CBP Targeted Americans
Associated with the
2018–2019 Migrant
Caravan
September 20, 2021
OIG-21-62
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DHS OIG HIGHLIGHTS
CBP Targeted Americans Associated with the
2018–2019 Migrant Caravan
www.oig.dhs.gov OIG-21-62
What We Found
U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) officials
placed lookouts on U.S. travelers suspected of potential
criminal activity. However, many CBP officials were
unaware of CBP’s policy related to placing lookouts.
Therefore, CBP may have inadvertently placed lookouts
on U.S. citizens suspected of organizing or being
associated with the migrant caravan, which did not fully
comply with policy. Additionally, CBP officials did not
remove lookouts promptly. As a result, CBP subjected
some individuals to repeated and unnecessary
secondary inspections.
In addition, in December 2018, a CBP official asked
Mexico to deny entry to caravan associates, including 14
U.S. citizens. Unlike CBP’s legitimate reasons for
placing lookouts on these individuals, CBP had no
genuine basis for asking Mexico to deny entry to these
U.S. citizens. On several other occasions throughout
Operation Secure Line, other CBP officials also
improperly shared the sensitive information of U.S.
citizens with Mexico. Some of these CBP officials may
have asked Mexico to deny entry to these individuals,
but we could not determine whether they did, because
CBP officials were not forthcoming about the
disclosures, did not follow CBP policies on sharing
information with foreign entities, and did not retain
communication records.
CBP Response
CBP concurred with our six recommendations, which
are resolved and open.
September 20, 2021
Why We Did
This Review
In early 2019, a number of
journalists, attorneys, and
migrant caravan supporters
raised concerns in the media
and in litigation that CBP
took improper actions against
them as a form of
harassment due to their work
on the migrant caravan. We
conducted this review to
evaluate these allegations.
What We
Recommend
We made six
recommendations to improve
CBP’s controls on placing
and removing lookouts and
sharing U.S. citizens’
sensitive information with
foreign countries.
For Further Information:
Contact our Office of Public Affairs at
(202) 981-6000, or email us at
[email protected]v
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
Department of Homeland Security
www.oig.dhs.gov OIG-21-62
Table of Contents
Background .................................................................................................... 2
Results of Review ............................................................................................ 4
CBP Generally Had Legitimate Reasons for Placing Caravan-Related
Lookouts on U.S. Citizens, but Some Lookouts Did Not Fully Comply
with CBP Policy ..................................................................................... 5
CBP Inappropriately Asked Mexico to Deny Entry to at Least 14 U.S.
Citizens Affiliated with the Migrant Caravan ........................................ 16
Recommendations ......................................................................................... 30
Appendixes
Appendix A: Objective, Scope, and Methodology ................................. 34
Appendix B: CBP Comments to the Draft Report .................................. 36
Appendix C: CBP’s Foreign Disclosures to Mexico: Tracking
Compliance with DHS and CBP Policies ........................... 40
Appendix D: Major Contributors to This Report .................................... 42
Appendix E: Report Distribution .......................................................... 43
Abbreviations
CBP U.S. Customs and Border Protection
C.F.R. Code of Federal Regulations
EOC Emergency Operations Center
FOB Foreign Operations Branch
NTC National Targeting Center
SPII Sensitive Personally Identifiable Information
TTRT Tactical Terrorism Response Team
U.S.C. United States Code
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
Department of Homeland Security
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Background
Starting in October 2018, thousands of migrants gathered and traveled from
Central America through Mexico to seek entry to the United States. This came
to be known as the “migrant caravan.” U.S. Customs and Border Protection
(CBP) was concerned that the estimated 7,000 to 10,000 members of the
migrant caravan could overwhelm CBP’s resources and hinder its ability to
process the legitimate flow of trade and travel. Additionally, because of reports
that the migrant caravan entered Mexico by force, CBP was concerned about
the potential for mass illegal border crossings and violence against law
enforcement when the migrant caravan reached the U.S. border.
To coordinate its response to the migrant caravan, CBP implemented
“Operation Secure Line” from October 2018 through February 2019. As part of
this operation, in October 2018, CBP stood up an Emergency Operations
Center (EOC) in San Diego, CA. The EOC’s mission included maintaining
control of the border, preventing mass illegal border crossings, safeguarding
legitimate trade and travel, and protecting CBP personnel.
The EOC was comprised of several sections, including Planning, Operations,
Logistics, and Intelligence. The EOC’s Intelligence Section gathered
information about the number and travel patterns of migrants moving toward
the border and researched social media and news articles to identify potential
migrant caravan organizers. The EOC heightened its efforts following
“incursions” on November 25, 2018, and January 1, 2019, when members of
the migrant caravan stormed the border in an attempt to enter the United
States from Tijuana, and threw rocks at CBP personnel.
1
CBP closed the San
Ysidro Port of Entry outside of San Diego on November 25, 2018, and dispersed
tear gas on both occasions.
CBP officials, particularly those assigned to the EOC Intelligence Section, also
gathered information by placing “lookouts” on individuals they suspected of
being affiliated with the migrant caravan and others who might have
information about those individuals. Lookouts are electronic alerts placed in
CBP’s computer system that can result in a variety of different actions. Most of
the caravan-related lookouts resulted in lengthier, enhanced inspections for
those individuals when they crossed the U.S. border. When individuals with
caravan-related lookouts attempted to enter the United States at ports of entry,
1
Dara Lind, How a march at the US-Mexico border descended into tear gas and chaos, Vox (Nov.
26, 2018), https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2018/11/26/18112474/tear-gas-border-
patrol-caravan-rocks; Alan Yates, U.S. Agents Fire Tear Gas Across Mexican Border, New York
Times (Jan. 1, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/01/world/americas/migrants-
border-tear-gas.html.
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
Department of Homeland Security
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CBP officials referred them to secondary inspection,
2
where officers interviewed
them about their knowledge of and contacts with the migrant caravan. Some
interviews were relatively short, but others lasted several hours.
The EOC also collaborated with Federal, state, local, and Mexican agencies.
When exchanging information with Mexico,
3
the EOC worked with CBP’s San
Diego Foreign Operations Branch (FOB), which is responsible for liaising with
local Mexican officials. Often, information sharing happened at a command
post that Mexico and CBP established in November 2018 to share caravan-
related information. Mexican officials and CBP FOB officials staffed the
command post around the clock, exchanged intelligence relating to migrant
caravan movements and organizers, and coordinated U.S. and Mexican law
enforcement and immigration operations.
In early 2019, a number of U.S. and foreign journalists, attorneys, and migrant
caravan supporters raised concerns in the media that CBP was taking
improper action against them as a form of harassment due to their work on the
migrant caravan, or to intimidate them from continuing to perform caravan-
related work.
4
Some individuals claimed CBP subjected them to repeated,
unnecessary, and/or excessive secondary inspections when they attempted to
reenter the United States, including one individual who claimed CBP stopped
him for secondary inspection six times between December 2018 and February
2019. Other individuals alleged the United States placed alerts on them, which
led Mexican officials to deny them entry into Mexico. Finally, other individuals
alleged that CBP revoked their membership in Trusted Traveler Programs.
5
Following the media stories, several congressional committees questioned
whether CBP inappropriately targeted individuals who engaged in
constitutionally protected activities.
6
The Department of Homeland Security Office of Inspector General (OIG)
evaluated these allegations. Specifically, in this report we address the
following:
2
A secondary inspection is part of and a continuation of the overall border inspection, and an
officer may refer any traveler to secondary inspection for various reasons, at his or her
discretion in compliance with law and policy. Secondary inspections can include interviews
and searches of individuals, their possessions, and electronic devices.
3
For convenience, this report uses the term “Mexico” to refer to Mexican government officials.
4
Some of these individuals have also filed lawsuits alleging that CBP targeted them in violation
of the U.S. Constitution and Federal laws.
5
Trusted Traveler Programs provide expedited processing at ports of entry for preapproved,
low-risk travelers. We are currently conducting a separate review of allegations related to
CBP’s Trusted Traveler Programs.
6
We have not conducted a legal analysis of the constitutional issues as they were generally
outside DHS OIG’s purview and the scope of this report.
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
Department of Homeland Security
www.oig.dhs.gov 4 OIG-21-62
x whether CBP had legitimate law enforcement reasons for placing
lookouts on and conducting secondary inspections of U.S.
7
journalists,
attorneys, and migrant caravan supporters, or whether it did so to
harass, intimidate, or retaliate against them; and
x whether CBP improperly requested that Mexico deny entry to American
journalists, attorneys, and migrant caravan supporters.
Results of Review
CBP officials had legitimate reasons for placing lookouts on U.S. journalists,
attorneys, and others suspected of organizing or being associated with the
migrant caravan (caravan associates).
8
However, many CBP officials were
unaware of CBP’s policy related to placing lookouts and therefore may have
inadvertently placed lookouts on these U.S. citizens, which did not fully comply
with the policy. Additionally, CBP officials did not remove lookouts promptly
once they were no longer necessary.
9
As a result, CBP subjected some of these
individuals to repeated and unnecessary secondary inspections.
In addition, in December 2018, a CBP official asked Mexico to deny entry to
caravan associates, including 14 U.S citizens. Unlike CBP’s legitimate reasons
for placing lookouts on these individuals, CBP had no genuine basis for asking
Mexico to deny entry to these U.S. citizens. On several other occasions
throughout Operation Secure Line, other CBP officials also improperly shared
the names and sensitive information of Americans with Mexico. Some of these
CBP officials may have asked Mexico to deny entry to these U.S. citizens, but
we could not determine whether they did, because CBP personnel were not
forthcoming about the disclosures, did not follow CBP policies on sharing
information with foreign entities, and did not retain communication records.
7
Both U.S. citizens and foreign individuals raised concerns in the media, but we focused our
review on U.S. citizens.
8
This report uses the term “caravan associates,” even though some individuals, such as
journalists, may not have actually been “associated” with the caravan.
9
This report discusses “removing” lookouts even though CBP officials do not technically remove
most lookouts. Instead, they keep the lookouts active, but modify them so that the lookouts no
longer send individuals to secondary inspection.
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
Department of Homeland Security
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CBP Generally Had Legitimate Reasons for Placing Caravan-
Related Lookouts on U.S. Citizens, but Some Lookouts Did Not
Fully Comply with CBP Policy
We did not find that CBP placed lookouts to retaliate against U.S. citizens for
performing lawful work related to the migrant caravan. To the contrary,
witnesses told us, and contemporaneous emails and documents corroborated,
CBP placed lookouts to gain information about suspected illegal activity and
then generally sought information consistent with that purpose during the
resulting interviews. Although we determined CBP’s lookouts on a number of
journalists present at an illegal border crossing were unnecessary, we found no
evidence that CBP placed these lookouts to harass the journalists.
Even though we found no inappropriate intent behind the lookouts, we did find
CBP officials did not understand or always follow CBP policy related to
lookouts. Many CBP officials did not know the proper standard for placing
lookouts, and almost half of the caravan-related lookouts may not have
complied with the policy. Additionally, CBP subjected some U.S. citizens to
repeated and unnecessary secondary inspections, because CBP did not
promptly remove lookouts that were no longer necessary, as required by CBP
policy.
CBP Officials Placed Caravan-Related Lookouts and Generally Conducted
the Resulting Inspections for Legitimate Reasons
CBP offers little guidance and few restrictions on using lookouts. CBP’s only
written guidance on the appropriate basis for placing lookouts is a TECS
10
Directive that has not been updated since 1990, 13 years before DHS was
created.
11
According to the TECS Directive, lookouts must be placed for
“legitimate law enforcement purposes” and only if illegal activity is suspected.
10
TECS is the principal law enforcement and antiterrorism database used by CBP officers at
ports of entry to collect, maintain, and screen data and to document border inspections of
travelers and merchandise. TECS is the system in which users place lookouts. TECS
previously stood for Treasury Enforcement Communications System but is no longer an
acronym.
11
Customs Directive No. 4320-003, July 1990 (TECS Directive). CBP is in the process of
updating this Directive. Another policy — CBP Directive No. 3340-051, Passenger Analytical
Unit Procedures for Targeting High-Risk Travelers, June 2014 — contains a short section on
lookouts, but it does not include any additional guidance beyond the TECS Directive.
Previously, CBP’s Inspector’s Field Manual provided more detailed guidance on when CBP
officials can place lookouts, but CBP revoked that manual in 2013 and has not replaced it.
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
Department of Homeland Security
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Lookouts shouldnever be entered as a “prank” or “joke,” or for “retaliatory
reasons.”
We found no direct evidence in emails or interviews that CBP officials intended
to retaliate, harass, or intimidate individuals associated with the migrant
caravan by placing lookouts on them. To the contrary, the evidence suggests
CBP placed most lookouts to seek information that would help CBP respond to
the migrant caravan.
CBP officials in the EOC’s Intelligence Section placed most of the caravan-
related lookouts and tasked officers from the Tactical Terrorism Response
Team (TTRT)
12
with conducting the resulting secondary inspections. Within the
San Diego Sector, where the migrant caravan was expected to arrive, the EOC
took several steps to help the TTRT officers collect and report back useful
information to the EOC. At the outset of the operation, the EOC provided TTRT
officers with a list of general topics to explore in their caravan-related
interviews, such as information about the traveler’s involvement in the migrant
caravan, the “mood” of the migrant caravan, whether anyone was inciting
violence, and whether the traveler could identify other people from a photo
lineup. Additionally, upon placing most lookouts, EOC personnel provided the
TTRT with one-page “target profiles,” which included information such as the
individual’s picture, basic biographical data, and recent border crossing
history. The EOC also invited TTRT officers to ask for assistance if questions
arose in specific interviews, and TTRT officers told us they often contacted the
EOC before beginning interviews. Finally, the EOC instructed TTRT officers to
create a report documenting the substance of the interviews, which they did for
most initial interviews.
To further assess whether CBP placed lookouts for legitimate or retaliatory
purposes, we also reviewed the specific circumstances of the lookouts on 51
U.S. citizens, and the secondary inspections that resulted from these
lookouts.
13
In particular, we reviewed whether CBP could articulate a
legitimate law enforcement purpose for placing each lookout and whether it
sought information relevant to that purpose in the resulting interviews. If CBP
12
TTRT officers typically conduct inspections of travelers identified within terrorism screening
databases. Before being detailed to the EOC, several CBP officials responsible for the caravan-
related lookouts worked closely with the TTRT, and therefore asked the TTRT to conduct the
caravan-related interviews.
13
We identified 46 of the 51 lookouts in CBP documents, and the remaining 5 in media
articles. Four of the lookouts that we identified in CBP documents were placed by U.S.
Immigration and Customs Enforcement agents rather than CBP officials. We included these
four lookouts in our analysis because they were part of CBP’s targeting of caravan associates.
We are not aware of any other caravan-related lookouts that CBP placed on U.S. citizens. The
CBP documents we reviewed do not purport to be complete lists, so there could be others.
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
Department of Homeland Security
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placed lookouts to harass individuals associated with the migrant caravan,
CBP would be unable to explain why it placed the lookouts, or that it might
have had little concern for the information gathered in the interviews.
Alternatively, if the lookouts were placed for legitimate law enforcement
reasons, we would expect CBP to be able to explain what those reasons were
and to have actually asked the individuals about those topics.
CBP appears to have used the lookouts to seek information about possible
illegal activity. CBP placed approximately half of the caravan-related lookouts
on individuals suspected of inciting violence at the border, or others who might
have information about those individuals. CBP also placed lookouts on several
individuals suspected of involvement in marriage fraud, purportedly to assist
migrants with their asylum claims. In addition, CBP placed lookouts on
individuals suspected of organizing and leading the migrant caravan, as well as
others suspected of being associated with individuals or organizations leading
the migrant caravan. CBP targeted these individuals on the premise that
migrant caravan organizers and leaders could be helping to facilitate illegal
entry.
14
CBP’s inspections were generally consistent with the claimed purpose of the
lookouts, and officers usually documented and shared the information
obtained during these inspections.
15
For example, TTRT officers asked
individuals who were suspected of involvement in the January 1, 2019
incursion about their whereabouts on that night, and sought information
about the incident from those who were present. Likewise, TTRT officers asked
suspected migrant caravan organizers about their activities in support of the
migrant caravan. TTRT officers usually emailed EOC officials with reports of
their interviews, and the EOC then shared information about most interviews
in daily leadership briefs. These actions support that CBP had a legitimate
interest and purpose for these inspections.
However, in some instances, CBP’s inspections were not consistent with the
purported purpose of the lookouts. Lookouts that CBP placed on a particular
group of journalists raise the most serious concerns. Although we found no
14
In examining whether CBP documented legitimate reasons for placing the lookouts, we did
not judge the soundness of this premise and did not otherwise evaluate the strength of the
evidence supporting CBP’s lookouts. Even though in the following paragraphs we note some
lookouts that appear in hindsight to be based on particularly attenuated connections to
suspected illegal activity, we acknowledge the information may have appeared differently to
CBP officials making real-time decisions.
15
Although CBP usually documented the information obtained during its initial inspections of
individuals with caravan-related lookouts, CBP often did not have detailed interview records for
repeat inspections of the same individuals. Later in this report, we discuss how some of these
repeat inspections may have been unnecessary.
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
Department of Homeland Security
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evidence in emails or interviews that the EOC official who placed these
lookouts (EOC Official 1) did so to harass the journalists or for any other
ulterior reasons, his
16
subsequent actions, or lack thereof, demonstrate he did
not need to place the lookouts.
During Operation Secure Line, CBP officials noticed that individuals with
cameras were sometimes present when large groups attempted to cross the
border illegally. Because this happened multiple times, and in unusual
locations or times, such as the middle of the night, CBP officials suspected the
individuals with cameras were media, and might be assisting the illegal border
crossings. In one incident, Mexican police identified five American journalists
after CBP officials alerted them that CBP officials observed members of the
media helping migrants climb a border fence. EOC Official 1 then placed
lookouts on the five journalists. The lookouts did not mention the illegal
crossing but instructed interviewing officers where to find information about
the journalists.
Although EOC Official 1 told us the purpose of these lookouts was to determine
whether the journalists had information about the incident, his actions show
he actually had no interest in that information. Over the following weeks, all
five journalists came back to the United States, and CBP referred them to
secondary inspection. Interview records reflect that none of the five journalists
were asked about the illegal crossing.
17
In fact, the journalists returned to the
United States at various places and times and were therefore interviewed by
several different officers. None of the officers asked about the illegal crossing.
Yet, EOC Official 1 apparently never followed up with any of the interviewing
officers individually, or with the TTRT as a whole, to ask why they did not seek
that information or to request that they do so in the future.
EOC Official 1 placed more caravan-related lookouts than anyone else and was
in regular contact with the TTRT throughout Operation Secure Line. If he
wanted to know whether the journalists had information about this incident or
other illegal border crossings, he knew how to contact the TTRT. Additionally,
EOC Official 1 removed one of the lookouts after the journalist’s third
interview, even though according to the interview record, CBP never asked the
journalist about the illegal border crossing. If EOC Official 1 no longer needed
16
Throughout this report, one gender pronoun is used regardless of the individual’s actual
gender to avoid identification of individuals by gender.
17
Some of the interview records included general statements about not assisting migrants
while reporting on the migrant caravan, but none reflect questions about this specific incident
or any other illegal border crossings. In one of the interview records, the journalist mentions
that Mexican police photographed his identification during an encounter near the border, but
there is no further discussion about that event.
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
Department of Homeland Security
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information about the illegal border crossing at that point, then he also did not
need the information when he placed the lookout 9 days earlier.
18
We identified other instances of CBP officers not documenting information they
obtained during caravan-related inspections or not seeking information related
to the purported purpose of the lookout. But these appear to be inadvertent
mistakes; other evidence suggests CBP was not trying to harass or intimidate
these same individuals. For example:
x There are no interview records for a suspected migrant caravan organizer
who arrived at a port of entry in Arizona, so we cannot determine
whether CBP sought information that was relevant to the purpose of the
lookout. When the individual arrived at the same port of entry 2 days
after his initial crossing, officers contacted the official who placed the
lookout. He advised them to release the individual. Records also show
the individual was again released when he arrived at the same port of
entry the next day. If the lookout was intended to harass this U.S
citizen, the official who placed the lookout could have advised the port of
entry to continue interviewing the individual, but the official advised to
release him.
x TTRT officers did not ask a person suspected of marriage fraud about
that topic, but the evidence suggests the officers who interviewed this
individual may not have been aware of the marriage fraud concern at the
time of the interview.
19
Additionally, on the day after the interview, the
EOC official who placed the lookout emailed TTRT officers to request that
they ask about possible marriage fraud if the individual crossed again.
This suggests that the EOC official’s concern about potential marriage
fraud was legitimate and not a pretext for harassing the individual.
20
x A CBP intelligence official who was not part of the EOC placed a lookout
on a journalist after finding a YouTube video of his coverage of the
January 1, 2019 border incursion. In the lookout, the intelligence official
wrote the journalist was in “possession of journalistic evidence” of the
border incursion and “may be involved with inciting caravan migrants to
18
EOC Official 1 did not tell us that he received any new information that obviated the need for
the interview, and our review of EOC Official 1’s emails did not find that he received any new
information about this journalist.
19
The lookout did not mention marriage fraud. A few days before the individual arrived at the
port of entry, the EOC emailed information about this person and others to the TTRT but by
the time of the interview, the TTRT officers may not have remembered this individual was
specifically named in the email they received days earlier.
20
We also found documentary evidence of the marriage fraud concern.
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
Department of Homeland Security
www.oig.dhs.gov 10 OIG-21-62
attempt illegal entry.” In the following weeks, the journalist twice
returned to U.S. airports. In both instances, officers at the airports did
not call the intelligence official or record any information other than the
journalist’s occupation and employer. Although the intelligence official
received notifications of the encounters, he did not follow up with the
officers at the airports. This disconnect is likely due to the inexperience
of both the interviewing officers and the intelligence official. CBP officers
at airports did not regularly encounter people with caravan-related
lookouts, and the evidence suggests they might not have understood the
lookout. Additionally, the intelligence official was relatively new to his
role, and this was the first time he placed a lookout to request a
secondary inspection. When the journalist returned to the United States
a third time, the officers contacted the intelligence official and then asked
the journalist about the January 1 incident.
Some Migrant Caravan Lookouts Did Not Fully Comply with CBP Policy
Although we determined that CBP’s caravan-related lookouts were not intended
to harass or intimidate caravan associates, we also found CBP officials did not
always follow CBP policy related to lookouts. First, many officials were
unaware of CBP’s policy related to placing lookouts and therefore placed
lookouts for reasons that may not have been permitted by the policy.
Additionally, CBP officials did not monitor or remove lookouts as required by
CBP policy.
CBP Officials May Have Placed Some Lookouts for Unpermitted Reasons
As outlined earlier, the TECS Directive provides the standard for placing
lookouts: lookouts must be placed for “legitimate law enforcement purposes”
and shouldnever be entered as a “prank” or “joke,” or for “retaliatory reasons.”
Additionally, CBP may place lookouts “only if illegal activity is suspected. The
system will not allow a user to indicate that a ‘non-suspect’ is on ‘lookout.’”
This last sentence has two possible interpretations. It could mean officials may
place lookouts only on people who are suspects of illegal activity, and not on
non-suspects; or it could be a description of how the TECS system works.
21
21
Lookouts appear to be a type of “TECS record” or “TECS subject record,” but the TECS
Directive does not define those terms. While the TECS Directive says CBP may place lookouts
only when illegal activity is suspected, it allows CBP to create “TECS records” or “TECS subject
records” even when there is no suspicion of illegal activity. The TECS Directive states, “TECS
records should be created when the subject is deemed to be of enforcement interest … based
on previous violations, suspicion of violations or simply a result of a business or occupation in
which the Federal law enforcement community has an interest. The nature of the interest is to
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
Department of Homeland Security
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All CBP’s caravan-related lookouts were related in some way to suspected
criminal activity. However, nearly half of the caravan-related lookouts (25 out
of 51) were on people for whom there was no evidence of direct involvement in
illegal activity. Instead, those lookouts were based solely on the individuals’
associations with other people who were suspected of illegal activity. For
example, CBP officials placed lookouts on 15 U.S. citizens who either
previously crossed the border with, or were connected on social media to, a
person whom CBP suspected of planning violence at the border. CBP had no
information to suggest these 15 individuals might be involved in planning
violence or were present at one of the incursions. In other cases, CBP officials
placed lookouts on U.S. citizens with attenuated connections to people or
organizations believed to be leading the migrant caravan. In one instance, a
CBP official placed lookouts on two attorneys who previously crossed the
border with someone who was believed to be an administrator of a caravan-
related online chat group on WhatsApp.
22
In another example, after a
suspected migrant caravan organizer was seen riding in a vehicle, the EOC
placed lookouts not only on the owner of that vehicle but also on someone who
crossed the border with the vehicle owner one time, 9 months earlier, well
before the migrant caravan started traveling towards the United States.
We have no reason to doubt that the CBP officials who placed these lookouts
believed the lookout subjects might have useful information about potential
criminal activity. However, as explained earlier, the TECS Directive might not
allow CBP officials to place lookouts on non-suspects who might have useful
information about other individuals’ criminal activity. CBP officials were not
aware of this ambiguity, as many of them told us they were not aware of any
policies related to the proper bases for placing lookouts or had not received any
training on the issue. Consequently, the officials did not have consistent
understandings about when they could place lookouts. Some CBP officials
stated that lookouts require a connection to illegal activity. But other CBP
officials, including a senior San Diego Sector official and a senior official
responsible for TECS, contradicted the TECS Directive, stating CBP can place
lookouts for virtually any reason, including when there is no suspicion of illegal
activity. And although the TECS Directive might prohibit placing lookouts on
non-suspects, no CBP official noted this possibility.
be reflected in the Status Code, i.e., whether the subject is a suspect or non-suspect.” TECS
subject records should be created on “subjects who are currently or potentially of investigative
interest,” including “investigative targets, violators, suspects, corporations, businesses and
associates.”
22
WhatsApp is a social messaging platform that facilitates the exchange of encrypted messages
and calls.
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Department of Homeland Security
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If the TECS Directive is interpreted to prohibit placing lookouts on non-
suspects, then nearly half of the caravan-related lookouts may have violated
the TECS Directive. If the alternative interpretation is correct, that the TECS
Directive permits lookouts on non-suspects, then the caravan-related lookouts
did not violate the Directive. However, regardless of which interpretation is
correct, the Directive’s ambiguous language and CBP’s absence of training and
guidance leave officials without a clear understanding of the proper bases for
placing lookouts.
CBP Subjected U.S. Citizens to Unnecessary Secondary Inspections by Not
Promptly Removing Lookouts
CBP officials are responsible for updating their lookouts as new information is
developed, including removing lookouts that are no longer needed. According
to the TECS Directive, “inaccurate, irrelevant or out-of-date records” create a
risk that the “agency will make an adverse determination about an individual.”
Consequently, officials who create and maintain lookouts (lookout owners) are
responsible for “[m]aking appropriate modifications to existing records
whenever new information is developed or original information becomes
obsolete.” A high-level EOC official confirmed that CBP officials should
reevaluate lookouts after every inspection, to determine whether to keep them
active.
Yet, CBP officials did not remove many caravan-related lookouts once they were
no longer necessary. Although it might be appropriate to maintain lookouts in
certain situations,
23
TTRT and EOC officials acknowledged CBP should have
removed many caravan-related lookouts after it first interviewed the U.S.
citizens.
Two TTRT officers who conducted caravan-related interviews did not believe
there was a need to interview many of those individuals multiple times. One
officer said that TTRT did not obtain any valuable information during the
follow-up interviews, and that EOC officials should have removed lookouts on
“reporters and photographers” after their first referral to secondary inspection.
Another officer stated he called EOC officials on multiple occasions to ask them
to remove lookouts, but they did not do so.
EOC Official 1, who was primarily responsible for placing caravan-related
lookouts at the EOC, also told us that many U.S. citizens did not need to be
interviewed multiple times. Accordingly, EOC Official 1 claimed he went into
23
For example, CBP officials told us that officials typically maintain lookouts on suspected
smugglers or for other strategic reasons.
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
Department of Homeland Security
www.oig.dhs.gov 13 OIG-21-62
TECS and removed caravan-related lookouts after individuals were interviewed,
but review of TECS data revealed that EOC Official 1 did not remove any of his
lookouts on U.S. citizens following their first border crossings. When presented
with this information, he maintained that he tried to remove many lookouts
and speculated that a technical glitch may have prevented that from
happening,
24
but we confirmed that no such glitch occurred. Instead, the
evidence demonstrates that EOC Official 1 did not try to remove 18 of his 20
lookouts that resulted in secondary inspections.
25
In fact, EOC Official 1 did not reevaluate or remove his lookouts when he
finished his EOC detail at the end of January 2019. Instead, he and his
supervisor transferred at least 31 caravan-related lookouts to other EOC
personnel without giving any notice or instruction. One official who inherited
several of those lookouts stated he did not even learn he was assigned to those
lookouts until CBP officers contacted him as they were about to interview the
individuals. He recalled that one of the first times this happened, he reached
out to EOC Official 1, who originally placed the lookout. EOC Official 1 told
him the lookout was no longer necessary, even though he had transferred it to
him just days earlier. Still, after this discovery, the EOC did not systematically
review the remaining lookouts. Instead, the lookouts remained in place for 2
more weeks, until a media story calling attention to the lookouts spurred the
EOC to review and remove 18 caravan-related lookouts it determined were no
longer necessary.
26
In total, 39 U.S. citizens with caravan-related lookouts attempted to enter the
United States at least once and were referred to secondary inspection.
27
Although TTRT officers and EOC Official 1 told us many of those individuals
did not need to be re-interviewed, only 5 of those 39 lookouts were removed
after the first referral. Of the 34 U.S citizens whose lookouts remained active
24
EOC Official 1 asserted that while his supervisor instructed him to keep certain lookouts
active, many of his lookouts should have been removed. In addition to the technical glitch, he
speculated that he might not have promptly removed some of his lookouts because TTRT
officers took a long time to write reports of their interviews.
25
EOC Official 1 eventually removed two caravan-related lookouts after the individuals on
those lookouts were referred to secondary inspection multiple times. As previously discussed,
he removed a lookout on a U.S. journalist who was interviewed three times. In another
instance, an individual crossed twice within a week. The TTRT officer assigned to conduct the
second interview contacted EOC Official 1 to ask if another interview was necessary. EOC
Official 1 told him it was not and then removed the lookout.
26
EOC personnel who inherited the transferred lookouts claimed the head of the EOC
Intelligence Section instructed them to keep the caravan-related lookouts active while CBP’s
response to the migrant caravan was ongoing. The head of the EOC Intelligence Section denied
providing this instruction.
27
The remaining 12 U.S. citizens with lookouts were not inspected by CBP, because they did
not attempt to enter the United States during this time.
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
Department of Homeland Security
www.oig.dhs.gov 14 OIG-21-62
after their first referral, 18 reentered the United States at least once, and all 18
were referred to secondary inspection again. Figure 1 depicts inspections of
U.S. citizens with caravan-related lookouts.
Figure 1. Initial and Repeat Inspections of U.S. Citizens with Caravan-
Related Lookouts
Source: DHS OIG analysis of CBP-provided data
Some U.S. citizens were referred to secondary inspection multiple times, even
though the EOC officials who placed the lookouts showed no interest in what
was discussed during several of the follow-up interviews. For example:
x One individual was referred to secondary inspection six times in 1
month. An EOC official (EOC Official 2) placed this lookout to obtain a
phone number and information about a different person, yet there is no
evidence the TTRT officers asked the individual about that other person
in any of the six inspections.
28
During the second inspection, the
individual was handcuffed to a bench, possibly for several hours, until
28
The report from the first interview notes the individual was generally hesitant to provide
information about other individuals, but the report does not say whether the TTRT officers
asked him about any specific individual. Documentation from the subsequent inspections
reflects that TTRT asked him only about himself and not about other individuals.
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
Department of Homeland Security
www.oig.dhs.gov 15 OIG-21-62
the TTRT officers arrived for an interview.
29
The TTRT officers also
manually searched his phone but did not document what information
was sought or obtained, leaving in question whether the search served
any purpose.
30
EOC Official 2 apparently never made any effort to learn
what was discussed in the follow-up inspections or what was found on
the individual’s phone.
31
EOC Official 2 told us he might have lost track
of this individual.
x A U.S. citizen associated with an organization supporting the migrant
caravan was referred to secondary inspection four times between
December 2018 and January 2019. The records from the second and
third interviews indicate that CBP did not obtain any new or different
information from what was discussed in the first interview, and TTRT
officers did not document the fourth interview. There is no evidence that
EOC Official 1, the lookout owner, followed up with the officers, and he
never removed the lookout. The individual told us that he became
nervous and lost sleep in anticipation of secondary inspection. He
eventually decided to stop crossing the border to avoid additional
inspections, which prevented him from visiting family and friends, and
from providing humanitarian assistance to migrants.
29
CBP’s system shows that CBP held this individual in secondary inspection for 6 hours, but it
is unclear whether this is accurate. CBP officers manually enter start and stop times of
secondary inspections, and data we reviewed indicate that officers do not always consistently
or accurately record these times. TTRT officers told us this individual was handcuffed because
he was interviewed in a security office that required handcuffs as a protocol after an unrelated
security incident and not because of anything he said or did. We did not evaluate the legality
of the security office protocol.
30
In order to search electronic devices, officers must provide, and supervisors need to approve,
“a clear and detailed description of the reasons for the Officer’s decision to search or to detain”
the device. Memorandum from Executive Director, Operations, Office of Field Operations to
Directors, Field Operations and Director, Preclearance, Office of Field Operations, re: Border
Search of Electronic Devices – Field Guidance, Jan. 12, 2018. The officer completed the proper
form to record this search but did not include the reason for the search. Therefore, even
though the officer’s supervisor approved the form, he did not review and confirm the
justification for the search. Additionally, although CBP’s policy does not require officers to
document what they find on electronic devices, both the officer and his supervisor admitted
that the officer should have documented what he found on the phone. In addition to this
search, we found four other instances of CBP searching electronic devices of Americans during
caravan-related inspections. CBP properly documented three of these searches, but in one of
the four instances, the officer did not obtain supervisory approval for the search and did not
document the search, as required by the CBP policy.
31
We identified an email showing EOC Official 2 attempting to follow up with TTRT officers
after the individual’s first interview, to inquire about the information obtained, but we could
not determine whether he successfully connected with the TTRT officers. We found no
evidence of similar attempts, following the subsequent five inspections.
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
Department of Homeland Security
www.oig.dhs.gov 16 OIG-21-62
Based on our review of all available evidence, we were unable to determine why
CBP did not remove unnecessary caravan-related lookouts. We found no direct
evidence that CBP kept lookouts active to harass, intimidate, or retaliate
against caravan associates. However, EOC Official 1’s vague explanation for
not removing lookouts, and the EOC’s disinterest in the repeat interviews,
suggest it may not have been entirely accidental. Regardless of whether the
EOC intended to punish or dissuade U.S. citizens from traveling between
Mexico and the United States, subjecting them to repeated unnecessary
inspections can have that effect, as the individual who was referred to
secondary inspection four times explained.
Although the TECS Directive requires CBP officials to modify obsolete lookouts,
CBP has few controls to ensure that officials comply with the requirement. The
TECS Directive does not provide specific timeframes or procedures for officials
to promptly remove unnecessary lookouts, and CBP provides no other formal
guidance or training on the issue. CBP should implement new policies,
guidance, or training to help officials appropriately update and remove
lookouts. CBP should also develop new automated controls in the TECS
system to help officials monitor lookouts. At the time of our review, the TECS
system had automated rules in place to notify lookout owners and remove
some lookouts based on certain criteria, but the system only applied that
functionality when a supervisor has not approved a lookout. When supervisors
approve lookouts (as they are supposed to do), there were no such automated
controls. As a result, frequent border crossers are repeatedly sent to secondary
inspection, unless and until the lookout owner goes into TECS to manually
remove the lookout. New system features that automatically delete or at least
notify lookout owners of their potentially stale lookouts could help officials
better comply with the TECS Directive.
CBP Inappropriately Asked Mexico to Deny Entry to at Least 14
U.S. Citizens Affiliated with the Migrant Caravan
In January and February 2019, Mexican officials denied entry to at least four
U.S. citizens associated with the migrant caravan. Some of these individuals
claimed Mexican officials told them they could not enter Mexico because
another country placed alerts on their passports. We found that, in December
2018, a CBP official asked Mexico to deny entry to 14 U.S. citizens affiliated
with the migrant caravan, including one individual who was subsequently
denied entry into Mexico. CBP may restrict Americans’ rights to travel
internationally in certain circumstances, but CBP could not articulate any
genuine basis for sending this request and in fact later admitted that the
reasons provided to Mexico were not true. CBP officials at various levels who
knew of the request, including the official who oversaw CBP’s entire regional
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
Department of Homeland Security
www.oig.dhs.gov 17 OIG-21-62
response to the migrant caravan, denied or minimized their involvement and
told us the request was neither typical nor appropriate.
Additionally, this may not have been the only time that CBP asked Mexico to
deny entry to U.S. citizens associated with the migrant caravan. We found that
on eight other occasions, CBP officials improperly sent Mexico the names and
sensitive information of dozens of additional U.S. citizens, and some of those
individuals were later denied entry into Mexico.
32
However, because these CBP
officials did not comply with CBP policies on sharing information with foreign
entities and did not retain communication records, we cannot determine
whether the officials asked Mexico to deny entry to those Americans.
CBP Had No Genuine Basis for Requesting that Mexico Deny Entry to 14
U.S. Citizens Affiliated with the Migrant Caravan
On December 10, 2018, a CBP official in San Diego’s FOB
33
(FOB Official 1)
emailed an unencrypted list of 24 migrant caravan “organizers/instigators,”
including 14 Americans, to a Mexican immigration official. FOB Official 1
identified the individuals by name, date of birth, and nationality, and explicitly
requested that Mexico prevent the individuals from entering Mexico and
instead return them to the United States.
34
Figure 2. CBP Email to Mexican Official
Hello [First Name],
CBP has identified the following individuals as part of the
organizers/instigators of the migrant caravan that’s currently in
Tijuana. Most of these people are United States citizens, and it’s
highly likely that they lack the proper documentation to be in
Mexico. CBP wishes to interview them all and respectfully
requests that [Mexican Immigration] deny them entry into Mexico.
If located, please return them to the United States so that CBP can
proceed with their interview.
Your attention and assistance are greatly appreciated.
Source: CBP email obtained by DHS OIG
32
In response to litigation filed by some of these individuals, CBP denied placing alerts on
them.
33
The FOB is composed of CBP liaison officers who convey and receive information to and from
Mexico and other foreign nations on CBP’s behalf.
34
The original email was written in Spanish. This English translation was performed by a
professional translation service.
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
Department of Homeland Security
www.oig.dhs.gov 18 OIG-21-62
The right to travel, including the right to international travel, is a part of the
“liberty” of which American citizens cannot be deprived without the due
process of law under the Fifth Amendment.
35
In certain circumstances, the
Federal government may reasonably regulate American citizens’ right to
international travel, such as in the interest of national security or foreign
policy.
36
Despite the constitutional implications of restricting international
travel, CBP has no policies, procedures, guidance, or training that specifically
address asking or advising foreign countries to deny entry to Americans. CBP
officials identified two scenarios that might allow for actions similar to asking
another country to deny entry to Americans. First, under the Joint Security
Program, CBP officials are present in foreign airports to partner with the host
countries to identify and interdict high-risk travelers. However, according to
the Joint Security Program Director, the program does not “request” or
“instruct” other countries to deny entry to certain individuals. Instead, the
program “advises” other countries about high-risk travelers, and it only does so
when there is an outstanding warrant or another connection to a crime.
Second, CBP officials told us they might notify Mexico to “be on the lookout” in
exigent situations involving criminal suspects trying to flee to Mexico.
Here, FOB Official 1, another CBP official who drafted the email, and a third
CBP official who was copied on FOB Official 1’s email, could not identify any
specific concerns about most of the Americans and others listed in the email.
Nor could they explain how any national security or foreign policy concerns, or
exigent situations applied to those U.S. citizens’ situations.
Specifically, FOB Official 1 could not offer any reasons to us for asking Mexico
to deny entry to the 24 individuals listed in his email. He could not recall
anything about most of the 24 individuals, other than he did not think they
were involved in illegal activity. In fact, FOB Official 1 initially denied that he
ever asked Mexico to reject any individuals and insisted he did not remember
this email until we showed it to him. FOB Official 1’s concerns about the 24
individuals could not have been particularly serious, because when we
interviewed him, he could not recall what the concerns were or why they
prompted him to ask Mexico to deny entry to those individuals, even though he
said this was the first and only time he ever sent such a request.
Other CBP officials involved with FOB Official 1’s email were similarly unable to
articulate specific concerns about the 24 individuals. One of FOB Official 1’s
colleagues sent him an English version of the email (without the 24 names)
about an hour before FOB Official 1 sent the email in Spanish to the Mexican
35
See, e.g., Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 125–26 (1958).
36
See, e.g., Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 291, 306 (1981); Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 13–16
(1965).
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
Department of Homeland Security
www.oig.dhs.gov 19 OIG-21-62
official. This colleague denied any role in preparing the list of individuals,
stated he was only familiar with one individual on the list, and admitted he did
not know what information CBP hoped to learn in interviews with the
individuals. Another CBP official who FOB Official 1 copied on his email to
Mexico stated CBP was trying to prevent disorder at ports of entry. Yet, he
could not articulate how the 24 individuals might be connected to any potential
disorder, what information CBP had about the potential disorder, or any
specific concerns about the individuals.
Additionally, our interviews of FOB Official 1 and the two other CBP officials
indicate the first reason he provided to Mexico to support the request — that
the 24 individuals probably did not have proper travel documents — was not
genuine.
37
FOB Official 1 admitted CBP had “noknowledge of whether they did
or didn’t have documentation” when he sent the request, and one of the other
officials told us CBP had “no concern” about whether the individuals violated
Mexican immigration law. The third official could not explain how CBP
determined whether the 24 individuals were authorized to travel into Mexico.
FOB Official 1’s second reason for asking Mexico to prevent the individuals
from entering the country — that CBP “wishe[d] to interview them all” — also
does not seem to be supported by the facts. CBP did not interview one of the
Americans after Mexico denied his entry. Approximately a month after FOB
Official 1’s email, Mexico notified the FOB that it was denying entry to this
American. Yet, once Mexico returned the American to a U.S. port of entry, CBP
released him without an interview. FOB officials told us no TTRT or FOB
officers were available to interview the individual. If interviewing this
individual was important enough to request that Mexico deny him entry, one
might expect CBP officials would have been concerned when he was not
interviewed at the port of entry. Yet, nobody expressed concern — either to us,
or in any of the contemporaneous emails we reviewed — about missing the
opportunity to interview the individual.
38
Thus, CBP apparently had no need
to request that Mexico deny him entry.
39
Not only were these three CBP officials unable to provide a genuine basis for
asking Mexico to deny entry to the 24 individuals, but they and other officials
37
Notably, the email identified several of the 24 individuals as Mexican nationals, but it did not
address why those individuals would not have proper documents to enter their home country.
38
CBP did not interview this individual any time between FOB Official 1’s email and when
Mexico returned him to the United States. The CBP officials did not point out any intervening
events that rendered his interview unnecessary, and we found no evidence of any such
intervening events.
39
We did not find any instances of Mexico denying entry to the other 13 Americans listed in
FOB Official 1’s December 10 email.
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
Department of Homeland Security
www.oig.dhs.gov 20 OIG-21-62
did not admit directing or authorizing the request. Instead, they said the FOB
was merely a conduit for passing the request to Mexico on behalf of the EOC.
In particular, FOB Official 1 believed EOC Official 2 asked him to send the
request to Mexico. In fact, just 5 days before FOB Official 1 asked the Mexican
official to deny entry to 24 individuals, EOC Official 2 sent FOB Official 1
“target profiles” for those same 24 individuals.
Nevertheless, EOC Official 2 and his chain of command did not admit
involvement with FOB Official 1’s request and told us the request was not
proper or normal. EOC Official 2 disclaimed involvement with the request and
told us FOB Official 1 should not have sent it, but he could not explain why he
sent the 24 target profiles to FOB Official 1.
40
Additionally, the day after FOB
Official 1 sent the request to Mexico, he forwarded the request to EOC Official
2, who then forwarded it to his supervisor (EOC Official 3). EOC Official 3 did
not recall seeing the request to Mexico and stated he would not normally be
involved with such a request, but he could not explain why EOC Official 2
forwarded him the email.
EOC Official 3’s supervisor (EOC Official 4), also denied directing, approving, or
being involved with the request to Mexico. He stated he did not recall hearing
about the request. Yet, contemporaneous emails show that just hours after the
request, EOC Official 4 was “asking if a list of [Americans] was provided ... to
[Mexico] to deny them entry into Mexico” and that he spoke to FOB Official 1
about the request.
41
According to EOC Official 4, CBP only shares personally
identifiable information about Americans with Mexico in rare instances (such
as if an American is wanted by Mexican law enforcement relating to serious
concerns) and that requests to deny entry should be routed through consulates
or embassies. Therefore, EOC Official 4 speculated he probably asked about
the request because he was concerned about it. However, another possible
explanation is that EOC Official 4 directed the request and was confirming that
someone had carried out his instruction. In particular, if someone was truly
concerned about this request, we would expect him to recall asking about the
request, express his concern or disapproval in writing, admonish FOB Official 1
for sending the request, or take corrective action. We did not find any evidence
of such actions.
40
EOC Official 2 and other EOC officials previously placed lookouts on some of the U.S.
citizens included in FOB Official 1’s request. Even though they articulated legitimate law
enforcement reasons for placing those lookouts and may have been interested in interviewing
those individuals, they did not state that asking Mexico to deny entry to those individuals was
appropriate or necessary to conduct the interviews.
41
FOB Official 1 said he did not recall speaking with the EOC Official 4 about the request.
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
Department of Homeland Security
www.oig.dhs.gov 21 OIG-21-62
CBP Officials May Have Asked Mexico to Deny Entry to Numerous
Additional U.S. Citizens Whose Personally Identifiable Information They
Inappropriately Disclosed
FOB Official 1 was not the only CBP official who shared the names and
information of U.S. citizens with a Mexican official. Three other CBP officials
provided caravan associates’ names and Sensitive Personally Identifiable
Information (SPII)
42
to Mexican officials on at least eight occasions.
43
We
cannot confirm whether these officials asked Mexico to deny entry to the
individuals, because the officials did not follow CBP policies on sharing
information with foreign entities and did not retain communication records.
Three Additional CBP Officials Disclosed Information about U.S. Citizens to
Mexico
At a January 2019 meeting with Mexican officials, an FOB official (FOB Official
2) shared two documents, including a PowerPoint presentation with pictures,
names, dates of birth, countries of citizenship, and other information about
dozens of American and foreign nationals.
44
FOB Official 2 said the main focus
of the meeting with Mexico was to discuss how to stop the individuals listed on
the PowerPoint from
inciting violence and instigating mass incursions, and that
he tasked Mexican officials with “increasing their enforcement posture.”
45
FOB
Official 2 did not deny that he asked Mexico to reject the people on the
PowerPoint. In fact, he acknowledged that they discussed possibly preventing
caravan associates from entering Mexico but stated he could not recall whether
CBP specifically asked Mexico to do so. FOB Official 2 also told us that after
the January meeting, he sent a copy of the PowerPoint to the Regional Director
for a Mexican government immigration agency in a WhatsApp chat message.
42
SPII is information that, if lost, compromised, or disclosed without authorization, could
result in substantial harm, embarrassment, inconvenience, or unfairness to an individual.
Examples of SPII include driver’s license numbers, passport numbers, and social security
numbers. Other examples of SPII include citizenship or immigration status, date of birth, and
criminal history, when paired with the identity of an individual. DHS Privacy Office, Handbook
for Safeguarding Sensitive PII, Dec. 2017.
43
We also found instances of CBP officials sending Mexico information about foreign nationals.
44
In January 2019, an FOB official developed this PowerPoint, which is titled “Migrant Caravan
FY-2019 Suspected Organizers, Coordinators, Instigators, and Media.” The official who created
the PowerPoint told us he was not knowledgeable about most of the individuals included in the
PowerPoint, and he was simply consolidating CBP’s information about the migrant caravan
from several places into one document to brief the San Diego Sector Border Patrol Chief. In
March 2019, media articles published leaked excerpts of the PowerPoint.
45
Although FOB Official 2 told the Mexican officials that the individuals on the PowerPoint
were inciting violence and instigating mass incursions, he acknowledged to us that the
PowerPoint was an overly inclusive document and that being on the PowerPoint “doesn’t mean
you were a bad or a good guy … [it just] means you were associated” with the migrant caravan.
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
Department of Homeland Security
www.oig.dhs.gov 22 OIG-21-62
However, he did not retain the WhatsApp message transmitting the PowerPoint
or any other messages with the Mexican official and stated he could not recall
what he wrote when he sent the PowerPoint.
46
Also, in January 2019 another FOB official (FOB Official 3) used his official
CBP email account to send unencrypted SPII of six U.S. citizens to a Mexican
intelligence official’s Yahoo email address. FOB Official 3 told us he sent the
email so the Mexican official could provide information to help prevent a “very
serious” threat from occurring.
47
Yet, FOB Official 3’s email does not request
any information from the Mexican official, and instead of mentioning a future
threat, the email says the six individuals may have been involved in a past
event. We were unable to clarify this inconsistency or determine the true
reason FOB Official 3 sent this email, because he admitted deleting
contemporaneous WhatsApp messages with this Mexican official.
48
There are indications that FOB Official 2 and/or FOB Official 3 might have
asked Mexico to deny entry to the individuals whose information they provided
to Mexico.
FOB Official 2 admitted urging Mexico to do more to stop the caravan
associates when he shared the PowerPoint with them and conceded that he
46
In his initial interview with us, FOB Official 2 repeatedly denied ever providing the names of
individuals to Mexico or sending the PowerPoint to Mexican officials. We later discovered
evidence that he shared the PowerPoint with them, including that he retroactively attempted to
seek approval from his then-supervisor, 2 months after the fact. After we confronted FOB
Official 2 with this information in a second interview, he admitted sharing the PowerPoint with
Mexico.
47
FOB Official 3 claimed the threat, obtained from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI),
was so serious and imminent that he did not have time to consult with anyone else at CBP or
to obtain the approval he knew was required to send the information. FOB Official 3 told us
the FBI previously decided to stop investigating this alleged threat.
48
On the day before he sent the document with six U.S. citizens’ SPII to a Mexican official, FOB
Official 3 sent that same document from his official CBP email account to his own personal
Gmail account. He could not tell us why he did this. That same day, FOB Official 3 also sent
pictures of several caravan associates’ drivers’ licenses from his personal Gmail account to his
official CBP account. FOB Official 3 said the Mexican official provided these photographs to
him on an external drive, and he used his own personal computer and email account because
he had been instructed not to plug external drives into his CBP computer. Even assuming that
is true, FOB Official 3 could not explain why the Mexican official provided these photographs to
him in the first place. Regardless of the reason, these emails violated DHS policy, as DHS
employees must use only DHS-issued email accounts to send and receive DHS business-
related communications and may not use non-DHS email accounts to create or send DHS
records. DHS Directive No. 142-03, Electronic Mail Usage and Maintenance, Jan. 2018. We do
not know whether FOB Official 3 sent other work-related emails from his personal account,
including emails to the Mexican official, because we did not access FOB Official 3’s personal
email account.
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
Department of Homeland Security
www.oig.dhs.gov 23 OIG-21-62
might have asked Mexico to reject them. Additionally, we found Mexico
rejected a total of five caravan associates, including four U.S. citizens. Not only
were all five individuals listed on the PowerPoint, but it also appears that
Mexico started rejecting these individuals shortly after receiving the
PowerPoint. We do not know exactly when FOB Official 2 sent the PowerPoint
to the Mexican official, because he did not retain his WhatsApp messages.
However, 5 days before Mexico first denied entry to one of the individuals, FOB
Official 2 sent himself a reminder email to “provide target list to [Government of
Mexico].” Then, after Mexico rejected this individual, FOB Official 3 informed
colleagues that the denied individual was on the “target deck” that CBP shared
with Mexico.
49
Additionally, after Mexico denied entry to two caravan associates in late
January 2019, FOB Official 3 sent an email to his colleagues, noting of the two
rejected individuals, “Ambos de los Alertados de la Lista...” or “Both are Alerts
on the List.” FOB Official 3 stated he did not know what “List” the email was
referring to, because he copied and pasted this Spanish text from a WhatsApp
group message that Mexican officials sent. However, it seems unlikely that
FOB Official 3 would inform colleagues the individuals were on a list if he did
not know what that list was. In the same email, FOB Official 3 seemed pleased
about the rejections when he notified colleagues, “[Mexico] started to reject
entry of people assisting the Caravan in Tijuana…. Now, we just need to figure
out how to [make] them do the same with the Hondos and Guats....”
Finally, another CBP official — operating independently from the FOB — also
disclosed Americans’ SPII to Mexico, but we found no evidence that he asked
Mexico to deny entry to those Americans. Throughout January and February
2019, a National Targeting Center (NTC)
50
official provided names,
photographs, and other SPII of U.S. citizens associated with the migrant
caravan on at least five occasions to a Mexican intelligence official.
51
In early
January 2019, the NTC official agreed to an “internal” and “non-binding”
agreement between NTC and Mexico’s Intelligence National Center, “to share
information relating to organizers, inciters, and supporters of the migrant
49
FOB Official 3 told us that he was mistaken when he informed his colleagues and that the
target deck was not actually shared with Mexico, but we have no reason to believe his after-
the-fact explanation to us is more accurate than the contemporaneous statement he made to
his colleagues.
50
Located in the Washington, D.C. region, the NTC collects and analyzes data to identify high
risk travelers and cargo.
51
In the first email, the NTC official sent the information to Mexico unencrypted and
unprotected. He password-protected the information in the subsequent four emails. We also
identified a sixth instance where the NTC official shared U.S. citizens’ SPII with the Mexican
intelligence official during the same time period, but those individuals do not appear to be
affiliated with the migrant caravan.
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
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Caravans that are currently transiting Mexico en-route to the United States.”
52
Following this, the NTC official sent emails either requesting information from
Mexico about certain individuals or responding to Mexico’s requests for
information about certain individuals. The NTC official said he wanted Mexico
to provide information about these individuals’ border crossings, to give NTC “a
better understanding” of their involvement with the migrant caravan. He also
said he knew the FOB was also sharing information with Mexico, but he never
coordinated with the FOB and did not know what information the FOB shared
with Mexico.
CBP Officials Were Not Authorized to Disclose Information about U.S. Citizens to
Mexico
Federal law allows CBP to share information or documents with foreign
customs and law enforcement agencies when an authorized CBP official
reasonably believes it is necessary to:
x ensure compliance with any law or regulation that CBP enforces;
x administer or enforce multilateral or bilateral agreements to which the
United States is a party; or
x assist in “investigative, judicial and quasi-judicial proceedings” in the
United States.
53
The CBP Disclosure Directive
54
prescribes requirements and restrictions, in
accordance with the above statute and regulation, on sharing information with
foreign agencies. The Border Patrol and its San Diego Sector have also issued
additional guidance,
55
but CBP’s Office of Field Operations, which houses the
NTC, has not.
52
Although the NTC official forwarded a copy of the agreement to his supervisor, it is unclear if
they were authorized to enter into such an agreement on behalf of CBP. In particular, CBP
policy requires that “all agreements or arrangements … providing for the sharing of information
with a Foreign Authority shall be coordinated with the Office of International Affairs, Privacy
and Diversity office, and the Office of Chief Counsel.” CBP Directive No. 4320-025A, Disclosure
of Official Information to Foreign Authorities, Apr. 2014 (CBP Disclosure Directive), Section 5.14.
The NTC official told us that only he and his supervisor were involved with this agreement, and
he did not know if the Office of Chief Counsel was consulted.
53
19 U.S.C. §§ௗ1628(a)(1)-(3); 19 C.F.R. §§ 103.33(a)(1)-(3). Disclosure is also permitted in
comparable circumstances “undertaken by a foreign customs or law enforcement agency, or in
relation to a proceeding in a foreign country.” 19 U.S.C. § 1628(a)(4); 19 C.F.R. § 103.33(a)(4).
54
CBP Directive No. 4320-025A, Disclosure of Official Information to Foreign Authorities, April
14, 2014.
55
Memorandum from Chief of the U.S. Border Patrol to All Chief Patrol Agents and All Division
Chiefs, Record of Information Shared with a Foreign Government Agency, Oct. 27 2014; Richard
A. Barlow, Chief Patrol Agent, U.S. Border Patrol, San Diego Sector, San Diego Sector, Standard
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
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FOB Official 1, FOB Official 2, FOB Official 3, and the NTC official were not
properly authorized to provide information about U.S. citizens to Mexico. The
three FOB officials were assigned to the Border Patrol’s San Diego Sector when
they made their disclosures. The San Diego Sector does not allow its officials
to provide information about U.S. citizens to foreign entities, unless the FOB
Assistant Chief, the Division Chief of Operations, and the Sector Office of
Assistant Chief Counsel all provide advance, written approval.
56
FOB Official
1, FOB Official 2, and FOB Official 3 all made their disclosures without
securing the proper approvals. The fourth official, the NTC official, claimed his
supervisor orally authorized him to make each of his five disclosures, but the
CBP Disclosure Directive does not allow supervisors to authorize disclosures
without seeing those requests.
57
There is no evidence the NTC official ever
provided his supervisor with Mexico’s written requests for information for four
of his disclosures, and NTC official made his remaining disclosure proactively,
without a request from Mexico.
We Cannot Determine if CBP Officials Asked Mexico to Deny Entry to U.S.
Citizens Because the Officials Violated Policies on Sharing Information with
Foreign Entities and Did Not Retain Records
CBP’s foreign disclosure policies require CBP officials to take several steps to
record disclosures to foreign entities and to ensure the foreign entities maintain
and use the information appropriately.
58
For example, CBP officials must:
x advise foreign entities in writing to, among other things, keep the
information confidential and use it only for the purpose for which CBP
provided it;
59
x mark the documents with appropriate sensitivity notations (e.g., “For
Official Use Only – Law Enforcement Sensitive”) and warnings that the
Operating Procedure, 4320-001, Disclosure of Official Information to Foreign Authorities, Jan.
2015 (San Diego Disclosure SOP).
56
San Diego Disclosure SOP, Section 1.6.2.1.
57
The CBP Disclosure Directive states that “[e]xcept in exigent circumstances, requests by a
[foreign entity] shall be made in writing and provided to a CBP official delegated the authority
to provide such information.” This requirement helps ensure that CBP only discloses
information to foreign entities when a properly delegated official “reasonably believes [it] is
necessary,” as provided in the relevant statute and regulation. 19 U.S.C. §ௗ1628(a); 19 C.F.R. §
103.33(a).
58
CBP may only provide information to a foreign entity if CBP obtains assurances that the
entity will hold the information in confidence and use it only for the law enforcement purposes
for which CBP provides it. 19 U.S.C. §ௗ1628(b)(1); 19 C.F.R. § 103.33(b)(1).
59
CBP Disclosure Directive, Section 5.2; San Diego Disclosure SOP, Section 1.3.2.
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information is provided by CBP solely for the law enforcement purpose
supporting the request;
60
and
x maintain a record of all disclosures, including the request, the
information provided, and the supporting law enforcement reason for
disclosing the information.
61
None of the nine disclosures to Mexico we identified fully complied with these
requirements. Additionally, some of the disclosures contained SPII but were
not encrypted as required by DHS policy.
62
Appendix C shows OIG analysis of
compliance tracking for each of the nine disclosures.
63
Because they did not follow CBP’s information-sharing policies, FOB Official 1,
FOB Official 2, FOB Official 3, and the NTC official could not prove they shared
the information for appropriate reasons, or what they told or asked Mexico to
do with the information they shared. For example, FOB Official 1 could not
offer any reason for asking Mexico to deny entry to 14 U.S. citizens, and FOB
Official 3 offered conflicting reasons for sending information about U.S. citizens
to a Mexican official. Because they did not comply with the CBP Disclosure
Directive’s requirement to record the law enforcement reason for each
disclosure, they cannot demonstrate whether they reasonably believed the
disclosures were necessary to support a purpose authorized by the statute and
regulation. Similarly, we would have known that the CBP officials asked
Mexico to deny entry to U.S. citizens, if they had recorded that as the reason
for disclosing the information to Mexico. Alternatively, if the officials had
recorded a different reason for disclosing the information to Mexico, and
60
CBP Disclosure Directive, Section 5.6; San Diego Disclosure SOP, Section 3.2.
61
CBP Disclosure Directive, Section 5.11 (Each CBP office “shall maintain a record of all
[foreign] disclosures of official information … such record shall include … a record of the
request from the Foreign Authority, the information provided or a summary thereof, the
recipient of the information, and the supporting law enforcement reason for the disclosure.”).
Additionally, to comply with the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552a, when disclosing information
maintained in a System of Records, CBP must keep a record either in TECS, by filing the DHS
Privacy Act Disclosure Record form, or through other arrangements made with the CBP Privacy
and Diversity Office. CBP Disclosure Directive, Section 5.12. In the San Diego Sector, “a log
will be maintained by the FOB documenting all requests” and officials must complete and file
the “Record of Information Shared with Foreign Government Agency” form with the CBP Privacy
and Diversity Office for each foreign disclosure. San Diego Disclosure SOP, Sections 3.2, 3.3.4,
Attachment 2.
62
DHS Sensitive Systems Policy Directive 4300A, Version 13.1, Section 5.4.6k, July 2017; See
also DHS Privacy Policy Directive 047-01-007, Handbook for Safeguarding Sensitive PII, Dec.
2017.
63
CBP officials who improperly disclose CBP documents with confidential information are
subject to discipline. 19 C.F.R. § 103.34. DHS OIG is referring information related to the
improper foreign disclosures to CBP’s Office of Professional Responsibility for whatever action
CBP deems appropriate.
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properly instructed Mexico to use the information only for that purpose, it
would have shown that they probably did not ask Mexico to deny entry to U.S.
citizens.
We are also unable to determine whether the CBP officials asked Mexico to
deny entry to U.S. citizens because they did not retain records. The Federal
Records Act requires the heads of Federal agencies to create safeguards to
prevent the removal or loss of “records.”
64
Additionally, Federal employees may
not create or send Federal records using unofficial electronic accounts unless
they copy their official electronic messaging account in the original creation or
transmission of the record, or forward the message to their official account
within 20 days.
65
DHS policy requires its employees to “create, receive, and maintain official
records providing adequate and proper documentation in support of DHS
activities” and to “ensure all records are properly maintained.”
66
DHS policy
similarly provides that, “[a]ny communication in which an Agency decision or
commitment is made or where an action is committed to, that is not otherwise
documented, needs to be captured,” in “compliance with Federal records
management laws, regulations, and policies.”
67
According to CBP’s Records
Control Handbook (Records Handbook) in effect during the relevant period,
electronic Federal records “must be maintained and disposed of in accordance
with an approved disposition schedules.”
68
The Records Handbook further
states that “[i]nformation created in or received by the Customs Service in
carrying out its mission constitutes a Federal record.”
69
Finally, the Records
Handbook states “it is the responsibility of the Customs employee to ensure
that a copy [of an electronic mail record] is preserved by making it a part of the
official files of Customs,” and provides guidance on which electronic
communications constitute records:
64
44 U.S.C. § 3105; 36 C.F.R. § 1220.30. “Records” are “all recorded information, regardless of
form or characteristics, made or received by a Federal agency under Federal law or in
connection with the transaction of public business and preserved or appropriate for
preservation by that agency or its legitimate successor as evidence of the organization,
functions, policies, decisions, procedures, operations, or other activities of the United States
Government or because of the informational value of data in them.” 44 U.S.C. § 3301(a)(1)(A).
65
44 U.S.C. § 2911.
66
DHS Directive 141-01, Records and Information, Management, Section V, Aug. 2014.
67
DHS Policy Directive 141-03, Memorandum from Claire M. Grady, Under Secretary for
Management to Component Heads, Attachment: Documenting Electronic Messages and Verbal
Communications, Feb. 2018.
68
U.S. Customs Service, Records Control Handbook, CIS HB 2100-05A, Part 3.C, Jan. 2001
(Records Handbook). The Records Handbook has since been replaced (in June 2019, after the
end of this report’s review period) with a new version that offers additional guidance on
maintaining electronic records.
69
Records Handbook, Part 3.D.
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An electronic mail message can become a record when created by
the sender or when received and acted on by the recipient, if the
message contains substantive information that is necessary to
adequately and properly document the activities and functions of
Customs. It should be preserved as an official record.
…
Electronic mail documents are nonrecord when they provide no evidence
of Customs functions and activities, lack information of value on
Customs activities, duplicate information documented in existing or
subsequent records, and therefore are not unique.
70
All four CBP officials who sent information to Mexican officials about
Americans told us they communicated with their Mexican counterparts using
WhatsApp. None of the four officials retained all their relevant WhatsApp
messages:
x FOB Official 1 and FOB Official 3 said they deleted caravan-related
messages, including contemporaneous messages with their Mexican
counterparts, when their details to the FOB ended or when they
otherwise thought they no longer needed the messages.
x FOB Official 2 apparently lost all his WhatsApp data, including the
transmission of the PowerPoint to his Mexican counterpart, when CBP
updated his government-issued mobile phone.
x The NTC official claimed that before deleting WhatsApp messages, he
would copy and preserve their content in emails. Nonetheless, he was
unable to provide us with all messages related to his information
sharing, including a request from his Mexican counterpart for
information about an American.
71
The CBP officials’ failure to retain WhatsApp messages likely violated DHS and
CBP records retention policies, because the messages were information that
CBP created or received in carrying out its mission and contained substantive
information that was necessary to adequately and properly document the
activities and functions of the CBP officials. For example, the CBP officials who
communicated with Mexico could not answer questions that would have been
apparent in the deleted messages, such as what information was shared
between the Mexican and CBP officials, when that information was shared,
70
Records Handbook, Part 3.L.
71
Unless the four CBP officials’ WhatsApp accounts were their official CBP electronic account,
they likely violated 44 U.S.C. § 2911, because they did not copy or forward all WhatsApp
messages to their official CBP accounts.
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whether any instructions accompanied the shared information, and why the
information was requested or shared.
Moreover, the CBP officials’ inability to recall key details about their
communications with Mexican officials, or in some cases, whether they even
shared information about U.S. citizens with Mexican officials, raises questions
about whether there were other instances of Mexican and CBP officials’ sharing
information about American caravan associates. Complete WhatsApp records
would have shown whether CBP officials shared U.S. citizens’ SPII with Mexico
on other occasions.
The fact that none of these officials retained their WhatsApp messages, and the
various ways in which that happened, highlights the challenges of satisfactorily
upholding recordkeeping responsibilities when CBP employees use
WhatsApp.
72
This is particularly troubling given the widespread use of
WhatsApp during Operation Secure Line. Numerous CBP officials, across
various offices, regularly used WhatsApp to communicate both with individuals
and in various WhatsApp groups, some of which contained up to hundreds of
U.S. and Mexican officials. Yet, these officials did not consistently retain their
WhatsApp messages or copy or forward them to their official CBP accounts.
73
Finally, it is not clear whether CBP even allows officials to use WhatsApp for
official business. During Operation Secure Line, CBP had no policies regarding
the use of WhatsApp. Shortly afterwards, in May 2019, CBP’s Office of
Information Technology sent conflicting and confusing guidance, stating
“Although ‘WhatsApp’ is not approved for operational use at CBP, WhatsApp
users should immediately upgrade to the current version of the app … or
remove it from any mobile devices.” Warning employees not to use WhatsApp
for operational use but inviting them to download a new version on their
government-issued devices could cause confusion among employees.
72
CBP’s Records Handbook acknowledges that “the ease with which electronically stored
records can be erased or changed increases the risk of unauthorized destruction of official
documentation and information.” Records Handbook, Part 3.J. Similarly, the current CBP
Records Handbook warns that Electronically Stored Information “can be erased or altered.
This increases the risk of unauthorized destruction of federal records.” CBP Records and
Information Management Handbook, HB 2100-05B: Records and Information Management
Handbook, Part 3.J., June 2019.
73
Many CBP officials told us they primarily used WhatsApp for non-substantive purposes such
as scheduling, or that the information they received from Mexico was unsolicited and not
relevant to their work. However, from interviews and reviewing the contents of three CBP-
issued phones, we confirmed that CBP’s use of WhatsApp was not confined to those purposes
and that CBP officials also used WhatsApp to send and receive substantive messages that may
be subject to recordkeeping requirements.
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Conclusion
CBP’s actions in response to the migrant caravan raised public concerns that
CBP was inappropriately retaliating against U.S. citizens. Although we did not
find CBP took these actions to harass, intimidate, or retaliate against caravan
associates, we identified several issues. First, many CBP officials were
unaware of CBP’s policy related to placing lookouts and may have inadvertently
placed some caravan-related lookouts that did not comply with that policy.
Second, CBP officials did not remove lookouts that were no longer needed,
resulting in some repeated and unnecessary inspections. Finally, CBP officials
repeatedly and improperly sent the names and sensitive information of U.S.
citizens to Mexican officials and inappropriately asked Mexico to deny entry to
at least 14 of those individuals. Mexico subsequently denied entry to at least
four U.S. citizens, and CBP cannot fully explain its involvement in these
denials because CBP officials did not comply with the CBP policies on sharing
information with foreign agencies and did not retain communication records.
Recommendations
We recommend the Senior Official Performing the Duties of the Commissioner
of CBP:
Recommendation 1: Update Customs Directive No. 4320-003, July 1990
(TECS Directive) to clarify the appropriate bases for placing lookouts and
provide training to all CBP officials who have the authority to place lookouts.
Recommendation 2: Develop and implement procedures to ensure CBP
officials update and remove lookouts in accordance with the TECS Directive.
Recommendation 3: Develop and issue a policy regarding asking, advising, or
otherwise communicating with foreign governments about denying entry to
U.S. citizens. At a minimum, the policy should specify the appropriate
circumstances for such communications, who is authorized to approve such
communications, and the procedures to follow when making such
communications.
Recommendation 4: Conduct a review of all instances in which CBP, as part
of its response to the migrant caravan, disclosed U.S. citizens’ Sensitive
Personally Identifiable Information to Mexican officials, between October 2018
and March 2019, to identify any instances that did not comply with foreign
disclosure requirements and take remedial actions. Remedial actions may
include rescinding requests to deny entry to U.S. citizens, retroactively
instructing foreign authorities to hold CBP information in confidence and use
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CBP information only for the purpose for which CBP provided it, ensuring
disclosures are properly documented in CBP’s systems of records, and any
other steps necessary to ensure that all foreign disclosures comply with CBP
Directive No. 4320-025A, Disclosure of Official Information to Foreign Authorities,
DHS Sensitive Systems Policy Directive 4300A, DHS Handbook for Safeguarding
Sensitive Personally Identifiable Information, and all other applicable policies
and procedures.
Recommendation 5: Provide training to all CBP personnel on the process for
sharing information with foreign nations, covering all applicable policies and
procedures, including which CBP personnel are authorized to make foreign
disclosures.
Recommendation 6: Take immediate action to end the use of WhatsApp for
operational purposes or to ensure that WhatsApp messages are retained in
compliance with legal and policy requirements including records retention
schedules.
Management Comments and OIG Analysis
We have included a copy of CBP’s Management Response in its entirety in
Appendix B. We also received technical comments to the draft report and
revised the report where appropriate. CBP concurred with our six
recommendations, which are resolved and open. A summary of CBP’s
responses to our recommendations and our analysis follows.
CBP Response to Recommendation 1: Concur. CBP will update lookout
placement procedures in the TECS Directive. Additionally, CBP will modify
existing training to inform users that lookouts should only be created for law
enforcement purposes. CBP expects to complete these actions by December
31, 2021.
OIG Analysis: We consider these actions responsive to the intent of
Recommendation 1, which is resolved and open. We will close this
recommendation when CBP completes the identified updates to the TECS
Directive and provides documentation showing that it has updated its existing
training and provided that training to all CBP officials who have the authority
to place lookouts.
CBP Response to Recommendation 2: Concur. CBP will update lookout
placement procedures in the TECS Directive. In addition, CBP will issue a
memorandum and muster to remind CBP officers of their responsibilities to
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remove and update lookouts in accordance with policy. CBP expects to
complete these actions by December 31, 2021.
OIG Analysis: We consider these actions responsive to the intent of
Recommendation 2, which is resolved and open. We will close this
recommendation when CBP completes the identified updates to the TECS
Directive and provides documentation showing that it has issued the
memorandum and muster to CBP officers with guidance on removing and
updating lookouts in accordance with policy.
CBP Response to Recommendation 3: Concur. CBP will revise Directive No.
4320-025A, “Disclosure of Official Information to Foreign Authorities,” dated
April 2014, by adding a provision on sharing U.S. persons’ information with
foreign governments. CBP component offices will collaborate to revise and
issue the policy. CBP expects to complete these actions by July 29, 2022.
OIG Analysis: We consider this action responsive to the intent of
Recommendation 3, which is resolved and open. We will close this
recommendation when CBP completes the identified updates to Directive No.
4320-025A, “Disclosure of Official Information to Foreign Authorities.”
CBP Response to Recommendation 4: Concur. CBP will identify and review
disclosures of U.S. citizens’ Personally Identifiable Information to Mexican
officials that occurred as part of its response to the migrant caravans between
October 2018 and March 2019, to ensure compliance with foreign disclosure
requirements (specifically established policies and delegations of authority). To
the extent remedial actions are required, CBP will remediate each non-
compliant disclosure. CBP expects to complete these actions by March 31,
2022.
OIG Analysis: We consider these actions responsive to the intent of
Recommendation 4, which is resolved and open. We will close this
recommendation when we receive documentation showing that CBP has
completed its review of disclosures of U.S. citizens’ Personally Identifiable
Information to Mexico as part of its response to the 2018–2019 migrant
caravan, as well as documentation showing completion of any required
remedial action.
CBP Response to Recommendation 5: Concur. CBP’s Privacy and Diversity
Office, in coordination with various CBP components, will identify individuals
and work units that regularly disclose PII to foreign partners, and will provide
virtual training regarding all applicable policies and procedures by March 31,
2022. The Privacy and Diversity Office, in coordination with the Office of
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Training and Development, will also develop a new course focused on domestic
and foreign information sharing in the DHS Performance and Learning
Management System. CBP expects to complete these actions by December 30,
2022.
OIG Analysis: We consider these actions responsive to the intent of
Recommendation 5, which is resolved and open. We will close this
recommendation when we receive documentation showing that CBP has
completed the identified training on processes for sharing information with
foreign nations. In addition, in order to close this recommendation, we request
that CBP provide a copy, once completed, of the course developed by the
Privacy and Diversity Office, in coordination with the Office of Training and
Development.
CBP Response to Recommendation 6: Concur. CBP’s Office of Information
and Technology will explore the viability of the continued operational use of
WhatsApp, which will include looking for a replacement. Office of Information
and Technology is currently piloting a managed messaging platform to replace
WhatsApp. CBP is currently working on an operational pilot. CBP expects to
complete these actions by December 31, 2021.
OIG Analysis: We consider these actions responsive to the intent of
Recommendation 6, which is resolved and open. We will close this
recommendation when CBP provides documentation showing the results of its
pilot to replace WhatsApp and to ensure that messages are retained in
compliance with legal and policy requirements including records retention
schedules.
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Appendix A
Objective, Scope, and Methodology
The Department of Homeland Security Office of Inspector General was
established by the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (Pub. L. No. 107ï296) by
amendment to the Inspector General Act of 1978.
The objective of this special review was to determine whether CBP improperly
targeted journalists, attorneys, and advocates (caravan associates) because of
their affiliation with and perceived support of the migrant caravan. We focused
on CBP’s rationale for placing, maintaining, and removing active lookouts on
caravan associates and whether CBP improperly requested Mexico to deny
their entry. Our review primarily examined the actions of CBP’s Region IX
Emergency Operations Center located in San Diego and the Foreign Operations
Branch within the Border Patrol’s San Diego Sector, but we also reviewed
certain actions taken by CBP’s National Targeting Center in the Washington,
D.C. area.
We conducted more than 50 interviews of CBP employees, obtained more than
150,000 emails from 6 CBP officials, and imaged the contents of 3 government-
issued mobile phones assigned to CBP supervisors in San Diego. During the
early stages of our review, we asked CBP to provide “any and all notices or
alerts CBP made to any law enforcement or other government agency (domestic
or foreign)” about 54 specific U.S. citizens. The National Targeting Center and
the Border Patrol’s San Diego Sector both responded that they had no such
records, even though CBP officials in those units sent Mexico information
about all 54 Americans. These omissions — whether intentional or
unintentional — materially impeded and delayed our review.
We also reviewed the circumstances surrounding lookouts CBP placed to refer
51 U.S. caravan associates to secondary inspection. The PowerPoint that was
leaked to the media in March 2019 included 38 Americans with caravan-
related lookouts for referral to secondary inspection, and we identified 13
additional American caravan associates with lookouts for referral to secondary
inspection. For each of the 51 Americans, we reviewed data showing when
CBP placed, edited, or removed each lookout, documentation showing CBP’s
purported reason for placing the lookout, and all records relating to secondary
inspections that CBP conducted pursuant to those lookouts. We also reviewed
more than 20 binational information-sharing agreements between the United
States and Mexico. In addition, we reviewed DHS and CBP policies,
procedures, and delegation orders relating to sharing information with Mexico,
placing and maintaining lookouts, securely transmitting information, storing
government records, and conducting border searches.
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This review was initiated in February 2019 by the former DHS OIG Special
Reviews Group (SRG) and was conducted in accordance with SRG’s quality
control standards and the Quality Standards for Federal Offices of Inspector
General (Silver Book) issued by the Council of the Inspectors General on
Integrity and Efficiency. These standards require work to be carried out with
integrity, objectivity, and independence, and provide information that is
factually accurate and reliable. This report reflects work performed by SRG
pursuant to Section 2 of the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended.
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Appendix B
CBP Comments to the Draft Report
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Department of Homeland Security
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OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
Department of Homeland Security
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Appendix C
CBP’s Foreign Disclosures to Mexico: Tracking Compliance with
DHS and CBP Policies
1
Source: DHS OIG analysis of Federal law, DHS and CBP policies, and CBP-provided data
1
OIG’s analysis of the nine disclosures in Appendix C are bound by the limited facts that were
available to OIG. Because CBP officials were not always forthcoming about these disclosures,
OIG was not able to conclusively find whether the disclosures were made in compliance with
DHS’ and CBP’s record retention policies.
2
CBP Disclosure Directive, Section 5.2; San Diego Disclosure SOP, Section 1.3.2.
3
CBP Disclosure Directive, Section 5.6; San Diego Disclosure SOP, Section 3.2.
4
San Diego Disclosure SOP, Section 3.1.
5
DHS Sensitive Systems Policy Directive 4300A, Version 13.1, Section 5.4.6k, July 2017.
6
CBP Disclosure Directive, Sections 5.11, 5.12; San Diego Disclosure SOP, Section 3.2.1.
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7
DHS Directive 141-01, Records and Information Management, Section V, Aug. 2014; Policy
Directive 141-03, Memorandum from Claire M. Grady, Under Secretary for Management, to
Component Heads, Electronic Records Management Updates for Chat, Text and Instant
Messaging, Feb. 2018; U.S. Customs Service, Records Control Handbook, CIS HB 2100-05A,
Part 3.C, Jan. 2001.
8
FOB Official 1 said he communicated with the Mexican official using WhatsApp. Because he
deleted those messages, we do not know whether they used WhatsApp to communicate about
FOB Official 1’s request that Mexico deny entry to 14 Americans.
9
We cannot determine whether Disclosures 2 and 3 contained the appropriate written
advisements and markings, because documentary evidence of those disclosures does not exist.
FOB Official 2 made Disclosure 2 in person, and we cannot conclusively know what those hard
copy documents said. For Disclosure 3, FOB Official 2 did not retain his WhatsApp message
transmitting the PowerPoint to the Mexican official.
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
Department of Homeland Security
www.oig.dhs.gov 42 OIG-21-62
Appendix D
Major Contributors to This Report
John Shiffer, Chief Inspector
Matthew Neuburger, Director of the Special Reviews Group
Michael Redmond, Senior Special Agent
Kay Bhagat-Smith, Investigative Counsel
Steven Staats, Lead Inspector
Gregory Flatow, Lead Inspector
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
Department of Homeland Security
www.oig.dhs.gov 43 OIG-21-62
Appendix E
Report Distribution
Department of Homeland Security
Secretary
Deputy Secretary
Chief of Staff
Deputy Chiefs of Staff
General Counsel
Executive Secretary
Director, GAO/OIG Liaison Office
Assistant Secretary for Office of Policy
Assistant Secretary for Office of Public Affairs
Assistant Secretary for Office of Legislative Affairs
Commissioner, CBP
CBP Component Liaison
Office of Management and Budget
Chief, Homeland Security Branch
DHS OIG Budget Examiner
Congress
Congressional Oversight and Appropriations Committees
Senator Patrick Leahy
Senator Dianne Feinstein
Senator Richard J. Durbin
Senator Sheldon Whitehouse
Senator Amy Klobuchar
Senator Christopher A. Coons
Senator Richard Blumenthal
Senator Mazie K. Hirono
Senator Cory A. Booker
Additional Information and Copies
To view this and any of our other reports, please visit our website at:
www.oig.dhs.gov.
For further information or questions, please contact Office of Inspector General
Public Affairs at: [email protected].
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OIG Hotline
To report fraud, waste, or abuse, visit our website at www.oig.dhs.gov and click
on the red "Hotline" tab. If you cannot access our website, call our hotline at
(800) 323-8603, fax our hotline at (202) 254-4297, or write to us at:
Department of Homeland Security
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Attention: Hotline
245 Murray Drive, SW
Washington, DC 20528-0305