary of Defense in carrying out
the decisions of the NDPC. All of the DoD Components shall support the Chair's
requests for assistance in disclosure matters.
6.10. Classification Requirements
. DoD 5200.1-R (reference (j)) governs
classification and safeguarding of classified information. The DoD Components also
shall follow the security classification guide for NDP matters in enclosure 6.
7. INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS
The reports referenced in this Directive are exempt from licensing in accordance with
paragraph 5.4.2. of DoD 7750.5-M (reference (p)).
8. EFFECTIVE DATE AND IMPLEMENTATION
This Directive is effective immediately. Forward one copy of implementing documents
to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy within 120 days.
Enclosures - 6
E1. References, continued
E2. Definitions
E3. NDP-1 Disclosure Criteria, Conditions, and Limitations
E4. The DDL
E5. Requests for Exception to Policy
E6. Security Classification Guide for NDP
DoDD 5230.11, June 16, 1992
ENCLOSURE 1
14
E1. ENCLOSURE 1
REFERENCES
, continued
(d) DoD Directive C-5230.23, "Intelligence Disclosure Policy (U)," November 18, 1983
(e) DoD Directive 2040.2, "International Transfers of Technology, Goods, Services, and
Munitions," January 17, 1984
(f) Title 22, Code of Federal Regulations, Parts 120-130, "International Traffic in Arms
Regulations (ITAR)"
(g) DoD Instruction 5000.2, "Defense Acquisition Management Policies and
Procedures," February 23, 1991
(h) DoD Directive 5530.3, "International Agreements," June 11, 1987
(i) DoD Instruction 5230.18, "The DoD Foreign Disclosure and Technical Information
System (FORDTIS)," November 6, 1984
(j) DoD 5200.1-R, "Information Security Program Regulation," June 1986
(k) Public Law 83-703, "Atomic Energy Act of 1954," August 30, 1954, as amended
(Sections 2121, 2153, and 2164 of title 42, United States Code)
(l) DoD 7110.1-M, "Department of Defense Budget Guidance Manual," May 1990
(m) DoD Directive 5200.12, "Conduct of Classified Meetings," May 16, 1988
(n) DoD Directive 5230.20, "Control of Foreign Representatives," June 25, 1984
(o) National Military Information Disclosure Policy Committee Record of Action
001.7/70, "NDPC Detailed Operating Procedures," September 15, 1981
(p) DoD 7750.5-M, "DoD Procedures for Management of Information Requirements,"
November 1986
(q) Executive Order 12356, "National Security Information," April 2, 1982
(r) DoD Directive 5230.25, "Withholding of Unclassified Technical Data from Public
Disclosure," November 6, 1984
(s) DoD Directive 5400.7, "DoD Freedom of Information Act Program," May 13, 1988
(t) Title 15, Code of Federal Regulations, Parts 730-799, "Export Administration
Regulations (EAR)"
DoDD 5230.11, June 16, 1992
ENCLOSURE 2
15
E2. ENCLOSURE 2
DEFINITIONS
E2.1.1. Classified Military Equipment
. Military equipment that is itself classified;
contains classified information that may be derived from or revealed by its operation or
testing; or will require the disclosure of classified information for operation, employment,
maintenance, or training.
E2.1.2. Classified Military Information
. Information originated by or for the
Department of Defense or its Agencies or is under their jurisdiction or control and that
requires protection in the interests of national security. It is designated TOP SECRET,
SECRET, and CONFIDENTIAL, as described in E.O. 12356 (reference (q)). Classified
military information may be in oral, visual, or material form and has been subdivided
further into the eight categories described below:
E2.1.2.1. Category 1 - Organization, Training, and Employment of Military
Forces. Information of a general nature pertaining to tactics, techniques, tactical doctrine,
and intelligence and counterintelligence doctrine and techniques. Excluded is
information necessary for the operation, training, and maintenance on specific equipment
covered under Categories 2 and 3, below.
E2.1.2.2. Category 2 - Military Materiel and Munitions. Information on
specific items of equipment already in production, or in service, and the information
necessary for the operation, maintenance, and training. Items on the U.S. Munitions List
fall within this category. This category does not pertain to equipment that is in research
and development.
E2.1.2.3. Category 3 - Applied Research and Development Information and
Materiel. Information related to fundamental theories, design, and experimental
investigation into possible military applications; it includes engineering data, operational
requirements, concepts, and military characteristics required to adopt the item for
production. Development ceases when the equipment has completed suitability testing
and has been adopted for use or production.
E2.1.2.4. Category 4 - Production Information
. Information related to designs,
specifications, manufacturing techniques, and such related information necessary to
manufacture materiel and munitions.
E2.1.2.5. Category 5 - Combined Military Operations, Planning, and
Readiness. Information necessary to plan, ensure readiness for, and provide support to
the achievement of mutual force development goals or participation in specific combined
DoDD 5230.11, June 16, 1992
ENCLOSURE 2
16
tactical operations and exercises. It does not include strategic plans and guidance or
North American defense information.
E2.1.2.6. Category 6 - U.S. Order of Battle
. Information pertaining to U.S.
forces in a specific area. In general, disclosures of this information are limited to those
countries in which U.S. Forces are stationed or are in adjacent geographical areas.
E2.1.2.7. Category 7 - North American Defense
. Information related to plans,
operations, programs, and projects, to include data and equipment, directly related to
North American defense.
E2.1.2.8. Category 8 - Military Intelligence. Information of a military
character pertaining to foreign nations. This category of information does not include
national intelligence or sensitive compartmented information under the purview of the
Director of Central Intelligence (DCI).
E2.1.3. Controlled Unclassified Information. Unclassified information to which
access or distribution limitations have been applied in accordance with national laws,
policies, and regulations of the originating country. It includes U.S. information that is
determined to be exempt from public disclosure in accordance with DoD Directives
5230.25 and 5400.7 (references (r) and (s)) or that is subject to export controls in
accordance with the ITAR (reference (f)) or the EAR (reference (t)).
E2.1.4. Delegation of Disclosure Authority Letter (DDL). A letter issued by the
appropriate designated disclosure authority explaining classification levels, categories,
scope, and limitations of information under a DoD Component's disclosure jurisdiction
that may be disclosed to a foreign recipient. It is used to delegate disclosure authority to
subordinate disclosure authorities.
E2.1.5. Designated Disclosure Authority
. An official, at subordinate component
level, designated by the Head of a DoD Component or the Component's Principal
Disclosure Authority to control disclosures of classified military information by his or her
organization.
E2.1.6. Disclosure
. Conveying classified information, in any manner, to an
authorized representative of a foreign government.
E2.1.7. Foreign Disclosure and Technical Information System (FORDTIS)
. An
automated system to assist decision makers and analysts in reviewing, coordinating, and
reaching decisions concerning proposals to release classified military information,
materiel, and technology to foreign governments.
E2.1.8. Government-to-Government Channels
. The principle that classified
information and materiel will be transferred by government officials through official
channels or through other channels expressly agreed upon by the governments involved.
DoDD 5230.11, June 16, 1992
ENCLOSURE 2
17
In either case, the information or materiel may be transferred only to a person specifically
designated in writing by the foreign government as its representative for that purpose.
E2.1.9. Intelligence
. The product resulting from the collection, processing,
integration, analysis, evaluation, and interpretation of available information concerning
foreign countries or areas.
E2.1.10. International Organization
. An entity established by recognized
governments pursuant to an international agreement which, by charter or otherwise, is
able to acquire and transfer property, make contracts and agreements, obligate its
members, and pursue legal remedies.
E2.1.11. Joint Information. Military information over which two or more DoD
Components, or two or more Federal Departments or Agencies, exercise control,
jurisdiction, or security awareness.
E2.1.12. Meeting. A conference, seminar, symposium, exhibit, convention, training
course, or other gathering during which classified or controlled unclassified information
is disclosed.
E2.1.13. Originating DoD Component. The DoD Agency that exercises original
classification jurisdiction for classified information.
E2.1.14. Security Assurance. The written confirmation, requested by and
exchanged between governments, of the security clearance level or eligibility for
clearance, of their employees, contractors, and citizens. It includes a statement by a
responsible official of a foreign government that the original recipient of U.S. classified
military information possesses the requisite security clearance and is approved by his or
her government for access to information of the security classification involved on behalf
of the foreign government and that the recipient will comply with any security
requirements specified by the United States. In the case of industrial facilities, the
security assurance should include a statement concerning the level of storage capability.
E2.1.15. Sensitive Compartmented Information
. Information and material that
requires special controls for restricted handling within compartmented intelligence
systems and for which compartmentation is established.
E2.1.16. Strategic War Plan. A plan for the overall conduct of a war.
DoDD 5230.11, June 16, 1992
ENCLOSURE 3
18
E3. ENCLOSURE 3
NDP-1 DISCLOSURE CRITERIA, CONDITIONS, AND LIMITATIONS
E3.1.1. Disclosure Criteria
. Disclosures of classified military information in
Categories 1 through 8 defined in item E2.1.2. of enclosure 2 may be made only when all
of the criteria listed in subparagraph E3.1.1.1. through E3.1.1.5., below, are satisfied.
Disclosures in Category 8 also must be in compliance with DoD Directive C-5230.23
(reference (d)).
E3.1.1.1. Disclosure is consistent with U.S. foreign policy and national
security objectives concerning the proposed recipient foreign government. For example:
E3.1.1.1.1. The recipient government cooperates with the United States in
pursuance of military and political objectives that are compatible with those of the United
States.
E3.1.1.1.2. A specific U.S. national purpose, diplomatic or military, will
be served.
E3.1.1.1.3. The information will be used in support of mutual defense and
security objectives.
E3.1.1.2. Disclosure is consistent with U.S. military and security objectives.
For example:
E3.1.1.2.1. Disclosures of advanced technology, if compromised, will not
constitute an unreasonable risk to the U.S. position in military technology and operational
capabilities, regardless of the intended recipient.
E3.1.1.2.2. The proposed disclosure reflects the need for striking a proper
balance between pursuit of our mutual defense and foreign policy objectives on the one
hand and the preservation of the security of our military secrets on the other.
E3.1.1.3. The foreign recipient of the information will afford it substantially
the same degree of security protection given to it by the United States. (The intent of a
foreign government to protect U.S. classified military information is established in part
by the negotiation of a General Security of Information Agreement or other similar
security arrangement. A foreign government's capability to protect U.S. classified
military information normally is determined by the evaluation of embassy security
assessments, Central Intelligence Agency risk assessments, National Military Information
Disclosure Policy Committee (NDPC) Security Survey Reports, and/or historical
precedence.)
DoDD 5230.11, June 16, 1992
ENCLOSURE 3
19
E3.1.1.4. Disclosures will result in benefits to the United States at least
equivalent to the value of the information disclosed. For example:
E3.1.1.4.1. The United States obtains information from the recipient
nation on a quid pro quo basis.
E3.1.1.4.2. The exchange of military information or participation in a
cooperative project will be advantageous to the United States from a technical or other
military viewpoint.
E3.1.1.4.3. The development or maintenance of a high level of military
strength and effectiveness on the part of the government receiving the information will be
advantageous to the United States.
E3.1.1.5. The disclosure is limited to information necessary to the purpose for
which disclosure is made. For example, if the purpose of the disclosure is the sale of
military equipment, information on operation, maintenance, and training would be
released. Research and development data, or production know-how, must be withheld.
E3.1.2. Disclosure Conditions. After a decision is made to disclose classified
military information to a foreign government or international organization, based on the
criteria listed in subparagraphs E3.1.1.1. through E3.1.1.5. of this enclosure, above, or an
exception to policy, release of the classified military information will be contingent upon
agreement by the recipient foreign government that the listed minimal conditions in
subparagraphs E3.1.2.1. through E3.1.2.8., below, will be met. The conditions normally
are satisfied by the provisions of existing General Security of Information Agreements.
When a General Security of Information Agreement does not exist, the conditions may be
included in a program-specific agreement, government contract, or similar arrangement.
E3.1.2.1. The information or acknowledgment of its possession will not be
revealed to a third-country government, organization, or person, except with the prior
written permission of the originating U.S. Department Agency.
E3.1.2.2. The information will be afforded substantially the same degree of
security protection afforded to it by the United States.
E3.1.2.3. The information will be used only for designated military purposes,
or other specified purposes.
E3.1.2.4. The recipient will report promptly and fully to U.S. authorities any
known or suspected compromise of U.S. classified military information released to it.
E3.1.2.5. All individuals and facilities that will have access to the classified
military information and materiel will have security clearances granted by their
DoDD 5230.11, June 16, 1992
ENCLOSURE 3
20
government at a level equal to that of the classified information involved and an official
need-to-know.
E3.1.2.6. The information will be transferred through government-to-
government channels.
E3.1.2.7. Security experts of each government will be permitted to visit the
other government, when mutually convenient, to review and discuss each other's policies
and practices for protecting classified information.
E3.1.2.8. The recipient of the information agrees to abide by or meet U.S.-
specified special terms and conditions for the release of U.S. information or materiel.
E3.1.3. Disclosure Limitations
E3.1.3.1. General Limitations. Nothing in this Directive shall be construed so
as to allow the disclosure of the following types of information:
E3.1.3.1.1. Prohibited by Law or Agreement. Classified information, the
disclosure of which is prohibited by Federal law or by any international agreement to
which the United States is a party.
E3.1.3.1.2. Naval Nuclear Information. Any naval nuclear propulsion
information, classified or unclassified, except under an agreement negotiated pursuant to
the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (reference (k)).
E3.1.3.1.3. Proprietary Information. Classified or unclassified proprietary
information, the rights to which are owned by private firms or citizens (i.e., patents,
copyrights, or trade secrets) without the owner's consent, unless such disclosure is
authorized by relevant legislation, and then release will be subject to such legislation.
E3.1.3.1.4. National Intelligence
. National Intelligence or
interdepartmental intelligence produced within the National Foreign Intelligence Board
(NFIB) structure. Such intelligence cannot be disclosed without authorization of the DCI
in accordance with applicable policies.
E3.1.3.1.5. National Security Telecommunications and Information
Systems Security Information. The National Security Telecommunications and
Information Systems Security Committee is authorized by its terms of reference to make
disclosures of classified military telecommunications and information systems security
equipment and information without reference to the NDPC.
E3.1.3.1.6. Counterintelligence. Operational information related to
counterintelligence activities and disclosures related thereto.
DoDD 5230.11, June 16, 1992
ENCLOSURE 3
21
E3.1.3.1.7. Atomic Information. Such disclosures are made in accordance
with the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (reference (k)).
E3.1.3.1.8. Strategic Planning and Guidance
. Only the Secretary of
Defense or the Deputy Secretary of Defense may authorize the disclosure of plans,
concepts, or other information about strategic war plans. Requests for such disclosure
shall be submitted through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
E3.1.3.2. Specifically Prohibited Disclosures
. The following types of
classified information are specifically prohibited from disclosure:
E3.1.3.2.1. Classified information officially obtained from a foreign
government, except when the information has been conveyed by the government with
express written consent to its further disclosure.
E3.1.3.2.2. Combined information without prior agreement of all parties.
E3.1.3.2.3. Joint information without prior agreement of all Departments
or Agencies having control or jurisdiction.
E3.1.3.2.4. Information originated by or for another Department or
Agency, unless that Department or Agency consents to the disclosure.
E3.1.3.2.5. Intelligence information described in section I, subparagraph
5.c.(2) and section II, subparagraph 5.b.(7) of NDP-1 (reference (c)).
DoDD 5230.11, June 16, 1992
ENCLOSURE 4
22
E4. ENCLOSURE 4
THE DDL
The following DDL format should be used by the DoD Components: (While all
elements identified should be provided in the general order shown, information should be
presented in the clearest and easiest-to-use manner. For example, the usefulness of the
DDL for complex systems will be enhanced if items 5 and 6 are broken out by major
subsystems and software and disclosures are discussed separately.)
TITLE
: DATE:
E4.1.1. CLASSIFICATION: Identify highest classification of information to be
disclosed.
E4.1.2. DISCLOSURE METHODS: E.g., oral, visual, or documentary.
E4.1.3. CATEGORIES PERMITTED: Specify National Disclosure Policy
categories to be disclosed.
E4.1.4. SCOPE: Specify who is authorized to release material or information, and
to whom disclosure is authorized.
E4.1.5. AUTHORIZED FOR RELEASE AND/OR DISCLOSURE: Describe
materiel and/or information that can be released or disclosed.
E4.1.6. NOT AUTHORIZED FOR RELEASE AND/OR DISCLOSURE: Describe
materiel and/or information that cannot be released or disclosed. (In addition to
providing specific descriptions of releasable and restricted materiel and information,
items 5 and 6 will also specify any conditions or limitations to be imposed; e.g., time-
phasing of release, allowable forms for software, identification of items releasable only as
finished, tested assemblies, etc.)
E4.1.7. PROCEDURES: Specify review and release procedures, special security
procedures, or protective measures to be imposed.
E4.1.8. REDELEGATION: Specify the extent of redelegation of authority (if any)
permitted to subordinate activities.
DoDD 5230.11, June 16, 1992
ENCLOSURE 5
23
E5. ENCLOSURE 5
REQUESTS FOR EXCEPTION TO POLICY
Requests for an exception to policy shall contain the following elements of information:
E5.1.1. A concise statement of the action proposed. Include security classification
and categories of U.S. classified military information to be disclosed. (For
example: "The OUSD(A) member, National Disclosure Policy Committee (NDPC),
requests an exception to the National Disclosure Policy to permit the disclosure of
SECRET Category 3 (Applied Research and Development Information and Materiel)
information to the Government of ___________ in support of the negotiation of a Data
Exchange Agreement pertaining to surface-to-air missiles.")
E5.1.2. A precise statement of why an exception to policy is required. For
example: An exception is required because:
E5.1.2.1. The level of classified information involved exceeds the
classification level delegated in Annex A of NDP-1; or
E5.1.2.2. The proposed action is not in consonance with policy currently
established in Annex B or C of NDP-1; or
E5.1.2.3. Certain (identify which) of the disclosure criteria or conditions listed
in section II. of NDP-1 are not fully met; or
E5.1.2.4. Any or all of the above in combination.
E5.1.3. An assessment of how each of the disclosure criteria and conditions in
section II. of NDP-1 shall be met:
E5.1.3.1. "Disclosure is consistent with the foreign policy of the United States
toward the Government of ___________." (A further detailed discussion shall be
included to substantiate this statement. Reference shall be made to Presidential, National
Security Council, or other high-level policy decisions to support the justification
provided. A simple statement such as "the recipient cooperates with the United States in
pursuance of military and political objectives" is not sufficient.)
E5.1.3.2. "The military security of the United States permits disclosure." (If
equipment or technology is involved, there must be a discussion on the result of a
compromise on U.S. operational capability or the U.S. position in military technology.
This discussion shall include an analysis of the state of the art regarding the technology
involved, the susceptibility of the item to reverse engineering, the capability of the
DoDD 5230.11, June 16, 1992
ENCLOSURE 5
24
foreign recipient to reverse engineer the item, the foreign availability of the technology or
equipment involved, and other governments to whom similar equipment or technology
has been released.)
E5.1.3.3. "The foreign recipient will afford the information substantially the
same degree of security protection given to it by the United States." (If there has been an
NDPC Security Survey for the proposed recipient, the conclusion reached therein shall be
discussed. In the absence of an NDPC Security Survey, efforts shall be made to obtain,
through intelligence channels, a counterintelligence risk assessment or security analysis
of the foreign government's security capabilities. The mere statement that "classified
information has been released previously to this government and there is no indication
that such information has been compromised" is not sufficient.)
E5.1.3.4. "Disclosures will result in benefits to the United States at least
equivalent to the value of the information disclosed." For example:
E5.1.3.4.1. The United States obtains information from the proposed
recipient on a quid-pro-quo basis, describe the information and the value to the United
States;
E5.1.3.4.2. Explain how the exchange of military information for
participation in a cooperative project will be advantageous to the United States from a
technical or military capability viewpoint;
E5.1.3.4.3. If the development or maintenance of a high degree of
military strength and effectiveness on the part of the recipient government will be
advantageous to the United States, explain how.
E5.1.3.5. "The disclosure is limited to information necessary to the purpose for
which disclosure is made." (For example, if the purpose of the request is for the sale of
equipment only, it shall be indicated clearly that research and development data or
production know-how is not to be divulged or that documentation will be sanitized.)
E5.1.4. Any limitations placed on the proposed disclosure in terms of information to
be disclosed, disclosure schedules, or other pertinent caveats that may affect NDPC
approval or denial of the request. (If disclosures are to be phased or if certain
information is not to be released, the phasing or non-releasable information shall be
specified.)
E5.1.5. A statement that the requested exception is to be either a continuing
exception, subject to annual review, or a one-time exception. (A continuing exception
usually is associated with a long-term project, such as a co-production program or
military sale when the United States will be obligated to provide life-cycle support. A
one-time exception typically is used for a briefing or demonstration or short-term
training.)
DoDD 5230.11, June 16, 1992
ENCLOSURE 5
25
E5.1.6. The names and titles of U.S. officials accredited to the requesting foreign
government or international organization with whom the proposed exception has been
coordinated, as well as the views of the Theater Commander. (Sufficient time shall be
allowed to obtain an opinion from U.S. Embassy personnel in-country and the
responsible Theater Commander before submitting the request for approval. Many cases
are delayed because a U.S. Embassy or Theater Commander opinion has not been
obtained.)
E5.1.7. The opinion of other interested Departments or Agencies if joint Service or
shared information is involved. (If the information or item of equipment is of shared or
joint interest, such as an air-to-air missile used by two Services or containing technology
of concern to another Service, the views of the other party will be included.)
E5.1.8. Any information not mentioned above that would assist the NDPC
members, the Secretary of Defense, or the Deputy Secretary of Defense in evaluating the
proposal.
E5.1.9. The name and telephone number of a knowledgeable individual within the
requesting organization who can provide additional technical detail or clarification
concerning the case at issue.
E5.1.10. The date a response is desired on the case. Ten full working days for
NDPC case deliberations should be allowed. The suspense date (10 full working days) is
computed starting from the first full working day after the date of the request.
DoDD 5230.11, June 16, 1992
ENCLOSURE 6
26
E6. ENCLOSURE 6
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION GUIDE FOR NATIONAL DISCLOSURE POLICY
SUBJECT MATTER CLASSIFICATION REMARKS
A. The Charts in Annex A of NDP-1
(reference (c)).
SECRET
1. The association of a foreign country or
international organization with one or
more disclosure category entries quoted
from the chart in Annex A of reference
(c).
CONFIDENTIAL
2. The association of one or more
disclosure category entries in the charts
in Annex A of reference (c) pertaining to
two or more foreign countries or
international organizations (that is, any
comparison of the disclosure levels of
two or more countries or international
organizations).
SECRET
B. The fact that a specific foreign
country or international organization has
agreed to afford U.S. classified military
information the same degree of
protection as afforded by the U.S.
Government.
UNCLASSIFIED Unless the mere existence of the
governing security agreement is
classified, in which case the same
classification applies. This can be
determined by reviewing Part B of
the charts in Annex A of reference
(c).
C. Disclosure authority as set forth in
section II.4. of reference (c).
UNCLASSIFIED
D. Disclosure criteria (and examples)
set forth in section II.5.a. of reference (c)
without reference to a specific case or
country.
UNCLASSIFIED
E. Disclosure criteria for military
intelligence as set forth in section II.5.b.
of NDP-1 (reference (c)) and DoD
Directive C-5230.23 (reference (d)).
CONFIDENTIAL Unless otherwise specified by the
paragraph markings in section
II.5.b.
F. Disclosure conditions for classified
military information as set forth in section
II.6. of reference (c).
UNCLASSIFIED
G. NDPC organization and membership
in section III. of reference (c).
UNCLASSIFIED
H. NDPC procedures enumerated in
section IV. of reference (c).
UNCLASSIFIED Except for section IV.2.b., which is
CONFIDENTIAL
I. Specific disclosure policy, in addition
to that in the chart in Annex A of
reference (c), relative to a specific
country or international organization.
CONFIDENTIAL Other classification levels will be
recommended to the Chair of the
NDPC when circumstances
warrant.
DoDD 5230.11, June 16, 1992
ENCLOSURE 6
27
SUBJECT MATTER CLASSIFICATION REMARKS
J. Specific disclosure policy for selected weapon
systems, equipment, and technologies.
CONFIDENTIAL Other classification levels
will be recommended to
the Chair of the NDPC
when circumstances
warrant.
K. Information revealing the security policies,
procedures, methods, or practices of a foreign country
or international organization for protecting classified
military information compiled by a NDPC Security
Survey Team.
CONFIDENTIAL Other classification levels
will be recommended to
the Chair of the NDPC
when circumstances
warrant.
L. Assessments, including deficiencies or
recommendations, compiled by an NDPC Security
Survey Team that would not result in adverse effects
of foreign relations if disclosed but that could result in
damage to the national defense if disclosed. For
example, the deficiency concerns an exploitable
vulnerability that, if revealed, could cause direct or
immediate jeopardy to the security of U.S. classified
information.
CONFIDENTIAL Other classification levels
will be recommended to
the Chair of the NDPC
when circumstances
warrant.
M. Deficiencies or recommendations compiled by the
NDPC Security Team that could result in adverse
effects on foreign relations if disclosed.
CONFIDENTIAL Other classification levels
will be recommended to
the Chairman of the
NDPC when
circumstances warrant.
N. The above items shall be declassified on "ODAR."
