Case No. 21-1454, Reynolds v. Addis
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CLAY, Circuit Judge, dissenting. Whether summary judgment is appropriate in this case
turns on one question: could a reasonable jury find that Officer Addis used excessive force in
violation of the Fourth Amendment and Michigan law when he shot and killed Cody Reynolds
after responding to the scene of an alleged stabbing? The record indicates that a reasonable jury
could find that Addis’ force was excessive. Indeed, the evidence fails to confirm Officer Addis’
allegation that he faced a deadly threat when Cody Reynolds got up from his knees and purportedly
advanced toward him. (See Appellant’s Br. 58.) The record instead suggests the possibility that
Cody ran away from Addis to flee from the scene when he stood up and ran.
This Court has repeatedly held that an officer’s use of deadly force is excessive when a
suspect with visibly empty hands runs away from a police officer in a way that does not “imperil[]
the lives of officers or the public.” Godawa v. Byrd, 798 F.3d 457, 467 (6th Cir. 2015); see also
Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 11 (1985); Smith v. Cupp, 430 F.3d 766, 769–75 (6th Cir. 2005).
Because courts must draw all inferences in favor of Plaintiff at this stage, the district court
appropriately denied Defendant’s motion for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment
and state law claims.
1
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986) (“The evidence
of the non-movant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.”)
(quoting Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 158–59 (1970)).
1
As a preliminary matter, it is important to emphasize that “[t]his Court’s jurisdiction regarding orders
denying qualified immunity . . . is narrow.” Harrison v. Ash, 539 F.3d 510, 517 (6th Cir. 2008). Indeed, appeals may
only be taken from final decisions, Cunningham v. Hamilton Cnty., Ohio, 527 U.S. 198, 200 (1999), and denials of
summary judgment are not final decisions, DiLuzio v. Vill. Of Yorkville, Ohio, 796 F.3d 604, 609 (6th Cir. 2015).
Accordingly, “to bring an interlocutory appeal of a qualified immunity ruling, the defendant must be willing to concede
the plaintiff’s version of the facts for purposes of the appeal.” Jefferson v. Lewis, 594 F.3d 454, 459 (6th Cir. 2010);
see also Ouza v. City of Dearborn Heights, Mich., 969 F.3d 265, 276 (6th Cir. 2020).
In this case, Defendant has not “conceded the facts in the light most favorable to [Plaintiff],” meaning that
the appeal “falls outside of the narrow jurisdiction of this Court” and should therefore be dismissed. Harrison,
539 F.3d at 517; see infra pp. 2–6. However, because the majority nevertheless reaches the merits of Defendant’s
arguments, the dissent will proceed to address the arguments as well.